STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, CHAPTER 2

Case Digest by F.M. Orpilla, Jr. SBC1D (2012)

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC. vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE
POSTMASTER GENERAL,
G.R. No. L-19650, September 29, 1966
CASTRO, J., En Banc
Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering
and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors
of the law with respect to its application to a given case,
where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst
others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of
Laws, p. 1).
FACTS: In 1960, Caltex (Philippines) conceived a
promotional scheme to drum up patronage for its oil
products i.e. "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest." It calls
for participants therein to estimate the actual number
of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will
dispense during a specified period. Participation is to
be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners
and/or licensed drivers". No fee or consideration is
required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products
required to be made.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails for the said
contest, Caltex made a letter to the postal authorities to
justify its position that the contest does not violate the
anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed,
the then Acting Postmaster General, Enrico Palomar,
opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the
provisions of The Postal Law i.e. Chapter 52 of the
Revised Administrative Code, sections 1954(a), 1982
and 1983, which prohibits the non-mailable matter of
any information regarding "any lottery, gift enterprise,
or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real
or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any
kind".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing
a petition for declaratory relief against the Postmaster
General, praying that judgment be rendered declaring
its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest not to be violative of
the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow
petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the
attention of the public. The trial court ruled that the
contest does not violate the Postal Code and that the
Postmaster General has no right to bar the public
distribution of the contest rules by the mails. The
Postmaster General appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex
is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of
the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the
intended meaning of the words used therein?
HELD: No. "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by
Caltex is not a lottery that may be administratively and
adversely dealt with under the Postal Law. The term in
question is used in association with the word "lottery".
"Lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of
prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions,
prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of
gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are:
First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance (El
Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio). In the present case, the
elements of prize and chance are too obvious in the
disputed Caltexs scheme. However, with regards to the
third element i.e. consideration, SC found nowhere in
the said rules of any requirement that any fee be paid,
any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or
any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to
participate. The scheme does not only appear to be, but
actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property by
chance. Like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes also
within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the
tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration.
The apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the
fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon
are not identical, the terms "lottery" and "gift
enterprise" are used interchangeably; every case must
be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the
applicable statutory provision.
With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to
the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur
a sociis it is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other meaning than
that which is consistent with the nature of the word
associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only
if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift
enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in
the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate
that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise"
therein included. Gratuitous distribution of property by
lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not
resorted to as a device to evade the law and no
consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the
party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being
cultivated or stimulated thereby. Under the prohibitive
provisions of the Postal Law, gift enterprises and similar
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Case Digest by F.M. Orpilla, Jr. SBC1D (2012)

schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if,
like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.
ALFREDO L. AZARCON, petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
JOSE C. BATAUSA, respondents.
G.R. No. 116033 February 26, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J., Third Division
Legislative intent is determined principally from the
language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to
its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to
only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice
(Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, 596,
September 28, 1995).
Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated
an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. His
services were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he
engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla
whose trucks were left at the formers premises.
On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal
Property was issued by BIR commanding one of its
Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or
effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a
sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and a delinquent
taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and
subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him
to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the
property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon
then volunteered himself to act as custodian of the truck
owned by Ancla.
After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir
of BIR stating that while he had made representations
to retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby
relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the
said property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his
equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said
that Azarcons failure to comply with the provisions of
the warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility.
Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before
the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of
public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the
accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum
period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was
subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: (1) Whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the controversy. (2) Whether
petitioner can be considered a public officer by reason
of his being designated by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue as a depositary of distrained property.
Held: No. SC finds Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon and his
co-accused Jaime Ancla to be both private individuals
erroneously charged before and convicted by
Respondent Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction
over them.
Rationale: (1) It is hornbook doctrine that in order
"(to) ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not,
the provisions of the law should be inquired
into." Furthermore, "the jurisdiction of the court must
appear clearly from the statute law or it will not be held
to exist. It cannot be presumed or implied." And for this
purpose in criminal cases, "the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the law at the time of commencement of
the action."
Section 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only
instances when the Sandiganbayan will have
jurisdiction over a private individual is when the
complaint charges the private individual either as a co-
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or
employee who has been charged with a crime within its
jurisdiction. However, the Information does no charge
petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing
an offense under the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a public officer,
Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime
charged.
Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are.
Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for
the truck constructively distrained by the BIR,
commenced to take part in an activity constituting
public functions, he obviously may not be deemed
authorized by popular election. Neither was he
appointed by direct provision of law nor by competent
authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon
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Case Digest by F.M. Orpilla, Jr. SBC1D (2012)

to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the National
Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint
Azarcon a public officer. The BIRs power authorizing a
private individual to act as a depositary cannot be
stretched to include the power to appoint him as a
public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer.
(2) Legislative intent is determined principally from the
language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to
its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to
only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." This
is particularly observed in the interpretation of penal
statutes which "must be construed with such strictness as
to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant . . . ."
Article 222 of the RPC apply to private individuals who,
in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular,
provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or property
and to any administrator or depository of funds or
property attached, seized or deposited by public
authority, even if such property belongs to a private
individual. The language of the foregoing provision is
clear. A private individual who has in his charge any of
the public funds or property enumerated therein and
commits any of the acts defined in any of the provisions
of Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise
be penalized with the same penalty meted to erring
public officers. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed
or implied that a private individual falling under said
Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH
XIII, HON. JESUS P. MORFE, PRESIDING JUDGE, AND
PRES. ROXAS RURAL BANK INC., respondents.
G.R. No. L-30381 August 30, 1988
FERNAN, C.J., Third Division

A "real party in interest" has been defined as the party
who would be benefitted or injured by the judgment of
the suit or the party entitled to avail of the suit. Indeed, if
the bank were not a real party in interest, the legislature
would not have provided for its joining as a party in the
escheat proceedings.
The phrase "or actions" in this section is very significant.
It manifests awareness on the part of the legislators that
a single action to cover all banks wherever located in the
Philippines would not be legally feasible.
ESCHEAT - is a proceeding whereby the real and personal
property of a deceased person in the Philippines, become
the property of the state upon his death, without leaving
any will or legal heirs.
FACTS: In January 1968, pursuant to Section 2 of Act
No. 3936 (Unclaimed Balance Law), some 31 banks
forwarded to the Treasurer of the Philippines all
deposits and credits held by them in favor, or in the
names of such depositors or creditors known to be
dead, or who have not been heard from, or who have
not made further deposits or withdrawals during the
preceding ten years or more. Respondent Bank, has only
two (2) names appeared: Jesus Ydirin with a balance of
P126.54 and Leonora Trumpeta with a deposit of
P62.91.

Thereafter, or on July 25, 1968, the Republic of the
Philippines instituted before the CFI of Manila a
complaint for escheat against the aforesaid 31 banks,
including herein private respondent. Likewise named
defendants therein were the individual depositors
and/or creditors. Summonses were accordingly issued
to defendant banks and the creditors/depositors
requiring them to file severally their answers to the
complaint within 60 days after the first publication of
the summons with notice that should they fail to file
their answers, plaintiff would take judgment against
them by default.

Private respondent Bank filed before the CFI a motion
to dismiss the complaint as against it on the ground of
improper venue. Opposed by the petitioner, the motion
to dismiss was granted in the first assailed Order. Its
motion for reconsideration of said dismissal order
having been denied in the second assailed order,
petitioner interposed the instant appeal on pure
questions of law.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Pres. Roxas Rural Bank is a
real party in interest in the escheat proceedings (2)
Whether or not venue of action has been properly laid
in the City of Manila, since all defendant banks,
wherever they may be found, could be included in one
single action (3) Whether or not Section 2(b), Rule 4 of
the Revised Rules of Court on venue, likewise, governs
escheat proceedings.
HELD:

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Case Digest by F.M. Orpilla, Jr. SBC1D (2012)

1. A "real party in interest" has been defined as
the party who would be benefitted or injured by
the judgment of the suit or the party entitled to
avail of the suit. There can be no doubt that
private respondent bank falls under this
definition for the escheat of the dormant
deposits in favor of the government would
necessarily deprive said bank of the use of such
deposits. It is in this sense that it stands to be
"injured by the judgment of the suit;" and it is
for this reason that Section 3 of Act No. 3936
specifically provides that the bank shall be
joined as a party in the action for escheat.
Indeed, if the bank were not a real party in
interest, the legislature would not have
provided for its joining as a party in the escheat
proceedings.
2. The first sentence of Section 3 of Act No. 3936
directs the Attorney General, now Solicitor
General, to commence an action or actions in
the name of the People of the Philippines in the
Court of First Instance of the province where
the bank is located. The phrase "or actions" in
this section is very significant. It manifests
awareness on the part of the legislators that a
single action to cover all banks wherever
located in the Philippines would not be legally
feasible in view of the venue prescribed for such
action under the same section, i.e., the province
where the bank is located. Thus, the addition of
the last sentence, which the lower court had
correctly interpreted to mean "that for escheat
of unclaimed bank balances all banks located in
one and the same province where the Court of
First Instance concerned is located may be
made parties defendant "in one action" was
clearly intended to save on litigation and
publication expenses, but certainly not as
authority for the lumping together of all banks
wherever found in the Philippines in one single
escheat proceedings.
3. Anent the third issue raised, suffice it to say that
Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court cannot govern escheat proceedings
principally because said section refers to
personal actions. Escheat proceedings are
actions in rem which must be brought in the
province or city where the rem in this case the
dormant deposits, is located.
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996
BELLOSILLO, J., First Division

Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be
construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and
the evils sought to be remedied.
FACTS: Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a CENRO assigned
in Kidapawan, Cotabato, being investigated by the
Ombudsman on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty,
abuse of authority and illegal cutting of mahogany trees
and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area. To have a
copy of the complaints against him, he was asked by his
counsel, Atty. Francis Palmones, to take his letter-
request to the Office of the Ombudsman in the absence
of his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez. Before
proceeding, he talked to Perez who advised him not to
worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he
would be required to acknowledge receipt of the
complaint.
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the
Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the
security officer to register in the visitors' logbook.
Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the
name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed
to the Administrative Division for the copy of the
complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty.
Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division,
Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the
complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing
the name "Oscar Perez." Before petitioner could leave
the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa
Amparo, who also worked in the same office. They
conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned
that the person who introduced himself as "Oscar
Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a
customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida
reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who
recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.
The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A.
No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. He was sentenced
to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day
of prision correccionalminimum as minimum, to four (4)
years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with
all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to
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Case Digest by F.M. Orpilla, Jr. SBC1D (2012)

pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs. Petitioner appealed
to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed just the same
the conviction of petitioner but nevertheless modified
the penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of one
(1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum
and a fine of P5,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua
violated Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No.
6085, and is guilty of using an alias?
HELD: No. While the act of petitioner may be covered
by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an
offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended
under which he is prosecuted.
Rationale: Time and again we have decreed that
statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to
be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in
construing a statute the reason for its enactment should
be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with
reference to the intended scope and purpose.

The court
may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers.


An alias is a name or names used by a person or
intended to be used by him publicly and habitually
usually in business transactions in addition to his real
name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the
first time or substitute name authorized by a competent
authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds
by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and
by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is
known by several different names and these are known
as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a
different name belonging to another person in a single
instance without any sign or indication that the user
intends to be known by this name in addition to his real
name from that day forth does not fall within the
prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other
provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense
within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under
which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in
business transactions which the anti-alias law and its
related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as
the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those
contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142
as amended. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal
statute, it should be construed strictly against the State
and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle
is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals
and the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the
discretion of the court limited. Indeed, our mind cannot
rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be
convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act
done by him.
PEDRO SANTOS TO, petitioner, vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ-PAO, Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVIII,
and JUAN Y. OCAMPO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-55130 January 17, 1983
DE CASTRO, J., Second Division

If only for the above observation as to how the law should
be applied in order that its objective could be realized
and achieved, We cannot but find respondent judge's
reasons for his denial of the petition for probation
insufficient to justify a deviation from a policy of
liberality with which the law should be applied.
FACTS: Petitioner was convicted by respondent judge
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City
Branch) of the crime of estafa for having issued a
bouncing check for P5,000.00, and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from seven years and eight
months of prision mayor as minimum, to nine years and
four months of prision mayor, as maximum.

He
appealed to the Court of Appeals which reduced the
penalty to one year and one day of prision
correccional as minimum, to one year and eight months
as maximum.


Upon the Court of Appeals' decision becoming final,
petitioner not having appealed therefrom, he filed a
petition for probation with respondent judge, who,
despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation
Office, denied the petition on July 24, 1980, on the
following grounds: (a) to grant probation to petitioner
will depreciate the seriousness of the offense
committed, and (b) petitioner is not a penitent
offender.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to
probation?
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Case Digest by F.M. Orpilla, Jr. SBC1D (2012)

HELD: Yes. SC finds no sufficient justification for
respondent judge's holding petitioner to be a non-
penitent offender. The liberality with which the
Probation Law should be applied in favor of the
applicant for its benefits affords the better means of
achieving the purpose of the law (Balleta Jr. vs. Hon.
Leviste).
Rationale: Under Section 9, P.D. 968 (Probation Law),
petitioner may not be disqualified from being entitled to
the benefits of probation based from a reading of the law
in its entirety, with liberality rather than undue
strictness. In expressly enumerating offenders not
qualified to enjoy the benefits of probation, the clear
intent is to allow said benefits to those not included in
the enumeration.
The respondent judges reasons of denying petitioners
probation - i.e. (1) petitioner will depreciate the
seriousness of the offense committed, and (b)
petitioner is not a penitent offender are all erroneous.
First, for purpose of probation, what the law gives more
importance to is the offender, not the crime. The inquiry
is more on whether probation will help the offender
along the lines for which the probation system has been
established, such as giving the first-time offender a
second chance to maintain his place in society through a
process of reformation. Respondent judge would thus
be writing into the law a new ground for disqualifying a
first-offender from the benefits of probation. Second,
the appeals made by the petitioner do not make him a
non-penitent offender. If petitioner appealed the
decision of the respondent judge to the Court of
Appeals, he cannot be blamed for insisting on his
version by which he could hope either to be acquitted or
at least given a lighter penalty that would entitle him to
the benefits of probation. The recourse he took has,
indeed, proved to be well worth the effort. His penalty
was reduced on appeal which placed him within the
benign purpose of the Probation Law.
ERNESTO M. DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs.
HON. ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Civil Service
Commissioner, HON. NORBERTO AMORANTO, as
Mayor of Quezon City, ET AL., respondents
G.R. No. L-31683 January 31, 1983
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The phrase criminal record governing qualifications for
appointment could not have been intended by the
Legislature to automatically cover every violation of a
municipal or city ordinance carrying a sanction of a
nominal fine to enforce it.
FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto M. de Guzman was
appointed patrolman in the Quezon City Police
Department by Mayor Norberto S. Amoranto on August
16, 1965. He was a civil service eligible having taken
and passed the civil service patrolman's examination
given on November 24, 1962. He had also passed the
usual character investigation conducted before
appointment. As a newly appointed patrolman, the
petitioner went through and successfully completed the
police training course.
On March 21, 1966, the petitioner's appointment was
forwarded to the Commissioner of Civil Service. On
August 18, 1966, or a year after the appointment and
with no action on the appointment papers being taken
by the respondent commissioner, the respondents city
treasurer and city auditor stopped the payment of the
petitioner's salaries.
On May 12, 1967, the respondent commissioner
returned the Petitioner's appointment papers, without
action thereon, to the respondent mayor on the ground
that Mr. de Guzman was disqualified for appointment
under Republic Act No. 4864, the Police Act of 1966,
Section 9 (5) because of the presence of criminal record
culled from his information sheet, where the petitioner
Yes for Jaywalking-paid fine P5.50; Municipal O.d.
(Mla.) Sect. 1187 (cochero) paid fine of P5.00.
The petitioner filed for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary injunction at the CFI but he was denied
because according to the court, the requirement of no
criminal record means without any criminal record
and makes no distinction whether an act violates a state
law or only a municipal or city ordinance.

ISSUE: Whether or not violations and/or convictions of
municipal ordinances, one, for 'Jaywalking' and the
other, Manila Municipal Ordinance No. 1187,
prohibiting the cochero from 'occupying any part of the
vehicle except the seat reserved for him', constitute
'CRIMINAL RECORD' to disqualify the petitioner under
the Police Act of 1966 (Rep. Act No. 4864) from
appointment to the Quezon City Police Force?

HELD: No. Respondent Subido (Civil Service
Commission Commissioner) should have gone deeper
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into the nature of the petitioner's acts instead of taking
every "Yes" answer in Question 15 of the information
sheet as an automatic disqualification.
The requirements for applicants to a policemans
position may be quite stringent but the basic policy of
attracting the best qualified is not served by
automatically excluding any person who in an absent
minded mood or while hurrying to an urgent
appointment may unwittingly have crossed a street or
stepped down from the curb in violation of a jaywalking
ordinance. The same thing is true of a person who may
have worked his way through college as a cochero and,
who, pitying his horse struggling up an incline or a
bridge, leaves his seat to stand aft and forward to
balance the calesa load or who, alone on his way home,
sits in the seat intended for passengers only to be fined
for violating an obscure municipal ordinance.

The phrase criminal record governing qualifications
for appointment could not have been intended by the
Legislature to automatically cover every violation of a
municipal or city ordinance carrying a sanction of a
nominal fine to enforce it. A violation of a municipal
ordinance to qualify as a crime must involve at least a
certain degree of evil doing, immoral conduct,
corruption, malice, or want of principles reasonably
related to the requirements of the pubic office.
Under Rule VI of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations,
the respondent commissioner had 180 days from
receipt of the appointment papers to act on them.
Inaction means the appointment is approved as
properly made. The papers were returned more than a
year by the commissioner after he received them. The
appointment, not having any defect of record except the
matter in issue in this case, must be deemed complete
and properly made after the 180 days period. The
termination of the petitioner's services was, therefore,
an illegal and invalid removal. The petitioner should be
reinstated, assuming he meets the physical and other
requirements of the Integrated National Police under
the new legislation and procedures governing police
forces. In addition to being paid any salaries for services
actually rendered but not paid, the petitioner, following
the formula in cases of illegal dismissals is entitled to
five years backpay (Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA
175,187).
BRUNO O. APARRI, petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and LAND AUTHORITY, the
latter in substitution for REMEDIOS O. FORTICH, as
Chairman, ANGELINO M. BANZON, RAFAEL B. HILAO,
VALERIANO PLANTILLA and SEVERO YAP, as
members of the Board of Directors of the defunct
National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA), respondents.
G.R. No. L-30057 January 31, 1984
MAKASIAR, J.: Second Division

It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "term"
with the purview of statutes so as to effectuate the
statutory scheme pertaining to the office under
examination.

FACTS: On January 15, 1960, members of the Board of
Directors of the defunct National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) approved
Resolution No. 13, appointing petitioner Mr. Bruno 0.
Aparri, as General Manager. On March 15, 1962, the
same Board of Directors approved Resolution No. 24,
resolving and fixing the term of office of the incumbent
General Manager up to the close of office hours on
March 31, 1962.
Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with
preliminary injunction with the then Court of First
Instance of Manila on March 29, 1962. The petition
prayed to annul the resolution of the NARRA Board
dated March 15, 1962, to command the Board to allow
petitioner to continue in office as General Manager until
he vacates said office in accordance with law and to
sentence the private respondents jointly and severally
to pay the petitioner actual damages in the sum of
P95,000.00, plus costs.
On August 8, 1963, when the case was still pending
decision in the lower court, R.A. 3844 (Agricultural
Land Reform Code), took effect. The said law abolished
the NARRA and transferred its functions and powers to
the Land Authority. The then CFI of Manila rendered
judgment, finding the case as moot and academic and
dismissed the said case.
On appeal to the then Court of Appeals, the appellate
tribunal affirmed the decision of the lower court. The
motion for reconsideration by petitioner in the then
Court of Appeals was denied on January 10, 1969. On
January 20, 1969, the petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari to review the decision of the then Court of
Appeals dated September 24, 1968. The same was
initially denied for lack of merit in a resolution dated
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Case Digest by F.M. Orpilla, Jr. SBC1D (2012)

January 27, 1969; but on motion for reconsideration
filed on February 11, 1969, the petition was given due
course.
ISSUE: Whether or not Board Resolution No. 24 (series
of 1962) was a removal or dismissal of petitioner
without cause.
HELD: Removal entails the ouster of an incumbent
before the expiration of his term. The petitioner in this
case was not removed before the expiration of his term.
Rather, his right to hold the office ceased by the
expiration on March 31, 1962 of his term to hold such
office.
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created
and conferred by law, by which for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power. By "appointment" is meant the act of
designation by the executive officer, board or body, to
whom that power has been delegated, of the individual
who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When
the power of appointment is absolute, and the
appointee has been determined upon, no further
consent or approval is necessary, and the formal
evidence of the appointment, the commission, may
issue at once. Where, however, the assent or
confirmation of some other officer or body is required,
the Commission can issue or the appointment is
complete only when such assent or condition is
obtained. Thus, the petitioner was appointed as general
manager pursuant to Resolution No. 13, which is still
incomplete because of the lack of approval of the
President of the Philippines to such appointment. Such
appointment was made complete only upon approval of
Resolution No. 24, wherein President submitted to the
Board his "desire" to fix the term of office of the
petitioner up to the close of office hours on March 31,
1962.
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and
definite period of time which the law describes that an
officer may hold an office. Upon the expiration of the
officer's term, unless he is authorized by law to hold
over, his rights, duties and authority as a pubic officer
must ipso facto cease. In the law on Public Officers, the
most natural and frequent method by which a public
officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the term
for which he was elected or appointed.
It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "term"
with the purview of statutes so as to effectuate the
statutory scheme pertaining to the office under
examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not
fixed by law. The power to fix the term is vested in the
Board of Directors subject to the recommendation of the
Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the
President of the Philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks
of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of
the petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. It is the
rule in statutory construction that if the words and
phrase of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous, its
meaning and the intention of the legislature must be
determined from the language employed, and, where
there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for
construction (Black on Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 51).
LORENZO M. TAADA and DIOSDADO
MACAPAGAL, petitioners, vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO,
ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL
SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO
HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing
officer,respondents
G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957
CONCEPCION, J., En Banc



What has been said above, relative to the conditions
antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of
section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals
clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority
party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that
the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium
between the majority and the minority parties therein,
with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are
members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting
balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said
provision for the selection of members of the Electoral
Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play.
it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence,
compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts
performed in violation thereof are null and void.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may
not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
those Senators who have not been nominated by the
political parties specified in the Constitution; that the
party having the largest number of votes in the Senate
may nominate not more than three (3) members
thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having
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the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the
exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators
who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that
neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may
be nominated by a person or party other than the one
having the second largest number of votes in the Senate
or its representative therein; that the Committee on
Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make
such nomination and that the nomination of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the
election of said respondents by the Senate, as members
of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.