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International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 32
Volume 32, Number 1, December 2003
- Sylvain Sorin:

Preface. 1 - Michel Benaïm

, Gérard Ben Arous:
A two armed bandit type problem. 3-16 - Bruno Bassan, Olivier Gossner, Marco Scarsini

, Shmuel Zamir:
Positive value of information in games. 17-31 - Pierre Cardaliaguet, Slawomir Plaskacz

:
Existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium feedback for a simple nonzero-sum differential game. 33-71 - Jean-Michel Coulomb:

Stochastic games without perfect monitoring. 73-96 - Ashok P. Maitra, William D. Sudderth:

Borel stay-in-a-set games. 97-108 - Jean-François Mertens, Abraham Neyman:

A value on 'AN. 109-120 - Andrzej S. Nowak

:
On a new class of nonzero-sum discounted stochastic games having stationary Nash equilibrium points. 121-132 - Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan

, Nicolas Vieille:
The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring. 133-150 - Alvaro Sandroni

:
The reproducible properties of correct forecasts. 151-159 - A. J. Vermeulen, M. J. M. Jansen, Jos A. M. Potters:

Making solutions invariant. 161-180
Volume 32, Number 2, December 2003
- Rafael Amer

, Jean Derks
, José Miguel Giménez
:
On cooperative games, inseparable by semivalues. 181-188 - Yevgenia Apartsin, Ron Holzman:

The core and the bargaining set in glove-market games. 189-204 - Vitaly Pruzhansky:

On finding curb sets in extensive games. 205-210 - Juan Carlos Cesco

:
Fundamental cycles of pre-imputations in non-balanced TU-games. 211-221 - Anna B. Khmelnitskaya

:
Shapley value for constant-sum games. 223-227 - Wojciech Polowczuk:

Pure Nash equilibria in finite two-person non-zero-sum games. 229-240 - Marilda Sotomayor:

Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism. 241-251 - Chih Chang, Yan-An Hwang:

The Harsanyi-Shapley solution and independence of irrelevant expansions. 253-271 - Robert W. Rosenthal, Jason M. Shachat

, Mark Walker:
Hide and seek in Arizona. 273-293 - YunTong Wang:

Simple random order methods to share costs. 295-314
Volume 32, Number 3, June 2004
- Stefano Demichelis, Klaus Ritzberger, Jeroen M. Swinkels

:
The simple geometry of perfect information games. 315-338 - Srihari Govindan

, Jean-François Mertens:
An equivalent definition of stable Equilibria. 339-357 - Srihari Govindan

, Arndt von Schemde, Bernhard von Stengel:
Symmetry and p-Stability. 359-369 - John Hillas

, Mathijs Jansen, Jos A. M. Potters, Dries Vermeulen
:
Independence of inadmissible strategies and best reply stability: a direct proof. 371-377 - Jean-François Mertens:

Localization of the degree on lower-dimensional sets. 379-386 - Jean-François Mertens:

Ordinality in non cooperative games. 387-430
Volume 32, Number 4, August 2004
- Kiho Yoon

:
The effective minimax value of asynchronously repeated games. 431-442 - Robert F. Nau, Sabrina Gomez Canovas, Pierre Hansen:

On the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria. 443-453 - Kislaya Prasad:

Observation, Measurement, and Computation in Finite Games. 455-470 - Burkhard C. Schipper:

Submodularity and the evolution of Walrasian behavior. 471-477 - Takuya Masuzawa:

Punishment strategies make the a-coalitional game ordinally convex and balanced. 479-483 - Elena Yanovskaya:

Consistent and covariant solutions for TU games. 485-500 - Eric J. Friedman:

Paths and consistency in additive cost sharing. 501-518 - P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch:

Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures. 519-531 - Gérard Hamiache:

A mean value for games with communication structures. 533-544 - Lars Ehlers, Bettina Klaus

:
Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems. 545-560 - Alberto Bressan, Wen Shen:

Semi-cooperative strategies for differential games. 561-593 - Judith Timmer, Peter Borm, Stef Tijs:

On three Shapley-like solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs. 595-613

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