Zach Schillace

POLS 435B

11.17.2016

The Great Earthquake, Fukushima, and Japans Energy Future

Introduction

On the eleventh of March 2011, the fourth largest earthquake ever recorded struck off the east coast of

Japan. This quake also created a tsunami, which had reached 38.9 meters high when it reached Iwate

Prefecture (Dunbar, 2011). Though the disaster inflicted damage and death throughout the Pacific

region, it wreaked the most bitter tally upon the islands of Japan itself. Japan’s National Police Agency

2015 report painted a bleak picture, “… there are 15,890 deaths and 2,590 missing… caused $220

billion damage in Japan and resulted in a nuclear disaster with an International Atomic Agency (IAEA)

rating of 7 at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Station…” (Dunbar, 2011) This last result of the tsunami is

the issue that most concerns this paper. A disaster within a disaster, the Fukushima power plant

experienced the loss of four of its six reactors, and spread radioactive material throughout the local

mainland area forcing the relocation of over 100,000 people. In addition to the human and material

cost of the disaster, these events have had a longstanding impact on the political and economic welfare

of the nation. In particular they caused the government of Japan to create new policies to make up for

the wide ranging effects of the loss of around 17% of the energy to the nations power grid in the

immediate aftermath of the earthquake alone (Masatsugu 2012). Practically this paper will focus on

three major policy issues the Fukushima disaster had a major effect on. Firstly, the government’s

reevaluation and scrutiny of nuclear power policy in general. The far reaching implications of the

Fukushima disaster both due to the resulting economic strain and long term ruination caused by the

spread of radioactivity led to a popular backlash against nuclear power in Japan, and a search for
expanding the nations alternative energy sources. However, the cost of increased imported fossil fuels,

as well as the loss of jobs in communities that surrounded nuclear plants lead to a counter push and

resurgence in pro-nuclear sentiment in the government which now determines future Japanese energy

policy. This leads directly to the second item, the importation of energy sources. Japan is poor in

natural resources, especially in coal and natural gas. After the Fukushima disaster and the loss of its

nuclear energy output, an increase in the importation of these resources became an essential policy of

the government as a means to make up the energy void. However, this new foreign policy, which in

some ways was essential caused an economic fallout as prices for energy skyrocketed. This in turn led

to a reexamination of Japan’s energy mix, and how it related to security. Finally the energy security of

Japan going into the future has been put into a tenuous perspective after the disaster and the closure by

the government almost immediately after the disaster of nuclear power plants nation wide. Essentially

a crisis of energy faith occurred in the nation. Nuclear power, for a long time deemed a clean, safe and

domestic industry had suddenly delivered to Japan and the world the worst nuclear disaster since

Chernobyl. As a major energy importer, Japan policy-makers sought to explore other sources of

renewable energy in an attempt to replace nuclear power, and to especially lessen the nations reliance

on energy importation. Overall, the disaster at Fukushima created a “soul searching” moment in

Japanese energy policy. The catastrophe was a major threshold concerning energy policy in Japan,

causing a relatively rapid change in perceptions of energy policy that so many had taken essentially for

granted. These changes were so dramatic that it forced the government into a series of equally

quickfire policy making sequences, dethroned a political party, and instigated measures that are still at

play five years after the events unfolded.

Nuclear Energy Policy

The immediate effects of the Fukushima disaster, especially on the local population, created a backlash

against nuclear power on the islands on Japan, and a reevaluation on the use of that power in general

compared to alternate energy sources. What was left in the wake of the tsunami that compromised the
reactors of the Fukushima I power plant was utter nuclear catastrophe. Defined as a level seven

incident on the International Nuclear Event Scale (the worst level possible), the after effects left a 3,000

square kilometer swath contaminated the government considering expanding that area to 13,000 square

kilometers (Fukushima 2015). This area was made uninhabitable by the enormous release of

radioactive particles from compromised reactors, forcing over 100,000 people to be relocated from

their homes and businesses. To put this radiation in perspective, the amount of material released was,

“...around 15,000 terabecquerels of caesium-137 was released from reactor 1–3 at the Fukushima Dai-

ichi nuclear power plant, 168.5 times that of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.” (Kim 2013)

While no reports of death due to radiation exposure amongst the refugees has been reported as of yet,

whole towns had to be permanently uprooted due to the fallout from this irradiation. In addition, long

term effects of the radiation spread by the disaster have been revealed, especially concerning farmland,

fisheries, and even the water table. International regulations for instance decree that, “the amount of

radioactive caesium-137 should not exceed 8 Bq/kg in milk and baby formula and 16 Bq/kg in all other

foodstuff” (Rosen 2012). However, in reaction to the excessive radiation levels in the areas

surrounding the Fukushima reactor, new government policy raised permissible levels, in milk to 200

Bq/kg, and to 500 Bq/kg for everything else (Rosen 2012). This is a blatant admission through policy

that a major radioactive presence has seeped into the food supply of the area. Indeed studies have

found that even outside of the governments original 20 kilometer evacuation zone radiation has snuck

into the food supply at unacceptable levels, except to this new, stand-in government policy. Most

damning was the discovery that, “...in a northern district of Tokyo, tap water contained 210 Bq/l of

iodine-131 (Rosen, 2012). The fact is that had there been no nuclear power plant built, there would

have been no Fukushima I to be destroyed by the tsunami, and therefore no spread of the radioactive

isotopes that made the surrounding area uninhabitable. The uprooted population could have returned to

their homes as soon as the more conventional debris from the tsunami and earthquake was cleaned up.

In Japan, there was a general sense that the humanitarian disaster was made much worse by the
radiation released, which created an additional environmental disaster as radiation was leaked into the

Pacific Ocean and the water table, corrupting local foodstuffs.

Because of this immediate backlash against nuclear power in general, the reigning Democratic Party of

Japan at the time, decided that a major reduction in dependence on nuclear power was necessary. To

this end new policies and committees were established to look into the ability to rein back on nuclear

power while expanding coal, liquid natural gas (LNG), and renewable sources such as solar, or wind.

This effort crystallized shortly after the Fukushima disaster in July of 2011, “… Energy & Environment

Council (Enecan or EEC) was set up by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) cabinet office as part of

the National Policy Unit to recommend on Japan's energy future to 2050.* It was chaired by the

Minister for National Policy to focus on future dependence on nuclear power. Its initial review was to

recommend that nuclear power's contribution to electricity be targeted at 0%, 15%, or 20-25% for the

medium term...” (Nuclear 2015) To this end 50 nuclear power plants in Japan were shut down pending

reviews of their management, and safety procedures. This placed enormous strain on the energy grid of

the nation prompting the reopening of previously decommissioned coal and oil plants, which in turn

garnered concern both domestically and abroad of Japans’ commitment to clean energy. As an

acknowledgment of this concern and Japans’ desire to balance green policy with its increases reliance

on coal or oil based power plants, during a 2013 United Nations climate change meeting, “Japan’s

Minister of the Environment announced that his country was changing its CO2 emission reduction

target from 25% lower than 1990 levels by 2020 to a 3.1% increase from then, or 3.8% reduction from

2005 levels. He cited the shutdown of Japan’s 50 nuclear power reactors, some possibly for an

extended period, as a prime reason for this, forcing reliance on old fossil fuel plants.” (Nuclear 2015)

This careful attempt to balance a policy reduction of nuclear output, with an increased reliance on

imports of fossil fuels while toeing an international desire to keep close to clean energy targets was the

DPJ’s main focus post-Fukushima. In addition, the national government passed legislation aimed at

improving regulations that monitor life-extension of nuclear reactors, and increasing energy
conservation, “In the summer of 2011... measures were applied leading to a 12% reduction in power

consumption... and more significantly, a reduction in peak demand reaching 18%...” (Nuclear 2015).

These policies were aimed to hopefully improve the quality of remaining active nuclear plants (or even

make life-extension an unattainable goal for some forcing their closure), but more importantly

conservation measures would reduce over all energy consumption and thus curb the pain incurred from

increased energy imports. Overall it seemed as though the public in general favored this DPJ policy of

distancing domestic energy generation from nuclear options. When asked about nuclear energy in

Japan, “in March 2013, the proportion opting for increase or status quo had dropped to 22%, while 53%

wanted to decrease it and 20% wanted to abolish it.” (Nuclear, 2015) However in the long term, their

anti-nuclear policies would end up having a negative effect on the DPJ’s control of the government,

and even directly contribute to losing their majority to a resurgent Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

While the DPJ was busying itself with regulations and rollbacks on nuclear energy policy, it was also

steadily distancing itself from the significant constituencies that revolved on the economics

surrounding nuclear towns, which eventually translated to a LDP takeover in 2012. The LDP had been

focusing on a more pro-nuclear platform, concerned with rising fossil fuel expenditures and the

communities which relied on nuclear power plants. By positioning itself as dynamically opposed to

DPJ policies, the LDP was able to pick up support among these communities as well as any businesses

that were negatively impacted by the increase in energy imports, “In December 2012, after a decisive

victory in national elections for the Diet's lower house, with 294 out of 480 seats, the LDP took a more

positive view of restarting idled nuclear power plants than its predecessor, which had seemed

indifferent to electricity shortages and massive LNG and other fossil fuel import costs. The new

government said it would take responsibility for allowing reactor restarts... Construction of Shimane 3

and Ohma 1 was to continue, and the construction of up to 12 further units could be approved.

(Nuclear, 2015) The ultimate goal was to promote the reopening of nuclear power plants while

introducing firmer regulations to prevent future disasters. By refocusing on a pro-nuclear policy, a

These measures seemed to hit the nail on the head and in 2013, the LDP and its partner won a majority

with 115 seats in the Diet’s upper house. (Nuclear 2015) The nuclear issue was clearly a major winner

for the LDP, which doubled down on supporting pro-nuclear policies. For instance, in every district

that contained a nuclear power plant the LDP was able to secure a seat in the Diet (Nuclear 2015)

Moving forward the LDP backtracked on the DPJ’s attempts to eventually weed out all nuclear power.

In an attempt to become more self sufficient by reducing dependence on imported energy sources as

well as promote energy security, “In June 2015 the government's draft plan for electricity generation to

2030 was approved. This has nuclear at 20-22%, renewables 22-24%, LNG 27% and coal 26%. It aims

to reduce CO2 emissions by 21.9% by 2030 from the 2013 level, and to improve the energy self-

sufficiency rate to 24.3%, from 6.3% in 2012.” (Nuclear 2015) Considering the desired rates of CO2

emissions and self-sufficiency the nuclear percentage of Japans projected energy mix will likely rise.

Over all the Fukushima disaster led to a soul searching moment in Japanese energy policy. Was the

nuclear energy, with its low environmental footprint and ability to free Japan from international

dependence on energy imports worth the potential risks, especially in a nation prone to earthquakes?

While in the short term the DPJ attempted to rescind national reliance on nuclear energy based on fears

of further catastrophes, the subsequent reliance on importing fossil fuels from international markets and

the economic consequences of that action resulted in political losses domestically, leading to the

resurgence of the LDP and a pro-nuclear platform that seems set on being projected into the future.

Energy Importation

Japan has a distinct history on relying on importation of energy sources to fuel its economy and at

times in its past, war was waged solely to secure foreign sources of energy. This history of importation

reliance stems from the fact that the islands as a whole contain close to no fossil fuel deposits that the

nation could theoretically exploit (Fam 2014). The rate of energy importation has increased along with

the industrialization of the Japanese islands, and as mentioned earlier led to an almost 84% of Japans
energy being imported. In an attempt to check this massive amount of imported energy and reduce

strain on the economy and industry caused by high domestic energy prices, the Japanese government

supported nuclear and renewable sources of energy. Both nuclear and renewable sources have always

been utilized at much lower levels than imported fuels, however the government had proposed plans

before 2011 to increase nuclear powers contribution to Japan’s energy mix to almost 60% (Nuclear

2015). The political and social reality in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster put a cold stop on

plans to expand the nuclear program, as plants around the islands of Japan were closed in fears of

similar malfunctions revealing themselves in a similarly catastrophic fashion. While the DPJ put

reopening these reactors on hold while they underwent stringent safety examinations, the immediate

result was a large gap in the national energy grid which had been filled with nuclear power. This

energy void led directly to an existential need to boost energy generation, energy which needed to come

from other sources.

While Japan was already a major importer of energy, this sudden loss of around 30% of its domestic

energy production meant that its rate of importation would have to be increased, especially in fossil

fuels like coal, LNG, and even oil. As a result of this necessary policy, “In FY 2012 the additional fuel

costs to compensate for idled nuclear reactors was ¥3.6 trillion ($35.2 billion), mostly for oil and LNG.

In 2013 Japan imported a record 109 million tonnes of coal, and plans to build almost 15 GWe of coal-

fired generating capacity were reported. (Nuclear, 2015) Such a massive increase in energy

importation had an immediate and detrimental effect on the economy of Japan. Especially effected

were domestic electrical suppliers who had to pay out more Yen to import foreign energy sources

instead of being able to rely on a percentage of cheaper domestic nuclear energy taking some of edge

off of their costs. The costs of increased importation are not constant either, but are projected to

increase over time and almost immediately resulted in losses, “The total net loss of electricity suppliers

(excluding Chugoku and Okinawa) reached ¥1.6 trillion ($20.5 billion); the additional fuel cost

increased ¥2.3 trillion ($29.5 billion), compared to the previous fiscal year. The government predicts
that the net loss of electricity suppliers will further expand to ¥2.7 trillion ($34.6 billion) in the fiscal

year 2012 unless the reactivation of the off-line nuclear reactors is realized. (Masatsugu, 2012) These

were all costs generated solely by attempting to fill the almost 30% power gap that had been previously

supplied by domestic nuclear reactors, and were in addition to costs associated with normal levels of

importation. While these electrical companies had been turning a steady profit before the shutdown of

nuclear reactors, the collapse of that industry in the short term after Fukushima demonstrated how slim

that margin of profit really was when put under emergency strain. In addition this rise of imported

fuels had a major impact on the Japanese economy as a whole, creating the first actual trade deficit the

nation experienced since 1980. Even though some reactors throughout the nation were restarted after

the government came under LDP power, trade was negatively effected by this importation for years

after the original increase in imported fuel, “The total trade deficit from April 2011 to end of March

2014 was thus ¥23.25 trillion ($227 billion), compared with previous surpluses of at least ¥2.5 trillion

per year (¥6.6 trillion in 2010). (Fam 2014) This was a huge impact on an already struggling

economy. It was clear that while importation as the primary source of energy during peak economic

years was an unfortunate necessity, if the system was exposed to strain, such as the loss of nuclear

power after the 2011 Fukushima incident, that the importation burden became untenable. This would

especially be the case if a long term loss of nuclear or other domestic means of energy production

occurred as was the case with the destruction of the Fukushima I plant.

Overall, though it is clear that heavy reliance on imported energy fuel was a historical norm for Japan

and that in all likelihood 100% domestic production of energy is out of reach for the foreseeable future,

that a continuation of the status quo would be impossible. While major changes concerning the

importation of resources may be out of reach, the LDP has already begun attempting to normalize the

relationship between nuclear, renewable and imported sources of energy in their 2015 draft for energy

policy aiming for a more balanced energy mix (Nuclear 2015). Overall, the importation issue, perhaps
even more than the actual destruction of the Fukushima I plant, exposed the major issues concerning

energy security that complacent policies in the past had caused.

Energy Security

National security has revolved around energy for many decades in Japan, perhaps highlighted the most

when Japan’s foreign policy was negatively effected by the US oil embargo before the energy crisis

forced an outbreak of hostilities between those two nations. The fact that Japan, as a modern nation

with an ever growing hunger for energy, has a distinct lack of domestic sources of energy production

means that securing avenues of access to energy is paramount. The first time during the post-war

period that Japan’s energy security became a major topic in foreign policy was during 1973. Japan was

becoming a major industrial power and in order to fuel this new sector of the economy became heavily

reliant on fossil fuel imports especially from the Middle East whose oil contributed to 66% of the

energy during 1974 (Nuclear 2015) However the security weaknesses that reliance on a single type of

energy source and from a single geographical location became apparent during the 1973 oil shock

(Nuclear 2015). The detriments of single resource and location energy led to a, “Re-evaluation of

domestic energy policy resulted in diversification and in particular, a major nuclear construction

program.” (Nuclear 2015) A mixed energy resource plan gives Japan more security as the lost of any

one source of energy can be offset by either importing more in the case of fossil fuels or constructing

more renewable energy plants or nuclear reactors. However, in the current era, even a peaceful Japan

still requires a massive amount of energy resources. Despite an increase in the amount of nuclear

reactors that service the nations power grid, Japan still imports almost 84% of its power requirements

(Nuclear 2015) This means that even with a diverse portfolio of energy sources, nearly 84% of Japans

energy needs are reliant on foreign nations or NGOs and thus true control or security over those

resources is unattainable. The Fukushima disaster, and the anti-nuclear power policies the DPJ pursued

in its wake only served to hinder Japan’s energy security, making it even more reliant on source of

imported energy, “With atomic stations providing close to 30% of Japan’s electricity before the
Fukushima disaster, utilities have been forced to rely more on oil- and gas-fired power plants to make

up the difference. The increased use of thermal plants to make up for the loss of nuclear output caused

higher fuel import costs, borne by Japanese consumers and industries, and leading to a first trade deficit

since 1980.” (Vivid, 2013) Thus an over reliance on imported energy sources resulted, in the case of a

national emergency, in an economic and energy crisis. This did not merely have an effect on large

corporations or the government but individual Japanese citizens as well. For everyone, the increase in

imported energy sources created a rise in energy prices, “As a consequence of a nuclear shutdown and

increased cost of energy imports, corporate customers in and around Tokyo will pay up to 18% more

for their electricity beginning April 2012. In 2012, a regular household’s electricity bill is predicted to

increase by ¥1,049, or 18%, and the rate for industrial consumers by 36% per month on average due to

rise in fuel costs...” (Vivid, 2013) This was a classic trickle down effect. The extra-operating costs of

the electrical companies were passed along to average Japanese citizens at the consumer end. Another

relatively quirky, but significant weakness in energy security was an east west divide that became

important when eastern electrical companies promised to send power to the affected western districts to

alleviate some of the losses felt immediately after the Fukushima disaster. In essence there is a power-

barrier between the two halves of the main island, “A peculiarity of Japan's electricity grids is that on

the main island, Honshu, the northeastern half including Tokyo is 50 Hz, served by Tepco... the

southwestern half including Nagoya, Kyoto and Osaka is 60 Hz, served by Chubu… and there is only

1.2 GWe of frequency converters connecting them.” (Nuclear 2015). This particular anachronism, the

result of two different nations technological influence on the island, became another barrier to ease of

energy transfer. While not as serious as the importation issue, the fact that a leading nation like Japan

experiences difficulty directing energy flow between two very close regions within its own national

boundaries has an impact on energy security that was on display for all to see as citizens in the eastern

region had to experience black outs due to the inability to successfully transfer enough power in a

timely manner. These are all examples of reliance on outmoded energy systems that destabilized the
Japanese energy grid after the Fukushima disaster, and revealed the truly poor level of energy security

being practiced in a complacent and unprepared nation..

Not only does reliance on foreign energy create poor energy security at home but can be a detriment to

international relations even with close allies. For instance, “In January 2012, Washington applied

pressure on Tokyo to reduce dependency on Iranian oil and natural gas. This would be a further blow to

Japan’s already low diversified oil import portfolio. In 2011, Iranian crude oil made up 10% of Japan’s

oil imports… Yet, cutting Iranian imports carries risks for Japan as the country’s reliance on imported

energy has increased since the 3/11 disaster.” (Vivid, 2013) In the fluid world of international relations

the relative positions of close allies compared to that of energy source providers can create a strain on

Japan’s energy security or even national security as the goals of allied nations begin to conflict with

those of Japan’s. In the above instance, the United States desire to strengthen an embargo against Iran

will either the US-Japanese relationship if denied, or place a great burden on an already stretched

energy situation if Japan acquiesced. Going hand in hand with this example is the fact that foreign

nations that provide Japan with energy sources could, for political reasons, attempt to withhold vital

fuel to adversely affect Japan domestically. Even without this chance at trade belligerency on the part

of the international community, the fossil fuels that Japan imports have to reach its shores in the first

place, often passing through territory of nations or NGOs that could in theory hamper these vital

shipments. In particular concern is China due to a growing strain on Sino-Japanese relations, “China

also claims over 80% of the South China Sea, through which at least 70% of Japan’s oil supply is

shipped...” (Fam 2014) If as a measure of economic warfare, China decided that it would be beneficial

to disallow shipments to Japan to pass through its territorial waters, major harm could be caused to the

energy security of Japan. While shipments could be rerouted, extended time to delivery, market

uncertainty, and costs associated with both would still have a degenerative effect on the energy security

of the nation. In the long term with growing competition over remaining sources of fossil fuels and the
chances of global conflict between nations in the South-East Asia region risk a great deal of threat to

over-extended Japanese energy supply lines.

In addition, over-reliance on imported fossil fuels, especially coal, can jeopardize Japanese

commitment to international clean energy initiatives. This can produce strain between other nations

who may see Japans reliance on imported fossil fuels as unnecessary or harmful to previous

international agreements. Indeed, the new need to import additional fossil fuels to make up for

deactivated nuclear reactors has already has an adverse effect on Japans greenhouse gas emissions,

“Carbon dioxide intensity from Japan's electricity industry climbed again in FY 2012, reaching levels

39% greater than when the country's nuclear reactors were operating normally, and taking the sector far

beyond climate targets. About 100 million tonnes per year more CO 2 is being emitted than when the

reactors were operating, adding 8% to the country’s emissions. Emissions from electricity generation

accounted for 486 Mt CO2 (36.2%) of the country's total in fiscal [year] 2012, compared with 377 Mt

(30%) in 2010. (Nuclear, 2015) This extraordinarily rapid increase in CO2 levels has occurred

primarily because of the need to fill the energy gap left by the shut down of numerous nuclear power

plants. All of those extra tons of coal and other fossil fuels burning enlarges the carbon footprint of the

nation of Japan.

To this end, it stands to reason that energy security is directly equivalent to energy self sufficiency.

Essentially, the Japanese have outline nuclear power as traditionally holding this role of securing the

national energy interest, providing a bulwark against any rapid changes in the nature of imported

energy sources, “In April 2015 the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ) said that an important

economic role of nuclear power in the past was to reduce extreme dependence on imports, and this

policy had saved Japan from sending ¥33 trillion ($276 billion) overseas. "We are effectively living on

these savings and we may lose about two thirds by 2020 if we stay on this course," due to the "drain of

national wealth" caused by ¥3.6 trillion ($30 billion) being spent on imported fuel each year simply to

compensate for idled reactors. (Nuclear, 2015) This logic leads to the conclusion that nuclear power or
renewable energy, sources that can be secured within Japan and provide sustained energy over the long

term are obvious sectors to concentrate Japans efforts at energy security. While nuclear reactors

require fuel which may need to be imported in the short term, they can be erected on Japans soil and

project energy production far into the future. Renewable sources of energy such as solar or wind may

require substantial funds to initially construct but will in the long run produce energy that will far

exceed start up costs for such ventures. Indeed if it were not for relatively limited space on the

Japanese islands, and the complications of creating storage facilities for energy generated by renewable

sources, nuclear reactor may be left far behind. However, Japan had seemingly committed long before

the Fukushima incident to the projection of nuclear energy as a major source of power for the nation,

“In 2004 Japan's Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF) released a report on the future prospects for nuclear

power in the country. It brought together a number of considerations including 60% reduction in carbon

dioxide emissions and 20% population reduction but with constant GDP. Projected nuclear generating

capacity in 2050 was 90 GWe. This would mean doubling both nuclear generating capacity and nuclear

share to about 60% of total power produced. In addition, some 20 GW (thermal) of nuclear heat would

be utilized for hydrogen production. Hydrogen is expected to supply 10% of consumed energy in 2050

and 70% of this would come from nuclear plants.” (Nuclear, 2015) While the disaster at Fukushima

has dealt a blow to nuclear energy in Japan, the security derived from a projected 60% of all power in

Japan being produced by domestic nuclear reactors would be a major economic and security boon

going forward. This hypothetical scenario would mean a reduction of imported energy from around

84% to 44%, in addition to the environmental benefits of using cleaner nuclear energy over fossil fuels.

In addition, a reduction in the need for literally hundreds of thousands of tons of imported energy from

around the globe would mean that Japan could be much pickier when deciding upon which nations that

it deals with to acquire energy sources. Theoretically it could avoid belligerent nations, like the

aforementioned Iran, whose involvement could put potential strain on more meaningful international

relationships and alliances. In addition the reduction of costs on the electrical companies within Japan
by reducing reliance on imports and being able to concentrate efficiency on a fewer number of fuels

will create larger profit margins for those businesses and hopefully the savings will in turn be passed on

to consumers who will no doubt be thankful for lower energy costs. In the end, while the disaster of

Fukushima did reveal a great many things wrong with the energy security of Japan, without it those

issues may have never seen the light of day and could have led to an even bigger economic,

international, or ecological disaster in the years to come. At least now, the root of many of Japans

energy security issues has been revealed, and now policy-makers can take the necessary steps to secure

the island nations future.

Conclusion

While heavy investment in nuclear power going into the future seems to be the most logical course of

action to take to address the issues of energy importation and security, the catastrophe at Fukushima has

hurt the image of nuclear power in the public eye. This became apparent in the period immediately

following the disaster, with the major blunders as far as containment causing vast ecological issues.

However, the revelation that the nuclear industry was perhaps not acting as carefully as was warranted

led to more stringent regulations and inspections that have hopefully made the industry more robust

and safer going forward. The nuclear disaster was also imperative to cause the DPJ to shut down

nuclear reactors across the nation. Those anti-nuclear actions led to the necessary pursuit of policies

that increased Japan’s dependence on foreign energy imports. As far as energy security was concerned

this had an overall detrimental effect, with a major loss in control over Japan’s energy grid. In addition,

this increasing dependence on foreign energy sources had a negative impact on Japans economy,

spiking costs associated with energy consumption domestically as well as creating the first trade deficit

since the 1980s. This trend was put under a microscope via a Japanese investigation into the effects of

increased importation, “In July the government approved the FY2014 Energy White paper (to March

2015). It showed that the percentage of power from fossil fuel had risen from 62% to 88% over four

years, and the increased fuel cost due too nuclear shutdowns was JPY 2.3 trillion in FY2011, JPY 3.1
trillion in FY2012 and JPY 3.6 trillion in FY2013. Household energy expenses had increased an

average of 13.7% over the four years.” (Nuclear, 2015) These trends combined had a negative effect

on the DPJ’s domestic control, many constituents lashing out at the voting booth against increased

energy costs and a loss of jobs due to reactor closures. As a result of this loss in domestic support, the

LDP experienced a political resurgence, based largely upon their pro-nuclear energy stance and desire

to move towards stronger energy security. After stepping up the re-opening of several nuclear power

plants in an effort to take the strain of continued importation off the economy, the LDP took a firm

policy stance that ensured nuclear powers future in Japan, as well as the nations goal to reduce reliance

on imported energy sources from foreign nations, “In June 2015 the government's draft plan for

electricity generation to 2030 was approved. This has nuclear at 20-22%, renewables 22-24%, LNG

27% and coal 26%. It aims to reduce CO2 emissions by 21.9% by 2030 from the 2013 level, and to

improve the energy self-sufficiency rate to 24.3%, from 6.3% in 2012.” (Nuclear, 2015) This plan

would seem to be the energy focused section of an overall more conservative and security oriented

government. In essence the ability to reduce overall reliance on imported energy contributes directly to

national security as a whole, making Japan less dependent on foreign powers and their resources, while

also giving the nation more leeway when pursing international relations. This will give Japanese

foreign policy, as displayed in the Iran example, a freer hand less reliant on maintaining ties to nations

in poor international standing based solely on availability of energy resources and their willingness to

funnel those resources to Japan. In this way, Japan becomes a more attractive ally as well, without

being hamstrung by numerous energy agreements throughout the world. Without the political and

economic upheaval that resulted after Fukushima the desire and need to reevaluate Japan’s reliance on

importation and poor quality of nuclear reactor oversight and protective measures. To this end, the

Fukushima catastrophe has caused a political upheaval domestically, causing an energy renaissance that

has had a profoundly positive effect on Japan’s strength in international relations by creating a need to
rethink the nations energy mix and security. Projecting this into the future a more robust, energy secure

nation can interact on the global stage with more self assurance.

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