TodayisFriday,March14,2014

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
[Link].L7859February12,1913
VICTORIASEOANE,administratrixofTheIntestateEstateofEduardoFargas,plaintiffappellee,
vs.
CATALINAFRANCO,administratrixofTheIntestateEstateofManuelFranco,defendantappellant.
RamonSalinas,forappellant.
Gibbs,McDonoughandBlanco,forappellee.
MORELAND,J.:
ThisisanappealfromajudgmentoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofZamboangainfavoroftheplaintiff,holdingthat
therightofactionuponthemortgagedebtwhichwasthebasisoftheclaimpresentedagainsttheplaintiff'sestate
hadprescribed.
The mortgage in question was executed on the 13th of October, 1884, to secure the payment of the sum of
P4,876.01,themortgagoragreeingtopaythesum"littlebylittle."Theclaimappearstohavebeenpresentedto
theplaintiff'sintestateonthe8thofAugust,[Link].
We are of the opinion that this case falls within the provisions of article 1128 of the Civil Code, which reads as
follows:
[Link],butitcanbeinferredfromitsnatureandcircumstancethat
therewasanintentionofgrantingittothedebtor,thecourtsshallfixthedurationofsuchaterm.
Thecourtsshallalsofixthedurationofatermwhenitmayhavebeenleftatthewillofthedebtor.
The obligation in question seems to leave the duration of the period for the payment thereof to the will of the
[Link]
[Link],onseveraloccasions,thattheobligationisnotdueandpayableuntil
anactionhasbeencommencedbythemortgageeagainstthemortgagorforthepurposeofhavingthecourtfix
thedateonandafterwhichtheinstrumentshallbepayableandthedateofmaturityisfixedinpursuancethereof.
[Link]([Link].,309),inwhichtheopinionwaswrittenby
the Chief Justice of the court, is the leading case upon the subject. In that case the question was over the
durationofaleaseconcerning"apieceoflandforafixedconsiderationandtoendureatthewillofthelessee."In
discussingthequestionthecourtsaid(p.310):
[Link]
beenpresented:Onewhichmakesthedurationdependuponthewillofthelessor,who,upononemonth's
noticegiventothelessee,mayterminatetheleasesostipulatedanotherwhich,onthecontrary,makesit
dependent upon the will of the lessee, as stipulated and the third, in accordance with which the right is
reservedtothecourttofixthedurationoftheterm.
Theclauseonwhichthecaseturnsisasfollows(p.312):
[Link],orwhoevermaysucceedhimassecretaryoftheclub,mayterminatethisleasewhenever
desired without other formality than that of giving a month's notice. The owners of the land undertake to
maintaintheclubastenantaslongasthelattershallseefit.
Consideringthecasethecourtsaid(314):

Consideringthecasethecourtsaid(314):
The Civil Code has made provision for such a case in all kinds of obligations. In speaking in general of
obligationswithatermithassuppliedthedeficiencyoftheformerlawwithrespecttothe"durationofthe
termwhenithasbeenlefttothewillofthedebtor,"andprovidesthatinthiscasethetermshallbefixedby
thecourts.(Art.1128,sec.2.)Ineverycontract,aslaiddownbytheauthorities,thereisalwaysacreditor
who is entitled to demand the performance, and a debtor upon whom rests the obligation to perform the
[Link],inthis
contractoflease,thelesseeisthecreditorwithrespecttotherightsenumeratedinarticle1554,andisthe
debtor with respect to the obligations imposed by articles 1555 and 1561. The term within which
[Link]
mustbefixedbythecourts.
Theonlyactionwhichcanbemaintainedunderthetermsofthecontractisthatbywhichitissoughttobe
obtainfromthejudgethedeterminationofthisperiod,andnottheunlawfuldetaineractionwhichhasbeen
brought an action which presupposes the expiration of the term and makes it the duty of the judge to
[Link]
of the contract, whether conventional or legal in order to decree the relief to be granted in the former
actionitisnecessaryforthejudgetolookintothecharacterandconditionsofthemutualundertakingswith
aviewtosupplyingthelackingelementofatimeatwhichtheleaseistoexpire.
[Link]([Link].,416)dealtwithacasewherethetermsofadonationdid
notfixthetimeoftheperformanceoftheconditionplaceduponthedonation,andthecourtheldthattheperiod
mustbedeterminedbythecourtinaproperactioninaccordancewitharticle1128oftheCivilCode,saying(p.
420):
Thecontracthavingfixednoperiodinwhichtheconditionshouldbefulfilled,theprovisionsofarticle1128
[Link]
[Link],[Link].,309.([Link].,624.1)
[Link]([Link].,353)thecourtsaid(p.355):
Thedefendanthavingboundhimselftopayhisdebttotheplaintiffsinpartialpayments,assetforthinthe
noteinquestion,itisseenthattheobligationisoneofpaymentbyinstallments,sinceitsfulfillmentcannot
be required immediately nor does its existence depend upon the happening of any particular event. But,
thought the obligation is one of payment by installments, nevertheless no fixed day was specified for its
fulfillment, so that the period for payment is undetermined or was not fixed by the parties when they
[Link],itisevidentthatthetermforpaymentwasgrantedfortheexclusivebenefit
of the defendant and for his own convenience, as by the language of the document, the plaintiffs gained
[Link]
debt during the time that it should remain unpaid by the defendant. For the foregoing reasons, and in
whatever manner this case be considered, it is unquestionable that it falls within the provisions of article
1128oftheCivilCode....
The obligation being manifestly defective with regard to the duration of the period granted to the debtor,
that is, to the defendant, that defect must be cured by the courts through judicial decision which shall
determine the said duration, under the power expressly granted them for such purpose by the legal
provisionsjustabovetranscribed.
Thetrialcourt,therefore,actedinaccordancewiththelawinexercisingthesaidpowerinthepresentcase,
byfixingthedurationoftheperiodonthebasisthatthepaymentofthedebtshouldbemadeattherateof
P200amonthandweseenoabuseofjudicialdiscretionoffixingsucharate,consideringtheimportance
oftheobligationandtheabsenceofanystipulationofinterestinfavorofthecreditors.
Fromthesedecisionsitisclearthattheinstrumentsueduponinthecaseatbarisonewhichleavestheperiodof
[Link],anactionshouldhavebeenbroughtforthepurposeof
having the court set a date on which the instrument should become due and payable. Until such action was
[Link],therefore,clear
[Link]
dismissed.
Ordinarily when an action of this sort is dismissed the plaintiff may at once begin his action for the purpose of
[Link]
factsandconditionsthatveryprobablycannotbechargedhereafter,itisourpresentopinionthatsuchactionis

factsandconditionsthatveryprobablycannotbechargedhereafter,itisourpresentopinionthatsuchactionis
itselfprescribed.Section38oftheCodeofCivilProcedurereadsasfollows:
SEC. 38. To what this chapter does not apply. This chapter shall not apply to actions already
commenced,ortocaseswhereintherightofactionhasalreadyaccruedbutthestatutesinforcewhenthe
actionorrightofactionaccruedshallbeapplicabletosuchcasesaccordingtothesubjectoftheactionand
withoutregardtotheformnorshallthischapterapplyinthecaseofacontinuingandsubsistingtrust,nor
toanactionbythevendeeofrealpropertyinpossessionthereoftoobtaintheconveyanceofit:Provided,
nevertheless, That all rights of action which have already accrued, except those named in the last
precedingparagraph,mustbevindicatedbythecommencementofanactionorproceedingtoenforcethe
samewithintenyearsafterthisActcomesintoeffect.
This section evidently covers all rights of action of whatever kind or nature, except those which have special
limitations and are referred to in subsequent sections. A right of action to fix a day for the determination of the
time of payment is included within the terms of this section. The mortgage in question having left the period of
paymenttothewillofthemortgagor,anactioncouldhavebeenmaintainedbythemortgageeatanytimeafterits
execution for the naming of a date on which the instrument must be paid in full. The right of action accrued as
soon as the instrument was executed. Such action, therefore, falls within the provisions of section 38, and not
having been commenced within the ten years next following the 1st day of October, 1901, such action cannot,
underthefactsastheynowappear,bemaintained.
Whiletheexpressionofanopinionastotheprescriptionoftheactiontofixadateforthematurityoftheobligation
inquestionisunnecessaryforacompleteresolutionofthecasebeforeus,stillwedonothesitatetoexpressthat
opinion for the reasons which we have heretofore given in one or two cases, particularly that of Lichauco vs.
Limjuco (19 Phil. Rep., 12). That case went off upon the finding of the court that the action could not be
maintainedbytheplaintiff,Lichauco,onbehalfofhisbrothersandsistersanduponthatfindingthecomplaintwas
[Link],weneverthelesstookupthefactsasthey
appeared and expressed our opinion of what the result of the case would be upon the merits if it subsequently
[Link](p.17):
Webelieve,however,that,fortheinformationofthepartiesinterestedinthesubjectmatterofthisaction
andtotheendthatunnecessarylitigationmaybeavoided,theopinionofthecourtshouldbegivenupon
[Link]
willnotcaretopursuethelitigationfurtherunless,whichissomewhatunlikely,theyareabletopresentnew
[Link],therefore,proceedtoaconsiderationofthecaseuponthemeritsaspresentedbytherecord.
Thejudgmentisaffirmed,[Link].
Arellano,C.J.,Torres,Mapa,andTrent,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes
[Link].
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation