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Mbushuu (Alias Dominic Mnyaroje) & Anor V Republic (1995) ICHRL 5 (30 January 1995)

The appellants were convicted of murder but given life imprisonment instead of the death penalty by the trial judge. On appeal, their convictions were quashed for lack of evidence but the court also considered the respondent's appeal of the sentences. The court held that the death penalty was constitutional under Tanzania's constitution. It found that the right to life and prohibition of cruel punishment must be interpreted based on current conditions. While the death penalty was inherently cruel, it could be allowed under the constitution to protect public interest and achieved deterrence in Tanzanian society given existing legal safeguards.

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2K views1 page

Mbushuu (Alias Dominic Mnyaroje) & Anor V Republic (1995) ICHRL 5 (30 January 1995)

The appellants were convicted of murder but given life imprisonment instead of the death penalty by the trial judge. On appeal, their convictions were quashed for lack of evidence but the court also considered the respondent's appeal of the sentences. The court held that the death penalty was constitutional under Tanzania's constitution. It found that the right to life and prohibition of cruel punishment must be interpreted based on current conditions. While the death penalty was inherently cruel, it could be allowed under the constitution to protect public interest and achieved deterrence in Tanzanian society given existing legal safeguards.

Uploaded by

Robert Walusimbi
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Mbushuu (alias Dominic Mnyaroje) & Anor v Republic [1995] ICHRL 5 (30

January 1995)
Tanzania
[1995] 1 LRC 335, [1996] 2 CHRLD 160; [1995] TLR 97
For the Appellants: Mr Rweyongeza, Advocate
For the Respondent: Miss Korosso, State Attorney
The appellants were convicted of murder but the trial judge held that the death
penalty prescribed by the Penal Code was unconstitutional and sentenced them to
life imprisonment. Their convictions were quashed on appeal for lack of proper
identification evidence but the Court also considered the respondents appeal against
the sentences. In declaring the death penalty constitutional, it was held that:
1. The right to life provision in the Constitution (Art 14) expressly allows for
situations where it will be denied by the due process of law.
2. The constitutional right to dignity in the execution of a punishment and the
prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading punishment (Art 13(6)(d) and
(e)) must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions (Trop v Dulles
356 US 86 (1957) (SC) and Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 1
(ECtHR) considered).
3. The death penalty, and hanging in particular, is inherently inhuman, cruel and
degrading (Furman v Georgia 408 US 238 (1972) followed).
4. The death penalty provision could be saved by Art 30(2) of the Constitution,
which allows a law to derogate or limit an individuals basic rights on public
interest grounds (Daudi Pete v A-G (Cr App No 28 of 1990, unreported) and
Kukutia Ole Pumbun v A-G [no citation] applied).
5. The existence of safeguards in criminal law and procedure means that the
death penalty is not arbitrary. Having regard to the context of Tanzanian
society, the death penalty is also proportional since it is presently deemed to
be a reasonably necessary deterrent to achieve the legitimate object of
protecting the right to life of other members of society.

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