CHAPTER-VI

DEMAND FOR STATE AUTONOMY AND ITS IMPACT

ON INDIAN FEDERAL SYSTEM

The demand for more autonomy is one of the most controversial

issues of the Indian federalism, although federalism is an important

feature of the constitutional structure of the Indian democracy. Every

federal polity envisages division of powers between the union and the

state governments. The scheme of distribution of powers in every

federal system is very much influenced by the operation of socio

cultural, economic, political, and historical factors and as such there

is no uniform pattern of federal system in the contemporary world.

One can find different models of the federal systems both in the

democratic and communist countries. The founding fathers of the

Indian constitution created a very powerful centre due to many

compelling reasons. Article 1 of the Indian constitution provides that

India that is Bharat is a "union of states. 1 The Indian constitution is

federal in form. Infact, nowhere in the constitution the word

federation has been used. A union in essence is a federation, with a

strong centre, a union has pronounced centripetal tendencies, and

therefore exhibits propensity to centralize administration,

governmental activities and political power. Even then a union does

not become a unitary state. It remains federal, with a bias towards the

centre. K.C. Wheare described India as quasi federal^, a unitary state

with subsidiary federal features rather than a federal state with

subsidiary unitary features.2 Sir Ivor Jennings described India as a

federation with a strong centralizing tendency.3 Norman D Palmer

argued, the republic of India is a federation, although it has many
distinctive features which seem to modify the essentially federal
nature of the state.4

Federalism is an important feature of the constitutional

structure of the Indian democracy. It is perhaps adopted on the

Canadian model. There were specific and valid reasons for calling our

polity as union of states, and not a federation. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar had

his own justification and explanation to offer. According to him the

Indian federation was not the result of an agreement by the states to

join in a federation and that the federation not being the result of an

agreement, no state has the right to secede from it.5 The federation in

India is a union because it is indestructible. The country is one

integral whole... the drafting committee thought that it was better to

make it clear at the outset rather than to leave it to speculation or to

dispute. The explanation, coming as it does, from the chairman of the

drafting committee, is significant and throws sufficient light on the

nature of our polity and inter- governmental relations. It is relevant to

any discussion on the relations between the centre and the states in

our country, even after over three and half decades of constitutional

experience. As if this was not sufficient, a law was enacted

subsequently to make it more clear and specific that our federation is

indestructible. Such an emphatic enactment came in the wake of the

secessionist forces forged out by some political parties like the Dravida

Munnetra Kazagam in Tamil Nadu, to set at rest the controversy

regarding the constitutional position of the states in the Indian union.

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 The federal process elsewhere has been promoted by a desire on

the part of the small independent states contiguously situated and

forced by circumstances to form a larger political union to survive and

develop in a fiercely competitive comity of nations as was evidenced by

the formation of the American confederation to start with. It

presupposes a willingness on the part of such states to give up a

known part of their sovereignty with respect of agreed areas of activity.

In India the process was reversed and it was the colonial government

at the centre that was the focus for the formation of a federal polity.

India was always a unitary state with provinces or presidencies as its

units of administration and the entire executive power was vested in

the office of the viceroy, and the legislative powers in the British

parliament, the existence of central and provincial legislatures not

withstanding. The government of India Act, 1935, which mooted the

amalgamation or merger of princely states, conceived India to be a

federation for the first time. Obviously, the federal arrangement under

the 1935 Act, this act also envisaged provincial autonomy, which gave

guarded freedom of action to the provinces. The idea of a strong centre

and subordinate states was thus mooted and developed much before

the constitution of 1950.

Dr B.R. Ambedkar stated in the Constituent Assembly, this dual

polity under the proposed constitution will consist of the union at the

centre and the states at the periphery, each endowed with sovereign

powers to be exercised in the field assigned to them respectively by the

constitution.6 But what we have today is not a dual polity in the

*

American sense. Dr B.R. Ambedkar was aware of this and he made

out a case for a particular type of federal system for India, which

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would be free from the effects of a normal federal polity, rigidity and

legality. He provided for a polity, which could be both unitary as well

as federal according to the requirements of time and circumstances.

In normal times, it is framed to work as a federal system. But in times

of war, it is designed as to make it work as though it was a unitary

system.... The president of India issuing a proclamation under Article

352 can transform our federal polity into a unitary state. Besides such

an omnibus provision, there are also other provisions giving the

parliament the power to legislate to exclusively state subjects even

during normal times. Dr.B.R. Ambedkar had hoped that it would be

possible to achieve the required degree of unity through such an

arrangement in the life of the newly born republic. He provided

technical and circumstantial justification for removing the doubts in

the minds of the members as to the nature of our constitution and

polity. It is possible to hold that such an arrangement was also to a

large extent shaped by the personal views and preferences of Dr. B.R.

Ambedkar himself on the subject. He was not a votary of a federal

system, for he was a believer in a strong central government,

particularly to safeguard the interests of the minorities. It was also

necessary in the country like India with centripetal and centrifugal

tendencies .as he had observed elsewhere, the genius of Indians was

to divide and not to unite. Parochialism, casteism, linguism and such

fissiparous tendencies have persisted all along in the history of our

people. He was of course, not opposed to a federal form of government.

But he said I confess I have a partiality for a unitary form of

government. I think India needs it but I also realize that a federal form

of government is inevitable if there is to be provincial autonomy. He

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therefore provided for a flexible federal polity, which drastically

restricts the autonomy of the states in the Indian union. The

constitution of 1950 has actually provided for an over centralized

union with weak units with a view to vesting real responsibility at the

centre.7

The political process in our countiy has further reinforced a

constitutional structure of a quasi-federal nature, or a decentralized

unitary state, ever since the launching of the constitution. The

monolithic nature of the Indian National Congress to which power was

transferred by the British, continued to be in power both at the centre

and all the states for nearly two decades since independence. The

Indian National Congress was deeply entrenched in power under the

leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru till his demise in 1964 and continued

to be so till the general elections of 1967. The 1967 ballot upset the

apple cart for the first time as political parties other than the Indian

National Congress came to power in as many as nine states and its

majority was drastically reduced both at the centre and also in those

states where the congress party managed to survive in power. Stresses

and strains surfaced in the centre - state relations with the

disappearance of the one party dominance of the congress. We notice

for the first time ripples in the centre state relations becoming visible.

The constitution of India does not lay any emphasis on

autonomy of states in any assumed role for fulfilling political

ambitions of such groups, which can identify themselves within the

states. Rather, it proceeds on the basis of single citizenship with same

rights and obligations for people living any where on the Indian

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Territory. Every citizen has the freedom of movement and of

settlement in any part of the country. The freedom of occupation,

trade, profession or business can take an individual to any part of the

country with opportunities equal to those of the local people. Marvaris

from Rajasthan and Punjabis from Punjab control business all over

India while Rao, Reddy or Menons from south India man the

administrative machinery in every state. The states, which constitute

the federal units in India, have the same constitution for their political

organization and it is laid down by the constitution. The powers of

state legislatures and executives can be increased or decreased by the

consent of the majority of states only, and such an amendment of the

constitution has to be passed by the parliament with special majority

in the first instance. In the exercise of their functions, the states are

subject to union parliament and government in multifarious ways, it

will not be a.n exaggeration to say that with the general economic

planning and taxing state can opt for economic planning affecting

states is primarily being done by the union government. State

protectionism for its individuals and state industries is also next to

impossible under the constitution. The union government is

committed to bringing up India upto level of most advanced industrial

countries of the world. This kind of perspective is highly averse to any

kind of preferential claim by any state for its minerals, agricultural or

industrial resources or capabilities. The state autonomy is very much

eclipsed by the general industrial thrust for the country created by the

union government.

The basic proposition of Indias functioning federal system is

that, despite the wide array of powers with which the centre is armed

185
by the constitution, there has been an unmistakable and growing

trend towards an assertion of autonomy on the part of the constituent

units. Of course, the trend has not been an unmistakable and growing

trend towards an assertion of autonomy on the part of the constituent

units. While the trend has not been uniformly evident and there has

been back and forth movement, the balance of power tilting now

towards the centre and then towards the states. Quite often it has

been camouflaged by one party dominance, which, for long,

characterized the political process in India as also by the blurring of

jurisdictional lines caused by economic planning. The imposition of

internal emergency muted but did not eliminate the trend. The second

proposition is that the growing vitality of the states implies no erosion

of the authority of the centre or the unity and security of the nation.

The Indian federal system has developed sophisticated formal and

informal instrumentalities for moderating the stresses and a strain,

which inevitably, arise in such a polity. What it does imply is the

development of a relationship of collaborative partnership, which

subsists on the basis of the simultaneous independence, and

interdependence of the centre and the states. Finally, it is proposed to

draw attention to some of the socio, political dynamics which lie at the

root of this developing pattern of partnership as distinguished from

one of domination and subservience and is bringing Indias structural

federalism into greater harmony with what, for want of a better term,

may be described as her social federalism. It is, of course, not

suggested that these are the only variables, which affect the working

of federal relations in India.

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 The federalist idea in the constitution of India had some

inherent strains in the matter of equality among the federal units. The

first noticeable inequality is with regard to the special status granted

by Article 370 to Kashmir by making reference to its instrument of

accession.8 The exception in favour of Kashmir is, however, amply

justified by the then existing state of national and international

situation created by Pakistani aggressional situation created by

Pakistani aggression. The paradox of the situation was that Kashmir

had a predominantly Muslim population under the Hindu Ruler but

with a non-Muslim population under the Hindu Ruler but with a non-

Muslim league and pro-India popular ruling political party. In the

interest of the unity of nation in the bargain the constituent assembly

had to recognize greater latitude in the legislative powers to Kashmir

as compared to other princely states, which had merged, with India.

Secondly, the constituent assembly had made settlements for

other princely states, which had merged with the Union of India. In

one way, by providing privy purses to the princes and by

constitutionally recognizing personal immunities and privileges for

them, healing touch was given to personal feelings of the former

rulers. Some princes were also made Raja Pramukhs of part B states

which were princely states grouped together, Maharajas of Mysore and

Kashmir and Nawab of Hyderabad were made regular Raja Pramukhs

of their former princely states, which singly had become part B states

under the constitution. Some princely states, which had strategic

location, were made part C states and became centrally administered

areas.

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 The seventh constitution Amendment of 1956 abolished the

class of part B states altogether and it redefined the territories of India

as states and Union territories,. The legislative and administrative

privileges of part B states significantly came to an end. The personal

immunities and privileges of the former rulers and privy purses under

Article 363 and 391 of the constitution were not affected by this

amendment. This prevented the rulers from organizing any resistance

against complete absorption of their old states into a common national

pattern. Subsequently, by 26th amendment of the constitution the

personal privileges of nawabs and maharajas were as well abolished.

The constitution envisages similar or equal status for all states though

Articles 370 and 371-a to 371-f have provided special provisions to

deal with particular problems of the some states, Maharashtra,

Gujarat, Nagaland, Assam, Manipur, Andhra Pradesh and Sikkim.

These provisions give meaningful contents to federal system keeping

in view the unity of the nation by making some needed adjustments

investor of the feelings or level of development of concerned people.

However, these provisions do not disturb the inter se equality in the

legislative field, which is basically and commonly laid down by the

format of seventh schedule.

The second problem of Union State Relationship arises when

the ruling political parties at the two levels are different. This situation

requires demarcation of union and state politicians field of politics

and a harmonious understanding of the constitution for better union

state amity. The two sets of politicians should be able to avoid mutual

attribution of incompetence, which now is being done at the cost of

the people, or development of the nation or the unity of the nation as

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particularly noticed with regard to the state of West Bengal. Since the

1985 elections of parliament and the state legislature, while congress I

rules at the union and majority of the states, Andhra Pradesh has

Telugu Desam, Tamil Nadu has AIADMK, Karnataka has Janata Dal,

West Bengal has CPI (M), Jammu and Kashmir has National

Conference and Sikkim has Ganatantra Parishad, Assam has Assam

Gana Parishad, Tripura has Communist party of India and Punjab

has Akali Dal as ruling parties.9 It is desirable in the interests of unity

of the nation that the Indian politics and the constitution should

ensure that at all times the union government is fair to all states. In

no circumstances the provisions of the constitution should be used to

justify any action by the union when its steps are patently

discriminatory among the states or seek to obtain popularity for union

ruling party by ensuring the fields of politics, which should

legitimately be left for the state politics. Although the constitution

envisages a two-tier system of politics in India, parliament and the

state legislatures are not in a condition of competition with one

another but these are rather partners in the same game. The

preamble and directive principles of the state policy and various

constitutional and conventional limitations set the objectives of the

game. In this process parliament has the function of taking care of the

working of the constitution at all levels. Theoretically, the Council of

States is meant to safeguard the interests of the states in parliament.

The Council of States is a continuous body, which cannot be

dissolved, like the House of People that represents the political will of

the people. Comparatively even though the Council of the States has

special powers under Article 250 of the constitution; it is more like the

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House of Lords of British parliament in its function than the Senate of

the USA Congress. In India, politically it is being treated as a

duplicate of the House of People; therefore, it is unable to perform the

constitutional role, which its name conveys. The election of its

members and conduct of its proceedings reflects the achievements

and the interests of the political parties rather, than protection and

promotion of the interests of the states. As such, the Council of States

is not a check on the government and parliament when there is any

change of injustice to a state or discrimination between the states on

the suspected grounds of party politics. The Council of the States can

be evolved as a representative of states in parliament independent of

politics

Obviously, therefore in order to maintain harmony between

federal system and interactional politics at the union and state level in

order to maintain the integrity and unity of the nation, there is need to

define the legitimate zone for national level and state level politics.

This has not been attempted so far and neither the electorate nor the

political parties understand the two zones. The national politics for

elections to parliament has to project the political ideas, which

coordinate the common to some or all states, and which can only be

put into operation through state matters. Conversely, the regional or

state level political parties like Telugu Desam, AIADMK, Akali Dal,

etc., should resist the temptation of contesting elections to the House

of the People but should concentrate on the elections to the Council of

the States and give real role and character to the latter house of

parliament. In the eighth parliament the regional parties like Telugu

Desam or AIADMK have given considerable representation to

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themselves in the House of People without that much of direct interest

in national politics which their memorandum of association, so as to

say, would have initially provided.10

The process of separation of national politics from state politics

is made difficult by the constitutional position created by the
concurrent list of the seventh schedule of the constitution, which gives
jurisdiction to parliament in matter, which operate locally, or in civil
life of people. In addition, the task of social and economic uplift of the
people item 20 of list 111, though heavy industrialization regulated
and coordinated by five year plans laid down by the planning
commission, has very much eclipsed the role of state politics and
administration in the welfare of the people of the states. Actually, the
resulting interference in state autonomy though the money power
exercised by the union though Article 282 of the constitution should
have been either made concrete by the amendment of the constitution
in favour of the union or voluntarily curtailed so as not to take away
initiatives from the state politics in the matter of the socio -economic
development in the states.

IMPACT OF STATE AUTONOMY ON INDIAN FEDERAL SYSTEM

The union-state relations in Indian political system have both

static and dynamic characteristics. Federalism as such is both a
structure and a process. As a structure it indicates the static legal and
constitutional relationship, powers and positions of both the sets of
governments, as a process it includes operational interrelationship,
interdependence and interaction between the union and states and
among the states both at party and governmental levels, thus dynamic

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according to changing environment. The interdependence of union

and state government in Indian political system is responsible for dual

trends towards centralization and decentralization-centralization in

response to, for example, the exigencies of national planning and

decentralization as a result of many factors including centres

dependence upon the states for the administration of its programmes.

Although the union has its own area of power, the territories in

which it functions are under the control of states, which in turn have

their own areas of power independently of the union. To ensure that a

state government by its actions does not interfere with the legislative

and administrative policies of the union and thereby undermine the

unity of the nation, certain powers of administrative control over the

states have been given to the central government. Article 256 of the

constitution of India lays down that it shall be the duty of the states

so as to exercise its executive powers as to secure that due effect is

given within the state to every act of parliament, which applies in that

state. This is a statement of constitutional duty of every state. India is

entitled to give directions to the state government regarding the duty,

which is imposed upon Article 256. The term state cannot be held to

apply merely to a geographical entity or territory. A direction can only

be given to a legal entity and not a geographical or territorial entity.11

Under the Indian Constitution there is a distribution of

legislative powers between the Union and the States (Article 246)

where as in the United States and Australia the powers of the federal

legislature have been enumerated and in Canada there is a double

enumeration of powers provincial and concurrent. In India, as in the

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Act of 1935, there is a three-fold enumeration, namely union, state

and concurrent with the residuary powers being given to union

instead of the states, as in the United States and Australia. Article

249 says that if the Council of states (Rajya Sabha) declares by a

resolution of two-third of its members present and voting that it is

necessary or expedient in the national interest that parliament should

have power to make laws relating to any matter enumerated in the

state list, then the parliament would be competent to make such laws

for the whole or any part of India.

Under Article 252, the union parliament has powers to legislate

for two or more states provided their legislatures resolve that it is

desirable for parliament to make laws with respect to any matter

included in the state list. Article 253 enjoins that parliament has

power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of

India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any

other country or any decision made in any international conference or

association. In other words, Article 253 empowers the parliament to

legislate on state subjects if such legislation is necessary for

implementing an international obligation.

Article 352 empowers the president to proclaim an emergency

when the security of India or any part of its territories is threatened by

war, external aggression or internal disturbances.12 Article 250

empowers the parliament to make laws for the whole or any part of

the territory of India with respect to any of the matters enumerated in

the state list during the pendency of the emergency. In other words,

the union during emergency may withdraw all powers from the states

and function as a unitary state.13

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 Resolution of the disputes between two or more states is

essential for reducing tensions in Union-State relations. Usually, an

Inter-State Dispute increases the bargaining power of the centre vis-a-

vis the concerned states and therefore it may be in the interest of the

centre to keep these disputes alive. Both the central and the state

governments are required to spend a great deal of energy on keeping

these disputes within manageable boundaries, consequently affecting

their effectiveness in the developmental goals. As the centre is

empowered by the constitution to settle these disputes, the concerned

states direct their demands and frustrations at the centre and convert

these disputes into issues of the centre-state relations. In our country,

there are two types of Inter-State Disputes, Inter-State Water Disputes

and inter-state boundary disputes.

In a federation conflicts between the union and the states

cannot be ruled out altogether. Effort should be made to avoid such

conflicts. This is normally done by mutual discussions, consultations

and negotiations at conferences of governors, Chief Ministers, officials

of the central government and state governments, Planning

Commissions, National Development Council, National Integration

Council etc. In view of the changed political atmosphere the means of

settling disputes through mutual discussions, consultations and

negotiations may not prove useful. The establishment of an Inter-state

council under Article 263 affords an alternative means of settling

these disputes between the Union and the states; it should effect

Indian federal system.

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 The supporters of decentralization of powers and autonomy for

states argue that the preservation of national unity and the process of

consolidating the forces of national integration presuppose the

acceptance of the manifold diversities, present in the nation and the

urgent need for realistic and logical attempts to handle these

diversities at the local level, by harnessing local initiative and utilizing

local talent. Any attempt to tackle these diversities from a central

point of control would only serve to heighten the tensions in the

system. Contrary to this those who advocate greater consolidation of

the powers of the centre opine that providing an impetus to the forces

of nationalism was critical to strengthening national integration. They

are emphatic in their belief that any step in the direction of weakening

the centre would only open the floodgates to eventual balkanization. A

strong centre is the only panacea to stem the institutionalization of

sub national loyalties. According to this viewpoint the centre is

believed to protect national integration while other centres of power

would only encourage and abate the rise and growth of divisive forces.

However, events both in India and in other parts of the world have

shown that whereas decentralization aims at fulfilling the hopes and

aspirations of the people in a more purposive and meaningful manner

it is the process of centralization, which triggers off the process of

disintegration.

In this background the decade of the eighties in particular

witnessed a struggle to get the federal issue on the nations agenda.

When the political challenge assumed new dimensions and tensions

between the centre and the state grew in sharpness, it became

necessary to case the situation somewhat. In this context, the

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government of India announced on March 24, 1983 the appointment

of a commission to examine and review the working of existing

arrangement between the union and the states in regard to powers,

functions and responsibilities in all spheres and recommend

appropriate changes and measures. The commission came to be

known as the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-state relations. This

commission kept in view the social and economic developments that

have taken place over the years as also the scheme and the framework

of the constitution and the need for preserving the unity and integrity

of the country.14

Indias political system is under great pressure today regarding

the centre-state relations, and there is a demand for rethinking about

them from the states. A number of them have been not only asking for

more autonomy but, today they have made their impact irrevocably

felt at the centre by actively participating in the formation of a federal

government at the centre comprising a coalition of national and state

based parties. The Sarkaria Commission had observed in its report

that a strong single monolithic party continued to hold power both in

the union as well as the states for a long time had unexpected adverse

effect on the healthy growth of union-state relations. With a strong

leadership being at the apex of the congress, the centre-state issues

came to be resolved through party channels and the need for

institutions which would have enable effective union-state dialogue

and meaningful discussions in a spirit of compromise and co

operative partnership to arrive at solutions based on consensus, was

not felt. For a country of Indias size with diverse cultures and

customs, only a federal system of government would be able to provide

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a stable system. The framers of the Indian constitution had already

recognized the inevitable need for a federal system. But the federal

mechanism was not effectively operated until the fourth general

Elections of 1967. Moreover, there is a large gap between the

theoretical and practical aspects of centre-state relations in India.

The appointment of the Sarkaria Commission by Mrs. Indira

Gandhis government was the resultant response to the oft-repeated

demands of the non congress ruled states, more particularly Andhra

Pradesh ruled by [Link] Rao Telugu Desam Government and

Karnataka ruled by the Janata Party for the first time turned non

congress and demanded the restructuring of Centre-state relations.

Infact, the demand for a review of centre-state relations had been

constantly and consistently raised by the DMK government in Tamil

Nadu. It tried to emphasize that there was a heavy in -built bias

infavour of the centre in the constitution. In its 1971 election

manifesto, the DMK stressed, we are of the opinion that anyway in

impairing of an India-strong only such powers should be entrusted to

the central government as would enable it to function in those spheres

necessary to ensure a strong India. The rest of the powers, it said,

should be passed on to the states and in order to bring about this

necessary change the constitution should be suitably reviewed and

amended. Further the party declared in its election Manifesto that the

party shall undertake the mission of gathering support for state

autonomy on an all India basis. It was the articulated view of the

party that state autonomy was essential for the governance of states

since state governments were closer to the people and only when they

acquired it they would be able to serve the people in a manner

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expected of them. Karunanidhi and other prominent leaders of the

party toured many states in the north and campaigned vigorously for

greater autonomy to the states. The chief minister of Jammu and

Kashmir, Farooq Abdullah, said in January 1978, that the states

must be given more powers if the federal character of the constitution

was to be maintained. All the states should be given the sort of status

enjoyed by Jammu & Kashmir under Article 370. 15 The Chief

Minister of Kerala, E.M.S. Namboodripad said the emergence of new

political forces in the country expressly called for the recognition of

the multilingual and multi-national character of India and the need to

make necessary adjustments in the federal character of the

constitution.

The demand for the restructuring of centre-state relations

gained momentum when the Left-Front Government of West Bengal

headed by Jyothi Basu, passed a resolution in the legislative assembly

and presented a memorandum to the centre on centre-state relations

in 1978. Later, the demand was taken to the National Development

council by the Non-Janata ruled states and then Prime Minister;

Morarji Desai rejected demand saying that the time was not ripe for

such a review.

In the post 1980 period the opposition increasingly became

regional in its orientation. It put forth the demand of state autonomy.

Some prominent leaders including Farooq Abdullah, [Link],

Surjit Singh Barnala, Ram Krishna Hegde, [Link] Rao attended the

conclaves arranged for discussion on autonomy at Vijayawada, Delhi

and Srinagar. To articulate the demand of greater state autonomy, in

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1987 called upon the people to save the country from disintegration

by halting the dangerous drift due to the centralization of power and

distortion of the constitution. It issued a consensus statement seeking

a full review of centre-state relations. Checking the unitary overtones,

which over shadow the federal features of the constitution and

changed the centralized pattern of economic and financial

administration. It added that to end the tensions and disputes

between the centre and the states. It suggested that Article 356 which

enables the president to dissolve the state government or assembly

should be suitably amended. In case of a constitutional breakdown, it

should be obligatory for the centre to hold elections with in six

months.

Very recently, the present Man Mohan Singh government has

constituted a new commission on centre-state relations on 29th April

2007 led by justice [Link] to discuss with a desirability of

increasing the share of states in central tax, transfer of centrally

sponsored schemes in the state subject to the states and alleviation of

the problem of debt burden on the state in the terms of reference.

The demand for secession from the union is the most serious

form of regionalism, which even poses a serious threat to the national

unity. The Sikh community, following the lead of Master Tara Singh,

had demanded, during the freedom struggle, an independent state, to

be called khalistan, for itself. Immediately after independence, Tara

Singh demanded a Sikh state consisting of the Gurgaon district of

Punjab and Patiala and the East Punjab State TJnion (PEPSU). On 2nd

November 1949 he demanded a Sikh Province in East Punjab,

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declaring that the Hindus of East Punjab had become narrow-minded

communalists and that the Sikhs could not hope to get a fair deal at

their hands.16 During 1950 and early 1960s, the Sikhs of Punjab

carried on an agitation, often times violent, for a Punjabi Suba and

eventually this demand was conceded by the centre on 1966. Having

realized that secession from the Indian union would not be possible,

the Akali Dal leadership started talking of decentralization of political

power and the greater autonomy to the states. At a meeting held at

Anandpur Sahib on 16 and 17, 1973, the Akali Dal adopted a

resolution, generally known as Anandpur Sahib resolution, containing

its demands. This resolution stated that certain areas which had been

taken away from Punjab and had been intentionally kept apart should

be immediately merged with Punjab under one administrative unit,

and that in the new Punjab, the central intervention should be

restricted to defence, foreign affairs, post and telegraphs and currency

and railways.

A different version of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution was put

forth by the Akali Dal (Talwandi group) at a world Sikh convention at

Anandpur Sahib in 1981. Its resolution stated that an autonomous

region in the north of India should be set up forthwith wherein the

Sikhs interests were constitutionally recognized as of primary and

special importance, and that the Sikh autonomous region may be

conceded and declared as entitled to frame its own constitution and

may enjoy all powers except foreign relations, Defence and general

communications.17

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 On April 1981, the Akali extremists have been taking a hard

line approach for establishing a New All Sikh Nation called Khalistan,

a demand originally voiced by a former member of the Akali Dal, Jagjit

Singh. This was taken up in various milder forms by officially

recognized and influential bodies such as the Sikh Gurudwara

Prabandhak Committee (SGPC). The chief political organ, the Akali

Dal, clearly split over the issue, with the extremist group headed by

jagdeve Singh Talwandi demanding a separate nation, and middle of

the road Akali Dal leadership led by Sant Hari Chand Singh Longowal,

president of the Akali Dal, bemoaning the Pariah status of the

Sikhs.18 This demand for a new such nation has already taken two

lines. Firstly in order to curb unrest in Punjab, Mrs. Gandhi took

action with the help of army, by sending troops into golden temple

complex (the holy place of Sikhs). This action hurt the feelings of

Sikhs and as such vengeance was taken by shooting [Link] to

death. Subsequently, Shiromani Akali Dal Leader Mr. Longowal, was

also shot dead because he was the party to the Memo signed both by

prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and Mr. Harchand Singh on 24th july

1985, paving the way for stability and peace in the state of Punjab.

Regarding the Akali Dal demand relating to Centre-state

relations the authorities in New Delhi set up, in June 1983, a

commission under the Chairmanship of Justice Ranjit Singh Sarkaria

to examine and review the working of existing arrangements between

the union and states in regard to powers, and recommend such

changes as might be appropriate. This should have satisfied the Akali

as it did the other opposition which also had raised this issue, but the

Akalis were adamant that the government should make specific

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mention of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution while referring the matter

to Sarkaria Commission.

In a similar strain another instance of demand for Secession is

the DMKs demand for Dravida Nadu launching an agitation for the

secession the erstwhile state of Madras from the Indian Union and

formation of an independent sovereign state of Tamil Nadu. It is one of

the political planks of the DMK to fight against the imposition of Hindi

on non-Hindi speaking people. The battle against Hindi that began in

1938 has not yet ended. The DMK opposed Hindi not because of any

hatred towards a particular language nor even due to its

overwhelming love for the mother tongue viz., Tamil. Its opposition is

based upon deeper and more fundamental principles. If Hindi, the

mother tongue of certain North Indian States, was allowed to become

the national language it would naturally result in the supremacy of

those states over others. Such situations make the non-Hindi states in

general and Tamil Nadu in particular to take subordinate place in the

national politics. This is the real cause for which the DMK has been

opposing the imposition of Hindi even today. The framers of the

constitution of India decided to institutionalize Hindi as a language of

administration much against the wishes of the non-Hindi speaking

people. In 1965 the Anti-Hindi feeling reached its apogee when the

DMK observed the Republic day as a day of mourning. The reaction of

the government of Tamil Nadu, headed by [Link]

towards this agitation was one of the apathy and it characterized this

movement as anti-national. But the DMK had not in any way relented

in its right, even though repressive measures were adopted against it.

The government was driven to the necessity of obtaining the services

202
of the army when the law and order situation deteriorated. The excited

and frenzied rank and file of the DMK resorted to self-immolation in

different parts of the state. Strangely the students of the colleges and

high schools in Madras were in the vanguard of the movement. They

came forward to give up even their lives. The slogan Life to Tamil and

body to the soil reverberated throughout the length and breadth of

the state of Tamil Nadu.

An important ideological change was the demand of Dravida

Nadu as a sovereign independent state, separated from the Indian

Union. Anna was a man of churchillian courage. It is not so easy to

conquer the ideology of ones own party which was advocated for more

than two decades. The national interest in him was strong enough to

persuade his own followers to give up that ideology when the Indo-

Chinese war of 1962 posed a threat to the territorial integrity of our

country. In the words of Anna, the party had realized the dangerous

potentialities of secession at the time of the Chinese aggression and

had come to the conclusion that the plea would be suicidal to the

DMK in particular and the country in general.19 In a statement Anna

explained that his party had to give up its demand or a separate

Dravida Nadu since no party in our country could exist outside the

ambit of the constitution of India. Instead, it has decided to function

as parliamentary party with good reasons. Accordingly in June 1963

the central executive committee of the DMK amended the party

constitution to drop its goal of independent Dravida Nadu. Anna

declared, even though we have given up our demand for a separate

Dravida Nadu, the reasons which led to our demand still remain. 20

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 The government of Tamil Nadu headed by the former Chief

Minister, [Link] appointed Rajmannar Committee to examine

the centre-state relations and recommended on the future federal set

up in India. [Link] was chairman of this committee

expressed the constitutional position of the centre and the states in

these words. There is a theme of subordination of the states running

right through the constitution. There is a large scope for the centre to

intrude into state affairs and thus affect the autonomy of the states.

On interstate water disputes the Rajmannar Committee recommended

that all disputes relating to inter-state rivers should be decided by the

Supreme Court and satisfactory provisions should be made for

implementing its decisions. Regarding the state territories the

committee suggested that one of the essential points of the federal

principle is that the central or the national government should not

have the power to redraw the map of the country unilaterally by

forming new states or by altering the boundaries of the existing states.

The committee discussed three alternatives in this connection, one

was to provide in the constitution for the consent of the states

concerned like other federal constitution the second was to set up an

independent judicial tribunal for deciding the issues and third was to

ascertain the opinion of the people of the area concerned.

[Link] made use of the Rajmannar Committee

recommendations to pressurize the centre to grant more powers to the

states. The union government did not accept the recommendations of

the committee. In a particular case, which may be stated here, the

Tamil Nadu government tried to define state rights. The CPI and the

Anna DMK in Tamil Nadu made specific charges against the chief

204
Minister, Karunanidhi and his ministry and requested the union

government to appoint a commission of enquiry against the chief

Minister and his ministry. In his letter to the prime minister enclosing

his replies to specific charges made against his ministry,

[Link] argued that the state cabinet was responsible to the

legislative assembly of the state. The former chief minister clarified

that there is no provision in our constitution, which makes the state

cabinet accountable to the union. And as such it would be subversive

of the entire scheme of the constitution and the system of responsible

government if a state cabinet is ought to be subjected to a commission

of inquiry by the union. On the other hand, the union government was

of the view that it was fully competent to set up a commission of

inquiry to go into any matter of public importance pertaining to the

central or any state government.

Tamil Nadu chief minister [Link], gave an ultimatum to

the centre that unless it announced finally and firmly its decision to

set up a steel plant at Salem, his government would refuse to give its

consent to the fourth plan document. [Link] said that plan

scheme would not yield the desired benefit if powers of formulating

them and their implementation were concentrated in the hands of the

centre. He put his views more plainly by demanding the abolition of

the concurrent list in the constitution and recast the constitution in

the light of the changed situation where the same party was not in

power at the centre and in the states. The centre state relations,

which depend to a large extent, on the basis of political parties in

power at the centre and in the states. The centre has an advantage so

long as it is governed by the single largest party in the parliament but

205
as soon as the political complexion changes at the centre. There may

be strong demand in favour of a new pattern of relations between the

centre and states. The prime minister is the head of the government at

the centre but his position will be affected if there is a coalition

government at the centre. When a prime minister heads a coalition

government he will have to work according to the mandate of a co

ordination committee established with the consent of all partners in

the coalition. In case a co-ordination committee consists of the

representatives of some regional parties, the coalition government will

be forced to agree to the conditions put by one or the other regional

party. Therefore, the growth and role of regional parties is relevant not

only at the state level but also in the context of a national government

will be forced to agree to the conditions put by one or the other

regional party. Therefore, the growth and role of regional parties is

relevant not only at the state level but also in the context of a national

government at a certain stage.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir however had a special status

amounting to autonomy in all areas except for the four issues of

national concern in the original constitutional test. But Article 370

was gradually eroded under political exigencies. The pressures of

communal forces in India, the chauvinism in Jammu and the global

forces of the cold war combined to obscure the federal issue in the

state. The result was that the issue of autonomy of states in general

and of regions within them remained dormant for long. However, it

could not remain in cold storage for long. As soon as other political

parties, including those of regional orientation, came up to claim their

share in political power in 1967, the issue came to forefront. Article

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370 became a matter of concern for the state governments, especially

outside the cow-belt.21 The debate on autonomy of Jammu and

Kashmir and of its constituent units should be seen in the light of

these developments.

As far as one can see the case of more autonomy in Jammu and

Kashmir state is a critical requirement for which there is no time to

lose. After securing the state autonomy within Article 370 or under its

modified version, the three regions, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh

may have their respective spheres of activity defined in clear terms. It

will not be politically helpful to India or to the people of the state to

carve separate states or union territories out of all or some of them.

The precarious balance of communities makes a development in that

direction seriously hazardous for the state as well as for the country.

It is wrought with serious risks of neighbourly and global intrusions.

One cannot, however absolutely overlook the fact that there are sub-

regions, like Rajouri-Poonch, Doda-Kishtwar and Kargil which must

be adjusted in a scheme of more autonomy. Demands for their

autonomy may not be on the immediate political agenda but the issue

is bound to acquire urgency as soon a scheme of regional autonomy

for the three units is implemented. In policy making, it is always

prudent to anticipate developments and take steps to pre-empt well in

time the adverse consequences that may fall out of them.

Autonomy is an essential feature in the process for enduring

integration. In human relationship as well as in democratic theory, a

free association holds out the prospects of its durability. When one

looks back to the political scene of pre-partition days, the rejection of

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Zonal formula of Simla proposals seems to be one blunder of the
Indian National Congress which deprived our nationalism the last
chance of avoiding the partition of the country and keeping India
together as a subcontinent. It is also true that separatist tendencies
and militant movements often emanate from undue opposition to
legitimate demands for autonomy.

Article 370 of the constitution is no longer an exclusively

Kashmiri demand. Some states, like Nagaland, have already acquired
special status under Article 371 A, while Article 37IB (Assam) and
Article 371C (Manipur) also accord special status. Sikkim too has a
special status in the terms of the constitution (thirty-fifth Amendment)
Act of 1974, by which it became a constituent state of India. Others,
like Punjab and Tamil Nadu, are putting political pressures to obtain
similar status. There is a provision of regional committees in Andhra
Pradesh and development boards for Maharashtra and Gujarat.

A very general question can be raised at this stage: why should

the union government not concentrate on four vital issues of national
importance? The state governments deserve autonomy. Many
arguments against it have been shown as unconvincing. It has already
been seen that small states do not always prove to be economically
non-viable. In many instances, creation of small states like Haryana
and Punjab has facilitated economic progress than in.

Nevertheless, the logic of autonomy goes beyond states.

Regional imbalance often creates impediments in the way of growth in
some regions. But in a bid to secure balanced development, it is not
always necessary to create states, particularly when some sort of

208
regional autonomy within it can achieve the purpose. If one accepts

the principle of autonomy for a viable region, there seems to be no

justification in procrastinating the same right to sub-regions. In a

polyarchal system, therefore, more autonomy appears to be a

judicious strategy for survival and integration.

The latest and very controversial report on state autonomy is

that of Jammu and Kashmir government. The state government

constituted a committee to examine the issue of state autonomy, the

report was submitted to the assembly and from June 20, 2000 was

thoroughly discussed in the assembly and was adopted without much

alteration with a note that it should be sent to the union cabinet for

its consideration. The union cabinet in its meeting held on July 4th,

2000 out rightly rejected the autonomy report without going into

much deliberation. So in a way, autonomy committee report of

Jammu and Kashmir government received the same treatment from

the central government as it was done at the time of Rajamannar

Committee appointed by Tamil Nadu government in 1971 on the

autonomy subject, the cabinet remarked that the acceptance of it

would set the clock back and reverse the national process of

integration of the state with India.

In spite of the fact that the report has been rejected by the

union government but political analysts cannot easily afford to ignore

it. It is a detailed and serious effort on the subject. The central theme

of the report is to restore pre-1953 position to the state of Jammu and

Kashmir which was the basis of Delhi Agreement of July 24th 1952

between Sheikh Abdullah and Jawaharlal Nehru defined the

relationship between the Union and Jammu and Kashmir.22

209
 Some of its key provisions:

1. Citizenship: persons domiciled in Jammu and Kashmir shall be

Indian citizens.

2. Fundamental Rights: these, as defined in the Indian

constitution, could not be conferred on Jammu and Kashmir
residents in their entirety.

3. Headship of the state: the head of the state, or Sadre-e-Riyasat,

shall be the person recognized by the president on the
recommendation of the state legislature.

4. Emergency powers: the centre would have full authority in

relation to the defence of the state from external aggression. But
in the case of internal disturbance such powers would only be
applied with the concurrence of the state legislatures.

Thus we find that the autonomy committee report is a very

comprehensive exercise on the subject of centre-state relations with a
specific purpose to demand more autonomy within the constitution of
India for the state.

The reorganization of the states has further brought to light the

extent and scope of adjustment for the federal form of government.
The system after all does not stand for multi-policy alone. It stands for
multiplicity in unity. In order to keep the federation alive to the needs
of the people there must be a wide scope for co-operation between the
central and regional governments, in as much as it is one of the
fundamental principles of the federal structure that the central and
regional governments should be properly co-ordinate. With a view to

210
bringing about a far better co-ordination in a speedy and goal oriented

execution of development projects the institution of Zonal Councils

was created under the states reorganization act of 1956. It may,

however, be mentioned that the provisions for Zonal Councils has not

been incorporated in any constitutional enactment. Article 263 of the

constitution refers to the powers of the president to establish an inter

state council in order to co-ordinate the relations between the states

and the union and one or more of the states. Such of Zonal Councils,

which are advisory in character and functions entirely on a co

operative basis. The Zonal scheme was specifically devised to avoid

much of the legal formality, for a legal sanction might be too formal for

a co-operative attitude among the states. The introduction of Zonal

Councils in 1956 was an attempt to link the political aspirations

realized through the formation of linguistic states with that of

economic necessities and long-range planning. In terms of a pragmatic

approach in democratic planning the creation of Zonal Council would

necessitate the state leaders to have a broad view of the region and

evolve the methods of co-operation or inter-state problems. Socio

economic integration of the states in a region covers a vast field of co

operation which also requires a proper treatment to the minorities and

backward classes, proper health schemes, exploitation of natural

resources and energy, and proper distribution of essential

commodities are some important matters that concern the Zonal

Councils was envisaged to combat forces of regionalism and provide a

common forum among the neighbouring states to solve their inter

connected problems by way of discussion and mutual understanding.

However, the same spirit was not maintained in actual practice during

211
the last decade. The remorse at letting down so valuable as

instrument into-disuse was strongly shared by the former president

[Link] when he deplored there being allowed to become

practically dormant.

In 1972 meeting of the Southern Zonal Council was held at

Hyderabad, which raised fresh hopes that this machinery would play

a fruitful role in promoting regional co-operation among the states in

mutual and national interest. Apart form the accord reached among

the chief ministers of the Southern Zone in the matter of sharing the

power supply, greater significance was attached to removing the

harshness of linguistic regionalism. In order to strengthen the forces

of secularism and combat communalism in the states a meeting of the

Central Zonal Council was held. Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh

decide to check the communal tendencies in their neighbouring areas.

Eradication of infectious diseases and taking protective measures

against the spread can chalk out health development programmes

with the assistance of the central government. Technical co-operation

among the states is vital in the matter of irrigation, power, exploitation

of energy resources and health schemes. Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat,

Maharashtra and Rajasthan agreed on the sharing of the Narmada

water. Energy crisis is an important issue that would further

necessitate the co-operation of the states and activation of the Zonal

Councils; moreover in the field of economic planning, it is not possible

to achieve the objective of development unless there is a proper

distribution among the states on essential commodities. The

agreement among the states on essential commodities at the Zonal

level can help the system of distribution. To meet the challenge of

212
rising inflation and counter the increasing smuggling activities a

meeting of the Southern Zonal Council was held at Trivandrum on

31st December 1974, which discussed the measures to be taken

against smugglers along the seacoast in southern states.

The Secessionist Movements, like the earlier one in Mizoram,

and the continuing ones in Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland and

Assam, are looked upon as not only unwarranted but also illegitimate.

While there may be strong and valid grounds for holding such a view,

the focus of attention has to be on the reasons for germination and

burgeoning of the secessionist ideas and possible constitutional and

political solutions. Democratic federalism enjoins openness, dialogue,

debate, discussion and even paradigm shifts. The hill districts of

Assam have also displayed great regional feeling and demanded the

formation of an independent Mizo state. They demanded a separate

state of Mizoram outside the union of India and in order to press their

demand they organized themselves in a political front known as the

Mizo National Front (MNF). The union government, naturally, turned

down this demand and sought to suppress the movement.23 The

Mizos organized armed agitation and commenced guerilla warfare and

took support from foreign powers like China.

In course of time, the Mizo leaders realized the futility of the

agitational and violent approach and submitted a memorandum to the

Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi expressing their dissatisfaction

with the existing arrangements. A three-member delegation headed by

(MNF) president chunga met the prime minister in January 1971 to

impress upon her the genuiness of their demand. By this time, the

213
Mizos had given up their demand for secession from the Indian union

and instead demanded a referendum on the question of granting

separate statehood to the Mizos. The union government keeping their

aspirations in view decided to make Mizo hill area a union Territory

that was inaugurated by the Prime Minister herself on 21st January

1972. It was named Mizoram. This arrangement however did not

satisfy the Mizos and as such they under the leadership of Laldenga

continued their agitation to achieve their objective of a separate Mizo

state outside the Indian union. However in July 1976, an agreement

was signed between the central government and Laldenga, which

decided to solve the Mizos problems through non-violent means. But

in March 1977 this agreement was violated by Laldenga by adopting

violent means. With the agreement that the Rajiv Gandhi government

has signed with Mizo National Front of Laldenga, farewell to arms by

the outlawed Mizo National Army and an end to the total neglect of the

aspirations of a highly literate people by the centre are expected. And

as such Mizoram was elevated to the status of a state from the union

territory in the Indian union.

Similarly, another tribe (Nagas of Assam) demanded for

secession from the Indian union and agitated for an independent

state. The Nagas formed the Naga National Council under Zapa Phizo

to carry on an agitation for the grant of independent status. In

February 1950, phizo held in plebiscite on the issue of Naga

Independence and 99 percent of Nagas were said to be in favour of a

sovereign independent state. Several attempts by the centre were

made to find a solution to the Nagaland problem, but nothing concrete

emerged. The rebels continued to be on warpath, although a vast

214
majority of the Nagas has, however, now come within the peace

movement and have agreed and reconciled themselves to the idea that

all efforts to create a separate independent state of Nagaland outside

the Indian Union will be a futile attempt and of no avail.

The Jharkhand Movement may be traceable to its innocuous

socio-educational origins in the establishment in 1912 of Unnati

Samaj and growth of political roots in the emergence in 1938 of

Adivasi Mahasabha. Its distinctive political aspiration crystallized a

decade or so later in the goal of a Jharkhand state within the Indian

Union. The agitation for the state continued ever since the movement

glided meanderingly. It differs in several other respects form the Naga

Movement. If the latter produced the dour and tenacious Anagami

Zapo Phizo, the former boasts of the charismatic leader Jaipal Singh.

But, unlike the unswerving phizo, in retrospect it appears that

perhaps unwittingly Jaipal Singh compromised the cause.24 After

Jaipal Singh, the Jharkhand leadership neither adequately inspired

the people nor distinguished itself too highly except in skimpy

patches. In consequence, the Movement spurted or languished over

the decades growing violent at times and lingering listlessly at others.

Nevertheless, it was bale to sustain the abiding morale and even

loyalty of its cadres. Retaining its civil and constitutional character by

and large it did not face the need to go underground. Sincere

implementation of the recommendations of the Committee for

Jharkhand Matters (COJM) for a council framework might have led to

a degree of genuine autonomy a while earlier and saved some socio

political turmoil. That could also have spelt an early certitude of a

stepping-stone for a Jharkhand state. Superficially in place, in reality

215
the council was bereft of substance. In consequence, the Jharkhand

tract remained in a state of tension, breeding different societal ills.

The Jharkhandis felt let down, caught in the maze of murky politics.

Nagaland state was conceded quite early in the battle the focus in

history of the unremitting Jharkhand struggle was uncertain way

ward and zigzag. One cannot escape the feeling that though the

Jharkhand demand, set within the constitutional premises, was not

unreasonable, at times the movement leadership lacked the mettle

and the fiber to clinch matters, especially on occasions when the goal

appeared within an ace of realization. Secondly, that the regions

public weal and interest fell prey to political skull duggery.

Nevertheless, since, by and large, the movement was people. Up

borne, its fulfillment in 2000 sent waves of exhilaration and hope in

the region.

The Jharkhand and the Bodoland Movements do not fall in the

category of secessionist movements since the demands locate the

proposed states within the existing constitutional precincts. At best,

they may be regarded as restructures movements. The staunch

protagonists of the nation-state may dub them as less malevolent then

secessionist, though still malignant. Such votaries have to reset their

sights. In India, a genuine over all federal structure has not only been

in the making but is also an imperative of an intensely diverse,

evolving polity that might have set out initially on a unitary

constitutional path, but finds it incompatible with the evolutionary

trends. Further, it needs to be appreciated that such demands do not

question the legitimacy of the nation state. An internal rearrangement

of a system may do no violence to the inherent fundamental federalist

216
structure. On the contrary, there is reason to repose belief in the view

that the satisfaction generated on acceptance of a rational demand

may strengthen the inner bonds of the polity.

To be sure, India will have to live with several such movements

at different points of time in different parts of the country, creating

every time new political and societal constellations. Infact, as of today,

several demands for creation of new states are afloat. In a polity of

Indias kaleidoscopic variety and magnitude this should cause no loss

of nerve. On the other hand, it may lead to spring origins of creativity

for a secular, throbbing, dynamic federal India, these different

movements has a serious impact on the integrity of the Indian union.

In order to understand this unique phenomenon of Indian

politics, one has to probe into the history of centre-state relationship

in India. Before 1967, the congress party barring in some isolated

pockets like PEPSU in 1952 and Kerala in 1957, held complete sway

over the entire country. Obviously centre-state relationship remained

smooth owing to one party dominant system. Central control was

exercised through central party organization but to some extent it was

impeded by state level party organizations.25 In West Bengal, the state

level leaders used the argument of leftist threat to maintain its

independence from central control. This situation in West Bengal was

truly unique on the one hand, it pleaded for a greater central

assistance to curb the leftist menace thereby increasing its

independence on the centre. On the other hand, it used the very same
t

argument to remain independent of central domination. It took the

plea of extenuation circumstances to remain independent to central

217
party discipline to deal firmly with local and state level problems,

unfettered by central direction and control party cohesion and its

ability to mobilize masses for political action to counteract leftist

threat were the major sources of the state autonomy. Because of this

threat the central leaders were willing to concede wider degree of

latitude and independence to the state level leaders. So was the case

of former congress government in Tamil Nadu and Punjab. Both used

successfully the threat posed by the DMK and the Akali Dal to remain

largely independent of central control. The bugbear of feudal revival

was successfully used by the congress government of Rajasthan,

Gujarat, and Orissa, that of RSS obscurantism by the government of

Madhya Pradesh and Telangana separatism by the government of

Andhra Pradesh, to remain relatively independent of central

domination. The situation after 1967 underwent a radical change. The

political contour in several states has changed and as many as nine

states, viz, Haryana, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal,

Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala threw off the yoke of

congress partys domination lasting over two decades. With that

disappeared the unifying role of congress high command. A new era

of multi-party rule was inaugurated in India at the state level, which

considerably strained the centre-state relations and posed a big

challenge to the federal exigencies of India. Even a stable state like

DMK governed in Tamil Nadu, while remaining implacably opposed to

the congress party within Tamil Nadu, began cultivating the central

congress leaders for greater financial assistance. Nor were the Akali

Dal in Punjab averse to cultivating this kind of relationship though in

this endeavour their success was as short-lived as their government.

218
Their numerical inferiority denied the Alkalis a decisive bargaining

role.26 The congress split in 1969 gave further impetus to the trend of

bargaining co-operativism between the centre and states. The DMK

came closer to congress and not only remained independent of central

assistance for drought relief as part of the bargain.

A fifth general election was held in 1972, for sixteen state

assemblies and the legislature of two union territories was conducted.

The country had just then in December 1971, fought a war with

Pakistan over Bangladesh issue, and leaders of several opposition

parties expressed the view that elections for the assemblies should be

postponed for sometime in order to save the country from huge

expenditure involved in that exercise. But professing to be a great

constitutionalist and a democrat Mrs. Gandhi took the view that the

election should be held according to schedule. The real reason why

she took this stand appeared to be that due to victory over Pakistan

her image in the country had gone high and she wanted to cash on it.

The new era in the centre-state relations began in 1977 when

the emergency came to an end with the massive victory of the Janata

party failed to have the same leading position in south India, and as

such there were different political parties in power in various states.

Sheikh Abdullahs National conference came to power in Jammu and

Kashmir, CPM and its leftist allies gained absolute majority in West

Bengal and in two of the major southern states congress (I) achieved a

clear majority, whereas in Tamil Nadu a regional party AIADMK came

to power. The central leadership of the Janata party had to deal with

states who might not agree with the policies of the ruling Janata party

at the centre. Taking advantage of political situation in the country

219
the state government leaders from West Bengali, Tamil Nadu, Punjab

and Jammu and Kashmir raised the demand for autonomy of the

states. Their belief was further strengthened by the election manifesto

of Janata party, which had announced on the eve of parliamentary

elections the twin objectives of decentralization of power in political as

well as economic matters. The West Bengal government headed by

Jyoti Basu asked for a national debate and a fresh review of the

centre-state relations. A memorandum was submitted by the West

Bengal government to the seventh Finance Commission in which it

was stated that the changed political situation and the need for

harmonious and rapid social and economic development called for a

fundamental restructuring of the existing centre-state fiscal

arrangement reducing particularly the centres discretionary powers.

The then prime minister, Morarji Desai made it clear in the parliament

that it was not necessary at the present time to hold national debate

on the centre-state relations, however if any chief minister desired to

raise the matter again, he was free to do so, he said the centre-state

relations, and said that the matter was covered by the administrative

reforms commission, which studied the subject in depth and

recommended that no constitutional amendment was necessary for

ensuring proper and harmonious relations with the states. Provisions

of the constitution were adequate for the purpose of meeting any

situation or resolving any problem that might arise. The central

government had agreed with the general approach recommended by

the Administrative Reform Commission. The government therefore did

not consider the present time appropriate for national debate on this

issue.

220
 Considering the political complexion in various states the

discussion on centre-state relations will also continue in future. The

regional parties, which are confined only to certain specific areas, will

insist for more autonomy for the states. The CPM is an All India Party,

but its main hold is in West Bengal. In view of its election

commitments to the people for the development of the state the party

finds limited resources to fulfill its commitments, other political

parties and opposition groups in West Bengal have opposed the idea of

autonomy of state on the ground that it poses a threat to parties

which are in minority in the state, and a danger to the integrity of the

country. Similarly, in Punjab the demand of autonomy of state by

Akali Dal is opposed by the Janata party group in the state as the

Janata group is in minority. The Janata party is a constituent of the

coalition government in Punjab but there are differences between the

Janata and the Akali Dal on the use and promotion of the national

language-Hindi in the states. The minority groups in most of the

states, whether determined on the basis of culture or political

grouping are not in favour of the autonomy demand of the states, as

the feeling among minorities runs on the line that a strong centre

would be in a position to protect their interest.

Most important role in bringing about a realignment of power

within the federal system is being played by the regional parties per

se, such as the AIADMK, the DMK, the Akali Dal and the reviewed

National Conference in Jammu & Kashmir. These parties are regional

not only in terms of their electoral support base but also in terms of

their political ambitions and policy perspectives. With no apparent

221
prospect of capturing power at the centre or except in extraordinary

situations, of even playing a balancing role in the power structure at

the national level, they are obliged to articulate and mobilize regionally

based interest and to agitate local issues. Charges of discrimination by

the centre against their respective regions are their most potent

electoral gunpowder. It is only to be expected that the most vociferous

demands for greater autonomy for the states are championed by

regional parties whose raison is to act as vehicles for the self-

expression of regional particularities. The regional parties are

functional to the federal system is evident from the firmness of their

electoral support base. This appears to be the only valid explanation of

the fact that Tamil Nadu has become a stronghold first of the DMK,

and now of the A1ADMK, and that the Akali Dal has returned to power

in Punjab as a result of the June 1977 election to the state legislative

assembly apart from having won all the seats in March 1977 election

to the Lok Sabha.

In 1977 we have perceived this trend in the political behaviour

and style of ruling party in dealing with the opposition governments of

the states. The possibilities of authoritarian behaviour and style would

be less. The demand for decentralization and greater state autonomy

would be more strongly vocalised, and the complaints of toppling the

state opposition ministries would be heard intermittently. Infact our

constitutional structure of All India Parties is unitary. If the centre is

strong, with an undisputed, effective popular national leadership,

everything relating to its party and governments of the state would be

222
decided at the central level. The process of rule making and rule

application will be directed and controlled by the centre. In the reverse

position, the strong, state-oriented, regional leaders would tiy to

dominate the national politics.

The All India Parties do not show an agreed view on union-state

relations. Some parties as erstwhile Jan Sangh, Communist and the

Congress to certain extent are centralists. But when they are holding

powers in the state, they will strongly demand for more state

autonomy and decentralization, because of their particular political

strategy, and regional support base, example CPI (M), erstwhile the

Swantantra party is committed to an ideology of decentralization and

socialist in their eagerness to balance the claims of national integrity

and regional autonomy are reluctant to find any basis of conflicts of

interest of the union and the states. Naturally, from them the politics

of union-state confrontation has no major interest. The major bond of

alliance is provided by the attraction of power. The central leaders of

different constituent units of Janata Party want to have their CM in as

many states as possible.27 It is an uneasy and uncomfortable

compromise of diverse interests and ideologies. The sufficient

awareness and intensity in union state relations have increased and

due to regional based political parties in the states, the demand for

state autonomy is vocally and manifestly articulated. The centre is

involved in its intra party sectional conflicts and is not in a position

either to fulfill all the demands or to act strictly.

223
 The central leaders of the party are expressing different opinion

with regard to their intra party conflicts and no policy matters. The

legitimacy of their action is not based on rational, traditional or

charismatic ground. In the absence of above element, the legitimacy of

the central action is widely suspected and the political system is put

to sever strains. When a leadership of party is criticizing its own party

leaders and government cannot justify central action and satisfy its

own central and state leader of different units, how can it create an

environment of mutual good will, adjustment and cooperation with

other opposition parties of the states? The central action in the state

sphere should be based either on the totality of constitutional scheme

or consent of the state authority concerned. Once the genuine

complaints of the states could be removed and the legitimacy of the

central actions is substantially ensured, the edge of regional

discontent will soon be blunt and an atmosphere of mutual goodwill

and trust arise. It will then become possible to make an extensive and

fruitful use of the various devices of cooperative federalism and avoid

any bitter union state controversy. But this could be possible only

when the political party in the centre has not to bother for its own

existence in the face of bitter intra-party conflicts and divided

leadership.

Federalism is essentially a political culture, an outlook on

national life. The question is whether in a land of Indias continental
dimensions of rich diversities, regional, linguistic and other profound

224
cultural traditions, does Indian nationalism require suppression of the

diversities of whether the national well being will be fostered by

encouraging and allowing the diversities to have full play within the

national framework. Most states have been demanding more

autonomy for a long time much before the demand of Kashmir became

strident .as soon as Farooq Abdullah had a resolution passed in its

favour by the Kashmir Assembly .Akalis in Punjab began to clamour

for demand for separate states. Autonomy is not only a question of

wider jurisdiction for self-rule but also in an important sense, a

question of adequacy and dignity both among the political class and

the people at large. Concerns relating to the path of development and

its relation to politicization of ears in terms of a groups destiny cannot

be ignored. Because the central contradiction of the history of Indian

states seems to be between the logic of economic development and the

logic of political identities. One worked through centralizing states and

homogenizing market and the other its dark underside of constant

process of exclusion, resentment and hostility to the undeserved

privilege. Once spoke the language of integration and unity and the

other negative language of localism and regional autonomy reflecting

xenophobic homogeneous political communities.

To conclude to say that federal studies have not concerned

themselves sufficiently with how the powers and functions

theoretically assigned to state governments under the seventh

schedule are operationally exercised below the state level. The

artificial boundaries between federal studies limited to problems and

issues of centre state relations and studies on state and local

government need to be done away with in the interest of evolving an

225
integrated multi level approach to the federal polity. The centre state

relations paradigm extend their concerns to encompass the

possibilities and potential of multi-level federalism. If the first

responsibility of scholars is to explore all proposed answers of our

time, then carrying forward the idea of self-government is an urgent

priority. With the observation of Nikhil Chakaravarty if more

autonomy is granted right to all the states and the centre is diverted of

its overload of powers, retaining only the very minimum, why should

that lead to the disintegration of the country? Rather the very concept

of the union of India will come into its own. The durability of our

present state structure depends on the willing cooperation of all

regions. The centre is strengthened when the parts are willing

partners. There lies the dialectics of our polity today.28

226
 REFERENCES

1. Pal Chandra, State Autonomy in Indian Federation. Deep and

Deep Publication, New Delhi, 1984, p.70.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Bhaskara Rao V., Parliamentary Democracy in India: Trends

and Issues. Mittal Publication, New Delhi, 1987, p.166.

6. Ibid, p. 167.

7. Ibid, p.168.

8. Gupta, U.N., Indian Federalism and Unity of Nation. Vohra

Publication, Allahabad, 1988,p. 168.

9. Ibid, p. 12.

10. Ibid, p. 13.

11. Permual, C.A., Journal of Political Science, Srinivas Printer,

Madras, 1979, p.2.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Sharma, R.N., Kashmir Autonomy and Exercise in Centre-

State Relationship, Shubhi Publication, Delhi, 2000, p.107.

15. Ibid, p. 109.

227
16. Khan, M.G., Challenges to Indian Federalism, Third

Concept, August 1997,p.2.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Rajaraman, P., The DMK: the Beacon Light of Tamil Nadu,

poompozhil publishers, Chennai, 1999, p.12.

20. Ibid.

21. Wadhwa, K.K., Constitutional Autonomy: a Case Study of

Jammu and Kashmir. Bhavana Books and Prints, New Delhi,

1999, p.60.

22. Ibid.

23. Singh, Bhupinder, Autonomy Movements and Federal India,

Rawat Publications, Jaipur, 2002, p.45.

24. Ibid. p. 178.

25. Gupta, U.N., Indian Federalism and Unity of Nation, [Link],

p.98.

26. Ibid.

27. Permual, C.A., Journal of Political Science, [Link]., p. 18.

28. Sharma, R.N., Kashmir Autonomy and Exercise in Centre-

State Relationship, [Link]., P.117.

228