United Nations S/2001/357

Security Council Distr.: General

12 April 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 12 April 2001 from the Secretary-General

to the President of the Security Council

I wish to refer to the presidential statement dated 2 June 2000

(S/PRST/2000/20) in which the Security Council requested me to establish a Panel
of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a period of six months. The
Council also requested that the expert panel, once established, submit to the
Council, through me, its final report at the end of the mandate.
Further to my letter dated 2 April 2001, I have the honour to transmit to you
the report of the Panel, submitted to me by the Chairperson of the Panel. I should be
grateful if you would bring the report to the attention of the members of the Security
Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. Annan

01-32354 (E) 130401

*0132354*
S/2001/357

Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of

Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Contents
Paragraphs Page

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–24 3
A. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4–8 3
B. Methodological framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9–16 4
C. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17–20 5
D. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21–24 6
II. Illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25–108 6
A. Pre-existing structures that facilitated illegal exploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26–31 6
B. Mass-scale looting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32–45 8
C. Systematic and systemic exploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46–70 9
D. Current structures of illegal exploitation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71–86 14
E. Individual actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87–93 17
F. Economic data: confirmation of the illegal exploitation of the natural
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94–108 19
III. Links between the exploitation of natural resources and the continuation of the
conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109–212 27
A. Budgets compared to military expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110–124 27
B. Financing the war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125–172 29
C. Special features of the links between the exploitation of natural resources
and the continuation of the conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173–180 36
D. Facilitators or passive accomplices? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181–212 37
IV. Conclusion and findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213–218 41
V. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219–242 42
Annexes
I. Sample of companies importing minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo
via Rwanda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
II. Countries visited and representatives of Governments and organizations interviewed . . . . . . . . 48
III. Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

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I. Introduction taken, and either transferred to those countries or

exported to international markets by their forces and
1. By the statement of its President of 2 June 2000 nationals.
(S/PRST/2000/20), the Security Council requested the 6. Systematic and systemic exploitation. Planning
Secretary-General to establish an expert panel on the and organization were required for this phase. The
illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms systematic exploitation flourished because of the pre-
of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for existing structures developed during the conquest of
a period of six months, with the following mandate: power of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the
– To follow up on reports and collect information Liberation of Congo-Zaire. These pre-existing
on all activities of illegal exploitation of natural structures were improved over time and new networks
resources and other forms of wealth of the for channelling extracted resources were put in place.
Democratic Republic of the Congo, including in However, the systemic exploitation used the existing
violation of the sovereignty of that country; systems of control established by Rwanda and Uganda.
In both cases, exploitation was often carried out in
– To research and analyse the links between the violation of the sovereignty of the Democratic
exploitation of the natural resources and other Republic of the Congo, the national legislation and
forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of sometimes international law, and it led to illicit
the Congo and the continuation of the conflict; activities. Key individual actors including top army
– To revert to the Council with recommendations. commanders and businessmen on the one hand, and
government structures on the other, have been the
2. The Secretary-General, in his letter to the engines of this systematic and systemic exploitation.
President of the Security Council dated 31 July 2000
(S/2000/796), notified the President of the Security 7. The consequence of illegal exploitation has been
Council that the composition of the Panel was as twofold: (a) massive availability of financial resources
follows: for the Rwandan Patriotic Army, and the individual
enrichment of top Ugandan military commanders and
Mme Safiatou Ba-N’Daw (Côte d’Ivoire) civilians; (b) the emergence of illegal networks headed
(Chairperson); either by top military officers or businessmen. These
Mr. François Ekoko (Cameroon); two elements form the basis of the link between the
exploitation of natural resources and the continuation
Mr. Mel Holt (United States of America); of the conflict. Other contributing factors however
Mr. Henri Maire (Switzerland); exist — the roles played by some entities and
institutions, and the opportunistic behaviour of some
Mr. Moustapha Tall (Senegal). private companies and influential individuals,
3. The Panel was assisted by a technical advisor, an including some decision makers in the Democratic
associate political officer, an administrator and a Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe. Some leaders in
secretary. the region bear a direct responsibility. The Panel
concludes that tough measures must be taken to bring
to an end the cycle of exploitation of the natural
A. Summary resources and the continuation of the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
4. Illegal exploitation of the mineral and forest
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is 8. The Panel’s recommendations revolve around six
taking place at an alarming rate. Two phases can be broad themes: (1) sanctions against countries and
distinguished: mass-scale looting and the systematic individuals involved in the illegal activities;
and systemic exploitation of natural resources. (2) preventive measures to avoid a recurrence of the
current situation; (3) reparations to the victims of the
5. Mass-scale looting. During this first phase, illegal exploitation of natural resources; (4) design of a
stockpiles of minerals, coffee, wood, livestock and framework for reconstruction; (5) improvement of
money that were available in territories conquered by international mechanisms and regulations governing
the armies of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda were some natural resources; and (6) security issues.

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B. Methodological framework against whom serious allegations were made. When

access to those key witnesses or primary actors was
9. Methodology. Owing to the nature of the work denied, Panel members often relied on their closest
and the complexities of the issues, a methodology that collaborators for insight. The Panel however faced a
allows flexible data collection was essential in order to problem of imbalance in the acquisition of data. Indeed
complete this project. The Panel has therefore utilized: data was abundant for Rwanda, Uganda, RCD-Goma,
RCD-ML and MLC. This is partly due to the high
(a) Primary data collection. Official
number of insiders living in the Democratic Republic
documentation from ministries and other institutions as
of the Congo and in Europe who were directly involved
well as recorded minutes of meetings involving various
with those entities and who offered to share almost
relevant actors;
everything they knew or had experienced or gathered
(b) Secondary sources. Reports, workshop as documentation while they were involved with them.
proceedings, published and unpublished literature; The same quantity and quality of data were not
available for Angola, Namibia or Zimbabwe, although
(c) Interviews. Structured, semi-structured and
the Panel visited those countries. This constraint can be
open interviews as well as interviews resulting from
felt in the report. Overall the report was written using
various network referrals.
the empirical method combined with the economic
10. A vast amount of data was obtained from three analysis of data collected, supported by elements of
essential sources: evidence.
(a) Countries and other entities involved in the 12. Establishing boundaries. Geographically, data
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, were gathered for occupied and non-occupied
namely: Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of territories within the Democratic Republic of the
the Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Congo as well as for any country involved in the
RCD-Goma and RCD-ML; conflict or of other strategic importance, geographic,
financial or other. With respect to natural resources, the
(b) “Third-party” sources such as Belgium,
Panel focused on minerals, forest and agricultural
Cameroon, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Kenya,
products and other forms of wealth, primarily taxes.
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
Given the high number of natural resources found in
and Northern Ireland, the United Republic of Tanzania,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the high level
the United States of America, Switzerland, various
of exploitation by numerous parties, and the limited
United Nations agencies, the International Monetary
time and resources available to the Panel, the following
Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization,
criteria for the selection of resources to be examined
OECD, the International Coffee Organization, De
were developed:
Beers, the Diamond High Council, the International
Diamond Manufacturers Association, the University of • The commercial value of the resources in
Maryland, the World Resource Institute and CIFOR; absolute terms;
(c) Various individual actors and stakeholders • The interest of parties in the resources;
who expressed an interest for various reasons in
• The scale of exploitation.
sharing their knowledge and understanding with the
Panel. 13. Based on these criteria, three categories of
products were of primary consideration: (a) mineral
11. The production and export data series available
resources, primarily coltan, diamonds, gold and
for the analysis cover the period 1995-2000. Data were
cassiterite; (b) agriculture, forests and wildlife,
systematically analysed separately and then compared
including timber, coffee and ivory; and (c) financial
with one another. Comparative analysis thus
products, mainly in regard to taxes. Copper, cobalt,
contributed to the Panel’s ability to develop a good
livestock, gorillas, okapis, tobacco, tea, palm oil and
understanding of the issues. In addition, the Panel
land allocation deserved to be among the resources and
sought to cross-check every item of information
products to be studied. Some did not meet established
received. In relation to this and to the extent possible,
criteria, however, and for others, such as copper and
Panel members attempted to speak to individuals
cobalt, time constraint was the main reason for a lack

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of study. These resources are touched upon in the protect some interests or to create a situation of
report for illustrative purposes, but were not monopoly.
systematically studied.
(d) The violation of international law including
14. Defining the key concepts. In determining the “soft” law. The Panel considers that business activities
parameters of the project the definition or carried out in violation of international law are illegal.
interpretation of illegality and exploitation was
The Panel utilized the aforementioned elements in a
vigorously debated.
complementary manner, refusing to be exclusive or to
15. Illegality. The most contentious concept in the focus on one single element. On the basis of
mandate has been the term “illegality” with regard to discussions with different members of the Security
exploitation. Almost all actors in the conflict and Council, the Panel has interpreted the wish of the
observers requested a clear definition of illegality. In Security Council to be a broad interpretation of the
the Panel’s view, the understanding of illegality is concept of illegality.
underpinned by four elements all related to the rule of
16. Exploitation. The Panel opted for a broad
law, namely:
understanding and interpretation of exploitation.
(a) Violation of sovereignty. The first element Exploitation was used beyond the mere consideration
is based on the Security Council’s understanding of of production and extraction. It was viewed as all
illegality as described in the Panel’s mandate (see the activities that enable actors and stakeholders to engage
statement of the President of the Security Council of 2 in business in first, secondary and tertiary sectors in
June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/20)). This posits that all relation to the natural resources and other forms of
activities — extraction, production, commercialization wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The
and exports — taking place in the Democratic Republic broad interpretation enabled the Panel to look into
of the Congo without the consent of the legitimate extraction, production, commercialization and exports
government are illegal. This interpretation suggested of natural resources and other services such as
that only non-invited forces and their nationals are transport and financial transactions.
carrying out illegal activities in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
C. Overview
(b) Respect by actors of the existing regulatory
framework in the country or territory where they 17. This section offers a general overview of the
operate or carry out their activities. The Panel report. Initially, the Panel examined the pre-existing
considers that if authorities exerting effective power structures that have facilitated the illegal exploitation
and control over their sovereign area recognize or set of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the
up a regulatory framework to govern the use or Congo. These elements encompass the
exploitation of resources, this framework shall be financial/commercial links and the transportation
respected. Failure to do so may lead to the networks that essentially laid the foundation for the
infringement of the law and, therefore, activities current situation of illegal exploitation.
considered illegal or unlawful. In this case, the Panel
deems illegality to be the carrying out of an activity in 18. The Panel then reviewed the primary processes
violation of an existing body of regulations. by which the natural resources are physically exploited
by the occupying forces, primarily Rwanda and
(c) The discrepancy between widely accepted Uganda, in conjunction with their respective rebel
practices in trade and business and the way business is counterparts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
conducted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In Subsequently, the current structures of exploitation
this category, the Panel has considered that the use and were discussed in order to demonstrate the evolution of
abuse of power by some actors fall into the category of the process to its present state. Selected individuals
illegality. This includes forced monopoly in trading, were then profiled to illustrate the extent to which this
the unilateral fixing of prices of products by the buyer, is an organized and embedded venture. Economic data
the confiscation or looting of products from farmers, were then analysed to confirm the findings described
and the use of military forces in various zones to above.

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19. The focus then moved to exploring the eastern Zaire fundamentally altered the composition of
complexities of the links between the continuation of the regional stakeholders and the distribution of natural
the conflict and the exploitation of resources through resources. Previously, the distribution norm was (via
the use of specific country examples. The aim is to legal and illegal channels) through locally based
demonstrate the varying means by which power Congolese, mostly civilian-managed, business
structures can manipulate situations for the most operations. However, these traditional modes were
favourable outcome. This section is directly linked to quickly overtaken by new power structures. Along with
the previous one and, in some cases, information new players came new rules for exploiting natural
overlapped. This was unavoidable because of the resources. Foreign troops and their “friends” openly
intricate nature of the problem at hand. embraced business in “liberated territories”,
encouraged indirectly by the AFDL leader, the late
20. The report goes on to discuss more incidental
President Kabila.
elements in this exploitation, which are nonetheless
important and relevant: official and non-official fronts 24. In August 1998, fighting erupted again in the
utilized as well as the facilitators or passive northern, western and eastern parts of the Democratic
accomplices within the processes. The report concludes Republic of the Congo, this time between Rwandan and
with a summary of the findings and recommendations Ugandan troops and the Congolese army, with the
for action. assistance of Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean
armies, as well as Sudanese and Chadian forces. The
last two countries have since withdrawn their soldiers
D. Background from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
21. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is located
in the heart of equatorial central Africa and has an area II. Illegal exploitation of natural
of 2,267,600 square kilometres and a current resources and other forms of
population estimated at 50 million. The Democratic
Republic of the Congo is endowed with a unique
wealth
biodiversity, vast mineral and forest resources, and rich
soils conducive to agriculture (see map). These 25. The illegal exploitation of resources by Burundi,
favourable conditions, concentrated in the eastern Rwanda and Uganda took different forms, including
regions, are the setting for the current ongoing confiscation, extraction, forced monopoly and price-
occupation and struggle to exploit these natural fixing. Of these, the first two reached proportions that
resources. made the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
a very lucrative business. Prior to defining the type and
22. The initial disruption, predominantly affecting the manner of illegal exploitation, however, it is important
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, began with to examine the pre-existing structures which facilitated
the 1994-1995 refugee crisis in the region, spawned by this process.
the war in neighbouring Rwanda. The sudden influx of
hundreds of thousands of refugees, including members
of the Interahamwe, created a new demographic A. Pre-existing structures that facilitated
dynamic in the subregional population, abruptly illegal exploitation
disturbed the delicate balance of the ecosystems and
generated a new security situation along the border 26. Illegal exploitation1 by foreigners aided by the
between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Congolese began with the first “war of liberation” in
Rwanda. 1996. The AFDL rebels, backed by Angolan, Rwandan
and Ugandan soldiers conquered eastern and south-
23. The situation further deteriorated in 1996 with the eastern Zaire. As they were advancing, the then AFDL
war between the Zairian forces and the Alliance of leader, the late Laurent-Désiré Kabila, signed contracts
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire with a number of foreign companies. Numerous
(AFDL), the rebel movement led by the late Laurent- accounts and documents suggest that by 1997 a first
Désiré Kabila and supported by the Angolan, Rwandan
__________________
and Ugandan forces. This AFDL-led conquest of then
1 In the context of the Panel’s mandate.

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wave of “new businessmen” speaking only English, 29. Financial and commercial links. During the
Kinyarwanda and Kiswahili had commenced operations early months of the rebellion, the financial setting and
in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.2 networks were already in place. At the heart of the
Theft of livestock, coffee beans and other resources financial setting is the Banque de commerce, du
began to be reported with frequency. By the time the développement et d’industrie (BCDI) located in Kigali.
August 1998 war broke out, Rwandans and Ugandans According to some sources, there was an understanding
(top officers and their associates) had a strong sense of between the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame,
the potential of the natural resources and their locations President Museveni and the late Laurent-Désiré Kabila
in the eastern the Democratic Republic of the Congo. on the collection and use of financial resources during
Some historians have argued that Ugandan forces were the time of the AFDL rebellion. This collaboration led
instrumental in the conquest of areas such as Wasta, many sources to believe that the three leaders were
Bunia, Beni and Butembo during the first war. shareholders in BCDI. But this was not the case.
27. Numerous accounts in Kampala suggest that the 30. The following example illustrates the nature of
decision to enter the conflict in August 1998 was the financial transactions and links involving BCDI,
defended by some top military officials who had served Citibank New York as a corresponding bank, and some
in eastern Zaire during the first war and who had had a companies and individuals. In a letter signed by
taste of the business potential of the region. Some key J. P. Moritz, General Manager of Société minière de
witnesses, who served with the Rally for Congolese Bakwanga (MIBA), a diamond company, and Ngandu
Democracy rebel faction in early months, spoke about Kamenda, the General Manager of MIBA ordered a
the eagerness of Ugandan forces to move in and payment of US$ 3.5 million to la Générale de
occupy areas where gold and diamond mines were commerce d’import/export du Congo (COMIEX),3 a
located. Other sources informed the Panel that, late in company owned by late President Kabila and some of
September 1998, they were already engaged in his close allies, such as Minister Victor Mpoyo, from
discussions with General Salim Saleh on the creation an account in BCDI through a Citibank account. This
of a company that would supply the eastern Democratic amount of money was paid as a contribution from
Republic of the Congo with merchandise, and on the MIBA to the AFDL war effort.
import of natural resources. The project never
31. Transportation networks. Illegal activities also
materialized in this form, but the sources reportedly
benefited from the old transportation network that
also discussed this and other business venture
existed prior to the 1998 war. This network consists of
possibilities with the President of Uganda, Yoweri
key airlines and trucking companies, a number of
Museveni.
which aided AFDL troops in their war against the
28. There are strong indications that, if security and Mobutu regime. The pattern of transport remains
political reasons were the professed roots of the similar today: merchandise or arms are flown in and
political leaders’ motivation to move into the eastern natural resources or their products are flown out. For
Democratic Republic of the Congo, some top army example, Aziza Kulsum Gulamali, a businesswoman
officials clearly had a hidden agenda: economic and operating within the region for some time, utilized this
financial objectives. A few months before the 1998 war network even in the 1980s. She contracted Air Cargo
broke out, General Salim Saleh and the elder son of Zaire to transport arms to the FDD Hutu rebels in
President Museveni reportedly visited the eastern Burundi and smuggled cigarettes on the return flight.
Democratic Republic of the Congo. One month after Since 1998, aircraft also fly from the military airports
the beginning of the conflict, General James Kazini at Entebbe and Kigali, transporting arms, military
was already involved in commercial activities. equipment, soldiers and, for some companies,
According to very reliable sources, he knew the most merchandise. On the return flights, they will carry
profitable sectors and immediately organized the local coffee, gold, diamond traders and business
commanders to serve their economic and financial representatives and, in some cases, soldiers. The Panel
objectives. __________________
3 COMIEX is registered as follows: immatriculé No.
__________________ 43797, identification nationale No. 31837T, Siège
2 Cross-border commercial exchanges between people of sociale Kinshasa/Gombé No. 4 Avenue de la Justice.
the region have traditionally existed. Administrateur Directeur générale: Frédéric Kabarele.

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concludes that these pre-existing networks and large operation for the confiscation of coffee beans.
structures constitute the basis for the current Mr. Bemba initiated, encouraged and perpetuated such
exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic practices in the Province. In a written letter to one of
Republic of the Congo. his commanders, he urged him to release a bigger
vehicle he was using because it was needed urgently.
The source indicated that this was later used to carry
B. Mass-scale looting away tons of coffee beans. A participant in this
operation, who has since left the movement, explained
32. Between September 1998 and August 1999, that two months were required to remove the enormous
occupied zones of the Democratic Republic of the quantities of coffee. In the past, this province produced
Congo were drained of existing stockpiles, including 60 per cent of the country’s robusta coffee. The
minerals, agricultural and forest products and livestock. localities of Bumba, Lisala, Bosonzo, Binga and
Regardless of the looter, the pattern was the same: Mindembo for a year did not have coffee stocks to
Burundian, Rwandan, Ugandan and/or RCD soldiers, export because of these seizures. The Société
commanded by an officer, visited farms, storage congolaise du café, the largest owner of coffee stocks
facilities, factories and banks, and demanded that the in the area, went bankrupt. The mass-scale looting
managers open the coffers and doors. The soldiers were reached such levels that, in one instance, Mr. Bemba
then ordered to remove the relevant products and load seized 200 tons of coffee beans from the SCIBE
them into vehicles. The Panel received numerous company, which was owned by his father, Saolona
accounts and claims of unlawful removal of products Bemba. The matter remains unresolved in court.
by Rwandan or Ugandan armies and their local RCD
allies. The Panel has chosen to illustrate this point with 36. In some cases, factories were dismantled or
some examples. machinery spare parts were taken away, as in the case
of the sugar factory of Kaliba in South Kivu. When the
33. In the mining sector, SOMINKI (Société minière Panel asked about the dismantling of some factories,
et industrielle du Kivu) had seven years’ worth of the RCD cabinet replied that investors were free to
columbo-tantalite (coltan) in stock in various areas. dismantle their factories and relocate wherever they
From late November 1998, Rwandan forces and their wanted. In essence, RCD recognized the phenomenon,
RCD allies organized its removal and transport to but explained it in terms of the investors’ decision to
Kigali. Depending on the sources, between 2,000 and relocate the factories while taking the raw materials
3,000 tons of cassiterite and between 1,000 and 1,500 from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Cars and
tons of coltan were removed from the region between other items were apparently also taken from the
November 1998 and April 1999. A very reliable source country, as statistics on Ugandan registered cars
informed the Panel that it took the Rwandans about a reflected an increase of about one quarter in 1999.
month to fly this coltan to Kigali. The Panel, however,
received official documents including one in which 37. The financial sector was not left untouched either.
RCD acknowledged removing 6 tons of coltan and 200 A defector from RCD who participated in some looting
tons of cassiterite from SOMINKI for a total of informed the Panel that Rwandan soldiers
US$ 722,482. systematically targeted local banks as soon as they
conquered a town. In many cases, they would use the
34. Late in late August 1998, General Kazini’s RCD soldiers to collect the money while those who
soldiers absconded with the stockpiles of timber were armed would surround the bank. For example, the
belonging to the logging company Amex-bois, located Kisangani Bank, a branch of the central bank, received
in Bagboka. In December that year, the same General a visit of RCD staff accompanied by Rwandan soldiers.
ordered the confiscation of all the stocked timber Depending on the source (central bank in Kinshasa or
belonging to the logging company La Forestière. eyewitness), anywhere between $1 million and
General Kazini was reportedly seen in the area at least $8 million worth of Congolese francs was taken. The
twice during the period when the looting occurred and Panel was told that the operation took place a couple of
temporarily established his headquarters in the area. days after the central bank and Ministry of Finance
35. Then, in January 1999, in Equateur Province, officials deposited money to pay civil servants and old
Jean-Pierre Bemba and General Kazini organized a Congolese franc notes were replaced by new ones.

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38. Under the escort of soldiers, the money was taken 42. However, over time the mass-scale looting
to the Palm Beach Hotel. The hotel management described above diminished and theft by individual
recalled that bags full of money were stored in one of soldiers became more visible. For example, in Bunia,
the rooms and that during those few days armed during Panel discussions, local non-governmental
soldiers who could not speak Lingala (the most organizations, eyewitnesses and victims mentioned
commonly spoken Congolese language) guarded the cases in which Congolese civilians were injured or
hotel premises. Could such an operation involving a murdered for resisting the attempted seizure of
number of armed soldiers be carried out without the property by the RCD rebels and foreign soldiers. In
knowledge and consent of the highest Rwandan Bukavu, individuals have told Panel members how
commander in the Democratic Republic of the Congo? Rwandan soldiers confiscated their life savings in
dollar notes and some of the gold they were buying and
39. Aides of Jean-Pierre Ondekane (an RCD leader)
keeping as monnaie refuge in the face of the repeatedly
reportedly collected the money from the Palm Beach
devalued Congolese franc. Partially, this has
Hotel, flew with it to Goma and handed it over to
contributed to the increasing resentment felt by the
Emmanuel Kamanzi (former chief of the Finance
Congolese population towards foreign soldiers and
Department of RCD), who then flew on to Kigali. The
some rebels.
Panel could not identify the final recipient of the
money or how much disappeared between Kisangani, 43. The lootings of manufacturing plants, stocks and
Goma and Kigali. However, some sources told the private property were not only acts of isolated
Panel that Mr. Kamanzi was imprisoned briefly at some individual soldiers but were encouraged, sometimes
point after this transaction. According to the same organized and coordinated, by the highest army
sources, he had apparently helped himself to the money commanders of both Rwanda and Uganda.
he was ordered only to transport. Mr. Kamanzi told
44. General Kazini used the same method to facilitate
friends that he simply took a break of two months in
looting activities. He would appoint loyal commanders
Kigali.
and reliable civilian Congolese in the civil
40. During the period when this operation was under administration in areas potentially rich in natural
way, in Equateur Province, Mr. Bemba’s men visited resources in order to secure his networks. This was
several banks. According to a reliable source exactly the case in Ituri, where he appointed Adele
Mr. Bemba’s instructions to his soldiers were to Lotsove in 1999 (see para. 71). In turn, these top layers
systematically empty the bank once a town was of collaborators, colonels and majors utilized their
captured. His troops took an equivalent of $400,000 right-hand men to carry out the actual looting.
from the Banque commerciale du Congo branch in
45. The Panel has strong indications after talking to
Bumba, $500,000 in Lisala, and approximately
numerous witnesses (key and others) that key officials
$600,000 in Gemena.
in the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda were aware
41. The pilfering was also occurring in Kinshasa. The of the situation on the ground, including the looting of
Panel has evidence of a widespread practice by which stocks from a number of factories. In some cases, the
the late President Kabila would by proxy have level of production of mineral resources would have
companies give a certain percentage of their profits. alerted any government, such as those of gold for
For example, certain oil companies in the Democratic Uganda and coltan for Rwanda (from 99 tons in 1996
Republic of the Congo, under the umbrella of taxe to 250 tons in 1997).
parafiscale, were delivering sums of money, in hard
cash, daily or weekly to the late President via his
Minister, friend and right-hand man, Mr. Mpoyo. Other C. Systematic and systemic exploitation
companies, such as MIBA, were asked to hand over
part of their profits to the late President’s regime, and 46. Extraction phase. The mass-scale looting carried
all parastatals and important private companies were out on many levels within the Democratic Republic of
invited to open bank accounts in the Banque de the Congo by rebels and foreign soldiers overshadowed
commerce et du développement (BCD) (see para. 78). extraction activities during the first 12 months of the
second war. When resource stockpiles were looted and
exhausted by occupying forces and their allies, the

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exploitation evolved to an active extraction phase. Both that vast quantities of timber are exported to Asia,
Congolese (civilians and soldiers) and foreigners Europe and North America.
(civilians and soldiers) became involved in the
49. The Panel also discovered during its investigation
extraction of natural resources. This section highlights
that individual Ugandan loggers violated forestry
one particular case study rather than offering a number
legislation, recognized by their ally RCD-ML, by
of shorter illustrative examples. The study will in effect
logging (extracting) the timber directly. According to
demonstrate how a company used illicit business
the Congolese legislation on the permis de coupe, only
practices and complicity with occupying forces and the
individual Congolese nationals are allowed to harvest
Government as well as its international connections to
timber and only in small quantities. Foreigners must
exploit the natural resources of the Democratic
apply for the larger concessions. Initially, Ugandans
Republic of the Congo.
operated in partnership with a Congolese permit holder.
47. DARA-Forest case study. A Ugandan-Thai Soon, the Ugandans began to pay the Congolese to
forest company called DARA-Forest moved to the Ituri sub-lease the permit and, subsequently, to obtain the
area late in 1998. In March 1998, DARA-Forest licence in direct violation of the law.
applied for a licence to carry out logging activities in
50. Timber extraction in the Democratic Republic of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but was denied
the Congo and its export have been characterized by
a forest concession by the Kinshasa authorities. In
unlawfulness and illegality. Besides extracting timber
1999, the company began to buy production by hiring
without authorization in a sovereign country and in
individuals to harvest timber and then sell it to the
violation of the local legislation, DARA-Forest
company. Initially, these individuals were Congolese
consistently exported its timber without any
operating in partnership with Ugandans. The same
certification procedure. It tried to approach some
year, DARA engaged in industrial production with the
certification bodies licensed by the Forest Stewardship
construction of a sawmill in Mangina. By 2000, it had
Council. These bodies requested documentation and
obtained its own concession from RCD-ML. Analysis
elements that the company failed to provide. Yet
of satellite images over a period of time reveals the
DARA-Forest exported timber in violation of a normal
extent to which deforestation occurred in Orientale
procedure generally required and accepted by the
Province between 1998 and 2000. The most harvested
international forest community and gradually
forests in the areas were around Djugu, Mambassa,
considered to be international “soft law”. Companies
Beni, Komanda, Luna, Mont Moyo and Aboro. This
importing this uncertified timber from DARA-Forest
logging activity was carried out without consideration
were essentially in major industrialized countries,
of any of the minimum acceptable rules of timber
including Belgium, China, Denmark, Japan, Kenya,
harvesting for sustainable forest management or even
Switzerland and the United States of America.
sustainable logging.
51. The Panel also realized that DARA Great Lakes
48. Timber harvested in this region, which is
Industries (DGLI), of which DARA-Forest is a
occupied by the Ugandan army and RCD-ML, has
subsidiary, along with a sister company in Uganda,
exclusively transited or remained in Uganda. Our own
Nyota Wood Industries, is in collusion with the
investigation in Kampala has shown that mahogany
Ministry of Water, Land and Forests of Uganda in
originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is
establishing a scheme to facilitate the certification of
largely available in Kampala, at a lower price than
timber coming from the Democratic Republic of the
Ugandan mahogany. This difference in price is simply
Congo. In May 2000, DGLI signed a contract for forest
due to the lower cost of acquisition of timber. Timber
stewardship certification with SmartWood and the
harvested in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by
Rogue Institute for Ecology and Economy in Oregon,
Uganda pays very little tax or none at all. In addition,
United States of America. On 21 March 2000, the
customs fees are generally not paid when soldiers
Director of the DARA group, Prossy Balaba, sent a
escort those trucks or when orders are received from
letter to the Commissioner asking him to allow an
some local commanders or General Kazini. Timber
official of SmartWood to visit certain forests, such as
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo is then
Budongo and Bugoma; he was due to visit the region in
exported to Kenya and Uganda, and to other continents.
mid-April. The visit was meant to deceive the official
The Panel gathered from the Kenyan port authorities
by presenting those forests as the ones for which

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certification was sought and to convince SmartWood to was reported that other products were loaded in trucks
work for the certification of their timber. Indeed, when which are supposed to carry timber only; it is likely
the visit took place, from 14 to 16 April, the DARA that coltan and cassiterite were these products.
group had not even applied for the concession of the Moreover, the fraud extends to the forging of
Budongo forest (Uganda). It was only on 5 July 2000 documents and declarations “originating” in Kinshasa.
that John Kotiram of the DARA group wrote to the
54. The logging rate was alarming around Butembo,
Commissioner to request the concession on the
Beni, Boga and Mambassa. The RCD-ML
Budongo forest.
administration acknowledged its lack of control over
52. The idea behind this is to use Budongo forest as a the rate of extraction, the collection of taxes on logging
model of forests from which timber is harvested and activities and the customs fees at the exit points. On the
which comply with the international requirements for basis of eyewitness accounts, satellite images, key
certification, in order to certify timber coming from the actors’ acknowledgements and the Panel’s own
Democratic Republic of the Congo for which basic investigation, there is sufficient evidence to prove that
elements of certification do not exist. Future plans for timber extraction is directly related to the Ugandan
beating the international system are already in place. presence in Orientale Province. This has reached
According to internal documents of DGLI, DARA- alarming proportions and Ugandans (civilians, soldiers
Forest will import timber from the Democratic and companies) are extensively involved in these
Republic of the Congo into Uganda, which will be activities. In May 2000, RCD-ML attributed a
processed for different types of products in the new concession of 100,000 hectares to DARA-Forest. Since
plant in Namanve for the sawmilling of hardwood, both September 1998, overall DARA-Forest has been
imported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo exporting approximately 48,000 m3 of timber per year.
and harvested in Uganda. DGLI partners in this new
55. Other extraction schemes. Burundians and
scheme include DARA Europe GmbH Germany,
Rwandans have also extracted timber or have been
Shanton President Wood Supply Co. Ltd China,
associated with Congolese loggers. Roads to evacuate
President Wood Supply Co. Ltd Thailand, DARA
timber from places deeper in the forest are in a very
Tropical Hardwood, Portland, Oregon, United States of
bad state. Yet Congo timber, as it is referred to in
America. The distribution of sales of the company is
Bujumbura, is readily available in Burundi and
thought to remain the same, about 30 per cent to the
Rwanda. Some Burundians, however, are also involved
Far East, China, Japan and Singapore, 40 per cent to
in the harvesting of bark from prunus Africana. This
Europe and 25 per cent to North America. DARA Great
tree is known and used in medicine for prostate
Lakes Industries shareholding and management is
treatment. Statistics gathered from the Tanzanian Port
between Thai and Ugandan nationals, among them
Authority clearly indicate that Burundi exported those
John Supit Kotiran and Pranee Chanyuttasart of
barks in 1998 and 1999. Prunus Africana is not found
Thailand and Prossy Balaba of Uganda. Some
in Burundi, however, but rather in the forests of South
unconfirmed information indicates that members of
Kivu.
President Museveni’s family are shareholders of DGLI,
although more investigation is needed. 56. Mining sector. In the mining sector, direct
extraction was carried out in three ways, namely (a) by
53. The DARA group also established another
individual soldiers for their own benefit; (b) by locals
scheme to carry out fraudulent activities in the
organized by Rwandan and Ugandan commanders; and
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The objects of
(c) by foreign nationals for the army or commanders’
DGLI range from logging to financial and industrial
benefit.
activities. Because of the confusion created between
DARA-Forest, which received a concession from RCD, 57. The Panel came across a number of cases in
and DGLI, DARA-Forest has also been dealing in which soldiers were directly involved in mining in
diamonds, gold and coltan. The Panel has received Watsa. In September 1999, the UPDF local commander
reports from the custom posts of Mpondwe, Kasindi demanded the extraction of gold on the pillars of the
and Bundbujyo of the export from the Democratic Gorumbwa mine galleries in which dynamite was used.
Republic of the Congo of minerals such as cassiterite On 9 September, the galleries collapsed, leading to the
and coltan in trucks. During the Panel’s visit to Bunia it death of a number of Congolese miners. Some months

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later, Ugandan soldiers who came to mine in the same coltan while guarded by RPA soldiers. Human Rights
area contracted respiratory disease. Other returning Watch also reported the same information in March
UPDF soldiers have themselves told friends how they 2001. This recent report confirms numerous other
operated in order to acquire the gold. From these reports and eyewitness accounts of the involvement of
accounts, it appears that, even when the local prisoners, some of whom are former refugees.
commanders were informed about these activities,
61. Impact on wildlife. Wildlife has also suffered a
there was an acceptable level of tolerance. Although
great deal from the conflict. Numerous accounts and
the Panel qualifies this behaviour as passive complicity
statistics from regional conservation organizations
on the part of some commanders, it is not clear whether
show that, in the area controlled by the Ugandan troops
soldiers shared the acquired minerals with their allies.
and Sudanese rebels, nearly 4,000 out of 12,000
58. Local Congolese have been mining for years for elephants were killed in the Garamba Park in north-
their own benefit. The novelty of their involvement lies eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo between
in the fact that some of them were used as “convincible 1995 and 1999. The situation in other parks and
labour” to mine gold, diamonds or coltan. In the Bondo reserves is equally grave, including Kahuzi-Biega Park,
locality within Equateur Province, young men from 12 the Okapi Reserve and Virunga Park. The number of
to 18 years were recruited by Jean-Pierre Bemba. The okapis, gorillas and elephants has dwindled to small
Ugandan allies trained the recruits and shared with populations. In the Kahuzi-Biega Park, a zone
them the idea that the Ugandan army was an “army of controlled by the Rwandans and RCD-Goma and rich
development” that aimed at improving ordinary in coltan, only 2 out of 350 elephant families remained
people’s living conditions. After the one-hour morning in 2000. There is serious concern among
physical training session, they were sent to gold mines conservationists that the rest fled of their own accord
to dig on behalf of the Ugandans and Mr. Bemba. or were killed, as two tons of elephant tusks were
According to eyewitnesses, in Kalima, RPA traced in the Bukavu area late in 2000. Already by
commander Ruto enrolled two teams of local April 2000, about three tons of tusks were temporarily
Congolese to dig coltan; these Congolese worked under seized by RCD-ML in Isiro. After strong pressure from
the heavy guard of Rwandan soldiers. Uganda, the cargo was released and transferred to
Kampala.
59. In the Kilo-Moto mineral district, Ugandan local
commanders and some of the soldiers who guarded the 62. The Panel has indications that, in most cases,
different entry points of the mining areas allowed and poaching of elephants in violation of international law
encouraged the local population to mine. The (Convention on International Trade in Endangered
arrangement between the soldiers and the miners was Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)) was well
that each miner would leave at the entry/exit point one organized. Either soldiers hunted directly with the
gram of gold every day. A key informant of the Panel consent of the commander or they provided equipment
indicated that on average 2,000 individuals mined this and protection to local villagers to execute the task
large concession six days a week. This source, with the objective of collecting elephant tusks. For
confirmed by other sources, informed the Panel that it example, in August 2000, UPDF Colonel Mugeni and a
was so well organized that the business ran smoothly. crew of his soldiers were discovered with 800 kg of
On average 2 kg of gold are delivered daily to the elephant tusks in their car near Garamba Park. The
person heading the network. Government of Uganda received detailed notification
of this incident. Eyewitnesses reported to the Panel
60. The last pattern of organized extraction by the
several incidents that involved Rwandan soldiers in the
occupying forces involves the import of manpower for
trading of elephant and buffalo meat. In the Bukavu
mining. Occupying forces brought manpower from
and Goma areas, there appears to be a pattern: high
their own countries and provided the necessary security
commanders take the tusks, soldiers negotiate the
and logistics. In particular, Rwanda utilized prisoners
wholesale price with some locals, and the locals sell
to dig coltan in exchange for a sentence reduction and
the meat in the market place as retailers.
limited cash to buy food. The Panel was recently
informed that there is a presence of 1,500 Rwandan 63. Harvesting of coffee by non-owners has been
prisoners in the Numbi area of Kalehe. According to another feature of the exploitation of natural resources.
the same report, these prisoners were seen mining Jean-Pierre Bemba, the leader of MLC and now the

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President of the Front de libération du Congo, a partner to Kinshasa for a better price. The control of trade and
in the coffee business with General Kazini, has been other business networks for commercial crops, such as
harvesting coffee directly from plantations he does not coffee and palm oil, is almost total within the occupied
own. During our visit to Gbadolite, some locals zones. This translates into a de facto monopoly like the
mentioned that coffee was harvested by Mr. Bemba’s one Jean-Pierre Bemba has on coffee exports in
men from some private plantations that belonged to Equateur Province. The locals who desperately remain
individuals who had fled the region. in the villages work more for less, if anything at all.
Humanitarian organizations working in the occupied
64. Monopolies and price-fixing. In addition to
zones told the Panel stories of a number of women in
looting and extracting resources, rebels and Rwandan
some villages who have simply stopped taking their
and Ugandan troops have abused the commerce and
children to the health centres because they no longer
trade system. In some cases, they forced locally owned
possess simple items of clothing to preserve their
and some foreign-owned businesses to close down. The
dignity.
methods used varied from looting to harassing the
owners. The end objective was to gain control of local 67. Exploitation of resources becomes even more
commerce. The result is unprecedented control of the questionable, as some of the players not only produce
economy of the eastern and north-eastern Democratic counterfeited Congolese francs, but use them to
Republic of the Congo. During its field visit, the Panel purchase natural resources. According to reliable
noted that consumer goods and other merchandise sources, the Victoria Group, whose key shareholder is
found in Gbadolite and Bunia originated mostly in General Khaleb Akandwanaho, alias Salim Saleh, was
Uganda. During its field visit to Bunia, the Panel involved in the making of counterfeit Congolese
members witnessed the unloading of beer crates from francs. These notes are used for the purchase of
an aircraft coming from Uganda. In Gbadolite, most commercial crops, primarily coffee. A very reliable
cigarettes, beverages, toilet paper etc. are imported source told the Panel that in mid-1999 Jean-Pierre
from Uganda. Equally, goods in Kisangani, Bukavu Bemba ordered the production of 100-franc Congolese
and Goma come mainly from Burundi or Rwanda. notes. Simultaneously the Victoria Group also
Imported goods for the occupied zones arrive via the produced counterfeit Congolese francs. By the end of
ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam. This was 1999, Equateur Province was flooded with counterfeit
confirmed during the Panel’s visit to the customs Congolese currency so that Mr. Bemba decided to
services (Internal Revenue Authority) in Kampala. suspend all 100-franc notes, including the ones he had
Furthermore, depending on the importer of the goods, produced, so as to stop inflation in the areas he
taxes are not paid. The failure to pay taxes, especially controlled.
in Orientale Province, was acknowledged to the Panel
68. The Panel has evidence that the illegal
by RCD-ML during our discussions in Bunia in
exploitation of natural resources goes beyond mineral
October 2000.
and agricultural resources. It is actively occurring also
65. Rwandan and Ugandan troops and their in respect of financial transactions, taxes and the use of
Congolese allies have also been exploiting local cheap labour, which our mandate qualified as other
farmers. They have imposed prices and conditions on forms of wealth. Local banks and insurance companies
the farmers. In one instance, a farmer living near the operating in Goma, Bukavu, Kisangani, Bunia and
Ubangi River, 20 km from Gbadolite, explained to a Gbadolite deal directly with Kigali or Kampala. A
member of the Panel how he is dependent on the coffee system of tax collection — enforced in some cases —
dealers for the supply of the bags imposed by the has been implemented by MLC, RCD-ML and RCD-
coffee collectors (buyers). Failure to use these bags Goma with their established Ugandan and Rwandan
leads to an automatic reduction in the price of the counterparts. In the rebels own words, these taxes are
coffee. These bags are not produced in the eastern aimed at “financing or supporting the war effort”.
Democratic Republic of the Congo and they have to Indeed, part of the funds collected is sent to Kigali (in
buy them. the case of RCD-Goma). In the case of the former
RCD-ML and MLC, not only was part of the taxes sent
66. In another instance, one woman explained how
to Kampala but also individual colonels would claim
she and her husband could no longer sell their palm oil
direct payment from RCD-ML. In Bunia and Bukavu,
to the neighbouring Central African Republic or ship it

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people protested, demonstrated and denounced this 72. Modes of transportation. Illegal activities have
practice of abuse. In areas controlled by Mr. Bemba, benefited from the evolution of the means of
peasants carrying palm oil on bicycles have to pay transportation in the region. Prior to the second war
taxes on the bicycles. most exchanges of goods and products were conducted
through road transportation. To a large extent,
69. The use of child labour is also rampant in the
smugglers utilized Lake Kivu and Lake Tanganyika to
occupied territories. Some children are reportedly
smuggle goods and products to and from the
mining gold in the Kilo Moto mines. In Equateur
Democratic Republic of the Congo and, in limited
Province, some children were seen in the diamond
circumstances, used aircraft. The shift over the past
mines. The Panel members witnessed the presence of
four years has been noticeable. An increasing number
young MLC recruits at Gbadolite airport and in the
of aircraft are utilized to transport products and arms
city. They were at the airport waiting for a flight,
into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, while
having recently completed their military training.
transferring out vast quantities of agricultural products
70. The aforementioned demonstrates that the and minerals, in particular to Kampala and Kigali. The
procedures and processes for exploiting the natural other novelty of increased air transport has been the
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are use of aircraft leased by the army for commercial and
continuously evolving. Occupying forces began with non-military functions. Different categories of people,
the easiest method, looting stockpiles. As the wells ran including soldiers, journalists and traders, have told the
dry, they developed efficient means of extracting the Panel about their journeys in aircraft alongside bags of
additional resources necessary to keep the coffers full. coffee and other non-military products.
Eventually, any means necessary was recognized as a
73. This change in mode of transportation was
legitimate mode of acquisition. From all the evidence
accompanied by a change in players as well as a
offered above, it appears that this process will continue
redefining of transportation companies. Traditional and
to evolve as is deemed necessary.
well-established companies such as TMK saw their
share of the market erode while others simply
D. Current structures of illegal disappeared (Air Cargo Zaire). At the same time, new
exploitation companies emerged and expanded, such as Air Navette
and Jambo Safari; they are owned or controlled by the
71. Administrative structures. The illegal relatives and friends of generals, colonels and
exploitation of natural resources is facilitated by the Presidents. At the other end, outsiders who entered the
administrative structures established by Uganda and region with the AFDL “conquest” of Kinshasa during
Rwanda. Those countries’ leaders directly and the first war, by transporting troops, remained and
indirectly appointed regional governors or local consolidated their position; that is the case of Victor
authorities or, more commonly, appointed or confirmed Butt, a notorious arms dealer in the region. Most flights
Congolese in these positions. Typical examples are, on to and from Equateur and Orientale Provinces originate
the Ugandan side, the appointment of the Governor of from the Entebbe military airport. During a visit to
Ituri Province. On 18 June 1999, Ugandan General Kampala, the Panel was informed about the concern
Kazini appointed as Governor of this Province Adele expressed by the Ugandan Internal Revenue to the
Lotsove, a Congolese who had already been employed Ministry of Defence. This complaint raised the issue of
by the Mobutu and Kabila administrations. Information revenue loss to the treasury due to the fact that
gathered clearly indicates that she was instrumental in products entering or leaving the Democratic Republic
the collection and transfer of funds from her assigned of the Congo by air to and from Entebbe military
administrative region to the Ugandan authorities in airport are not checked, and taxes are not levied by the
1999. According to some sources, she also contributed customs services.
to the reallocation of land from Lendus to Hemas. On 74. On the Ugandan side, three main private
the Rwandan side, according to one reliable source, companies are involved:
Rwandan authorities have helped secure the
appointment of Gertrude Kitembo as Governor of • Air Alexander, whose owner is Jovia
Maniema. Akandwanaho, the wife of Salim Saleh and sister-
in-law of President Museveni. Her company

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mainly operated between Entebbe and Kisangani 77. Financial network. All illegal activities in the
before the last battle of Kisangani. According to eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, primarily
some sources, the company continues to operate the commercial and trade operations, utilize the
in the territory held by Ugandan troops. financial network to some extent. One of the
characteristics of this network has been its ability to
• Air Navette has dealings with General Salim
quickly adapt to the new political and economic
Saleh and Jean-Pierre Bemba. The company flies
environment. Cities like Kisangani and Goma were
to Gbadolite, Gemena, Kisangani, Bunia and
already big trading centres for diamonds and consumer
Kampala. This company uses an Antonov 26 and
goods. Most banks operating in the occupied zones
an Antonov 12.
were already in operation in the Democratic Republic
• Uganda Air Cargo, which mainly deals with the of the Congo before the August 1998 war. Their
Ugandan Ministry of Defence. Previously, it was headquarters or corresponding banks were generally in
using a C-130, but currently uses an Ilyushin 76 Kinshasa. With the occupation, headquarters and
and an Antonov 12. This company flies to corresponding banks tended to move to Kigali. Some
Entebbe, Gemena, Basankasu, Isiro and Buta. of these banks are:
The Panel has indications that most private air • Union des banques congolaises. Although the
companies do not own the aircraft they use; the owners headquarters remains in Kinshasa, it has ongoing
are usually people like Victor Butt. operations in areas controlled by Rwanda.
75. On the Rwandan side, a number of private • Banque commerciale du Congo. The headquarters
companies operate in the territory. These are: is in Kinshasa and it has branches in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Director
• New Gomair, which flies to Kisangani-Goma and
was transferred to Kigali in order to oversee
Kigali. According to some sources, the wife of
operations in the eastern Democratic Republic of
the current Minister of Finances of Rwanda is a
the Congo. This bank is linked to the Belgolaise,
shareholder.
a Belgian bank consortium.
• Air Navette flies to Goma, Bukavu, Kisangani
• Banque commerciale du Rwanda. The
and Kigali. According to some sources, one of the
headquarters is in Kigali, but it has operations in
major shareholders, Modeste Makabuza, also
Kisangani, Bukavu and Goma. The Government
owner of Jambo Safari, is a known figure in the
of Rwanda is said to be one of the shareholders.
entourage of President Kagame.
• Banque à la confiance d’or (BANCOR). One of
• Air Boyoma is a shuttle between Goma and
the newest banks in Kigali which started its
Lodja; according to some sources Mr. Ondekane,
activities in 1995. It was family owned until 1999
former first Vice-President of RCD-Goma, is a
but early in 2000 a businessman, Tibere Rujigiro,
shareholder.
purchased the bank at a very low price according
• Other companies, such as Compagnie aérienne to various sources.
des Grands Lacs et Cargo fret international, Sun
78. Special cases: BCDI and BCD. The Banque de
Air Services and Kivu Air Services, operate in the
commerce, du développement et d’industrie is the
area.
newest bank, created in November 1996 and
76. Clients and other very reliable sources have headquartered in Kigali. Its involvement with the
indicated that Sabena Cargo is transporting illegal Democratic Republic of the Congo dates back to the
natural resources extracted from the Democratic beginning of the AFDL conquest of the former Zaire.
Republic of the Congo. Sabena Cargo is said to carry BCDI operated most AFDL financial transactions
coltan extracted from the Democratic Republic of the before Laurent-Désiré Kabila took power. The Panel
Congo from Kigali airport to European destinations. was told that its shareholders are essentially the
The Panel asked to meet with the management of Rwandan Patriotic Front, COMIEX, Alfred Khalissa
Sabena in Kampala and in Brussels, but no one was and some Angolans. The real shareholders are the
made available to speak to the Panel members. allies, except Uganda. Some documents, receipts for
payments and authorization for payments made by

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some large companies in the Democratic Republic of Panel the involvement of the Victoria Group in the
the Congo between early and late 1997 clearly indicate making of counterfeit currency.
that payments are to be made through BCDI for the
81. Trinity is an equally interesting case. Ateenyi
contribution to “the war effort”. When the late
Tibasima, second Vice-President of RCD-ML and now
President Kabila came to power, he created the Banque
the Commissaire général adjoint of FLC, was the
de commerce et du développement, which has the
“manager” of the company. According to reliable
peculiarity of having as shareholders Tristar, COMIEX
sources, Trinity is a fictitious company and a
and Alfred Khalissa of BCDI. The Rwandan Patriotic
conglomerate of various businesses owned by Salim
Front remains, through BCDI and Tristar, a shareholder
Saleh and his wife. Its primary purpose was to facilitate
in BCD in spite of the war situation.
their business activities in Orientale Province. To this
79. Other private companies. A number of end, Mr. Tibasima granted a tax holiday to all Trinity
companies were created to facilitate illegal activities in activities in the areas controlled by Uganda and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Others have administered by RCD-ML in November 1999. Trinity
existed in the region for decades and joined the has imported various goods and merchandise and has
bandwagon to pursue the obvious financial windfalls taken from Orientale Province gold, coffee and timber
involved in the exploitation of the country. On the without paying any tax. Different individuals,
Ugandan, MLC and RCD-ML side, rebel leaders and/or Ugandans as well as Congolese, have taken the
Ugandan military officials created new companies and opportunity created by the confusion over Trinity to
businesses using prête-noms. Most, if not all, of these export from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (on
companies are privately owned by individuals or a behalf of Trinity) various natural resources, also
group of individuals. without paying taxes.
80. Among the companies involved in the illicit 82. On the Rwandan side, most companies with
acquisition of natural resources in the Democratic important activities related to the natural resources of
Republic of the Congo, Trinity and Victoria seem to be the Democratic Republic of the Congo are owned
the most interesting given their modus operandi, either by the Government or by individuals very close
activities and respective shareholders. Victoria Group to the inner circle of President Kagame. Rwanda
is chaired by Mr Khalil and its headquarters is in Metals, for example, is a company involved in coltan
Kampala. According to reliable sources, Mr. Khalil dealing. It purchases coltan and exports it out of the
deals directly with Mrs. Akandwanaho on diamond continent. The Panel has strong indications that RPF
issues. Mr. Khalil has two collaborators in the controls Rwanda Metals. In mid-January 2001, some
Democratic Republic of the Congo, based in Kisangani very reliable sources met with the senior management
and Gbadolite. Both are said to be from Lebanon, they of Rwanda Metals in Kigali. During these discussions,
are Mohammed Gassan and Mr. Talal. During its visit the Director told them that Rwanda Metals was a
to Gbadolite, the Panel received confirmation of the private company with no relation to the army. He
presence of one of them and his leading role in the further explained that he was expecting key partners
purchase of diamonds in the region. A reliable source that very morning for discussions. As discussions
told members of the Panel that the Victoria Group continued, the so-called partners arrived as planned;
belongs jointly to Muhoozi Kainerugabe, son of unfortunately they were in Rwandan army uniforms
President Museveni, and Jovia and Khaleb and were top officers. This incident confirms accounts
Akandwanaho. Victoria Group is involved in trading from various sources indicating that Rwanda Metals is
diamonds, gold and coffee. The Group purchases these controlled by RPF. Meanwhile there are also
mineral and agricultural products in Isiro, Bunia, indications that RPA is a shareholder of Grands Lacs
Bumba, Bondo, Buta and Kisangani. The company paid Metals, a company also dealing in coltan.
taxes to MLC, but failed to do so with RCD-ML. When
83. Jambo Safari is another company whose
counterfeit currencies (Congolese francs and United
emergence and growth has raised some eyebrows in
States dollars) were found in areas where the company
Goma and Bukavu. When the August 1998 war started,
buys the natural resources, fingers were pointed at the
Modeste Makabuza was buying oil from Kenya and
Victoria Group. Other sources have confirmed to the
selling it in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Jambo Safari has benefited from an internal

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network of false receipts within RCD-Goma and RPA. Republic of the Congo. However, this is known by the
According to a very reliable source, Jambo Safari political establishment in Kampala.
would charge RCD-Goma for three times the quantities
86. In the case of Rwanda, things are more systemic.
of oil delivered and any attempt to question the figures
There are linkages and bridges between some key
would be suppressed. In a rare attempt to clarify the
companies, as in the case of Tristar and BCDI and,
situation, some members of RCD-Goma during the last
above all, the relationship between RPA, RPF, BCDI,
General Assembly meeting, in June 2000, requested
Rwanda Metals, Grands Lacs Metals and Tristar. The
that a commission be set up to conduct an internal
senior management of these companies seems to report
audit. Kigali agreed to send a colonel to conduct the
separately to the same people at the top of the pyramid.
audit along with an RCD team. When the issue of false
On the other hand, all key managers have personal
receipts and overpayment was established, Kigali
relationships with different army commanders who
recalled the colonel and suspended the inquiry. Some
themselves report to the leadership. This pyramidal and
sources have confirmed the close ties between Mr.
integrated structure coupled with the strict discipline of
Makabuza, the apparent owner of Jambo Safari, and
the group has made the exploitation of the resources of
President Kagame. Jambo Safari has diversified since
the Democratic Republic of the Congo more
its original business venture, is now dealing in coffee,
systematic, efficient and organized. There is equally a
recently purchased a fleet of new trucks and is also
bridge between the internal Rwandan structures of
involved in air transport with Air Navette.
illegal exploitation and the RCD-Goma structures. The
84. Other minor companies also operate with the Government of Rwanda made arrangements with RCD-
protection of some local commanders. For example, Goma to drain resources from the Democratic Republic
Établissement Habier is involved in the distribution of of the Congo. There is a case of loans made by BCDI
oil and petrol in Goma and Bukavu. This company is to RCD to pay suppliers whose business is related to
said to belong to Ernest Habimana, who is closely RPA. This “financial bridge” is statutory; indeed the
linked to RPA, especially to Major Karasira and RCD statute indirectly recognizes the role of Rwanda
Mr. Gakwerere. STIPAG, a company owed by Mr. in overseeing the finances of the movement and its
Mbugiye operating in collaboration with Major Kazura participation in decision-making and control/audit of
(chief of security of the Rwandan Army in the finances.
Democratic Republic of the Congo) and Major Gatete,
is among those junior companies involved in coffee
and diamond dealing. Finally a myriad of small E. Individual actors
companies was created and their shareholders are
invariably powerful individuals in the Rwandan 87. The list that follows is not exhaustive, but the
nomenklatura or in RCD structures. That is the case of Panel’s choice was based on the crucial roles played by
Grands Lacs Metals, where Majors Gatete, Dan and these persons and their direct involvement in either
Kazura are reportedly shareholders. In other cases, providing support, entertaining networks or facilitating
foreign companies incorporate local potentates on their the exploitation of natural resources within the
board, as in the case of Gesellschaft für Democratic Republic of the Congo. On the Ugandan
Elektrometallurgie (GFE), with Karl Heinz Albers and side, some familiar names surface frequently, such as
Emmanuel Kamanzi as partners, or MDM with Mr. Major General Salim Saleh, Brigadier General James
Makabuza. Kazini, Colonel Tikamanyire, Jovia Akandwanaho,
Colonel Utafire, Colonel Mugeni, Mr. Khalil, Ateenyi
85. The Panel, on the basis of the data, accounts and Tibasima, Mbusa Nyamwisi, Nahim Khanaffer, Roger
documents received and analysed, came to the Lumbala, Jean-Yves Ollivier, Jean-Pierre Bemba,
conclusion that the systems of illegal exploitation Adele Lotsove, Abdu Rhaman and latecomers such as
established by Ugandans and Rwandans differ from Colonel Muyombo.
each other. In the case of Uganda, individuals, mainly
top army commanders, using their hold over their 88. The Panel has selected to focus on three key
collaborators and some officials in rebel movements, actors. First and second are Major General (retired)
are exploiting the resources of the Democratic Salim Saleh and his wife, Jovia Akandwanaho. Khaleb
Akandwanaho, alias Salim Saleh, and his spouse Jovia
are at the core of the illegal exploitation of natural

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resources in areas controlled by Uganda. He is the some individuals have played at a given time and for
younger brother of President Museveni (very popular some operations. In addition to the names mentioned in
in the army) and he pulls the strings of illegal activities the paragraphs on main companies, certain names can
in areas controlled by Uganda and allies. James Kazini be highlighted.
is his executing arm and his right hand. He controls
91. First, Ali Hussein, who plays a major role in
and protects Mbusa Nyamwisi and Ateenyi Tibasima.
diamond and gold deals in Bukavu and Kisangani.
In return, they protect his commercial and business
Those who have dealt with him in the past have
interests in regions controlled by the former RCD-ML.
mentioned the presence of a Rwandan national during
He used both the Victoria Group and Trinity for the
commercial negotiations. There are indications that the
purchase and the commercialization of diamonds,
Rwandan citizen attending the meetings is a civil
timber, coffee and gold. Very reliable sources have told
servant working in the President’s office in Kigali.
the Panel that behind Salim Saleh there is Jovia
Second is Colonel James Kabarebe, who is the RPA
Akandwanaho, who is more aggressive on the issue of
facilitator for some deals. According to some sources
exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic
he has been in contact with Victor Butt [or Bout] for
Republic of the Congo. She is particularly interested in
the lease of an Ilyushin 76 that served to carry coltan
diamonds. According to very reliable sources, she is at
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Kigali.
the root of the Kisangani wars. She wanted control of
He is said to be a partner to Mohamed Ali Salem,
the Kisangani diamond market after having
manager of the company Global Mineral. This
confirmation from Mr. Khalil, “Director” of the
company is involved in coltan purchasing in Bukavu
Victoria Group, that it was a good idea and that it was
and Goma. Third, Tibere Rujigiro, member of RPF,
feasible to control the Kisangani market.
who is considered to be one of the main money
89. The third is Brigadier General James Kazini, providers to the party during the 1990-1994 war. He is
former Chief of Staff of UPDF and former commander a major shareholder in Tristar Investment, a company
of military operations in the Democratic Republic of equally close to RPF. He is said to be also involved in
the Congo. He is the master in the field; the the tobacco business.
orchestrater, organizer and manager of most illegal
92. The fourth, Aziza Kulsum Gulamali, is a unique
activities related to the UPDF presence in north and
case among key actors in the illegal exploitation of the
north-eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. He is
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
the right hand of Salim Saleh. He very much relies on
Congo. Mrs. Gulamali is said to hold several passports.
the established military network and former comrades
She lives in Bukavu, Brussels or Nairobi, depending on
and collaborators, such as Colonels Tikamanyire and
her schedule. Mrs. Gulamali has acknowledged having
Mugeni. He has been close to Messrs. Nyamwisi,
been involved in the past in the Burundi civil war.
Tibasima and Lumbala and to Jean-Pierre Bemba, all of
According to reliable sources she armed and financed
whom have facilitated his illegal dealings in diamonds,
the Hutu rebels of FDD in Burundi. Yet she built new
coltan, timber, counterfeit currency, gold and coffee,
alliances with the Government of Rwanda and has
and imports of goods and merchandise in Equateur and
become a major ally of the Kigali regime and RCD-
Orientale Provinces. He is said to have a good
Goma. Mrs. Gulamali is involved in gold, coltan and
relationship with Mr. Baramoto, a former general of
cassiterite dealings in territories controlled by the
President Mobutu. In spite of being discharged from
Rwandans. Prior to that, she was involved in arms
his responsibilities as commander of UPDF forces in
trafficking for the benefit of the Burundian Hutus and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, his networks
was equally involved in gold and ivory trafficking. Her
remain in place. The Panel asked to meet with these
name was also mentioned in connection with cigarette
key actors, but the request was turned down.
smuggling. Very reliable sources told the Panel that she
90. Actors from Rwanda and RCD-Goma involved in covered her illegal dealings by her cigarette factory,
the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the now in bankruptcy. In the coltan business, her clients
Democratic Republic of the Congo cannot be separated include Starck, Cogecom and Sogem; the Bank
from the structure they serve. Most of these people Bruxelles Lambert handles some of her financial
serve a system. The Panel has, however, noticed a transactions. The Panel requested RCD-Goma several
recurrence of some names or the particular role that times for a meeting with Mrs. Gulamali and also

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contacted her aides, but she never arranged a meeting officials that the volume of Ugandan gold exports does
with the Panel. not reflect this country’s production levels but rather
that some exports might be “leaking over the borders”
93. She was recently appointed by RCD-Goma as
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The
General Manager of SOMIGL, a conglomerate of four
central bank reported that, by September 1997, Uganda
partners, which obtained the monopoly for the
had exported gold valued at $105 million, compared
commercialization and export of coltan. This monopoly
with $60 million in 1996 and $23 million in 1995.
has strengthened her position as a major player in the
trade in coltan in the region. RCD-Goma, in an attempt 98. Second, the data from the Ugandan authorities are
to explain this partnership, said that she is a very useful silent with regard to diamond production and export.
person and would bring $1 million to RCD monthly. Several third party sources (WTO, World Federation of
Some sources have told the Panel members that her Diamond Bourses, Diamond High Council) indicate
network of contacts is impressive and that she controls diamond exports from Uganda during the last three
almost every official in RCD-Goma. According to years. These diamond exports are suspicious for many
some sources, she is also involved with her daughter reasons:
Djamila in counterfeiting currency. Mrs. Gulamali is
(a) Uganda has no known diamond production;
famous for forging customs declarations, especially for
the products she exports. Confronted recently with a (b) Diamond exports from Uganda are observed
false customs declaration where coltan was declared as only in the last few years, coinciding surprisingly with
cassiterite, she replied, “in this business everybody the occupation of the eastern Democratic Republic of
does that”. Her declaration alerted the Panel to the the Congo as shown in table 2 and figure 2;
extent to which fraud is prevalent among the
(c) Finally, these facts corroborate the Panel’s
companies that export coltan.
findings from field investigation, discussions and
external observers on the need to control the rich
F. Economic data: confirmation of the diamond zone near Kisangani and Banalia.
illegal exploitation of the natural 99. These figures are understated and there are
resources of the Democratic Republic indications that Uganda exported more diamonds.
of the Congo However, this is not well captured in the statistics
because of the loose regulations governing the free
94. All the empirical evidence provided above is zone areas. These regulations permit diamonds
complemented by the economic analysis of data originating in any country to be repackaged, and then
provided by different sources. to be sold from any country as diamonds from a
country of origin that is not necessarily the one
Uganda mentioned in the statistics.
95. At the request of the Panel, the Ugandan
authorities provided extensive data, including
production and export values for agricultural products
such as coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco. In terms of
minerals, the data also cover gold and coltan
production and export figures.
96. The official data contain substantial
discrepancies. First, export figures for gold are
consistently greater than production values, as shown
in table 1 and figure 1.
97. The gap between production and export could
originate from the exploitation of the natural resources
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Central
Bank of Uganda has reportedly acknowledged to IMF

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Table 1
Uganda: mineral exports and production, 1994-2000

Year Gold Tin Coltan Cobalt

A. Mineral exports (tons)

1994 0.22 - - -
1995 3.09 - - -
1996 5.07 3.55 - -
1997 6.82 4.43 2.57 -
1998 5.03 - 18.57 -
1999 11.45 - 69.5 67.48
2000 10.83 - - 275.98
B. Mineral production (tons)
1994 0.0016 3.704 0.435 -
1995 0.0015 4.289 1.824 -
1996 0.003 0.38 - -
1997 0.0064 1.81 - -
1998 0.0082 1.102 - -
1999 0.0047 - - 76.74
2000 0.0044 - - 287.51

Source: Uganda, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. 2000 data are from January to
October.

Figure 1. Uganda: gold production and exports, 1994-2000

14

12

10

8
Production
Tons

Exports
6

0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year

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Table 2 in the transboundary movement of natural resources

Uganda: rough diamond exports, 1997- between 1998 and 1999.
October 2000
Coffee 1998: 144,911 bags
Volume Value 1999: 170,079 bags
Year (carats) (United States dollars)
2000: 208,000 bags
1997 1 511.34 198 302
Timber 1998: 1,900 m3
1998 11 303.86 1 440 000
1999: 3,782 m3 and 46,299 pcs
1999 11 024.46 1 813 500
2000 9 387.51 1 263 385 2000: 3,272 m3 and 3,722 pcs

Source: Diamond High Council.

Cassiterite* 1998: None
1999: 30 kgs
100. Data collected from any third party consistently
show that Uganda has become a diamond exporting 2000: 151 drums
country; they also show that diamond exports from
Uganda coincide with the years of the wars in the
* The sudden increase in the import of cassiterite may
Democratic Republic of the Congo, that is from 1997
also mean an increase in the import of coltan. The Panel
onward. discovered that cassiterite is often listed in lieu of
101. As far as niobium is concerned, the pattern coltan, as coltan possesses a higher value, which
implies high import taxes in Uganda.
appears to be the same: no production prior to 1997
followed by a series of increases in exports as shown in
Rwanda
table 3 and figure 3.
103. In response to the request for statistics by the
Table 3 Panel, the Rwandan authorities provided the following
Uganda: niobium exports, 1995-1999 data:
(thousands of United States dollars)
Table 4
Year Niobium Rwanda: mineral production, 1995-2000

1995 0 Gold Cassiterite Coltan

Year (kg) (tons) (tons)
1996 0
1997 13 1995 1 247 54
1998 580 1996 1 330 97
1999 782 1997 10 327 224
Source: World Trade Organization (aggregated data). 1998 17 330 224
1999 10 309 122
102. Third, the Ugandan authorities, in their response 2000 10 437 83
to the Panel’s questionnaire, stated that there was no
record of transit of mineral products. However, the Source: Rwanda Official Statistics (No. 227/01/10/MIN).
Panel received information from one Ugandan customs
post at the border between the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and Uganda. Records for 1998, 1999 and
2000 reveal that mineral products as well as other
commodities left the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and entered Uganda (presumably this would
also prove true for the other dozen or so points of
entry). The following three examples show an increase

21
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Figure 2. Uganda: rough diamond exports, by volume, 1997-October 2000

12000

10000

8000

6000
Volume
4000

2000

0
1997 1998 1999 2000

22
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Figure 3. Uganda: niobium exports by volume, 1995-1999

800
700
600
500
400 US Dollars
(thousands)
300
200
100
0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

23
S/2001/357

Figure 4.A. Rwanda: mineral production, 1995-2000

450

400

350

300

250 Gold (kg)

200 Cassiterite (tons)
Coltan (tons)
150

100

50

0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Figure 4.B. Rwanda: gold production, 1995-2000 (kg)

18

16

14

12

10
Kg

0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year

24
 S/2001/357

104. The Rwandan authorities also underline the fact and pending deals give clear indications of their
that “Rwanda has no production of diamond, cobalt, potential impact on the balance of payments.
zinc, manganese, and uranium”. However, in spite of
107. The economic and resource-based analysis above,
this statement, there is substantial evidence that
by using the figures given by the respective
Rwanda has been exporting diamonds. In fact, several
Governments, reveals that Uganda and Rwanda have
organizations such as WTO and the High Diamond
been exporting diamonds, and that this activity is
Council, and Belgian statistics, have computed import
hidden and does not appear in the statistics they
data for selected commodities and provide support for
disseminate. They do not produce diamonds, nor do
the fact that Rwanda has been exporting diamonds (see
they officially export this mineral. It is probable that
table 5 and figure 5). Production figures display some
these minerals are coming from the Democratic
irregular patterns for gold and coltan starting from
Republic of the Congo and would constitute the basis
1997 (see figures 4.A and B). It is revealing that the
for the re-exportation economy.
increase in production of these two minerals appeared
to happen while AFDL, backed by Rwandan troops, 108. Regarding the Democratic Republic of the
was taking over power in Kinshasa. Congo, mineral production and export display a
declining trend, imputable partly to the occupation of
Table 5 the eastern side of the country. However, the
Rwanda: rough diamond exports, 1997- deterioration of the rural infrastructure represents a
October 2000 limiting factor for mining as well as for agricultural
activities.
Volume Value
Year (carats) (United States dollars)

1997 13 060.39 720 425

1998 166.07 16 606
1999 2 500.83 439 347
2000 30 491.22 1 788 036

Source: Diamond High Council.

105. Burundi. An IMF office memorandum indicates

that “Burundi does not produce gold, diamonds,
columbo-tantalite, copper, cobalt, or basic metals”.
Burundi however has been exporting minerals it does
not produce. As in the case of Uganda and Rwanda,
Burundi’s export of diamonds dates from 1998,
coinciding with the occupation of the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The coltan exports
span a longer period (1995-1999), perhaps suggesting
that this might be a regular activity.
106. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Only third
party sources were used to determine whether
production and export trends in these countries
displayed abnormalities. Available production and
export statistics relative to Angola, Namibia and
Zimbabwe were fairly normal in terms of trend. They
did not reveal any suspicious behaviour. Additional
data are however needed for a definite stand on the
issue. In the case of Zimbabwe, accounts of ongoing

25
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Figure 5. Rwanda: rough diamond exports, by volume, 1997-October 2000

35000

30000

25000

20000

15000 Volume

10000

5000

0
1997 1998 1999 2000

26
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III. Links between the exploitation of 112. An aircraft owner operating in the region has
natural resources and the indicated that he charges on average $2,000 per hour.
Based on his experience of three rotations per day in a
continuation of the conflict smaller area, the Panel estimates five rotations for
Rwanda at an average of six hours each. A simple
109. The following sections explore the links between
calculation gives a figure of $1.8 million per month
the exploitation of natural resources and the
and $21.6 million per year.
continuation of the conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. The sections are interrelated, but 113. Based on the minimum number of 25,000 soldiers
separated for clarity. The first section outlines the in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and an
countries’ budget allocations for their respective armed average $100 for pay and bonuses, the Panel has
forces versus the actual expenditures. It will be calculated a total of $2.5 million per month and
demonstrated that military expenditures far outweigh $30 million per year. Transportation and pay of troops
the supposed money allocated for such expenses. The alone in the Democratic Republic of the Congo amount
subsequent section will explore in depth the means by to $51.6 million per year, which is about three quarters
which these countries find the necessary additional of the total Rwandan official defence budget. By taking
financial resources to continue the war.4 The panel into consideration the remaining 20,000 soldiers
finds a link between the exploitation of the natural stationed in Rwanda and their average pay of $50 per
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and month, almost the total defence budget ($63 million) is
the continuation of the conflict. used on two items. RPA soldiers in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo have other basic needs,
however, such as ammunition for even their light
A. Budgets compared to military equipment, and maintenance and replacement of the
expenditures equipment.

Rwanda 114. All military experts consulted suggested that the

official defence budget of Rwanda cannot alone cover
110. Rwanda spends about 3 per cent of its GDP or 29 the cost of their war and presence in the Democratic
per cent of its annual budget on its defence needs. In Republic of the Congo. The Panel concurs with
the current fiscal year, $70 million was allocated to President Kagame, who described the conflict in the
defence in the national budget. These official figures Democratic Republic of the Congo as “a self-financing
provided by the Minister of Finance comprise every war”.
single expense of the army, including, soldiers’ pay and
bonuses and the maintenance and acquisition of new Uganda
military equipment.
115. Uganda officially spends about 2 per cent of its
111. Military specialists with a great deal of GDP on defence, which is being monitored by the
experience in the region agreed on the fact that Bretton Woods institutions. For the fiscal year 2000,
Rwandan soldiers use light equipment, so that expenses the defence budget was about $110 million. This
on equipment have for a long time been limited. They budget covers pay of about $70 per month for 50,000
also recognize that, given the size of the Democratic soldiers, 10,000 of whom are stationed in the
Republic of the Congo and the portion of the territory Democratic Republic of the Congo, pays for the
under Rwandan control, there is a minimum number of pension of retired soldiers, buys equipment and
soldiers needed to cover this area, which could be addresses other needs.
estimated at 25,000 soldiers on average during the
period of the conflict. Moreover, the use of aircraft for 116. According to various sources, UPDF has on
the transport of troops and some types of equipment average 10,000 soldiers in the Democratic Republic of
and supplies may be costly. the Congo out of the 50,000 total. Indeed, the budget
line for pay alone for a year is about $41 million for
__________________ the 50,000 Ugandan soldiers. If a bonus of $20 is paid
4 The number of soldiers has fluctuated during the period to each of the 10,000 soldiers, that would amount to
of the war; the numbers used are therefore average
estimates.

27
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$200,000 per month (in 1998 and 1999), a total of N$ 24 million has remained at the same level since
$2.4 million per year. 1999 in spite of the support given to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. However, the emergency or
117. On the basis of a rate of $2,000 per hour and six
additional budget for the armed forces has decreased
hours on average for a return journey and three
from N$ 89 million in 1999 to N$ 76 million in 2001.
rotations a day, UPDF spends on average $12.96
million per year on transportation alone. Other
Rebels
expenses for purchase, maintenance and replacement of
equipment are important. According to some sources, 122. The rebel movements MLC, RCD-Goma and
Uganda spent about $126 million on its armed forces in RCD-ML have their own troops. MLC troops are
1999, an overspending of about $16 million. evaluated at 12,000 to 15,000 men. They usually use
light military equipment bought from Kampala. In
Democratic Republic of the Congo some cases, deals are done between Jean-Pierre Bemba
and other traders and businessmen. These deals consist
118. Of all the warring parties, the Democratic
of giving them the opportunities to carry out business
Republic of the Congo presented the greatest challenge
activities or granting a mining concession, in exchange
as far as defence budget figures and number of troops
for which the beneficiary would supply some military
were concerned. Lack of reliable data and the barely
items. In 1999, when Mr. Khalil demanded of Mr.
existent State apparatus have made the collection of
Bemba a concession for a diamond mine, he obtained a
data very difficult. The country has been at war since
concession in exchange for military fatigues and socks,
1996 and prior to that the army was already
all made in Uganda.
disintegrating. Various military experts that the Panel
members met agree on one point: the extreme difficulty 123. The pay of these soldiers is unknown. The Panel
of giving an estimate of the Democratic Republic of the gathered however that these young men were not paid,
Congo army. Those who try to give an estimate speak but could receive from time to time some money as
of 50,000 to 55,000 soldiers. “help”. The consequence has been their involvement in
the exploitation of natural resources. The cost of war
119. According to some government sources, the
appears to be minimal. The war expenses are the
Democratic Republic of the Congo relies on Chinese
purchase of ammunition and light weapons, transport
and Eastern European companies to supply its military
of soldiers by air and the money MLC paid to UPDF
arsenal and required equipment. The Panel has strong
and individual top officers for their support. A similar
indications that the Government, despite its economic
scenario was played out with RCD-ML, which has
problems, has invested a great deal in the defence of its
approximately 3,000 soldiers.
territory.
124. The RCD-Goma troops are estimated to be
Zimbabwe around 12,000 to 15,000. According to some sources,
the Rwandan army until recently used to supply the
120. Zimbabwe’s overall defence budget has been
RCD-Goma troops with military equipment. The
decreasing at the very moment ZDF has troops engaged
military budget was not offered to the Panel in spite of
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A reduction
its request, and the estimates are very difficult to make.
was announced early in January 2000, lowering the
Military equipment and the transport of troops as well
budget from Z$ 15.3 billion in 2000 to Z$ 13.3 billion
as supplies of oil and petrol are the major expenses.
in 2001. Yet, ZDF with approximately 10,000 troops
Pay is apparently uncertain, so that the soldiers when
engaged in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
possible try to survive, even at the expense of the local
spent on average about $3 million per month, a total of
population and the wildlife. For all parties involved in
$36 million in a year.
the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
this war seems to be expensive by African standards.
Angola and Namibia
The question is: how do the different parties finance
121. Angola’s presence is smaller than Zimbabwe’s in their war effort?
terms of troops. According to some sources, Angolan
troops number about 3,000. Namibia’s presence is
limited to 2,000 troops. The defence budget of

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B. Financing the war the two comptoirs controlling the Kisangani diamond
market. Messrs. Nassour and Arslanian, the “conflict
125. There are three primary means of financing this diamond dealers” in the eastern Democratic Republic
war: (a) purchase of arms and equipment through direct of the Congo, provided on average $2 million per year,
payment; (b) barter (arms for mining concessions); and each directly to the Congo desk. A similar percentage
(c) creation of joint ventures. The economies of is applied for other mineral resources in the area
Rwanda and Uganda, unlike those of Angola and controlled by RCD-Goma.
Namibia, have to varying extents financially benefited
128. Before July 2000, monopoly holders used to pay
from the conflict. Zimbabwe is a special case given the
the sum of $200,000 per month in its entirety to Kigali;
potential of concessions attributed to Zimbabwean
this has changed slightly since RCD-Goma claimed its
companies. Data received from various sources,
share. The larger diamond comptoirs would therefore
including the countries involved in the conflict, OECD
pay $100,000 to the Congo desk and $100,000 to the
and the Bretton Woods institutions, demonstrate that in
RCD-Goma authority. The Panel believes that over a
broad terms the mineral production of those three
period of two years the Congo desk would have
countries has decreased. However there are some
received about $4 million as direct payment for
interesting peaks between 1997 and 1999 (see sect. II.F
granting the authorization to operate in the areas under
above). Isolated and varied examples of how these
its control.
countries finance their military presence in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo are given below. 129. Some documents point to a direct implication of
the Rwandan Patriotic Army in commercial activities.
Rwanda As mentioned earlier, RPA, through the companies
Rwanda Metals and Grands Lacs Metals, has big stakes
126. Rwanda’s military appears to be benefiting
in the coltan business. Most of the coltan extracted by
directly from the conflict. Indeed, the Panel has noted a
civilians and prisoners is sold to intermediaries
great integration between the military apparatus, the
(civilians or soldiers) who in turn sell it to comptoirs,
State (civil) bureaucracy and the business community.
some of which are controlled by the Rwandan military.
RPA finances its war in the Democratic Republic of the
The quasi-totality of this coltan is sent to Kigali, and
Congo in five ways: (a) direct commercial activities;
generally stored in facilities owned by the Government.
(b) profit from shares it holds in some companies;
A good portion goes to Rwanda Metals and the rest is
(c) direct payments from RCD-Goma; (d) taxes
exported directly by some professionals. Rwanda
collected by the “Congo desk” and other payments
Metals and Grands Lacs Metals, directly or through
made by individuals for the protection RPA provides
Congo desk, contact clients on the availability of
for their businesses; and (e) direct uptake by the
coltan. Some of the letters sent to potential clients in
soldiers from the land.
Europe and the United States of America are signed
127. Since 1998, the Department of External Dan, who was the head of the Congo desk.
Relations, through the Congo desk has been receiving
130. Given the substantial increase in the price of
substantial amounts of money from various comptoirs.
coltan between late 1999 and late 2000, a period during
Several diamond comptoirs were operating in
which the world supply was decreasing while the
Kisangani before the monopoly was given to two in
demand was increasing, a kilo of coltan of average
July 2000. According to very reliable sources, taxes
grade was estimated at $200. According to the
were paid directly to the Congo desk. On average, a
estimates of professionals, the Rwandan army through
comptoir with a turnover of $4 million per month
Rwanda Metals was exporting at least 100 tons per
would pay $200,000 per month to the Congo desk.
month. The Panel estimates that the Rwandan army
Every diamond dealer who intends to purchase
could have made $20 million per month, simply by
diamonds in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
selling the coltan that, on average, intermediaries buy
Congo or at Kigali would pay 5 per cent of the
from the small dealers at about $10 per kg. According
diamond value to the Congo desk before the
to experts and dealers, at the highest estimates of all
transaction. This amount is consistent with the
related costs (purchase and transport of the minerals),
so-called mandatory 5 per cent of the value of
RPA must have made at least $250 million over a
purchased diamonds that the Congo desk takes from
period of 18 months. This is substantial enough to

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finance the war. Here lies the vicious circle of the war. 134. The BCDI loans to SONEX could be well-crafted
Coltan has permitted the Rwandan army to sustain its operations to transfer money from BCDI to RPA and to
presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The pay RPA suppliers by using SONEX. Paying RPA
army has provided protection and security to the suppliers is one way of financing the war without
individuals and companies extracting the mineral. taking from the official budget. Reliable sources report
These have made money which is shared with the that about $700,000 has already been paid back by
army, which in turn continues to provide the enabling RCD. According to a RCD-Goma document explicitly
environment to continue the exploitation. The last detailing how debts should be repaid with money made
illustration of how Rwanda finances its war deals with out of the coltan sale, part of the $1 million per month
the financial transactions involving Rwandan banks, in taxes that Mrs. Gulamali pays to RCD for the
RPA suppliers and RCD institutions. In these particular monopoly on coltan could also be used to pay back the
cases, Rwanda has used BCDI and SONEX to pay RPA BCDI loan.
suppliers.
Uganda
131. SONEX was founded in March 1999 in Kigali. It
belonged to RCD-Goma and was managed by 135. Uganda unlike Rwanda did not set up an
Emmanuel Kamanzi, former chief of the Finance extrabudgetary system to finance its presence in the
Department of RCD-Goma. Its primary purpose was to Democratic Republic of the Congo. The regular
serve as the commercial and financial arm of RCD, defence budget is used and broadly the deficit is
handling most commercial and financial deals. SONEX handled by the treasury. However, the Ugandan
was dissolved late in 2000, but it had sufficient time to economy benefited from the conflict through the re-
put in place a pattern for the transfer of resources from exportation economy. In turn, the treasury benefited
RCD to Kigali. The Panel received documents and this allowed an increase in the defence budget.
highlighting the financial transactions of SONEX and
136. The re-exportation economy implies that natural
BCDI. According to those documents, BCDI released
resources imported from the Democratic Republic of
$1 million in mid-1999 for SONEX as a loan to pay
the Congo are repackaged or sealed as Ugandan natural
fuel bills to Jambo Safari. SONEX was to repay this
resources or products and re-exported. That is the case
loan with the money obtained from the selling of coltan
for some gold, diamonds, coltan and coffee exported by
and cassiterite. By February 2000, $200,000 to
Uganda. The re-exportation economy has had a
$300,000 had already been reimbursed to BCDI. This
tremendous impact on the financing of the war, in three
loan seems to be part of the financial transaction by
ways.
which money is transferred to Kigali, and some
individuals in RCD take their own substantial cut. 137. First, it has increased the incomes of key
businessmen, traders and other dealers. In the coffee
132. The same year, SONEX requested another loan of
sector, gains have been substantial for the traders in
$10 million from BCDI in Kigali, and $5 million was
Kampala and Bujumbura. According to an expert in the
approved. According to one of the actors at the time,
sector who lives in the region, there is a trick used by
the $5 million loan was not physically paid to SONEX.
coffee exporters in the region. Arabica coffee produced
Instead, BCDI ordered Citibank in New York to pay
in Bujumbura is of a higher grade than the one
RCD suppliers with the loans technically given to
produced in Kivu. The difference in price could be in
SONEX. This financial arrangement is suspicious in
some cases one third. Burundian dealers by importing
many ways.
Congolese coffee and mixing it, then presenting it as
133. First, RPF through Tristar is a shareholder in Burundian coffee, gain a higher price. The Ugandan
BCDI. Second, the suppliers of RCD are mostly traders use the same schemes. In the case of Uganda,
Rwandan companies whose owners are closely the dealers gain both ways. The trader buys
acquainted with RPA or RPF. Third, the deal with inexpensive coffee in the Democratic Republic of the
SONEX is handled by Major Dan, at the Congo desk, Congo, often with counterfeit currency, eventually
who is related by marriage to Mr. Kamanzi, head of the mixes it with Uganda coffee, and then re-exports this
Finance Department and mastermind of the whole coffee as Ugandan robusta, which is of better quality
operation. than Congolese robusta.

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138. Second, the illegal exploitation of gold in the and relatives of UPDF soldiers who served in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo brought a Democratic Republic of the Congo clearly shows that
significant improvement in the balance of payments of there were elements of self-payment much more
Uganda. This in turn gave multilateral donors, satisfactory that the official bonus. Overall, the
especially IMF, which was monitoring the Ugandan military, its leaders and other involved individuals
treasury situation, more confidence in the Ugandan manage to manipulate budgetary and other factors to
economy. Third, it has brought more money to the retain their control in the occupied territories.
treasury through various taxes on goods, services and
142. The Ugandan situation can be summarized as
international trade. Discussions with the Deputy
follows: the re-exportation economy has helped
Commissioner of the Ugandan Revenue Authority
increase tax revenues, allowing the treasury to have
revealed that the tax collection level has increased
more cash. Businesses related to the conflict and
dramatically over the past five years. IMF figures on
managed by Ugandans have contributed to an extent to
Ugandan fiscal operations confirm this positive
generate activities in the economy in a sector such as
evolution over the past three years. A detailed analysis
mining (gold and diamonds). The growth in these
of the structure and the evolution of the fiscal
sectors has had a trickle-down effect on the economy
operations reveals that some sectors have done better
and permitted Uganda to improve its GDP in 1998 and
than others, and most of those tend to be related to the
maintain it somewhat in 1999.5 The improvement in
agricultural and forestry sector in the Democratic
GDP has permitted, according to Ugandan officials, an
Republic of the Congo. Logs, sawn wood or planks
increase in absolute terms of the military budget while
destined for Uganda, Kenya or for export out of the
keeping the level of the military budget at the agreed 2
continent pay customs duties as they enter Uganda.
per cent of GDP. The apparent strength of the Ugandan
139. Between 1998 and 2000, about 1,800 trucks economy has given more confidence to investors and
carrying logs, timber, coffee, medicinal barks, bilateral and multilateral donors who, by maintaining
cassiterite, pyrochlore, iron ore, tea and quinina have their level of cooperation and assistance to Uganda,
transited through Uganda. The official figures from the gave the Government room to spend more on security
Government of Uganda show an average of 600 lorries matters while other sectors, such as education, health
per year, all registered by customs officers. As Mrs. and governance, are being taken care of by the bilateral
Lotsove once noted, the tax exoneration given to the and multilateral aid.
Victoria and Trinity companies represents a net loss of
$5 million per month (there are 15 points of entry). The MLC, RCD-Goma and RCD-ML
Panel concludes that, given the absence of the
143. Officially, the rebel movements receive the bulk
exoneration on the Ugandan side, and a higher level of
of their military equipment through UPDF and RPA.
taxes in Uganda, customs duties related to the
During discussions with the Ugandan Minister of
transiting of Congolese natural resources exploited by
Defence and the Chief of Staff of UPDF, the Panel was
Ugandans and some Congolese in Equateur and
informed that weapons seized from the Congolese
Orientale Provinces would bring the treasury at least
armed forces are usually given to MLC and RCD-ML.
$5 million every month.
According to other sources, some military equipment is
140. Another way of financing the presence of the acquired by these groups through direct purchase and
army in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was to barter. The Panel came across a very interesting case in
purchase military supplies on credit. The Ugandan which Mr. Bemba, at the instigation of General Kazini,
army has purchased petrol on credit from a number of bargained with the highest authorities of Uganda for
private companies. The accruing debt is treated as the release of some Ukrainian pilots whose Antonov
internal debt. has been captured. A very reliable source told the Panel
that in exchange Mr. Bemba received military fatigues,
141. The Panel also gathered that the local
boots and medical supplies for his soldiers from a third
commanders of UPDF turn a blind eye to soldiers’
party.
racketeering among the populations or their
involvement in small business. This is seen as a way to __________________
pay their bonuses and this has proved to be a very 5 Uganda’s GDP has been increasing since the early
successful method. Information received from friends 1990s. However, a slight decrease was noted in 1999.

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144. RCD-Goma has designed a fiscal system based elsewhere. The diamond shipments are held at the
mainly on the mining sector. About six different forms Bank of Tanzania before being forwarded to Belgium,
of tax exist in this sector, and they are applied on the Netherlands and South Africa.
approximately eight different types of minerals,
146. The gold and diamonds are being sold by RCD-
including the most important (coltan, gold and
Goma in exchange for cash or bartered for armaments
diamonds). From RCD official statistics the Panel
and medicines to support continuation of the current
notes that in 1999 on average 60 kg of gold was
hostilities. RCD-Goma’s representatives in Dar es
extracted every month from the area controlled by
Salaam also arrange for the purchase of foodstuffs and
RCD. That is about 720 kg a year. In 2000, the
other logistical needs for the war effort. In addition,
extraction was higher, up to 100 kg a month. With
timber resources from the Democratic Republic of the
regard to coltan, 27 tons were extracted every month in
Congo are being shipped through Dar es Salaam to
1999, while 29 tons were produced every month in
Greece and Belgium. In the case of Greece, the timber
2000. Given the number of comptoirs (19 for coltan),
transaction is being partially arranged by an
and the six types of tax, the Panel concludes that
import/export business located in Goma. The
substantial revenues through tax collection are
shipments of gold, diamonds and timber are also
available to RCD. It is however difficult to estimate the
processed in Dar es Salaam in cooperation with RCD
figures, although some insiders have told the Panel that
representatives by a company believed to be a covert
the financial situation has been improving since late
business entity created for the purpose of facilitating
2000, and the prospects for a balanced budget are
support for the financial and logistical operations of
better than two years ago. Information obtained from
RCD-Goma. It is important to note that the activities
documents and individuals suggests that, in addition to
described above represent an RCD-Goma operation and
taxes levied and shares it holds in SOMIGL, RCD-
are exclusive of operations handled by the Government
Goma has given a monopoly of coltan to SOMIGL, in
of Rwanda, via Kigali.
exchange for which it receives $1 million monthly.
147. The Panel concludes on this point that the major
145. Illustration of the commercial activities of
rebel groups are gradually becoming autonomous
RCD. A preponderance of information obtained from
(MLC/FLC and RCD-Goma) in terms of supply of
documents and individuals regarding the activities of
military equipment. They are capable of raising
RCD-Goma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
substantial amounts of cash, enough to buy the light
Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, and
equipment they use. Equally they have put in place
elsewhere during the current hostilities
their own network and contacts, which would allow
overwhelmingly suggests that RCD-Goma and others
them to purchase their own equipment when necessary.
are marketing the natural resources of the Democratic
This growing autonomy has manifested itself recently
Republic of the Congo — gold, diamonds and
as RCD-Goma has requested that money usually given
timber — through Dar es Salaam. Gold and diamonds
to the Congo desk by diamond dealers be shared
belonging to RCD-Goma are shipped through their
equally between both entities. Equally, RCD-Goma has
financial and logistical network, via Dar es Salaam, for
initiated some military attacks on RCD-ML positions
sale on the international market. In order to facilitate
in order to occupy mineral-rich areas as shown earlier.
the movement of the commodities and to give the
As the need for an autonomous supply of weapons
appearance of legitimacy, RCD-Goma obtains
grows, so does the need to find additional resources,
documents to hide or cover their ownership. The
and therefore clashes for the control of mineral-rich
documents covering the shipments of gold and
areas will be recurrent; so goes the vicious circle of
diamonds are completed forms of the Democratic
war and exploitation of natural resources on the side of
Republic of the Congo. The forms indicate issuance
the rebellion.
from a government organization, complete with the
required stamps and signatures indicating approval and
Democratic Republic of the Congo
issuance in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. RCD-Goma’s
representatives in Dar es Salaam coordinate the receipt, 148. The Government of the Democratic Republic of
forwarding and sale of gold and diamond shipments. the Congo has relied on its minerals and mining
The gold shipments transit through Dar es Salaam industries to finance the war. Between 1998 and early
international airport for sale to buyers in Sri Lanka and 2001, the strategy for financing the war was based on

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three pillars, namely (a) search for cash through the its territory has instead brought other problems to the
attribution of monopolies; (b) direct and indirect Government and has paradoxically deprived the
uptake of funds from parastatals and other private treasury of substantial revenue.
companies; and (c) creation of joint ventures between
153. Uptaking money from parastatals. Another way
parastatals and foreign companies in countries allied
of financing the war has been the direct and indirect
with the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
uptake of money from parastatals and other private
149. Search for cash. The late President used companies, mainly the Société minière de Bakwanga
different schemes to raise funds. He instituted the tax and the Générale des carrières et des mines
parafiscale (see para. 41) and also implemented (Gecamines). The Government has claimed from
schemes such as the creation of a monopoly for the MIBA since August 1998 on average two fifths of their
commercialization of diamonds. earnings. The Panel was told that in some cases three
fifths, the equivalent of $4 million per sale, was sent to
150. Monopoly on diamonds granted to
the President’s office. The Panel has also confirmation
International Diamond Industries (IDI). According
that oil companies gave important sums of money as
to government sources, the objective of this monopoly
taxes parafiscales to the Government. In most cases,
was twofold: first, to have fast and fresh money that
this cash in Congolese francs was delivered to Victor
could be used for the purchase of needed arms, and
Mpoyo, who then reported to the late President Kabila.
address some of the pending problems with the allies.
This money was used for the salary and bonuses of
Second, to have access to Israeli military equipment
Congolese soldiers in the battlefield. According to
and intelligence given the special ties that the Director
some Congolese officials, the taxes parafiscales were
of International Diamond Industries, Dan Gertler, has
never used for the purchase of weapons.
with some generals in the Israeli army.
154. MIBA receives from the Government the
151. This deal turned out to be a nightmare for the
equivalent of two fifths of its sales of diamonds in
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Congolese francs changed at the official rate, which is
and a disaster for the local diamond trade as well as an
only one quarter of the black market rate. It is believed
embarrassment for the Republic of the Congo, which is
that about 75 Congolese francs for each dollar changed
currently flirting with illicit diamonds. According to
is unaccounted for and possibly used for defence
different sources, IDI paid only $3 million instead of
needs.6
$20 million and never supplied military equipment.
155. The contribution of Gecamines to the war effort
152. President Joseph Kabila has expressed
appears to be on two levels. On the one hand, one third
willingness to liberalize the diamond trade in the
of the company’s profit was taken directly by the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and IMF and the
Government in 1999 and in 2000. On the other, the
World Bank are very supportive of this move. IDI is,
Government contributed indirectly to the expenses of
however, threatening to sue the Government of the
the Zimbabwe Defence Forces between May 1999 and
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The IDI deal also
October 2000.
turns out to be a disaster for the local diamond trade.
As the monopoly was granted to IDI, most diamond
A special case: Zimbabwe
dealers operating in the Government-controlled area
crossed to Brazzaville to sell their diamonds. It is 156. Zimbabwe has financed its involvement in the
estimated that during the first three months of the conflict in two different ways: (a) by using the defence
monopoly, $60 million worth of diamonds from the budget — the bulk of Zimbabwe’s military expenses
Democratic Republic of the Congo were sold on the seem to be covered by the regular budget; (b) by
international market, and the Republic of the Congo indirect financing of the war through direct payment by
was mentioned as the country of origin. This some Congolese entities, mainly companies. According
smuggling of diamonds deprived the already ailing to two very reliable sources, during the tenure of Billy
economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of Rautenbach money from Gecamines paid bonuses to
substantial sums of money and the treasury of the Zimbabwean soldiers. These payments might be
substantial tax revenues. This case shows that the __________________
desperate need for quick cash to finance the defence of 6 In 2000, the official exchange rate was one dollar for 23
Congolese francs.

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linked to the contract between the Government and Whabira, former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry
Ridgepoint. Indeed, part of the rights to exploit of Defence, Onesimo Moyo, President of Minerals
Gecamines mines was transferred to Ridgepoint Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe, and Isaiah
without apparent compensation. According to some Ruzengwe, General Manager of Zimbabwe Mining
sources, the compensation, which is not mentioned in Development Corporation, got into a partnership with
the contract, could be the sharing of profits between the COMIEX; COSLEG was born of this partnership.
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Through COSLEG, Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF) could
and Ridgepoint, on the basis of 80 per cent for the exploit and market minerals, timber and other
Government and 20 per cent for Ridgepoint. According resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
to some sources, curiously, Mr. Mpoyo, the Congolese
160. Reliable sources told the Panel that a
minister, signed the contract as one of the officials of
Zimbabwean delegation headed by the then Minister of
Ridgepoint rather than signing on behalf of the
Justice, Emmerson Munangagwa, visited the Kasai
Government. Two months after the contract of Mr.
region to see the various mining concessions given by
Rautenbach as Director of Gecamines came to an end,
the late President Kabila to ZDF as barter payment for
discontent among Zimbabwean soldiers in Katanga
its military support. The team was composed of the
over their lack of bonuses was reported.
former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of
157. The Panel has, however, noted a practice which is Defence, Moven Mahachi; the Chief of the Armed
neither the financing of war nor the provision of direct Forces, General Zvinavashe; and the President of
assistance. The practice is qualified in this report as MIBA, Kadende Muya. President Kabila’s gift to the
“incentives for assistance”. The former Government of Zimbabwean military was causing a problem, however,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo often used the as they did not have the financial and technical
potential of its vast resources in the Katanga and Kasai expertise to exploit their mining concessions. Late in
regions to secure the assistance of some allies or to 1998, Thamer Al Shanfari, Chairman of Oryx Natural
cover some of the expenses that they might incur Resources, was asked to provide the needed financial
during their participation in the war. Among all of its and technical expertise. Mr. Al Shanfari decided to
allies, Zimbabwean companies and some decision create Oryx Zimcon, Ltd., a joint venture between
makers have benefited most from this scheme. The Oryx Natural Resources and COSLEG.
following examples illustrate how different schemes
161. Instead of selecting one of the various mines
were implemented and benefited the decision makers,
belonging to COSLEG to start its investment, Oryx
the very group of officials who can decide about ZDF
Zimcon wanted the best mines which initially belonged
assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
to MIBA. At the request of ZDF and on the advice of
The most utilized scheme has been the creation of joint
Victor Mpoyo and Mwenze Kongolo,7 the late
ventures.
President Kabila transferred two of MIBA’s richest
158. Joint ventures. One way of securing the concessions — the kimberlite deposits in Tshibua and
engagement of some allies in the war has been the the alluvial deposits in the Senga Senga River, to Oryx
provision of financial incentives by way of creating Zimcon. Oryx Zimcon and COSLEG together created
business opportunities in the mining sector. At least Sengamines.
three features emerged from the scheme:
162. As promised, Mr. Al Shanfari started investing in
(a) Zimbabwean companies received interesting mining
Sengamines and used the Breco group of companies of
concessions; (b) Zimbabwean companies using their
John Bredenkamp to transport mining equipment to the
influence with the Government of the Democratic
mines. As the technical and financial partner, Oryx was
Republic of the Congo developed business partnerships
to receive 40 per cent, OSLEG 40 per cent and
with private companies and parastatals; and (c) in turn,
COSLEG 20 per cent. As the need for money grew,
received preferential treatment for their businesses.
159. Sengamines: example of a joint venture. The __________________
Panel gathered that, late in 1998, a private 7 According to some sources, Mwenze Kongolo is involed
Zimbabwean company, Operation Sovereign in most COMIEX dealings. Most importantly, it is said
to the main bridge between Zimbabwean officials such
Legitimacy (OSLEG), whose shareholders are
as the influential Emmerson Munangagwa and the
Lieutenant General Vitalis Musungwa Zvinavashe, Job Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

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Mr. Al Shanfari decided to launch Oryx on London’s companies belonging to ZANU-PF, met with the late
Alternative Investment Market under the name Oryx President Kabila to negotiate this contract of the
Diamonds. Upon strong objections from various central part of the Gecamines concessions. The Panel
stakeholders, Oryx Diamonds was withdrawn from the does not draw any conclusions, but wishes to highlight
market. The new statute of the company does not the quality of the people involved in the negotiations,
mention the name OSLEG.8 The Panel was informed, their past records, current activities and position in
however, that the increase in the shares of COMIEX as Zimbabwe.
seen in the new statute was meant to preserve the
166. Many other deals are ongoing such as the one
interests of Zimbabweans. The Panel was also told that
concerning the supply of foodstuffs to the Congolese
payment would be made to the Government of the
army, for which General Zvinavashe’s company is said
Democratic Republic of the Congo only after the loan
to have been attributed the transport. President Robert
taken for this operation (about $25 million) was repaid.
Mugabe once told interlocutors that the late President
163. The ease with which the Tshibua and Senga Kabila had given him a mine concession.
Senga River concessions were given to Oryx without
167. The Government of the Democratic Republic of
due regard for the legal requirements and the
the Congo, in its effort to defend its territory and
preferential treatment given to Oryx show the
secure the supply of military equipment, has signed a
determination of the former Government of the
contract worth several million United States dollars
Democratic Republic of the Congo to reward some of
with the Government of China. Official sources in
its allies.
Kinshasa, while confirming this deal, have informed
the Panel that in exchange a mining concession was
Attribution of concessions
awarded to a joint venture between a Chinese company
164. According to some sources, a very recent (26 and a parastatal of the Democratic Republic of the
February 2001) concession of cobalt and copper in Congo.
Kambove-Kakanda was to be given KMC Group of the
168. In the same vein, the Government of the
Zimbabwean Billy Rautenbach. According to very
Democratic Republic of the Congo has made a deal
reliable sources, different ministers had signed the
with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
concession two days before the assassination of the late
which trains troops of the Democratic Republic of the
President Kabila and only his signature was missing.
Congo and in exchange, it is believed, has received a
The trade unionist of Gecamines has indicated that the
mining concession around Shinkolobwe, very rich in
cession was completed, but President Joseph Kabila
uranium. The Americans in the past extracted uranium
told the Panel that the deal has not been signed yet. If it
from this mine. Challenged on this issue, officials of
is signed, there could be a rapprochement of activities.
the Democratic Republic of the Congo mentioned high
165. This case shows rapprochement of the activities radioactivity in the area, making it impossible for
and interests of some Zimbabwean businessmen, and a anyone to work there.
possible link between arms dealing and mining
169. According to some officials, the Democratic
activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Republic of the Congo has asked the United States of
Indeed Mr. Bredenkamp is said to have an interest in
America to consider addressing the problem of
this venture, although he was alleged to be an arms
radioactivity in the area, given their historical presence
dealer. In November 2000, a month after the departure
in mining that particular area for uranium. The official
of Mr. Rautenbach from Gecamines, Mr. Bredenkamp
denial of a deal between the Democratic Republic of
is said to have established a direct link with Mr.
the Congo and the Democratic People’s Republic of
Rautenbach. According to three reliable sources, Mr.
Korea was based on the fact that the Government of the
Rautenbach, Mr. Bredenkamp and Mr. Munangwana,
Democratic Republic of the Congo has sought United
the current Speaker of the House of Zimbabwe,
States assistance — which it cannot receive if the
Chairman of ZANU-PF and director of many
Koreans are mining the same area.
__________________
170. The Panel has enough elements and evidence to
8 The distribution of shares is a follows: Oryx 49 per cent,
suggest that the Government of the Democratic
COMIEX 33 per cent, MIBA 16 per cent and Congolese
partners 3 per cent.
Republic of the Congo under the late President Kabila,

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gave strong incentives in the form of access, armies do not confront each other on a daily basis and
exploitation and management of mineral resources. battles or rather serious battles are not frequent. The
These incentives in turn have “convinced” the Panel noted that the conflict, especially in occupied
Zimbabwean authorities to remain engaged in the zones, is fought on three levels:
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The incentives
(a) Government forces and the allies versus the
have, however, been so important that the whole
rebels and their Ugandan-Rwandan and Burundian
balance of the mining industries is likely to be affected.
allies;
The question in the region is which course of action
will sidelined companies take in the future to guarantee (b) RCD-Goma and its Rwandan allies versus
their presence in the mining sector? Will it be another MLC or RCD-ML and their Ugandan allies;
cycle of war or intensification of war in relation to the
(c) Rebel movements and their allies (Rwanda
securing of access to the rich cobalt and copper area of
or Uganda versus the so-called negative forces:
the Democratic Republic of the Congo?
Interahamwe, Maï-Maï and other dissident groups).
Angola and Namibia 174. Indeed, the conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo is being fought on two fronts, official and
171. These two countries have financed their
unofficial. The official front is that of classic
participation in the conflict with their regular defence
warfare — two or more armies confronting each other.
budget. In the case of Angola, some deals, minor
This front goes from Pweto to Mbandaka on an uneven
compared to those of Zimbabwe, have been signed,
line crossing various localities. The unofficial front is
such as the creation of Sonangol, in which Sonangol
concentrated inside zones controlled by rebels and their
Angola has 60 per cent of shares and COMIEX 40 per
Ugandan and Rwandan allies.
cent. Sonangol Angola is a 100 per cent State-owned
company (Sonangol supplies oil to the Democratic 175. The analysis of battles and skirmishes recorded
Republic of the Congo). The two countries have also from mid-1999 to 2001 shows that:
signed a letter of intent to jointly exploit crude oil off
(a) Overall, the number of battles on the official
their coast when peace returns to the region.
front with the engagement of the army is lower than the
172. In the case of Namibia, the Panel was informed number of skirmishes, about 96 between 1999 and
by the Namibian authorities of the existence of a joint 2001;
venture between a Namibian company called August
(b) The number of battles has been decreasing
26, whose main shareholder is the Ministry of Defence,
over the years. In the first quarter of 2001, only eight
an American company and a “company” of the
confrontations were reported on the official front line;
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Other deals
involving individuals have been signed. At this point, (c) Current big battles have been fought in
the Panel has not found substantial evidence that areas of major economic importance, towards the
Angola and Namibia have signed commercial deals in cobalt- and copper-rich area of Katanga and the
the nature of “arms and support for natural resources”. diamond area of Mbuji Mayi. Military specialists argue
Their motivation seems to be solely political and that the Rwandan objective is to capture these mineral-
strategic (for Angola). According to very reliable rich areas to deprive the Government of the Democratic
sources, joint ventures proposed to these two countries Republic of the Congo of the financial sources of its
were a sign of gratitude rather than an incentive for war effort. Without the control of this area, the
their support and they never pressed for it. Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
cannot sustain the war. This rationale confirms that the
availability of natural resources and their exploitation
C. Special features of the links between permits the continuation of the war. This may be true
the exploitation of natural resources for all the parties. In view of the current experience of
and the continuation of the conflict the illegal exploitation of the resources of the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo by Rwanda and
173. It is often said that the conflict in the Democratic Uganda, it could also be thought that the capturing of
Republic of the Congo is low-intensity warfare, as this mineral-rich area would lead to the exploitation of

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those resources. In that case, control of those areas by by RCD-ML and captured Kandole, an area rich in
Rwanda could be seen primarily as an economic and diamonds and with some coltan. Also late in December
financial objective rather than a security objective for 2000, RCD-Goma initiated an attack from Lindi to
the Rwandan borders. conquer Lakutu, another diamond-rich area.
176. The number of skirmishes between rebel forces 179. Finally, in areas where the risks are too high,
and their allies, and the armed group Maï-Maï has adversaries, if not enemies, become partners in
increased. From May to December 2000, about 177 business. That is the case of the Maï-Maï doing
clashes were reported. The battlefields are generally business with RPA civilian coltan dealers, who in turn
around coltan- and diamond-mining or coltan-rich sell to comptoirs controlled by Rwandans and their
areas. The Panel has strong indications that most of the companies Grands Lacs Metals and Rwanda Metals.
fights between Rwandan soldiers and Maï-Maï have The most famous case was when the Maï-Maï chief,
occurred in the so-called “coltan belt”. Some areas General Padiri, informed people in Kigali in November
experienced up to 10 skirmishes in 2000. According to 2000 that he was selling 60 tons of coltan.
some sources, numerous reports and accounts of
180. Strategies to sustain the vicious circle of war
eyewitnesses mention the presence of Rwandan and
and exploitation: the example of Uganda. Top UPDF
Ugandan soldiers providing security around coltan and
commanders have essentially used the Hema/Lendu
diamond mines. Officials of RCD-Goma have
conflict. The Panel has received very reliable
confirmed the risk posed by the Maï-Maï and “negative
information clearly showing how General Kazini and
forces” in those areas. A senior RCD official specified
Colonels Kyakabale and Arocha assisted in training
that only very well organized entities with the
different Hema militia, and manipulated those groups
necessary security infrastructure can carry out the
to fight each other. Reports clearly showed that while
exploitation of coltan in those areas. In this particular
the Kazini camp was helping with the training of the
case, the Rwandan army is the only institution with that
Hemas, the Colonel Peter Karim camp was assisting in
capability in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
training the Lendus. Both camps belonging to UPDF.
Congo.
There are strong indications that some UPDF elements
177. Rwanda’s “unusual” tactics. The Rwandan may spark violence so as to remain in the region in an
forces will attack the same area for two days then pull attempt to control the gold-rich area and the potentially
back. According to our sources, these attacks seem to coltan-rich areas of Nyaleki. There is, therefore, a clear
coincide with the period when coltan has been intent of the military commanders to control these
extracted and put in bags for evacuation by the Maï- mineral-rich areas and keep them for long-term
Maï. Attacked, the Maï-Maï abandon their coltan, exploitation. The Nia-Nia confrontation in October
which is then taken away by small aircraft. The 2000, in which UPDF General Kazini and Roger
Rwandan soldiers retreat again waiting for the next Lumbala fought another UPDF group and RCD-ML is
information on available coltan. In the areas where a variation of the fighting inside UPDF for control of
their grip is weaker, Rwanda in particular has designed coltan-rich areas. According to different sources, Roger
strategies to retain control within certain echelons of Lumbala, of RCD-national, has been used by General
the existing local hierarchies. In those areas controlled Kazini to control the Bafwasende area, rich in
by the Interahamwe and Maï-Maï forces, either RPA, diamonds and coltan.
from time to time, mounts military operations that
allow it to capture the areas temporarily and evacuate
the coltan, or else middlemen are used for the purchase D. Facilitators or passive accomplices?
of coltan from the Maï-Maï and “negative forces”.
181. The link between the continuation of the conflict
178. Battles between rebel movements are also and the exploitation of natural resources would have
reported in areas rich in mines. On 18 November 2000, not been possible if some entities, not parties in the
RCD-Goma and its Rwandan allied troops based in conflict, had not played a key role, willingly or not.
Kisangani attacked positions of MLC in Bengamisa, 50 Bilateral and multilateral donors and certain
km north-west of Kisangani, and took control of this neighbouring and distant countries have passively
rich diamond area. On 31 December 2000, RCD-Goma facilitated the exploitation of the resources of the
and its allies launched an attack on the area controlled Democratic Republic of the Congo and the

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continuation of the conflict; the role of private Bilateral donors

companies and individuals has also been vital.
185. The main bilateral donors to Rwanda and Uganda
182. The Panel has gathered information showing that have been the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
linkages between different actors and stakeholders are Northern Ireland, Denmark, Germany and the United
very well structured to the point that Governments and States of America in various sectors. The analysis of
large reputable companies operate in confidence. In the their cooperation shows that sectors benefiting from
case of coltan, all the needed documentation for its this assistance are related to poverty, education and
export is provided in Kigali, but there are accomplices governance. Priority sectors have been water and
in Kinshasa in the Ministry of Mines. The importing sanitation, health and governance, including
companies and their facilitators are aware of the real institutional reforms, justice and human rights,
origin of the coltan, however. According to manifests especially for Rwanda. In some cases, direct aid to the
that the Panel received, Sabena Cargo as well as SDV budget is provided. The balance of payments of
of the Bollore group have been among the key Rwanda shows that budget support has steadily
companies in this chain of exploitation and increased, from $26.1 million in 1997 to $51.5 in 1999.
continuation of war. Thousands of tons of coltan from While such support is legitimate, the problem is that
the Democratic Republic of the Congo were carried expenditures and services which were supposed to be
from Kigali or through the port of Dar es Salaam. provided and covered by the Governments of Rwanda
and Uganda and which are covered by the bilateral aid
183. The Panel also has indications of the direct and
constitute savings in the national budget. Were these
indirect involvement of some staff of the embassies and
savings used to finance this war?
cooperation agencies of developed countries. They
have facilitated the purchase of illegal minerals. The 186. The German Ambassador in Kigali told the Panel
United States honorary consul in Bukavu, as he about German support to German business dealing in
presented himself, Ramnik O. Kotecha, in addition to pyrochlore and coltan in the occupied Democratic
promoting deals between American companies and Republic of the Congo. In this particular case, German
coltan dealers in the region, is himself Chairman of the cooperation has given a preferential loan of DM
Kotecha group of companies based in Bukavu and 500,000 to Karl Heinz Albers, a German citizen, to
deals in coltan. expand his coltan business in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (SOMIKIVU) and Mr. Albers’s business
184. On the basis of the facts and their analysis, the
is guarded by RCD-Goma soldiers.
Panel reaches the conclusion that the increase in
revenues of the Rwandan army from coltan sales was
Multilateral donors
made easy by three key factors:
187. The World Bank has praised Uganda for its
(a) The passive role of some private companies
economic performance and the reforms under the
such as Sabena and SDV for the transport of coltan,
structural adjustment programme as a success story and
Citibank for the financial transaction as the
has promoted its case for the new debt relief
corresponding bank of BCDI, the self-proclaimed
programme, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries
United States honorary consul in Bukavu and some
initiative.
staff in various embassies in Kigali;
188. The Panel has however indications that this
(b) The rush to profit of some foreign
economic performance was driven in part, especially
companies that were ready to do business regardless of
over the past three years, by the exploitation of the
elements of unlawfulness and irregularities (see
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
annex I for a sample of companies);
Notes exchanged between World Bank staff clearly
(c) The political legitimization provided by show that the Bank was informed about a significant
some developed countries. In November 2000 in increase in gold and diamond exports from a country
Kigali, the Panel was told that the illegal exploitation that produces very little of these minerals or exports
of resources and the financial gains of RPA were quantities of gold that it could not produce (see para.
justified as the repayment for the security that Rwanda 97). Internal discussions of the World Bank staff also
provides. confirm this knowledge of the situation: in one of those

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internal exchanges, a staff member warned his 192. According to some sources, the Government of
colleague that the World Bank silence would blow up the Central African Republic was aware of the
in the Bank’s face. commercial activities of MLC in Bangui. Jean-Pierre
Bemba’s friends, Jean-Yves Ollivier, Jean-Pierre
189. In the case of Uganda and its exploitation of the
Dupont and Jean-Pierre Saber, have all used Bangui as
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
the arrière-base for their diamond and coffee deals.
Congo, the World Bank never questioned the
The Government never prevented MLC from using the
increasing exports of resources and in one instance a
Central African Republic for economic activities. In
staff member even defended it. During the Panel’s visit
addition, some individuals were using the territory of
to Uganda, the representative of the Bank dismissed
the Central African Republic to carry out their illegal
any involvement of Uganda in the exploitation of those
activities, as was the case with Victor Butt, who used
resources. The Bank not only encouraged Uganda and
Bangui airport to load and offload coffee and arms.
Rwanda indirectly by defending their case, but equally
gave the impression of rewarding them by proposing 193. According to some sources, some countries in the
these countries for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries region have been very attractive to Rwandan families
debt relief initiative. with an acceptable level of wealth. Army salaries
cannot sustain such lucrative properties and standards
190. The Bank’s shadow on the conflict in the
of living. How do they sustain these families? Where
Democratic Republic of the Congo is even more
did the money come from?
apparent on the budget. The balance of payments of
both Uganda and Rwanda shows a significant increase 194. Kenya has played a different role in the
in long-term borrowing in support of the budget. The exploitation of the resources of the Democratic
defence budget however has increased in absolute Republic of the Congo. It has been the base for the
terms, allowing Uganda and Rwanda to continue the supply of counterfeit United States dollars and also the
conflict. There seems to be a precedent for the Bank’s venue of financial transactions of various traders who
behaviour. During the Cambodian crisis in the 1980s, export their resources (timber, coffee and tobacco)
the Bank turned a blind eye to the illicit exploitation of through the port of Mombasa.
Cambodian timber; the question is whether it is World
Bank policy to ignore broad governance issues (hard or The pivotal role of leaders
soft) while dealing with its clients.
195. This section aims to show how Presidents and
other decision makers tolerate, organize or put in place
Transit countries
the framework and conditions to maintain the status
191. Countries in the region have indirectly and quo of exploitation and war. The Panel refrains from
passively facilitated the cycle of exploitation of the making allegations about the personal involvement of
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Presidents in the illegal and financial activities until
Congo and the continuation of the conflict. This has further investigation is carried out. For instance, the
usually happened without any intent to cover up or Panel received but dismissed, for lack of evidence,
protect some interests. That is particularly the case of allegations of the involvement of President Kagame’s
countries with seaports. Those countries have served as family in diamond dealing; it focused rather on the
the hub for the export of natural resources. They were objective elements of the President’s political
bound by regulations and agreements signed within the responsibility. In some reports and accounts, the name
framework of subregional organizations such as of President Museveni was mentioned as a shareholder
COMESA for the seaports of Mombasa and Dar es in a specific company. The Panel refrains from citing
Salaam and UDEAC/CEMAC for the port of Douala. these accounts until further research is conducted.
Mombasa and Dar es Salaam were the main ports used
196. President Paul Kagame. His position in the
by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi to export some
State apparatus with regard to the exploitation of the
natural resources, such as timber, cassiterite, coffee and
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
various barks. Douala seaport was also used for coffee
Congo and the continuation of the war has evolved, yet
from Equateur Province and transported from Bangui.
his role has remained pivotal. This role can be situated
on three levels: his relations with the Rwandan

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business community operating in the Democratic of the situation, his implicit approval of the
Republic of the Congo, control over the army, and the continuation of the illegal exploitation of the resources
structures involved in the illegal activities. of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and somehow
his complicity as well as his political and moral
197. According to some reliable sources, President
responsibility.
Kagame has close relationships with top Rwandan
businessmen. For instance, he maintains good relations 201. President Yoweri Museveni. President Yoweri
with Modeste Makabuza, “owner” of Jambo Safari. He Museveni’s role in the exploitation of the natural
is also close to Alfred Khalissa, the “founder” of BCDI resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
and former manager of BCD. The same sources told the continuation of the war can be situated at the
the Panel that President Kagame is very close to Tibere following levels: his policy towards the rebel
Rujigiro, who is known for generous financial support movements, his attitude towards the army and the
to RPF during the 1990-1994 war. Mr. Rujigiro is one protection provided to illegal activities and their
of the shareholders of Tristar Investment, with very perpetrators.
close ties to RPF. This close aide to President Kagame
202. He has shaped the rebellion in the area controlled
has business relationships with Faustin Mbundu, who
by Uganda according to his own political philosophy
is known for his arms dealing activities. What all these
and agenda. He opted for a more decentralized
businessmen have in common is their direct
authority and only intervenes when major problems
involvement in the exploitation of natural resources in
arise, but he has a very good knowledge of the
the areas that Rwanda controls. Different sources have
situation on the ground.
told the Panel that each of these businessmen has at a
certain point benefited from the President’s “help”. 203. Messrs. Mbusa Nyamwisi and Tibasima, former
first and second Vice-Presidents close to General Salim
198. President Kagame, when he was Minister of
Saleh and General Kazini, are more inclined to
Defence, reorganized or approved the reorganization of
business and the extraction of natural resources. In
the Rwandan army and the Ministry of Defence, which
December 1999, a report was handed over to the
subsequently led to the creation of the Department of
President of Uganda, specifically pointing out the
External Relations in which the Congo desk is located.
embezzlement of $10 million by Mr. Nyamwisi and
This unit has been the cornerstone of the financial
$3 million by Mr. Tibasima. Another report was handed
transactions of RPA. The former Minister of Defence
to President Museveni in February 2000, specifically
should have been aware of the functioning of RPA as
denouncing the collusion between Trinity Group and
well as the daily operations of the army.
Mr. Tibasima and the impact on the collection of
199. Two very reliable sources told the Panel that in customs duties. President Museveni chose to give the
September 1998 the then Vice-President, during a direction of the Congolese Liberation Front to those
meeting with various officials of RCD and RPA top who are the accomplices of illegal cartels.
commanders, informed the participants that there was a
204. President Museveni was also informed of the
need to raise $50 million to make it possible to reach
situation on the ground, the exploitation being carried
Kinshasa in two months.
out and the involvement of officials of MLC and RCD-
200. Finally, when faced with the question of the ML, including the conflict between Hemas and Lendus.
involvement of RPA in the exploitation of the resources
205. The President’s family has also been very
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the President
involved in business in the Democratic Republic of the
announced in a radio interview that private Rwandan
Congo in the occupied zones. General Salim Saleh and
citizens were carrying out commercial activities in the
his wife, shareholders in Victoria and Trinity, have
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Was this a
confidently carried out their activities undisturbed.
deliberate act to mislead various partners or was it
translating the President’s lack of information on the 206. The Panel concludes that when the information is
issue? Meanwhile, the President has admitted in the passed to the President and he chooses not to act, when
past that the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the he appoints the very people who carry out criminal
Congo was self-financing. All these elements activities, and when his family members get away with
combined suggest the President’s degree of knowledge

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criminal activities, it becomes overwhelming that the IDI and Sengamines some of which reportedly have
President has put himself in the position of accomplice. ties with arms dealers, are likely to create a more
troubling situation in the Democratic Republic of the
207. The late President Laurent-Désiré Kabila. His
Congo. Equally, joint ventures and concessions given
role in the continuation of the war has survived his
to some allies as rewards may cause some problems
death. On three levels, he bears part of the
given the nature of the shareholders who are either
responsibility for the current situation. First, as the
armed forces or powerful and influential politicians.
chief of AFDL, he created a precedent in giving a
The situation is now deeply embedded and the regional
character of “legality” or legitimacy to otherwise
power structures are consequently not stable.
illegal operations. During his advance on Kinshasa, he
granted concessions even though he did not have 212. The link between the exploitation of natural
authority to do so. These are the same methods being resources and the continuation of the conflict in the
used by some armed groups to fight for power. Democratic Republic of the Congo does exist, and it is
based on five factors which are not mutually exclusive.
208. Second, he allowed and tolerated some unlawful
First, the capacity of countries to use their own
ventures as a way of rewarding allies. He also initiated
resources to sustain the war up to a certain stage, as in
the barter system in order to defend his territory. This
the case of Angola. Second, the ability of countries to
is gradually becoming the normal practice for the rebel
take resources from enemies and use it to fight the so-
groups.
called “self-sustaining” war, as in the case of Rwanda.
209. Third, he offered a good excuse and a pretext to Third, the intent of some Governments to take
those who had carefully planned the redrawing of the advantage of the war situation and use it to transfer
regional map to redistribute wealth. Many sources have wealth from one country to their national economy, as
told the Panel how they were approached and asked to is the case with Rwanda and Zimbabwe. Fourth, the
think about the distribution of wealth of the will of private citizens and businesses who endeavour
Democratic Republic of the Congo in terms of their to sustain the war for political, financial or other gains;
personal enrichment. for example, generals and other top officers in the
Ugandan and Zimbabwean army and other top officials
210. According to the facts, accounts and information
and unsavoury politicians (Victor Mpoyo, Gaëtan
gathered, the pivotal roles of the Ugandan and
Kakudji, Mwenze Kongolo) in the Government of the
Rwandan leaders reside in the way in which they
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Fifth, the capacity
diverted the primary mission of their armies from
of one of the warring parties to give incentives
protection of their territory and made them armies of
(mineral and others) to its allies and soldiers, for
business. By the same token, they indirectly created
example the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
within their armies conditions for top officers to put in
place networks that they controlled. These networks
are becoming cartels, which will take over the war for IV. Conclusion and findings
natural resources.
211. Presidents Kagame and Museveni are on the 213. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
verge of becoming the godfathers of the illegal Congo has become mainly about access, control and
exploitation of natural resources and the continuation trade of five key mineral resources: coltan, diamonds,
of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the copper, cobalt and gold. The wealth of the country is
Congo. They have indirectly given criminal cartels a appealing and hard to resist in the context of
unique opportunity to organize and operate in this lawlessness and the weakness of the central authority.
fragile and sensitive region. Finally, the attitude of the 214. Exploitation of the natural resources of the
late President has possibly planted the seeds for Democratic Republic of the Congo by foreign armies
another round of war for resources in the Democratic has become systematic and systemic. Plundering,
Republic of the Congo. Politicians such as Jean-Pierre looting and racketeering and the constitution of
Bemba, Mwenze Kongolo, Victor Mpoyo, Adolphe criminal cartels are becoming commonplace in
Onusumba, Jean-Pierre Ondekane and Emmanuel occupied territories. These criminal cartels have
Kamanzi are ready to make any deal for the sake of ramifications and connections worldwide, and they
power or for personal enrichment. Companies such as

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represent the next serious security problem in the Follow-up

region.
220. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
215. The role of the private sector in the exploitation extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the
of natural resources and the continuation of the war has Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
been vital. A number of companies have been involved Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the
and have fuelled the war directly, trading arms for Congo, to allow it to conduct a follow-up investigation
natural resources. Others have facilitated access to and report on the structures and networks put in place
financial resources, which are used to purchase or facilitated by warring parties to illegally exploit the
weapons. Companies trading minerals, which the Panel natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
considered to be “the engine of the conflict in the Congo, including the situation after the withdrawal of
Democratic Republic of the Congo” have prepared the foreign military forces.
field for illegal mining activities in the country.
Sanctions
216. Bilateral and multilateral donors have sent mixed
signals to Governments with armies in the Democratic 221. The Security Council should immediately declare
Republic of the Congo. a temporary embargo on the import or export of coltan,
niobium, pyrochlore, cassiterite, timber, gold and
217. Top military commanders from various countries,
diamonds from or to Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda
for different reasons, needed and continue to need this
until those countries’ involvement in the exploitation
conflict for its lucrative nature and for temporarily
of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of
solving some internal problems in those countries as
the Congo is made clear and declared so by the
well as allowing access to wealth. They have realized
Security Council. All countries should abstain from
that the war has the capacity to sustain itself, and
facilitating the import or export of these resources. Any
therefore have created or protected criminal networks
country breaking this embargo should face sanctions;
that are likely to take over fully if all foreign armies
Governments should take the measures necessary to
decide to leave the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
ensure that companies registered in their territory and
218. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the individuals breaking the embargo are punished.
Congo, because of its lucrative nature, has created a
222. The Security Council should decide that all
“win-win” situation for all belligerents. Adversaries
Member States without delay should freeze the
and enemies are at times partners in business (Maï-Maï
financial assets of the rebel movements and their
and Rwandans and Congolese rebels), prisoners of
leaders. Member States should take the necessary
Hutu origin are mine workers of RPA, enemies get
measures to ensure that their public and private
weapons from the same dealers and use the same
financial institutions stop doing business with banks
intermediaries. Business has superseded security
named in this report that are located in Burundi,
concerns. The only loser in this huge business venture
Rwanda and Uganda.
is the Congolese people.
223. The Security Council should strongly urge all
Member States to freeze the financial assets of the
V. Recommendations companies or individuals who continue to participate in
the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the
Prerequisite Democratic Republic of the Congo immediately after
219. The Panel acknowledges the validity of Security the publication of this report.
Council resolutions 1304 (2000) and 1341 (2001), as 224. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
well as the Lusaka Agreement, and puts its report and declare an immediate embargo on supply of weapons
recommendations within their broad framework. The and all military materiel to the rebel groups operating
Panel believes its report and recommendations are in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and consider
consistent with those resolutions. extending this embargo to the States that support or
assist those groups.

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225. The Panel recommends that the Security Council doing business with rebels and Burundi, Rwanda and
decide that all military cooperation with States whose Uganda. Failure to do so should lead to action through
military forces are present in the Democratic Republic the World Diamond Council. The Republic of the
of the Congo in violation of its sovereignty be Congo and the Central African Republic should take
suspended immediately until those armies withdraw the necessary measures to stop abetting the trade in
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. illicit and conflict diamonds.
231. Furthermore, the Panel endorses all the relevant
Financial and economic matters
recommendations on diamonds made by the Panel of
226. The Panel recommends that the Security Council Experts established by resolution 1306 (2000) in
urge Member States to suspend balance of payments relation to Sierra Leone in its report (S/2000/1195,
support to the countries of the region involved in the paras. 155 to 166), in particular:
illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the
(a) A certification scheme similar to that
Democratic Republic of the Congo, until the Security
adopted by Sierra Leone should be required of the
Council has evidence to its satisfaction that the illegal
Democratic Republic of the Congo and all other
exploitation of natural resources has stopped.
diamond-exporting countries in the region, within a
227. The Panel recommends that the Security Council period of six months;
requests the World Bank and IMF to consider
(b) Major trading centres should agree on a
suspending their support to the budgets of these
recording and public documentation system for rough
countries until the end of the conflict. If, within two
diamond imports that clearly designates countries of
months after the publication of this report, clear
origin and provenance;
evidence and signs of the disengagement of these
countries from the exploitation of the natural resources (c) All countries importing rough diamonds
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are not given must apply a “rough control” system whether they have
to the Security Council, cooperation between those free trade zones or not;
institutions and the countries involved should be
(d) The European Union should have few entry
suspended. The World Bank and IMF should design a
points for diamonds;
policy guideline on cooperation between each
institution and countries involved in conflicts. (e) The United Nations and the World Diamond
Council should form a commission to conduct an
228. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
annual review of the proper implementation of the
urge Member States sharing a common border with the
certification system;
Democratic Republic of the Congo or serving as transit
countries for goods and natural resources from the (f) An annual statistical production report
Democratic Republic of the Congo to form a should be compiled by each exporting country and
commission to investigate financial and economic gathered into a central annual report, compiled by the
activities conducted on their territories in connection World Diamond Council and/or by the certification
with the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, body that is expected to emerge from the “Kimberley
and take the necessary action to curb or halt activities process”.
that contribute to the continuation of hostilities.
Forest and timber
Diamond business
232. The Panel proposes that countries with seaports
229. The Security Council should call upon the and those with transit facilities report to the United
Democratic Republic of the Congo to take the Nations Forum on Forests on the transit of timber
necessary steps to curb the flow of illicit diamonds by through their territory. As the timber from the
liberalizing the diamond trade. A clear signal in this Democratic Republic of the Congo transits through the
regard should be sent to all companies that resist and ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, the Governments
obstruct the liberalization of the mineral markets. of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania should
declare to the Forum on Forests the origins of the
230. All diamond dealers operating in the territories
occupied by foreign forces should immediately stop

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timber that is being shipped from their seaports, as well and “conflict timber product” trade in the report of the
as the certification documents of such timber. Forum on Forests.
233. The Panel recommends that the United Nations
Reparation and compensation
Forum on Forests unify the different schemes and
procedures for timber certification. The certification 236. The Panel recommends that individuals, in
scheme should be based on the broad framework of particular farmers, religious groups and companies
principles, criteria and indicators promoted by the whose properties, livestock and crops were damaged,
International Panel on Forests and the International looted or expropriated by the Burundian, Rwandan or
Forum on Forests. New criteria on “conflict timber” Ugandan armed forces and their allies should be
should be considered. The Forum on Forests should compensated by the States concerned. Properties
become or designate one single accrediting body for confiscated should also be returned to their legitimate
timber certification. The composition of such a body owners. The Governments of Burundi, Rwanda and
should reflect the diversity of actors and interests as Uganda and their allies should pay compensation to the
well as the specificity of regions. Such a unified companies whose properties and stocks of coltan,
mechanism would prevent some “loose codification” cassiterite, gold, timber and other materials which were
and purely commercial certifying bodies from confiscated or taken between 1998 and 2000. The
delivering or attempting to deliver certificates. The Security Council may consider how the Office of the
Panel urges the Security Council to declare timber and United Nations Resident Coordinator in Kinshasa could
non-timber forest products coming from warring areas, help in gathering information on the claims.
“conflict timber and non-timber forest products”.
237. UNESCO, in collaboration with UNEP, the
Countries importing non-certified timber should put in
secretariat of CITES and non-governmental
place minimum guidelines and sanctions for companies
organizations working in the Democratic Republic of
that import timber and non-timber forest products from
the Congo should assess the extent of damage to
countries at war or experiencing civil war related to the
wildlife in Garamba Park, Kahuzi-Biega Park, the
allocation or distribution of natural resources.
Okapi Reserve and Virunga Park, and propose
234. The Panel proposes, following the declaration on sanctions to be taken against those Governments whose
the control of illegal logging made by the Group of soldiers were involved in the mass killing of
Eight in 1998, and the ongoing discussions on “conflict endangered species.
timber products”, that a mandate be given to the United
Nations Forum on Forests: Framework for reconstruction
(a) To compile information in collaboration 238. The Security Council would give mandate and
with various non-governmental organizations on illegal means to a United Nations commission created to help
logging and “conflict timber products” in the world; the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo manage the transition in the formerly occupied
(b) To publish annually a list of countries
regions. The Commission will help design and put in
involved in illegal and “conflict timber products” trade;
place the legal and administrative framework and
(c) To submit an annual report to the General create an enabling environment for economic activities.
Assembly of the United Nations. The Commission will also help put in place the
necessary conditions for the enhancement of State
235. The Panel recommends that countries of transit
authority and security over its territory.
and final destination of the timber trade request from
logging companies certificates of origin for the timber
General
that is transiting through or arriving in their territory.
Those countries should send copies of these certificates 239. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
to Governments of countries of origin within three consider establishing an international mechanism that
days. Failure to abide by this should be considered to will investigate and prosecute individuals involved in
be complicity on the part of those countries and they economic criminal activities (such as Khaleb
should be listed as countries facilitating “illicit timber” Akandwanaho alias Salim Saleh, Jean-Pierre Bemba,
James Kazini, Mbusa Nyamwisi, Ateenyi Tibasima,

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Roger Lumbala, Aziza Kulsum Gulamali and others

named in this report), companies and government
officials whose economic and financial activities
directly or indirectly harm powerless people and weak
economies.
240. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
consider establishing a permanent mechanism that
would investigate the illicit trafficking of natural
resources in armed conflicts so as to monitor the cases
which are already subject to the investigation of other
panels, such as those of Angola, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone.
241. Member States should be encouraged to adopt
legislation that will forbid companies registered in their
territory from importing or exporting natural resources
to or from invading countries.

Security
242. The Panel urges the Security Council to hold
Governments of countries parties to the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, rebel movements
and those military representatives cited in the report
responsible if any harm is done to any member of the
Panel. The Security Council should encourage
individual countries to assist the Panel members by
providing security to each of them well after the Panel
is dissolved. The Security Council should urge the
Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements
to ensure the security of the Panel members well after
the Panel is dissolved. The Panel has received
information of harassment in Bunia and other localities
of individuals who may have been in contact with the
Panel members. The Security Council should hold the
authorities of Rwanda, Uganda, RCD and FLC
responsible for any harm to witnesses who shared their
knowledge with the Panel.

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Annex I
Sample of companies importing minerals from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo via Rwanda
Company Country of destination Merchandise

Cogem Belgium cassiterites

Muka-Enterprise Belgium cassiterites
Issa Germany cassiterites
Chpistopa Floss Germany cassiterites
Redemi Rwanda cassiterites
Banro-Resources Corp. Malaysia cassiterites, coltan
Canada cassiterites
Bharat United Republic of cassiterites
Tanzania

Extano-Office Rwanda coltan

Coopimar Rwanda coltan
Geologistics Hannover Germany coltan
Rwasibo-Butera Switzerland coltan
Eagleswings Netherlands coltan
Veen Netherlands coltan

Soger Belgium coltan

Patel Warehouse Netherlands coltan
Afrimex United Kingdom of Great coltan
Britain and Northern
Ireland
Netherlands cassiterites
Chimie Pharmacie Netherlands coltan
Belgium coltan
Sogem Belgium coltan, cassiterites, tin
Cogecom Belgium coltan, cassiterites
Cogea Belgium coltan

Panalpina Kenya coltan

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Company Country of destination Merchandise

Tradement Belgium coltan, cassiterites

Ventro Star United Kingdom of Great coltan
Britain and Northern
Ireland
Raremet India coltan
Finconord Pakistan coltan
Finiming Ltd. Belgium coltan
Finconcorde Russian Federation cassiterites, coltan
Patel India cassiterites
Cicle International Belgium coltan

Masingiro Germany coltan

Union-Transport Germany coltan
Specialty Metal Belgium coltan

MDW Belgium cassiterites, coltan

Transintra Belgium cassiterites

Source: The Rwandan Revenue Authority.

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Annex II
Countries visited and representatives of Governments
and organizations interviewed
The Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo wishes to express its
deep appreciation to the government officials, diplomats, non-governmental
organizations, individual relief workers, journalists, and others who assisted it in its
enquiries and helped to make this report possible.
The Panel further wishes to extend special thanks to the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), in
particular Ambassador Kamel Morjane; to the United Nations Office at Nairobi, in
particular Klaus Töpfer and Alexander Barabanov; and to the Office of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, in
particular Ambassador Berhanu Dinka.
Among countries involved in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the Panel would like to make special note of the cooperation received from
the Republic of Uganda, which provided the Panel with all information that was
requested.
The following list is incomplete in deference to the wishes of those who
requested anonymity, in particular Congolese individuals who put their lives at risk
in order to provide the Panel with information.
Angola
Government officials
Vice-Minister of External Relations
Vice-Minister of Finance
Minister of Petroleum
Minister of Geology and Mines
United Nations agencies and offices
Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office
in Angola
United Nations Office in Angola
Belgium
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Communications, Civil Aviation Administration
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Economy and Finance
Cabinet of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
Department of Customs and Accounts
Office belge du commerce extérieur
Département de douanes et droits indirects
International organizations
Eurostat
World Customs Organization

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Other
Belgolaise
BHP Diamonds and Minerals
BHV
Diamond High Council
Independent Diamond Valuators
Institute of Politics and Development Management
Langer Diamonds
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet (Nordic Africa Institute)
Royal Museum for Central Africa, Department of Geology and Mineralogy
SwissCargo
World Federation of Diamond Markets
Burundi
Government officials
His Excellency Major General Pierre Buyoya, President of the Republic of
Burundi
Minister of Agriculture and Livestock
Ministry of Finance
Minister of International Relations and Cooperation
Minister of National and Regional Development and Environment
Minister of Transportation, Post and Telecommunications
Representatives of States
Belgium
Democratic Republic of the Congo
France
United States of America
United Nations agencies and offices, and international organizations
MONUC
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi
UNDP
World Bank
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government officials
His Excellency Major General Joseph Kabila, President of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo
Commissariat général du Gouvernement chargé des affaires de la MONUC
Banque nationale du Congo
Banque centrale
Département des Forêts
Direction générale des contributions (DGC)
Direction générale des recettes administratives, judiciaires, domaniales et de
participations (DGRAD)
Institut congolais pour la conservation de la nature (ICCN)
Ministre des affaires foncières de l’Environnement, de la conservation de la
nature et du développement touristique
Ministre de l’agriculture et elevage
Ministre des droits humains

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Ministre de l’economie, du commerce, et de l’industrie

Ministre de l’energie
Ministre des finances et du budget
Ministère des mines
Ministre d’Etat chargé du pétrole
Ministre des transports et communications
l’Office des douanes et accises (OFIDA)
Representatives of States
Belgium
China
France
Italy
United States of America
Diplomatic Corps of Kinshasa
United Nations agencies and offices
FAO
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
MONUC
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNDP
UNHCR
UNICEF
WFP
WHO
Other
COSLEG Holding
Fédération des entreprises du Congo (FEC)
Georges Forrest International
Governor of South Kivu and Provincial Directors
Observatoire gouvernance-transparence (OGT)
Kotecha Group of Companies
Mouvement pour la libération du Congo
Olive Company
RCD-Goma
Rally for Congolese Democracy-ML/Kisangani
Trafca
World Resource Institute
France
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry – Department of the Treasury
French Development Agency
Inspector General of Civil Aviation and Meteorology
Direction générale des douanes et droits indirects – Sous-Direction de l’Union
douanière et de la coopération internationale
Bureau of Geological and Mining Research (BRGM)

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International organizations
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Kenya
Government officials
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Kenya Ports Authority
Representatives of States
Belgium
Democratic Republic of the Congo
France
Japan
Russian Federation
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Special Representative
for the Great Lakes
Zimbabwe
International organizations
Office of the Facilitator for the peace process in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
United Nations agencies and offices
MONUC
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great
Lakes Region
UNDP
UNEP
United Nations Office at Nairobi
Other
International Crisis Group (ICG)
Namibia
Government officials
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Information and Broadcasting
Minister of Finance
Deputy Minister of Defence
Minister of Mines and Energy
Minister of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development
Minister of Environment and Tourism
Representatives of States
China
France
Russian Federation
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America

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Rwanda
Government officials
His Excellency Major General Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of
Rwanda
Chef d’Etat major
Minister of Energy, Water and Natural Resources
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Finance and Economic Planning
Minister of Agriculture, Forests and Livestock
Minister of Works, Transport and Communications
Minister of Energy, Mines and Water
Minister of Land, Resettlements and Environment
National Bank of Rwanda
Secretary-General of Commerce, Industry and Tourism
Rwanda Revenue Authority
Representatives of States
Belgium
Canada
China
France
Germany
Netherlands
Russian Federation
Switzerland
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
Office of the European Union Delegation
United Nations agencies and offices
ECA
FAO
Heads of United Nations agencies represented in Rwanda
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
MONUC
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP
South Africa
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Other
Anglo-American
De Beers
Switzerland
Government officials
Department of Foreign Affairs, Chef de la direction politique
Swiss Federal Administration

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International organizations
World Trade Organization
Other
Société générale de surveillance
Uganda
Government officials
His Excellency Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda
Civil Aviation Authority
Internal Revenue Authority
Minister of Agriculture
Minister of Defence
Minister of Energy and Mineral Development
Minister of State for Environment, Water and Land
First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Finance
Minister of State for Planning and Investment
Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications
Parliamentary Committee on Presidential and Foreign Affairs
Vice-President of the Republic of Uganda
Representatives of States
Belgium
Denmark
France
Italy
Russian Federation
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
European Union Special Envoy to the Great Lakes
United Nations agencies
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP
Heads of United Nations agencies in Kampala
Media
East African
Monitor
New Vision
Radio Uganda
Top Radio
Ugandan Television
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Government officials
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Other
Cluff Mining
De Beers
The Economist
International Coffee Organization
World Diamond Council
United States of America
Government officials
Department of State
– Bureau of African Affairs
– Bureau of International Organization Affairs
Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney, Fifth District, Georgia
United Nations agencies and offices
UNESCO and United Nations Foundation/White Oak Conference
International organizations
World Bank
Other
Oregon Certification Group
SmartWood
University of Maryland
Zimbabwe
Government officials
Senior Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Energy and Mines
Chief Executive Officer, Civil Aviation Authority
Representatives of States
Belgium
China
France
Russian Federation
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
United Nations agencies and international organizations
UNDP
Heads of all United Nations agencies represented in Zimbabwe
Media
Zimbabwe Independent newspaper
Daily News
Other
First Banking Corporation Limited
Zimbabwe Transparency International
ZimTrade

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Annex III
Abbreviations
AFDL Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-
Zaïre (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Congo-Zaire)
BCD Banque de Commerce et du développement (Trade and
Development Bank)
BCDI Banque de commerce, du développement et d’industrie, Kigali
CEMAC Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique centrale
(Central African Economic and Monetary Community)
CIFOR Centre for International Forestry Research
coltan columbo-tantalite
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COMIEX (1) Compagnie mixte d’import-export
COMIEX (2) La Générale de commerce d’import/export du Congo
COSLEG COMIEX-OSLEG joint venture
ECA Economic Commission for Africa
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDD Forces pour la défense de la démocratie
FLC Front de libération du Congo (merger of MLC and RCD-ML)
Gecamines Générale de carrières et des mines
IDI International Diamond Industries
IMF International Monetary Fund
MIBA Société minière de Bakwanga (Mining Company of Bakwanga)
MLC Mouvement de libération congolais (Congolese Liberation
Movement)
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSLEG Operation Sovereign Legitimacy
RCD Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (Rally for
Congolese Democracy)
RCD-Goma Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie, based in Goma
RCD-Kisangani Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie, based in Kisangani,
later based in Bunia and referred to as RCD-ML

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RCD-ML Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie — Mouvement de

Libération, first based in Kisangani, later in Bunia
RCD-National Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie — National, located
in Bafwasende
RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front
SOMIGL Société minière des Grands Lacs (Great Lakes Mining Company)
SOMIKIVU Société minière du Kivu
SOMINKI Société minière et industrielle du Kivu
UDEAC Union douanière et économique de l’Afrique centrale (Central
African Customs and Economic Union)
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UPDF Uganda People’s Defence Forces
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZDF Zimbabwe Defence Forces

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