Es, Foreign Policy Theories, Actors, Cases SECOND EDITION Edited by Steve Smith Amelia Hadfield Tim Dunne [UNIVERSITY PRISEContents in brief Notes on contributors x Introduction 1 steve Smith, Amalia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne SECTION ONE Foreign Policy Analysis: 1 6 10 " 2 SECTION TWO Analysing Foreign Policy: Actors, Context, and Goals heoretical and Historical Perspectives ‘The history and evolution of foreign policy analysis 3 Valerie M. Hudson Realism and foreign policy 5 Wiliam C. Wohlforth Liberalism and foreign policy 54 Michael W. Doyle Constructivism and foreign policy 8 ‘Tine Flockhart Discourse analysis, post-structuralism, and foreign policy 4 Lene Hansen ‘Actors, structures, and foreign policy analysis 13 ‘Walter Carlsnaes Foreign policy decision making: rational, psychological, and neurological models 130 Janice Gross Stein Implementation and behaviour 17 Fisabetia Brighiand Christopher Hit ‘The role of media and public opinion 168 Piers Robinson “The primacy of national security 188 Brian C. Schmidt Economic statecraft 204 Michael Mastanduno Duties beyond borders 223 ‘Michael BarnettCONTENTS IN BRIEF SECTION THREE Foreign Policy Case Studies 13. Teaching foreign policy cases steven L- Lamy 14 The Cuban Missile Crisis ‘Graham Alison 45. Canada and antipersonnel landmines: the case for human security asa foreign policy priority Loyd Axworthy 16 Neoconservatism and the domestic sources of American foreign policy: the role of ideas in Operation Iraqi Freedom ‘Yuen Foong kitong 47 Chinaand the Tian‘anmen bloodshed of June 1989 Rosemary Foot 18 Indiaand the World Trade Organization Arita Narkar 19° Rising Brazil and South America ‘Alene Brickner 20 Australia and global climate change ‘Matt McDonald 21 _Israeli-Egyptian (in)security: the Yom Kippur War Gareth Stansfield 22. Blair's Britain and the road to war in traq Tim Dunne 23. Energy and foreign policy: EU-Russia energy dynamics ‘Amelia Hadfield ‘24 Newactors, new foreign policy: EU and enlargement Lsbeth Aggestam Glossary Endnotes Bibliography Index 203 256 284 308, 327 348 367 384 400 a9 aa 463 485 495 503 $33Realism and foreign policy WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH Chapter contents Introduction Fa hatis realism? % | Thedovelopment of realist theories 3% eatst analysis of foreign poley a2 Using reais in analysing foreign Ply “0 Concusion: hedgehogs foxes, and analysingoreign policy 0 @ Reader's guide ‘this chapter shows how famlay with reais theory improves Fore Policy Analy TE UFPA) The main challenge ist expel two features of ces that are often in aasem ith each othor i frm grounding centuries fea foreign policy practice, andits aspiration to create powerful general theories thathelp tosimplify and explain are pernatinal sting in which foreign poi takes place, The raFie ‘identifies a aanra of eal theory-neoclasscalrealism—vwhich bridges the gap Fete" these tres aspects ofthe realist tration and thus s most wel for he ‘analysis of foreign policy. The following key questions are addressed fe What s realism? «9 Howisit applied tothe analysis and practice of foreign policy? ‘e- What are the main pitfalls in applying realist theories to FPAT ‘9 Whatisausefl st of guidelines for avoiding those pitfalls and using cealist insights to sharpen the analysis of foreien policy? Introduction Realism is the foundational school of thought about international politics around which all cthersare ortented follows that any foreign policy analyst who wishes to make use of Inter- oavtonal Relations (IR) theory must understand realism, Fortunately: this s not dificult to do. is this chapter demonstrates, the realist school can be ‘understood as a body of theories and related arguments that flow from avery small set of basic assumptions about how the world vonke. Used with sensitivity in their application to the complexlty ‘and uncertainty of the real political world, realist theories can substantially sharpen the analysis of foreign policy.+ qo apply realism to FPA, one has to bridge the gap that divides highly general, ‘top-down! ‘theory from the ‘inside-out analysis of specific cases. Realism itself embodies this tension, reflecting the desire to be both realistic (.e. grounded in actual foreign policy practice) and theoretical (ie. espiringto general timeless knowledge). Realistsseekto distil the accumulated swisdom of generations of foreign policy practitioners into general theories of IR. Realism’s basic conceptual foundations are derived from the close observation of lived politics. But in seeking to construct and apply 2 reality-based theory, realists ‘constantly face the challenge of cycling between the ‘nuanced subtleties of real foreign policy situations and the razor-sharp ‘assumptions and deductions of theory. vrthis chapter: |show that realism’ promise for the analysis of foreign policy stems from its twin commitments to particular and general knowledge, and that most ‘of the pitfalls of ap plying realism derive from a failure to get this balance right. ! outline an approach to realist theory designed to connect the insights of general theory to the details and uncertainty of analysing specific foreign policy siwations. This approach reflects @ sustained effort on the part of a new generation af scholars to gain the analytical benefits of realist theory without falling prey to its potentially misleading over-generalization. To ‘understand this new ap- proach, however, one first needs to know what realism is, how it has developed over the years, and how the general theories that have developed as part of the realist canon have been used to analyse foreign policy What is realism? Realism isa schoo! of thought based on three core: assumptions about how the world works: ‘9 Groupism Humans face one another mainly as members of groups. To survive at anything above subsistence level, people need the cohesion provided by group solidarity, yet that very same in-group cohesion generates the potential for conflict pith other groups. ‘Today the most important human groups fe nation-states, and the ‘most important source of in-group cohesion = ‘nationalism. For convenience, | shall arse the term states henceforth, However itis important to stress that realism makes wo assumption about the nature ofthe polity It may apply to any social setting where groups interact. a[ Egoism Se-interest ultimately drives political behaviour. Although certain conditions (can facilitate altruistic behaviour, egoism 's rooted in human nature. When push comes To chove and ultimate trade-offs between collective ‘and self-interest must be confronted, cgoism tends to trump altruism. As the classic realist adage hast, ‘inhumanity is just humanity under pressure! « Power-centrism Power i the fundamental featire of politics. Once past the hunter gatherer stage, human affairs are always marked by great inequalities of power in both aerees ofthat term social influence or control {some gro' ‘and individuals always have aevouteized influence on politics) and resources (ome B/o ‘and individuals are always disproportionately endowed with the rateral wherewithal fo get what they want)- Key to politics in any area is the interaction between social and material power, an interaction that unfolds in the shadow of the potential use oF material power to coerce. As Kenneth| CHAPTER 2 REALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY ‘Waltz putit, ‘The web of social and political life is spun out of inclinations and incentives, deterrent threats and punishments, Eliminate the latter two, and the ordering of society depends entirely on the former—a utopian thought impractical this ide of Eden’ (Waltz fone believes the world generally works by these rules, then many Important conse- quences follow for how one thinks about international politics: that the main groups with which people identify be they tribes city-states, empires, ornation-states-will exert a major influence on human afairs; that the groups collective interest, however defined, will be cen- tralto its politics; that necessity as the group interest defines i wl ump any putatively unt versal morality and ethics; and thus that humankind is unlikely ever to wholly transcend,” power politics through the progressive power of reason. This way of thinking about IR leads immediately to an identiiably realist approach to for- ign policy: an orientation towards the most powerful groups (Le. the most resource rich and influential) at any given time (today this means major powers lke the USA or China);ascepti- ism towards professed aims of foreign policy other than the state interest; a tendency to question the ability of any stat’ foreign policy to transcend power politics, and @ penchant forlooking beyond rhetoric to the power realities that realists expect nearly always underlie policy, These precepts represent a simple realist checklist for FPA: look for where the power is, what the group interests are, and the role power relationships play in reconciling clashing interests. Certain types of thinkers tend to share similar bets about how the world works. Critics like tosay that the kind of person most lkely to accept the core realist assumptions isa congenital pessimist and cynic. Realists counter that these assumptionsare simply realistc~ased on the Lispassionate observation of human affairs the way they are, as opposed to the way we might i them to be. There is a degree of truth to both views, and they add up to produce a unity of realist thought stretching from Thucydides to Machiavelli, Weber, Carr, Morgenthau, and Waltz. Even though the thinkers indelibly associated with realism are a highly diverse lot, and even though their ideas often contradict each other, the threads of those three core assump- tions tie them all together into a coherent intellectual school. Reading any of the writings of any ofthese thinkers concerning the foreign policies oftheir day, one immediately discerns the unmistakably realist approach to foreign policy | identified above. “Tobe sure, realism is more than academic theory. Itis also. tradition of statecraftthat tends to reflect these same basic assumptions, But the focus here is on the use of scholarly theory toinform the analysis of foreign policy For that purpose, itis mportantto be clear about how ‘Scholars transform the basic assumptions about the world into theories. And that demands larity about what we mean by the word ‘theory’. Confusingly, scholars use theory'to refer to three distinct things: realism itself (a large and complex school of thought), subschools within realm such as neorealism (smaller but sill complex schools of thought fitting within the { realist tradition), and spectic realist theoriestike the balance of power, the security dilemma, } tor the offence-defence balance (all propositions about patterns of relations among states of pressures facinga particular state) In this chapter, | keep these things clear, reservingtheterm ‘theoty’for specific propositions or arguments, These distinctions are not academic quibbles. “The foreign policy analyst may wel be sceptical of realism in general butstilfindspeciic real- ist theories very helpful indeed."The development of realist theories “trademark realist theories all proceed rom realisr’s three core assumptions of groupi golem, and power-centrism. The fist fand most general of al these theories, and the one from which most others proceed, can be stated simply: if human affairs are indeed character” iced by graupfam, ego, and power-centism, then politics is likely to be conflictual unless hore iesome central authority to enforce order When no authority which can enforceagree- tents exists ~a condition theorists call anarchy 2° state can resort to force to get what it ares Byen fa state can be fairy sure that no other state will take up arms today, there is no guarantee against the possibilty that one might do so tomorrow. Because no state can rule Bit his prospect states tend to arm thennselves against this contingency. With all states thus seme, politics takes on a different cast Disputes that would be easy to settle if states could rely on some higher authority to enforce an Mreement can escalate to war in the absence Of reo authority. Therefore the classic realist theoretical argument is that anarchy renders the Security of states problematicand potentially conflictual, ands key underlying cause of Wat. vo move from this very general argument about the potential importance of power and contlctin IR to any eal foreign policy situation requires hee steps:a knowledge of theoreti- «creole within realism, Familiarity with specific realist theories, and, pethaps most impor ‘ant canity about how theories, assumptions, and conditions are related. ‘Theoretical schools within realism ‘The development of realist thought can be seen as a Sei of refinements, amendments, qualifications, and extensions of the basic argument. For simplicity, scholars often lump fo gether all realist thought from Thucycies fo the middle years of the Cold War as classical alm. They describe distinctions within the massive classical realist canon by reference to individual thinkers. The classical realists allsought to translate the distilled wisdom of genera tions of practitioners and analysts into very general theories. However, they were not always tear about when their theories applied to specific situations as opposed to general patterns. ‘his ambiguity in the classical realist writings led f0 ‘endless debates about what was actually being claimed For any particular theory. ins interest in the scientific approach to the study of politics grew (especially in the USA), / Kenneth Waltz sought to revivify realist thinking PY ‘ranslating some core realist ideas into & deductive top-down theoretical framework that eventually came to be called neorealism. Waltz (1959) held that the classical realists) powerful insights into the workings of interna. tional politics were weakened by their failure tO distinguish clearly among arguments about human nature the internal attributes of states, and the overall system of states. His Theory of Intemational Pots (Waltz 1979) brought together and clarified many earlier realist ideas about how the features of the overall system of states affect the ways states interact. He re jsatedin the clearest form yet the classic argument about how the mere existence of groups in anarchy can lead to powerful competitive pressure ‘and war-regardiess of what the inter inal politics of those groups might be ike The advent of neorealism caused scholars to think much harderand more clearly about the underlying forces that drive IR. Realists jscovered that, depending on how they thoughtee CHAPTER 2 REALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY 39 about the core assumptions and what they saw as the most reasonable expectations about ‘real-world conditions, neorealism could lead to very different predictions. Written ina highly abstract manner, Waltz’s neorealism ignored important variations in IR, including geography and technology. Depending on how one conceptualized those factors, the exact same neore- alist deas could generate widely disparate implications about the dynamics of inter-state politics. Out of this realization were borne two new theoretical subschools, each of which built on the basic insights of neorealism. Defensive realists reasoned that under very common conditions the war-causing poten- tial of anarchy is attenuated. Proceeding from the core realist assumption about groupism, these theorists argued that the stronger group identity is—as in the modern era of national-\ ism—the harder itis to conquer and subjugate other groups. And the harder conquest is, the} more secure all states can be. Similarly, technology may make conquest hard—for example, it” is hard to contemplate the conquest of states that have the capacity to strike back with nu-") clear weapons. Thus, even accepting all of Waltz’s arguments about how difficult it is to be secure in an anarchic world, under these kinds of conditions states could still be expected to find ways of defending themselves without threatening others, or could otherwise signal their peaceful intentions, resulting in an international system with more built-in potential for peace than many realists previously thought. The result was to push analysts to look inside states for the domestic/ideational causes of war and peace, Offensive realists, by contrast, were more persuaded by the conflict-generating structural potential of anarchy itself. They reasoned that, with no authority to enforce agreements, states could never be certain that any peace-causing condition today would remain oper: in the future. Even if conquest may seem hard today owing to geography, technology, or | group identity, there is no guarantee against the prospect that another state will develop | some fiendish device for overcoming these barriers. Given this uncertainty, states can rarely | be confident of their security and must always view other states’ increases in power with sus- picion. As a result, states are often tempted to expand or otherwise strengthen themselves, and/or weaken others, in order to survive over the long haul, The result is to reinforce the Classic realist argument about the competitive nature of life under anarchy, regardless of the internal properties of states. As clear and elegantas neorealism and its immediate outgrowths were, it eemained unclear Just how relevant they were to any given foreign policy problem. So focused were realists on defining the single best and most universal formulation of thelr theory that it began to seem as if the development of realism had taken a completely different path from the analysis of foreign policy. Waltz (1996) himself argued famously that ‘international politics is not foreign ) policy’, implying that theory development and FPA had become two distinct endeavours with fittle connection to each other. Neoclassical realism is a subschool within realism that seeks to rectify this imbalance be- ‘tween the general and the particular. It accepts from neorealism and its descendants the basic utility of thinking theoretically about the international system as distinct from the internal properties of states (Rose 1998). However, having carefully specified their assessment of the international conditions particular states face, neoclassical realists go on to factor in specific features of a given situation to generate more complete explanations of foreign policy. They seek to recapture the grounding in the gritty details of foreign policy that marked classial ) realism, while also benefiting from the rigorous theorizing that typified neorealism.‘ “jaeoclassical realists are not driven by the dream of creating a single universal theory of in- ternational politics. For them, the question Which realist school (fany)ismost useful forana: Iysing issues of foreign policy at given place and time? To some extent, the choice of theory 1s rrantextual issue. For example, offensive resism provides a powerful shorthand portrayal of the incentives and constraints faced by states In Pars ‘of Europe for long stretches of the eight: vrth to twentieth centuries. In other periods, and for some groups of states in Europe, defen Give realism arguably provides a more accurate ‘model of the international setting, And many analysts hold thatin today's EU anarchy is sufficiently attenuated that neither is much use. “The degree to which a theoretical picture ofthe jnternational system really appliesis a mat= ter of judgement, based on the analysts reading of the context. Neoclassical realists remain agnostic over which theoretical proposition may apply: they bringto bear those theories that are arguably relevant, However, while they are agnostic over which theory or theoretical thoot may apply, they agree that theory helps strengthen analysis. From the perspective of weatim, a basi set of questions constantly recurs in FPA. To ‘what degree is state X's policy @ response to external pressures and incentives as ‘opposed to internally generated? Ifa new party were to come to power, how much would the policy change? Would state X respond reece favourably toincentives or threats? To answer these questi one has to imagine what ay state would do in X's postion. The key contribution of neorealism and its offshoot sub- tchools of offensive and defensive realismis rigorous thinking about exactly these questions. Tor neoclassical reafists, theoretical structures like offensive ‘and defensive realism are not always and everywhere true or false, Rather they ‘make it easier to perform the key mental experiments that lie atthe core of FPA by helping analysts frame their assessments of the ‘external constraints and incentives states face. “This I shall argue, isthe approach mostlikely to exploit the benefits of realism for the analy- sis of foreign policy while avoiding the potential ptfals. To see swiny this isso, itis necessary to pe famliar with more specific realist theories, and to Be aware of how theories actually relate to specific situations. Theories within realism Theoretical subschools do not capture realism’s full diversity. Equally important are specific theories about the fundamental constraints: and incentives that shape foreign policy. A knowl- culge of realist theories prompts one to ask questions 2bodt foreign policy one would not ‘otherwise ask, to look for patterns that would not otherwise seem relevant, and to see com- ‘monalities through time and so help distinguish the mundane from the remarkable. ‘Arguably the best-known theoretical proposition about iRisbalance of power theory. Given the basic problem that under anarchy any state can resort to force to get what it wants, itfol- ows that states arelikely to guard against the possibility that one state might amass thewhere- withal to compel all the ‘others to do its will and even possibly eliminate them. The theory } posits that states will check dangerous concentrations of power by building up their own ca~ { pabilties (internal balancing) or aggregating their capabilities with other states in alliances _(lexternal balancing). Because states are ‘always looking to the future to anticipate possible problems, balancing may occur even before any one state or alliance has gained an obvious power edge. Thus, Britain and France fought the Russian Empirein the Crimea inthe middle of the nineteenth century less because they saw an immediate challenge to their position thanf { I CHAPTER 2 REALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY secause they reasoned that, funchecked, Russian power mightsome day bea threat to ther. However wise or unwise tmayhave been, the thinkingin London and Paris at that timestrikes many historians as entirely consistent with the expectations of balance of power theory. Balance of threat theory adds complexity to this picture. As its name implies, this theory predicts that states wil balance against threats, Thueat.in tar driven by a combination of " Fivee key variables: aggregate capabilities (Le.a states overall military and economic poten- til) geography, and perceptions of aggressive intentions. If one stat becomes especially powerul, and fits location and behaviour feed threat perceptions on the partof other states, tran balancing strategies will come to dominate their foreign polices ‘Thus the USA began Heath external and internal balancing after the end ofthe Second World War ever though the Soviet Union remained decidedly inferior in most categories of power Ultimately, the West- sev iance overwheimed the Soviet-led alliance on neatly every dimension, Balance of threat theory holds tha twas the location of Soviet power in the heart ‘of Europe, as well as the threat inherent in its secretive government and perceived aggressiveness that produced this outcome. Hegemonic stability theory builds on the observation that powerful states tend to seek dominance over al or pats of any international system, thus fostering some degree of hier- archy within the overall systemic anarchy. It seeks to explain How cooperation can emerge among major powers and how international orders, comPrsing rules, norms, and institu- tone, emerge and are sustained. The theory's core prediction is that any international order isstable only to the degree thatthe relations of authority within it are sustained by the under Tying distribution of power. According to this theory, the current ‘globalization’ order is sus~ tained by US power and is ikely to come undone as challengers {ike China gain strength. Power transition theory isasubset of hegemonic stability that seeks 'o explain how orders break down into war. Building from the premises of hegemonic stability theory, it deduces that dominant states will prefer to retain leadership, that the preference of lesser states for contesting that leadership will tend to strengthen as they become stronger relative to the understanding anarchy as | have discussed it here-as a matter of degree. Hence, realist scholars ‘squabble over whether the logic of anarchy spelled outin defensive or offensive realismis universally valid. Foreign policy analysts, by contrast, must be sensitive tothe fact that anarchy in the real world is a veviable, not a constant. In order to know how strongly realist theories apply, one needs to know to what degree anarchy might be attenuated. As {have noted, anarchy can be attenu- ated for purely ‘reals’ reasons, asin a regional order created DY & local hegemon. Or, of course It may be attenuated for reasons not identified in realist theory. a4 the institu- tions-based order of the EU. In either case, realist theories about the conflict-generating potential of anarchy do not apply particularly strongly. AS scholars move from theory to the pel world, they sometimes fail to adjust their pure conception of anarchy to the messy reality they confront. Second, theorists operate in a competitive scholarly world, where theories and schools of thought ae often seen to be competing against others. ‘Adjustments to the theoryrecogn- tion ofits contingent nature-may be selzed upon by intellectual rivals 95 ‘admissions of the theory's weakness or irrelevance. Realism is the fulerum of these academic debates. Most other schools of thought and theories are written in one way oF ‘anyother as a response to veatism, Perhaps responding in turn realist scholars sometimes seem Very reluctant to ac- oviledge the contingent nature of their theories, Analysts of foreign policy, by contrast, generally have no reason to increase competition between theories. To understand foreign policy dilemmas from as many angles as possible, such analysts naturally gravitate towards theidea that theories are complementary rather than competitive, ‘Over half a century ago, the philosopher Isaiah Berlin wrote an es52¥, ‘that built on a line among the fragments of the Greek poet Archilochius which says: “The fox knows many things, tut the hedgehog knows one big thing’ Berlin argued that: taken figuratively, the words can be made to yield a sense which they mark one of ‘he deepest differences which divide writers and thinkers and it ay be, human beings in genera, For there exists a great chasm between those, on one © ide, who relate everything rena single central vision, one system less or more coherent oF articulate, in terms of winich, they understand, think and feet single, universal, organizing principle in terms of which sTove all that they are and say has sigificance-and, on the other side, those who pursue many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de facto way, for some psychological or physiological cause, related by no moral or aesthetic principle; these last lead lives, perform acts, and entertain ideas that are centrifugal rather than centripetal, their thought i scattered or ciffused, moving o8 MANY levels, seizing upon en vonce of avastvarcty of experiences and objects for what they ep themselves, with aac eersneiousy or unconsciously, seeking to fit them Into, oF exclude them from, any one inchanging,allerbracing sometimes self-contraictory and incomplete, at times fanatical, unitary inner vision. 5152 WILLIAM C, WOHLFORTH Academic theorists tend to be hedgehogs, not foxes, Berlin (1992) suggested that foxes will be batter at practical tasks like FPA. There is more than intuition to support this conclusion; practitioners themselves argue that they have to be foxes As ‘explored in Chapter Six, we have areas ofa twenty-five yearlong research project that tracked experts real analytical and forecasting acumen. The result? Foxes systematically outperform hedgehogs (Tetlock 2006). ‘The implication is that analysts should not be dogmatic realists~or anti-realists. They should know theories without becoming overly committed to any one: ‘And nothing in the realistapproach makes one inevitably alnedgehog. On the contrary, many realistscholars and analysts are foxes. Foxclike FPA involving a constant dialogue otween case expertise and general theory i possible, Allthe examples cited above are casts in point. As explored above, euhole scholarly approach is devoted to putting these ideas into practice ‘After neorealism gave birth to defensive and offensive realism, anew ssubschool came into its own, Neoclassi- realism is, simply put, realist theory for the foreign policy analyst While this proliferation Of realisms causes some physics-envying purists to quip about a ‘declining research pro- gramme, itis only a boon to FPA. Examples of work by neoctassical realists can be found in ‘Eurther reading. All have in com- mon sensitivity to realist core insights and an appreciation of how neorealism can aid in the rental experiments that lie atthe core of FPA, but they lack dogmatic attachment to one theory or the other. All are masters, not staves, of theory. But neorealists, too, can avoid the pitfalls of hegdehogism. Consider the case of the US neorealists’ opposition to the Bush ad- v rnistation’s foreign policy, especialy the Iraq war. There Is no doubt that realists were the most visible IR scholars opposing the march to war. Yet the analysis behind their policy pre- sctiption was quintessentially fox-like. It did not flow directly from neorealist theory, but +e from a careful analysis ofthe situation informed generally by realist ideas Inasense, these scholars seek to do what classical realists like Hans Morgenthau or George Kennan did when they analysed foreign policy, or what analysts like Stephen Sestanovich did inhis study of Soviet policy under Gorbachev, but to do so with amore self-conscious atten- tion tothe interaction between general theories and specific cases. For that purpor, specific vette theories are in many ways more important than the more general schools of thought. @® Key points ealemsthe foundational approach to IR theory. and ater approaches re mainly responses 0 thao those who wish o use IR theory in FPA must be knowledgeable about reali. © Realisrnisa diverse intellectual approach that combines a general school of thought about IR with aaa ar eke neorealsm,andspeifitheores ike the security drnmaor the balance of Powe «9 Athi diversity can be understood as derive fom three basic assumptions: rowpism. eEOH and power-centrism. «9 Knowledge ofrealsm as. general schoot af thought sharpens FPAy nculcaing base realist analytical precepts (which th w selves refiect centuries oF diplomatic practice) as wells helping Us ‘understand other theoretical approaches in IR. « Reafamisatonce committed to deep groundingin real forign policy practice and tothe construction ofhighly general theories9g CHAPTER 2 REALISHY AND FOREIGN POLICY «e Whiletheyoten seem asthe are universal in scape, realist theories and subschools are onditionat different theories apply in different strengths depending on circumstances. «ost pitalls in applying ealsm to FPA have to do wth geting the balance wrong unciealy Using theory without suicientcrss-checking with detaled knowledge about the orien policy situation under scrutiny. «o Whenve getthe balance right-astodays neoclassical realists seek to do-theresltisa powerf wet of FPA as demonstrated by prescient realist analysis of decisions on US policy ranging orm Vietnam to tra, Questions 1. According to this chapter, howis realism defined? 2, Whatare the key components of realism? 3. Whatare the main hallmarks of realist FPA? 4, Namea recent example, not mentioned in the text, of realist FPA? ‘5, Whats the main mistake people make when applying realist theory to FPA? ‘6. Whats the most important distinction to keepin mind when applying realist theory. FPA? Further reading Donnelly. (2000), Realism and International Relations (cambridge: Cambridge University Press) “The best general Introduction to realism. international Security (2005),30:1-140. “This presents a useful set of articles propasing and debating the new theory of Sf balancing’ against the USA, ose, 6 (1998); Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. Word Poles St: 44-72 ion cient arc reveuing several examples of neoclassical reais foreign policy anayss- ‘Vasquez J:A, and Elman C. (eds) (2003), Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate (Saddle River, Nf: Prentice-Hall) “This ian excelent compendium on balance of power theory and balance of threat theory ‘wiv A (2008), Explatning Why State X Made a Certaln Move Last Tuesday: The Promise and itaions of Realist Foreign Policy Analysis Journal of internaonal Relations and Development, &: 385-20. {Ths article presents useful and more tical view of realism and FPA. Visit the Online Resource entre that accompanies this book for more information: wawwoxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/smith.foreign/