AN ACT CREATING THE PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE OF TRADITIONAL AND

ALTERNATIVE HEALTH CARE (PITAHC) TO ACCELERATE THE DEVELOPMENT

OF TRADITIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE HEALTH CARE IN THE PHILIPPINES,
PROVIDING FOR A TRADITIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE HEALTH CARE
DEVELOPMENT FUND AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled::

Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the “Traditional and Alternative
Medicine Act (TAMA) of 1997.”

ARTICLE I
GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State to

improve the quality and delivery of health care services to the Filipino people through
the development of traditional and alternative health care and its integration into the
national health care delivery system.

It shall also be the policy of the State to seek a legally workable basis by which
indigenous societies would own their knowledge of traditional medicine. When such
knowledge is used by outsiders, the indigenous societies can require the permitted
users to acknowledge its source and can demand a share of any financial return that
may come from its authorized commercial use.

Section 3. Objectives. – The objectives of this Act are as follows:

(a) To encourage scientific research on and develop traditional and alternative

health care systems that have direct impact on public health care;

(b) To promote and advocate the use of traditional, alternative, preventive and
curative health care modalities that have been proven safe, effective, cost
effective and consistent with government standards on medical practice;

(c) To develop and coordinate skills training courses for various forms of
traditional and alternative health care modalities;

(d) To formulate standards, guidelines and codes of ethical practice appropriate

for the practice of traditional and alternative health care as well as in the
manufacture, quality control and marketing of different traditional and alternative
health care materials, natural and organic products, for approval and adoption by
the appropriate government agencies;
 (e) To formulate policies for the protection of indigenous and natural health
resources and technology from unwarranted exploitation, for approval and
adoption by the appropriate government agencies;

(f) To formulate policies to strengthen the role of traditional and alternative health
care delivery system; and

(g) To promote traditional and alternative health care in international and national
conventions, seminars and meetings in coordination with the Department of
Tourism, Duty Free Philippines, Incorporated, Philippine Convention and Visitors
Corporation and other tourism-related agencies as well as non-government
organizations and local government units.

ARTICLE II
DEFINITION OF TERMS

Section 4. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

(a) “Traditional and alternative health care” – the sum total of knowledge, skills
and practices on health care, other than those embodied in biomedicine, used in
the prevention, diagnosis and elimination of physical or mental disorder.

(b) “Traditional medicine” – the sum total of knowledge, skills, and practice on
health care, not necessarily explicable in the context of modern, scientific
philosophical framework, but recognized by the people to help maintain and
improve their health towards the wholeness of their being, the community and
society, and their interrelations based on culture, history, heritage, and
consciousness.

(c) “Biomedicine” – that discipline of medical care advocating therapy with

remedies that produce effects differing from those of the diseases treated. It is
also called “allopathy”,”western medicine”, “orthodox medicine”, or “cosmopolitan
medicine”.

(d) “Alternative health care modalities” – other forms of non-allopathic,

occasionally non-indigenous or imported healing methods, though not
necessarily practiced for centuries nor handed down from one generation to
another. Some alternative health care modalities include reflexology,
acupressure, chiropractics, nutritional therapy, and other similar methods.

(e) “Herbal medicines” – finished, labelled, medicinal products that contain as

active ingredient/s serial or underground part/s of plant or other materials or
combination thereof, whether in the crude state or as plant preparations.

Plant material includes juices, gums, fatty oils, essential oils, and other
substances of this nature. Herbal medicines, however, may contain excipients in
 addition to the active ingredient(s). Medicines containing plant material(s)
combined with chemically-defined active substances, including chemically-
defined, isolated constituents of plants, are not considered to be herbal
medicines.

(f) “Natural product” – those foods that grow spontaneously in nature whether or
not they are tended by man. It also refers to foods that have been prepared from
grains, vegetables, fruits, nuts, meats, fish, eggs, honey, raw milk, and the like,
without the use or addition of additives, preservatives, artificial colors and flavors,
or manufactured chemicals of any sort after harvest or slaughter.

(g) “Manufacture” – any and all operations involved in the production, including
preparation, propagation, processing, formulating, filling, packing, repacking,
altering, ornamenting, finishing, or otherwise changing the container, wrapper, or
labelling of a consumer product in the furtherance of the distribution of the same
from the original place of manufacture to the person who makes the final delivery
or sale to the ultimate consumer.

(h) “Traditional healers” – the relatively old, highly respected people with a
profound knowledge of traditional remedies.

(i) “Intellectual property rights” – is the legal basis by which the indigenous
communities exercise their rights to have access to, protect, control over their
cultural knowledge and product, including, but not limited to, traditional
medicines, and includes the right to receive compensation for it.

ARTICLE III
THE PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE OF TRADITIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE HEALTH
CARE

Section 5. Philippine Institute of Traditional and Alternative Health Care. – There is

hereby established a body corporate to be known as the Philippine Institute of
Traditional and Alternative Health Care, hereinafter referred to as the Institute. The
Institute shall be attached to the Department of Health. Its principal flag office shall be in
Metro Manila, but it may establish other branches or offices elsewhere in the Philippines
as may be necessary or proper for the accomplishment of its purposes and objectives.

Section 6. Powers and Functions. – In furtherance of its purposes and objectives, the
Institute shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) To plan and carry out research and development activities in the areas of
traditional and alternative health care and its ultimate integration into the national
health care delivery system;
(b) To verify, package and transfer economically viable technologies in the field
of traditional and alternative health care, giving emphasis on the social
engineering aspects necessary for group endeavor;

(c) To provide the data base or policy formulation that will stimulate and sustain
production, marketing and consumption of traditional and alternative health care
products;

(d) To organize and develop continuing training programs for physicians, nurses,
pharmacists, physical therapists, and other professional health workers and
students, as well as scientists, research managers and extension workers in the
field of traditional and alternative health care;

(e) To formulate policies that would create public awareness through educational
activities, conventions, seminars, conferences, and the like by focusing on the
promotion of healthy living for preventing diseases, thereby uplifting the health
care industry;

(f) To acquire or obtain from any governmental authority whether national or

local, foreign or domestic, or from any person, corporation, partnership,
association or other entity, such charters, franchises, licenses, rights, privileges,
assistance, financial or otherwise, and concessions as are conducive to and
necessary or proper for the attainment of its purposes and objectives;

(g) To receive and acquire from any person and/or government and private
entities, whether foreign or domestic, grants, donations and contributions
consisting of such properties, real or personal, including funds and valuable
effects or things, as may be useful, necessary or proper to carry out its purposes
and objectives and administer the same in accordance with the terms of such
grants, donations and contributions, consistent with its purposes and objectives;

(h) To serve as the coordinating center of a national network of traditional and

alternative health care stations located in the different regions of the country;

(i) To formulate a code of ethics and standards for the practice of traditional and
alternative health care modalities for approval and adoption by the appropriate
professional and government agencies;

(j) To formulate standards and guidelines for the manufacture, marketing and
quality control of different traditional and alternative health care materials and
products for approval and adoption by the Bureau of Food and Drugs;

(k) To coordinate with other institutions and agencies involved in the research on
herbal medicines;

(1) To adopt and use a corporate seal;

 (m) To sue and be sued in its corporate name;

(n) To succeed by its corporate name;

(o) To adopt its bylaws and promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary or proper to implement this Act, and to amend or repeal the same
from time to time;

(p) To enter into, make and execute contracts and agreements of any kind or
nature;

(q) To borrow, raise or obtain funds, or to enter into any financial or credit
arrangement in order to support or carry out its research programs, finance its
capital and operating expenses, subject to pertinent laws governing public debts
and expenditure;

(r) To invest in, purchase or otherwise acquire, own, hold, use, mortgage, pledge,
encumber, sell, assign, convey, exchange, or otherwise deal in real and/or
personal properties of whatever kind and nature, or any interest therein, including
shares of stock, bonds, notes, securities and other evidences of indebtedness of
natural or juridical persons, whether domestic or foreign and whether government
or private;

(s) To exercise all the powers of a corporation under the General Corporation
Law, insofar as such powers are not in violation of the provisions of this Act; and

(t) To exercise such other powers and functions, and perform other acts as may
be necessary, proper or incidental to the attainment of its purposes and
objectives.

Section 7. Board of Trustees. – The corporate powers of the Institute shall be

exercised, and all its business, activities and properties shall be controlled by a Board of
Trustees, hereinafter referred to as the Board.

(a) Composition. – The Board shall be composed of the following:

Secretary of Health – ex-officio chairman

Permanent representatives of the following government offices:

Department of Science and Technology;

Department of Environment and Natural Resources;

Department of Agriculture;
 Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and

Commission on Higher Education.

Representatives of the following industries/sectors:

One (1) physician who is engaged in the practice of traditional and

alternative health care;

One (1) member from a duly recognized academe/research institution

engaged in traditional and alternative health care research;

One (1) traditional and alternative health care practitioner who is not a
physician;

One (1) biomedical/allopathietwestem medical practitioner preferably from

the Philippine Medical Association;

One (1) member from the natural food industry and/or organic food
industry; and

One (1) member from an environmental sector organization,

The six (6) members representing the abovementioned sectors/industries

shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Health.

Of the appointive members, two (2) members shall have a term of three
(3) years; the second two (2) members shall have a term of three (3)
years; and, the third two (2) members shall each have a term of one (1)
year.

Any member appointed to a vacancy shall serve only for the unexpired
term of the member whom he/she succeeded.

(b) Meetings and quorum. – The Board shall meet regularly at least once a
month or as often as the exigencies of the service demand. The presence of at
least six (6) members shall constitute a quorum, and the majority vote of the
members present, there being a quorum, shall be necessary for the adoption of
any resolution, decision, or any other act of the Board.

(c) Allowances and per diems. – The members of the Board shall receive a per
them for every meeting actually attended subject to the pertinent budgetary laws,
rules and regulations on compensation, honoraria and allowances.
Section 8. Powers and Functions of the Board. – The Board shall exercise the
following powers and functions:

(a) To define and approve the programs, plans, policies, procedures and
guidelines for the Institute in accordance with its purposes and objectives, and to
control the management, operation and administration of the Institute;

(b) To approve the Institute’s organizational structure, staffing pattern, operating

and capital expenditure, and financial budgets prepared in accordance with the
corporate plan of the Institute;

(c) To approve salary ranges, benefits and privileges, bonuses and other terms
and conditions of service for all officers and employees of the Institute, upon
recommendation of the Director General and consistent with the salary
standardization and other laws;

(d) To appoint, transfer, promote, suspend, remove or otherwise discipline any

subordinate officer or employee of the Institute, upon recommendation of the
Director General;

(e) To create such committee or committees and appoint the members thereof,
as may be necessary or proper for the management of the Institute or the
attainment of its purposes and objectives;

(f) To determine the research priorities of the Institute consistent with the
framework of its purposes and objectives and in coordination with other
government agencies; and

(g) To exercise such other powers and functions and perform such other acts as
may be necessary or proper for the attainment of the purposes and objectives of
the Institute, or as may be delegated by the Secretary of Health.

Section 9. Director General and Other Officers. – The Institute shall be headed by a
Director General who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Health. The Director General shall have a term of
six (6) years.

The Director General shall be assisted by such Deputy Director General(s) and program
managers/coordinators as the Board may determine to carry out the purposes and
objectives of this Act.

Section 10. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Director General. – The Director
General shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
 (a) To exercise overall supervision and direction over the implementation of all
research and development programs of the Institute, and to supervise and direct
the management, operation and administration of the Institute;

(b) To execute contracts, including the deeds that may incur obligations, acquire
and dispose of assets and deliver documents on behalf of the Institute, within the
limits of authority delegated to him by the Board;

(c) To implement and enforce policies, decisions, orders, rules and regulations
adopted by the Board;

(d) To submit to the Board an annual report of the Institute;

(e) To submit to the Board an annual budget and such supplemental budget as
may be necessary for its consideration and approval; and

(f) To exercise such other powers and functions and perform such other duties as
may be authorized by the Board.

Section 11. Government Agency Support and Coordination. – The Institute may, for
the purpose of its research and development activities, obtain and secure the services
of scholars, scientists and technical personnel of any unit of the Department of Health
and other agencies of the Philippine Government. Such personnel may be paid
honoraria as may be fixed and authorized by the Board following the usual government
rules and regulations governing honoraria and allowances. The Institute shall also
assist, cooperate and coordinate with other government agencies, such as the Bureau
of Food and Drugs of the Department of Health and the Philippine Council for Health
Research and Development of the Department of Science and Technology for the
implementation of the purposes and objectives of this Act.

ARTICLE IV
PROMOTION OF TRADITIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE HEALTH CARE

Section 12. Traditional and Alternative Health Care Advocacy and Research
Program. – The Institute shall promulgate a nationwide campaign to boost support for
the realization of the objectives of this Act. It shall encourage the participation of non-
government organizations in traditional and alternative health care and health-related
projects. The Institute shall also formulate and implement a research program on the
indigenous Philippine traditional health care practices performed by “traditional healers”
using scientific research methodologies.

Section 13. Standards for the Manufacture, Marketing and Quality Control of
Traditional Medicine. – The Institute, in collaboration with the Bureau of Food and
Drugs, shall formulate standards and guidelines for the manufacture, quality control and
marketing of different traditional and alternative health care materials and products.
Section 14. Incentives for the Manufacturers of Traditional and Alternative Health
Care Products. – Manufacturers of traditional and alternative health care products like
herbal medicinal plants shall enjoy such exemptions, deductions and other tax
incentives as may be provided for under the Omnibus Investment Code, as amended.

Section 15. Traditional and Alternative Health Care Development Fund. – To

implement the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created a Traditional and
Alternative Health Care Development Fund which shall be used exclusively for the
programs and projects of the Institute, in the amount of Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000,00) for the first year, Seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000.00) for the
second year, and One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the third year from
the earnings of Duty Free Philippines: Provided, That not more than fifteen percent
(15%) of said fund shall be used for administrative costs of the Institute.

Thereafter, such amount as may be necessary to fund the continued implementation of

this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

ARTICLE V
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

Section 16. Appointment of Board Members. – Within thirty (30) days from the date
of effectivity of this Act, the President of the Philippines shall appoint the members of
the Board as well as the Director General and Deputy Director General(s).

Section 17. Transfer of Functions of the Traditional Medivine Unit. – Upon the
establishment of the Institute, the functions, personnel and assets of the Traditional
Medicine Unit and all the pharmaceutical and herbal processing plants of the
Department of Health shall be transferred to the Institute without need of conveyance,
transfer of assignment.

For the year, during which this Act was approved, the unexpended portion of the budget
of the offices, agencies and units merged shall be utilized for establishing the Institute
and initiating its operations, including the formulation of the rules and regulations
necessary for the implementation of this Act.

Incumbent officials and employees of the affected offices shall continue to exercise their
respective functions, duties and responsibilities with the corresponding benefits and
privileges. To the greatest extent possible and in accordance with existing laws, all
employees of the affected offices, agencies and units shall be absorbed by the Institute.

ARTICLE VI
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Section 18. Oversight Function. – The Institute shall submit to Congress an annual
accomplishment report which shall include the status of its priority researches and
operation. In the exercise of its oversight functions, Congress may inquire into the
programs of the Institute.

Section 19. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within thirty (30) days from the
completion of their appointments, the Board shall convene and, in collaboration with the
Department of Health – Traditional Medicine Unit, formulate the rules and regulations
necessary for the implementation of this Act. Said rules and regulations shall be issued
within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the Board’s initial meeting and
shall take effect upon publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Section 20. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, executive orders, and other laws
including their implementing rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby amended, repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 21. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is declared

unconstitutional or invalid, other provisions thereof which are not affected thereby shall
continue in full force and effect.

Section 22. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.

Approved: December 9, 1997

 MALACAÑANG
Manila

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 541 August 20, 1974

ALLOWING FORMER FILIPINO PROFESSIONALS TO PRACTICE THEIR RESPECTIVE

PROFESSIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES.

WHEREAS, a considerable number of Filipino professionals have, with the passage of time, gone to
other countries to pursue further studies and/or take up specialized studies in their chosen fields of
endeavor while others emigrated to other lands in search of better job opportunities;

WHEREAS, since their departure from the Philippines some of these professionals have become
naturalized citizens of their host countries so that they are now barred from the practice of their
profession in our country;

WHEREAS, a considerable number of these erstwhile Filipino professionals are now desirous to
come home under the Balikbayan Program and, while here, would like to serve our people or share
their advanced knowledge and expertise with their local professional colleagues;

WHEREAS, for the sake of faster national development our government is now trying to attract these
erstwhile Filipino professionals to return and reside permanently in the Philippines so that they can
provide the talent and expertise urgently needed by the homeland;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order the following:

Section 1. The provisions of all existing laws, rules and regulations, decrees, orders, and
instructions to the contrary notwithstanding, professionals who were formerly citizens of the
Philippines and who have previously passed licensure examinations in the Philippines for the
practice of their profession, may, while in this country on a visit, sojourn or permanent residence,
practice their profession: Provided, That they are professional practitioners of good standing prior to
their departure from the Philippines and in their adopted country: Provided further, That prior to the
practice of their profession they shall have first registered with the Professional license fee; and
Provided finally, That they shall pay the corresponding income tax due on all incomes realized by
them in the practice of their respective professions in the Philippines.

Section 2. The Professional Regulations Commission shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to implement and carry out the purposes of this Decree.

Section 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 20th day of August, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-four.
 MALACAÑANG
Manila

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 819 October 24, 1975

DECLARING A BALIK-SCIENTIST PROGRAM, ALLOWING ANY FOREIGN-BASED

SCIENTISTS, PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICIAN, OR ANY PERSON WITH SPECIAL SKILL OR
EXPERTISE WHO IS OF FILIPINO ORIGIN OR DESCENT TO PRACTICE HIS/HER
PROFESSION OR EXPERTISE IN THE PHILIPPINES AND ALIGNING INCENTIVES FOR
HIM/HER AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

WHEREAS, Letter of Instruction No. 210 dated August 20, 1974 extending the Balikbayan Program
to another period beginning September 1, 1975 to February 29, 1976, and has especially
emphasized "our duty to encourage overseas Filipino scientists and technicians to come home and
apply their knowledge to the development programs of the country . . .";

WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 541 allows erstwhile Filipino professionals to practice their
professions in the Philippines under certain conditions but did not specify Filipino professionals who
passed licensure examinations given by their host country;

WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 659 amending Section 5(j) of Presidential Decree No. 223
allows foreign nationals to practice their professions in the Philippines, also under certain conditions,
but did not include those of Filipino origin and descent and their families who may also qualify under
the Balikbayan Program;

WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 439 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 592 providing for
tax holiday for overseas Filipinos as contemplated in Letters of Instructions No. 105, 163 and 210
which would include Balik-Scientists, is co-terminous with the Balikbayan program which will end on
February 29, 1976;

WHEREAS, there is need of attracting foreign-based scientists, professionals, or persons with

special skill or expertise who are of Filipino descent or origin to visit the Philippines in order for them
to learn the truth about the New Philippines and contribute their share in the building of a New
Society;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order the following:

Section 1. Any foreign-based scientist, technician, or professional, or any person with special skill or
expertise who is a Filipino or of Filipino origin or descent and the members of his/her family, who is
licensed to practice his/her profession, special skill or expertise in his/her host, adopted or native
country, may practice his/her profession, special skill or expertise while staying in the Philippines
either on a temporary or permanent basis upon approval by the Secretary of Health: Provided, That
such foreign-based scientist, technician or professional shall first register with the Professional
Regulation Commission regardless of whether or not, his special skill or expertise falls within any of
the regulated professions and vocations in the Philippines and pay the required license fee for the
practise of her/his profession, skill or expertisee in his country.

Section 2. All incentives, benefits and privileges now granted to or being enjoyed by overseas
homecoming Filipinos (Balikbayans) under existing decrees maybe availed of by professionals,
scientists, or technicians referred to in Section 1 hereof, for the duration of the Balik-Scientist
program which shall run for a period of five (5) years from the date of effectivity of this decree.
Section 3. The Department of Tourism, the National Science Development Board and the
Professional Regulation Commission shall coordinate their activities in this regard and, within thirty
(30) days from the promulgation of this Decree, jointly promulgate such rules and regulations as
maybe necessary to implement and carry out effectively the purpose, spirit and objective of this
Decree. Said Rules and Regulations shall include such additional incentives, benefits and privileges
that maybe necessary to attract the individuals referred to in Section 1 hereof, to come and help in
the scientific and technological advancement of the country.

Section 4. The Secretary of Tourism, in his capacity as Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, or
his duly authorized representative, is hereby authorized to negotiate with or secure from any airline
company non-revenue or discounted air passage tickets for the use of any of the individuals covered
by this Decree.

Section 5. All laws, decrees, orders, letters of instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof that
are inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed, superseded, modified or
amended accordingly.

Section 6. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 24th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-five.
 [ GR No. 46094, Sep 27, 1939 ]

PEOPLE v. FERNANDO C. QUEBRAL +

DECISION
68 Phil. 564

MORAN, J.:
In June, 1937, the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan filed an information
against the accused, Fernando C. Quebral, for violation of section 770 of the
Administrative Code. The pertinent portion of the information reads as
follows:
"Que en o hacia y desde el año de 1930 en adelante hasta el mes de mayo de
1937, inclusive, en los municipios de San Jacinto, Mapandan, Mangaldan y
Dagupan, Provincia de Pangasinan, Filipinas, y dentro de la jurisdiccion de
este Juzgado, el acusado arriba nombrado voluntaria, ilegal y
criminalmente y sin haber obtenido previamente el certificado de registro
correspondiente, expedido por la Junta Examinadora de Medicos, ejercio la
medicina dentro de los terminos del articulo 770 del Codigo Administrative
Revisado, * * *."
There is no question that the accused diagnosed, treated and prescribed for
certain diseases suffered by certain patients, from whom he received money
as compensation; but it is contended that no evidence has been adduced to
the effect that the accused had thus practiced medicine "without having
previously obtained the proper certificate of registration issued by the
Board of Medical Examiners," as provided in section 770 of the
Administrative Code.
As to this question, the lower court said:
"No hay cuestion alguna en cuanto al hecho de que los actos del acusado
probados por la acusacion constituyen un ejercicio de la medicina. La unica
cuestion, por tanto, a determinar es la de si o no incumbia a la acusacion
probar que dicho acusado habia ejercido la profesion medica sin estar
previamente registrado como tal medico.
"Teniendo en cuenta lo dispuesto en el articulo 297 del Codigo de
Procedimiento Civil y la doctrina enunciada por nuestra Honorable Corte
Suprema en las causas Estados Unidos contra Gonzalez (10 Jur. Fil., 67);
Estados Unidos contra Co Pinco (10 Jur. Fil., 370); Estados
Unidos contra Tria (17 Jur. Fil, 304); y Estados Unidos contra De la Torre
(42 Jur. Fil., 65), el Juzgado cree que no es necesario que la acusacion
pruebe que el acusado no estaba previamente registrado como medico
antes de ejercer la profesion medica, pues, si el acusado lo estaba, y funda
su defensa en tal hecho, a el incumbe probarlo."
The accused was found guilty of the offense charged and was sentenced to
pay a fine of two hundred pesos (P200) with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. He appealed, and, in this court, he reiterates his
contention that it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that he
practiced medicine without the proper certificate, and that there being no
evidence to that effect, he should be acquitted.
The rule is, and has always been, that, if the subject of the negative
averment, like, for instance, the act of voting without the qualifications
provided by law, inheres in the offense as an essential ingredient thereof,
the prosecution has the burden of proving the same. (Sec. 297, Act No. 190;
U. S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil., 303, 306, 307.) In view, however, of the difficult
office of proving a negative allegation, the prosecution, under such
circumstance, need do no more than make a prima facie case from the best
evidence obtainable. (U. S. vs. Tria, supra.) It would certainly be
anomalous to hold "* * * that mere difficulty in discharging a burden of
making proof should displace it; and as a matter of principle the difficulty
only relieves the party having the burden of evidence from the necessity of
creating positive conviction entirely by his own evidence; so that, when he
produces such evidence as it is in his power to produce, its probative effect
is enhanced by the silence of his opponent." (22 C. J., pp. 81, 82.)
The rule, however, is different when the subject of the negative averment
does not constitute an essential element of the offense, but is purely a
matter of defense. In such case, the burden of proof is upon the defendant.
As to whether or not a negative averment is a matter of defense, is a
question which we have fully discussed in United States vs. Chan Toco (12
Phil, 262).
Section 770 of the Administrative Code provides that "no person shall
practice medicine in the Philippine Islands without having previously
obtained the proper certificate of registration issued by the Board of
Medical Examiners * * *." This provision clearly includes the want of
certificate as an essential element of the offense charged. The negative fact
is not separable from the offense as defined. It is, therefore, incumbent
upon the prosecution to prove that negative fact, and failure to prove it is a
ground for acquittal.
In the instant case, however, the decision rendered by the lower court
makes mention of Exhibit F-2 as showing that the accused is not a
registered physician. That document is signed by Jose Ma. Delgado,
chairman of the Board of Medical Examiners, wherein it is stated, in part,
that "there is nothing in the records of this Board to show that Mr.
Fernando C. Quebral is a registered physician." This document is
admissible as evidence of its contents, under one of the exceptions to the
hearsay rule, regarding official written statements. "The certificate of a
custodian that he has diligently searched for a document or an entry of a
specified tenor and has been unable to find it ought to be usually as
satisfactory for evidencing its non-existence in his office as his testimony on
the stand to this effect would be." (3 Wigmore on Evidence, p.
561.) Furthermore, Exhibit H-3 is also mentioned in the decision of the
lower court, which is a letter of the accused to the President of the
Philippines, quoting approvingly an article published in the Philippines
Herald, wherein it is said that Fernando Quebral is not a holder of a doctor
of medicine degree. These Exhibits, F-2 and H-3, are sufficient evidence to
show that the accused has been practicing medicine without the required
certificate of registration issued by the Board of Medical Examiners.
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14160 June 30, 1960

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ANUNCIACION VDA. DE GOLEZ, defendant-appellee.

Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for appellant.
Aniceto V. Zezobrado for appellee.

REYES, J. B. L., J.:

On October 2, 1957, the provincial fiscal of Negros Occidental filed an information in the Court
of First Instance of that province charging Anunciacion Vda. de Golez with the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence, as follows:

That on or about the period comprised from December 12, 1956 to December 24, 1956,
in the municipality of San Carlos, province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, without being duly licensed
to practice medicine and with reckless negligence and without taking due precaution,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniosly diagnose, prescribe, and treat one
Susana Tam, who had been suffering for sometime with bodily ailment, knowing fully
well that she is incompetent and not possessing the necessary technical or scientific
knowledge or skill, and as a consequence of such negligence and carelessness and lack
of medical skill, said Susana Tam died thereafter.

The accused pleaded not guilty to the information.

When the case was called for trial, the assistant fiscal made a manifestation that the accused
had also been charged with the crime of illegal practice of medicine before another sala of the
same court. In view of this manifestation, the trial court motu proprio dismissed the information
for being fatally defective, without prejudice to the filing of the proper information against the
same accused. The grounds given for the dismissal were the following:

In view of the foregoing manifestation of the Fiscal, the Court finds that the information is
fatally defective and, therefore, should be dismissed under Par. (a), Sec. 2 of Rule 113
of the Rules of Court inasmuch as the facts charged do not constitute the offense of
homicide thru reckless imprudence because illegal practice of medicine is malicious per
se, and when the accused practiced medicine without academical preparation and
without a license to do so, then she is per se committing a criminal act for which the
criminal intent is presumed. Although the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence
can be committed by a duly licensed physician when in the practice of his profession he
fails to exercise due care and diligence from which the criminal act arises, this crime
cannot be imputed to a person who has no authority to practice this profession, which
act is malicious per se. The crime described in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
 results from the performance of a lawful act which was done without exercising the care
and diligence that is required by the circumstances, and not from the performance of an
unlawful act which is the subject of the information in this case because a quack doctor
who practices medicine does so against the law, and, therefore, his act is necessarily
malicious and criminal.

From the above order, the provincial fiscal appealed to this Court, and, through the Solicitor
General, urges that the court below erred in dismissing the information for being fatally defective
because the facts charged therein allegedly do not constitute the crime of homicide thru
reckless imprudence.

We agree with appellant that the order of dismissal is erroneous, in that the crime of illegal
practice of medicine is a statutory offense wherein criminal intent is taken for granted, so that a
person may be convicted thereof irrespective of his intention and in spite of his having acted in
good faith and without malice; i.e., even if he was not motivated by an evil desire to injure or
hurt another, but by an honest desire to cure or alleviate the pain of a patient. In fact, as defined
by Section 2678 of the Revised Administrative Code (the law then in force), the offense consists
in the mere act of practicing medicine in violation of the Medical Law, even if no injury to
another, much less death, results from such malpractice. When, therefore, the patient dies, the
illegal practitioner should be equally responsible for the death of his patient, an offense
independent of and distinct from the illegal practice of medicine.

The allegations in the information in this case that the accused acted with reckless negligence in
diagnosing, prescribing for, and treating the deceased Susana Tam, knowing that she did not
possess the necessary technical knowledge or skill to do so, thus causing her death, sufficiently
charge the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, since ordinary diligence counsels
one not to tamper with human life by trying to treat a sick man when he knows that he does not
have the special skill, knowledge, and competence to attempt such treatment and cure, and
may consequently reasonably foresee harm or injury to the latter, said accused was found guilty
and convicted by this Court of physical injuries through imprudence under the old Penal Code
(U. S. vs. Feliciano Divino, 12 Phil., 175).

However, in view of the error of the lower court in dismissing the information, we cannot sustain
this appeal for the reason that it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The present
information being valid and sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, the
dismissal thereof by the court after the accused had pleaded not guilty to the charge and without
his consent constitutes jeopardy as to bar further proceedings upon the case (U. S vs. Yam
Tung Way, 21 Phil., 67; People vs. Hernandez, 94 Phil., 49; 49 Off. Gaz. No. 12, 5342;
People vs. Ferrer, 100 Phil., 124; 55 Off. Gaz. [4] 620). The failure of the accused to file a brief
and raise the question of double jeopardy in this appeal does not mean that section 2, Rule 118,
providing that the People can not appeal if the defendant would be placed in double jeopardy
would no longer apply (People vs. Bao, 106 Phil., 243; 56 Off. Gaz. [51] 7768).

The unfortunate result in this case could have been avoided if the trial court had proceeded
more deliberately, without allowing its judgment to be influenced by preconceived notions or
undue haste in dispatching cases.

The appeal is, therefore, dismissed, with costs de oficio.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 78813-14 November 8, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FARHAD HATANI y ABOLHASSAN, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Nestor I. Madlansacay, counsel de parte for accused-appellant.

Nasser A. Marohomsalic, collaborating counsel for accused-appellant.

QUIASON, J.:

This is an appeal from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City,
convicting appellant in Criminal Cases No. Q-11867 and No. Q-11868.

The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. Q-11867 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Farhad Hatani
y Abolhassan, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal practice of medicine in
violation of R.A. 2382 otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959 (Secs. 8, 10)
penalized by Section 28 thereof with "a fine of not less than one thousand pesos
nor more than ten thousand pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, or by imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than five
years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court; and
considering the circumstances of the case and the ignominy caused by him to his
two teen-aged, female, then unmarried victims, this Court exercising its discretion
granted under said Section 28 of the law, hereby SENTENCES said accused
FARHAD HATANI Y ABOLHASSAN to pay a fine of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency AND to suffer
imprisonment of five (5) years; and to pay the costs.

This Court further recommends that after service of his sentence the accused be
deported as undesirable alien (Rollo, p. 35).

The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. Q-11868 reads as follows:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, FARHAD
HATANI y ABOLHASSAN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape punishable under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
SENTENCES said accused to suffer life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua; and
to indemnify the complainant, Precila Borja, in the sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) and to pay costs (Rollo, p. 41).

The information in Criminal Case No. Q-11867 charged appellant with illegal practice of
medicine, in violation of R.A. No. 2382, otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959, committed
as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of July, 1979, in Quezon City, Philippines the above
named accused, knowing fully well that he has not satisfactorily passed the
corresponding Board Examination, neither is he a holder of a valid Certificate of
Registration duly issued by the Board of Medical Examiners, as in fact he does
not even appear to have taken or completed the course leading to a medical
degree, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously for compensation,
fee and salary, paid to him directly, physically examined Priscila (sic) Borja Y
Loquero and Wilma Borja Y Loquero, diagnosed, treated and administer
injections on the persons of Prescila (sic) Borja Y Loquero and Wilma Borja Y
Loquero, in Violation of Section 10, in relation to Section 28, Republic Act No.
2382 (Records, Vol. I, p. 1).

The information in Criminal Case No. Q-11868, charged appellant with Rape, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 6th day of July, 1979, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, with lewd designs, and while she was deprived of reason
or unconscious after having been drugged or administered medicine, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the
undersigned PRECILA BORJA Y LOQUERO without her consent and against
her will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded under
the provisions of the Civil Code (Records, Vol. II, p. 1).

It appears that in the morning of July 6, 1979, Agustina Borja visited her comadre, Maura
Fontreras, and requested malunggay leaves as medication for her 16-year old daughter,
Precila, who had high fever and loose bowel movement. Upon learning that Precila was sick,
Marita, Maura's daughter, introduced Agustina to her husband, appellant herein, whom she said
was a medical doctor. Marita suggested that her husband treat Precila and Agustina agreed.

Appellant and Marita went to the Borja residence, where he examined Precila. He gave her
tablets to take and administered two injections (to her), one in the morning and the second at
noon. After each injection, Precila would feel dizzy and fall asleep.

It was appellant's diagnosis that Precila was a drug addict and required further observation and
treatment. Appellant offered to attend to Precila at his house and again, Agustina agreed in the
belief that her daughter was a drug addict.

In the evening of the same day, Precila was fetched by appellant and Marita and was brought to
appellant's house. Again, Precila was given an injection which caused her to sleep. When she
awoke, she realized that she was naked and her entire body was in pain. Appellant was seated
on the bed and was fondling her private parts. Shocked, Precila called for her mother and tried
to get up. Appellant, however, punched her on the chest and forced her to lie down. He pressed
a pillow on her face and injected her again, causing her to fall asleep.

When Precila awoke the second time, she found appellant in bed with her. He was naked and
fondling her private parts. The pain all over her body lingered. When Precila touched her private
parts, she saw blood stains on her hand. She tried to stand up but she was too weak. Appellant
gave her another injection rendering her unconscious.

The following morning, Agustina went to fetch Precila. Upon reaching the Fontreras' residence,
she went straight to the bedroom, where, to her great dismay, she found Precila and appellant
both asleep and naked. She hurriedly dressed up Precila and brought her home.

When Precila woke up, she noticed she was already home and her mother was crying. Precila
remained dizzy, with throbbing pains all over her body. When talked to, she was incoherent.

That evening, Precila's oldest sister, Josefina, a nurse by profession, came home and saw
Precila looking very weak. Her mother, who was crying narrated what she had witnessed that
morning. She also told Josefina that appellant was in the other bedroom, treating another sister,
Wilma whom he also diagnosed as a drug addict. Josefina immediately proceeded to the
bedroom and saw appellant about to inject Wilma.

Josefina saw the open bag of appellant, which contained empty capsules of dalmane and empty
vials of valium. She inquired on the need of the injection and appellant replied that a second
shot of plain distilled water was required to cure Wilma of her drug addiction. Josefina told
appellant to stop but he persisted. Only upon threat that she would call the police did appellant
stop. Appellant and his wife then left the Borja residence.

The following day, Agustina and Josefina brought Precila and Wilma to the Philippine
Constabulary Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, where Josefina and Wilma gave
their statements (Exhs. "D" and "F"). Precila was physically examined by a doctor, whose
medical report stated that Precila's hymen and "deep, healing lacerations" and that "subject is in
non-virgin state physically" (Exh. A). Several needle puncture marks were also found on
Precila's arms and buttocks.

A physical examination was likewise done on Wilma, which showed that she too had a needle
puncture, as shown in the Medico-Legal Report (Exh. "L").

Acting on the complaint filed before the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), a surveillance
of appellant's residence was conducted. Subsequently, a search warrant was secured from
Judge Jose P. Castro of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. Armed with the warrant,
CANU agents raided appellant's residence on July 15, 1979.

Assorted drugs, such as dalmane, valium and mogadon, as well as prescription pads in the
name of Dr. Jesus Yap (Exhs. "H" "H-4") and other medical instruments, such as a
"thermometer, a "hygomonometer (sic), stethoscope, syringes and needles, were seized.
The Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. "I") on the prescription slips showed that these were
written by the appellant himself. The report on the chemistry examination of the seized tablets
and capsules (Exhs. "J" "J-1") confirmed the presence of mogadon, dalmane and valium.

After the preliminary investigation, separate informations for rape and violation of R.A. No. 2382
were filed. Appellant pleaded not guilty to both crimes.

The defense's version is that in the evening of July 6, 1976, Agustina and Precila Borja visited
the mother-in-law of the appellant, Maura Fontreras. In the course of the conversation, Agustina
asked Marita if she could help Precila. Marita obliged and agreed to take care of Precila for the
night and allow her to sleep in her bedroom.

Precila and Marita chatted the whole night. Accordingly, Precila confessed that she was not
really sick. She merely related her personal problems, involving her parents. She also admitted
her vice, such as drinking, smoking and taking drugs.

Their talk lasted until the wee hours of the morning and during their conversation, appellant
would occasionally enter the room but he never joined their discussion.

Precila and Marita shared the same bed. Appellant; who was wearing only his pajama pants,
slept on the floor at the opposite end of the room.

The following morning Agustina arrived and Marita related some of Precila's problems. Nothing
untoward happened that day and Agustina headed for home while Precila and Marita followed
later.

At past midnight of July 15, 1979, a raid was conducted by CANU agents in the house of the
appellant under the supervision of C1C Agustin Timbol, Jr. The raid was made upon Josefina's
complaint for illegal possession of drugs.

Appellant and his wife were driven out of their bedroom, while three-men remained. Later,
appellant was called to join them in the bedroom and he was shocked to see assorted drugs
scattered around. Appellant denied owning them. Photographs were taken of him with the
drugs. A barangay official was called to attest to the list of the confiscated drugs. Appellant,
however, refused to sign the said list.

C1C Timbol offered to fur the case in exchange of money. Instead of acceding, appellant
demanded to see the search warrant. C1C Timbol failed to show a warrant on the pretext that
they were military men without need of any identification or search warrant. Appellant, his wife
and brother-in-law were forced to join C1C Timbol for questioning in Camp Crame. Upon
boarding the van, appellant saw Josefina aboard kissing C1C Timbol and both exchanged
victory signs.

The trial court rendered two separate decisions and convicted the appellant of both crimes. In
finding appellant guilty of illegal purchase of medicine, considerable weight was given to the
prosecution's exhibits.

The Professional Regulation Commission certified that appellant is not among the list of
registered physicians nor among those with special permit to practice medicine in a limited
scope (Exh. "K").
Appellant failed to refute the Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. "I") released by the PC
Crime Laboratory showing that the signature of Dr. Jesus D. Yap (Exhs. "H" — "H-4")
prescribing medicine belonged to him. The pictures also taken during the raid (Exhs. "G" - "G-8'"
undeniably reveal several medical equipment used by practicing physicians.

Notwithstanding the trial court's finding that there was no direct evidence of rape, it concluded
that circumstantial evidence indicate that rape was consummated by appellant considering the
following:

1. The medico-legal examination of victim Precila, taken on July 8, 1979 at 10:25

in the morning or less than 48 hours from the evening of July 6, 1979 found
"hymen with deep, healing lacerations at 4, 6 and 9 o'clock position"; thus
indicating that the lacerations were recent as they are in the process of healing;
(Exh. "A-1")

2. The above undeniable findings of the expert confirms the statement of the
victim, a young girl of 16 or 17 years of age, that when she held private parts
which were painful then, she noticed blood. (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 4-5).

The fresh laceration of the hymen further confirms the carnal assault. (People vs. Ocampo, L-
47335, Aug. 13, 1986)

3. In the two short waking moments of the victim she noticed she was naked and
beside her on the same bed was the accused, also naked. (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9,
1984, pp. 3-5)

4. The accused, then 21 years of age was in the prime of youth, and the
unconscious girl beside him was just 16 or 17 years of age, thus in the full bloom
of womanhood. The sexual excitement on the part of the accused was therefore
exceedingly great.

5. When the mother, Agustina, came into the room of the accused that early
morning of July 7, 1979 she saw her daughter and the accused on the same bed
and both naked. (tsn., Rogato, Jan. 27, 1981, p. 9)

6. The medico-legal found several needle puncture marks on the arms and
buttocks of Precila (Exh. "A"); thus confirming Precila's testimony that she had
been injected by the accused, rendering her unconscious (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9,
1984, pp. 4-5; tsn., Nenita, May 21, 1984, pp. 3-6; also pp. 29-30).

7. The medico-legal found the victim "in non-virgin state physically." (Exh; "A-i")

8. At the time of the medico-legal examination, i.e. morning of July 8, 1979, the
victim was found to be "incoherent." (Exh. A) — after effect of the injections or
drugs.

9. At the time of the incident (July 6, 1979) the Borjas and Frontreras (sic) were
"comadres" and neighbors. There is no enmity between and among them.
 10. Between accused and Marita on one hand, and the victim, her mother, and
sisters, on the other hand, there was no misunderstanding before the incident.
There is absolutely absence of any ulterior motive for the teen-aged victim or her
family to file the serious charge of rape which would expose her to
embarrassment of examination of her private parts and public trial (Rollo, pp. 38-
39).

In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

Appellant faults complainant for recounting her ordeal only after four years when she took the
witness stand. This argument is misleading. The record shows that the day after the rape,
Josefina and Wilma Borja, accompanied by their mother, Agustina, issued their statements at
Camp Crame. Agustina gave her statement twice on separate days. Precila did not give any
statement due to her weak condition but it cannot be denied that she was instead physically
examined. Suffice it to say, the Medico Legal Report (Exh. "A") indicates swellings and
lacerations and concludes that Precila was no longer a virgin. Although the records fail to show
any sworn statement by Precila, such is not fatal where the sworn affidavits of her mother, her
two sisters and the medico-legal report are sufficient to show probable cause of rape (People v.
Yambao, 193 SGRA 571 [1991]).

Precila was either dizzy or unconscious at the time she was sexually abused. We find her
testimony consistent and credible. While her testimony is limited to the times when she would
gain her consciousness, it is not unlikely that such traumatic incidents would still be engraved
on her mind even four years after.

Appellant's assertion that Precila failed to inform her family of his misdeeds is explainable. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Precila was still dizzy and incoherent as a
consequence of the injections administered by appellant. In fact, when Precila was physically
examined by the doctor the day after, she was still sleepy and groggy (TSN, March 31, 1980,
pp. 7-8).

Appellant also finds it strange that considering the acts allegedly committed by him against
Precila, the medico-legal report fails to specify any injuries on the body of Precila. Appellant
need not inflict heavy blows on Precila for the simple reason that she was under sedation. The
absence of the injuries does not negate the commission of rape (People v. Torrevillas, 203
SCRA 576 [1991]; People v. Arenas, 198 172 [1991]) for rape may be committed after rendering
a woman unconscious (Art. 335, Revised Penal Code; People v. Gerones, 193 SCRA 263
[1991]).

Appellant alleges that Precila was no longer a virgin on that fateful day and that her bleeding
was actually the start of her menstrual cycle. It is settled jurisprudence that virginity is not an
essential element of rape (People v. Corro, 197 SCRA 121 [1991]; People v. Banayo, 195
SCRA 543 [1991]). To claim that Precila's menstrual cycle began on that day is highly
speculative.

Appellant claims that the sworn statements of the Borjas (Exhs. "D", "E" and "F") were
antedated and were prepared after the illegal search was conducted in his residence. He also
cites some inconsistencies in said statements. We find the claim to be devoid of merit. It is only
now on appeal that appellant disputes the execution of these affidavits. When they were
presented and offered as evidence, appellant failed to raise such objections and to refute them.
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses merely refer to minor
details, which cannot destroy their credibility (People v. Doctolero, 193 SCRA 632 [1991]). This
is also true where statements made while on the witness stand are claimed to be inconsistent
with the affidavit, which are generally incomplete (People v. Lagota, 194 SCRA 92 [1991];
People v. Avanzado, 158 SCRA 427 [1988]).

With regard to the second assignment of error, appellant insists that his conviction arose from
insufficient evidence and his failure to prove his innocence.

Indeed, the circumstantial evidence established at the trial are more than sufficient to prove the
guilt of appellant. The Medico-Legal Report on Precila, taken within 48 hours from the
commission of rape confirmed that her hymen had "deep, healing lacerations at 4, 6 and 9
o'clock position" and Precila was "in non-virgin state physically" (Exh. "A"). Furthermore, the
report confirms that Precila had at least six needle puncture marks and swellings, which confirm
that appellant had injected her several times.

On the two occasions that Precila woke up, she positively stated that appellant was with her on
the bed and that they were both naked. She also tried to free herself on both attempts from
accused, but, he made her unconscious through injections (TSN, February 9, 1984, pp. 3-5).
This is corroborated by the testimony of Agustina, who saw her daughter and accused together
naked on bed (TSN, January 27, 1981, p. 9). These unbroken chain of events leads one to a fair
and reasonable conclusion that accused actually raped Precila.

As held in People v. Yambao, supra, credence is given to the findings of the trial court where
the rape victim's testimony is buttressed by the corroborative testimony of the mother and the
medico-legal report, as well as the report of the police investigator.

It must also be borne in mind that at the time of the commission of the crime, Precila was just
sixteen years old. No young lady at the prime of her youth would concoct a story of defloration,
allow an examination of her intimate parts and later bare herself to the disgrace brought to her
honor in a public trial unless she was motivated solely by a desire to have the culprit
apprehended and brought to justice (People v. Patilan, 197 SCRA 354 [1991]; People v.
Yambao, 193 SCRA 571 [1991]).

Appellant claims that his right to be presumed innocent was violated. He cites the trial court's
decision holding that it. —

. . . finds that with these circumstantial evidences (sic) pieced together the
prosecution has proved the crime of rape, and the burden shifted on the defense
to show the contrary (Rollo, p. 40).

Appellant was afforded a fair trial and in fact he availed of surrebuttal evidence. The statement
of the trial court, as correctly argued by the Solicitor General, implies that the circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction unless the defense is able to provide
evidence to the contrary.

With respect to his conviction of illegal practice of medicine, appellant presented inconsistent
claims. On one hand, he claims that the drugs and other paraphernalia were planted by the
raiding team; while on the other hand, he claims that these were seized without any warrant.
If indeed the evidence were all planted, how can appellant explain his handwriting on the
prescription pads in the name of Dr. Jesus Yap? A perusal of the photographs showing accused
during the raid, fails to indicate any protestation by him. In fact, the other photographs (Exhs.
"G-l", "G-2", "G-4" — "G-8") do not bear any sign of disorder, in contrast to appellant's testimony
that his room was made into a mess during the raid.

The records fail to disclose a copy of a search warrant. However, the prosecution was able to
present its return (Exh. "ZZ") and we are satisfied that indeed a lawful search warrant was
obtained. Besides, the judge who granted the search warrant was the same judge who initially
heard both criminal cases. It can therefore be presumed, that the search was made with a
search warrant and absent of any showing that it was procured maliciously, the items seized are
admissible in evidence (People v. Umali, 193 SCRA 493 [1991]).

The evidence is overwhelming that appellant actually treated and diagnosed Precila and Wilma
Borja. The positive testimony of Agustina, Precila, Wilma and Josefina Borja; the medico-legal
reports (Exhs. "A", "A-7", "C", "L" and "L-1") which attest to the needle marks; the Handwriting
Identification Report (Exh. I); the photographs (Exhs. "G-l — "G-8") showing assorted drugs and
medical equipment in appellant's room; and the chemistry reports (Exhs. "J" — "J-1") prove that
appellant was engaged in the practice of medicine. And as to his allegation that there was no
proof of payment, the law specifically punishes said act whether or not done for a fee.

Appellant claims that Precila admitted in her cross-examination that she was in school the whole
day of July 6, 1979 and it was therefore impossible for him to have treated and diagnosed her
on that date. An accurate reading of the transcript, however, will show that Precila's testimony
was in response to a question regarding her school schedule for that day.

Finally, appellant claims that the ponente of both decisions was not the trial judge, ergo said
judge was thus deprived of the opportunity to assess the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses.

Admittedly, the ponente's participation was limited to the resolution of the cases. The fact that
the judge who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment, and for that
reason the latter did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during
the trial but merely relied on the records of the case, does not render the judgment erroneous
(People v. Ramos, Jr., 203 SCRA 237 [1991]; People v. Villamayor, 199 SCRA 472 [1991]),
especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion.

WHEREFORE, the judgments appealed from are AFFIRMED in toto. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15079 January 31, 1962

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GUILLERMO I. VENTURA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Claro M. Recto for defendant-appellant.

BENGZON, C.J.:

Statement. —This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal finding
Guillermo I. Ventura guilty of illegal practice of medicine under Section 770 in connection with
Section 2678 of the Revised Administrative Code, and sentencing him, this being his second
offense, to pay a fine in the sum of P500.00, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay costs.

Appellant, the accused, was charged with the above offense in an information which alleged
that in February, 1955, he did, .

"willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and for compensation and reward, practice medicine
in the said City (Pasay) by treating and applying electrical appliances to patients for the
purpose of curing them with their ailments, diseases, pains, and physical defects from
which they are suffering and by holding out himself to the public by means of signs,
advertisements, and other means, to be a Doctor of Medicine."

Facts. — lower court found, as facts, the following:

"... in the year 1949, the accused herein, Guillermo I. Ventura, was convicted by the
court of first instance of Rizal of a 'similar offense' or illegal practice of medicine in the
municipality of Pasay, now Pasay City and sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00 under the
same legal provisions, or Section 770 in connection with Section 2678 of the Revised
Administrative Code.

"... by reason of certain complaints the National Bureau of Investigation had received
from the President of the Philippine Federation of Private Medical Practitioners and from
the Chairman of the Board of Medical Examiners, the National Bureau of Investigation
on December 16, 1955, sent its morgue attendant Jose Natayan to the clinic of the
accused at No. 2454 M. de la Cruz Street, Pasay City. Natayan was at that time
suffering from pains in his back and he asked the accused to see his sickness. The
accused attended to Natayan; wrote something on a piece of paper; and then he told
him that he (Natayan) 'was sick of lumbago'. Thereupon, the accused asked Natayan to
pay P5.00 and then asked him to pay the amount to a lady employee in the clinic which
Natayan did. At the request of the accused, Natayan, then went around the other side of
 the clinic where he was given an enema of hot water by a male attendant. Then Natayan
was asked to lie down on a table where his back was exposed to a big bulb for around
fifteen minutes and afterwards to a red colored bulb for another ten minutes. Thereafter
Natayan went back to the accused, who told him to come back to his clinic for six
consecutive days. After that Natayan went back on the same day or December 16, 1955
to his office in the National Bureau of Investigation.

The following day, Natayan returned to the clinic of the accused with the National
Bureau of Investigation raiding party composed of two agents, two attorneys and one
photographer. After he was dropped by the National Bureau of Investigation agents
about seven meters away from the clinic of the accused, Natayan proceeded to the
office of the accused, who then and there told him that another treatment would be
applied to him and that he would pay P3.00. After paying this amount and while Natayan
was lying on a table about to be given treatment the National Bureau of Investigation
agents raided the place.

The accused herein, Guillermo I. Ventura, is not a duly registered masseur or a

physician qualified to practice medicine.

Issues. —Appellant seeks a reversal here of aforementioned judgment of conviction on the

grounds: (1) that the offense charged in the information had already prescribed; (2) that the laws
involved are unconstitutional and void; (3) that granting that the said laws are valid, the accused
should not have been prosecuted thereunder because he was not engaged in the practice of
medicine; (4) that Congress, in passing House Bills Nos. 2405 and 357 recognized and believed
in the efficacy of the drugless systems of healing and although said bills were vetoed by the
President of the Philippines and thereby did not become regular statutes, they may be
considered as concurrent resolutions formally establishing the drugless system of healing as a
separate and distinct profession, not covered by Section 770 of the Medical Law; (5) that the
complainants and the Government are estopped from prosecuting the accused under Section
770 because they were the ones who induced him to practice drugless healing after his
conviction in 1949; and (6) that the accused has an implied license to practice drugless healing
from the people of the Philippines and the Chairman of the Medical Board of Examiners.

Discussion. — Appellant, testifying on his behalf admitted that for the past 35 years, he had
been practicing as a naturopathic physician, "treating human ailments without the use of drugs
and medicines" and employing in his practice "electricity, water and hand" without a license to
practice medicine; that during this time he had treated 500,000 patients, more or less about
90% of whom were healed, and that he had studied drugless healing in the American University,
Chicago, Illinois for about four years.

Invoking prescription, he argues that in view of the fact that he had begun the alleged practice of
medicine thirty five years ago without the required license, the crime charged in the information
had already prescribed.1

The records reveal that the accused began practicing his method of drugless healing 35 years
ago. This practice was first discovered by the authorities in 1949. He was prosecuted and
convicted therefor the same year. Sometime after he again set up a clinic. He had a lucrative
clientele and nobody bothered him.1äwphï1.ñët
However, at about February, 1955, the President of the Philippine Federation of Private Medical
Practitioners, complained to the National Bureau of Investigation that appellant was advertising
himself as capable of treating human ailments without drugs. Upon investigation, appellant was
found to be without certificate of registration to practice such profession either from the Board of
Medical Examiners or from the Committee of Examiners of Masseurs. So, this prosecution
started in 1956. It is clear that the four-year period of prescription of the offense charged should
be computed from February, 1955 when the National Bureau of Investigation discovered
appellant's alleged illegal practice of Medicine.

Appellant also questions the constitutionality of Section 770 in relation to Section 775 of the
Revised Administrative Code. It is appellant's theory that to require, of any person whose
business is merely to stimulate by mechanical means the nerves of the body, many years of
study in medical schools, taking up obstetrics, general surgery, gynecology, bacteriology and
many other sciences, is curtailment of the exercise of one's calling, a violation of the
constitutional principle that all men have the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
and are entitled to the equal protection of the law. It is furthermore theorized that inasmuch as
drugless healing is not taught in any of the medical schools prescribed, how could the members
of the Medical Board of Examiners pass on the competence of these drugless healers? .

This same contention was presented to and settled by this Court in the case of People vs.
Buenviaje who was convicted of illegal practice of medicine for practicing chiropractor.2 It held:

There is very little force in this argument. The subjects in which an examination is
required relate to matters of which a thorough knowledge seems necessary for the
proper diagnosis of diseases of the human body and it is within the police power of the
State to require that persons who devote themselves to the curing of human ills should
possess such knowledge.

In the instant case, we must again uphold these immutable concepts of the police power of the
State. Under this power, the State may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will secure
or tend to secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them against the consequences
of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud. As one means to this end, it has
been the practice of different States, from time immemorial to exact in any pursuit, profession or
trade, a certain degree of skill and learning upon which the community may confidently rely,
their possession being generally ascertained in an examination of parties by competent
persons, or inferred from a certificate to them in the form of a diploma or license from an
institution established for instruction on the subjects, scientific or otherwise, with which such
pursuits have to deal.3

Appellant claims that his act of stimulating the affected nerves of the patients without use of any
drug or medicine is not practice of medicine; that "practice of medicine" is confined only to the
systems taught by the medical schools, namely, the regular, the homeopathic and the eclectic
schools or systems.

Section 770 of the Revised Administrative Code in no uncertain terms covers appellant's acts.
The statutory definition as to what acts constitute illegal practice of medicine its provided in said
Section 770 includes the acts and practices performed by appellant, By his own statements, he
admitted to have continuously diagnosed and treated more or less 500,000 instances of
different kinds of human ailments and to have prescribed remedies therefor.
As regards the contention that there are at least two concurrent resolutions declaring formally
that Congress has recognized the drugless methods of healing, we need not elaborate further
than to say that not until such recognition is actually embodied in a statute, shall we extend
consideration of such method.

Appellant pleads that the lower court erred in not holding that the complainants and the
government are estopped from prosecuting him because they were the ones who induced him
to practice drugless healing after his conviction in 1949. He tried to show that medical
practitioners, members of Congress, provincial governors, city mayors and municipal board
members wrote to him requesting his help for persons suffering from all kinds of ailments; that
municipal ordinances and resolutions were also passed authorizing him not only to practice his
method of healing but also to put up clinics in some of municipalities; that he was even
extended free transportation facilities to work in the Central Luzon Sanitarium in Tala, Caloocan,
Rizal.

Above plea cannot be sustained by this Court. The doctrine of estoppel does not apply to the
government.4 It is never stopped by mistakes or errors on the part of its agents, even assuming
without conceding that said municipalities had encouraged appellant's practice. We cannot
allow the bargaining away of public health and safety for the semblance of benefit to a few
government officials, people or even municipalities.

Similarly, there is no such thing as implied license to practice drugless healing by the mere fact
that the Chairman of the Board of Medical Examiners had permitted appellant to serve free in
the Central Luzon Sanitarium in Tala, Caloocan, Rizal, or that countless people persisted in
engaging his services. For one thing, these people might have contracted his services on the
mistaken notion that he was duly licensed to practice his profession; for another, a repetition of
illegal acts can never make them legal.

As additional argument, appellant urges acquittal under the new Medical Act of 19595 wherein
the practice of physiotherapy is recognized as a distinct science. He claims coverage of said law
on the ground that he practices physiotherapy by massage through physical devices and upon
the recommendation of duly registered physicians.

The above argument has no merit because there is strong evidence to the effect that appellant
alone diagnoses his patients' ailments and applies the remedies therefor6 without written order
or prescription by a registered physician.

Judgment. — Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all parts and
respects. Costs against appellant.

Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and De Leon
JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22945 March 3, 1925

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOVITA V.

BUENVIAJE, Defendant-Appellant.

Francisco and Lualhati and Ariston Rivera for appellant.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

OSTRAND, J.:

The defendant is accused of the violation of the Medical Act, the information alleging "that on or
about the first day of June, 1923, and for some time prior to said date, the said accused without
having obtained from the Board of Medical Examiners the corresponding certificate of
registration for the practice of medicine in the Philippine Islands, voluntarily, illegally and
criminally and for compensation, practiced medicine in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands,
assisting, treating and manipulating the head and body of Regino Noble for the purpose of
curing him of the ailments, diseases, pains and physical defects from which he pretended to
suffer, and advertising and offering her services as a physician, by means of cards which she
distributed and by letterheads and signs which she exposed on the door of her office, situated at
No. 712 Calle Asuncion, and in newspapers which are published and circulated in the City of
Manila, in which cards, letterheads, signs and advertising she added and prefixed to her name
the letters `Dra.,' which is the abbreviation of the word `doctor,' for the purpose of causing the
public to believe that she, the said defendant, had received the corresponding title of
doctor."chanrobles virtual law library

To this information the defendant demurred in the court below on the grounds: (1) That it stated
more than one offense, and (2) that it was not drawn in accordance with the form prescribed by
law. The demurrer was overruled and the defendant pleaded not
[Link] chanrobles virtual law library

At the trial of the case the defendant made the following admissions: "That on the first of June,
1923, she had no certificate from the Board of Medical Examiners authorizing her to practice
medicine in the Philippine Islands; that on that day she treated and manipulated the head and
body of Regino Noble in order to cure him of ailments from which he pretended to suffer, the
treatment consisting in a `thrust' by means of the application of the hand to the spinal column;
that she for such treatment received and collected from said Regino Noble the sum of P1; that
the said treatment took place in her office situated at No. 712 Calle Asuncion, District of
Binondo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands; that she on or about the first day of June, 1923, and
for some time prior to that date, advertised herself as a `doctor of chiropractic,' in said City of
Manila, said advertisement appearing upon her business cards and in the newspaper `El
Debate,' in its issue of April 29, 1923, edited and published in Manila and in which cards and
newspaper advertisement the defendant prefixed the abbreviation `Dra.' to her name; that she
was graduated a doctor in chiropractic on the 13th day of August, 1919, as evidenced by a
certificate marked Exhibit I and issued by the American University School of Chiropractic of
Chicago, Illinois."chanrobles virtual law library

Upon this admission and some other evidence to the same effect, the trial court found the
defendant guilty as charged in the information and, in accordance with section 2678 of the
Administrative Code, sentenced her to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs. From this judgment the defendant appeals to this court and
presents four assignments of [Link] chanrobles virtual law library

I. In the first assignment of error counsel contends that the demurrer to the information should
have been sustained on the ground that said information charged more than one offense. The
Medical Law is contained in sections 758 to 783 of the Administrative Code and it is argued that
inasmuch as some of the illegal acts with which the defendant is charged are prohibited by
section 770 of the Code and others by section 783, the defendant is in reality accused of two
separate and distinct offenses, namely, illegal practice of medicine and illegally representing
oneself as a [Link] chanrobles virtual law library

We cannot accept this view. It may be noted that the Medical Law itself, as it appears in the
Administrative Code, does not declare any of the therein prohibited acts penal offenses. The
penal provisions relating thereto are contained in section 2678 of the Code, which reads as
follows:

SEC. 2678. Violation of Medical Law. - A person violating any provision of the Medical Law
shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than three hundred pesos or by
imprisonment for not more than ninety days, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The offense here penalized is "violation of the Medical Law." The statute makes no distinction
between illegal practice of medicine and illegally advertising oneself as a doctor. Both are in
violation of the Medical Law and carry the same penalty. They are merely different ways or
means of committing the same offense and both of these means are closely related to each
other and usually employed [Link] chanrobles virtual law library

In these circumstances and where, as alleged in the information in the present case, the various
violations have taken place simultaneously, we do not think it was the intention of the legislator
that each single act should be regarded as a separate offense and separate informations
presented for each. The language of this court in the case of United States vs. Poh Chi (20
Phil., 140), in regard to the Opium Law, is opposite to the present case.

It is true that the Commission has provided a certain punishment for the possession of a pipe
used in the smoking of opium, for the smoking of opium, as well as a punishment for the illegal
possession of opium, but it is not believed that it was the intention of the legislature to have
separate complaints filed against a person who was found in the illegal possession of opium
and a pipe at the same time. If that were true then every person who was found to be smoking
opium could be charged in three different complaints: First, with the illegal possession of the
pipe; second, the illegal possession of the opium; and third, for smoking the opium. Certainly the
legislature did not intend any such consequences.

In the case of United States vs. Douglass (2 Phil., 461), the court said:

It is not objectionable, when a single offense may be committed by the use of different means,
to charge, in the alternative, the various means by which the crime may have been committed.
(U.S. vs. Potter, 27 Fed. Cases, 604; Bishop's New Criminal Procedure, sec. 434.)

The same rule was followed in the case of United States vs. Dorr (2 Phil., 332); United
States vs. Tolentino (5 Phil., 682); and United States vs. Gustilo (19 Phil., 208) and is in
harmony with the views of the courts in other jurisdictions. That the various means of committing
the offense is described in more than one section of the statute does not necessarily effect the
general principle involved; the subdivision of a statute into section is merely a matter of
convenience and while it sometimes may be of some aid in ascertaining the legislative intent, it
is, of course, not conclusive [Link] chanrobles virtual law library

II. Under the second assignment of error the appellant argues in substance that chiropractic has
nothing to do with medicine and that the practice of that profession can therefore not be
regarded as practice of medicine. There is no merit whatever in this contention. Assuming
without conceding that chiropractic does not fall within the term "practice of medicine" in its
ordinary acceptation, we have the statutory definition contained in section 770 of the
Administrative Code and which clearly includes the manipulations employed in chiropractic. The
statutory definition necessarily prevails over the ordinary
[Link] chanrobles virtual law library

Under the same assignment of error the defendant also argues that the examination prescribed
by section 776 of the Administrative Code for admission to the practice of medicine, embraces
subjects which have no connection with chiropractic and that to require chiropractors to take
that examination is unreasonable and, in effect amounts to prohibition of the practice of their
profession and therefore violates the constitutional principle that all men have the right to life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness and are entitled to the equal protection of the
[Link] chanrobles virtual law library

There is very little force in this argument. The subjects in which an examination is required by
section 778 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3111, relate to matters of which
a thorough knowledge seems necessary for the proper diagnosis of diseases of the human
body and it is within the police power of the State to require that persons who devote
themselves to the curing of human ills should possess such knowledge. (State vs. Edmunds,
127 Iowa, 333; 69 L.R.A., 504; Underwood vs. Scott, 43 Kan., 714; People vs. Blue Mountain
Joe, 129 Ill., 370; State vs. Mylod, 20 R. I., 632; 41 L.R.A., 428; Stewart vs. Raab, 55 Minn., 20;
Matthei vs. Wooley, 69 Ill. App., 654; State vs. Buswell, 40 Neb., 158; 24 L.R.A., 68;
O'Connor vs. State, 46 Neb., 157; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218.)chanrobles virtual law
library

III. The third assignment of error is closely related to the foregoing. The appellant contends that
the prohibition in section 783 against the unauthorized use of the title "doctor" must be
understood to refer to "Doctor of Medicine" and has no application to doctors of chiropractic.
Under different circumstances that might possibly be so, but where, as here, chiropractic is by
statute made a form of the practice of medicine, it necessarily follows that a person holding
himself out as a doctor of chiropractic in legal effect represents himself as a doctor of
[Link] chanrobles virtual law library

IV. In her fourth assignment of error the appellant attacks the constitutionality of Act No. 3111,
amending section 770 of the Administrative Code, on the ground that the subject of the Act is
not sufficiently expressed in its title and that it embraces more than one subject. There is no
merit in this contention. The title of Act No. 3111 reads as follows:

An Act to amend sections seven hundred and fifty-nine, seven hundred and sixty, seven
hundred and sixty-one, seven hundred and sixty-two, seven hundred and sixty-five, seven
hundred and sixty-seven, seven hundred and seventy, seven hundred and seventy-four, seven
hundred and seventy-five, seven hundred and seventy-six, seven hundred and seventy-eight,
seven hundred and eighty, seven hundred and eighty-two, seven hundred and eighty-three, and
twenty-six hundred and seventy-eight of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven,
known as the Administrative Code, increasing the number of the members of the Board of
Medical Examiners, conferring upon the same certain additional powers and responsibilities and
for other purposes.

All of the sections enumerated in the title quoted relate to the same general subject, namely,
defining and regulating the practice of medicine, and section 770 is expressly mentioned as one
of the sections [Link] chanrobles virtual law library

This is sufficient. Under constitutional provisions similar to ours the general rule is that a title
which declares the amendatory statute to be an act to amend a designated section or the like of
a specified Code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory Act need not be further
stated. (Ross vs. Aguirre, 191 U.S., 60; Udell vs. Citizens Street R. Co., 152 Ind., 507;
McGuire vs. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 131 Iowa, 340; Lankford vs. County Commissioners of
Somerset County, 73 Md., 105; Tabor vs. State, 34 Tex. Crim., 631; Com. vs. Brown, 91 Va.,
762.) For a full and authoritative discussion of this subject, see Note to Lewis vs. Dunne, 55
L.R.A., 833. See also Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Binalonan and
Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia (32 Phil., 634) and Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad (p.
385, ante).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We find no error in the judgment appealed from and the same is therefore affirmed, with the
costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Malcolm, Villamor, and Johns, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ROMUALDEZ, J., dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library

I believe that the complaint charges more than one offense, and that the demurrer interposed on
that ground should have been sustained. For that reason I dissent from the opinion of the
majority.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 89095 & 89555 November 6, 1989

SIXTO P. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner,

vs.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SPOUSES SHOJI YAMADA and MICHIYO
YAMADA and SPOUSES TOMOTADA ENATSU and EDITA ENATSU, respondents.

Salma Pir T. Rasul, Rosalinda L. Santos and A.E. Dacanay for petitioner.

Gonzales, Batiller Law Offices for respondents.

Quisumbing, Torres and Evangelista for Spouses Tomotada and Edita Enatsu.

Lino M. Patajo for Spouses Shoji and Michiyo Yamada.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

In his petition for certiorari, 1 the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the en banc resolution dated
February 14, 1989 of the Securities and Exchange Commission in SEC EB Case No. 191 and the
concurring opinions thereto (Annexes F, G, and H, pp. 39-62, Rollo), as well as its orders dated June
27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (Annexes M and 0, pp. 83-86, Rollo) directing the corporate secretary of
the United Doctors Medical Center, Inc. (hereafter "UDMC") to call a special meeting of the
stockholders to elect the officers and directors in the implementation of the SEC's aforementioned en
banc resolution of February 14, 1989, which the Court of Appeals affirmed in its decision dated June
8, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 17435, entitled "Sixto Crisostomo, petitioner vs. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Spouses Dr. Shoji Yamada and Michiyo Yamada, and Spouses Dr. Tomotada Enatsu
and Edita Enatsu, respondents." On August 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied Crisostomo's
motion for reconsideration of its decision. On August 24, 1989, he filed a petition for review of said
decision in this Court (G.R. No. 89555) which was originally assigned to the Third Division, but was
later consolidated with G.R. No. 89095.

At first blush, the petitions sound like a patriotic defense of the Constitution, but, at bottom they are
only an artful scheme to defraud a group of foreign investors who had been persuaded by the
officers of UDMC to invest P57 million to save the corporation (its assets as well as those of the
Crisostomo's) from imminent foreclosure by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to which
UDMC was indebted in the sum of P55 million. It is the kind of operation that sullies our collective
image as a people and sets back our government's heroic efforts to attract foreign investments to
our country.

The antecedent facts, culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Sixto Crisostomo, Felipe Crisostomo (deceased), Veronica Palanca, Juanito

Crisostomo, Carlos Crisostomo, Ricardo Alfonso, Regino Crisostomo and Ernesto
Crisostomo (known as the Crisostomo group) were the original stockholders of the
United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) which was organized in 1968 with an
authorized capital stock of P1,000,000 (later increased to P15,000,000 in 1972).
They owned approximately 40% of UDMC's outstanding capital stock, while the 60%
majority belonged to the members of the United Medical Staff Association (UMSA),
numbering approximately 150 doctors and medical personnel of UDMC.

Despite their minority status, the Crisostomo group has managed UDMC from its
inception, with Juanito Crisostomo as president, Ricardo Alfonso, Sr. as chairman of
the board, Carlos Crisostomo as corporate secretary and Sixto Crisostomo as
director and legal counsel.

In 1988, UDMC defaulted in paying its loan obligation of approximately P55 million to
the DBP. In the last quarter of 1987, UDMC's assets (principally its hospital) and
those of the Crisostomos which had been given as collateral to the DBP, faced
foreclosure by the Asset Privatization' rust (APT), which had taken over UDMC's loan
obligation to the DBP.

To stave off the threatened foreclosure, UDMC, through its principal officers, Ricardo
Alfonso and Juanito Crisostomo, persuaded the Yamadas and Enatsu (Shoji
Yamada and Tomotada Enatsu are Japanese doctors) to invest fresh capital in
UDMC. The wife of Tomotada Enatsu, Edita Enatsu, is a Filipina. They invested
approximately P57 million in UDMC.

The investment was effected by means of: (1) a Stock Purchase Agreement; and (2)
an Amended Memorandum of Agreement whereby the group subscribed
to 82.09% of the outstanding shares of UDMC.

Both transactions were duly authorized by the board of directors and stockholders of
UDMC. They were submitted to, scrutinized by, and, finally, approved by the Board
of Investments, the Central Bank of the Philippines, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The elaborate governmental approval process was done openly and
with full knowledge of all concerned, including Sixto Crisostomo, the corporate legal
counsel. Upon the completion of the governmental approval process, shares of
stock, duly signed by UDMC's authorized officers, were issued to the Yamadas and
Enatsus.

This capital infusion not only saved the assets of the UDMC (especially the hospital)
from foreclosure but also freed the Crisostomos from their individual and solidary
liabilities as sureties for the DBP loan.

As it had been agreed in the Amended Memorandum of Agreement between UDMC

and the Japanese group that upon the latter's acquisition of the controlling interest in
UDMC, the corporation would be reorganized, a special stockholders' meeting and
board of directors' meeting were scheduled to be held on August 20, 1988.

However, on the eve of the meetings, i.e., on August 19, 1988, Sixto Crisostomo,
supposedly acting for himself, filed SEC Case No. 3420 against Juanito Crisostomo,
Ricardo Alfonso, Shoji Yamada, Michiyo Yamada, Tomotada Enatsu and Edita
Enatsu, praying, among other things, (1) to stop the holding of the stockholder's and
board of directors' meetings; (2) to disqualify the Japanese investors from holding a
controlling interest in UDMC and from being elected directors or officers of UDMC;
and (3) to annul the Memorandum of Agreement and Stock Purchase Agreement
because they allegedly did not express the true agreement of the parties (pp. 194-
203, Rollo).

Two weeks later, on September 2, 1988, Crisostomo filed Civil Case No. 88-1823 in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, where he also sought a preliminary
injunction and the Identical reliefs prayed for by him in SEC Case No. 3420 (pp. 317-
335, Rollo). It was dismissed by the trial court for lack of jurisdiction and is pending
appeal in the Court of Appeals where it is docketed as CA-G.R. No. 20285-CV.

On September 13, 1988, the hearing officer, Antonio Esteves, granted the application
for a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents —

... from holding the special meeting of the stockholders and of the
Board of Directors of United Doctors Medical Center, [Inc.] (UDMC)
scheduled on August 20, 1988 or any subsequent meetings; from
adopting resolutions to elect new directors and appoint new officers;
from approving resolutions directly or indirectly affecting the
operations, organizational structure, and financial condition of the
corporation, ... and from disbursing funds of the said corporation
except those ordinary day-to-day expenses pending the final
termination of this case. (p. 30, Rollo.)

The private respondents' motion for reconsideration of this order was denied by the
hearing officer on November 16, 1988. In the same order, he created a management
committee to administer UDMC (pp. 32-35, Rollo).

The respondents appealed by certiorari to the SEC en banc. On February 14,1989,

Commissioner Jose C. Laureta, with whom Commissioners Rosario N. Lopez and
Gonzalo T. Santos separately concurred, set aside the preliminary injunction issued
by Esteves and the management committee which he created. The dispositive part of
the decision reads:

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED and
the Commission en banc ORDERS:

1. That the questioned orders of the hearing officer in SEC Case No.
3420 of September 13, 1988 and November 16, 1988, be
immediately vacated;

2. That a special stockholders' meeting of UDMC be held for the

purpose of allowing the stockholders of record of the corporation to
elect a new board of directors, which special meeting is hereby
directed to be scheduled within 10 days from receipt of a copy of this
resolution by the incumbent corporate secretary or acting corporate
secretary of UDMC, and to this end, that such officer be, as he
hereby is, directed: (a) to issue a call for such special meeting and
serve notice thereof on all stockholders of record of the corporation,
in accordance with section 6 of article VII of UDMC's by-laws; and (b)
to submit to the Commission, through the Commission Secretary, a
written report of his compliance with this particular order of the
 Commission, not later than 5 days prior to the scheduled date of the
proposed UDMC special stockholders' meeting;

3. That upon the election of a new board of directors of UDMC, that

such board be, as it hereby is, enjoined to meet as promptly as
possible for the purpose of electing a new set of officers of the
corporation in order to ensure its proper management;

4. That the hearing officer be, as he hereby is, directed to continue

with the proceedings of SEC Case No. 3420, and to do so with all
deliberate speed, for the purpose of resolving the alleged violation of
certain rights of Sixto Crisostomo, as a stockholder of UDMC
particularly, his right to inspect the corporate books and records of
UDMC, his preemptive right to subscribe to the P60 million increase
in the authorized capital of UDMC, and his appraisal rights; and

5. That the board of directors and officers of UDMC be, as they

hereby are, ordered to submit to the Commission, through the
Chairman, a written report as to its plans as regards its nursing
school, such report to be submitted at least one month prior to the
commencement of the school year 1989-1990.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 49-50, Rollo.)

Sixto Crisostomo sought a review of the SEC's en banc resolution in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
SP No. 17435).

On June 8, 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition and lifted the temporary restraining
order that it had issued against the SEC's resolution (Annex K, pp. 65-81, Rollo). Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration (pp. 418-434, Rollo). The Court of Appeals required the private
respondents to comment but it denied the petitioner's motion to reinstate the writ of preliminary
injunction (Annex L, p. 82, Rollo),

On motion of the private respondents (Annex K, p. 413, Rollo), the SEC en banc issued an order on
June 27, 1989 directing the secretary of UDMC to call a special stockholders' meeting to elect a new
board of directors and officers of the corporation (Annex F). Petitioner asked the SEC to recall that
order on account of his pending motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals. The motion was
opposed by the private respondents. On July 21, 1989, the SEC denied petitioner's motion (p. 86,
Rollo). Whereupon, he filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for preliminary
injunction alleging that the SEC en banc abused its discretion:

1. in setting aside Esteves' orders

2. in allowing the Japanese group to have control of UDMC for it will result in
culpable violation of Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals or
corporations qualified to acquire or hold land of the public domain, meaning
corporations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by Filipino citizens
(Sec. 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution); and

3. in allowing the Japanese investors to own more than 40% of the capital stock of
UDMC (which operates a nursing and midwifery school) in violation of Section 4 (2)
 Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution which provides that educational institutions ...
shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens.

The public and private respondents, in their comments on the petition, asked that the petition be
dismissed and that the petitioner be cited for contempt for forum-shopping.

We find no merit in the petition. The first allegation that the SEC en banc erred in reversing the
orders of the hearing officer, Esteves, is the same ground raised by the petitioner in CA-G.R. No. SP
17435. The issue is frivolous for the authority of the SEC en banc to review, revise, reverse, or affirm
orders of its hearing officers is too elementary to warrant any debate.

Equally unmeritorious are the second and third grounds of the petition — that the P57 million
investment of the Japanese group in UDMC violates the constitutional provisions restricting the
transfer or conveyance of private lands (Art. XIII, Sec. 7, 1987 Constitution) and the ownership of
educational institutions (Art. XVI, Sec. 14[a], 1987 Constitution), to citizens of the Philippines or
corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens. While 82% of UDMC's
capital stock is indeed subscribed by the Japanese group, only 30% (equivalent to 171,721 shares
or P17,172.00) is owned by the Japanese citizens, namely, the Yamada spouses and Tomotada
Enatsu. 52% is owned by Edita Enatsu, who is a Filipino. Accordingly, in its application for
approval/registration of the foreign equity investments of these investors, UDMC declared that 70%
of its capital stock is owned by Filipino citizens, including Edita Enatsu. That application was
approved by the Central Bank on August 3, 1988 (p. 249, Rollo,).

The investments in UDMC of Doctors Yamada and Enatsu do not violate the Constitutional
prohibition against foreigners practising a profession in the Philippines (Section 14, Article XII, 1987
Constitution) for they do not practice their profession (medicine) in the Philippines, neither have they
applied for a license to do so. They only own shares of stock in a corporation that operates a
hospital. No law limits the sale of hospital shares of stock to doctors only. The ownership of such
shares does not amount to engaging (illegally,) in the practice of medicine, or, nursing. If it were
otherwise, the petitioner's stockholding in UDMC would also be illegal.

The SEC's orders dated June 27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (directing the secretary of UDMC to call a
stockholders' meeting, etc.) are not premature, despite the petitioner's then pending motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The lifting by the Court of Appeals of its writ
of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. SP No. 17435 cleared the way for the implementation by the
SEC's en banc resolution in SEC EB Case No. 191. The SEC need not wait for the Court of Appeals
to resolve the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a
preliminary injunction is immediately executory. It "shall not be stayed after its rendition and before
an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal." (Sec. 4, Rule 39, Rules of Court; Marcelo
Steel Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 89 [1973]; Aguilar vs. Tan, 31 SCRA 205 [1970]; Sitia
Teco vs. Ventura, 1 Phil. 497 [1902]; Watson & Co., Ltd. vs. M. Enriquez, I Phil. 480 [1902]).

We now address the public and private respondents' separate motions to dismiss the petition and to
cite Crisostomo and his counsel for contempt of court for forum-shopping. The records show that
Crisostomo had two actions pending in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP 17435 and CA-G.R.
No. 20285 CV) when he filed the petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 89095) in this Court on July 27,
1989. The case docketed as CA-G.R. No. 20285-CV, is his appeal from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, dismissing his complaint for annulment of the Memorandum of Agreement and
the Stock Purchase Agreement between UDMC and the Japanese investors. CA-G.R. No. SP 17435
is his petition for certiorari to review the SEC's en banc resolution upholding those transactions and
ordering the holding of a stockholders meeting to elect the directors of the UDMC, and of a board of
directors meeting to elect the officers.

Notwithstanding the pendency of those two cases in the Court of Appeals, Crisostomo filed this
petition for certiorari 1 and prohibition on July 27, 1989 where he raises the same issues that he
raised in the Court of Appeals.

The prayer of his petition in CA-G.R. No. SP 17435 reads thus:

3) After hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered:

a) Annulling and setting aside the questioned rulings of the

respondent COMMISSION 2for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

b) Making permanent the preliminary injunction issued in this case

against the respondents. (p. 241, Rollo.)

In his petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 89095), he also prays that —

1. Upon the filing of this petition, a temporary restraining order issue enjoining
respondents, their representatives or agents from implementing or executing the
SEC opinions (Annexes "F", "G" and "H") and its June 27 and July 21,1989 orders
(Annexes "M" and "O") until further orders from the Honorable Court.

xxx xxx xxx

3. After notice, this petition be given due course and a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued for the same purpose and effect upon such terms and conditions the
Honorable Court may impose; and thereafter, judgment be rendered granting the writ
prayed for and annulling and setting aside the said opinions rendered by the SEC in
their stead, affirming the orders of the Hearing Officer (Annexes "A" and "B"). (pp.
27-28, Rollo.)

Additionally, in his petition for review (G.R. No. 89555) he prays this Court to giant "all the reliefs"
prayed for by him in CA-G.R. SP No. 17435. Here is a clear case of forum-shopping.

There is forum-shopping whenever as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a

party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The
principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in
connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative
proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes
and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court
ruling. This is specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit
was brought, has no jurisdiction. (Villanueva vs. Adre, G.R. No. 8063, April 27,
1989.) (p. 303, Rollo)

Forum-shopping is prohibited by the Interim Rules of Court for it trifles with the courts and abuses
their processes (E. Razon, Inc. vs. Phil. Port Authority, 101 SCRA 450). Section 17 of the Interim
Rules of Courts provides:
 17. Petitions for writs of certiorari, etc., — No petition for certiorari, mandamus,
prohibition, habeas corpus or quo warranto may be filed in the Intermediate Appellate
Court if another similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the Supreme
Court. Nor may such petition be filed in the Supreme Court if a similar petition has
been filed or is still pending in the Intermediate Appellate Court, unless it be to review
the action taken by the Intermediate Appellate Court on the petition filed with it. A
violation of this rule shall constitute contempt of court and shall be a cause for the
summary dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate
action against the counsel or party concerned. (Interim Rules of Court.)

Forum-shopping makes the petitioner subject to disciplinary action and renders his petitions in this
Court and in the Court of Appeals dismissible (E. Razon, Inc. vs. Philippine Port Authority, et al.,
G.R. No. 75197, Resolution dated July 31, 1986; Buan vs. Lopez, Jr., 145 SCRA 34, 38-39; Collado
vs. Hernando, L-43886, May 30, 1988). For this reason, if not for their lack of merit, the petitions
should be, as they are hereby, dismissed.

WHEREFORE, these petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. The temporary restraining order which
this Court issued on August 7, 1989 in G.R. No. 89095 is hereby lifted. The Court of Appeals is
ordered to immediately dismiss CA-G.R. CV No. 20285. The petitioner and his counsel are censured
for engaging in forum-shopping. The petitioner is further ordered to pay double costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 168512 March 20, 2007

ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR., doing business under the name and style COMMUNITY
DIAGNOSTIC CENTER and BU CASTRO,1 Petitioners,
vs.
RANIDA D. SALVADOR and RAMON SALVADOR, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the February 27, 2004
Decision3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58668 finding petitioner Orlando D. Garcia
liable for gross negligence; and its June 16, 2005 Resolution4 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

On October 1, 1993, respondent Ranida D. Salvador started working as a trainee in the Accounting
Department of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal, Inc. (the Company). As a prerequisite for regular
employment, she underwent a medical examination at the Community Diagnostic Center (CDC).
Garcia who is a medical technologist, conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test and
on October 22, 1993, CDC issued the test result5 indicating that Ranida was "HBs Ag: Reactive."
The result bore the name and signature of Garcia as examiner and the rubber stamp signature of
Castro as pathologist.

When Ranida submitted the test result to Dr. Sto. Domingo, the Company physician, the latter
apprised her that the findings indicated that she is suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Thus,
based on the medical report6submitted by Sto. Domingo, the Company terminated Ranida’s
employment for failing the physical examination.7

When Ranida informed her father, Ramon, about her ailment, the latter suffered a heart attack and
was confined at the Bataan Doctors Hospital. During Ramon’s confinement, Ranida underwent
another HBs Ag test at the said hospital and the result8 indicated that she is non-reactive. She
informed Sto. Domingo of this development but was told that the test conducted by CDC was more
reliable because it used the Micro-Elisa Method.

Thus, Ranida went back to CDC for confirmatory testing, and this time, the Anti-HBs test conducted
on her indicated a "Negative" result.9

Ranida also underwent another HBs Ag test at the Bataan Doctors Hospital using the Micro-Elisa
Method. The result indicated that she was non-reactive.10

Ranida submitted the test results from Bataan Doctors Hospital and CDC to the Executive Officer of
the Company who requested her to undergo another similar test before her re-employment would be
considered. Thus, CDC conducted another HBs Ag test on Ranida which indicated a "Negative"
result.11 Ma. Ruby G. Calderon, Med-Tech Officer-in-Charge of CDC, issued a Certification
correcting the initial result and explaining that the examining medical technologist (Garcia)
interpreted the delayed reaction as positive or reactive.12

Thereafter, the Company rehired Ranida.

On July 25, 1994, Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint13 for damages against petitioner Garcia and
a purportedly unknown pathologist of CDC, claiming that, by reason of the erroneous interpretation
of the results of Ranida’s examination, she lost her job and suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma
and sleepless nights, while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business opportunities.

On September 26, 1994, respondents amended their complaint14 by naming Castro as the "unknown
pathologist."

Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and incompetence and reiterated the scientific
explanation for the "false positive" result of the first HBs Ag test in his December 7, 1993 letter to the
respondents.15

For his part, Castro claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to CDC and only when a case was
referred to him; that he did not examine Ranida; and that the test results bore only his rubber-stamp
signature.

On September 1, 1997,16 the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents to
present sufficient evidence to prove the liability of Garcia and Castro. It held that respondents should
have presented Sto. Domingo because he was the one who interpreted the test result issued by
CDC. Likewise, respondents should have presented a medical expert to refute the testimonies of
Garcia and Castro regarding the medical explanation behind the conflicting test results on Ranida.17

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court’s findings, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered
ORDERING defendant-appellee Orlando D. Garcia, Jr. to pay plaintiff-appellant Ranida D. Salvador
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and
attorney’s fees in the amount of P25,000.00.

SO ORDERED.18

The appellate court found Garcia liable for damages for negligently issuing an erroneous HBs Ag
result. On the other hand, it exonerated Castro for lack of participation in the issuance of the results.

After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Garcia filed the instant petition.

The main issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision of the trial
court, correctly found petitioner liable for damages to the respondents for issuing an incorrect
HBsAG test result.

Garcia maintains he is not negligent, thus not liable for damages, because he followed the
appropriate laboratory measures and procedures as dictated by his training and experience; and that
he did everything within his professional competence to arrive at an objective, impartial and
impersonal result.
At the outset, we note that the issues raised are factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or
not is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari which is
limited to reviewing errors of law.19

Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,20 whereby such other person
suffers injury. For health care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is: did the health care
provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have
done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have
done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient;21 if yes, then he is guilty of negligence.

Thus, the elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate
causation.

All the elements are present in the case at bar.

Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as rules
and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people by
preventing the operation of substandard, improperly managed and inadequately supported clinical
laboratories and by improving the quality of performance of clinical laboratory examinations.22 Their
business is impressed with public interest, as such, high standards of performance are expected
from them.

In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we found the owner of a furniture shop liable for the
destruction of the plaintiff’s house in a fire which started in his establishment in view of his failure to
comply with an ordinance which required the construction of a firewall. In Teague v. Fernandez, we
stated that where the very injury which was intended to be prevented by the ordinance has
happened, non-compliance with the ordinance was not only an act of negligence, but also the
proximate cause of the death.23

In fine, violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the duty to
do something, his omission or non-performance will render him liable to whoever may be injured
thereby.

Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4688, otherwise known as The Clinical Laboratory Law,
provides:

Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to be professionally in-charge of a registered clinical
laboratory unless he is a licensed physician duly qualified in laboratory medicine and authorized by
the Secretary of Health, such authorization to be renewed annually.

No license shall be granted or renewed by the Secretary of Health for the operation and
maintenance of a clinical laboratory unless such laboratory is under the administration, direction and
supervision of an authorized physician, as provided for in the preceding paragraph.

Corollarily, Sections 9(9.1)(1), 11 and 25(25.1)(1) of the DOH Administrative Order No. 49-B Series
of 1988, otherwise known as the Revised Rules and Regulations Governing the Registration,
Operation and Maintenance of Clinical Laboratories in the Philippines, read:

Sec. 9. Management of the Clinical Laboratory:

9.1 Head of the Clinical Laboratory: The head is that person who assumes technical and
administrative supervision and control of the activities in the laboratory.

For all categories of clinical laboratories, the head shall be a licensed physician certified by the
Philippine Board of Pathology in either Anatomic or Clinical Pathology or both provided that:

(1) This shall be mandatory for all categories of free-standing clinical laboratories; all tertiary
category hospital laboratories and for all secondary category hospital laboratories located in areas
with sufficient available pathologist.

xxxx

Sec. 11. Reporting: All laboratory requests shall be considered as consultations between the
requesting physician and pathologist of the laboratory. As such all laboratory reports on various
examinations of human specimens shall be construed as consultation report and shall bear the
name of the pathologist or his associate. No person in clinical laboratory shall issue a report, orally
or in writing, whole portions thereof without a directive from the pathologist or his authorized
associate and only to the requesting physician or his authorized representative except in
emergencies when the results may be released as authorized by the pathologist.

xxxx

Sec. 25. Violations:

25.1 The license to operate a clinical laboratory may be suspended or revoked by the
Undersecretary of Health for Standards and Regulation upon violation of R.A. 4688 or the rules and
regulations issued in pursuance thereto or the commission of the following acts by the persons
owning or operating a clinical laboratory and the persons under their authority.

(1) Operation of a Clinical Laboratory without a certified pathologist or qualified licensed physician
authorized by the Undersecretary of Health or without employing a registered medical technologist
or a person not registered as a medical technologist in such a position.

And Section 29(b) of R.A. No. 5527, otherwise known as The Philippine Medical Technology Act of
1969, reads:

Section 29. Penal Provisions.- Without prejudice to the provision of the Medical Act of 1959, as
amended relating to illegal practice of Medicine, the following shall be punished by a fine of not less
than two thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, or imprisonment for not less than six
months nor more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the court:

xxxx

(b) Any medical technologist, even if duly registered, who shall practice medical technology in the
Philippines without the necessary supervision of a qualified pathologist or physician authorized by
the Department of Health;

From the foregoing laws and rules, it is clear that a clinical laboratory must be administered, directed
and supervised by a licensed physician authorized by the Secretary of Health, like a pathologist who
is specially trained in methods of laboratory medicine; that the medical technologist must be under
the supervision of the pathologist or a licensed physician; and that the results of any examination
may be released only to the requesting physician or his authorized representative upon the direction
of the laboratory pathologist.

These rules are intended for the protection of the public by preventing performance of substandard
clinical examinations by laboratories whose personnel are not properly supervised. The public
demands no less than an effective and efficient performance of clinical laboratory examinations
through compliance with the quality standards set by laws and regulations.

We find that petitioner Garcia failed to comply with these standards.

First, CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required by law,
but by Ma. Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed Medical Technologist.24 In the License to Open and
Operate a Clinical Laboratory for the years 1993 and 1996 issued by Dr. Juan R. Nañagas, M.D.,
Undersecretary for Health Facilities, Standards and Regulation, defendant-appellee Castro was
named as the head of CDC.25 However, in his Answer with Counterclaim, he stated:

3. By way of affirmative and special defenses, defendant pathologist further avers and plead as
follows:

Defendant pathologist is not the owner of the Community Diagnostic Center nor an employee of the
same nor the employer of its employees. Defendant pathologist comes to the Community Diagnostic
Center when and where a problem is referred to him. Its employees are licensed under the Medical
Technology Law (Republic Act No. 5527) and are certified by, and registered with, the Professional
Regulation Commission after having passed their Board Examinations. They are competent within
the sphere of their own profession in so far as conducting laboratory examinations and are allowed
to sign for and in behalf of the clinical laboratory. The defendant pathologist, and all pathologists in
general, are hired by laboratories for purposes of complying with the rules and regulations and
orders issued by the Department of Health through the Bureau of Research and Laboratories.
Defendant pathologist does not stay that long period of time at the Community Diagnostic Center but
only periodically or whenever a case is referred to him by the laboratory. Defendant pathologist does
not appoint or select the employees of the laboratory nor does he arrange or approve their
schedules of duty.26

Castro’s infrequent visit to the clinical laboratory barely qualifies as an effective administrative
supervision and control over the activities in the laboratory. "Supervision and control" means the
authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, revise
or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units.27

Second, Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of respondent Ranida without the supervision of
defendant-appellee Castro, who admitted that:

[He] does not know, and has never known or met, the plaintiff-patient even up to this time nor has he
personally examined any specimen, blood, urine or any other tissue, from the plaintiff-patient
otherwise his own handwritten signature would have appeared in the result and not merely stamped
as shown in Annex "B" of the Amended Complaint.28

Last, the disputed HBsAG test result was released to respondent Ranida without the authorization of
defendant-appellee Castro.29

Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequences which followed after the release of the
HBsAG test result. However, his failure to comply with the laws and rules promulgated and issued
for the protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe that care which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.

Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcia’s failure to comply with the
mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated from the service for failing the
physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo
several more tests. All these could have been avoided had the proper safeguards been scrupulously
followed in conducting the clinical examination and releasing the clinical report.

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

The foregoing provision provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers
damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision.30 This was incorporated
by the Code Commission to provide relief to a person who suffers damage because another has
violated some legal provision.31

We find the Court of Appeals’ award of moral damages reasonable under the circumstances bearing
in mind the mental trauma suffered by respondent Ranida who thought she was afflicted by Hepatitis
B, making her "unfit or unsafe for any type of employment."32 Having established her right to moral
damages, we see no reason to disturb the award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Exemplary damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages,33 and attorney’s fees may be recovered
when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded.34

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58668 dated February 27,
2004 finding petitioner Orlando D. Garcia, Jr. guilty of gross negligence and liable to pay to
respondents ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱25,000.00
as attorney’s fees, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
People v. Handzik

Annotate this Case

410 Ill. 295 (1951)

102 N.E.2d 340

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, v. E.O. HANDZIK,

Plaintiff in Error.

No. 31906.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed November 27, 1951.

*296 *297 FREDERICK J. BERTRAM, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

IVAN A. ELLIOTT, Attorney General, of Springfield, and JOHN S. BOYLE, State's

Attorney, of Chicago, (JOHN T. GALLAGHER, RUDOLPH L. JANEGA, ARTHUR F.
MANNING, and WILLIAM J. McGAH, JR., all of Chicago, of counsel,) for the People.

Judgment affirmed.

*298 Mr. JUSTICE MAXWELL, delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff in error, E.O. Handzik, also known as Esther O. Hankzik, was tried and
convicted of a violation of the Medical Practice Act upon information filed in the county
court of Cook County. She comes here directly from that court by writ of error to review
the verdict of the jury and the sentence to pay a fine of $500. Direct review lies to this
court because she directly challenged the constitutionality of sections 24, 36, and 37 of
this act in the lower court and has properly preserved those questions for review here.

It appears from the evidence that plaintiff in error, who will be hereinafter referred to as
defendant, was a woman about 60 years old at the time of the hearing, was a native of
Sweden, had been in this country about 27 years and was a citizen. She resided in her
second-floor apartment in the city of Chicago with her husband, Frank Handzik. She
claimed to be a faith healer or healing minister ordained by the Central Baptist Church
of Chicago and was a member of a sect which believed in and practiced divine or faith
healing. The prosecuting witness, Mrs. Frances Dickerson, was an investigator for the
Department of Registration and Education of the State of Illinois. She testified that on
November 15, 1949, she went to the defendant's apartment to investigate a complaint
which the Department had received about one Dr. Frank Handzik; that defendant
answered the door, witness gave her the alias of Bertha Baker, and asked to see Dr.
Frank Handzik; that defendant advised her that Dr. Frank Handzik was not in and asked
her if she wanted a treatment; that she replied in the affirmative and defendant then told
the witness that she was Dr. E.O. Handzik, that she did the same kind of work as Dr.
Frank Handzik and invited her into the apartment; that defendant then asked her where
she had her pain and the witness told her it was between her shoulders, *299 and
defendant told her she had arthritis; that defendant then asked her if she believed in
God and when witness replied that she did defendant requested a donation of $4 for her
church and told witness that she would give her a treatment, that she too had had
arthritis and had cured herself. The witness then described the treatment given to her
which consisted of rapid inhaling, exhaling, and drinking two glasses of water, one
described as "holy" water and the other as "atomic" water; that defendant also went
through the rapid breathing process and stated that the purpose was to make one hot
and make contact with God easier; that defendant placed her hands on the witness and
prayed; that defendant told the witness that she also had machines, the "Estemeter"
and "Vita Ray" machines, and if witness did not get relief from the treatment that she
would apply "hot wires." The witness also testified that defendant gave her a printed
card bearing the names of Dr. Esther O. Handzik and Dr. Frank A. Handzik, underneath
which names was printed "Christian Psychophysicians," and showing the address,
phone number and office hours. This card was introduced in evidence. The defendant
testified that she believed in, had studied and practiced divine healing through prayer as
a minister of her church. She denied charging a fee but admitted that she accepted a
donation for her church and stated that this donation was usually divided, 10 per cent to
the church and 90 per cent to her. She denied making any physical examination or
diagnosis. She denied giving the witness the card but stated that she knew they were in
the house. She stated that she was employed as a tailor to earn her living and did not
depend upon any income from healing treatments for that purpose.

The jury found her guilty under counts 3, 4, and 5 of the information and made no
finding under counts 1 and 2. Count 3 charged that defendant, on November 15, 1949,
in the city of Chicago, County of Cook, "not then and *300 there possessing in full force
and virtue a valid and existing license issued by the authority of the State of Illinois to
practice the treatment of human ailments in any manner, * * * did then and there
unlawfully suggest, recommend and prescribe the loud and rapid inhaling and exhaling
and the drinking of water for the relief and cure of the supposed ailment of Frances
Dickerson, also known as Bertha Baker, with the intention of receiving therefor a fee in
the sum of four ($4.00) dollars." Count 4 alleged that the defendant, on November 15,
1949, not possessing a license of the State of Illinois to practice the treatment of human
ailments in any manner, did then and there "within the said County of Cook, unlawfully
attach the title Doctor, Physician, Surgeon, M.D. or some other words or abbreviation to
his name indicative that he was engaged in the treatment of human ailments as a
business, to wit: Did then and there unlawfully attach the title `Doctor' to her name,
indicative that she was engaged in the treatment of human ailments as a business, by
informing patient that she was `Dr. E.O. Handzik,' all in violation of Section 24 of an
Act," etc. Count 5 alleged that the defendant, on November 15, 1949, not possessing a
license of the State of Illinois to practice the treatment of human ailments in any
manner, did then and there "within the said County of Cook unlawfully maintain an office
for examination or treatment of persons afflicted * * * with any ailment, to wit: Did then
and there unlawfully maintain an office for the examination and treatment of persons
afflicted and supposed to be afflicted with any ailments, at 2573 Lyndale Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois, all in violation of Section 24 of an Act," etc.

Defendant's written motions to quash the information, for a directed verdict, in arrest of
judgment and for a new trial were all overruled by the court.

Defendant first contends that section 24 of the Medical Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949,
chap. 91, par. 16i,) is *301 unconstitutional because (1) the general language used in
section 24 is restricted in its operation by the exceptions made by section 37 of the
same act and is therefore void, and also because section 24 provides for punishment
for "any" person, which term includes those exempted by section 37; (2) the subject
matter of section 24 is not embraced or expressed in the title of the act; (3) the penalties
authorized by section 24 inure to the Department (section 36) which is in effect an
appropriation or diversion of public funds in violation of sections 16 to 20, article IV of
the Illinois constitution; (4) the provisions of section 24, providing punishment for any
person using the titles "Doctor" and "Physician," violate the due process clause and
constitute an abridgement of the privileges of citizens of the United States; (5) section
24 violates and infringes upon religious freedom.

Section 24 of this act provides, in substance, that if any person shall hold himself out to
the public as being engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of human ailments; or shall
suggest, recommend or prescribe any form of treatment with the intention of receiving
any fee or gift, or any compensation whatsoever; or shall profess to heal any ailment or
supposed ailment of another; or shall maintain an office for examination or treatment of
any persons afflicted with any ailment; or shall attach the title Doctor, Physician,
Surgeon, M.D. or any other word or abbreviation to his name, indicative that he is
engaged in the treatment of human ailments as a business; and shall not then possess
in full force and virtue a valid license issued by authority of this State, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine or imprisonment in the
county jail, or by both fine and imprisonment.

Section 36 provides that all such fines shall inure to the Department.

Section 37 provides that this act shall not apply to certain named classes of persons,
including "persons treating *302 human ailments by prayer or spiritual means as an
exercise or enjoyment of religious freedom."

Defendant's contention that section 24 is invalid because the general language used
therein is repugant to section 37 is untenable. It is an elementary rule of statutory
construction that all the parts of an act relating to the same subject should be
considered together and not each alone, so that the purpose and intent of the whole act
can be ascertained and given effect as consistent provisions to accomplish the purpose
intended. The provisions of section 37 merely constitute exceptions to the general
provisions of section 24, and when the whole act is read together there is no
inconsistency or repugnancy. Mason v. Finch, 2 Scam, 223; Burke v. Monroe County,
77 Ill. 610; Thompson v. Bulson, 78 Ill. 277.

There is no merit in the contention that the subject matter of section 24 is not embraced
or expressed in the title of the act. The object of the provisions of section 13 of article IV
of the constitution, requiring the subject to be expressed in the title of all acts of the
General Assembly, is to give information as to the subject with which the act deals, and
to prevent joining in one act incongruous or unrelated matters. (People v. McBride, 234
Ill. 146; People v. Williams, 309 Ill. 492; People v. Jiras, 340 Ill. 208.) The title should
express in general terms the purpose of the act, and any provisions germane to that
purpose may be inserted so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject. The title of an act is not required to be an index of all its provisions.
(People v. Sisk, 297 Ill. 314.) Where there is any doubt, it should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the act. (Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98; Fuller v. People, 92 Ill. 182.) The
title of the Medical Practice Act is "An Act to revise the law in relation to the practice of
the treatment of human ailments for the better protection of the public health and *303
to prescribe penalties for the violation hereof." Section 24 provides that the doing of
certain specified acts for the purpose of treating human ailments, without a valid license,
constitutes a misdemeanor, and provides penalties upon conviction thereof. The
purpose and object of the act, as set out in the title, is to regulate the practice of treating
human ailments. The power to license is a common and established method of
regulating. The specific acts prohibited by section 24 are all methods of treating human
ailments. Prohibiting certain methods of treatment without a license is clearly not
inconsistent with or foreign to regulating the practice of the treatment of human
ailments, but is germane to, and in furtherance of, the purposes of the act for the better
protection of the public health.

Defendant's contention that the act is invalid because section 36 provides that all fines
shall inure to the Department of Registration and Education, instead of providing for
such fines to be paid to the State or the county for public use and benefit, in violation of
sections 16 to 20 of article IV of the constitution, cannot be sustained. We are unable to
see how sections 16, 17, 18 and 19 of article IV could be interpreted to apply in any
manner to a statute making disposition of fines. Sections 16, 17, and 18 apply only to
appropriations made by the General Assembly out of the State treasury and section 19
deals with extra pay for persons or on contracts. Defendant's contention would have to
be based on the provisions of section 20 of this article, which provides that the State
shall never pay, assume, or become responsible for the debts or liabilities of, or in any
manner give, loan or extend its credit to or in aid of any public or other corporation,
association or individual. In People v. Heise, 257 Ill. 443, the defendant challenged the
constitutionality of a statute which provided that the court which convicted a defendant
of wife and child abandonment could order the fine paid, in whole or *304 in part, to the
wife or guardian of the child. The defendant there contended that this statute violated
section 2 of the schedule and sections 1, 16, 17, 20 and 22 of article IV. We there held,
as to sections 16 and 17, that they applied only to appropriations from the State
treasury, and that it was not intended that section 20 of article IV should apply in any
manner to the disposition to be made of fines and penalties for the violation of our
criminal statutes. The General Assembly has the power to impose penalties and the
power to dispose of them, and section 36 of the Medical Practice Act does not violate
any of the constitutional provisions relied on by defendant.

The defendant's contention that section 24 provides punishment for any person using
the titles "Doctor" and "Physician" without a valid license ignores the plain language of
the statute. Not every use of the titles is punishable, but only the use of the titles in an
unlawful manner "indicative that he is engaged in the treatment of human ailments."
(People v. DeYoung, 378 Ill. 256.) The licensing and control of persons who represent
to the public that they are trained and qualified to treat human ailments is a valid and
essential exercise of the police power of the State for the better protection of the public
health. (People v. Walder, 317 Ill. 524.) Within constitutional limits the General
Assembly is the sole judge of the laws that shall be enacted for the protection of the
public health, and so long as such laws do not invade inherent or constitutional rights
the determination of the General Assembly is conclusive. The use of these titles is not
an inherent or constitutional right in everyone and the General Assembly may regulate
their use in the treating of human ailments. It is common knowledge that these titles, in
general use as applied to human ailments, have a connotation indicating special
qualifications and training to diagnose and treat afflicted persons, and the misuse of
such titles could cause deceptions, frauds and practices dangerous to the public *305
health. Laws regulating the use of these titles where health and even life itself are
involved are not unreasonable or arbitrary. We think the prohibition of the use of such
titles "indicative that he is engaged in the treatment of human ailments as a business" is
reasonably necessary and appropriate to accomplish the legitimate objects and
purposes of the Medical Practice Act and within the police power of the State. The
validity of the Medical Practice Act of 1923 has been repeatedly affirmed by this court
and we have found that section 24 does not violate the due process clause of the
constitution. People v. DeYoung, 369 Ill. 341, and cases cited.

Defendant's contention that section 24 violates and infringes upon religious freedom is
likewise untenable. As heretofore pointed out, section 24 must be read in conjunction
with section 37, and that section specifically exempts "persons treating human ailments
by prayer or spiritual means as an exercise or enjoyment of religious freedom."

Defendant contends that counts 3, 4, and 5 of the information were legally insufficient to
charge a crime or offense against the State of Illinois, were insufficient to inform her of
the nature and cause of the accusation, and failed to negative that she was exempt
from the act, and that therefore the trial court erred in overruling her motions to quash
the information and in arrest of judgment. The three counts all charged defendant with
the crimes in the language of the statute and then, under a videlicet, with specific acts
constituting violations of the act. Section 24 prescribes the precise acts which constitute
violations, and the information is predicated upon these precise acts. Both the statute
and the information are clear and unambiguous and informed the defendant of the exact
nature of the offense. Informations in similar language have been upheld in People v.
Shaver, 367 Ill. 339; People v. Paderewski, 373 Ill. 197; People v. Moe, 381 Ill. 235;
People v. Rongetti, 395 Ill. 580; People v. DeYoung, 378 Ill. 256; *306 and People v.
Kabana, 388 Ill. 198. Failure to negative that defendant was one of the exempted class
does not make the information insufficient. We have frequently held that such
exemptions or exceptions are not a part of the description of the offense and therefore
need not be negatived in the information. (People v. Boyden, 400 Ill. 409; People ex rel.
Courtney v. Prystalski, 358 Ill. 198; People v. Talbot, 322 Ill. 416; People v. Green, 362
Ill. 171.) Such exemptions or exceptions are matters of defense. People v. Allen, 360 Ill.
36; People v. Saltis, 328 Ill. 494; Sokel v. People, 212 Ill. 238.

The defendant contends the court erred in overruling the motion for a directed verdict on
the grounds that all the evidence, both for the State and the defendant, shows that this
was purely a case of faith healing and was an exercise of her right of religious freedom.
An examination of the instructions reveals that the jury was adequately instructed in
regard to defendant's claimed exemption, it heard the evidence and observed the
witnesses, and by its verdict found the defendant was not one of the exempted class.
We cannot say that the evidence here, with the legitimate inferences deducible
therefrom, is insufficient to support that verdict.

The defendant further contends that the prosecution failed to prove that she had no
license, an essential allegation of the information, and that the court erred in instructing
the jury that "It is not incumbent upon the People to prove that allegation of the
information; if the defendant did not have such a license, it is a matter of defense and
you should not find the defendant not guilty solely by reason of the fact that there is no
proof of evidence as to whether the defendant did or did not have such a license." The
wording of this instruction is garbled and confused but, if it says anything, it says that
the People are not required to prove the allegation of the information that the defendant
did not have a license.

*307 Failure to have a license is an essential part of the description of the offense, and
if that was not alleged the information would be vulnerable to a motion to quash and
would not support a conviction. (People v. Prystalski, 358 Ill. 198.) As a general rule, it
is elementary that the State is required to prove every essential averment of the charge
against the defendant. There usually is no burden upon a defendant to disprove any
averment or even to make a defense. However, there is an exception to this rule in this
type of case. In prosecutions for doing an act which the State prohibits to be done by
any person except those who are duly licensed, the negative averment that defendant
had no license, being an averment peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, is
taken as true, unless disproved by the defendant. (Kettles v. People, 221 Ill. 221;
Noecker v. People, 91 Ill. 468; Williams v. People, 121 Ill. 84; People v. Frankowsky,
371 Ill. 493; People v. Hollenbeck, 322 Ill. 443.) Under the law as established by these
cases the State was not required to prove that defendant had no license and the
instruction was not prejudicial error. Furthermore, we are unable to see any unfairness
or harm in applying this rule here, where defendant took the stand and testified.

In her 25 assignments of error the defendant has raised objections to the court's rulings
on the evidence, the giving and refusing of various instructions, the court's refusal to
excuse one of the jurors, and alleged prejudicial conduct of the prosecuting attorney.
The merit or weight of none of these objections justifies extending this opinion by a
separate discussion of each of them. Each has been carefully examined and none is
found to be prejudicial error. It appears from the entire record that defendant has had a
fair and impartial trial in every respect.

Finding no prejudicial error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
PEOPLE V COLE

CHASE, J.

On February 18, 1911, on an application therefor by the New York County Medical Society, a warrant
was obtained against the defendant charging him with practicing medicine as defined by section 160 of
the Public Health Law of the state of New York, without being duly licensed therefor.
( People v. Cole, 25 N Y Crim. Rep. 350.) On March 21, 1911, he was indicted by a grand jury of the
county of New York. The indictment charges him with the crime of practicing medicine without lawful
authorization and registration and alleges that such unlawful practicing of medicine occurred on the 19th
day of January, 1911, and continually thereafter to and including the 28th day of January, 1911. The
defendant was tried on such indictment in the New York Supreme Court Criminal Term, but the jury
failed to agree and was discharged. Another trial was had in the same court and resulted in a verdict of
guilty and a judgment was accordingly entered against the defendant on the 30th day of March, 1912. He
appealed from such judgment to the Appellate Division where it was affirmed by a divided court.
( People v. Cole, 163 App. Div. 292.) An appeal was then taken from such judgment of affirmance to this
court.

Practicing medicine when unaccompanied by acts that are in themselves evil, vicious and criminal, is not
a crime at common law. Practicing medicine is not malum in se. It is important in the interest of public
health and public welfare that a person holding himself out as a physican or healer of diseases, should
have the education, training, skill and knowledge adequate for such purposes. Statutes designed to protect
public health and general welfare by regulating the practice of medicine, in some part or all of the
territory constituting this state, have been enacted from time to time since 1760.

When a person is charged with practicing medicine without a license it is necessary to examine the acts of
the legislature to ascertain whether the practices complained of are in violation of the statute law.

The Public Health Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 45) of this state provides, and did provide at all the times
mentioned in the indictment, that "No person shall practice medicine, unless registered and legally
authorized prior to September first, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, or unless licensed by the regents
and registered under article eight of chapter six hundred and sixty-one of the laws of eighteen hundred
and ninety-three and acts amendatory thereto, or unless licensed by the regents and registered as required
by this artiele. * * *" (Public Health Law, § 161.) "The practice of medicine is defined as follows: A
person practices medicine within the meaning of this article, except as hereinafter stated, who holds
himself out as being able to diagnose, treat, operate or prescribe for any human disease, pain, injury,
deformity or physical condition, and who shall either offer or undertake, by any means or method, to
diagnose, treat, operate or prescribe for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity or physical
condition." (Public Health Law, § 160, subd. 7.)

The statute also provides: "This article shall not be construed to affect * * * the practice of the religious
tenets of any church * * *." (Public Health Law, § 173.)

Our Constitution provides: "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this state to all mankind; * * * but the liberty of
conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify
practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state." (Constitution of the State of New York,
article 1, section 3.)
The defendant was never registered or licensed as a practitioner of medicine. He is a member of the
Christian Science church and a recognized practitioner within the rules of that church. For about seven
years he maintained an office in the city of New York. At the times mentioned in the indictment, his
office was on the ninth floor of a building at Fifth avenue and Madison square. It consisted of two rooms;
one, a reception room containing chairs, tables, a clock and literature; and an inner office containing a
desk, two chairs, and a telephone. On the door of his office were the words: "Willis Vernon Cole,
Christian Scientist."

The evidence taken on the trial consisted of the testimony of a woman who for seven years had been
employed by and under the direction of the New York County Medical Society as an investigator, and the
testimony of the defendant.

The investigator testified that at her first interview with the defendant on January 19, 1911, she waited in
the reception room of his office with others until an opportunity arrived to see him and she then went into
the inner office. She further testified as follows:

"I asked him if he was Dr. Cole. And he said he was Mr. Cole, a Christian Science healer. * * * I said * *
* that I read about him in the newspapers; that I called to see if he could cure my eyes, I had been
troubled with eye trouble. And he said, `How long have you been wearing glasses?' And I said, `Ten
years.' He said, `You understand I do not give any medicine, I only give Christian Science treatment.' * *
* I said to him, `What is Christian Science?' And he said, `I cure by prayer.' He said that `You must have
faith in God; that God don't make us to have any disease; that we must be all love and all kindness and
that God would cure the infidel as well as the confirmed believer in his Divine Power.' And I said what
would be the fee? And he said $2 for the first treatment and all subsequent treatments $1. * * * The
defendant then said, `I will give you a treatment.' So Mr. Cole had his chair facing mine, and he closed his
eyes and raised his hands up to his face and remained in perfect silence for fifteen or twenty minutes. * *
* He said, `That will do for to-day's treatment. * * * You come back on Friday any time.'" On Friday, the
next day, she returned to his office. Her testimony as to what occurred is as follows:

"I went in and he said to me, `Why, you are looking very well.' And I said, `I feel about the same.' And
after that, why, he spoke about God is good and we must have love and faith in God. And then he says,
why, he will give me a treatment. So that Mr. Cole placed his chair facing mine again, closed his eyes and
put his hands up to his face and we remained in perfect silence there for about fifteen or twenty minutes."

She further testified that before the treatment she said to him, "`Mr. Cole, I have a pain in my back.' * * *
I then said that I had a porous plaster on my back at that time; and I said to him what did he think about
the pain I had in my back. He said it was some kind of disease, but he could not tell what kind it was; he
said. `I can cure it.' * * * He said, `You must now take off that porous plaster because Christian Science
cannot cure with plasters on.' * * * He said that I must take off my glasses as well as remove the plaster
from my back * * * That I should have more faith and understanding; that I must have courage; that I
should remove the glasses. * * * I said I must keep my glasses as I cannot go without them. * * * He said
if I wanted to be cured by Christian Science I must remove the glasses. * * * I said, `How can you cure
locomotor ataxia?' He said, `Just by prayer and having faith in God.' He said, `When patients are given up
by physicians they always turn to Christian Science for help.'" He told her to come back on Monday,
January 23. She did so. She said to him, "`I removed the plaster that was on my back as you told me to.'
And he said, `I want you also to remove the glasses.' I says, `I have to keep the glasses on.' * * * I said, `*
* * when I eat bread and potato I would distress my stomach very much,' He said, `Leave your stomach
alone; you go home and eat anything you want to.' * * *"
She returned again on January 27 and brought her little girl with her. The little girl wore glasses. She
further testified, "I said to Mr. Cole that the child has been wearing glasses and she also has a cold. I said,
`Can you cure her by Christian Science?' and he said, `Absolutely.' I said, `Well, will you cure her?' And
he replied, `Absolutely.' So I said that the child had a pair of roller skates, and wearing glasses, why, if
she should fall she would injure herself. And he said, `You take the glasses off and let the child run and
romp like other children;' that mothers should not put such fear in children. * * *" He gave them treatment
similar to the one he had given her before.

The defendant during the interviews stated to the witness that she had as much power to heal disease as he
had, and could do so as well if she would study the Bible and rely upon its promises and offer the prayer
of understanding and faith. She understood him when he asserted that he could cure disease as saying that
he could bring about the cure by means of prayer to Almighty God. He said to her that all diseases are
alike to a Christian Scientist.

The defendant testified that at the first interview with the investigator "She told me that she had come to
be treated for trouble with her eyes and stomach trouble. I informed her that Christian Science treatment
was prayer to God, we did not believe in drugs, medical treatment, anything like that, and she asked me to
give her treatment. Something was said in regard to the basis of Christian Science, and I told her
substantially that Christian Science was the truth about God, and the truth about man and the truth about
man's relationship to God and the truth of his birthright as a result of this relationship, which is the
foundation of what we teach, and I told her that on this basis disease was no part of her birthright, or
inharmony, and when she realized her oneness with God, and got in harmony with God that this was the
treatment and was what we would do. She sat there for about fifteen minutes. I covered my face with my
hands, or sat with my head partially bowed for fifteen minutes," in prayer.

He testified that at the second interview "She spoke to me about taking off her glasses and I told her that
there was no reason that she should not take off her glasses, and I casually spoke of my own healing, that
I had worn glasses for many years * * * and taken them off. * * * I told her I had trouble with my eyes
and had several other diseases and that I had been to a number of physicians and that I had been healed by
Christian Science." He further testified that on the second visit he told her "That Christian Science
treatment was prayer to God. I told her that Christian Science realized that God was omnipotent, or all
powerful; that He was omniscient, or all knowing; that he was omnipresent, or ever present; and that
because God was omnipotent and omniscient, and omnipresent, and God was good, that it must follow
that evil, disease, inharmony, sin and discord were no part of His Being and had no real existence, and I
told her that man was the image and likeness of God, and was entitled to dominion, and that his birthright
was dominion and that he had the right to affirm and secure immunity from discord of whatever name and
nature, and that disease was like a shadow that flees before the light."

He says he told her that this result would follow from spiritual understanding. He says he spoke to her
about keeping her life pure and Christ-like and loving and good, and just and free from error. He says he
then prayed again, and that prayer is a synonym for treatment.

He further testified that at the first interview "I told her I could not cure her, that I had no more power to
cure her than any one else, that God was the only power, and the only healer. * * * I told her that she
could cure herself just as much as I could if she would study and purify her life and her thoughts and
cleanse from her consciousness fear and inharmony and false thoughts. I told her that by studying and
gaining an understanding that she could apply the principle and law of Christian Science as well as
anyone else, as well as I could. * * * I told her that I was nothing and that she was nothing, it was God."
His testimony as to what was said at the third interview is as follows: "We discussed Christian Science
and I picked up Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures by Mrs. Eddy which is recognized in
Christian Science as the standard text book; it is the original Christian Science text book which we accept
with the Holy Scriptures of which it is explanatory as the basis of our great religious truth. I asked her to
procnre a copy of this book." He testified that he read to her from that book. "To be `present with the
Lord' is to have, not mere emotional ecstasy or faith, but the actual demonstration and understanding of
Life as revealed in Christian Science. To be `with the Lord' is to be in obedience to the law of God, to be
absolutely governed by Divine Love, — by Spirit, not by matter.

"Become conscious for a single moment that Life and intelligence are purely spiritual — neither in nor of
matter, — and the body will then utter no conscious complaints. If suffering from a belief in sickness, you
will find yourself suddenly well. Sorrow is turned into joy when the body is controlled by spiritual life,
Truth and Love. * * *

"Entirely separate from the belief and dream of material living, is the Life Divine, revealing spiritual
understanding and the consciousness of man's dominion over the whole earth. This understanding casts
out error and heals the sick, and with it you can speak `as one having authority.'"

He testified that he was practicing Christian Science as laid down by the church. He denied that he was
practicing medicine.

It was conceded on the trial that Christian Science is a religion based upon the Scriptures and founded by
Mary Baker Eddy in 1866 and that the church has about a million members. The alleged healing of moral,
mental and physical diseases by prayer was practiced by Christian Scientists in New York for more than
twenty years before the times mentioned in the indictment. It was also conceded that in order to obtain
entry upon the list of practitioners of the Christian Science church proof must be furnished satisfactory to
the church of the character and qualifications of the applicant, but that the education and experience of the
applicant is not an element in his qualifications. The church relies wholly upon the sincerity of the
applicant and his reliance and faith in the power and efficacy of prayer to heal diseases.

It appears from the statute that we have quoted that a person practices medicine when he "holds himself
out as being able to diagnose, treat, operate or prescribe for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity or
physical condition, and who shall either offer or undertake, by any means or method, to diagnose, treat,
operate, or prescribe for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity or physical condition."

The language of the statute is very general. It bears evidence in itself that the words were chosen for the
express purpose of prohibiting, except upon registration and authorization of the practitioner, as by the
statute provided, every means and method that could thereafter be used or claimed to be used to relieve or
cure disease and infirmity by any person individually, or as a representative of a school, religious body or
other organization.

It does not appear that the defendant attempted to diagnose the diseases which the investigator stated to
him that she had; he not only in substance denied that she had any disease, but asserted that they rested in
her imagination or were mere evidence of a lack of true relation to her God. There was no inquiry on his
part into the symptoms which the investigator claimed that she had as indicating the diseases. There was
no laying on of hands, manipulation, massage, or outward ceremonial. His direction to her to remove her
glasses and take off a porous plaster which she asserted she had upon her back were, as also asserted by
him, simply to bring about complete reliance by her upon the power and willingness of God to heal her
diseases. Such directions were not, he asserts, intended as a prescription or as advice. It was a test of her
faith. He, however, testified that prayer was a synonym for treatment. He habitually termed his
interposition by prayer a treatment and such it would seem to have been in the ordinary meaning of the
word. He had a place where interposition by prayer to God could be sought through him at a price, either
as a compensation or as an honorarium. He asserts that he made interposition with God by prayer to take
away diseases or what he alleges to be wrong relationships between persons having diseases and their
God. His interposition with God as explained by him was to obtain such Divine action that the inharmony
between the Divine Being and the person who sought to be relieved of diseases and infirmities might be
adjusted. The duties of the defendant as a practitioner would seem to have been to handle the claim of
those that came to him with their ills with a view to obtaining a Divine cure. Such interposition under
such circumstances was, in the language of the defendant himself, a "treatment."

We are of the opinion that the defendant did "treat" the investigator by "any (some) means or method," as
the word is used in the general prohibition contained in the statute.

The general and comprehensive definition of a person who practices medicine has an express exception.
The descriptive words are preceded by the phrase "except as hereinafter stated." The exception
concededly refers to the words in section 173 of the Public Health Law as follows: "This article shall not
be construed to affect * * * the practice of the religious tenets of any church." The exception includes
every person in the practice of the religious tenets of any church and it is not in any way in conflict with
the Federal or State Constitution. The language quoted from said section 173 is not in any sense an
affirmative license. It is, we repeat, an exception to the general prohibition. Whether the practice of the
religious tenets of any church should have been excepted from the general prohibition against the practice
of medicine unless the practitioner is registered and authorized so to do, or whether the exception should
be continued therein, is a question for the legislature and not for the courts. The purpose of the general
statute is to protect citizens and others of the state from being treated in their physical ailments and
diseases by persons who have not adequate or proper training, education or qualifications to treat them.

The tenets of a church are the beliefs, doctrines and creeds of the church. The exception relates to the
tenets of the church as an organized body as distinguished from an individual. It does not relate to or
except persons practicing in accordance with individual belief.

It appears from the record that it is a tenet of the Christian Science church that prayer to God will result in
complete cure of particular diseases in a prescribed, individual case. Healing would seem to be not only
the prominent work of the church and its members, but the one distinctive belief around which the church
organization is founded and sustained.

It is claimed that the church extends its influence and spreads knowledge of its power by practical
demonstration on the part of its sincere practitioners in securing the overthrow of moral, mental and
physical disease. It disclaims any reliance upon skill, education or science. In view of the tenets of the
Christian Science church the exception to the prohibition in the statute is broader than the provision of the
Constitution of this state which we have quoted and which permits the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference.

The exception in the statute is not confined to worship or belief but includes the practice of religious
tenets. If it was the intention of the legislature to relieve members of the Christian Science and other
churches from the provisions of sections 160 and 161 of the Public Health Law to the extent of permitting
them within the rules, regulations and tenets of a church to maintain an office and there offer prayer for
the healing of the diseases of those that might come to such church members for treatment, and the
defendant has in good faith acted in accordance therewith, he is not guilty of the crime alleged in the
indictment.
 The Christian Science church is in terms expressly excepted from the prohibition contained in the
medical practice acts of many of the states. It is so expressly excepted in the statutes of Maine, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, North and South Dakota, Kentucky, Tennessee
and Wisconsin.

We think the exception in the statute in this state is broad enough to permit offering prayer for the healing
of disease in accordance with the recognized tenets of the Christian Science church. It may be said that if
the exception is so construed, it will lead to numberless persons assuming to cure diseases in the name of
a church for the purpose of thereby maintaining a business and securing a livelihood. The religious tenets
of a church must be practiced in good faith to come within the exception. When such practice is a fraud or
pretense it is not excepted from the general prohibition. When wrong is practiced in the name of religion
it is not protected by Constitution or statute. ( Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145; Davis v. Beason,133 U.S.
333; Mormon Church v. U.S., 136 U.S. 1.) Many of the decisions referred to by counsel may be explained
by the fact that the persons therein severally considered were frauds and shams.
(See People v. Spinella, 150 App. Div. 923; affd., 206 N.Y. 709.)

A person should not be allowed to assume to practice the tenets of the Christian Science or any church as
a shield to cover a business undertaking. When a person claims to be practicing the religious tenets of any
church, particularly where compensation is taken therefor and the practice is apart from a church edifice
or the sanctity of the home of the applicant, the question whether such person is within the exception
should be left to a jury as a question of fact. In this case the court charged the jury: "If you find from the
evidence in this case that this defendant did engage in the practice of medicine as alleged in the
indictment, within the definition which I have given to you, it is no defense that he did what he did from
any sense of duty, or that he did these acts in the practice of the religious tenets of the Christian Science
church." We are of the opinion that the court was in error in so charging the jury. The exception was
intended by the legislature to exclude from the prohibition the practice of the religious tenets of the
Christian Science and other churches. It was necessary as we have seen that the practice be of the tenets
of a recognized church and the court, instead of charging the jury as stated, should have left to the jury,
the question whether the defendant was in good faith practicing the tenets of such a church within the
meaning of the statutory exception.

The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered.

CUDDEBACK and CARDOZO, JJ., concur; WILLARD BARTLETT, Ch. J., concurs in the following
memorandum: I concur in Judge CHASE'S construction of the statute. But I would go farther. I deny the
power of the legislature to make it a crime to treat disease by prayer; COLLIN, J., not voting; HOGAN J.,
absent; SEABURY, J., not sitting.

Judgment reversed, etc.

People v. Klinger
Not overruled or negatively treated on appeal
Appellate Court of Illinois, First DistrictNov 10, 1937Full title
292 Ill. App. 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937)
292 Ill. App. 321•11 N.E.2d 40
MR. JUSTICE DENIS E. SULLIVAN delivered the opinion of the court.

Defendant Valeria Klinger brings this appeal from a judgment entered in the county court finding
her guilty of having violated the Medical Practice Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, ch. 91, secs. 1-39;
Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 79.01-79.40, and sentencing her to the county jail for 30 days and
imposing a fine of $100 for said violation.

In the trial court the defendant was informed against by an information which consisted of two
counts charging her with having violated the Medical Practice Act, ch. 91, sec. 24, Ill. Rev. Stat.
1937, Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 79.25. The information was sworn to by one Adolph J. Meadel, an
inspector in the department of registration and education. The trial was had before a judge and
jury. A motion was made to quash the information and each count thereof, which motion was
overruled and a verdict was returned upon which judgment was entered as aforesaid.

Charlotte Hermes, testified on behalf of plaintiff that she was employed by the State as an
investigator for the department of registration and education; that she called at the home of the
defendant at 6641 North Artesian avenue, Chicago, Illinois, on June 11, 1936; that she told the
defendant that she had been suffering from severe headaches and wanted to see her; that
defendant said she had certain times for her patients; that she again called at the home of the
defendant on July 10, 1936, about 7 o'clock and went into the basement where other people
were waiting; that she told the defendant that she had an arm that would repeatedly go out of
joint; that defendant said she understood and would help her; that the statements of the witness
with reference to her ailments were untrue; that defendant gave the witness a treatment,
manipulating the shoulder muscles with her hands and also worked on the back of her neck;
that defendant seemed to go into a trance and that defendant folded her hands as if in prayer;
that she paid the defendant $1 for the treatment; that she, the witness, has used the names of
Agnes Hilgren, Mrs. Sigerman and also Mrs. E. Johnson.

The defendant, Valeria Klinger, testified that for the past five years she has belonged to the First
Spiritualist Church of Cicero and is a qualified healer of that church; that she does not sell any
medicine or give it away or prescribe any medicine, just prays for divine healing and heals
through prayer; that she does not practice surgery; that the first time she ever saw Charlotte
Hermes was on September 10, 1936, in the courtroom, and that she received no money from
her.

C. A. Burgess, a witness on behalf of defendant, testified that he lived at 110 South Loomis
street, Chicago, Illinois; that he has been president of the Spiritual Association of Illinois for the
past 27 years; that it is a regular church incorporated under the laws of the State of Illinois; that
there are 62 such churches in Illinois and they have healers; that these healers are examined by
the board of examiners of the church and are given certificates by the Illinois State Board; that
defendant is a healer of that church; that the law of the church permits the practice by certified
healers; that the Illinois Spiritualist Association was organized about 30 years ago and chartered
by the National Spiritualist Association, also chartered by Springfield, State of Illinois, to
organize churches, certify to representatives of the churches, and to certify mediums
and healers, ordain or recommend ordination; that healers are authorized to get the necessary
healing forces to operate upon the patient by prayer; that they believe the majority of cases are
mental and if they can correct that mental condition by prayer, they go ahead; that he has been
a healer for 64 years.

Many questions are raised by defendant which we do not think it is necessary to consider at this
time.

The section under which the prosecution is urged is sec. 37 of ch. 91, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937; Jones
Ill. Stats. Ann. 79.38, known as the Medical Practice Act, which reads as follows: "This Act shall
not apply to dentists, pharmacists, optometrists, or other persons lawfully carrying on their
particular profession or business under any valid existing Act of this State regulatory thereof, nor
to persons rendering gratuitous services in cases of emergency, nor to persons treating human
ailments by prayer or spiritual means as an exercise or enjoyment of religious freedom."

The evidence in this case clearly shows that defendant's method of curing was by prayer; that
defendant was a duly authorized member of the First Spiritualist Church of Cicero and that her
license was issued by the Spiritualist Association of Illinois, Inc., which was incorporated under
the laws of the State of Illinois, and defendant was one of their regular healers. The Spiritualist
Church was organized under the laws of the State of Illinois and no doubt comes within the
provisions of the statute hereinbefore quoted. Therefore, since defendant came within the class
of persons exempted by the statute, we do not think a conviction should have been had.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion the judgment of the county court is hereby reversed.

Judgment reversed.

HEBEL, P. J., and HALL, J., concur.

 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 137268. March 26, 2001]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUTIQUIA CARMEN @ Mother

Perpetuala, CELEDONIA FABIE @ Isabel Fabie, DELIA SIBONGA @ Deding Sibonga,
ALEXANDER SIBONGA @ Nonoy Sibonga, and REYNARIO NUEZ @ Rey Nuez, accused-
appellants.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City, finding
accused-appellants Eutiquia Carmen @ Mother Perpetuala, Celedonia Fabie @ Isabel Fabie, Delia Sibonga
@ Deding Sibonga, Alexander Sibonga @ Nonoy Sibonga, and Reynario Nuez @ Rey Nuez guilty of
murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim
the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity as well as the costs.
The information[2] against accused-appellants alleged:

That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997 at about 2:00 oclock p.m., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there inflict fatal physical injuries on one Randy
Luntayao which injuries caused the death of the said Randy Luntayao.

Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge, whereupon they were tried.
The prosecution presented evidence showing the following: At around 2 oclock in the afternoon of
January 27, 1997, Honey Fe Abella, 10, and her friend Frances Claire Rivera, 7, were playing takyan in
front of the house of one Bebing Lastimoso in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City, when suddenly they heard a child
shout, Tabang ma! (Help mother!). The cry came from the direction of the house of accused-appellant
Carmen, who is also known in their neighborhood as Mother Perpetuala. The two children ran towards
Mother Perpetualas house.[3] What Honey Fe saw on which she testified in court, is summarized in the
decision of the trial court, to wit:

While there[,] she saw a boy, whose name . . . she [later] came to know as one Randy Luntayao, . . . being
immersed head first in a drum of water. Accused Alexander Sibonga was holding the waist of the body
while accused Reynario Nuez held the hands of the boy at the back. Accused Eutiquia Carmen, Delia
Sibonga, and Celedonia Fabie were pushing down the boys head into the water. She heard the boy
shouting Ma, help for two times. Later, she saw accused Reynario or Rey Nuez tie the boy on the bench
with a green rope as big as her little finger. . . . After that Eutiquia Carmen poured [water from] a plastic
container (galon) . . . into the mouth of the boy. Each time the boy struggled to raise his head, accused
Alexander Sibonga banged the boys head against the bench [to] which the boy was tied [Link] even
heard the banging sound everytime the boys head hit the bench. For about five times she heard
it. According to this witness after forcing the boy to drink water, Eutiquia Carmen and accused Celedonia
Fabie alias Isabel Fabie took turns in pounding the boys chest with their clenched fists. All the time Rey
Nuez held down the boys feet to the bench. She also witnessed . . . Celedonia Fabie dropped her weight,
buttocks first, on the body of the boy. Later on, Eutiquia Carmen ordered Delia or Deding Sibonga to get
a knife from the kitchen. Eutiquia Carmen then slowly plunged the stainless knife on the left side of the
boys body and with the use of a plastic gallon container, the top portion of which was cut out, Eutiquia
Carmen [caught] the blood dripping from the left side of the boys body. Honey Fe heard the moaning
coming from the tortured boy. Much later she saw Nonoy or Alexander Sibonga, Reynario Nuez, Delia
Sibonga, Celedonia Fabie, and Eutiquia Carmen carry the boy into the house.[4]

Eddie Luntayao, father of the victim, testified that he has five children, the eldest of whom, Randy,
was 13 years old at the time of the incident. On November 20, 1996, Randy had a nervous breakdown which
Eddie thought was due to Randy having to skip meals whenever he took the boy with him to the
farm. According to Eddie, his son started talking to himself and laughing. On January 26, 1997, upon the
suggestion of accused-appellant Reynario Nuez, Eddie and his wife Perlita and their three children (Randy,
Jesrel, 7, and Lesyl, 1) went with accused-appellant Nuez to Cebu. They arrived in Cebu at around 1 oclock
in the afternoon of the same day and spent the night in Nuezs house in Tangke, Talisay.
The following day, they went to the house of accused-appellant Carmen in Quiot, Pardo,[5] where all
of the accused-appellants were present. Eddie talked to accused-appellant Carmen regarding his sons
condition. He was told that the boy was possessed by a bad spirit, which accused-appellant Carmen said
she could exorcise. She warned, however, that as the spirit might transfer to Eddie, it was best to conduct
the healing prayer without him. Accused-appellants then led Randy out of the house, while Eddie and his
wife and two daughters were locked inside a room in the house.[6]
After a while, Eddie heard his son twice shout Ma, tabang! (Mother, help!). Eddie tried to go out of
the room to find out what was happening to his son, but the door was locked. After about an hour, the
Luntayaos were transferred to the prayer room which was located near the main door of the house.[7]
A few hours later, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, accused-appellants carried Randy into the prayer
room and placed him on the altar. Eddie was shocked by what he saw. Randys face was bluish and contused,
while his tongue was sticking out of his mouth. It was clear to Eddie that his son was already dead. He
wanted to see his sons body, but he was stopped from doing so by accused-appellant Eutiquia Carmen who
told him not to go near his son because the latter would be resurrected at 7 oclock that evening.[8]
After 7 oclock that evening, accused-appellant Carmen asked a member of her group to call the funeral
parlor and bring a coffin as the child was already dead. It was arranged that the body would be transferred
to the house of accused-appellant Nuez. Thus, that night, the Luntayao family, accompanied by accused-
appellant Nuez, took Randys body to Nunezs house in Tangke, Talisay. The following day, January 28,
1997, accused-appellant Nuez told Eddie to go with him to the Talisay Municipal Health Office to report
Randys death and told him to keep quiet or they might not be able to get the necessary papers for his sons
burial. Nuez took care of securing the death certificate which Eddie signed.[9]
At around 3 oclock in the afternoon of January 28, 1997, accused-appellant Carmen went to Tangke,
Talisay to ensure that the body was buried. Eddie and his wife told her that they preferred to bring their
sons body with them to Sikatuna, Isabela, Negros Occidental but they were told by accused-appellant
Carmen that this was not possible as she and the other accused-appellants might be arrested. That same
afternoon, Randy Luntayao was buried in Tangke, Talisay.[10]
After Eddie and his family had returned home to Negros Occidental, Eddie sought assistance from the
Bombo Radyo station in Bacolod City which referred him to the regional office of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in the city. On February 3, 1997, Eddie filed a complaint for murder against accused-
appellant Nuez and the other members of his group.[11] He also asked for the exhumation and autopsy of
the remains of his son.[12] As the incident took place in Cebu, his complaint was referred to the NBI office
in Cebu City.
 Modesto Cajita, head of NBI, Region VII (Cebu), took over the investigation of the case. He testified
that he met with Eddie Luntayao and supervised the exhumation and autopsy of the body of Randy
Luntayao.[13] Cajita testified that he also met with accused-appellant Carmen and after admitting that she
and the other accused-appellants conducted a pray-over healing session on the victim on January 27, 1997,
accused-appellant Carmen refused to give any further statement. Cajita noticed a wooden bench in the
kitchen of Carmens house, which, with Carmens permission, he took with him to the NBI office for
examination. Cajita admitted he did not know the results of the examination.[14]
Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, the NBI medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on Randy Luntayao,
testified that he, the victims father, and some NBI agents, exhumed the victims body on February 20, 1997
at Tangke Catholic Cemetery in the Tangke, Talisay, Cebu. He conducted the autopsy on the same day and
later submitted the following report (Exhs. E and F):[15]

FINDINGS

Body in advanced stage of decomposition wearing a white shirt and shorts wrapped in printed blanket
(white and orange) placed in white wooden coffin and buried underground about 4 feet deep.

Contusion, 3.0 x 4.0 cms. chest, anterior, left side.

Fracture, 3rd rib, left, mid-clavicular line.

Fracture, linear, occipital bone right side extending to the bases of middle cranial fossae right to left down
to the occipital bone, left side.

Fracture, diastatic, lamboidal suture, bilateral.

Internal organs in advanced stage of decomposition.

Cranial vault almost empty.

CAUSE OF DEATH: [The victim] could have died due to the internal effects of a traumatic head
injury and/or traumatic chest injury.

Dr. Mendez testified that the contusion on the victims chest was caused by contact with a hard blunt
instrument. He added that the fracture on the rib was complete while that found on the base of the skull
followed a serrated or uneven pattern. He said that the latter injury could have been caused by the forcible
contact of that part of the body with a blunt object such as a wooden bench.[16]
On cross-examination, Dr. Mendez admitted that he did not find any stab wound on the victims body
but explained that this could be due to the fact that at the time the body was exhumed and examined, it was
already in an advanced state of decomposition rendering such wound, if present, unrecognizable.[17]
Accused-appellants did not testify. Instead, the defense presented: (a) Ritsel Blase, an alleged
eyewitness to the incident; (b) Maria Lilina Jimenez, Visitacion Seniega, and Josefina Abing, alleged
former patients of accused-appellant Carmen; (c) Dr. Milagros Carloto, the municipal health officer of
Talisay, Cebu and; (d) Atty. Salvador Solima of the Cebu City Prosecutors Office.
Ritsel Blase, 21, testified that since 1987 she had been with the group of accused-appellant Carmen,
whom she calls Mother Perpetuala. She recounted that at around 2 oclock in the afternoon of January 27,
1997, while she was in the house of accused-appellant Carmen, she saw Eddie Luntayao talking with the
latter regarding the treatment of his son. The boy was later led to the kitchen and given a bath prior to
treatment. After water was poured on the boy, he became unruly prompting accused-appellant Carmen to
decide not to continue with the treatment, but the boys parents allegedly prevailed upon her to continue. As
the boy continued to resist, accused-appellant Carmen told accused-appellants Delia Sibonga and Celedonia
Fabie to help her (Carmen) lay the boy on a bench. As the child resisted all the more, Eddie Luntayao
allegedly told the group to tie the boy to the bench. Accused-appellant Delia Sibonga got hold of a nylon
rope which was used to tie the child to the bench. Then Carmen, Delia Sibonga, and Fabie prayed over the
child, but as the latter started hitting his head against the bench, Carmen asked Nuez to place his hands
under the boys head to cushion the impact of the blow everytime the child brought down his head. To stop
the boy from struggling, accused-appellant Fabie held the boys legs, while accused-appellant Nuez held his
shoulders. After praying over the boy, the latter was released and carried inside the house. Accused-
appellant Alexander Sibonga, who had arrived, helped carry the boy inside. After this, Blase said she no
longer knew what happened inside the house as she stayed outside to finish the laundry.[18]
Blase testified that the parents of Randy Luntayao witnessed the pray-over of their son from beginning
to end. She denied that accused-appellants Fabie and Delia Sibonga struck the victim on his chest with their
fists. According to her, neither did accused-appellant Carmen stab the boy. She claimed that Randy was
still alive when he was taken inside the house.[19]
The defense presented Maria Lilia Jimenez, 20, Visitacion Seniega, 39, and Josefina Abing, 39, who
testified that accused-appellant Carmen had cured them of their illnesses by merely praying over them and
without applying any form of physical violence on them.[20]
Milagros Carloto, Municipal Health Officer of Talisay, Cebu, was also presented by the defense to
testify on the death certificate she issued in which she indicated that Randy Luntayao died of
pneumonia. According to her, Eddie Luntayao came to her office on January 28, 1997 to ask for the issuance
of a death certificate for his son Randy Luntayao who had allegedly suffered from cough and fever.[21]
On cross-examination, Dr. Carloto admitted that she never saw the body of the victim as she merely
relied on what she had been told by Eddie Luntayao. She said that it was a midwife, Mrs. Revina Laviosa,
who examined the victims body.[22]
The last witness for the defense, Assistant City Prosecutor Salvador Solima, was presented to identify
the resolution he had prepared (Exh. 8)[23] on the re-investigation of the case in which he recommended the
dismissal of the charge against accused-appellants. His testimony was dispensed with, however, as the
prosecution stipulated on the matters Solima was going to testify with the qualification that Solimas
recommendation was disapproved by City Prosecutor Primo Miro.[24]
The prosecution recalled Eddie Luntayao to the stand to rebut the testimonies of Ritsel Blase and Dr.
Milagros Carloto. Eddie denied having witnessed what accused-appellants did to his son. He reiterated his
earlier claim that after accused-appellants had taken Randy, he and his wife and two daughters were locked
inside a room. He disputed Blases statement that his son was still alive when he was brought into the prayer
room. He said he saw that his sons head slumped while being carried by accused-appellants.[25]
As for the testimony of Dr. Carloto, Eddie admitted having talked with her when he and accused-
appellant Nuez went to her office on January 28, 1997. However, he denied having told her that his son was
suffering from fever and cough as he told her that Randy had a nervous breakdown. He took exception to
Dr. Carlotos statement that he was alone when he went to her office because it was Nuez who insisted that
he (Eddie) accompany him in order to secure the death certificate.[26]
On November 18, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, [the] accused are all found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are hereby [sentenced] to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify jointly and severally the
heirs of the deceased Randy Luntayao in the sum of P50,000.00; and to pay the costs. The accused, are,
however, credited in full during the whole period of their detention provided they will signify in writing
that they will abide by all the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.[27]

In finding accused-appellants guilty of murder, the trial court stated:

Killing a person with treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill. When death occurs, it is
presumed to be the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted. Since the defendant did commit the
crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the voluntary presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery (P v. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 530). All the accused in the case at bar had contributed
different acts in mercilessly inflicting injuries to the victim. For having immersed the head of the victim
into the barrel of water, all the herein accused should be held responsible for all the consequences even if
the result be different from that which was intended (Art. 4, par. 1, RPC). It is pointed out that in P. v.
Cagoco, 58 Phil. 524, even if there was no intent to kill[,] in inflicting physical injuries with treachery, the
accused in that case was convicted of murder. In murder qualified by treachery, it is required only that
there is treachery in the attack, and this is true even if the offender has no intent to kill the person
assaulted. Under the guise of a ritual or treatment, the accused should not have intentionally immersed
upside down the head of Randy Luntayao into a barrel of water; banged his head against the bench;
pounded his chest with fists, or plunged a kitchen knife to his side so that blood would come out for these
acts would surely cause death to the victim. . . .

One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally and
logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. Ordinarily, when a person commits a
felony with malice, he intends the consequences of his felonious act. In view of paragraph 1 of Art. 4, a
person committing a felony is criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious acts are not
intended by him. . . .

....

Intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. The presumption of criminal intent may arise
from the proof of the criminal act and it is for the accused to rebut this presumption. In the case at bar,
there is enough evidence that the accused confederated with one another in inflicting physical harm to the
victim (an illegal act). These acts were intentional, and the wrong done resulted in the death of their
victim. Hence, they are liable for all the direct and natural consequences of their unlawful act, even if the
ultimate result had not been intended.[28]

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants allege that the trial court erred in convicting them of murder.[29]
First. It would appear that accused-appellants are members of a cult and that the bizarre ritual
performed over the victim was consented to by the victims parents. With the permission of the victims
parents, accused-appellant Carmen, together with the other accused-appellants, proceeded to subject the
boy to a treatment calculated to drive the bad spirit from the boys body. Unfortunately, the strange
procedure resulted in the death of the boy. Thus, accused-appellants had no criminal intent to kill the
boy. Their liability arises from their reckless imprudence because they ought that to know their actions
would not bring about the cure. They are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and not of murder.
Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in
voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason
of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such act. Compared to intentional
felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes the place of the element of malice or intention to commit
a wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of skill taking into account his
employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding
persons, time, and place.
The elements of reckless imprudence are apparent in the acts done by accused-appellants which,
because of their lack of medical skill in treating the victim of his alleged ailment, resulted in the latters
death. As already stated, accused-appellants, none of whom is a medical practitioner, belong to a religious
group, known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima, which is engaged in faith healing.
In United States v. Divino,[30] the accused, who was not a licensed physician, in an attempt to cure the
victim of ulcers in her feet, wrapped a piece of clothing which had been soaked in petroleum around the
victims feet and then lighted the clothing, thereby causing injuries to the victim. The Court held the accused
liable for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. It was noted that the accused had no intention
to cause an evil but rather to remedy the victims ailment.
In another case, People v. Vda. de Golez,[31] the Court ruled that the proper charge to file against a non-
medical practitioner, who had treated the victim despite the fact that she did not possess the necessary
technical knowledge or skill to do so and caused the latters death, was homicide through reckless
imprudence.
The trial courts reliance on the rule that criminal intent is presumed from the commission of an
unlawful act is untenable because such presumption only holds in the absence of proof to the
contrary.[32]The facts of the case indubitably show the absence of intent to kill on the part of the accused-
appellants. Indeed, the trial courts findings can be sustained only if the circumstances of the case are ignored
and the Court limits itself to the time when accused-appellants undertook their unauthorized treatment of
the victim. Obviously, such an evaluation of the case cannot be allowed.
Consequently, treachery cannot be appreciated for in the absence of intent to kill, there is no treachery
or the deliberate employment of means, methods, and manner of execution to ensure the safety of the
accused from the defensive or retaliatory attacks coming from the victim.[33] Viewed in this light, the acts
which the trial court saw as manifestations of treachery in fact relate to efforts by accused-appellants to
restrain Randy Luntayao so that they can effect the cure on him.
On the other hand, there is no merit in accused-appellants contention that the testimony of prosecution
eyewitness Honey Fe Abella is not credible. The Court is more than convinced of Honey Fes credibility.
Her testimony is clear, straightforward, and is far from having been coached or contrived. She was only a
few meters away from the kitchen where accused-appellants conducted their pray-over healing session not
to mention that she had a good vantage point as the kitchen had no roof nor walls but only a pantry. Her
testimony was corroborated by the autopsy findings of Dr. Mendez who, consistent with Honey Fes
testimony, noted fractures on the third left rib and on the base of the victims skull. With regard to Dr.
Mendezs failure to find any stab wound in the victims body, he himself had explained that such could be
due to the fact that at the time the autopsy was conducted, the cadaver was already in an advanced state of
decomposition. Randy Luntayaos cadaver was exhumed 24 days after it had been buried. Considering the
length of time which had elapsed and the fact that the cadaver had not been embalmed, it was very likely
that the soft tissues had so decomposed that, as Dr. Mendez said, it was no longer possible to determine
whether there was a stab wound. As for the other points raised by accused-appellants to detract the
credibility of Honey Fes testimony, the same appear to be only minor and trivial at best.
Accused-appellants contend that the failure of the prosecution to present the testimony of Frances
Claire Rivera as well as the knife used in stabbing Randy Luntayao puts in doubt the prosecutions
evidence. We do not think so. The presentation of the knife in evidence is not indispensable.[34]
 Finally, accused-appellants make much of the fact that although the case was tried under Judge Renato
C. Dacudao, the decision was rendered by Judge Galicano Arriesgado who took over the case after the
prosecution and the defense had rested their cases.[35] However, the fact that the judge who wrote the
decision did not hear the testimonies of the witnesses does not make him less competent to render a decision,
since his ruling is based on the records of the case and the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies
of the witnesses.[36]
Second. The question now is whether accused-appellants can be held liable for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, considering that the information charges them with murder. We hold that they can.
Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent parts:

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in
or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.

In Samson v. Court of Appeals,[37] the accused were charged with, and convicted of, estafa through
falsification of public document. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment and held one of the
accused liable for estafa through falsification by negligence. On appeal, it was contended that the appeals
court erred in holding the accused liable for estafa through negligence because the information charged him
with having wilfully committed estafa. In overruling this contention, the Court held:

While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon v. Justice
of the Peace of Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a
quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under
an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater
includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged
with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that
in effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not
act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the
identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information
alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is
a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof. . . .

The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with imprudence is of
no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by appellant himself and
the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it
would be incongruous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of
criminal intent is incompatible with the concept of negligence.

In People v. Fernando,[38] the accused was charged with, and convicted of, murder by the trial
court. On appeal, this Court modified the judgment and held the accused liable for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide after finding that he did not act with criminal intent.
 Third. Coming now to the imposable penalty, under Art. 365, reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period. In this case, taking into account the pertinent provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
accused-appellants should suffer the penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
As to their civil liability, accused-appellants should pay the heirs of Randy Luntayao an indemnity in
the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages also in the amount of P50,000.00.[39] In addition, they should
pay exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 in view of accused-appellants gross negligence in
attempting to cure the victim without a license to practice medicine and to give an example or correction
for the public good.[40]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide and are each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition,
accused-appellants are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Randy Luntayao indemnity in
the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the
amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.