NPT: Introduction and historical background

Since the first atomic bombs were detonated above Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in 1945, nuclear weapons proliferation has become one of the greatest
threats to international security. While progress has been slow, nuclear non-
proliferation efforts have largely proven to be successful. In order to achieve
nuclear disarmament, some concrete measures must be taken to strengthen
these goals.
On 5 March 1970, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) officially entered
into force following the unanimous approval of a 1961 United Nations
General Assembly resolution. The purpose of the NPT is to limit further states
from acquiring nuclear weapons while trying to contain and control the
nuclear arsenals of states that currently possess them. It is arguably one of
the most influential arms control treaties in the world. There are currently
189 signatory states; five of which are recognized nuclear weapon
states (NWS). The remaining three NWS (India, Israel, and Pakistan) have
never joined the NPT, and North Korea is the only country to withdraw from
the treaty. The framework of the NPT is based on three legally binding pillars:
1. Non-proliferation: NWS agree not to transfer their nuclear devices
to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). The NNWS agree to not acquire
or manufacture nuclear weapons, and they agree to comply with
the safeguards issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
2. Disarmament: All signatory states agree to work towards complete
disarmament of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles.
3. Peaceful use of nuclear energy: NPT member states agree that the
use of nuclear technology and materials will be used for the development
of civilian nuclear energy programs. The states are subject to the IAEA
safeguards to ensure that the technology and material are not being
used for the purpose of nuclear weapons development.
Article 1 Nuclear weapon states wont transfer Article 2-Non nuclear
wont accept transfer Article 3- Safeguards under IAEA Article 4-no
peaceful uses unless agreement on IAEA procedures Article 6- in good faith,
all will disarm Article 9- Nuclear state detonated before Jan 1, 1967
IAEA Basics:
The IAEA is not a party to the Treaty but is entrusted with key roles and
responsibilities under it. Under the NPT, the IAEA has specific roles as the
international safeguards inspectorate and as a multilateral channel for
transferring peaceful applications of nuclear technology:
NPT Article III: The IAEA administers international safeguards to verify that
non-nuclear weapon States party to the NPT fulfill the non-proliferation
commitment they have made, "with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear
energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices."
NPT Article IV: The Agency facilitates and provides a channel for endeavours
aimed at "the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States
Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing
areas of the world."
In practical terms, the IAEA also is seen as having roles in connection with
verification of nuclear-weapon-free zones and in the context of verifying ex-
nuclear weapon material.
HISTORY:
he IAEA is the world's centre for cooperation in the nuclear field. It was set up as the world's "Atoms
for Peace" organization in 1957 within the United Nations family. The Agency works with its Member
States and multiple partners worldwide to promote the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear
technologies.

Organizational Profile
The IAEA Secretariat is headquartered at the Vienna International Centre in
Vienna, Austria. Operational liaison and regional offices are located in
Geneva, Switzerland, New York, USA, Toronto, Canada and Tokyo, Japan. The
IAEA runs or supports research centres and scientific laboratories in Vienna
and Seibersdorf, Austria, Monaco and Trieste, Italy.
The IAEA was created in 1957 in response to the deep fears and expectations
resulting from the discovery of nuclear energy. Its fortunes are uniquely
geared to this controversial technology that can be used either as a weapon
or as a practical and useful tool. The Agency's genesis was US President
Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace address to the General Assembly of the United
Nations on 8 December 1953. These ideas helped to shape the IAEA Statute,
which 81 nations unanimously approved in October 1956."
The IAEA Secretariat is a team of some 2500 multidisciplinary professional
and support staff from more than 100 countries. The Agency is led by
the Director General and six Deputy Director Generals who head the major
departments.
IAEA programmes and budgets are set through decisions taken by its policy-
making bodies: the 35 members of the Board of Governors and the General
Conference comprising representatives from all IAEA Member States. Reports
on IAEA activities are submitted periodically and, as cases warrant, to the
United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly.
IAEA financial resources include the regular budget and voluntary
contributions. The General Conference sets the annual regular budget and
addresses extra-budgetary funds as well as voluntary contributions made to
the Technical Cooperation Fund. These figures are published in the
latest IAEA Annual Report.
12 international laboratories (Vienna, Seibersorf and Monaco) and research
centres.

330 million total regular budget for 2013, supplemented by extrabudgetary

expenditures in 2013 totalling 62.7 million.

IAEA Mission & Programmes

The IAEA's mission is guided by the interests and needs of Member States,
strategic plans and the vision embodied in the IAEA Statute. Three
main areas of work underpin the IAEA's mission: Safety and Security, Science
and Technology, and Safeguards and Verification.

Relationship with the United Nations

As an independent international organization related to the United Nations
(UN) system, the IAEA's relationship with the UN is regulated by a special
agreement. In terms of its Statute, the IAEA reports annually to the UN
General Assembly and, when appropriate, to the UN Security Council
regarding States' non-compliance with safeguards obligations, as well as on
matters relating to international peace and security.

The IAEA Mission Statement

The International Atomic Energy Agency:

is an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based

organization, in the United Nations family, that serves as the global
focal point for nuclear cooperation;

assists its Member States, in the context of social and economic goals,
in planning for and using nuclear science and technology for various
peaceful purposes, including the generation of electricity, and
facilitates the transfer of such technology and knowledge in a
sustainable manner to developing Member States;

develops nuclear safety standards and, based on these standards,

promotes the achievement and maintenance of high levels of safety in
applications of nuclear energy, as well as the protection of human
health and the environment against ionizing radiation;
 verifies through its inspection system that States comply with their
commitments, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other non-
proliferation agreements, to use nuclear material and facilities only for
peaceful purposes.

Medium Term Strategy

The latest IAEA Medium Term Strategy covers the period 2012 to 2017. It has
been developed through a process of interaction between the Secretariat
and an open-ended Working Group established for this purpose by the Board
of Governors.

The Medium Term Strategy 2012-2017 provides overarching guidance and

serves as a roadmap to the Agency's activities during this period by
identifying priorities among and within programmes based on such
considerations as recent technological trends, emerging needs and the
political, economic and social background.

The Strategy serves also as a general framework and guide for the
preparation of three programme and budget cycles using the results based
management approach. The programme and budget for each biennium will
be developed on the basis of the Medium Term Strategy 2012-2017
objectives.

The Medium Term Strategy 20122017 sets out the following six strategic
objectives to be pursued in a coordinated and mutually reinforcing manner:
A. Facilitating access to nuclear power; B. Strengthening promotion of
nuclear science, technology, and applications; C. Improving nuclear safety
and security; D. Providing effective technical cooperation; E. Strengthening
the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the Agencys safeguards
and other verification activities; F. Providing efficient, innovative
management and strategic planning.

Conference On Disarmament:

The Conference on Disarmament (CD), established in 1979 as the single

multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community,
was a result of the first Special Session on Disarmament of the United
Nations General Assembly held in 1978.

It succeeded other Geneva-based negotiating fora, which include the Ten-

Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960), the Eighteen-Nation Committee
on Disarmament (1962-68), and the Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament (1969-78).
The current Director-General of UNOG is the Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament as well as the Personal Representative of the
UN Secretary-General to the CD.

The terms of reference of the CD include practically all multilateral arms

control and disarmament problems. Currently the CD primarily focuses its
attention on the following issues: cessation of the nuclear arms race and
nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related
matters; prevention of an arms race in outer space; effective international
arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat
of use of nuclear weapons; new types of weapons of mass destruction and
new systems of such weapons including radiological weapons;
comprehensive programme of disarmament and transparency in
armaments.

The CD meets in an annual session, which is divided in three parts of 10, 7

and 7 weeks, respectively. The first week shall begin in the penultimate week
of the month of January. The CD is presided by its members on a rotating
basis. Each President shall preside for a period of four weeks.

In order to ensure a coherent approach among the six Presidents of the

session to the work of the Conference, as of 2006, an informal coordination
mechanism - the P6 - was established that provides for the six presidents of
the session to informally meet, usually on a weekly basis. Also on a weekly
basis, the President meets informally with the Regional Group Coordinators
and China together with the P6 (Presidential Consultations).

As originally constituted, the CD had 40 members. Subsequently its

membership was gradually expanded (and reduced) to 65 countries. The CD
has invited other UN Member States that have expressed a desire to
participate in the CD's substantive discussions, to take part in its work as
observers.

The CD adopts its own Rules of Procedure and its own agenda, taking into
account the recommendations of the General Assembly and the proposals of
its Members.

It reports to the General Assembly annually, or more frequently, as

appropriate. Its budget is included in that of the United Nations. Staff
members of the Geneva Branch of the Department for Disarmament Affairs
service the meetings of the CD, which are held at the Palais des Nations.
The Conference conducts its work by consensus.

The CD and its predecessors have negotiated such major multilateral arms
limitation and disarmament agreements as the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of
 Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques,
the seabed treaties, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

23.In the CD Pakistan must continue to insist that:

Only a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) which addresses existing fissile
material stocks and asymmetries to assure equal security for all should be
negotiated. That would be a true disarmament objective and achievement,
not an FMCT aimed at the expense of only Pakistan, the last entrant, which
was forced by the Indian nuclear tests and subsequent threats, to go nuclear
to preserve the strategic balance essential for peace and security in South
Asia.
That this should be in the context of parallel negotiations of equal
status with the same objective to reach legal instruments on the other three
core issues before the CD, Nuclear Disarmament, Negative Security
Guarantees, and the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.
The Group of 21 in its statement of 11th August 2011 at the CD
Plenary, which demonstrated that Pakistan is not isolated in the CD, inter
alia called for; consensus on a comprehensive and balanced program of work
taking into account the security concerns of all states; the early
commencement of negotiations, within the CD, on a phased program for the
complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific period of time
including a Nuclear Weapons Convention to prohibit the possession,
development, stockpiling, transfer and use of nuclear weapons, leading to
their ultimate destruction.
Such a Convention goes far beyond any status quo FMCT proposal and
the NPT nuclear powers to fulfill their NPT vertical deproliferation obligations
should agree to demonstrate their sincerity.
24.Pakistan, a responsible nuclear State, supports the objectives of non-
proliferation and should continue to contribute to the strengthening and
further development of the international non-proliferation regime based on
the principles of non-discrimination, equal and undiminished security for all
states, and equal access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Ending nuclear weapon testing has been on the global arms control agenda
for more than forty years. In 1954, India proposed a standstill agreement of
nuclear testing, and since then this matter has been a fixture of international
diplomacy. Tripartite discussions between the U.S., the U.K., and the USSR
that had been underway since 1958, eventually were successful in reaching
agreement in 1963 on banning nuclear explosions in all environments except
underground. The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), agreed in the
aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis and radioactive contamination of the
atmosphere, was characterized as an interim step along the road to "achieve
the discontinuance of all test explosions...for all time."

Over a decade later, the two nuclear superpowers were only able to agree on
limiting the yield of their underground test explosions not to exceed 150
kilotons. The 1974 U.S./USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty was agreed on the
eve of the first review conference of the NPT mainly for political not arms
control reasons. Two years later, it was complemented by the 1976 Peaceful
Nuclear Explosions Treaty that carried over the restrictions of the PTBT to
"peaceful nuclear explosions". These two treaties delayed the achievement
of a total ban.

Nuclear weapon states traditionally conducted nuclear tests for at least six
reasons: 1) to achieve and demonstrate a weapons capability; 2) to develop,
certify, and modernize warheads; 3) to maintain stockpile reliability; 4) to
determine and evaluate weapons effects; 5) to enhance safety of existing
designs; and 6) to retain the technological infrastructure for nuclear
armaments.

Negotiations on an Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) were conducted in

three phases not directly related to one another. During 1957-1963,
tripartite-U.S., U.K., and USSR-discussions took place but fell apart due to
differences over verification, with the Soviets holding out for a minimal
inspection regime. From 1977 to 1980, another attempt was made at
tripartite talks on a CTBT, and limited progress was achieved on a set of
principles, but differences continued over verification. The Reagan
administration launched a major strategic modernization program and did
not pursue talks on a CTBT. Frustrated by this lack of progress on a CTBT and
given robust testing programs in the NWS, a group of non-aligned states
sought to amend the PTBT in 1991 and to convert it to a CTBT with the
insertion of an additional article and two protocols. With the U.S. and the U.K.
openly opposed, and given the absence of China and France as non-parties,
the PTBT Amendment Conference was doomed to failure. Following an
October 1990 Soviet unilateral moratorium on testing, in September 1992
the U.S. Congress proclaimed its own moratorium and obligated the
administration to conclude a CTBT by 30 September 1996. Negotiations at
the Conference on Disarmament (CD) took on a new impetus after
September 1993 resulting in a treaty that was opened for signature at the
UN on 24 September 1996. Thus, after some 2,050 nuclear test explosions
since 1945, many believed that the era of nuclear weapon testing had
ended. India's nuclear tests, followed by those of Pakistan, in May 1998
however came as rude shock.
The CTBT, when it enters into force, will become a critical part of the system
of interlocking treaties and agreements that help prevent the global spread
of nuclear weapons. It presently has 154 signatories with 51 ratifications,
and 26 states have ratified of the 44 whose ratification is necessary for
entry-into-force. Two of the five NWS-France-and the United Kingdom-have
already ratified, and France remains the only NWS to have dismantled its
national test site. An international conference on facilitating the CTBT's entry
into force was held in Vienna from 6 to 8 October 1999, at which ninety-two
ratifying and signatory states to the CTBT unanimously agreed on a "Final
Declaration" reinforcing the importance and authority of that Treaty and
called for its early entry-into-force.

Once the CTBT enters into force an international monitoring system

comprising 321 monitoring stations, supported by 16 technical laboratories,
will come into effect. Four technologies are being used by the proto-type
international data centre, of the provisional technical secretariat of the CTBT
Organization, to monitor nuclear tests: seismic, infra sound, hydro-acoustic,
and atmospheric sampling. Despite it being "history's most sought after and
hardest fought prize", the CTBT represents a compromise treaty that leaves
it open to charges of allowing nuclear weapons modernization through the
backdoor. So-called virtual nuclear testing through sub-critical tests, fusion
experiments, and simulations using networked supercomputers, which is not
prohibited, threatens to undermine the effectiveness of the new treaty in
serving nuclear non-proliferation interests and provides justification to
proliferators for testing.

Despite its weaknesses though, a CTBT will help in de-legitimizing nuclear

weapons and bring additional pressure on NPT hold-outs to refrain from
weapon development and to join the regime. A CTBT would prevent countries
such as India, Israel, and Pakistan from validating theoretical designs and
calculations for nuclear warheads, and raise the political costs of violating
the global non-proliferation norm. A CTBT also would help eliminate a critical
element of friction and dissatisfaction concerning the inequality of
obligations assumed under the NPT by nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-
weapon states. NNWS parties to the NPT from the Third World constituted by
far the overwhelming majority of NPT members-these states regarded a
CTBT as a sine qua non for NPT extension-and their support was crucial in
securing the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. While it could be argued
that a CTBT per se will not necessarily contribute to nuclear arms reductions
and will freeze the current superiority in nuclear weapons technologies of
some of the NWS, many non-nuclear weapon states consider a CTBT as an
important and visible indicator of the nuclear weapon states' compliance
with Article VI of the NPT.
Unless serious measures are undertaken to promote the early entry-into-
force of the CTBT and a legally binding norm against further testing is
established, there will be pressures in some of the NWS to resume nuclear
testing and it will remain difficult to prevent further testing by India and
Pakistan. Such a resumption of testing would be justified in the United States
on the grounds of revitalizing an aging arsenal and maintaining the nuclear
weapons production infrastructure, in Russia in terms of certifying existing or
new sub-strategic warhead designs to compensate for declining conventional
forces, and in China as required for nuclear force modernization to respond
to deployment of theater- or national-missile defences by the United States
These pressures are likely to be the strongest in Russia and China, and
should these two countries resume nuclear testing it is unlikely that the
United States would not respond in kind.

Fissile Material Treaty

Banning further production of weapon-usable fissile material as a barrier to

further nuclear proliferation was also first envisaged in the early 1950s. The
failure to secure an early agreement eventually led to the production of
nearly two thousand metric tonnes of highly-enriched uranium and some
three hundred metric tonnes of weapon-usable plutonium. Given sufficient
stocks, the United States halted plutonium production (not separation) in
1988, curtailed HEU production in 1964 and suspended all HEU production
(including that for naval reactors) in November 1991. In Russia, which had 13
plutonium production reactors in operation in 1994, only two remain in
production and are likely to be shut down over the next couple of years; but
it is not clear whether Russia is still producing HEU even though President
Gorbachev promised a halt.

As part of its Strategic Defence Review in July 1998, the United Kingdom
declared 7.6 tonnes of plutonium and 21.9 tonnes of HEU. Apparently it
stopped HEU production in January 1993. In February 1996, France
announced a halt in HEU production and the closure of production facilities. A
production halt of both HEU and plutonium has been declared by the United
States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom-apparently, among the NWS,
only China might still be producing weapon-usable nuclear material. India,
Israel and Pakistan are also reportedly still producing such material.

In 1993, the UN General Assembly agreed by consensus on a resolution

calling for negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. But disagreements
over scope of a treaty and negotiating mandate frustrated progress at the
CD as well as on a subsequent UNGA resolution. After two years of deadlock
in the Conference on Disarmament over whether negotiations on a FMT and
discussions on a future programme for disarmament should proceed in
parallel, the South Asian tests prompted establishment of an ad
hoc committee in August 1998 on a FMT based on the mandate contained in
the March 1995 report of the Special Coordinator, and also resulted in a UN
General Assembly resolution in December on the need for a FMT. However,
during its 1999 session, the CD was unable to re-establish an ad
hoc committee on FMT, due to differences over parallel negotiations on
nuclear disarmament, and consideration of "prevention of an arms race in
outer space" to prevent weaponization of space, among other reasons.

Originally conceived as a nuclear disarmament instrument, a FMT has come

to be regarded by the NWS principally as a non-proliferation treaty. The
inclusion of existing stocks or historic production of weapon-usable fissile
material has become a matter of contention, with the NWS and India and
Pakistan arguing for exclusion while the G-21 and other (Western and
Eastern) states would prefer to include such stocks. In order to be effective,
an FMT will have to fulfill both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-
proliferation functions, and will have to be fully consistent with the principles
and obligations of the NPT. Other complexities pertaining to definitions,
scope, declarations, verification etc. will not be addressed here due to space
considerations. Suffice it to add that a FMT negotiation will be the most
complex and controversial yet at the multilateral forum of the CD.

Decommissioning of Weapon Systems and Control of Sensitive Nuclear

Materials in the former Soviet Union

With the unexpected and sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, the fate of
some 25,000 to 30,000 nuclear warheads became a major issue of
international concern. The command and control, accounting and safe
storage of these warheads poses an important challenge to Russian
authorities and the world community. Other proliferation concerns relate to
the possible export of nuclear expertise and weakened state control over
nuclear materials.

Reportedly, U.S. military authorities and intelligence agencies are quite

confident, and have received categorical assurances from the highest
authorities in Russia, that all non-strategic nuclear warheads-some 19,000 in
all-were properly accounted for and removed to the territory of the Russia
under appropriate controls by 1 July 1992 under the terms of the Alma Ata
Declaration of 22 December 1991.

The Alma Ata accord and the Lisbon Protocol to the START treaty of 23 May
1992, committed Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to transfer all strategic
nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantling and to accede to the NPT as non-
nuclear weapon states. Further, in letters by the presidents of these three
states to the U.S. president, each state pledged to ratify START I, to
guarantee the removal of all strategic nuclear forces on its territory during
the seven-year period as provided for in START I, and to accede to the NPT as
non-nuclear weapon states. All three states have acceded to the NPT as
NNWS and former Soviet weapons based on their territories have been
removed and dismantled with the financial and technical assistance provided
by the United States.

Current nuclear arms reduction agreements are resulting in the release of

highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and weapon-usable plutonium (Pu) from
dismantled nuclear warheads. Dealing with these radioactive materials will
be a major challenge in terms of assuring their physical safety,
accountability, and storage or disposal under proper monitoring. According to
one study, fissionable materials to be released from nuclear warheads as a
result of disarmament include: for the U.S., 50 tons of Pu, and 210 tons of
HEU; and for Russia, 89 tons of Pu and 430 tons of HEU. Russia still lacks
safe, secure storage facilities for the large quantities of weapon-usable
nuclear materials from dismantled warheads, and only one large storage
facility is under construction.

Various proposals have been forwarded in this context. These include, for
instance, the establishment of an international storage facility under the
supervision of the IAEA, something akin to Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace"
plan of 1953. Article XII.A.5 of the IAEA Statute authorizes the Agency to
extend safeguards over weapon-grade nuclear materials placed under its
supervision or control, and the IAEA has offered its services in this regard.
Other proposals include converting HEU to reactor grade fuel for burn up in
commercial power reactors to generate electricity, and to convert Pu to
mixed-oxide fuel for burn up in CANDU and/or "fast burn" reactors that have
yet to be built or in civilian breeder reactors (since these last two options will
add to the amount of Pu in civil stockpiles they do not seem viable).

Beginning in December 1995, the United States started buying from Russia
500 tons of HEU over 20 years released from dismantled former Soviet
nuclear warheads. The U.S. was to purchase 10 metric tons of HEU in each of
the first five years beginning in 1995, and no less than thirty metric tons
during each of the following fifteen years. The 94% U-235 was to be diluted
to an enrichment level of about 4% and sold by the Department of Energy to
commercial customers in the United States. This programme, however, has
run into serious difficulties due to domestic political and economic
considerations in the U.S., as well as concerns about the origin of HEU being
transferred from Russia, and high-level attention is now required to bring it to
a successful outcome.

Canada, Japan, and France, all have expressed interest in burning up

plutonium released from Russian warheads in power reactors (as MOX fuel) in
Canada and Japan, while the French proposal calls for MOX burn up in Russia
with French technical assistance.

Other non-proliferation activities include core conversion programmes for

converting reactor cores from HEU to other forms of uranium in Russian
reactors and reactors elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. Assistance is
also being provided to Russia to help it safely dismantle more than 200
nuclear-powered submarines. And nuclear material protection, accounting
and control measures continue to be the focus of attention in the new
independent states of the former Soviet Union.

A U.S. "Cooperative Threat Reduction" programme is directed at eliminating

weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union. Thus far,
programme activities have facilitated the destruction of 365 ballistic missiles,
343 ballistic missile launchers, 49 strategic bombers, 136 submarine missile
launchers, sealed 191 nuclear test tunnels, as well as deactivated 4,838
nuclear warheads.

Conclusion

"We have met the enemy and he is us," said the comic-strip sage Pogo. While
the end of the Cold War has greatly reduced the traditional threat of
superpower conflict, maintaining and even strengthening global non-
proliferation regimes have become important new challenges. Despite its
successes, the non-proliferation regime has sustained some severe blows
and it remains the responsibility of the international community to shore up
the regime. The NPT bargain comprising nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear
disarmament, and cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy under
safeguards remains essential to the future integrity and longevity of the
regime. New strategies need to be devised to engage the holdouts and to
encourage their normative behaviour-this would require, at a minimum,
standardized responses to proliferation activities in India, Israel and Pakistan.
In addition, the UN Security Council, which belatedly issued a statement on
31 January 1992 to the effect that proliferation constituted a threat to
international peace and security, and agreed to resolutions 687 on Iraq, on
North Korea, and 1172 on India and Pakistan, remains unfocused and
divided. On matters relating to combating proliferation, the permanent
members might consider suspending their right of veto, or alternatively
requiring two vetoes, to prevent Security Council non-proliferation
enforcement action.

It is generally recognized that nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear

disarmament are inter-linked. In this context, the challenge to the NWS is to
fashion a strategy to de-legitimize nuclear weapons that follows the new
logic of post-Cold War security dynamics and capitalizes on the possibilities
opened by emerging strategic realities where inter-state war is declining.
Establishing new norms in concert with pro-active diplomacy to resolve
regional conflicts, meshing supply-side restraints and demand-side
motivations, offer the best prospect of reversing proliferation and shoring up
a fraying NPT regime. A fundamental question that has not yet been
adequately answered is: How important is nuclear non-proliferation, and
what price in terms of nuclear disarmament are the NWS prepared to pay to
realize the non-proliferation objective? The commitment of the NWS to the
NPT is under question not the least given the lack of progress in achieving
further nuclear disarmament, but also in terms of their living up to other
negotiated arms control treaties.

General (ret'd.) George Lee Butler, former C-in-C of the United States
Strategic Command, who was one of a very few nuclear war planners to
evaluate the entirety of the 12,500 targets in the U.S.' single integrated
operational plan (SIOP) for using nuclear weapons and reduced it down to
3,000 targets, concluded: "I long ago took to heart the words of Omar
Bradley, spoken virtually a half century ago, when he observed, having seen
the aftermath of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, thus: 'We live in an
age of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We live in a world that has achieved
brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. We've unlocked the
mysteries of the atom and forgotten the lessons of the Sermon on the Mount.
We know more about war than we know about peace, more about killing than
we know about living'."

Living with nuclear weapons for more than half a century has been possible
because of a non-proliferation regime anchored in the NPT. The
overwhelming majority of states has concluded that their security interests
are better served by not having nuclear weapons. The NPT regime has
created a legal barrier against proliferation, established norms for
cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and put in place a
comprehensive system of nuclear material accountancy and control
buttressed by remote and on-site surveillance. But the world, despite its non-
proliferation rhetoric has gotten by on the cheap-expending a mere $100
million dollars a year on the IAEA safeguards system. Non-proliferation and
disarmament require adequate financial investment.
Leadership whether on nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament or
regional security issues depends on clarity of vision and clarity of
commitment. Being satisfied with the lowest common denominator of
agreement among states is at best an unreliable guide to security and
stability. It is therefore vital to formulate a grand strategy for the prohibition
of nuclear weapons as part of a broader vision of curbing the spread of
nuclear weapons.