Perez v. People, G.R. No.

164763, 12 February 2008 - VILLAPANDO

Syllabus:

Right to Speedy Trial; In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the United States Supreme
Court was confronted for the first time with two „rigid approaches on speedy trial as „ways of
eliminating some of the uncertainty which courts experience protecting the right the fixed-time
period and the demand waiver rule went on to adopt a middle ground, the „balancing test, which
necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis, using the factors
length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendantÊs assertion of his right, and prejudice to
the defendant.·In Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court was confronted for the first
time with two rigid approaches on speedy trial as ways of eliminating some of the uncertainty
which courts experience protecting the right. The first approach is the fixed-time period which
holds the view that the Constitution requires a criminal defendant to be offered a trial within a
specified time period. The second approach is the demand-waiver rule which provides that a
defendant waives any consideration of his right to speedy trial for any period prior to which he
has not demanded trial. Under this rigid approach, a prior demand is a necessary condition to the
consideration of the speedy trial right. The fixed-time period was rejected because there is no
constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial can be quantified into a specific number of
days or months. The demand-waiver rule was likewise rejected because aside from the fact that it
is inconsistent with this Court’s pronouncements on waiver of constitutional rights, it is
insensitive to a right which we have deemed fundamental. The Court went on to adopt a middle
ground: the „balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are
weighed.‰ Mr. Justice Powell, ponente, explained the concept, thus: A balancing test
necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little
more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a
particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some might express them in different
ways, we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.

Same; Philippine jurisprudence has, on several occasions, adopted the balancing test.·Philippine
jurisprudence has, on several occasions, adopted the balancing test. In 1991, in Gonzales v.
Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298 (1991), this Court ruled: It must be here emphasized that the
right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when
the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive
a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally
applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right
to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both
the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for
the delay, the defendant’s assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant
resulting from the delay, are considered. (Italics supplied) Subsequently, in Dela Peña v.
Sandiganbayan, 360 SCRA 478 (2001), this Court again enumerated the factors that should be
considered and balanced, namely: (1) length of delay; (2) reasons for the delay; (3) assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) prejudice caused by the delay. Once more, in
Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, 440 SCRA 423 (2004), this Court reiterated that the right to
speedy disposition of cases, like the right to speedy trial, is violated only when the proceedings
are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In the determination of whether said
right has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case. The conduct of both the prosecution and defendant, the length of the delay, the
reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by accused, and the prejudice
caused by the delay are the factors to consider and balance.

Facts:
An audit team conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who was then
the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. In the course of the audit, the amount of
P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner. The audit team embodied their findings in the
Report of Cash Examination, which also contained an inventory of cash items. Based on the said
audit, petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead of the
P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57. When asked by the auditing team as to the
location of the missing funds, petiti oner verbally explained that part of the money was used to
pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the
rest for his medicine.

As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum dated January 13,
1989 addressed to the Provincial Auditor of Bohol recommending the filing of the appropriate
criminal case against petitioner.

An administrative case was filed against petitioner on February 13, 1989. He filed an
Answer dated February 22, 1989 reiterating his earlier verbal admission before the audit team.
Later, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds,
defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
On March 1, 1990, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of “not
guilty”. Pre-trial was initially set on June 4-5, 1990 but petitioner’s counsel moved for
postponement. The Sandiganbayan, however, proceeded to hear the case on June 5, 1990, as
previously scheduled, due to the presence of prosecution witness Arlene R. Mandin, who came
all the way from Bohol.
On September 24, 2003, Sandiganbayan rendered a judgment of conviction.

Issues:
1. Was he deprived of his right to counsel?
2. Is the right of the accused to due process and speedy disposition of trial violated after the
lapse of more than 12 years?

Ruling:
1. No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in
the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or accused during custodial
investigation. It is not an absolute right and may be invoked or rejected in a criminal
proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry.
 While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a
criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature
of the charges and of respondent’s capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on
such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel.

Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such
inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service.

2. No. There is no violation of the rights to a speedy disposition of the cas.

The Court applied the ruling in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298 (1991), which
states:

It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right
to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are
asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.

Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been
denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in
which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such
factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion or non-
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are
considered.

Subsequently, in Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, 360 SCRA 478 (2001), this Court again
enumerated the factors that should be considered and balanced, namely: (1) length of
delay; (2) reasons for the delay; (3) assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and (4) prejudice caused by the delay. Once more, in Mendoza-Ong v.
Sandiganbayan, 440 SCRA 423 (2004), this Court reiterated that the right to speedy
disposition of cases, like the right to speedy trial, is violated only when the proceedings
are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In the determination of
whether said right has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. The conduct of both the prosecution and defendant,
the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such
right by accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay are the factors to consider and
balance.

More important than the absence of serious prejudice, petitioner himself did not want a
speedy disposition of his case. Petitioner was duly represented by counsel de parte in all stages
of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. From the moment his case was deemed submitted
for decision up to the time he was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan, however, petitioner has
not filed a single motion or manifestation which could be construed even remotely as an
indication that he wanted his case to be dispatched without delay. Petitioner has clearly slept on
his right.

The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those twelve years,
petitioner had shown signs of asserting his right to a speedy disposition of his case or at
least made some overt acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that he was not
waiving that right. Currit tempus contra decides et sui juris contempores: Time runs against the
slothful and those who neglect their rights. Ang panahon ay hindi panig sa mga tamad at pabaya
sa kanilang karapatan. Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt. The law aids the
vigilant and not those who slumber in their rights. Ang batas ay tumutulong sa mga
mapagbantay at hindi sa mga humihimbing sa kanilang karapatan.

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