Probabilistic Bounds on the Impact of Potential Data Integrity Attacks in Microgrids

Abstract

Microgrids are being increasingly adopted in electric power distribution systems to facilitate distributed energy resource integration and to provide resilient operations. Modern microgrids rely on sophisticated cyber communications and controls to maintain stable operation. Attacks on this cyber infrastructure can cause the system to undertake a potentially destabilizing control action. In this work, we present the results of a reachability analysis in which we determine whether a potential attack vector can result in actions that make an unstable state "reachable" in some time interval from the current state. Specifically, our analysis must be executed on a timescale that heads off the destabilizing system states due to malicious attacks. To that end, we propose a sensitivity analysis that assesses the worst-case impact of attack scenarios of interest while identifying reachable unstable states in the required time budget. This concept can be used to develop a tool to support DER control decisions under adverse conditions. Numerical tests are provided to validate the effectiveness of the attack reachability analysis.