

Legacy Encryption Downgrade Attacks against LibrePGP and CMS

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Abstract. This work describes vulnerabilities in the specification of AEAD modes and Key Wrap in two cryptographic message formats. Firstly, this applies to AEAD packets as introduced in the novel LibrePGP specification that is implemented by the widely used GnuPG application. Secondly, we describe vulnerabilities in the AES-based AEAD schemes as well as the Key Wrap Algorithm specified in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). These new attacks exploit the possibility to downgrade AEAD or AES Key Wrap ciphertexts to valid legacy CFB- or CBC-encrypted related ciphertexts and require that the attacker learns the content of the legacy decryption result. This can happen in two principal ways: either due to the human recipient returning the decryption output to the attacker as a quote or due to a programmatic decryption oracle in the receiving system that reveals information about the plaintext. The attacks effect the decryption of low-entropy plaintext blocks in AEAD ciphertexts and, in the case of LibrePGP, also the manipulation of existing AEAD ciphertexts. For AES Key Wrap in CMS, full key decryption is possible. Some of the attacks require multiple successful oracle queries. The attacks thus demonstrate that CCA2 security is not achieved by the LibrePGP and CMS AEAD or Key Wrap encryption in the presence of a legacy cipher mode decryption oracle. The proper countermeasure to thwart the attacks is a key derivation that ensures the use of unrelated block cipher keys for the different encryption modes.

Keywords: AEAD · downgrade · CMS · LibrePGP · decryption-oracle

1 Introduction

This work describes downgrade attacks that violate the confidentiality and authenticity properties of authenticated encryption, technically referred to as AEAD for “authenticated encryption with additional data”, as specified in the LibrePGP protocol and in the long-standing CMS protocol [Hou07].¹ LibrePGP is a recent fork of the OpenPGP standard in a proposed IETF draft [KT23] that introduces AEAD ciphers with the *OCB Encrypted Data packet*, referred to as *OCB Packet* throughout this work. However, official releases of GnuPG² already implement the new packet starting from GnuPG version 2.3 [gnu] and also the RNP OpenPGP library³ supports it. CMS is a widely used standard for cryptographic messages protected by encryption and signatures based on public key algorithms and using X.509 certificates. It supports AES-CCM and AES-GCM as AEAD modes [Hou07]. One of the prominent usages of CMS is in the S/MIME protocol for email encryption and signature [STR19].

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²<https://www.gnupg.org/>

³<https://www.rnpgp.org/software/rnp/>

We further show that AES Key Wrap with Padding [HD09] as a content-encryption algorithm in CMS suffers from a vulnerability that leads to full decryption of the wrapped key in the presence of a CBC-decryption oracle.

In the following, we use the term *modern cipher mode* to denote AEAD as well as Key Wrap schemes.

1.1 Previous Work

Decryption oracle attacks against symmetric encryption schemes are long known. A fundamental trait of all such attacks is the ability of the attacker to craft manipulated versions of the ciphertext he wishes to decrypt and send them to a recipient, who can be given by a human user with his messaging client or an autonomous IT system, and who will reveal certain information about the decrypted plaintext. Based on this information, the attacker learns parts of the original plaintext.

One fundamental type of attack are CBC padding oracles [Vau02]: Given that an implementation indicates whether the padding pattern that is used to indicate the number of unused bytes in the final block of a CBC encrypted message was erroneous or not, the whole CBC ciphertext can be decrypted.

Other authors [KS00, JKS02] have shown that legacy encryption schemes for human readable messages that use CFB or CBC encryption are prone to exhibit what can be called *fully-revealing oracles*: The attacker manipulates in a specific way an encrypted email that he wishes to decrypt, and sends the manipulated version to the original recipient. The recipient sees a message with no interpretable meaning, i.e., appearing just as garbled characters, and thus might send a reply which quotes the message that he received back to the attacker. Due to the quoted decrypted message being related to the original plaintext, the attacker can decrypt the original plaintext. More sophisticated approaches to trick a user into acting as a decryption oracle are described in the more recent work [MBP⁺19].

Format oracles [MRLG15] are yet another class of oracles which might reveal information about the plaintext. Format oracles are similar to CBC padding oracles, only that the errors that are indicated to the attacker have a different source. They stem from routines that verify certain aspects of the message format, such as application-specific file formats or specific character encodings for text files. In a recent work [IPK⁺23], a format oracle in iOS Mail was successfully used for the decryption of S/MIME emails.

All of the decryption oracle attacks have in common that they allow the decryption of messages encrypted under a legacy encryption mode by the use of a decryption oracle for the same encryption mode. Specifically, they exploit that the legacy encryption mode offers no integrity protection. In contrast to this, the modern cipher modes such as the AEAD modes achieve integrity protection of the ciphertext. AEAD modes thus prevent the attacker from using the AEAD decryption as an oracle: all his manipulated versions of the ciphertext will be rejected on the cryptographic level already with overwhelming probability.

However, in 2013, Jager, Paterson, and Somorovsky described a cross-mode attack against XML encryption using the AEAD scheme CCM [JPS13]. Specifically, their attack achieves the decryption of low-entropy plaintext blocks in CCM-encrypted XML-messages by exploiting the legacy XML CBC decryption. The attack uses the CBC decryption result obtained from the oracle to emulate the block decryption of the underlying cipher. This work shows that even AEAD-encrypted messages are at risk of being decrypted by oracle attacks, provided that a decryption oracle exists for a legacy encryption mode under the same key.

The work [JPS13] also shows the use of AES KeyWrap in XML encryption to be vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Here, the assumption is again the presence of a CBC decryption oracle.

1.2 Our contributions

The contributions of this work reveal vulnerabilities of the LibrePGP and the CMS protocol with respect to oracle attacks against modern cipher modes and are based on exploiting the presence of a legacy cipher decryption oracle.

For CMS, our work demonstrates the transferability of the previously described attacks by Jager et al. [JPS13] to CMS. Namely, the AES-based AEAD schemes AES-CCM and AES-GCM are subject to attacks that use downgrading of ciphertexts to AES-CBC encryption of CMS. Like the attacks described by Jager et al., they allow the decryption of a low entropy block in the plaintext if the attacker knows the position of that block inside the plaintext. Furthermore, we show AES Key Wrap, used in CMS as a content-encryption algorithm, to be vulnerable to CBC-downgrade attacks as well. This encryption mode is used for instance for the protection of Symmetric Key Package Content Types [Tur11].

For LibrePGP, we introduce novel attacks that allow the manipulation of LibrePGP OCB ciphertexts and the decryption of low entropy blocks with a known position as in the case of CMS.

The downgrade attacks that we present can thus be grouped into three types: a) the manipulation of AEAD ciphertexts – this is possible in the case of LibrePGP; b) decryption of high-entropy messages – this applies to the use of AES Key Wrap in CMS; and c) the decryption of low entropy plaintext blocks, i.e., plaintext blocks where only a few bytes are unknown to the attacker. This latter attack applies both in the case of LibrePGP and CMS. In each of these cases, the downgrade attack requires as a precondition that an oracle for a legacy encryption mode is available to the attacker.

In order to enhance the understanding of basic properties of these decryption oracle attacks, we introduce the terms *forward decryption oracle* and *inverse decryption oracle* to describe the relation between the block cipher operations of the modern cipher mode under attack and the legacy decryption mode that is realized by the oracle. This distinction is useful since fundamental properties of the attacks depend on this categorization.

Forward decryption oracles are given when the legacy mode implements the same block cipher direction, i.e., block encryption or decryption, that is needed in the modern cipher mode operation that is being attacked. Since the oracle provides the block cipher direction needed in the operation that is attacked, this type of oracle typically allows for full plaintext recovery: In a very simplified view of such attacks, the attacker can simply execute the attacked algorithm, and whenever the block cipher operation is needed that they cannot carry out themselves due to lack of knowledge of the cipher key, they query the legacy mode decryption oracle that performs the required block cipher operation for them.

Inverse decryption oracles on the other hand provide the opposite cipher direction of the one needed to carry out the operation under attack. This restricts the attack to verifying guesses for the plaintext and thus only allows attacks on low entropy plaintext blocks.

Table 1 groups the attacks from previous work and our own contributions into these two types of oracle attacks. Note that the oracle is always assumed to be a decryption oracle. In the case of the attack against LibrePGP’s OCB decryption, which makes use of the block cipher encryption as well as decryption, and where the legacy decryption oracle features the block cipher encryption, the oracle has to be classified as an inverse one since at least for one of the cipher operations needed in the attack only the inverse operation is provided by the oracle.

The structure of the paper is as follows. In Sec. 2 and 3 we introduce the new attacks against LibrePGP and CMS, respectively. Sec. 4 reports on the responsible disclosure process and Sec. 5 discusses the appropriate countermeasures to thwart the attacks. Finally, Sec. 6 gives the conclusion.

Table 1: Classification of decryption oracles in previous work and in our contributions. The first column indicates the oracle type. The second column gives the reference to the attack. The third column indicates the modern cipher mode that is subject to the attack together with the direction (encryption or decryption) that is needed during the attack. The forth column specifies the direction of the underlying block cipher operation for the operation referred to in the previous column. The final two columns indicate the same information for the legacy encryption scheme that is used as an oracle in the attack.

type	Attack	Attacked modern mode		Legacy mode decryption oracle	
		Mode & direction	Implied block cipher direction	Mode & direction	Implied block cipher direction
inverse	[JPS13]	AES-CCM decr.	encr.	CBC decr.	decr.
	This work: LibrePGP OCB decr. (Sec. 2.6)	OCB decr.	encr. & decr.	CFB decr.	encr.
	This work: CMS AES-CCM or AES-GCM decr. (Sec. 3.3)	AES-CCM or AES-GCM decr.	encr.	CBC decr.	decr.
forward	[KS00]	CFB decr.	encr.	CFB decr.	encr.
	This work: LibrePGP OCB manip. (Sec. 2.5)	OCB encr.	encr.	CFB decr.	encr.
	[JPS13] and this work: AES KeyWrap decr (Sec. 3.5)	AES KeyWrap decr.	decr.	CBC decr.	decr.

2 Attacks against LibrePGP OCB packets

In the following subsections, we first introduce some preliminaries in Sec. 2.1. Following, in Sec. 2.2 we explain how OpenPGP legacy-mode-decryption can be leveraged to an ECB encryption oracle. Sec. 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 describe the novel attacks. Our proof-of-concept implementation of one of these attacks is described in Sec. 2.7. Finally, Sec. 2.8 explores the potential of real world applications based on LibrePGP for being vulnerable to our attacks.

2.1 Preliminaries: OpenPGP and LibrePGP message encryption

2.1.1 OpenPGP and LibrePGP hybrid encryption

Public-key encrypted messages in OpenPGP function according to the well-known asymmetric/symmetric hybrid encryption approach: The encrypted message begins with one or more public key encrypted session key (PKESK) packets, one for each recipient. When decrypting the respective PKESK packet with their own private key, the recipient receives the session key. Then follows the data that is symmetrically encrypted under the session key. The data to be encrypted always has to be enveloped in a valid packet, e.g., a *Literal Data* (LIT) Packet. In LibrePGP, the following types of symmetrically encrypted data packets exist:

- *Symmetrically Encrypted Data (SED) Packet*, defined in OpenPGP, i.e. RFC 4880 [CDF⁺07]. This packet is encrypted using a slightly modified variant of CFB encryption without any integrity protection.
- *Symmetrically Encrypted Integrity Protected Data (SEIPD) Packet*, defined in

OpenPGP, i.e. RFC 4880 [CDF⁺07]. This packet type is used in conjunction with a Modification Detection Code (MDC) Packet: The data to be CFB-encrypted is formed by the sequence of the message, enveloped for instance in a LIT packet, and an MDC packet containing the SHA-1 hash of the LIT packet including its packet header. SEIPD packets also use CFB encryption. The verification of the SHA-1 hash of the plaintext data contained in the MDC packet provides an ad-hoc mechanism for the protection of the ciphertext’s integrity. The shortcoming of this packet type, which is not relevant for the attacks at hand, is addressed in App. A.

- *OCB Packet*, defined in LibrePGP [KT23]. OCB packets encrypt data using one of the two AEAD modes OCB or EAX, where the latter is marked as deprecated.

2.1.2 The LibrePGP OCB Packet with OCB mode encryption

The OCB encryption algorithm [KR14] takes as input the key, a nonce, the plaintext, and additional data. The latter is authenticated but does not become part of the resulting ciphertext. It outputs a ciphertext at the end of which is the authentication tag.

An OCB Packet may consist of more than one OCB chunk. Each chunk is a complete OCB ciphertext ending with the corresponding authentication tag. At the very end of the OCB Packet, an empty OCB chunk is encrypted to produce the final authentication tag. The additional data input to the OCB encryption algorithm for each chunk includes the index of the chunk within the packet. This ensures that the sequence of the chunks cannot be changed without being detected by the recipient. The detailed structure of the additional data used in each chunk is given in App. B.

The nonce used for the encryption of each chunk in an OCB Packet is $V \oplus I$, where $V \in \{0, 1\}^{120}$ is the initialization vector supplied on the protocol level and I is the chunk index encoded as a big-endian value of the same width as V . The chunk index is counted starting from zero.

2.1.3 SED Packet encryption in OpenPGP

The encryption of SED packets makes use of the CFB mode. In this mode, encryption of a block is given as $C_i = E_k(C_{i-1}) \oplus P_i$ and the decryption as $P_i = E_k(C_{i-1}) \oplus C_i$ with $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ and where $E_k()$ is the encryption of a block under the key k , and $C_0 = IV$ is the initialization vector.

The encryption of SED packets in OpenPGP does not use CFB straightforwardly, but is realized by a two-step CFB encryption which we describe in the following. Here, and throughout this work, all encryption operations are performed using the session key k resulting from the decryption of the corresponding PKESK packet without explicitly noting the use of k . Table 2 specifies various notations used in the algorithms.

- First, CFB-encrypt a bit string $Y \in \{0, 1\}^{144}$ where $Y[96 : 127] = Y[128 : 143]$, i.e., the last two octets are a copy of the preceding two octets, the remaining octets chosen at random, and an IV of all zero bits.
- Let the result of this first encryption step be H .
- Set $IV \leftarrow H[16 : 143]$
- CFB-encrypt the payload data using the IV computed in the previous step and append the encryption result to H to form the complete OpenPGP-CFB ciphertext.

Table 2: Notation used throughout this work. Numerous items have been taken without or with minor adaption from [KR14].

$ k $	the bit length of the value k
b	The letter b denotes the block width of the underlying block cipher in bits.
$[0]^x$	The bit string formed by x zero bits.
$X[i]$	The i -th bit of the string S (indices begin at 0, so if X is 011, then $X[0] == 0$, $X[1] == 1$, $X[2] == 1$).
$X[a : b]$	The substring of the bit string X ranging from the bit positions a to b inclusive.
$\text{str2num}(S)$	The big-endian conversion of a bit string S into an integer (e.g., $\text{str2num}(1110) == 14$).
$\text{num2str}(i, n)$	The big-endian conversion of an integer i into a bit string of length n (e.g., $\text{num2str}(14, 4) = 1110$ and $\text{num2str}(1, 2) == 01$).
$\text{ocbDouble}(S)$	If $S[1] == 0$, then $\text{ocbDouble}(S) = (S[2 : 128] \parallel 0)$; otherwise, $\text{ocbDouble}(S) = (S[2 : 128] \parallel 0) \oplus ([0]^{120} \parallel 10000111)$.
$E_k(X)$	AES block encryption of the block X under the key k . In some instances the indexing with k is omitted, as in this work we are not concerned with any variation in the employed block cipher key.

The corresponding decryption algorithm is given in Alg. 1. The condition “have quick-check” and its relevance for attacks on actual OpenPGP implementations will be discussed further down. In case that this condition is true and the comparison of the redundant bytes in Step 3 of this algorithm fails, the decryption is aborted with an error and no plaintext is output. If an attacker inputs random ciphertexts for decryption, and the condition “have quick-check” is true, then the decryption succeeds only with a probability of 2^{-16} .

Algorithm 1 OpenPGP’s SED two-step CFB decryption. The two arguments to $\text{SED-DEC}_K()$ are the first-step and second-step ciphertexts, respectively.

```

1: Algorithm  $\text{SED-DEC}_K(H \parallel B_1 \parallel \dots \parallel B_m)$  with  $H \in \{0, 1\}^{144}$  and  $B_i \in \{0, 1\}^{128}$ 
2:    $Y \leftarrow \text{CFB-DECRYPT}_K([0]^{128}, H) // Y \in \{0, 1\}^{128+16}$ 
3:   if have quick-check AND  $Y[96 : 127] \neq Y[128 : 143]$  then
4:     Abort with error (output no plaintext)
5:   end if
6:    $\text{IV} \leftarrow H[16 : 143]$ 
7:   return  $\text{CFB-DECRYPT}_K(\text{IV}, B_1 \parallel \dots \parallel B_m)$ 
8: end Algorithm
```

2.2 OpenPGP SED Packet CFB decryption as an ECB encryption oracle

As a prerequisite to the attacks developed further down, in this section we show how the OpenPGP SED Packet CFB decryption can be used as an ECB encryption oracle by straightforward transformations on the returned plaintext and address the applicability of the decryption oracle to currently existing LibrePGP implementations.

If an attacker has access to the algorithm SED-DEC_K given in Alg. 1 as a decryption oracle, an ECB encryption oracle can be built on top of this as specified in Alg. 2. See Fig. 1 for a depiction of how the ECB encryption oracle is built from the CFB decryption oracle.

Note that if the condition “have quick-check” in Alg. 1 amounts to “true”, this increases the number of queries necessary to retrieve a decryption result from the CFB-decryption

Algorithm 2 ECB mode encryption realized through an SED CFB decryption-oracle for a sequence of n block cipher blocks B_i in one call. b is the block size of a cipher block in bits. In case the call to $\text{SED-DEC}_K()$ in line 4 does not return a plaintext due to an error condition, this algorithm also aborts with an error and without returning a plaintext.

```

1: Algorithm ECB-ENC-OCK( $B_1 \parallel \dots \parallel B_n$ )
2:    $B_{n+1} = [0]^b$ 
3:    $R = \text{random bit string} \in \{0, 1\}^{144}$ 
4:    $P = P_1 \parallel \dots \parallel P_{n+1} = \text{SED-DEC}_K(R \parallel B_1 \parallel B_2 \parallel \dots \parallel B_{n+1})$ 
5:   for  $i = 1$  to  $n$  do
6:      $Q_i = P_{i+1} \oplus B_{i+1}$ 
7:   end for
8:   return  $\{Q_i | i = 1, \dots, n\}$ 
9: end Algorithm

```

Table 3: Overview of OpenPGP implementations regarding aspects that influence their susceptibility to SED decryption oracle attacks.

Implementation	Supports SED decryption	Enforces quick-check
GnuPG 2.4	limited in default configuration (see text)	no
RNP 1.17.0	yes	yes

oracle by a factor of 2^{16} on average. However, the implementation of the “quick-check” poses a vulnerability in itself [MZ06]. Accordingly, the LibrePGP specification warns in its “Security Considerations” section, to use the quick-check, if at all, then with care. While GnuPG itself does not implement the quick-check, RNP does so, as we inferred from the source code. Table 3 gives an overview of the SED decryption support of both implementations.⁴

In the following we investigate in how far the GnuPG application realizes an SED oracle. When decrypting an SED Packet with GnuPG, the following message is output

```

gpg: WARNING: message was not integrity protected
gpg: decryption forced to fail!

```

and the file is still decrypted if the output is written to stdout, i.e., if no output file was specified on the command line. However in this case, as long as the option `ignore-mdc-error` is not set in the GnuPG configuration file, the application exits with a non-zero exit code. If an output file was specified, the file is deleted again afterwards. Also the corresponding function of the GPGME library returns an error code for SED decryption [Koc24].

2.3 Appearance of a LIT Packet when Decrypting a Random Ciphertext

In the course of the attacks against LibrePGP AEAD that we will develop further down, the attacker has to feed crafted ciphertexts into the CFB-decryption oracle. These ciphertexts appear as random ciphertexts from the point of view of the recipient and will decrypt to data that appears as random as well. However, the OpenPGP packet semantics prescribe that a decrypted plaintext must start with a valid packet from a certain set of suitable packet types. According to the LibrePGP specification, the plaintext must contain either an Encrypted Message, a Signed Message, a Compressed Message, or a Literal Message.

⁴According to the Sequoia interoperability test suite, the latest RNP version 1.17.0 supports SED decryption. See https://tests.sequoia-gpg.org/#SED_encrypted_message

Table 4: Structure of an OpenPGP literal data (LIT) packet and estimated or presumed probabilities for the respective field to take on a valid value based on an entirely randomized plaintext. The symbols given in the first column are used in Fig. 1.

Symbol	Field name	Size in bytes	Condition for validity	Estimated probability for validity
T	packet tag for LIT	1	$T = 0xcb$ (new format) OR $T \in$ four valid old format tag octets	5/256
$L = (L_1, \dots, L_n)$	body length	$\in \{0, 1, \dots, 5\}$		unknown
O	format	1	$O = 0x62$ (binary) OR $O = 0x74$ (text) OR $O = 0x75$ (UTF-8) OR $O = 0x6d$ (MIME)	1/64
f	filename-len	1	none	1
$N = (N_1, \dots, N_f)$	filename	$\in \{0, 1, \dots, 255\}$	valid UTF-8 ⁵	unknown
$D = (D_1, \dots, D_4)$	date	4	presumably none	1
	body	as specified by L	valid UTF-8 in case of format octet 0x74 and 0x75	unknown

However, it is easy to see that from these message types the only one that can actually appear with non-negligible probability as a valid message in the pseudorandom plaintext is the Literal Message which is realized by a LIT Packet. The reason is that all other packets allowed by the standard need further successful processing which is highly improbable to achieve by chance: Processing random data as a compressed data packet will suffer from high chance of an error during decompression, and even in case of successful decompression requires the by-chance appearance of another valid packet in the decompressed data. Furthermore, processing random data as encrypted or signed packets entails the attempted decryption or signature verification which fails with overwhelming probability.

Since the protocol requires a valid LIT packet to appear in the decrypted data, the body of which is the plaintext returned to the application, only a subset of the crafted ciphertexts result will cause a decryption result to be returned by the CFB-decryption oracle. In the following, we explain the theoretical conditions according to the LibrePGP standard for a valid LIT packet and from this derive an estimate of the probability for such a packet to appear in the decryption result for a random ciphertext.

Table 4 shows the structure of a LIT packet with theoretically derived probabilities for successful processing of random data where possible. According to these derived probabilities, the probability for a valid LIT Packet to appear for a random ciphertext is at most $5/256 + 1/64 \approx 3, 5\%$. If the correctness of the body length and the UTF-8 encoding is also verified by an implementation, it is further reduced.

From our practical evaluation described in Sec. 2.7 we found a success rate for obtaining a decryption result for the initial oracle question of about 1.8%. This is quite close to the estimated probability as it differs only by approximately a factor of two.

⁵It is unknown to us whether a valid UTF-8 encoding is enforced during decryption in GnuPG or RNP.

2.4 A high-level view of the attacks on LibrePGP OCB Packet encryption

In the following subsections we provide the attacks against the LibrePGP OCB Packet encryption based on the presence of an OpenPGP SED decryption oracle. Specifically, these are an attack that allows for the manipulation of an existing OCB Packet (Sec. 2.5), and an attack that enables the decryption of low entropy plaintext blocks (Sec. 2.6).

The underlying idea of the attacks is to perform the algorithm needed to achieve the desired computation with the help of the SED decryption oracle. Within this algorithm, whenever the block cipher encryption operation is needed, the respective CFB decryption oracle implied by the SED decryption oracle is queried to retrieve the respective operation result, making use of the fact that an SED decryption oracle can be trivially transformed to an ECB encryption oracle (see Sec. 2.2). As an optimization to reduce the number of oracle queries that are required to conduct a specific attack, the attacker provides as many blocks to the oracle in a single query as possible according to the parallelisability of the block cipher operations in the attack algorithm.

However, as explained in Sec. 2.3, the probability for a crafted ciphertext that is input to the CFB-decryption oracle to return a plaintext is relatively low due to the requirement of the appearance of a valid LIT Packet header in the decrypted data by chance. This is another aspect that has to be taken into account when designing the attacks. The solution to this problem is to divide the query ciphertext into two parts: a leading part, which covers the maximal possible length of the LIT Packet header, and a second part, which contains the blocks to be decrypted, which we refer to as the *oracle blocks*. During the attack, the first part of the ciphertext is varied in sequential oracle queries until a decryption result is obtained.

After having received a decryption result in this way, the attacker can reuse the leading part of the ciphertext to conduct further queries for different oracle blocks. In the following, we refer to the task of achieving a decryption result for a given set of oracle blocks as an *oracle question*. In this terminology, the above says that the initial oracle question involves numerous oracle queries, but after a successful initial oracle question the remaining oracle questions each only require a single oracle query.

Accordingly, the general attack algorithm for the attacks against LibrePGP can be described on a high level of abstraction as follows. Depending on which attack is executed, the attacker executes the OCB encryption (for the attack given in Sec. 2.5) or an algorithm that allows for the decryption of low entropy plaintext blocks (for the attack in Sec. 2.6). In either case, the executed algorithm only requires the ECB-encryption under the unknown key. Whenever such an ECB-encryption operation is needed, the attacker resorts to querying the SED-oracle in order to perform the required ECB-encryption. From a high-level perspective, the attack is executed as follows:

1. Start the execution of the attack algorithm.
2. When for the first time encountering a step that requires the ECB encryption under the session key, determine the first oracle question, i.e., the oracle blocks that need to be ECB-encrypted.
 - (a) Generate the first part of the ciphertext randomly and append to it the byte sequence of the first of oracle question.
 - (b) Input the ciphertext to the decryption oracle.
 - (c) If the oracle does not output any plaintext, go back to Step 2a.
3. Evaluate the answer from the decryption oracle. As discussed further down, due to a variability in the length of the LIT packet header, this implies determining the offset of the decrypted oracle blocks within the plaintext returned by the oracle.




Figure 1: Overview of the structure of a LIT packet and the resulting offset of the returned oracle plaintext within the ciphertext. For the meaning of the symbols in the green block representing the LIT packet header see Table 4. The exclamation mark in the speech bubble at the seam block indicates the possible case that with the corresponding natural probability a number of the final bytes of the seam block are equal to the final bytes of the first $D_{\text{CFB}}(\text{oracle block})$ and thus the beginning of the block repetition pattern is recognized falsely too early.

4. Save the first part of the ciphertext that was generated randomly in the last execution of Step 2a and use it for all further oracle queries.
5. Continue the algorithm execution and process all further oracle questions arising in the course of the algorithm execution.
 - (a) Determine the next oracle question and append the data to be ECB-encrypted to the first part of the ciphertext that was saved in Step 4.
 - (b) Input the ciphertext to the decryption oracle.
 - (c) Evaluate the answer from the decryption oracle.
 - (d) Continue at Step 5a unless all oracle questions needed during the algorithm execution have been answered by the oracle.

Fig. 1 gives an overview of the relations between the OpenPGP SED-ciphertext, the resulting plaintext, and the semantics of the LIT packet which has to be found in the OCB plaintext while processing the first oracle question in the manner described in the abstract algorithm above. In the top left corner we see the first-step ciphertext of the SED two-step CFB decryption, the tail of which is used as the IV of the subsequent CFB decryption. After it, in the top row follows the sequence of the random blocks, all of which are chosen independently by the attacker during his attempts to achieve a first successful query. After the last random block follow the oracle blocks, i.e., those ciphertext blocks, that the attacker wishes to have CFB-decrypted, i.e., block-encrypted. Note that according to the specification of the CFB mode, the final oracle block is not block-decrypted and thus cannot be used to retrieve an encrypted block.

In the next row we find the operations $E()$ for block encryption under the respective session key and the bit-wise XOR operations on the blocks. Beneath that row we find the decryption result that starts with the decryption results of the leading random blocks which is entirely pseudorandom. The decryption of the first oracle block yields the seam block, which bears no useful information for the attacker. Then follow the blocks that are the result of the CFB-decryption of the oracle blocks.

In the subsequent row we find the indication of the semantic interpretation of the decryption result. The green data block represents the header of the LIT packet.

In the following, we elaborate how the attacker can reliably identify the decryption result of the oracle blocks in the decryption result. Since, as shown in Tab. 4, two LIT packet header fields have a variable length, namely the body length field, ranging from 0 to 5 bytes and the filename field, ranging from 0 to 255 bytes, the offset of the decryption result within the ciphertext has a corresponding variation as well.

In both the attacks from Sec. 2.5 and 2.6, the initial oracle question contains two different blocks, that we refer to as A and B in the following, that need to be ECB-encrypted (i.e., CFB-decrypted). Accordingly, the attacker needs a means for achieving orientation within the decryption result in order to be able to identify A and B during the first oracle question. In order to achieve this, the oracle blocks placed into the query need to exhibit a pattern that can be recognized in the decryption result. A block pattern in the ciphertext that achieves this is for instance $AABAAB$ etc. When receiving the decryption result, the attacker can identify the repeated blocks as the CFB-decryption of the blocks A and thus also identify the CFB-decryption of B .

As a further consequence, it is important to ensure that during the first oracle question, the sequence of leading random blocks in the ciphertext is long enough so that its end is under all circumstances within the decryption result returned by the application. Otherwise, namely if some of the decrypted oracle blocks are part of the packet header, the attacker will not be able to reliably determine which of the oracle blocks with respect to their absolute ordering is the first one he received in the decryption result. This will make it difficult to craft the ciphertexts for the subsequent oracle questions. On the other hand, if the first oracle block appears in the decryption result, the attacker determines its offset from the beginning of the decryption result and can reuse this offset to determine the start of the decrypted oracle blocks in the further oracle questions without the need for a pattern detection as described above for the first oracle question.

There is, however, the caveat that he cannot determine the start of the pattern with certainty in all cases. This is because with probability $1/256$, the last octet of the seam block will be identical to the last octet of each of the blocks of the first pair. This lets him determine the position of $E_{\text{ECB}}(\text{oracle-block}_1)$ one octet too early (or more octets too early if there are further accidental such matches). Furthermore, with the same probability, the same type of error can occur if the final byte of the decryption results of A and B are identical. Accordingly, a straightforward implementation of the attack in the manner described above fails with a probability of $1/128$.

2.5 Insertion of new OCB chunks

In this section we develop attacks that allow the insertion of new chunks with attacker chosen plaintext into an existing OCB Packet based on the exploitation of an SED decryption oracle. The attacker can replace chunks in an existing ciphertext or append new chunks at the end of the plaintext.

According to Alg. 4, Step 26, the authentication tag of each chunk is given as $T = E_k(s_{\tilde{n}} \oplus F_{\tilde{n}} \oplus L_{\S}) \oplus \text{HASH}(K, A)$, where the variable names correspond to those used in Alg. 3 and 4.

In order to achieve the computation of the tag T of an OCB chunk, the attacker runs Alg. 3. He first needs to query the CFB-oracle to receive the value L_* . Based on the knowledge of L_* he can compute $L_{\S}$ and L_i for $i \geq 0$.

We find that $S_m = \bigoplus_{i=0, \dots, m} E_k(A_i \oplus F_i)$. Note that the result of the OCB-HASH algorithm is $S = S_m$ if $|A| = i \times 128$ for an integer i . Otherwise, the final non-full block receives a padding but this does not introduce any fundamental changes so for the sake of simplicity we ignore this case in our description of the attack that follows.

Algorithm 3 computing the value of HASH for an OCB GnuPG AEAD chunk.

```

1: Algorithm OCB-HASH(key  $k \in \{0, 1\}^{|\mathbf{K}|}$ , additional data  $A \in \{0, 1\}^*$ )
2:    $L_* = E_k([0]^{128})$ 
3:    $L_\S = \text{ocbDouble}(L_*)$ 
4:    $L_0 = \text{ocbDouble}(L_\S)$ 
5:    $L_i = \text{ocbDouble}(L_{i-1})$  for any integer  $i > 0$ 
6:    $m = \lfloor |A|/128 \rfloor$ 
7:   parse  $A$  as  $A_1 \parallel A_2 \parallel \dots \parallel A_m \parallel A_*$  where  $|A_i| = 128$  for each  $1 \leq i \leq m$  and  $0 \leq |A_*| < 128$ 
8:    $F_0 = [0]^{128}$  // Offset
9:   for  $i \leftarrow 1$  to  $m$  do
10:     $F_i = F_{i-1} \oplus L_{\text{ntz}(i)}$ 
11:   end for
12:   if  $|A_*| > 0$  then
13:      $n \leftarrow m + 1$ 
14:      $F_n = F_m \oplus L_*$ 
15:      $A_n = (A_* \parallel 1 \parallel [0]^{127-|A_*|})$ 
16:   else
17:      $n \leftarrow m$ 
18:   end if
19:    $S_0 = [0]^{128}$  // Sum
20:   for  $i \leftarrow 1$  to  $n$  do
21:      $S_i = S_{i-1} \oplus E_k(A_i \oplus F_i)$ 
22:   end for
23:   return  $S = S_n$ 
24: end Algorithm

```

Algorithm 4 OCB encryption algorithm with the parameters key, nonce, additional data, and plaintext in that order. It returns the ciphertext C with $|C| = |P| + \text{taglen}$

```

1: Algorithm OCB-ENCRYPT( $k \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{keylen}}$ ,  $N \in \{0, 1\}^{120}$ ,  $A \in \{0, 1\}^*$ ,  $P \in \{0, 1\}^*$ )
2:   compute values  $L_*$ ,  $L_\S$ , and  $L_i$  for  $0 \leq i$  according to Step 2 in Alg. 3 et seq.
3:    $\tilde{m} = \lfloor |P|/128 \rfloor$ 
4:   parse  $P$  as  $P_1 \parallel P_2 \parallel \dots \parallel P_{\tilde{m}} \parallel P_*$  where  $|P_i| = 128$  for each  $1 \leq i \leq \tilde{m}$  and  $0 \leq |P_*| < 128$ 
5:    $\mathcal{N} = \text{num2str}(\text{taglen} \bmod 128, 7) \parallel [0]^{120-|\mathcal{N}|} \parallel 1 \parallel N$ 
6:    $q = \text{str2num}(\mathcal{N}[123 : 128])$  // “bottom”
7:    $f = E_k(\mathcal{N}[1 : 122] \parallel [0]^6)$  // “Ktop”
8:    $l = f \parallel (f[1 : 64] \oplus f[9 : 72])$  // “Stretch”
9:    $G_0 = l[1 + q : 128 + q]$  // “Offset”
10:   $s_0 = [0]^{128}$  // “Checksum”
11:  for  $1 \leq i \leq \tilde{m}$  do
12:     $G_i = G_{i-1} \oplus L_{\text{ntz}(i)}$ 
13:     $C_i = G_i \oplus E_k(P_i \oplus G_i)$ 
14:     $s_i = s_{i-1} \oplus P_i$ 
15:  end for
16:  if  $|P_*| > 0$  then
17:     $\tilde{n} \leftarrow \tilde{m} + 1$ 
18:     $G_{\tilde{n}} = G_{\tilde{m}} \oplus L_*$ 
19:     $u = E_k(G_{\tilde{n}})$  // “Pad”
20:     $C_{\tilde{n}} = P_* \oplus u[1 : |P_*|]$ 
21:     $P_{\tilde{n}} = P_* \parallel 1 \parallel [0]^{127-|P_*|}$ 
22:     $s_{\tilde{n}} = s_{\tilde{m}} \oplus P_{\tilde{n}}$ 
23:  else
24:     $\tilde{n} \leftarrow \tilde{m}$ 
25:  end if
26:   $T = E_k(s_{\tilde{n}} \oplus G_{\tilde{n}} \oplus L_\S) \oplus \text{HASH}(K, A)$ 
27:  return  $C = C_1 \parallel C_2 \parallel \dots \parallel C_{\tilde{n}} \parallel T[1 : \text{taglen}]$ 
28: end Algorithm

```

For the creation of an entirely new AEAD-encrypted chunk for the plaintext P to be inserted into an existing OCB packet encrypted under an unknown key, but for which an SED-decryption oracle is available, the attacker has to take the following steps:

1. The attacker chooses a plaintext P and determines the OCB nonce N and the additional data A according to the intended index of the chunk in the OCB Packet.
2. Compute the values in Alg. 4 from Steps 5 and 6.
3. Create the query ciphertext $R_1 = \underbrace{[0]^{128}}_{\text{plaintext block for } L_*} \parallel \underbrace{\mathcal{N}[1 : 122] \parallel [0]^6}_{\text{plaintext block for } f}$.
4. Retrieve the ECB-encryption of R_1 from the oracle and parse it into two blocks as $\text{ECB-encrypt}(R_1) = L_* \parallel f$ (Alg. 4, Step 7). This step represents the first oracle question. Note that executing the first oracle question is subject to the procedure described in Sec. 2.4, which covers all possible failures of single oracle queries.
5. Compute the value of l from f (Alg. 4, Step 8).
6. Compute the required values of L^* and $\{L_i\}$ according to Alg. 3, Steps 2 and following.
7. Compute from the $\{L_i\}$ all required values of $\{F_i\}$ according to Alg. 3, Steps 8, 10, and 14.
8. Compute from l , L^* , and $\{L_i\}$ all required values of $\{G_i\}$ according to Alg. 4, Steps 9, 12, and 18.
9. Compute the value $s_{\tilde{n}} = \bigoplus_{i=1, \dots, \tilde{n}} P_i$ according to Alg. 4, Steps 14 and 22.
10. Create the oracle ciphertext $R_2 = \underbrace{P_1 \oplus G_1 \parallel P_2 \oplus G_2 \parallel \dots \parallel P_{\tilde{m}} \oplus G_{\tilde{m}}}_{\text{regular ciphertext encryption}} \parallel \underbrace{G_{\tilde{n}}}_{\text{for } P_*} \parallel \underbrace{s_{\tilde{n}} \oplus F_{\tilde{n}} \oplus L_{\S}}_{\text{for tag computation}} \parallel \underbrace{A_1 \oplus F_1 \parallel \dots}_{\text{for HASH}(K, A)}$ and use it to query the ECB encryption oracle a second time. This second oracle question is not subject to potential failures since according to the explanations in Sec. 2.4 it reuses the initial part of the ciphertext found during the execution of the first oracle question above.
11. He thus receives from the ECB encryption oracle all values necessary to compute all the ciphertext blocks $C_1, \dots, C_{\tilde{n}}$ using Alg. 4, Steps 13 and 20.
12. Note: the values needed for the computation of $\text{HASH}(K, A)$ according to Alg. 3 have already been retrieved through the second oracle question above (namely $E_k(A_i \oplus F_i)$) and the first question (namely $E_k([0]^{128})$).
13. He computes the tag $T = \underbrace{E_k(s_{\tilde{n}} \oplus F_{\tilde{n}} \oplus L_{\S})}_{\text{from query } R_2} \oplus \underbrace{\text{HASH}(K, A)}_{\text{using query } R_2}$.

2.6 Decryption of low entropy blocks

If the plaintext of a LibrePGP OCB Packet contains low entropy blocks, i.e. blocks for the contents of which the attacker can create a reasonably short list of possible values for each block, he can find the correct guess out of this list by the following attack. For the sake of simplicity, we give a description of the attack for only attacking a single block within the ciphertext, excluding the final potential non-full block. Please note that failures to obtain a decryption result during the first oracle question are treated in the same way as described in Sec. 2.5.

- He has a set of h guesses $\mathcal{U} = \{U_i \mid 1 \leq i \leq h \text{ and } U_i \in \{0,1\}^{128}\}$ for the plaintext block P_t at block position t for a ciphertext C .
- He conducts the first oracle question in the same way as in the procedure described in Sec. 2.5 and thus can compute the values $\{G_i\}$ (see Step 8 in that section).
- He then computes the set of oracle blocks $\{Q_i = U_i \oplus G_t \mid U_i \in \mathcal{U}\}$.
- He creates a second query ciphertext $r_2 = Q_1 \parallel Q_2 \parallel \dots \parallel Q_h$ and feeds it to the ECB encryption oracle.
- The returned ECB-encryption result is parsed into blocks as $D_1 \parallel D_2 \parallel \dots \parallel D_h$.
- He computes $\{X_i = G_t \oplus D_i \mid 1 \leq i \leq h\}$.
- If there is one $X_j = C_t$, then the attacker knows that $U_j = P_t$.

The attack functions since the blocks $X_i = G_t \oplus E_k(U_i \oplus G_t)$ are the expected ciphertext blocks for the plaintext guesses in $\mathcal{U}$ at the plaintext position t .

We want to point out that in the special case where the attacker has partial control over the plaintext of the attacked message, such an attack can be extended to a full plaintext recovery by successively modifying the block-offset into the unknown plaintext and thus applying a divide-and-conquer style attack to recover one unknown plaintext byte at a time. This type of attack is referred to as *blockwise chosen-boundary attack* by the original authors [DR]. In [JPS13] it is applied to the inverse decryption oracle attacks against XML encryption. This potential extension of the attack also applies to the equivalent attacks against CMS presented in Sec. 3.3.

2.7 Practical attacks on GnuPG

We implemented⁶ and successfully tested an attack which replaces an OCB chunk with plaintext containing only whitespaces of the same size as the original chunk within an existing OCB-encrypted LibrePGP OCB Packet using AES as the cipher by performing the procedure described in Sec. 2.5. The OCB Packet to be modified was created with GnuPG 2.4.3 with the command

```
gpg --output <out-file> -a --recipient <recipient> --force-aead --aead-algo=ocb -z0 --chunk-size
=6 --encrypt <plaintext-file>
```

Compression was disabled with the option `-z0` since otherwise the changes in the middle of the plaintext lead to a decompression error with high probability. The chunk size was set to 64 bytes in order make the attack feasible for a small ciphertext. The execution of the attack according to Sec. 2.5 involves the initial query step, in which the random leading part of the OpenPGP CFB ciphertext, having a length of 256 bytes, is varied until a successful answer is returned. The leading random pattern is followed by 20 oracle blocks. When running the initial query step against GnuPG 2.2.27 as the decryption oracle for the SED ciphertext, the probability to obtain a decryption result was about 1.8% per ciphertext. The probability for a decryption result which allows the recovery the oracle blocks was about 1.4%. That the latter is slightly lower than the former is understandable since a randomly occurring too short decryption result may not contain sufficiently many decrypted oracle blocks.

When a decryption result is returned, our attack application identifies the start of the oracle block pattern by searching for the repeated block pattern and optionally verifies with the help of the correct session key provided as a command line option, that the oracle

⁶The attack tool is open source and is available at <https://github.com/crypto-security-tools/v5-aead-decr-oracle>

blocks were correctly ECB-encrypted. We point out that, for reasons of simplicity, our implementation of the attack deviates from the optimized procedure described in Sec. 2.5 in that it only uses a fixed oracle block in the initial oracle query and thus needs one more oracle query than the described optimized procedure.

For the oracle queries following the initial one, the leading part of the ciphertext determined in the first oracle question is reused and thus the algorithmic oracle calls beyond the first one only afford a single query to the SED decryption. The modified AEAD ciphertext is then successfully decrypted using GnuPG 2.4.3.

2.8 Possibly vulnerable applications using GnuPG

As stated in Sec. 2.2, in the default configuration, i.e. without setting the configuration option `ignore-mdc-error`, the GnuPG command line application outputs the plaintext on the stdout and exits with a non-zero exit code when decrypting an SED Packet. An application using GnuPG that rejects the output in case of a non-zero exit code is thus not vulnerable to the attacks. Note that this still does not mean that sending LibrePGP packets with GnuPG is safe, since the vulnerability is a principal problem of the LibrePGP protocol and its manifestation depends on the implementation choices of the recipient’s client.

Regarding the question under which circumstances real world applications using LibrePGP OCB packets could be vulnerable against our attacks, we suggest two main scenarios. The first one is given where a human user reveals the full plaintext, due to it appearing as “garbled”, to the attacker. The large number of initial queries needed for the first oracle question, which according to the success probability given in Sec. 2.7, is in the domain of multiple tens or hundreds could potentially be distributed over a set of users.⁷ In this case, the victim, against whom the full attack is conducted, would only observe two oracle queries (in the case of the attack from Sec. 2.5) which they have to answer with the resulting “garbled” decryption result.

However, note that conducting this attack against LibrePGP-based email encryption is not realistic, since an email client that is vulnerable against our attacks would also expose the vulnerability of SEIPD packets being downgradeable to SED Packets, which was exploited in the Efail attack [PDM⁺18]. This vulnerability can be exploited much more straightforwardly, i.e., with only a single modified ciphertext. Accordingly, for any application that also supports OpenPGP SEIPD packets, which clearly is the case for current email clients, the vulnerability of SEIPD packets would be the much greater problem.

The second conceivable scenario for a realistic decryption oracle would be the presence of format oracles [MRLG15]. A format oracle is given when an error message due to an invalid message format reveals information about the plaintext. Such an oracle might possibly also be exploitable via a timing side channel, which might allow to recover detailed information about the type of error and its position in the plaintext. On the one hand, a setting where format oracles reveal the values of individual octets in the decrypted plaintext during automated processing would lead to an even larger number of queries. On the other hand, such a setting would also make the execution of a large number of queries generally more feasible than in the case of required user interaction. However, we did not analyze this possibility further due to the absence of widely used applications that use OpenPGP or LibrePGP encryption in a protocol that makes oracle attacks feasible. Accordingly, this attack vector remains a hypothetical one.

⁷To give an idea about the number of required trials for the first oracle question: a Bernoulli chain with a success probability of 1.4% for each event and 50 events leads to a probability of $\approx 50\%$ for at least a single successful event. This means that after 50 queries for the initial oracle question, at least one successful answer can be expected with a probability of 50%.

3 Attacks on AES-CCM, AES-GCM, and AES Key Wrap in CMS

In this section we describe our novel attack against AES-CCM and AES-GCM in CMS. After giving some preliminaries in Sec. 3.1 and 3.2, we introduce our new attack in Sec. 3.3. In Sec. 3.4 we then discuss briefly the applicability of the attacks to S/MIME-encrypted emails and point out the possibility of CBC-downgrade attacks against AES Key Wrap in CMS in Sec. 3.5.

3.1 Hybrid encryption in CMS

Like OpenPGP, CMS employs a hybrid encryption model that realizes the content-encryption with two message parts. As the first part of a typical encrypted CMS message, a symmetric content-encryption key (CEK) is delivered by means of a *RecipientInfo* structure. The CEK is used to encrypt the content that follows as the second message part. This makes it possible to create an encrypted CMS message using the same CEK to multiple recipients, by supplying one *RecipientInfo* for each of them. CMS defines a number of *RecipientInfo* types [Hou09] that transfer the CEK using public-key and secret-key methods.

3.2 AEAD modes in CMS

RFC 5084 [Hou07] defines AES-CCM [Dwo04] and AES-GCM [Dwo07] as AEAD modes for CMS. Both of these AEAD modes employ the CTR mode for the data encryption with a publicly known nonce used as the basis for the derivation of the counter block, the encryption of which yields the key stream S :

$$S = (S_0, S_1, \dots, S_n) = (\text{AES-E}_k(\text{CTR}_0), \text{AES-E}_k(\text{CTR}_1), \dots, \text{AES-E}_k(\text{CTR}_n)),$$

where CTR_i is the counter block derived from the block index i and the AEAD nonce value. The details of the derivation of the counter blocks CTR_i for AES-CCM and AES-GCM in CMS are irrelevant to our attacks and thus are omitted here. Given the key stream S , the counter mode encryption is performed as $C = (C_0, C_1, \dots, C_n)$ with $C_i = P_i \oplus S_i$ and P_i being the i -th plaintext block. A non-full final block P_n is handled by truncating S_n and C_n to the same length as P_n .

3.3 A cross-mode attack against CMS AEAD modes

In the following, we describe an attack in which the attacker generates a CBC ciphertext that, when decrypted by a CBC decryption oracle, allows the decryption of a low entropy block in an AES-CCM or AES-GCM ciphertext. It is in principle analogous to the previously published attack against XML encryption [JPS13], but improves upon it regarding the number of necessary oracle queries: while the previous work only decrypts a single block guess in one oracle query, in our attack the decryption of all block guesses are performed simultaneously in one oracle query. This improvement is, however, only effective for a decryption oracle which returns the complete plaintext to the attacker. When a padding oracle or format oracle is exploited, the parallelisation of block decryption queries will naturally not work, since such an oracle typically only allows at most the determination of a single byte per oracle query.

The attack is executed as follows:

- Generate the set of h guesses $\{U_i\}$ with $i \in \{1, \dots, h\}$ for the target plaintext block P_t at position t in the original CMS AEAD ciphertext. The corresponding ciphertext block in the target CTR ciphertext is labelled C_t .

- Compute the corresponding set of guessed key stream blocks $\{Q_i = U_i \oplus C_t | i = 1, \dots, h\}$.
- Create the CBC ciphertext as the oracle input:
 - Choose CBC-IV as Q_0 arbitrarily.
 - Form the CBC ciphertext as the sequence of the guess blocks $(Q_i | i = 1, \dots, h)$.
- Then the CBC decryption oracle will compute the sequence of plaintext blocks: $(P_i = \text{AES-D}_k(Q_i) \oplus Q_{i-1} | i = 1, \dots, h)$.
- The attacker receives the plaintext (P_i) and computes the block sequence $(X_i = P_i \oplus Q_{i-1} | i = 1, \dots, h)$. This sequence represents the block-wise decryption of (Q_i) .
- Let H_t be the counter block at position t in the AEAD ciphertext, i.e., for the correct guess of the target key stream block Q_v at index $v \in \{1, \dots, h\}$ we have $Q_v = \text{AES-E}_k(H_t)$.
- Note that for the correct guess we have $X_v = \text{AES-D}_k(Q_v) \oplus Q_{v-1} \oplus Q_{v-1} = \text{AES-D}_k(Q_v) = H_t$.
- Thus, if the attacker finds a block $X_v = H_t$ in $(X_i | i = 1, \dots, h)$ then
 - the guess $Q_v = U_v \oplus C_t$ for the key stream block is correct
 - and thus the corresponding guess U_v for the plaintext block P_t is correct.

Note that since CMS does not place any restrictions on the format of the decrypted content, in contrast to the case of LibrePGP or OpenPGP legacy decryption oracles, on the level of CMS all oracle queries are successful. This may not apply to protocols used on top of CMS, as we elaborate in the next section.

3.4 Applicability to S/MIME-encrypted emails

S/MIME [STR19] builds upon CMS, making it directly vulnerable to attacks on CMS. In the case of email, in principle, a decryption oracle can easily be realized by a human user viewing the “garbled” mail in his mail user agent (MUA) and replying with the quoted original message to the attacker, as described in Sec. 1. However, as already pointed out in that section and also in Sec. 2.8, the ability to display such a “garbled” message implies other more severe vulnerabilities regarding the manipulation of legacy-mode-encrypted messages [PDM⁺18]. Accordingly, it can be expected that well-maintained MUAs realize countermeasures that make such decryption oracle attacks hard or infeasible. We found that for instance the widely used MUA Thunderbird refuses to display CBC-encrypted emails where a single byte was manipulated (leading to a full random binary plaintext block according to the properties of CBC).

However, as the work by Ising et al. [IPK⁺23] shows, there might exist more sophisticated attack vectors exploiting automated and observable message processing by MUAs.

3.5 Downgrade Attacks against AES Key Wrap in CMS

As pointed out already by Jager et al. [JPS13], the availability of a CBC decryption oracle allows to decrypt keys encrypted with AES Key Wrap according to RFC 3394 [SH02a]. This is due to the fact that the Key Wrap decryption algorithm employs the block cipher decryption operation under the respective key encryption key (KEK) as the

only secret operation. Accordingly, an attack can be mounted by running the AES Key Wrap decryption (unwrap) operation and querying the CBC decryption oracle analogously to the attack given in Sec. 3.3 whenever the block cipher block decryption is required.

As an example for a potentially vulnerable setup, RFC 6160 specifies the cryptographic protection of a Symmetric Key Package [Tur11] in CMS. It prescribes that AES Key Wrap with Padding [HD09] be used as the content-encryption algorithm. Accordingly, attacks downgrading AES Key Wrap to CBC encryption are possible. The attacker simply starts the execution of the “Extended Key Unwrapping Process” defined in [HD09], and whenever he needs the block decryption operation, he queries the CBC decryption oracle by submitting the same CMS message, exchanging only the encrypted content to regular CBC encrypted content and placing the block to be decrypted as the ciphertext. Figure 3 in App. C depicts the attack on the basis of the CMS data structures. Note that CMS generally specifies the typical redundant padding scheme to be applied when the content-encryption algorithm operates on the granularity of blocks, where each unused byte in the final block has the value of the number of unused bytes [Hou09, Sec. 6.3]. Thus a generic padding oracle is indeed conceivable in CMS implementations.

Such an attack is always possible when an AES Key Wrap algorithm is used as the content-encryption algorithm and a block decryption oracle for the same content-encryption key is available, here given through a CBC decryption oracle. The vulnerability is thus manifest in CMS independently of the specific application context of the Symmetric Key Package content. It also equally applies to the original AES Key Wrap without padding [SH02b, Dwo12].

4 Responsible disclosure

Prior to the publication of our results, we informed both the GnuPG and the RNP project as the only implementations of LibrePGP OCB Packets known to us. The maintainer of the GnuPG project declared that GnuPG was not vulnerable to the described attacks without setting the `ignore-mdc-error` configuration property to allow for SED decryption. However, as described in Sec. 2.2, due to the specific way GnuPG behaves without this configuration property being set when decrypting SED packets, our attacks may still be seen as applicable to the default configuration of GnuPG (given the non-zero exit code from GnuPG does not prevent the decrypted content from being displayed). Moreover, LibrePGP is a general standard and other implementations may behave differently regarding whether and how SED decryption is supported.

We disclosed the vulnerability of the AES-based AEAD schemes in CMS on the LAMPS mailing list⁸ as it might have affected the ongoing standardization of the KEMRecipientInfo. This working group inside the IETF is responsible for amending the CMS standards framework. As a result, a new RFC to address the vulnerability was adopted by the LAMPS working group, as further explained in Sec. 5.1.

The vulnerability of AES Key Wrap in CMS was not separately disclosed by us. We did not see any necessity for this, since, as explained in Sec. 5, the countermeasure proposed for the AES-based AEAD schemes equally prevents the attack on AES Key Wrap, at least the straightforward one described in Sec. 3.5.

5 Countermeasures

We discuss appropriate countermeasures to thwart the presented attacks against AEAD in LibrePGP and CMS.

⁸https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/TTtMQ1cpGRq_bThfJl-HnqqGLGI/

5.1 Employment of a key derivation

The appropriate countermeasure to thwart AEAD downgrade attacks is to apply a key derivation to the session key to ensure that each symmetric encryption mode uses a different content-encryption key. The underlying paradigm is known as *key separation*. Such a measure has been realized in RFC 9580 [WHWN24], the official successor of the previous OpenPGP standard [CDF⁺07]. One important feature of the key derivation function is that it may not be built from the block cipher encryption under the input key, as in that case the key derivation itself might be subject to downgrade attacks.

According to the feedback that we received from the GnuPG maintainer, a corresponding countermeasure in the LibrePGP specification is not foreseen.

For CMS, as the consequence of the revelation of our attack, RFC 9709 [Hou25] was drafted and subsequently published by the LAMPS working group. It specifies an optional key derivation using HKDF [KE] to be applied to the key encrypted in the RecipientInfo in order to derive the content-encryption key. The content-encryption algorithm ID enters the key derivation as the additional *info* input parameter to the HKDF and thus makes the derived key dependent on the content-encryption algorithm.

This proposed countermeasure in CMS effectively prevents both the attacks against the AES-based AEAD schemes as well as against AES Key Wrap as a content-encryption algorithm. However, besides functioning as a content-encryption algorithm, there are other potential uses of AES Key Wrap in CMS which are not affected by this countermeasure, such as in the KEKRecipientInfo. In the KEKRecipientInfo, a previously exchanged symmetric key encryption key (KEK) is identified as to be used for the decryption of the content-encryption key. If a receiving implementation accepted AES-CBC as a key-encryption algorithm specified in the KEKRecipientInfo, then it would still be vulnerable. A cursory test of the OpenSSL command line CMS tool showed that it does not perform decryption based on a KEKRecipientInfo that specifies AES-CBC as the content decryption algorithm.⁹ Furthermore, there is the remote possibility that the KEK used in the KEKRecipientInfo can be used for content decryption in a different context. This could be the case in a custom key management mechanism, as can be implemented in CMS via the generic OtherRecipientInfo structure. Then again, it is conceivable that in such a custom setup the previously exchanged KEK can be used for content decryption and thus a CBC decryption oracle could reveal the content-encryption key. Accordingly, though we could not identify a straightforward attack route against such uses of AES Key Wrap, insecure uses of it that are vulnerable to CBC downgrade attacks cannot be entirely precluded in the context of CMS.

Besides providing key separation between the different encryption modes, it is advisable to also ensure key separation between different ciphers. Otherwise, should it be the case that one cipher supported by the protocol can be used to leak the key through the decrypted plaintext, then a cross-cipher decryption oracle attack might be used to reveal the key of a strong cipher. For the proposed solution in the LAMPS draft, key separation between ciphers is fulfilled, since the algorithm identifiers in CMS are specific for the encryption mode as well as for the cipher [Hou07].

5.2 Disabling SED decryption in LibrePGP

A straightforward implementation countermeasure effective for the current state of LibrePGP is to not support the deprecated SED decryption. However, this countermeasure has the drawback that it can only be enforced by the receiving client and for the sender

⁹In the master branch of https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/crypto/cms/cms_env.c, at least up to the commit e87a347, viewed on 2025-01-10, the routine responsible for the decryption of the KEK in a KEKRecipientInfo, `cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_decrypt`, always assumes the usage of a Key Wrap variant as the key-encryption algorithm.

of an OCB Packet it would remain unknown if the receiving client is vulnerable or not. Furthermore, it would make it impossible for users to decrypt stored legacy data that was still encrypted with SED. The current LibrePGP specification only discourages but does not forbid the support of SED decryption and mandates precaution measures for it: “This [i.e., SED] packet is obsolete. An implementation **MUST NOT** create this packet. An implementation **MAY** process such a packet but it **MUST** return a clear diagnostic that a non-integrity protected packet has been processed. The implementation **SHOULD** also return an error in this case and stop processing.”¹⁰ This prescription is of course ambiguous, since “MAY process” and “SHOULD [...] stop processing” are obviously conflicting choices. Accordingly, it may be said that GnuPG realizes this countermeasure, but nevertheless the attack is still possible when a calling application or a human user of GnuPG’s command line interface accepts the decryption result despite the non-zero exit code of GnuPG, as explained in Sec. 2.2.

The application of the analogous countermeasure to CMS as a general one is infeasible as of today, since contrary to the SED encryption in OpenPGP, CBC-encryption is still widely used in CMS, for instance in S/MIME-encrypted emails.

6 Conclusion

In this work we introduce novel attacks exploiting the same principal design error in LibrePGP and CMS AEAD encryption, as well as certain uses of the AES Key Wrap in CMS, namely the absence of an algorithm-dependent key derivation for the content-encryption key in order to ensure key separation between the different encryption modes. The attacks against CMS are analogous to those previously published for XML encryption [JPS13]. While the attacks are shown to be realistic under the assumption of a fully-plaintext-revealing legacy-cipher-mode decryption oracle, we cannot point out any vulnerable real world application. On the contrary, we come to the conclusion that the presumably most widely deployed application layer protocols using these two cryptographic protocols, namely secure email with PGP/MIME and S/MIME, will be affected by our attacks to a lesser degree than by previous attacks against legacy-mode-encrypted emails like for instance Efail [PDM⁺18]. However, experience has shown that the reliance on the unexploitability of principal cryptographic vulnerabilities due to the specifics of typical protocol and application implementations is often unfounded. This is apparent for instance regarding the recurrence of padding oracle attacks against CBC [Mö14, AFP13] and PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption [Ble98, BSY18] in TLS. Works like [IPK⁺23] show that through unexpected features of applications, observable decryption oracles may exist even where the nature of the protocol does not suggest their presence. Consequently, we hold that our results for LibrePGP and CMS should be taken seriously and appropriate countermeasures be integrated into these protocols.

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A Erratum: OpenPGP SEIPD packets and adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks

v1 SEIPD packets specified in OpenPGP have the shortcoming that they can be downgraded to SED packets and then the malleability of SED packets can be used to modify the message [Per02, Mag15]. See also [PDM⁺18] for comprehensive overview of further aspects to the downgrade attacks and their exploitation in a decryption oracle attack.

Besides pointing out the above shortcoming of v1 SEIPD, this appendix section serves as an erratum to the version of the paper published originally at ePrint¹¹ and in the CIC Journal¹². The appendix in the original version gave the description of an attack demonstrating the vulnerability of v1 SEIPD packets, using the so-called “MDC system” for integrity protection, to adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks. However, the attack was based on the erroneous modelling of the MDC computation as

$$\text{mdc} = \text{SHA1}(\text{LIT-hdr} \parallel \text{message} \parallel \text{final octets}),$$

whereas in reality the MDC computation also incorporates the prefixed CFB-randomization string r , which has a length of one cipher block plus two octets:

$$\text{mdc} = \text{SHA1}(r \parallel \text{LIT-hdr} \parallel \text{message} \parallel \text{final octets}).$$

The devised erroneous attack is based on a crafted message which contains an embedded complete MDC message that can be extracted from the ciphertext and fed to the decryption oracle to test for its presence by achieving proper decryption including the MDC verification.

However, since the first block of the randomization string is decrypted with an all-zero IV, it is not possible for the attacker to predict the value of r' or the randomization string resulting for the tested message. We have $r' \neq r$, with r being the value of the randomization string in the originally embedded message, with overwhelming probability, since in the embedded message the respective ciphertext block is preceded by a non-zero

¹¹<https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1110>

¹²<https://cic.iacr.org/p/2/1/19>

ciphertext block which takes on the function of the IV. Since knowledge of r' is needed for the MDC computation, the attack does not work. See Figure 2 for a detailed depiction.

We are indebted to Bruce Walzer for pointing out this error to us.




Figure 2: Depiction of an attempted adaptively chosen ciphertext attack against SEIPD encryption assuming a block size of 16 bytes. Here, $E()$ indicates block encryption under the given block cipher key and $\oplus$ denotes XOR. The violet plaintext consisting of the bytes $p_{1,0}, p_{1,1}, \dots$ is the message M_0 prepared by the attacker enveloped in the outer LIT packet with the header $LIT-hdr_2$. Above the blocks $P_0, P_1, \dots$, the semantic interpretation of the decrypted plaintext is depicted in the same color. The light blue boxes show the resulting ciphertext C . The red and orange boxes represent the manipulated ciphertext C' and the plaintext resulting from its decryption. Here the red boxes represent repositioned ciphertext and plaintext blocks and the orange ones entirely different blocks. The red and orange arrows and XOR operators indicate the data flows and operations during decryption of C' . Since, as indicated by the orange boxes, the implicit IV of the all-zero block of the repositioned message is different from the originally preceding cipher block, the attacker cannot predict the value of r' .

Table 5: Structure of the additional data for the GnuPG AEAD chunks. The individual fields' encodings are omitted here since they are irrelevant to the described attack.

field	size in bytes	in chunks ...
Packet Tag in new format encoding	1	all
version number	1	all
cipher algorithm	1	all
encryption mode	1	all
chunk size	1	all
big-endian chunk index	8	all
msg. total bytes length	8	only in final

B Structure of the additional data in a LibrePGP OCB Packet OCB chunk

The structure of the additional data of each chunk in a LibrePGP OCB Packet is shown in Table 5.

C Depiction of the attack against the AES Key Wrap decryption operation in CMS

Fig. 3 depicts the attacks against AES Key Wrap in CMS that are given in Sec. 3.5.




Figure 3: Depiction of the attack against CMS EnvelopedData for the protection of Symmetric Key Package Content Types [Tur11]. In the upper half, the asymmetric decryption of the RecipientInfo structure is shown, which is the same for the decryption of the regular ciphertext as well as during the attack. In the lower half, on the left hand side the processing of the original symmetric ciphertext is shown, where the symmetric decryption is performed using the AES Key Wrap algorithm. At the bottom the attack algorithm is depicted. It is given by simply executing the AES Key Wrap decryption algorithm by using the CBC decryption oracle whenever the AES block decryption operation under the content-encryption key (CEK) must be performed. On the right hand side, the processing of the corresponding attacker-modified symmetric ciphertext is shown. Since the encryptedContentAlgorithm field, which signifies the symmetric decryption algorithm to use, is not cryptographically protected, the attacker can cause the query ciphertext to be decrypted under the same CEK as for the original ciphertext. The encrypted content is CBC-decrypted, and the attacker may learn the decryption result from a CBC padding oracle.