Adam Edward Williams

18125587
POL3ILO International Law and Organizations
Final Research Essay

1. Abstract
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been the primary legal agreement aiming
to prevent the development of nuclear weapons, and reduce the numbers of
current warheads in existence. This report will consider the effectiveness of the
NPT as well as its shortcomings.
2. Introduction
Since the first nuclear weapon was used to decimate the populations of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War, people, states, and
organizations, have attempted to find ways to prevent an all-out nuclear war.
Much of this work has focused on preventing the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, and the strategic control of fissile material stockpiles. This is aided by
international cooperation with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (hereafter called the NPT or Non-Proliferation Treaty), which has
become the relevant legal framework for nearly all work in this field. In simple
terms, this treaty aims to reduce the numbers of weapons stockpiled by nuclear
weapon states, limit the further proliferation of weapons to non-nuclear-weapon
states, and to promote the peaceful use of nuclear science for health and energy
production (United Nations, 1968). The treaty which relies on the assent of its
signatories and their compliance with its laws has been of mixed success
(Clempson, 2011). The agency tasked to monitor compliance with this treaty is
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a non-partisan international
organization.
Today, there are numerous new and evolving challenges to the non-proliferation
regime and the legal framework that supports it; A.Q. Khan a non-state actor
working for the highest bidder has significantly set back the goal of nonproliferation, selling nuclear fuel cycle designs to several states (Yourish &
D'Souza, 2004); India and Pakistan remain outside the NPT despite stockpiling

approximately 120 weapons each, as well as Israel (who has never publicly
admitted to its ownership of such weapons) with approximately 80. (Arms Control
Association, 2015); Iran has been under significant political pressure from the
United States and others to abandon its entire nuclear enrichment program (as
opposed to its weapons only), despite having the right to develop the technology
for peaceful uses under Article IV of the NPT (Elbaradei, 2011, pp. 254-255);
North Korea continues to develop its Musudan missile, gaining range and
reliability in delivering nuclear warheads against heavy international criticism
(Gale, 2016). It is clear that the NPT and the goal of nuclear arms control more
broadly faces serious challenges. This report will assess the ability of the NPT
and the IAEA to meet these challenges, and ways in which it may be changed to
become more effective in the future.
3. Discussion
The states most clearly engaged in the discussion regarding non-proliferation are
those that possess or have possessed in the recent past the technology and
capability to build and use nuclear weapons. These can be summarized into
groups as they relate to the NPT; the United States, Russia, China, United
Kingdom, and France, or P5 (the five permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council or UNSC) relate to Article I of the NPT, which outlines nuclearweapon State[s] (United Nations, 1968); Belgium, Turkey, Italy, Germany, and
Netherlands, which share nuclear weapons with the United States under NATO
security agreements (NATO, 2009) (though some have argued that this
constitutes an illegal proliferation under articles I and II of the NPT.); and finally
those states which are not party to the NPT, but maintain nuclear weapons,
including North Korea, India, Pakistan, and Israel.
The P5 states maintain a leadership role in the implementation of the NPT and
other responses surrounding the development of nuclear weapons (such as the
sanctioning of non-NPT states), and this has had mixed consequences. The socalled P5 process has reiterated the importance of nuclear disarmament
amongst nuclear-weapon states, following a period of growing discontent among
non-nuclear-weapon states that they had not been doing enough to fulfill their
end of the bargain (Berger & Chalmers, 2014). Recently, the P5+1 (P5 states
with the addition of Germany) have been instrumental in negotiating a deal with
Iran to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in exchange for relief from
economic sanctions and the ability to maintain a peaceful enrichment program

for nuclear power purposes (Tirone, 2016). Some have objected to US-led
imposition of economic sanctions against Iran and pressure to dismantle its
weapons program while Israel has been allowed to continue with its own
program relatively unchecked (Riedel, 2015). This highlights one of the major
difficulties of the current non-proliferation regime: its inability to limit political
machinations and unilateral responses from states. There is no definitive legal
reason as to why Iran (or any other state) should be treated one way, and Israel
(or any other state) should be treated in another (Borger, 2014). The matter is
one of international politics, mostly divorced from the legal framework of the
NPT.
The role of the IAEA has been critical in managing the diplomatic challenges
surrounding the NPT, and monitoring the nuclear material stockpiles of states
party to it. Furthermore, non-nuclear-weapon states under the treaty are
required to pursue a legally-binding agreement with the IAEA generally known as
a comprehensive safeguards agreement. This requires them to put their nuclear
materials produced under the inspection and accounting of IAEA monitors
(Elbaradei, 2011, p. 10). At a diplomatic level, the IAEA employs specialized
dispute resolution systems to manage discussions between states. Again,
difficulties can arise that are not covered by legal frameworks when states
choose to adopt other responses to conflicts such as use of military force or
economic sanctions (Suleman, 2008, p. 209). This can significantly undermine
the IAEAs ability to conduct peaceful negotiations, such as in the case of political
interference during the Iran talks. There have also been somewhat justified
moments of skepticism surrounding the accuracy of IAEA inspections. Failures in
Iraq in the late 80s and early 90s led to criticism by the United States, and dealt
a blow to the credibility of the agency as the primary monitor of nuclear
materials around the world. However, these charges have also been used to
justify ignoring their reports in later years, such as during the buildup to the
unsanctioned invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Hymans, 2014). Another limiting factor is
the non-universality of NPT membership, given that the acquisition of nuclear
weapons by one state increases the chances that another will seek to acquire
them also (Suleman, 2008, pp. 219-222). This has clearly been the case with
India and Pakistan, and to a certain extent between Israel and Iran.
Unfortunately, there are also limits to the ability of the IAEA to trace covert
weapons programs stemming from both a lack of funding and legal authority
(Elbaradei, 2011, pp. 316-317).

Some of the greatest challenges to the NPT come from sources external to it.
Between the late 70s and early 2000s, the Pakistani metallurgist Abdul Qadeer
Khan developed a black-market trade in nuclear technology, selling information
to North Korea, Libya, Iran, and China. This led to the development of nuclear
weapons programs outside of NPT purview, and is indeed responsible for many of
the challenges faced by the non-proliferation regime today (The Economist,
2008). In this case, a non-state actor was able to distribute designs for these
weapons for years without having been caught. It is worth considering what
might happen if the technology behind these weapons were to fall into the hands
of non-state terror groups; smaller groups may not have been able to fund such a
venture, but that may not always be the case. This becomes especially relevant
when it is considered in light of the latest developments by the Pakistani
weapons program, increasingly miniaturized tactical nuclear weapons that
could be carried onto the battlefield. These are significantly more likely to be
stolen or diverted by other actors than their considerably larger and more
complex cousins (Fair, 2015). These types of weapons are also considered to
pose a far greater escalation threat in regards to crossing the nuclear threshold,
that is, they are more likely to be deployed than their conventional nuclear
warheads in a combat situation (Broad & Sanger, 2016). The NPT does not
specify definite payload types or sizes of nuclear weapons, and thus fails to take
into account this modernization of their design and its related increase in the
danger of their use. Modernization and upkeep has continued on nuclear-weapon
state stockpiles, despite some effort to reduce total numbers of weapons,
leading some to question the commitment to disarmament of these states
(Deen, 2016). UNSC Resolution 1540 has provided some redress to these issues,
preventing UN member states from selling or transferring weapons of mass
destruction (including nuclear weapons) and related technology to non-state
actors. This mandate was extended by UNSC Resolution 1977 for another ten
years in 2011.
There have also been limits to proliferation of nuclear material enacted outside
of the NPT regime. India has recently been blocked from joining the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) a trading cartel of states that export nuclear material
by opposition from several countries, most notably China. China has called for
strengthening the rules regarding joining the NSG, following an exemption
granted in 2008 on the advice of the United States, and has recommended that
NPT membership should become a prerequisite (PTI, 2016). While this may be

positive in applying pressure for India (and indeed Pakistan, which also aims for
membership) to join the NPT, there are almost certainly other geopolitical
concerns involved in this decision-making process. This political opacity only
serves to further fracture the legal framework surrounding the trade in nuclear
material (Dalton, et al., 2016).
Other non-government organizations (NGOs) have been active in the cause for
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, though given that the topic relates to
the very highest strata of security policy between states their influence at this
level may be limited. However, in the civil arena these groups have attempted to
raise awareness and increase public support for the goals laid out in the NPT
(Stephenson, 2005). Proposals for nuclear-weapons-free zones have also been
floated in an attempt to change public opinion within states where support for
nuclear weapons is high (Arms Control Association, 2015). International groups of
scientists, engineers, and other experts, have made their own case for
disarmament, and laid out proposals for how this might take place (Scheffran,
1995). One of the more compelling ideas put forward is a No First Use policy,
whereby nuclear-weapon states would commit to never launching a nuclear
offensive attack unless fired upon first (Sagan, 2009, p. 164). NGOs have also
played a role in developing the Partial and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaties,
notably The Parliamentarians for Global Action NGO, comprising legislators from
states around the world. This has helped to develop further the legal framework
that supports the NPT and its aims by bringing together important voices
throughout the community (Javid, 2015). Another method used by NGOs has
been to attempt to delegitimize nuclear weapons, thus helping to build the
normative framework for disarmament. This approach has relied on the 1996
ruling by the International Court of Justice confirming the illegality of the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons (Reaching Critical Will, 2016).
4. Conclusions
It is clear that the NPT continues to face challenges from multiple sources. Major
states have made efforts throughout the life of the treaty to reduce their number
of weapons, but nothing approaching disarmament. The P5 process has
continued this work, and should be seen as a positive step forward, though more
needs to be done. Political and diplomatic posturing has hurt the cause for
disarmament, with some states receiving special treatment. This must be
condemned, and taken into account when creating or updating new agreements.

The IAEA has been a powerful force for the maintenance of the NPT and
monitoring of nuclear material stockpiling and exporting. It is in need of more
funding and support, as well as greater legal authority if it is to continue to stay
abreast of situations developing around the world. Non-state actors seem likely
to pose an ongoing threat to non-proliferation, especially considering the
development of so-called tactical miniaturized nuclear weapons. These pose a
greater risk of crossing the nuclear threshold, and should be condemned. The
NPT may need to be updated to deal with this growing threat. Non-NPT states
continue to complicate the situation, and nuclear-weapon states should be
discouraged from making unilateral deals with them unless they sign and ratify
the treaty. NGOs have played an important role in building the legal framework
around the NPT, bringing together legislators from around the world, and
delegitimizing nuclear weapons in the public. NGOs should be encouraged to
engage further with the cause of disarmament, and to continue to build networks
of like-minded individuals and states. The prospects for disarmament must be
seen as positive, despite considerable difficulties, as the alternative is an
increasingly insecure world.