Belgica vs.

Executive Secretary Ochoa (Group 12)

The term pork barrel, a political parlance of American-English origin, refers to an appropriation of
government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to
a representatives district.

The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise known as
the Public Works Act of 1922. Under this provision, release of funds and realignment of unexpended
portions of an item or appropriation were subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by
the Senate and the House of Representatives.

In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives of the people, also became
involved in project identification.

The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial law was declared.

It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called Support for
Local Development Projects (SLDP). SLDP started the giving of lump-sum allocations to
individual legislators. The SLDP also began to cover not only public works project or hard projects
but also covered soft projects such as those which would fall under education, health and
livelihood.

After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of democracy, the pork barrel was
revived through the Mindanao Development Fund and the Visayas Development Fund.

In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). The CDF was
meant to cover small local infrastructure and other priority community projects.

CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released directly to implementing agencies
subject to the submission of the required list of projects and activities. Senators and congressmen
could identify any kind of project from hard projects such as roads, buildings and bridges to soft
projects such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.

In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds was to be made upon the
submission of the list of projects and activities identified by individual legislators. This was also the
first time when the Vice-President was given an allocation.

The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that the Department of Budget and
Management was required to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House
Committee on Appropriations regarding the releases made from the funds.

Congressional insertions (CIs) were another form of congressional pork barrel aside from the CDF.
Examples of the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative
Allocations, and the Public Works Fund, among others.

The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior consultation with the
representative of the legislative district concerned and the legislators had the power to direct how,
where and when these appropriations were to be spent.

In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three separate forms of CIs: (i) Food
Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban Development
Infrastructure Program Fund. All three contained a provision requiring prior consultation with
members of Congress for the release of funds.

In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. PDAF required
prior consultation with the representative of the district before the release of funds. PDAF also
allowed realignment of funds to any expense category except personal services and other
personnel benefits.

In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list of general
programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently
chosen by the identifying authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-2010.

It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-governmental
organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was introduced.

The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for individual
legislators.

In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum amounts
allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President. It also contained a provision on
realignment of funds but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once.

The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies. Legislators were
also allowed identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district. Realignment of funds and
release of funds were required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations
and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.

Malampaya Funds and Presidential Social Fund

The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the
Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (PSF).
The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.
The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD No. 1993. The PSF is
managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff and is sourced from the share of
the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.

The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects"
using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging
five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints
are some of the lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the
annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for
the 2013 PDAF, and the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the

Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave
abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist
order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad
from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
ISSUES:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of
powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political
dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2.
Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
1.

1.

HELD:
Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congressrole must be
confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.

2.

Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for
which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds
for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects was declared constitutional. IT INDICATED
PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL
SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.
(b) and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines was declared [Link] GIVES
THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE
PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A PRIORITY. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF
PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT
ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.