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International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 31
Volume 31, Number 1, September 2002
- Tamás Solymosi

:
The bargaining set of four-person balanced games. 1-11 - Antonio Quesada:

A conflict between sequential rationality and consistency principles. 13-18 - Ori Haimanko

:
Marginal cost price rule for homogeneous cost functions. 19-28 - Ruud Hendrickx, Peter Borm, Judith Timmer:

A note on NTU convexity. 29-37 - Qizhi Fang, Shanfeng Zhu, Mao-cheng Cai, Xiaotie Deng

:
On computational complexity of membership test in flow games and linear production games. 39-45 - Marcin Malawski:

Equal treatment, symmetry and Banzhaf value axiomatizations. 47-67 - Paul Pezanis-Christou:

On the impact of low-balling: Experimental results in asymmetric auctions. 69-89 - Eilon Solan

, Rakesh V. Vohra:
Correlated equilibrium payoffs and public signalling in absorbing games. 91-121 - Steffen Huck

, Hans-Theo Normann, Jörg Oechssler
:
Stability of the Cournot process - experimental evidence. 123-136 - Benedikt Löwe:

Playing with mixed strategies on infinite sets. 137-150
Volume 31, Number 2, January 2003
- Daniel Granot, Michael Maschler, Jonathan Shalev:

Voting for voters: the unanimity case. 155-202 - Irit Nowik, Shmuel Zamir:

The game for the speed of convergence in repeated games of incomplete information. 203-222 - Thomas Ferguson, Lloyd S. Shapley, Robert Weber:

Notes on a stochastic game with information structure. 223-228 - Srihari Govindan

, Tilman Klumpp:
Perfect equilibrium and lexicographic beliefs. 229-243 - David Blackwell:

The prediction of sequences. 245-251 - Ehud Lehrer:

Approachability in infinite dimensional spaces. 253-268 - Marilda Sotomayor:

A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers. 269-283 - Bernard De Meyer, Hadiza Moussa Saley:

On the strategic origin of Brownian motion in finance. 285-319
Volume 31, Number 3, June 2003
- Bas van Velzen, Herbert Hamers, Henk Norde:

Convexity and marginal vectors. 323-330 - Annick Laruelle

, Federico Valenciano
:
Power indices and the veil of ignorance. 331-339 - Ehud Lehrer:

Allocation processes in cooperative games. 341-351 - Katarína Cechlárová

, Jana Hajduková:
Computational complexity of stable partitions with B-preferences. 353-364 - Eilon Solan

, Nicolas Vieille:
Quitting games - An example. 365-381 - Sigal Leviatan

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Consistent values and the core in continuum market games with two types of players. 383-410 - Marina Núñez

, Carles Rafels:
The assignment game: the τ-value. 411-422 - Marina Núñez

, Carles Rafels:
Buyer-seller exactness in the assignment game. 423-436 - M. Josune Albizuri, Juan Carlos Santos, José Manuel Zarzuelo

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On the serial cost sharing rule. 437-446 - Moshe Leshno, David Moller, Phillip Ein-Dor:

Neural nets in a group decision process. 447-467 - Stef Tijs, Rodica Branzei:

Additive stable solutions on perfect cones of cooperative games. 469-474
Volume 31, Number 4, September 2003
- Antonio J. Morales

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Absolutely expedient imitative behavior. 475-492 - Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal

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On existence of undominated pure strategy Nash equilibria in anonymous nonatomic games: a generalization. 493-498 - Jacqueline Morgan

, Roberto Raucci:
Lower semicontinuity for approximate social Nash equilibria. 499-509 - Sjaak Hurkens

, Karl H. Schlag
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Evolutionary insights on the willingness to communicate. 511-526 - Huibin Yan:

Noncooperative selection of the core. 527-540 - Richard Baron, Jacques Durieu, Hans Haller, Philippe Solal:

Control costs and potential functions for spatial games. 541-561 - Geoffroy de Clippel:

An axiomatization of the inner core. 563-569 - Taiji Furusawa

, Quan Wen:
Bargaining with stochastic disagreement payoffs. 571-591 - Toru Hokari, Anita Gellekom:

Population monotonicity and consistency in convex games: Some logical relations. 593-607 - Reinoud Joosten, Thomas Brenner, Ulrich Witt:

Games with frequency-dependent stage payoffs. 609-620

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