FIRST DIVISION
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN G.R. No. 164948
Petitioner,
Present
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. June 27, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
77826 which reversed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for
Adoption of the petitioner herein.
The Antecedents
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the
United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of
Guam, USA, filed a petition[3] for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon
Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986;[4] Elma Dizon Ramos, who was
born on September 7, 1987;[5] and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on
August 5, 1989.[6] The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos,
petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died
on May 19, 1990,[7] the children were left to their paternal grandmother,
Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-
married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no
longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-
laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors
are being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and
relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner
desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written
consent[8] to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that
she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already
married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives
alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and
works as a restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time
with the minors; her children gave their written consent [9] to the adoption of
the minors. Petitioners brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial
income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors
while in petitioners custody.
Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her
favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable
Court that after publication and hearing, judgment be rendered allowing
the adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon
Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the
minor childrens name follow the family name of petitioner.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the
premises.[10]
On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by Article 34 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to submit a report thereon not
later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the
petition.[11] The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance[12] but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its
behalf.[13] Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to
present her evidence ex parte.[14]
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine
Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written consent executed
by her and her siblings.[15] The petitioner marked in evidence the Affidavit
of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and
Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized by a notary public
in Guam, USA, as proof of said consent.[16]
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the
DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with the
following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma &
Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible for adoption because of the
following reasons:
1. Minors surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented
to their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is
in view of her inability to provide the parental care, guidance
and support they need. An Affidavit of Consent was executed
by the mother which is hereto attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their
willingness to be adopted and joins the petitioners
in Guam, USA in the future. A joint Affidavit of consent is
hereto attached. The minors developed close attachment to the
petitioners and they regarded her as second parent.
3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian
who has also family to look after. As young adolescents they
really need parental love, care, guidance and support to ensure
their protection and well being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended
that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D.
Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial
custody is hereby further recommended to be dispensed with
considering that they are close relatives and that close attachments
was already developed between the petitioner and the 3 minors.[17]
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:
The mother of minors came home together with her son John
Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to enable her appear
for the personal interview concerning the adoption of her children.
The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata
Landingin was conceived after the death of their paternal grandmother and
guardian. The paternal relatives including the petitioner who attended the
wake of their mother were very much concerned about the well-being of
the three minors. While preparing for their adoption, they have asked a
cousin who has a family to stay with minors and act as their temporary
guardian.
The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and
after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily
consented. She realized that her children need parental love, guidance and
support which she could not provide as she already has a second family &
residing in Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her children have
been supporting her children up to the present and truly care for them, she
believes her children will be in good hands. She also finds petitioners in a
better position to provide a secured and bright future to her children.[18]
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner,
likewise, failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia
assents to the adoption.
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for
adoption, rendered a decision granting said petition. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine
Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all
legal obligations obedience and maintenance from their natural parents
and that they be declared for all legal intents and purposes the children of
Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with considering that
parent-children relationship has long been established between the
children and the adoptive parents. Let the surnames of the children be
changed from Dizon-Ramos to Ramos-Landingin.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar
of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect the corresponding changes/amendment
in the birth certificates of the above-mentioned minors.
SO ORDERED.[19]
The OSG appealed[20] the decision to the Court of Appeals
on December 2, 2002. In its brief[21] for the oppositor-appellant, the OSG
raised the following arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE
PROPOSED ADOPTEES BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF
THE PETITIONERS CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONERS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH
THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED
ADOPTEES.
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision[22] reversing the ruling
of the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary
consent of Amelia Ramos, the childrens natural mother. Moreover, the
affidavit of consent of the petitioners children could not also be admitted in
evidence as the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated
or acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and although petitioner
has a job, she was not stable enough to support the children. The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision
dated November 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[23]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[24] on May 21, 2004,
which the CA denied in its Resolution dated August 12, 2004.[25]
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari[26] on September 7, 2004, assigning the following errors:
1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED
AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH
ARE OF WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF
CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE
CASE.
2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT
FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE
[27]
CHILDREN.
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the
following: (a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without
the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or
not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopters
children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner
is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as
stated in Malkinson v. Agrava,[28] that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to
allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and
give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation
of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus
be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives
of the law.[29]
However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals,[30] the Court also ruled that the
liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as
it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and
privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the
paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted
child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The Courts
position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to
inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the
discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on
best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights
of the parents over the child.[31]
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being
properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold
his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to
the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal
guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has
legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of
age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over,
of the adopter, if living with said adopter and the latters souse,
if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the
best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.[32]
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable
for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent
to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental
rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents.
In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos
to the adoption.
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to
interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son, John
Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in
the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is incredible that
the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent to
the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the petitioner bother to
present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the petition.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the
biological mother is no longer necessary because when Amelias husband
died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came back. The children were then
left to the guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal
relatives, including petitioner, who provided for the childrens financial
needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively abandoned the
children. Petitioner further contends that it was by twist of fate that after 12
years, when the petition for adoption was pending with the RTC that Amelia
and her child by her second marriage were on vacation in
the Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her,
and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social worker that she
conformed to the adoption of her three children by the petitioner.
Petitioners contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition
with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9
thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot
be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will
suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors
had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written
consent of their legal guardian.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his
child without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties.[33] The term means neglect and refusal to perform
the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent
withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and
neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the
child.[34]
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the
care of others is not such an abandonment.[35] To dispense with the
requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at
the time of adoption.[36]
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of
Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her
children. Petitioners testimony on that matter follows:
Q Where is the mother of these three children now?
A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.
Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an instance
where she communicated with the family?
A None, sir.
Q How about with her children?
A None, sir.
Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?
A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another man.
Q From whom did you learn that?
A From others who came from Italy, sir.
Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second
marriage?
A Yes, sir, she got two kids.[37]
Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:
Q Where is your mother now?
A In Italy, sir.
Q When did your mother left for Italy?
A After my father died, sir.
Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?
A Two years old, sir.
Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother
communicate with you?
A No, sir.[38]
However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also
stated the following:
IV. Background of the Case:
xxxx
Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the care and
custody of their maternal grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001
and an uncle, cousin of their deceased father now serves as their
guardian. The petitioner, together with her children and other relatives
abroad have been supporting the minor children financially, even
during the time that they were still living with their natural
parents. Their mother also sends financial support but very
minimal.[39]
xxxx
V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for
Adoption:
xxxx
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger
siblings. She helps them in their lessons, works and has fun with
them. She also encourages openness on their problems and concerns and
provides petty counseling. In serious problems she already consult (sic)
her mother and petitioner-aunt.[40]
xxxx
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors,
Amelia recalled that they had a happy and comfortable life. After the
death of her husband, her in-laws which include the petitioner had
continued providing support for them. However being ashamed of just
depending on the support of her husbands relatives, she decided to work
[Link] parents are also in need of financial help as they are
undergoing maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm
land which she used in going to Italy and worked as domestic helper.
When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3 children to
the care & custody of her mother-in-law who returned home for good,
however she died on November 2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from
Tarlac. They became live-in partners since 1995 and have a son John
Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of them are considered Italian
residents. Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment
of his marriage and his wife is amenable to it. He is providing his
legitimate family regular support.
Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a
month through her parents who share minimal amount of P3,000-
P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The petitioner and other paternal
relatives are continuously providing support for most of the needs &
education of minors up to present.[41]
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her
children, or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was
merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even
while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly
obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for,
as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious
personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to
the children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent
in-laws provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors
herein will have the effect of severing all legal ties between the biological
mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same shall then be vested on
the adopter.[42] It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial
consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to
deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. More proof has
to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and that
the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an
adopting parent.[43] Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes
precedence in adoption.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
which the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is
necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless
and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for
which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren
of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings
thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents
unless formally offered.[44]
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and of the Joint
Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity
of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of
petitioners children[45] was notarized on January 16,
2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same
way as a document notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section
2 of Act No. 2103,[46] which states:
Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in
a foreign country shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment and
authentication are made in accordance with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an
ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg d
affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or
place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or
officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place
where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that
the person acknowledging the instrument or document is
known to him, and that he is the same person who executed
it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and
deed. The certificate shall be under his official seal, if he is
by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate
shall so state. In case the acknowledgment is made before a
notary public or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of
the preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public
or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall be
authenticated by an ambassador, minister, secretary of
legation, charg de affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular
agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the
country or place to which he is accredited. The officer
making the authentication shall certify under his official
seal that the person who took the acknowledgment was at
the time duly authorized to act as notary public or that he
was duly exercising the functions of the office by virtue of
which he assumed to act, and that as such he had authority
under the law to take acknowledgment of instruments or
documents in the place where the acknowledgment was
taken, and that his signature and seal, if any, are genuine.
As the alleged written consent of petitioners legitimate children did
not comply with the afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by the
Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be proved either by
anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.[47]
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by
petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her legitimate children, the
same is inadmissible in evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not
stable enough to support the children and is only relying on the financial
backing, support and commitment of her children and her
siblings.[48] Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is financially
capable as she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a house, and
currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a
month. Her children and siblings have likewise committed themselves to
provide financial backing should the need arise. The OSG, again in its
comment, banks on the statement in the Home Study Report that petitioner
has limited [Link], it appears that she will rely on the financial
backing of her children and siblings in order to support the minor
adoptees. The law, however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a
position to provide support in keeping with the means of the family.
Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it
follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a
position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with
the means of the family.
According to the Adoption Home Study Report[49] forwarded by the
Department of Public Health & Social Services of the Government of Guam
to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate children, as
the latter are already adults, have individual lives and families. At the time
of the filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-
time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a
month. Petitioners main intention in adopting the children is to bring the
latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in
Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows
that the limited income might be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be
able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in
the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While
petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her
children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support
the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal
relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not
prove nor support petitioners allegation that her siblings and her children are
financially able and that they are willing to support the minors herein. The
Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for
her nieces and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against
reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented from
filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice