S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.

WILLIAM VAN
BUSKIRK, Defendant-Appellant.

Facts:

On September 11, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, together with her child, was riding a carromata in Ermita, Manila
when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant (used for the transportation of fodder and to which two horses are
attached), came from the opposite direction, while their carromata went close to the sidewalk in order to let the
delivery wagon pass by. However, the driver of the wagon tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the
delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon to unload the forage. While doing so, another vehicle drove
by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the
delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon
the ground and was unable to stop the horses. The horses then ran up and on which street they came into collision
with the carromata in which the plaintiff was ridding.

The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time of the accident, was actually
a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver
some forage at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the defendant’s employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the
front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by
the driver and made noises that frightened the horses causing them to run. The employee failed to stop the horses
since he was thrown upon the ground.

From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty of negligence. The court specifically cited a
paragraph of Article 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to reverse such decision.

Issue:
whether or not the employer is liable for the negligence of such driver in handling the team under the last
paragraph of the above provisions.

Held:

No. It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that
the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other five or six
months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they were left on
the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident due
to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day
of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being
delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.

“Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or
customary results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted in accident or injury, the actor is necessarily
negligent, is to go far. The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in such a case,
does not in any sense militate against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates a prima facie case,
and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act complained of was performed. It is
something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant’s case showing the conditions and circumstances under
which the injury occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears.” - Inland and Seaboard
Costing Co. v. Tolson (139 U.S., 551)
 Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co.

(CA-G.R. No. 3240-R, September 20, 1949)

Facts:

In the afternoon of May 5, 1946 while the plaintiff-appellee and other companions were loading grass, an
electric transmission wire, installed and maintained by the defendant Philippine Power and Development Co., Inc.,
alongside the road suddenly parted, and one of the broken ends hit the head of the plaintiff as he was about to board
the truck. As a result, plaintiff received the full shock of 4,400 volts of the wire. The electric charge coursed through his
body and caused extensive and serious multiple burns from skull to eyes, leaving the bone exposed in some parts and
causing intense pain and wounds that were not completely healed when the case was tried on June 18, 1947, over
one year after the incident. Defendant disclaimed such liability on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show any
specific act of negligence in evidence

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant is liable for the negligence in maintaining the electric transmission wire.

Held:

The appellate court held: “in case of non-contractual negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on
the plaintiff to establish that the proximate cause of injury was the negligence of the defendant, it is also a recognized
principle that ‘where the thing that causes injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of
the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur as if he having such control
used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from the
defendant’s want of care.’ And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he had observed due diligence
and care. This rule is known by the name of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself), and is
peculiarly applicable to the case at bar, where it is unquestioned that the plaintiff had every right to be on the highway,
and the electric wire was under the sole control of the defendant company. In the ordinary course of events, electric
wires do not part suddenly in fair weather, injure people, unless they are subject to unusual strain and stress or there
are defects in their installation, maintenance and supervision, just as barrels do not ordinarily roll out of the warehouse
windows to injure passers-by, unless someone is negligent (which is admittedly not present), the fact that the wire
snapped suffices to raise a reasonable presumption of negligence in its installation, care and maintenance.