Israel, Palestine and a Shared Homeland

By Anselm Kiersch, Oslo, Norway

February 2012

The Problem
In 20 years of peace talks the parties have been close to an agreement several times.
They have reached agreements on the settlements, on territory and even on Jerusalem,
but two contradicting demands have always prevented a final agreement:
Israel wants to stay a Jewish democratic state with a Jewish majority on the long
run.
2. The Palestinians insist on the refugees right to return to Palestine.
1.

These demands cannot be fulfilled 100% for both parties. Usually one would suggest
that a 50/50% solution would be a just one, but these demands are so essential for both
parties, that this is not possible.
Now the ongoing settlement building has made a two state solution more and more
unlikely to occur, because Israel will not be able to remove 10% of its population from
the settlements and a Palestinian state without its economic center in and around
Jerusalem will not be a viable state. The goal of this plan proposal is to present a smart
solution where both a Jewish democratic state and the Palestinian right of return is
possible to an 80/80% degree for both parties.

National Versus Binational Society

In Israel 92% of Jews in Israel live today in natural regions where there is a Jewish
majority of over 90%. Also most Palestinians live in a mono-national society in Gaza as
well as area A and area B in the West Bank. Therefore a majority of both people prefer
a two state solution where both people can live in their own national state. There are
however substantial parts of mainly rural areas in Israel and on the West Bank where
the population ratio between Jews and Palestinians lies between 70/30 and 30/70. There
people live de facto in a binational society. In some parts like Galilee they can build on
a tradition of peaceful coexistence, whereas in other parts like on the West Bank the
relationship is rather hostile. But also here good neighbourhood and cooperation will be
inevitable and for the best of both communities after a peace agreement is signed.
As further outlined in Annex 1 the optimal rule in a binational society is quite different
and contradictory to that of a national state. A state cannot represent a nation and be
neutral on the national issue itself like in a binational state. Therefore it is not possible
to find one kind of rule that fits both the mono- and the bi-national areas at once. Thus it
is for the best of the people to have a national rule in the national States of Israel and
Palestine, and a binational rule in areas with a binational society.

The Solution: Subdivision in 3 parts

The main feature of the plan is the subdivision of the entire area of Israel-Palestine into
tree parts, two national states and one binational entity, as shown at
https://sites.google.com/site/3stateconfederation/ or on map 1:

The Jewish State of Israel (national)

The Palestinian State (national)
The Shared Homeland of Israel-Palestine (binational).

The Shared Homeland belongs to both Israel and Palestine, but to none of them
exclusively. Thus the whole of the Jewish Homeland will consist of the State of Israel
and the Shared Homeland (map 2) as well as the whole of the Palestinian Homeland
will consist of the Palestinian State as well as of the Shared Homeland (map 2). Thus
both homelands are a lot larger than in any proposal of a two state solution. That is
possible if both parts are willing to give up any exclusive national claim on these areas.
For further geographical detail and reasoning about the division see Annex 3.

Demography
The Non-Jewish population in Israel today is not spread around the country, but is
living in certain areas, where their population share is quite substantial. These areas will
be part of the Shared Homeland. All major settlements on the West Bank as well as
areas with a high concentration of minor settlements and highly intersected areas around
Jerusalem (map 4) will be part of the Shared Homeland too. Without these areas the
remaining Jewish State of Israel will have a long-term sustainable majority of over 97%
Jews. The majority of Palestinians in the Palestinian State will be of a similar size. In
the Shared Homeland there will be almost an equal share of both populations, with a
slight majority of Palestinians in the areas derived from Israel, and a slight majority of
Jews in the areas derived from the West Bank.

Joint Administration of the Shared Homeland, Confederation of The

3 Sovereign States or a Federation of Israel-Palestine
The subdivision into 3 areas fits to different state concepts within Israel-Palestine: A
two state solution with a joint administration of the Shared Homeland, a
Confederation of 3 Sovereign States, or a Federal Republic of Israel-Palestine. A
more detailed description of power sharing within the Confederation is given in Annex
2. Since this is a medium solution between the two others, it fits to the joint
administration and the Federal Republic as well with some adjustments:
1.

Joint administration of the Shared Homeland: That is a two state solution, where
the two states will agree on terms how to administer the Shared Homeland together
with the regional parliament and government of the Shared Homeland. A model like
that of the Confederation with a Council elected by the national States of Israel and
Palestine can be applied to this solution as well, just that these institutions do not
have any confederal sovereignty, and their only task is to administer the Shared
Homeland. The Shared Homeland is not a sovereign state, but will be represented by
the two other states on foreign affairs. For the rest the description in Annex 2 can be
applied.

Confederation of The 3 Sovereign States: A detailed description of that model is

given in Annex 2. In this model only a few areas of common interest and
cooperation are delegated from sovereign states to the confederal level.
3. The Federal Republic of Israel-Palestine: In this solution the de facto one-state
solution as it exists today is recognised, the Israeli social, healthcare and state
system is applied for all inhabitants of Israel-Palestine, Israel is transformed to the
Federal Republic of Israel-Palestine, which consists of two national states, the
Jewish State of Israel and The Palestinian State, as well as the binational Shared
Homeland. The Federal Republic has responsibility for the common marked, taxes,
finances, security cooperation and foreign affairs. The IDF remains under the
control of the State of Israel for the near future, but the long-term plan is to convert
it into a federal army. Sovereignty on citizenship, immigration, culture and
education remains on state level as described in Annex 2.
2.

Citizenship, Electoral Rights and the Right of Return

Citizenship and immigration is in any case a matter of the national states of Israel and
Palestine and will not fall under the sovereignty of the Confederation or the Federation.
Thus Jews can practice the Law of Return to the State of Israel and Palestinians the
Right of Return to the State of Palestine. Most inhabitants of the Shared Homeland will
have either Israeli or Palestinian citizenship. In addition to that all of them will get the
Binational citizenship of the Shared Homeland, which is a residential citizenship. NonJewish Israeli citizens of the Shared Homeland can keep the Israeli citizenship, but will
loose the right to vote to the Knesset as long as they are living outside the State of Israel
in its new borders. That is an important part of the great compromise (see below) and
is internationally not that uncommon, as some European countries like Denmark have
similar regulations for their citizens living outside the country. All citizens however can
vote on the municipal level, on the state or regional level of the state/homeland they live
in and on the confederal or federal level.
Residency gives all rights as a citizen except the right to vote to the national parliament.
All citizens of Israel and Palestine can move to the Shared Homeland unconditionally.
In the confederal and federal solution there will be a common marked with free
movement of people and labour. For Israel that is however on the condition that the new
residents document that they can provide for themselves. That is not unusual in the EU
either. In addition to that the State of Israel is allowed to limit the immigration of
Palestinians to its territory to 30.000 a year.
For the right of return for the Palestinians that means in practice, that they can return
unconditionally to the State of Palestine and the Shared Homeland, and to Israel within
the above mentioned limits. Annex 4 goes more into details according to the refugee
problem and how to handle the right of return within a regional approach.

Security
According to military security the IDF will remain under the command of the State of
Israel for a foreseeable future. It will also be stationed in the part of the Shared
Homeland that is derived from Israel as well as in the Jordan Valley Canton (see Annex
2). For the rest of the West Bank internal security will be gradually handed over to the
local and/or the binational police forces in the Shared Homeland as well as to the police

of the PA in the Palestinian State within a transitional period of 2 years. This plan
contains not a details proposal for the security arrangements in a transitional phase, but
is referring on that issue to the plan of Raphael Gassel
(http://www.thebestplans.org/plans/32a-doc), where a detailed description of a
transitional security arrangements is given.

Summary: The Great Compromise

The main goal of the proposal has been to find a compromise where the Israeli and
Palestinian side by swallowing 20% of a bitter pill will get 80% of their essential
demands met:
1.

The bitter pill for both: Israel and Palestine give areas with a binational population
to the Shared Homeland, so their exclusive national territory will be less than in a
two state solution.

2.

The reward for Israel: The Jewish State of Israel will have a Jewish population of over 97%,
which is a much more sustainable demographic situation than today according to the future
of a Jewish and democratic state. It will in any of the proposed state models

have a constitutionally granted sovereignty on citizenship and the right to limit

immigration of Palestinians as residents down to 30.000 per year within its territory.
2. The reward for the Palestinians: They will get the unconditional right of return to
the Palestinian Homeland, which consists of ca. 2/3 of the habitable area of IsraelPalestine (south of Dimona is just desert), and a limited right of return to the State of
Israel as stated above.
1.

A summary of other advantages of the plan is listed in Annex 5.

How to Implement any Plan

The 20 years of peace talks have revealed that there have never been two equal parts
negotiating. While Israel is now blaming the Palestinian side for taking unilateral
actions at the UN, it has itself taken unilateral actions in all the years by illegal
expropriations, house demolitions and increased settlement building. The Israeli logic of
overwhelming power has been: If you had accepted the UN partition plan in 1947, then
you would have got 50%. If the Arab countries had not prepared for war in 1967, there
would not have been any occupation. If you had accepted the solution in 2000, we
would have agreed on the 1967 borders. Now there are different facts on the ground,
so we cannot negotiate on the basis of the 1967 borders any more. And if you do not
come back to the table soon to negotiate on the pizza while we are eating it up bit for
bit, there might not be any thing left at the end, so you better concede now before it is
too late.
It has always been clear that in terms of power the two parts have never been equal, but
maybe the Palestinians have expected a bit of fairness at least from the USA. Now it is
clear for all that the US have never been an honest broker and that mere power is the
only ting that counts. I wish I could be more neutral on that question, to say, both parts
should , but that is not possible considering how the peace process has developed

until now. The authors of any progressive peace plan that includes some right of return
for the Palestinians should not have any illusion on that: The mere discussion of the
plans, dialogue and public agitation for them will not change ANYTHING, as long as
the balance or power is not more equal on both sides. The Israeli public has learned:
The left wing government has bought us terrorists, the right wing has brought security
and ensures that we can keep most of the colonial privileges we had (on water, land,
civil rights etc) regardless the outcome of any agreement. Therefore it seems that some
kind of right wing government will stay in power for a long time to come. No colonist
regime has ever given up its privileges by mere fairness towards the colonised, but
only through inside and outside pressure. The 20 years of peace talks have shown, that
Israel is not exception to that.
Four factors have the potential to balance the power between the parties and are
therefore a part of the implementation strategy of the plan:
International support of the BDS movement is important so that it eventually
succeeds in implementing international sanctions on Israel in the same way like
South Africa. BDS has a right-based approach based on international law. By that it
will indirectly support any just solution by strengthening the power of the occupied.
2. The Palestinians should go on with applying for membership in more and more UN
institutions. Especially membership in the IAEA would cause major problems for
the USA, because it would force them to quit collaboration with the agency, which
is not in their national interest. Unfortunately Israel will probably stop paying the
PA, thus causing a loss of money and power for the Palestinian political elites, but
for the cause of balancing power it would be the best to go on with the UN
applications.
3. The Palestinians including the authorities should systematically promote the
knowledge of the non-violent strategies and tactics according to Gene Sharp and his
followers. There are many non-violent tactics that have not been tried yet, and that
could increase the internal pressure on the regime.
4. It is essential that the resistance is ABSOLUTELY PEACEFUL including the
ceasing of throwing stones. The picture of dead Jews on Western TV screens would
again provoke and sustain an unconditional solidarity reflex of their societies with
Israel, setting Israels security above all other standards, including basic human
rights for the Palestinians. Israel has until now got away with all kinds of destructive
and deadly collective punishment imposed on the Palestinians, because of this
unconditional solidarity reflex, that is based on the Western worlds own
unprocessed guilt about their historical responsibility towards the Jews. When Israel
will gradually loose this unconditional support due the success of the BDS
movement and internal resistance by the occupied, than Israeli politicians might set
up traps like Sharon did in 2000 by his walk on the Temple mount to provoke
violent actions by the Palestinians again. Therefore Palestinians should
systematically prepare for those cases so that the resistance remains peaceful
regardless of any provocation. Sabotage and damage on property might be
considered as legitimate means of resistance, but all violent actions that kill Jews
would only prolong the Israeli colonist and apartheid regime.
1.

Annex 1: Mono-national contra bi-national societies and

states
The following table illustrates the fundamental differences between a one-nation state
and societies that are based on two or more people with different language, culture or
ethnicity. The term binational is meant as a special case of a multinational or
multicultural society. Experiences from countries like Singapore, Switzerland, Canada,
Belgium and Yugoslavia are summarised and contrasted to the widely known concept
of a nation state.
Mono-national society and
state
Definition
A society where 90% or more
of its people share a common
language, culture and ethnicity
and up to ca. 10% belong to
other minorities.
Most
The nation is a matter of
appropriate
identification for the state as a
relation between nation state. People of the
state and nation minority groups are protected
and enjoy minority rights.

Binational society and state

A society where there are living two

people who each share their own
language, culture and ethnicity. The
population of each people exceeds
20 30 % of the entire population.
The state is neutral according to
both nations, is serving the needs of
its citizens, facilitating peaceful
coexistence of both people and
protecting other minorities (like in
Singapore).
National
National symbols and holidays National symbols and holidays are
symbols and
are expressed on state level,
allowed, but are a matter of private
holidays
serving to create and maintain preference, like religion is in secular
a collective national identity.
states. Holidays are administered on
a local level.
Nationalism, for Nationalism is serving the
Nationalism is perceived as a threat
example
collective identity of the
to peaceful coexistence, leads to
Zionism or
majority, gives security in
escalation of conflict and is a
Palestinian
times of crises, is regarded as a negative value. A binational state
nationalism
positive value as long as it is
has to find a balance between not
not extremist and respectful to suppressing expression of national
minorities.
feelings (like in former Yugoslavia),
but setting limits to intolerant
nationalistic organisations that try to
split and destroy the binational
society.
Official
The national language is
Both national languages are official
language
official language.
languages.
Political
Decisions in the government
Consensus orientated governments,
decisions in a
and parliament are made with broad coalitions so none of the two
democracy
low margins around 50%. The nations are overruled. If there is not
opposition may take over after a consensual tradition to build on
next elections without
(like in Switzerland) a
threatening the national
constitutionally granted demand of
consensus.
60 80% majority for all decisionmaking can serve that cause.

Leading or main The majority culture is

culture
accepted as the main one.
Minorities are protected as
long as they accept being a
minority and are not
challenging majority culture as
the leading one.
Education and
Regulations for schools and
cultural
curricula are at state level.
institutions
Cultural institutions can be
state or local level.

No culture is the leading culture.

High tolerance and local differences
belong to the binational identity.
Claims of one culture to be the
leading one can create fear, lead to
conflict, war and ethnic cleansing.

The binational state is giving a

framework for tolerance for school
curricula. For the rest schools and
cultural institutions are organised on
municipal level.
Stability of the A certain degree of centralised Central consensus and high local
state
organisation and leadership
autonomy guaranteed by
gives stability.
constitution gives stability.
Demographic
Minorities under 10% are
Regional variety and changes in
changes in a
mostly accepted in nation
demography are tolerated within a
democratic state states, even though it can be
wide range, because the state is
serious challenge. Minorities
aught to be neutral according to
over 20 30% with an
nationality and ethnicity (like in
increasing population have a
Singapore). Therefore a binational
different quality and are widely state organisation is more suitable
perceived as at threat to the
for a society with a minority over 20
state as a nation state. That is
30%.
worldwide, not only in Israel.
Table shows that the different demands to a national and a binational state are rather
different and mostly contradictory. It is not the same to have minority protection in a
nation state or having the state being neutral on the national issue itself in a binational
state. It is the same in cases where states are neutral or not neutral according to religion.
In Germany with a mixed catholic and protestant population the state is strictly neutral
in all religious issues. In Egypt, Israel and to a certain extend also European states like
Ireland, Poland and Italy, the state is granting protection for minority religions, but it is
not religiously neutral like in Germany. In the same way a binational state has to be
neutral according to nationality. For a national state it is impossible to represent a nation
and be neutral on nationality itself at the same time. Therefore at state can be either
national or binational, not both.

Annex 2: The Confederation of The 3 Sovereign States

Even if there would be a 2 states agreement there will persist areas of conflict that have
to be dealt with continuously in the future. The risk is high that conflicts will escalate
again later due to unilateral actions of populist politicians on both sides. The European
history with centuries of war has shown that no peace treaty, no international appeals
and not even democracy is able to change this kind of dynamic, if one or both parts
consider themselves in a position where they can gain more than they will loose in
escalating a new conflict. First after establishing a confederation among the European
core nations, a lasting peace has been possible.

Therefore an EU-like Confederation of the three sovereign states is likely to be the best
framework for any lasting peace agreement, because a sustainable mechanism of first
talk, then act will be established right from the beginning and the cost of leaving the
table will be higher than coming to terms through negotiations.
It is therefore proposed that simultaneously to the founding of the 3 sovereign states
they will agree on founding a confederation with a binding set of rules for conflict
resolution or better a confederal constitution. The transition from the occupation to the 3
States Confederation is proposed to occur in 5 steps, either simultaneously or within a
short and previously agreed on timeline of a few days:
A referendum is held on the peace treaty and/or the Confederal Constitution.
Declaration of the State of Palestine and the Shared Homeland on its territories.
Israel recognises both states and, as the first act of their new sovereignty, Palestine
and the Shared Homeland recognise Israel as a Jewish state within its new
territories.
4. All three states found the Confederation of The 3 States and the Confederal
Constitution comes into effect.
5. Palestine becomes a full member of the UN. The Confederation gets enhanced
observer status at the UN like the EU.
1.
2.
3.

The distribution of sovereignty between the 3 states and the confederation is outlined in
following tables:
Confederation of The 3 States
Confederal Council
Function: Appoints the Commission. Can veto confederal laws.

Appointment: 16 members, each one appointed for 10 years by the states parliaments
(Israel 8, Palestine 5, Shared Homeland 3) and 16 representatives of the actual states
governments (Israel 8, Palestine 5, Shared Homeland 3).
Confederal Commission
Function: The confederal government.
President of the Commission is appointed by the Council and appoints the
Commissioners in agreement with the Council.
Confederal Parliament

Passes confederal laws, confirms Commission President and Commissioners

Election: By all citizens, regardless ethnicity, one-person-one-vote. Election threshold
3%.
Confederal Constitutional Court
Judging whether confederal or state laws and regulations are in accordance with the
peace agreement and the confederal constitution
Areas of sovereignty on the confederal level:
Control of external borders incl. airports
Security cooperation between the 3 state police forces, a confederal anti terror unit
Currency (Shekel), Central Bank
Water distribution and management

Tax collection and redistribution

Infrastructure and planning
Confederal foreign policy. Representing the Shared Homeland in foreign affairs.
Enhanced observer status at the UN, like the EU.
Control of the airspace and the electromagnetic spectrum
Common market framework
A framework for school curricula to avoid extremist education
State borders are national state borders, but in practical terms they are administrative
only: no intern border control, a common internal market, free travel and free movement
of labour and people. Immigration, citizenship and regulation of residency according to
state law.
Facilitate binational reconciliation, regional cooperation and mutual respect. Work out
new a framework for school curricula according to that purpose.
The name of the confederal institutions and their competencies are inspired by the EU
structure with a Council and a Parliament that can block each other in their decisions.
As all institutions in general they have an inert tendency to gain more power over time,
which could transform the Confederation more and more into a federation. But that will
only happen if the sovereign States agree on that, because they consider it to be in the
best interest to both sides. State sovereignty cannot be transferred to confederal level
without both states consent.
If the Confederal Council and the Parliament are blocking each other constantly, they
will loose influence more and more to the 3 sovereign States, and that would be against
their own interest as confederal institutions. Threatened by this prospect they will be
forced to negotiate and work out compromises on difficult issues. As mere
administrators of a peace agreement they will loose their legitimacy. Thus the
Confederal Council and the Parliament are existentially interested in finding a
compromise on important issues, and therefore a confederation is a much more stable
solution than a simple peace agreement alone or a joint administration of the Shared
Homeland.
The sovereignty of The 3 States implies:

Func State of Israel

tion

Shared Homeland

State of Palestine

Nam State of Israel or

e of
Jewish State of Israel
the
states

Shared Homeland of
Israel-Palestine

State of Palestine,
Palestinian State

State Home country and nation State of its citizens and

identi state of the Jewish People shared homeland of the
ty
Jewish and Palestinian
people. Neutral

Nation State of the

Palestinian People

concerning nationality,
building on the tradition
of peaceful coexistence
of both people
Territ Map 1 or
Divided into 7 Cantons: https://sites.google.com/s
ory,
https://sites.google.com/s https://sites.google.com/s ite/3stateconfederation/
se the ite/3stateconfederation/
ite/3stateconfederation/
maps
Demo Ca. 97% Jews
Cantons derived from
Probably 97%
Israel have a ca. 60%
Palestinians
graph
Palestinian, and those
y
derived from the West
Bank have a ca. 60%
Jewish majority.
Politi Continues as today:
The regional parliament Parliament, president and
cal
Knesset, President,
appoints the government, government according to
syste Premier Minister etc.
all highly consensual
Palestine constitution
m
(Swiss model). All
decisions demand 75%
majority. High municipal
autonomy.
Forei Israel Ministry of
Foreign affairs
Palestine Ministry of
gn
Foreign Affairs
represented by the
Foreign Affairs
affair
confederal authorities
s
UN
Full member of the UN
Represented by the
Full member of the UN
memb
Confederation, that holds
erenhanced observer status
ship
Milita IDF as today.
IDF under Israeli
Demilitarised zone.
ry,
command, stationed in
optio
the Cantons that are
n1
derived from Israel and
the Jordan Valley
Canton, but not in the
other 3 cantons derived
from the West Bank.
Committed to defence
against external threats
only. Must not interfere
with internal conflicts.
Optional military service
for Shared Homeland
citizens
Milita IDF as today.
IDF under Israeli
Demilitarised zone.
ry,
Long term perspective:
command, stationed in all Participation in a
optio Transformation of the
cantons. Committed to
Confederal Army as a
n2
IDF into a Confederal
defence against external long term perspective.
Army
threats only. Must not
interfere with internal

Immigratio
n
Citize
nship

Elect
oral
right
to the
nation
al
parlia
ment

Resid
ency
and
citize
nship
Migra
tion
betwe
en
states

Intern
al
securi
ty

According to the Law of

Return for Jews.
Israeli citizenship.
Double citizenship with
Binational citizenship
possible, but not with
Palestinian citizenship.

conflicts. Obligatory
military service for all
male Binational citizens.
Civilian service for
conscientious objectors.
Migration from within
the confederation.

Residents get Binational

citizenship automatically.
Ethnicity like Jew or
Palestinian will not be
registered. Double
citizenship is allowed.
Israelis and Palestinians
can keep their
citizenship.
Israeli citizens living in
All residents are citizens
Israel. Citizens living
and can vote even though
outside Israel are missing they have double
electoral rights to the
citizenship and vote to
Knesset (like in
their national parliaments
Denmark), but regain it
additionally.
when they move
back. Jewish citizens can
vote even though they are
living abroad.
Permit of residency
Residency implies
grants all rights as
Binational citizenship.
citizen, including vote in Citizens keep Binational
local and confederal
citizenship also when
elections, but not in state moving from the Shared
elections.
Homeland.
According to the free
Unconditional right to
movement of labour
reside for Israeli and
Palestinians can reside as Palestinian citizens.
long as they can provide Possibility for both
for themselves. They get people to found and/or
temporary permit of
expand
residency for 2 years at a villages/settlements by
time and permanent after buying land and
10 years or when married according to the states
with an Israeli citizen.
regional planning
The number of permits
regulations.
can be restricted to
30.000 per year.
Israel Police.
Binational Police and
local municipal police
forces will gradually take
over internal security

According to the Right of

Return for Palestinians
Palestinian citizenship.
Double citizenship with
Binational citizenship
possible, but not with
Israeli citizenship.

All Palestinian citizens.

The parliament may
decide on whether to give
electoral rights to
Palestinians in the
diaspora or not.

Permit of residency
grants all rights,
including vote in local
and confederal elections,
but not in state elections.
Jews have the same right
of residency in Palestine
as Palestinians have in
Israel.

Police of the PA

Cultu
re and
educa
tion

Social
and
health
servic
es

from the IDF within a

transitional period of 2
years.
Cultural institutions,
No authority on cultural
schools with curricula
and educational matters.
according to confederal
Framework for school
framework, high schools, curricula and Universities
universities.
are confederal, cultural
institutions and schools
are under local municipal
authority.
As now.
The Israeli system of
social and health services
and other Israeli resident
rights are extended to all
the whole of the Shared
Homeland.

Cultural institutions,
schools with curricula
according to confederal
framework, high schools,
universities.

Negotiations on to which
extend the Israeli system
is to be adopted.

Annex 3: The Geography of the 3 States and 7 Binational

Cantons
The task of the division between the two national states and the Shared Homeland is to
take into account history and population, but also to look at what gives meaning
according to the local geography and to create some geographically contiguous areas. A
detailed and zoom-able map is here:
https://sites.google.com/site/3stateconfederation/home .
The State of Israel consists of the same territories as today minus the territories of the
Galilee-Haifa, the Western, the Bedouin and the South Gaza/Besor Canton.
The Palestinian State in the West Bank consists of the entire area A, almost all area B
and some area C areas in between major area A territories including some minor
settlements. The States territory sets a limit to settlement extension in areas with a solid
Palestinian majority. Its borders to The Shared Homeland are drawn in a way that the
territory is contiguous in combination with the main roads of the West Bank. Some
important missing links for the road net around East Jerusalem are proposed in map 3
(red lines), as well as one link giving a better connection of the area around Jenin to the
main road net.
The Shared Homeland consists of 7 Cantons:
In Jerusalem the Old City and the Holy Basin are a part of the Shared Homeland. The
French Hill remains as a part of Israel as a solid connection to the Mount Scopus area.
All other settlements of East Jerusalem and its suburbs as well as those around
Bethlehem and Ramallah are a part of the Jerusalem Canton (map 3). Some minor
areas at the West Jerusalem border south of the old town are also included due to their
binational character and/or to enhance cooperation and responsibility on both sides
about disputed areas like park contra resident areas etc.

The Central West Bank Canton includes all major settlements in the area. The borders
to the Palestinian State are drawn so both parts can become geographically meaningful
units as much as possible. In the northern and southern outskirts of the West Bank some
areas with settlements are part of the neighbouring Bedouin, Jordan Valley and Western
Canton.
The Jordan Valley Canton is interrupted by Jericho, but for the rest it contains all
strategically important mountain ridges, that Israel is demanding for the IDF, that will
remain stationed in the canton.
The Western Canton consists of Israeli natural regions with a Palestinian majority
between Umm al-Fahm and Kafr Qasem. It follows to some extend the natural region
borders, but contains also some single Palestinian villages as well as some intersected
Jewish communities from other regions so the canton becomes a contiguous area with
the characteristically binational population represented in that region. The meaning of
the canton is not to create small Arab-only-islands along the 1967 border, but
meaningful binational units.
The borders of the Galilee-Haifa Canton follow the Haifa and Akko subdistrict and the
Hof HaKarmel and Nazareth natural region border. The two natural districts to the east
are only partly included so the anyway sparsely populated mountain ridges west of the
Sea of Galilee remain a part of the State of Israel due to strategic defence precautions.
The Bedouin Canton consists of the largely unpopulated area west of the Hebron-part
of the State of Palestine, the Bedouin town of Rahat as well as a larger area with
Bedouin and Jewish settlements reaching out to the outskirts of Beer Sheva, Dimona
and Arad.
The Southern Gaza/Besor Canton is the only canton that is initially not a binational
area. The southern half of it is desert and in the northern half part live about 15.000
almost exclusively Jewish people. The regional towns Sderot, Netivot and Ofakim are
not included, so the area is merely rural. The reason for the proposal of that canton is
that it is not sustainable in the long run to have 1,4 2 million Palestinians living right
up to an area that is so sparsely populated. The Israeli governments attitude to Gaza has
been so far: They are not our territory and thus not our problem, as long as they are not
firing rockets at us. This kind of humiliating and ignorant attitude is no longer possible
in a Confederation. The refugees there come originally from areas northeast from Gaza
that are now Israeli core area. Thus it is also in the interest of Israel to give Palestinians
in Gaza the opportunity to settle carefully in this canton in order to avoid residepressure in the north-eastern direction, which would create much more conflict. For the
farmers in the Besor region it can also be a good deal to sell a part of their land as
building land for Palestinian suburb settlements around Gaza. A predefinition and
administration as a Binational Canton would be the right framework to facilitate the
necessary dialogue and cooperation about a careful extension of the housing around the
city, so Gaza as one of the worlds most populated areas can get a natural binational
hinterland. That has to be carried out with respect to the Jewish population that is not
meant to be expelled. Experience and expertise from the other Binational Cantons and
the Shared Homeland will be helpful to resolve the conflicts that can emerge in that
process.

Annex 4: How to Solve the Refugee Problem

The Property Issue
The property issue is one of the most complex and can here only be outlined in some
examples and fundamental aspects. The return of property sounds initially like a just
solution, but that can be doubted, as the following examples show:
Case 1: A Palestinian family was forced out of their house in 1948 and a Sephardic Jew,
who was expelled from his home in Damascus after the Nakba, lives now on that
ground and owns it under Israeli law. Provided that both of them can get their
property back according to a law of return of property, the Palestinian family will get a
ground or house of good value, probably modernized, whereas the Jew would get a
house in Damascus. Even if there were not an ongoing civil war that house would
probably have a value of 1/10 or 1/20 of that of the house in Israel. That would
practically mean an expropriation of the Jew, even though he got his house back. That
is not just.
Case 2: A Palestinian wants to get his ground back form the new Israeli owner, goes to
the Israeli court without success, but get his demand finally met at an international court
of human rights. After that 1.000 other Palestinians get their property back in the same
way after 10 additional years in the courts. But in all these years about 100.000 or more
other house owners, who never get effected by any concrete claim, will have massive
losses on their property, because they live in areas, where it cannot be completely
excluded that some of the grounds are former Palestinian property. They cannot take
any new loan on their houses, cannot use them as a supplement to their pension, and
when they sell them, they will have substantial losses. That would de facto mean a
partial expropriation of many innocent Israelis, because this doubt on their grounds
will remain in all the years or even decades, where the courts are working with the
property cases. That is not just either.
When ethnic cleansing has persisted for more than one generation it is almost
impossible to give property back to the former owners without creating new injustice.
Therefore the only practical solution to that problem is, that return of property is
through compensation only, if there are new owners under Israeli law. The
compensation in these cases will be paid by the state.
In South Africa the Restitution of Property Program was an utter failure, even though
the government of the ANC, which had a majority of 80% in the parliament, supported
it. The following Redistribution of Property Program did not work either and had
caused even more ethnical divisions, where the new black owners blamed the white
farmers of obstructing, and the farmers blamed the new black owners that they did not
have the expertise to organise modern farming. The result was a decay of the farmland
to the great disappointment of both parties. In the same way the return of the Palestinian
refugees village by village into the old structures is not be possible, even if it would
have the full support of the Knesset. The returning refugees are not educated in farming,
and the elders, who might be, do not know much about modern farming techniques

either and can only loose in the highly competitive farming market. In addition to that
modern farming does only need 1/10 of the manpower that traditional farming did. If
one out of 10 people in a re-established village would get a job in farming, what would
the other 9 do all day? High unemployment rates would be inevitable as well as both
sides blaming each other for the failure.
The cruel fact of ethnic cleansing and expulsion over decades is, that the old structures
cannot be rebuilt and are gone forever. What CAN be granted however is the individual
right of return for Palestinians, those who find a job in Israel one by one and can
return to their homeland and build a new existence there.

Pressure on the Refugees from 4 Sides

Many refugees especially those in the refugee camps outside the country, are under
pressure from 4 sides:
Form Israel, by refusing them to return or even VISIT their homeland.
Many of the regional countries like Syria, Lebanon and the GCC countries by not
granting the refugees citizenship and/or equal rights like their own population. Some
of them, like Lebanon have even actively prevented integration for decades by
restricting working permissions and limit the freedom of movement outside the
camps.
3. Western countries have a restrictive immigration policy in general, including
Palestinian refugees.
4. There is little doubt that all Palestinians want the right of return as an option for
themselves, but there are indications, that most of the younger generation identify
more with the place they are born and do not want to actually move to IsraelPalestine. They seldom admit that as there exists a certain pressure of loyalty to the
older generation and to the national case of Palestine, so they do not want to be seen
ad traitors. It is likely that the UNRWA as a de facto Palestinian institution is
contributing to maintain that internal pressure. As long as the possibility does not
exist, that internal Palestinian pressure is not especially relevant, but in a review of
the solution of the refugee problem according to the right of return, it has to be taken
into account.
1.
2.

In a dignified solution of the refugee problem these 4 types of pressure have to be

relieved, so every single refugee can ask him- or herself: What do I really want? Do I
want to stay where I am? Do I want to move to Israel-Palestine? Or do I want to
emigrate to an other country?

The 5 Stages of Loss

In working with dying people Elisabeth Kbler-Ross has developed her famous 5 stages
of loss, which can be applied to all kinds of losses. Before accepting a loss people
usually get through these stages:
1.
2.

Denial (the reality of the loss is denied),

Anger (about the fact or those who caused the fact)

Bargaining (making an inner deal, if I just can then I am ready to accept the
loss)
4. Depression (profound grief over the loss and realisation that it is an unchangeable
fact)
5. Acceptance (being able to get at peace with the loss and get on with life)
3.

For people who lost a relative where the body was never found, it is much harder to get
over the stages of anger and bargaining onto acceptance, then for those who have a
physical manifestation of the loss in form of the body. The same is the case for refugees
who never had the possibility to visit their lost homeland again. They are more likely to
get stuck on the stage of anger, thus increasing the risk for development of terrorism. In
1945 46 for instance 15 million Germans were forced to flee from what was then the
Eastern parts of Germany as an act of collective punishment for the Nazi regime. For
many of them it was important to be able to visit their lost homeland again some years
or decades afterwards, well knowing that they will never return, but to see the well
known landscape, to acknowledge that it is a different country now, that is very
different from what they remember and belongs to an other people, and get at peace
with the fact that the old world of childhood is a memory only and will never return.
Therefore it is important to a solution for the refugees (and it is also in the interest of
Israel!), that the refugees can visit their lost homeland, not only to maintain relations to
their relatives, but also in order to facilitate a broader acceptance of the loss. Therefore
opening up to the possibility for the refugees to visit Israel within certain security
arrangements would not boost, but rather prevent future terrorism.
If we assume that many of the refugees may have got stuck at the stage of anger, the
possibility to visit Israel would help to the next phase of bargaining. If I just could visit
then I possibly can accept. For the next phase of grief it would be helpful if
Palestinians could build some museums or other respected places of grief and memory
about the Nakba in Israel. Some might want to burry the key they still have at such
respected places, or perform other rituals that might facilitate the phase of grief so that
they can get peace with the loss. For others it might be enough to take some photos. In
any case the refugees visiting Israel-Palestine would get a much more realistic picture of
how their old homeland has been developed since they left and what a possible return
would imply for them.
Another important point to facilitate acceptance is that Israel has to apologise for the
Nakba. Even right wing Israeli historians admit that the expulsion of Palestinians was
not due to the war, but a part of an organised plan in order to create a Jewish state where
the Palestinians will be a minority. As all victims of the holocaust, or victims of rape or
other crimes know: The worst you can do to a victim of those crimes is to deny that the
crime happened (statements like Palestine was empty) or to blame the victim for that.
Therefore an apology from Israel is essential for the Palestinian refugees, as it is
essential for the Jewish refugees to get an apology from those Arab states where they
have been forced to flee from.

Practical Consequences for the Refugees and the Right of Return

The right of return is an individual right for any Palestinian as the law of return is
for any Jew.
There will be no organised village-by-village return, because that is not possible,
and because the return to the State of Israel requires an individual application and is
only given to those who can provide for themselves, i.e. for those who have a job in
Israel.
Return of property that is owned by Israeli citizens or institutions today will be
solved by compensation only, as the factual return only will create new injustice
(see above).
Israel is advised to permit refugees to visit Israel and the occupied territories as soon as
possible, also before an agreement is signed. That would facilitate the process of the 5
stages of loss onto acceptance and prevent further hostilities. It would not be complicated to
implement that regarding security. Refugees would have to apply for visa, have to travel in
minor groups, not over 100 for example, are not allowed to

demonstrate or cause other forms for unrest and those who do not comply to
these demands will lose the right to visit Israel for another time.
Palestinians will be permitted to build some museums and other memorial places
in Israel.
Israel is apologising for the Nakba and the regional Arab states for the expulsion
of Jews.
The problem of the refugees in the refugee camps in Arab countries needs a
regional and international approach. The UNRWA has to be dissolved, the
refugees have to be allowed to get citizenship in the respective countries, the
camps have to become ordinary municipalities and Western as well as other
Arab countries have to open their borders for a larger scale of immigration of
Palestinian refugees. On these preconditions the refugees have a real choice of
what they want: to stay, to return to Israel-Palestine or to emigrate to a Western
or an other Arab country. If they are free to make that choice without the above
mentioned 4 types of pressure, it is likely that only a smaller minority of them
actually will make use of the right to return.

demonstrate or cause other forms for unrest and those who do not comply to these
demands will lose the right to visit Israel for another time.
Palestinians will be permitted to build some museums and other memorial places in
Israel.
Israel is apologising for the Nakba and the regional Arab states for the expulsion of
Jews.
The problem of the refugees in the refugee camps in Arab countries needs a regional
and international approach. The UNRWA has to be dissolved, the refugees have to
be allowed to get citizenship in the respective countries, the camps have to become
ordinary municipalities and Western as well as other Arab countries have to open
their borders for a larger scale of immigration of Palestinian refugees. On these
preconditions the refugees have a real choice of what they want: to stay, to return to
Israel-Palestine or to emigrate to a Western or an other Arab country. If they are free
to make that choice without the above mentioned 4 types of pressure, it is likely that
only a smaller minority of them actually will make use of the right to return.