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_______________________________________________________________ Introduction
Introduction: Stability, Risks
and Opposition in Singapore
JAMES GOMEZ AND CAN-SENG OOI (GUEST EDITORS)
The respected Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) Group
has consistently assessed Singapore's domestic political risk as low.
Since 1997, on a scale of between zero and 10, with zero being the
best grade possible and 10 the worst, the city-state's worst grade for
domestic political risk was below 3 (PERC 2005). Singapore's scores
hover mostly around the 2 mark. PERC partly attributes Singapore's
low domestic political risk to the fact that it is 'very difcult for a formal
political opposition to unseat the PAP (People's Action Party) from
power even if there were a vibrant multi-party system' (PERC 2005).
This observation is shared by Freedom House, an international
NGO that publishes an annual report on global trends in democracy:
'Citizens of Singapore cannot change their government democrati-
cally' (Freedom House 2005). Political risk is often associated with the
threat of potential changes of government that may result in changes
in policies that may adversely affect the country's business climate.
Political risk is a concern to all countries. Unlike many other countries
that boast of their mature and institutionalized democracies that
allow for the smooth change of governments without jeopardizing
the business climate, the case of Singapore is apparently different.
Singapore scores low on political risk because the Singaporean
government, under the PAP, sees domestic political opposition as a
potential site of instability and has actively taken steps to curtail and
contain critics. Paradoxically, Singapore's good rating on the 'political
risk' scale might have jeopardized Singapore's democracy. However,
what is good for international and domestic business is not necessarily
good for civil society.
The Singaporean PAP government has entrenched its dominant
political position over a period of some four decades. Efforts continue
to be taken to ensure that political activism remains low and managed
through controlled channels (George 2000; Koh and Ooi 2000; Mauzy
and Milne 2002). Alternative political expressions are often treated
as dangerous and are met with efforts to neutralize them to maintain
the country's 'stability'. Many PAP critics tread warily when making
6 ____________________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 232006
James Gomez and Can-Seng Ooi _____________________________________________
any statements against the PAP because many have suffered the con-
sequences as 'dissidents' (see Gomez in this volume).
As a self-acknowledged soft authoritarian regime, Singapore has
become one of the most politically stable and economically competi-
tive countries in the world. The Singaporean model suggests that some
elements of democracy must be controlled to maintain the country's
stability. So, what are some of these political 'risks' that the ruling PAP
is so keen to control? What are the examples of control and how have
the strategies evolved over the years? What insights can we gain from
examining how the PAP government has responded to domestic crit-
ics? Is the inability to effectively challenge PAP policies necessarily a
good thing? These concerns are addressed in this special issue of The
Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies.
The Papers in this Collection
After the rigour of the double-blind peer review process, ve papers
have been assembled for this collection. They all deal with the manage-
ment of (in)stabilities in Singapore. The collection begins with Marc
Rerceretnam's 'Beyond the Clutches: The 1987 ISA Arrests and Interna-
tional Civil Society Responses to Political Repression in Singapore'. This
provides an overview of how the 1987 crackdown on alleged dissidents
in Singapore spurred international NGOs and expatriate Singaporean
communities to focus attention on human rights abuses in Singapore
and mobilize international opinion. We can see that the ISA was an
effective tool for dealing with critics, but the PAP government had to
pay the price of negative publicity from the international community
and media.
In his article, 'Selling Security: The War on Terror and the Internal
Security Act of Singapore', Damien Cheong demonstrates how the
Singapore government, despite its respect for the rule of law, has been
able to justify the use of the long-standing ISA on terrorist suspects.
We see here that a new security environment has helped legitimize old
laws in dealing with dissenters. We also see the creeping application
of sophisticated public relations strategies to manage negative percep-
tions internationally.
Jonathan Woodier's article, 'Securing Singapore/Managing Percep-
tions: From Shooting the Messenger to Dodging the Question, shows
how the Singaporean government uses public relations in its various
social and economic programmes. Singapore is of course not the only
__________________________________________________________________________ 7
_______________________________________________________________ Introduction
country that attempts to manage and cultivate public opinions and per-
ceptions. This city-state, however, is in the forefront of this public rela-
tions engineering in Asia. The public relations campaigns are complex
and driven by the need, rst, to persuade and coerce Singaporeans and
the rest of the world to regard Singapore as a good place for investment,
tourism and residence and, second, to simultaneously project Singapore
as a socially and economically vulnerable city-state.
The fourth paper in this collection, by Yan Jin, Augustine Pang and
Glen T. Cameron, analyses public perceptions of how the government
managed the SARS crisis in 2003. Based on their survey, the paper
concludes that the PAP government has been supremely successful in
managing the perceptions and emotions of Singapore's residents by
building on their ingrained fears of future insecurity.
James Gomez, the author of the nal paper in this collection, evaluates
the impact of laws that restrict and control the free speech of opposition
parties and politicians in Singapore. He demonstrates how the freedom
of speech of opposition parties is often restricted because of its potential
to cause 'instability'. The struggle for freedom of expression in Singa-
pore needs to recruit new mechanisms to assist opposition politicians.
A greater diversity of means also makes it harder for the PAP to keep
control of all the news.
The collection of papers presented in this special issue emerged out
of the Singapore Studies Project initiated in 2004 at the Monash Asia
Institute (Melbourne, Australia).
James Gomez is a Ph.D. candidate at Monash Asia Institute, Monash
University, Australia. Can-Seng Ooi is an Associate Professor at Copenhagen
Business School.
REFERENCES
Freedom House 2005. 'Country Report: Singapore'. Available from: [Link]
[Link]/[Link]?page=22&year=2005
George, C. 2000. Singapore: the Air-Conditioned Nation. Singapore: Landmark Books.
Koh, Gillian and Ooi Geok Ling 2000. StateSociety Relations in Singapore. Singapore:
Oxford University Press,.
Mauzy, Diane K. and R. S. Milne 2002. Singapore Politics under the People's Action Party.
London: Routledge.
PERC 2005. Singapore Risk Rating Update. Hong Kong: PERC.