1. G.R. No.

127107 October 12, 1998

At first, the accused, riding on [sic] a truck, went to the Municipal Hall of Masantol, Pampanga
PETER PAUL DIMATULAC and VERONICA DIMATULAC, petitioners, inquiring about PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac. Thereafter, they went to the house of Mayor Lacap for the
vs. purpose of inquiring [about] the [the location of the] house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, until finally,
HON. SESINANDO VILLON in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court they were able to reach the house of said Virgilio Dimatulac at San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga.
of Pampanga, Branch 54; HON. TEOFISTO GUINGONA, in his capacity as Secretary of
Justice; MAYOR SANTIAGO YABUT, SERVILLANO YABUT, MARTIN YABUT and Upon reaching the house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, the truck the accused were all riding, stopped
FORTUNATO MALLARI, respondents. and parked in front of the house of said PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, some of the accused descended
from the truck and positioned themselves around the house while others stood by the truck and
DAVIDE, JR., J.: the Mayor stayed [in] the truck with a bodyguard.

The issues raised by petitioners in their Memorandum1 and by the Office of the Solicitor General Accused Billy Yabut, Kati Yabut and Francisco Yambao, went inside the house of Virgilio Dimatulac
in its Comment2 in this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 [and] were even offered coffee.
of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners, children of the deceased Police Officer 3 (PO3) Virgilio
Dimatulac of Masantol, Pampanga, may be summarized as follows: [A]ccused Yabut brothers (Kati and Billy) strongly suggested to Virgilio Dimatulac to go down to
see the Mayor outside in front of his house to say sorry.
A. WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN: (1) GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION BY PRIVATE [W]hen Virgilio Dimatulac went down his house, suddenly [a] gun shot was heard and then, the
RESPONDENTS AGAINST WHOM WARRANTS OF ARREST WERE ISSUED BUT WHO HAD NOT YET son of Virgilio Dimatulac, Peter Paul, started to shout the following words: "What did you do to
BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE CUSTODY Of THE LAW; and (2) FILING THE INFORMATION FOR my father?!"
HOMICIDE DESPITE KNOWLEDGE OF THE APPEAL FROM SAID PROSECUTOR'S RESOLUTION TO
THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE. One of the men of Mayor "Docsay" Yabut shot Virgilio Dimatulac, and as a consequence, he died;
and before he expired, he left a dying declaration pointing to the group of Mayor "Docsay" Yabut
B. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PROCEEDING as the one responsible.
WITH THE ARRAIGNMENT AND IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE
ARRAIGNMENT AND RECONSIDERATION THEREOF DESPITE HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE PENDENCY That right after Virgilio Dimatulac was shot, accused "Docsay" Yabut ordered his men to go on
OF THE APPEAL AND THE SUBMISSION OF VITAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT MURDER AND NOT board the truck and immediately left away leaving Virgilio Dimatulac bleeding and asking for help.
HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED.
On their way home to Minalin, accused Santiago "Docsay" Yabut gave money to accused John Doe
C. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF Dan/Danny and Francisco "Boy" Yambao was asked to bring the accused John Doe to Nueva Ecija
DISCRETION IN RECONSIDERING HIS ORDER FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS which he did.
MURDER AND DIRECTING THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR TO AMEND THE INFORMATION FROM
HOMICIDE TO MURDER. Further, accused Santiago "Docsay" Yabut told his group to deny that they ever went to Masantol.

The records and the pleadings of the parties disclose the antecedents. The court, after having conducted preliminary examination on the complainant and the witnesses
presented, [is] satisfied that there is a [sic] reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder
On 3 November 1995, SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San was committed and that the accused in conspiring and confederating with one another are
Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. probably guilty thereof.

On 5 November 1995, a complaint for Murder was filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court Circumstantial evidence strongly shows the presence of conspiracy.
(MCTC) of Macabebe-Masantol in Macabebe, Pampanga, by SPO1 Renato Layug of the Masantol
Police Station against private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, That in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, warrants of arrest were issued against Santiago
Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit, Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Francisco Yambao, Avelino David, Casti David, Catoy
Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito Miranda, SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye, Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Boy dela Cruz, Lito Miranda and Juan Magat with no bail recommended.
Vladimir Yumul, a certain "Danny," and a certain "Koyang/Arding." The complaint was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 95-360. After conducting a preliminary examination in the form of searching However, with respect to accused Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding, the court directed the police
questions and answers, and finding probable cause, Judge Designate Serafin B. David of the MCTC authorities to furnish the court [a] description personae of the accused for the purpose of issuing
issued warrants for the arrest of the accused and directed them to file their counter-affidavits. the needed warrant of arrest.

Only accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Francisco Yambao were arrested; The accused were furnish [sic] copies of the complaint and affidavits of witnesses for them to file
while only Francisco Yambao submitted his counter affidavit.3 their counter-affidavits in accordance to [sic] law.

On 1 December 1995, after appropriate proceedings, Judge David issued a Resolution4 in Criminal As of this date, only accused Francisco "Boy" Yambao filed his counter-affidavit and all the others
Case No. 95-360 finding reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder had been waived the filing of the same.
committed and that the accused were probably guilty thereof. His findings of fact and conclusions
were as follows: A close evaluation of the evidence submitted by the accused Francisco Yambao which the court
finds it [sic] straightforward and more or less credible and seems to be consistent with truth,
That on or about November 3, 1995, all the accused under the leadership of Mayor Santiago human nature and [the] natural course of things and lack of motives [sic], the evidence of guilt
"Docsay" Yabut, including two John Does identified only as Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding, went against him is rather weak [compared to] the others, which [is why] the court recommends a
to Masantol, Pampanga for the purpose of looking for a certain PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac.

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cash bond of P50,000.00 for his provisional liberty, and the court's previous order of no bail for believe[d] to have been committed is Homicide as no circumstance would qualify the killing to
said accused is hereby reconsidered. murder.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Clerk of Court is directed to forward he entire records of Alfonso-Flores then ruled:
the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for further action, together with
the bodies of accused Francisco Yambao and Juan Magat to be remanded to the provincial Jail of WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that:
Pampanga.5 (emphasis supplied)
1. An information be filed with the proper court charging Santiago, Servillano and Martin all
In a sworn statement,6 petitioner Peter Paul Dimatulac narrated that Mayor Santiago Yabut, surnamed Yabut, and one John Doe alias Danny as conspirators in the crime of Homicide;
accompanied by a number of bodyguards, went to the residence of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac to talk
about a problem between the Mayor and Peter Paul's uncle, Jun Dimatulac. Virgilio warmly 2. The case be dismissed against accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap a.k.a. Casti David,
welcomed the group and even prepared coffee for them. Servillano and Martin Yabut told Virgilio Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit, Bladimir Dimatulac, Fortunato Mallari, Aniano
to come down from his house and apologize to the Mayor, but hardly had Virgilio descended when Magnaye, Gilberto Malabanan, Jesus dela Cruz and Joselito Miranda.
Peter Paul heard a gunshot. While Peter Paul did not see who fired the shot, he was sure it was
one of Mayor Yabut's companions. Peter Paul opined that his father was killed because the latter Bail of P20,000.00 for each of the accused is likewise recommended.
spoke to the people of Minalin, Pampanga, against the Mayor, Peter Paul added in a supplemental
statement (Susog na Salaysay) 7 that he heard Mayor Yabut order Virgilio killed. The Resolution discloses that Alfonso-Flores conducted a hearing on 11 January 1996 and
clarificatory questions were propounded only to Peter Paul Dimatulac.
It his Sinumpaang Salaysay,8 Police Officer Leopoldo Soriano of the Masantol Municipal Police
Station in Masantol, Pampanga, declared that on 3 November 1995, between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m., On 23 February 1996, before the Information for homicide was filed, complainants, herein
while he was at the polite station, three men approached him and asked for directions to the petitioners, appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of the Department of Justice
house of Mayor Epifanio Lacap. Soriano recognized one of the men as SPO1 Labet Malabanan of (DOJ). 10 They alleged in their appeal that:
Minalin, Pampanga. The group left after Soriano gave them directions, but one of the three
returned to ask whether PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was on duty, to which Soriano replied that 1. THE ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR NOT ONLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS
Dimatulac was at home. The group left on board a military truck headed for San Nicolas, Masantol, NO TREACHERY TO QUALIFY THE CRIME TO MURDER, BUT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT
Pampanga. Later that day, SPO2 Michael Viray received a telephone call at the police station APPRECIATING THE PRESENCE OF OTHER QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES, TO WIT:
reporting that someone had shot Virgilio Dimatulac.
(A) THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME WITH THE AID OF ARMED MEN AND WITH THE
Thereafter, Pampanga Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted a USE OF A PERSON TO INSURE OR AFFORD IMPUNITY;
reinvestigation. However, it is not clear from the record whether she conducted the same motu
proprio or upon motion of private respondents Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut (B) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN CONSIDERATION OF A PRICE, REWARD, OR PROMISE;
(hereafter YABUTs). All of the accused who had not submitted their counter-affidavits before the
MCTC, except accused "Danny" and "Koyang/Arding," submitted their counter-affidavits to (C) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED ON THE OCCASION OF A DESTRUCTIVE CYCLONE, WHEN
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso Flores. THE SUPER-TYPHOON "ROSING" WAS RAGING ON NOVEMBER 3, 1995;

In her Resolution dated 29 January 1996, 9 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores found (D) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED WITH EVIDENT PREMEDITATION;
that the YABUTs and the assailant Danny, to the exclusion of the other accused, were in conspiracy
with one another, but that the offense committed was only homicide, not murder. In support of 2. THAT THE HONORABLE INVESTIGATING ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
such finding, Alfonso-Flores reasoned thus: COMPLAINT AGAINST FORTUNATO MALLARI AND FRANCISCO YAMBAO BY RULING OUT
CONSPIRACY WITH THE YABUT BROTHERS AS AGAINST FORTUNATO MALLARI AND NOT
The complainant in this case charges the crime of Murder qualified by treachery. It must be noted CHARGING FRANCISCO YAMBAO AS AN ACCESSORY TO MURDER.
that to constitute treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit, 1) the employment of the
[sic] means of execution were give [sic] the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or To refute Alfonso-Flores' finding that the means of execution were not deliberately adopted,
to retaliate; and 2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted . . . . petitioners asserted that the meeting of the accused and the victim was not accidental as the
former purposely searched for the victim at the height of a typhoon, while accused Mayor Santiago
In the instant case, the presence of the first requisite was clearly established by the evidence, Yabut even remarked to his co-accused "Danny," "Dikitan mo lang, alam mo na kung ano ang
such that the attack upon the victim while descending the stairs was so sudden and unexpected gagawin mo, bahala ka na" (Just stay close to him, you know what to do). Thus, Danny positioned
as to render him no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. However, the circumstances, as himself near the stairs to goad the victim to come out of his house, while Fortunato Mallari
portrayed by witness Peter Paul Dimatulac, negate the presence of the second requisite. According represented to the deceased that the latter was being invited by a certain General Ventura. When
to the said witness, the victim was already descending when Mayor Yabut commanded the the victim declined the invitation by claiming he was sick, accused Servillano Yabut persuaded the
assailant to shoot him, and immediately thereafter, he heard the gunshot. This would therefore victim to come down by saying, "[T]o settle this matter, just apologize to the Mayor who is in the
show that the assailant did not consciously adopt the position of the victim at the time he fired truck." In view of that enticement, the victim came down, while Danny waited in ambush. To
the fatal shot. The command of Mayor Yabut to shoot came so sudden as to afford no opportunity emphasize the accused's resolve to kill the deceased, petitioners further narrated that when the
for the assailant to choose the means or method of attack. The act of Mayor Yabut in giving the deceased ran away after the first shot, the gunman still pursued him, while Mayor Santiago Yabut,
command to shoot further bolster[s] the fact that the conspirator did not concert the means and who was a doctor, kept away at a safe distance and told everyone in the truck, "Tama na, bilisan
method of attack nor the manner thereof. Otherwise there would have been no necessity for him ninyo," (That's enough, move quickly) without giving medical assistance to the deceased and
to give the order to the assailant. The method and manner of attack was adopted by the assailant without exerting any effort to arrest the gunman.
at the spur of the moment and the vulnerable position of the victim was not deliberately and
consciously adopted. Treachery therefore could not be appreciated and the crime reasonably The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga was furnished with a copy of the Appeal.

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On 26 February 1996, Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang issued a Resolution 11 ordering Defer Proceedings as he found no compelling reason therefor, considering that although the appeal
the release of accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Arturo Naguit (who were was filed on 23 February 1996, "the private prosecution has not shown any indication that [the]
then detained) in view of the aforementioned resolution of Alfonso-Flores, which, as stated in the appeal was given due course by the Secretary of Justice." Judge Roura also set the arraignment
order, the Provincial Prosecutor approved "on February 7, 1996." of the accused on 12 April 1996. 23

On 28 February 1996, an Information 12 for Homicide, signed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor It would appear that the private prosecution moved to reconsider the order denying the Motion to
Flores and Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang, was filed before Branch 55 of the Regional Defer Proceedings since, on 12 April 1996, Judge Roura issued an Order 24 giving the private
Trial Court (RTC) in Macabebe, Pampanga, against the YABUTs and John Doe alias "Danny prosecutor "ten (10) days from today within which to file a petition for certiorari questioning the
Manalili" and docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M). The accusatory portion of the order of the Court denying his motion for reconsideration of the order of March 26, 1996."
information read as follows: Arraignment was then reset to 3 May 1996.

That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1995, in the municipality of Masantol, province of On 19 April 1996, petitioners filed a motion to inhibit Judge Roura 25 from hearing Criminal Case
Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named No. 96-1667(M) on the ground that he: (a) hastily set the case for arraignment while the former's
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate appeal in the DOJ was still pending evaluation; and (b) prejudged the matter, having remarked
intent to take the life of PO3 Virgilio A. Dimatulac, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and in open court that there was "nothing in the records of the case that would qualify the case into
feloniously shoot the said PO3 Virgilio A. Dimatulac on his abdomen with the use of a handgun, Murder." At the same time, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition 26 with the Court of Appeals
thereby inflicting, upon him a gunshot wound which cause[d] the death of the said victim. docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, to enjoin Judge Roura from proceeding with the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M).
All contrary to law.
On 24 April 1996, Public Prosecutor Olimpio R. Datu filed a Manifestation and Comment 27 with
The Information, although dated 29 January 1996 was signed by Provincial Prosecutor Manarang the trial court wherein he opposed the motion to inhibit Judge Roura; manifested that "there is
on "2/27/96", i.e., a day before its filing in court. nothing in the record . . . which shows that the subject killing is qualified into murder;" and
announced that he "will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate or handle the
On 28 February 1996, Judge Reynaldo V. Roura, presiding judge of Branch 55, approved the cash prosecution of [the] case" in view of the latter's petition to inhibit Judge Roura.
bonds of the YABUTs, each in the amount of P20,000.00, and recalled the warrants for their arrest.
13 On 29 April 1996, Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and ordered the case transferred to
Branch 54 of the RTC, presided over by herein public respondent Judge Sesinando Villon. 28
On 29 February 1996, Atty. Amado Valdez, who had entered his appearance as private prosecutor,
filed two (2) motions with the trial court: (1) a Motion to Issue Hold Departure Order Against All On 30 April 1996, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 54 of the RTC received the record of
Accuseds14 [sic]; and an (2) Urgent Motion to Defer Proceedings, 15 copies of which were Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M). 29
furnished the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. The second motion was grounded
on the pendency of the appeal before the Secretary of Justice and a copy thereof was attached to On 30 April 1996, petitioners filed with the trial court a Manifestation 30 submitting, in connection
the motion. Judge Roura set the motions for hearing on 8 March 1996. 16 with their Motion to Defer Proceedings and Motion to Inhibit Judge Roura, documentary evidence
to support their contention that the offense committed was murder, not homicide. The documents
On 7 March 1996, Judge Roura ordered the arrest of the remaining accused, Danny Manalili. 17 which they claimed were not earlier submitted by the public prosecution were the following:

On 8 March 1996, the YABUTs filed their opposition 18 to the Motion to Issue Hold Departure a. Counter-Affidavit of SPO1 Gilberto D. Malabanan.
Order and the Motion to Defer Proceedings. The YABUTs asserted that, as to the first, by posting
bail bonds, they submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court and were bound by the condition b. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Vladimir Yumul y Dimatulac.
therein to "surrender themselves whenever so required by the court, and to seek permission from
the court should any one of them desire to travel;" and, as to the second, the pendency of the c. Counter-Affidavit of Francisco I. Yambao.
appeal before the Secretary of Justice was not a ground to defer arraignment; moreover, the trial
court had to consider their right to a speedy trial, especially since there was no definite date for d. Counter-Affidavit of SPO2 Fortunato Mallari.
the resolution of the appeal. Then invoking this Court's rulings in Crespo v. Mogul 19 and Balgos
v. Sandiganbayan, 20 the YABUTs further asserted that petitioners should have filed a motion to e. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Aniano Magnaye.
defer the filing of the information for homicide with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, or
sought, from the Secretary of Justice, an order directing the Provincial Prosecutor to defer the f. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Leopoldo Soriano.
filing of the information in court.
g. Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the Preliminary Investigation of Criminal Case No. 95-360,
In a Reply 21 to the opposition, the private prosecution, citing Section 20 of Rule 114 of the Rules containing the testimony of:
of Court, insisted on the need for a hold-departure order against the accused; argued that the
accused's right to a speedy trial would not be impaired because the appeal to the Secretary of a. Peter Paul Dimatulac
Justice was filed pursuant to Department Order No. 223 of the DOJ and there was clear and
convincing proof that the killing was committed with treachery and other qualifying circumstances b. Vladimir D. Yumul
not absorbed in treachery; and contended that the accused's invocation of the right to a speedy
trial was inconsistent with their filing of various dilatory motions during the preliminary c. SPO1 Gilberto Malabanan
investigation. The YABUTs filed a Rejoinder 22 to this Opposition.
d. PO3 Alfonso Canilao
On 26 March 1996, Judge Roura deferred resolution of the Motion to Issue a Hold Departure Order
until "such time that all the accused who are out on bail are arraigned," but denied the Motion to h. Investigation Report-dated November 4, 1995.

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 As has been repeatedly held, to constitute treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit: (1)
i. Dying declaration of Virgilio Dimatulac. employment of means of execution that gives the person [attacked] no opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted
j. Sketch (People vs. Talaver, 230 SCRA 281 [1994]). In the case at bar, these two (2) requisites are
present as established from the foregoing discussion. Hence, there being a qualifying circumstance
k. Unscaled Sketch of treachery, the crime committed herein is murder, not homicide (People vs. Gapasin, 231 SCRA
728 [1994]).
Likewise on 30 April 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated, in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, a
Resolution 31 directing respondent therein to file his comment to the petition within ten days from Anent the alleged participation of respondents Fortunato Mallari and Francisco Yambao, we find
notice and to show cause within the same period "why no writ of preliminary injunction should be sufficient evidence against Mallari as part of the conspiracy but not against Yambao. As can be
issued as prayed for in the petition." However, the Court of Appeals "deferred action" on the gleaned from the sworn-statement of Yambao, which appears to be credible, Mallari tried also to
prayer for a temporary restraining order "until after the required comment [was] submitted." persuade the victim to go with them, using as a reason that he (victim) was being invited by
General Ventura. He was also seen trying to fix the gun which was used in killing the victim. These
On 3 May 1996, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation 32 with the RTC, furnishing the trial actuations are inconsistent with the claim that his presence at the crime scene was merely passive.
court with a copy of the aforementioned resolution of the Court of Appeals and drawing the
attention of the trial court to the rulings of this Court in "Valdez vs. Aquilisan, (133 SCRA 150), On the other hand, we find credible the version and explanation of Yambao. Indeed, under the
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, and Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals . . . obtaining circumstances, Yambao had no other option but to accede to the request of Mayor Yabut
as well as the decision in Paul G. Roberts vs. The Court of Appeals." to provide transportation to the assailant. There being an actual danger to his life then, and having
acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear, reason dictates that he should be freed from
On 3 May 1996, Judge Villon issued an order resetting arraignment of the accused to 20 May criminal liability. 38
1996. 33 On the latter date, the YABUTs each entered a plea of not guilty. 34
The YABUTs moved to reconsider the resolution, 39 citing Section 4 of
Alarmed by the conduct of arraignment, petitioners filed, on 27 May 1996, an Urgent Motion to "Administrative/Administration Order No. 223 of the DOJ." 40
Set Aside Arraignment,35 citing the resolution of 30 April 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 40393 which, inter alia, deferred resolution on the application for a temporary restraining In an Ex-Parte Manifestation 41 dated 21 June 1996, petitioners called the trial court's attention
order "until after the required comment is submitted by the respondent;" stressed that the filing to the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, a copy of which was attached thereto. Later, in a
of the information for the lesser offense of homicide was "clearly unjust and contrary to law in Manifestation and Motion 42 dated 1 July 1996, petitioners asked the trial court to grant their
view of the unquestionable attendance of circumstances qualifying the killing to murder;" and motion to set aside arraignment. Attached thereto was a copy of the Manifestation and Motion 43
asserted that a number of Supreme Court decisions supported suspension of the proceedings in of the Solicitor General dated 18 June 1996 filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
view of the pendency of their appeal before the DOJ. 40393 wherein the Solicitor General joined cause with petitioners and prayed that "in the better
interest of justice, [the] Petition for Prohibition be GRANTED and a writ of prohibition be ISSUED
On 31 May 1997, Judge Villon issued an Order 36 directing the accused to file their comment on forthwith." In support of said prayer, the Solicitor General argued:
the Urgent Motion to Set Aside Arraignment within fifteen days from notice.
2. There is merit to the cause of petitioners. If the Secretary of Justice would find their Appeal
In a letter 37 addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor dated 7 June 1996, public respondent meritorious, the Provincial Prosecutor would be directed to upgrade the Information to Murder
Secretary Teofisto Guingona of the DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of petitioners. Secretary and extreme prejudice if not gross injustice would thereby have been avoided.
Guingona ruled that treachery was present and directed the Provincial Prosecutor of San
Fernando, Pampanga "to amend the information filed against the accused from homicide to 3. Consequently, the undersigned counsel interpose no objection to the issuance of a writ of
murder," and to include Fortunato Mallari as accused in the amended information. The findings prohibition enjoining respondent Judge from holding further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 96-
and conclusions of Secretary Guingona read as follows: 1667-M, particularly in holding the arraignment of the accused, pending resolution of the Appeals
with the Secretary of Justice.
Contrary to your findings, we find that there is treachery that attended the killing of PO3
Dimatulac. Undisputedly, the victim was suddenly shot while he was descending the stairs. The The YABUTs opposed 44 petitioner's Manifestation and Motion dated 1 July 1996 because they
attack was unexpected as the victim was unarmed and on his way to make peace with Mayor had already been arraigned and, therefore, would be placed in double jeopardy; and that the
Yabut, he was unsuspecting so to speak. From the circumstances surrounding his killing, PO3 public prosecutor — not the private prosecutor — had control of the prosecution of the case.
Dimatulac was indeed deprived of an opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.
In his letter 45 dated 1 July 1996 addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, the
Corollarily, we are also convinced that such mode of attack was consciously and deliberately Secretary of Justice set aside his order to amend the information from homicide to murder
adopted by the respondents to ensure the accomplishment of their criminal objective. The considering that the appeal was rendered moot and academic by the arraignment of the accused
admission of respondent Malabanan is replete with details on how the principal respondent, Mayor for homicide and their having entered their pleas of not guilty. The Secretary stated:
Yabut, in conspiracy with the assailant and others, had consciously and deliberately adopted
means to ensure the execution of the crime. According to him, while they were on their way to Considering that Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut had already been arraigned
the victim's house, Mayor Yabut already instructed Danny, the assailant, that, "Dikitan mo lang, on May 20, 1996 and had pleaded not guilty to the charge of homicide, as shown by a copy of the
alam no na king ano ang gagawin mo, bahala ka na" This explains why Danny positioned himself court order dated May 20, 1996, the petition for review insofar as the respondents-Yabut are
near the stairs of the victim's house armed with a handgun, such positioning was precisely adopted concerned has been rendered moot and academic.
as a means to ensure the accomplishment of their evil design and Mayor Yabut ordered nobody
else but Danny to shoot the victim while descending the stairs as his position was very strategic However, the Secretary reiterated that Fortunato Mallari should be included in the information for
to ensure the killing of the victim. homicide.

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On 30 July 1996, Public Prosecutor Jaime Bustos filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Information
and to Admit Amended Information.46 The Amended Information 47 merely impleaded Fortunato (3) The information for homicide was nevertheless filed despite notice to the Office of the
Mallari as one of the accused. Provincial Prosecutor of the appeal filed with the Secretary of Justice and request to defer any
action on the case.
In his Order 48 of 1 August 1996, Judge Villon denied petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment,
citing Section 4, DOJ Department Order No. 223, and the letter of the Secretary of Justice of 1 (4) The Office of the Public Prosecutor of Pampanga disallowed the private prosecutor from further
July 1996. Petitioners forthwith moved for reconsideration 49 of the order, arguing that the Motion participating in the case.
to Defer the Proceedings filed by petitioners was meritorious and did not violate the accused's
right to speedy trial; and that the DOJ had ruled that the proper offense to be charged was murder (5) Judge Roura denied the motion to defer proceedings and declared in open court that there
and did not reverse such finding. Petitioners also cited the Solicitor General's stand 50 in CA-G.R. was no prima facie case for murder, notwithstanding the pendency of petitioners' appeal with
SP No. 40393 that holding accused's arraignment in abeyance was proper under the respondent Secretary of Justice.
circumstances. Finally, petitioners contended that in proceeding with the arraignment despite
knowledge of a petition for prohibition pending before the Court of Appeals, the trial court violated (6) Even before receipt by petitioners of Judge Roura's order inhibiting himself and the order
Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on indirect contempt. The YABUTs opposed the motion regarding the transfer of the case to Branch 54, public respondent Judge Villon set the case for
on the ground that it raised no argument which had not yet been resolved. 51 arraignment and, without notice to petitioners, forthwith arraigned the accused on the information
for homicide on 20 May 1996, despite the pendency of the petition for prohibition before the Court
On 3 September 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment of Accused Fortunato of Appeals and of the appeal before the DOJ.
Mallari, 52 which the trial court granted in view of petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
court's order denying petitioners' motion to set aside private respondents' arraignment. 53 As (7) The Pampanga Provincial Prosecutor's Office did not object to the arraignment nor take any
expected, Mallari moved to reconsider the trial court's order and clamored for consistency in the action to prevent further proceedings on the case despite knowledge of the pendency of the
trial court's rulings. 54 appeal.

In an order 55 dated 15 October 1996, Judge Villon denied reconsideration of the order denying (8) The Provincial Prosecutor did not comply with the resolution of 7 June 1996 of the Secretary
petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment, citing the YABUTs' right to a speedy trial and of Justice directing the amendment of the information to charge the crime of murder.
explaining that the prosecution of an offense should be under the control of the public prosecutor,
whereas petitioners did not obtain the conformity of the prosecutor before they filed various Petitioners argue that in light of Roberts, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, 60 respondent Judge acted in
motions to defer proceedings. Considering said order, Judge Villon deemed accused Mallari's excess of his jurisdiction in proceeding with private respondents' arraignment for homicide and
motion for reconsideration moot and academic. 56 denying petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment. Moreover, although respondent Judge Villon
was not the respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393; he should have deferred the proceedings just
On 16 October 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision 57 in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 the same as the very issue in said case was whether or not the RTC could proceed with the
dismissing the petition therein for having become moot and academic in view of Judge Roura's arraignment despite the pending review of the case by respondent Secretary of Justice. Further,
voluntary inhibition, the arraignment of the YABUTs and the dismissal, by the Secretary of Justice, Judge Villon unjustly invoked private respondents' right to a speedy trial, after a lapse of barely
of petitioners' appeal as it had been mooted by said arraignment. three (3) months from the filing of the information on 23 February 1996; overlooked that private
respondents were estopped from invoking said right as they went into hiding after the killing, only
Judge Villon was later detailed to Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and Judge Roura to resurface when the charge was reduced to homicide; and failed to detect the Provincial
was ordered by the Supreme Court to preside over cases pending in Branch 54 of the Regional Prosecutor's bias in favor of private respondents. Judge Villon should have been more circumspect
Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, which was previously presided over by Judge Villon. 58 Judge as he knew that by proceeding with the arraignment, the appeal with the DOJ would be rendered
Roura informed the Office of the Court Administrator and this Court that he had already inhibited technically nugatory.
himself from hearing Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M). 59
Finally, petitioners submit that the DOJ rule prohibiting appeals from resolutions of prosecutors
On 28 December 1996, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari/Prohibition and to the Secretary of Justice once the accused had already been arraigned applies only to instances
Mandamus. They urge this Court to reverse the order of respondent Judge denying their Motion where the appellants are the accused, since by submitting to arraignment, they voluntarily
to Set Aside Arraignment; set aside arraignment of private respondents; order that no further abandon their appeal.
action be taken by any court in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) until this petition is resolved; and
order respondents Secretary of Justice and the prosecutors concerned to amend the information In their comment, private respondents contend that no sufficient legal justification exists to set
from homicide to murder. aside private respondents' arraignment, it having already been reset twice from 12 April 1996 to
3 may 1996, due to petitioners' pending appeals with the DOJ; and from 3 May 1996 to 20 May
Petitioners insist that the killing of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was attended by treachery since private 1996, due to the transfer of this case to Branch 54. Moreover, as of the latter date, the DOJ had
respondents tricked the victim into coming out of his house and then shot him while he was going not yet resolved petitioners' appeal and the DOJ did not request that arraignment be held in
down the stairs. There was, petitioners claim, "an orchestrated effort on the part of [private abeyance, despite the fact that petitioners' appeal had been filed as early as 23 February 1996,
respondents] to manipulate the rules on administrative appeals with the end in view of evading at least 86 days prior to private respondents' arraignment. They point out that petitioners did not
prosecution for the [non-bailable] offense of murder," as shown by the following events or move to reconsider the RTC's 26 March 1996 denial of the Motion to Defer, opting instead for
circumstances: Judge Roura's recusal and recourse to the Court of Appeals, and as no restraining order was issued
by the Court of Appeals, it was but proper for respondent Judge to proceed with the arraignment
(1) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores downgraded the nature of the crime committed of private respondent, to which the public and private prosecutors did not object.
to homicide, a bailable offense, on strength of a motion for reinvestigation filed by the YABUTs
who had not yet been arrested. Private respondents further argue that the decision of respondent Secretary, involving as it did
the exercise of discretionary powers, is not subject to judicial review. Under the principle of
(2) Respondent Mayor and his companions returned to Minalin after the killing and went into separation of powers, petitioners' recourse should have been to the President. While as regards
hiding for four (4) months until the offense charged was downgraded. petitioners' plea that the Secretary be compelled to amend the information from homicide to

5
murder, private respondents submit that mandamus does not lie, as the determination as to what Fourth, despite the pendency of the appeal, Alfonso-Reyes filed the Information for homicide on
offense was committed is a prerogative of the DOJ, subject only to the control of the President. 28 February 1996. It is interesting to note that while the information was dated 29 January 1996,
it was approved by the Provincial Prosecutor only on 27 February 1996. This simply means that
As regards DOJ Department Order No. 223, private respondents theorize that appeal by the Office of the Prosecutor was not, initially, in a hurry to file the Information. No undue prejudice
complainants is allowed only if the complaint is dismissed by the prosecutor and not when there could have been caused to the YABUTs if it were filed even later for the YABUTs were still at large;
is a finding of probable cause, in which case, only the accused can appeal. Hence, petitioners' in fact, they filed their bonds of P20,000.00 each only after the filing of the Information. If Alfonso-
appeal was improper. Flores was extremely generous to the YABUTs, no compelling reason existed why she could not
afford the offended parties the same courtesy by at least waiting for instructions from the
Finally, private respondents stress the fact that petitioners never appealed the withdrawal by the Secretary of Justice in view of the appeal, if she were unwilling to voluntarily ask the latter for
public prosecutor of the private prosecutor's authority to handle the case. instructions. Clearly, under the circumstances, the latter course of action would have been the
most prudent thing to do.
In its comment for the public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays that
the petition be denied because: (a) in accordance with Section 4 of DOJ Order No. 223, upon Fifth, as if to show further bias in favor of the YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
arraignment of the accused, the appeal to the Secretary of Justice shall be dismissed motu Pampanga did not even bother to motu proprio, inform the trial court that the private prosecution
proprio; (b) the filing of the information for homicide was in compliance with the directive under had appealed from the resolution of Alfonso-Flores and had sought, with all the vigour it could
Section 4(2), D.O. No. 223, i.e., an appeal or motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding muster, the filing of an information for murder, as found by the MCTC and established by the
probable cause shall not hold the filing of the information in court; (c) the trial court even evidence before it.
accommodated petitioners by initially deferring arraignment pending resolution by the Court of
Appeals of the petition for prohibition, and since said Court did not issue any restraining order, Unsatisfied with what had been done so far to accommodate the YABUTs, the Office of the
arraignment was properly had; and (d) reliance on Roberts is misplaced, as there, accused Roberts Provincial Prosecutor did not even have the decency to agree to defer arraignment despite its
and others had not been arraigned and respondent Judge had ordered the indefinite postponement continuing knowledge of the pendency of the appeal. This amounted to defiance of the DOJ's
of the arraignment pending resolution of their petitions before the Court of Appeals and the power of control and supervision over prosecutors, a matter which we shall later elaborate on.
Supreme Court. Moreover, in an unprecedented move, the trial prosecutor, Olimpio Datu, had the temerity, if not
arrogance, to announce that "he will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate or handle
We now consider the issues enumerated at the outset of this ponencia. the prosecution of [the] case" simply because the private prosecution had asked for the inhibition
of Judge Roura. Said prosecutor forgot that since the offended parties here had not waived the
Plainly, the proceedings below were replete with procedural irregularities which lead us to conclude civil action nor expressly reserved their right to institute it separately from the criminal action,
that something had gone awry in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga resulting in then they had the right to intervene in the criminal case pursuant to Section 16 of Rule 1l0 of the
manifest advantage to the accused, more particularly the YABUTs, and grave prejudice to the Rules of Court.
State and to private complainants, herein petitioners.
It is undebatable that petitioners had the right to appeal to the DOJ from the resolution of Alfonso-
First, warrants for the arrest of the YABUTs were issued by the MCTC, with no bail recommended Flores. The last paragraph of Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides:
for their temporary liberty. However, for one reason or another undisclosed in the record, the
YABUTs were not arrested; neither did they surrender. Hence, they were never brought into the If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the provincial
custody of the law. Yet, Asst. Provincial Fiscal Alfonso Reyes, either motu proprio or upon motion or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding
of the YABUTs, conducted a reinvestigation. Since said accused were at large, Alfonso-Reyes information without conducting another preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for the
should not have done so. While it may be true that under the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule dismissal of the complaint or information.
112 of the Rules of Court, the provincial prosecutor may disagree with the findings of the judge
who conducted the preliminary investigation, as here, this difference of opinion must be on the It is clear from the above, that the proper party referred to therein could be either the offended
basis of the review of the record and evidence transmitted by the judge. Were that all she did, as party or the accused.
she had no other option under the circumstance, she was without any other choice but to sustain
the MCTC since the YABUTs and all other accused, except Francisco Yambao, waived the filing of More importantly, an appeal to the DOJ is an invocation of the Secretary's power of control over
their counter-affidavits. Then, further stretching her magnanimity in favor of the accused, Alfonso- prosecutors. Thus, in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 16 we emphatically held:
Reyes allowed the YABUTs to submit their counter-affidavits without first demanding that they
surrender because of the standing warrants of arrest against them. In short, Alfonso-Reyes Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under
allowed the YABUTs to make a mockery of the law in order that they gain their provisional liberty the Revised Administrative Code, 62 exercises the power of direct control and supervision over
pending trial and be charged with the lesser offense of homicide. said prosecutors; and who, may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.

Second, Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of only P20,000.00 for the YABUTs and co-accused Sec. 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section[s] 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code
"Danny," despite the fact that they were charged with homicide and they were, at the time, gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and
fugitives from justice for having avoided service of the warrant of arrest issued by the MCTC and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of supervision and control is
having failed to voluntarily surrender. delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:

Third, Alfonso-Reyes was fully aware of the private prosecution's appeal to the DOJ from her (1) Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly
resolution. She could not have been ignorant of the fact that the appeal vigorously assailed her whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
finding that there was no qualifying circumstance attending the killing, and that the private performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts
prosecution had convincing arguments to support the appeal. The subsequent resolution of the and decisions of subordinate officials or units; . . . .
Secretary of Justice confirmed the correctness of the private prosecution's stand and exposed the
blatant errors of Alfonso-Reyes. Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007,
which read:

6
 appellant had already been arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the
Sec. 3. . . . appeal, said appeal shall be dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of Justice.

The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the Senior State Prosecutors, An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however, shall not
and the State Prosecutors shall . . . perform such other duties as may be assigned to them by the hold the filing of the information in court. (emphasis supplied)
Secretary of Justice in the interest of public service.
The underlined portion indisputably shows that the section refers to appeals by respondents or
xxx xxx xxx accused. So we held in Marcelo v. Court of
Appeals, 63 that nothing in the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul, 64 reiterated in Roberts v. Court of
Sec. 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a specific Appeals, 65 forecloses the power of authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of
power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or his subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in court. The
service, the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from entertaining a petition
shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify, or revoke any for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in
decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or service. court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the
Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court. In
"Supervision" and "control" of a department head over his subordinates have been defined in Roberts we went further by saying that Crespo could not have foreclosed said power or authority
administrative law as follows: of the Secretary of Justice "without doing violence to, or repealing, the last paragraph of Section
4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court" which is quoted above.
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former Indubitably then, there was on the part of the public prosecution, indecent haste in the filing of
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. Control, on the information for homicide, depriving the State and the offended parties of due process.
the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of As to the second issue, we likewise hold that Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion
the former for that of the latter. when, in his order of 26 March l996, 66 he deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure
order until "such time that all the accused who are out on bail are arraigned" and denied the
Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and motion to defer proceedings for the reason that the "private prosecution has not shown any
prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that indication that [the] appeal was given due course by the Secretary of Justice." Neither rhyme nor
mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by reason or even logic, supports the ground for the deferment of the first motion. Precisely,
an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly immediate action thereon was called for as the accused were out on bail and, perforce, had all
by courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be the opportunity to leave the country if they wanted to. To hold that arraignment is a prerequisite
allowed. to the issuance of a hold departure order could obviously defeat the purpose of said order. As to
the second motion, Judge Roura was fully aware of the pendency of petitioner's appeal with the
DOJ Order No. 223 of 30 June 1993 recognizes the right of both the offended parties and the DOJ, which was filed as early as 23 February 1996. In fact, he must have taken that into
accused to appeal from resolutions in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations, as provided consideration when he set arraignment of the accused only on 12 April 1996, and on that date,
for in Section 1 and Section 4, respectively. Section 1 thereof provides, thus: after denying petitioners' motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to defer proceedings, he
further reset arraignment to 3 May 1996 and gave petitioners ten (10) days within which to file a
Sec. 1. What May Be Appealed. — Only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State petition for certiorari to question his denial of the motion to defer and of the order denying the
Prosecutor/Prosecutor or City Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be the subject of reconsideration. In any event, the better part of wisdom suggested that, at the very least, he
an appeal to the Secretary of Justice except as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof. should have asked petitioners as regards the status of the appeal or warned them that if the DOJ
would not decide the appeal within a certain period, then arraignment would proceed.
While the section speaks of resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint, petitioners herein were
not barred from appealing from the resolution holding that only homicide was committed, Petitioners did in fact file the petition with the Court of Appeals on 19 April 1996 and, at the same
considering that their complaint was for murder. By holding that only homicide was committed, time, moved to inhibit Judge Roura. These twin moves prompted Judge Roura to "voluntarily"
the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Pampanga effectively "dismissed" the complaint for murder. inhibit himself from the case on 29 April 1996 67 and to transfer the case to the branch presided
Accordingly, petitioners could file an appeal under said Section 1. To rule otherwise would be to by public respondent Judge Villon. The latter received the records of the case on 30 April 1996.
forever bar redress of a valid grievance, especially where the investigating prosecutor, as in this From that time on, however, the offended parties did not receive any better deal. Acting with
case, demonstrated what unquestionably appeared to be unmitigated bias in favor of the accused. deliberate dispatch, Judge Villon issued an order on 3 May 1996 setting arraignment of the
Section 1 is not to be literally applied in the sense that appeals by the offended parties are allowed accused on 20 May 1996. If Judge Villon only perused the record of the case with due diligence,
only in cases of dismissal of the complaint, otherwise the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112, as should be done by anyone who has just taken over a new case, he could not have helped but
Rules of Court would be meaningless. notice: (a) the motion to defer further proceedings; (2) the order of Judge Roura giving petitioners
ten days within which to file a petition with the Court of Appeals; (3) the fact of the filling of such
We cannot accept the view of the Office of the Solicitor General and private respondents that petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393; (4) the resolution of the Court of Appeals directing respondents
Section 1 of DOJ Department Order No. 223 is the controlling rule; hence, pursuant to the second to comment on the petition and show cause why the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
paragraph thereof the appeal of petitioners did not hold the filing of the information. As stated should not be granted and deferring resolution of the application for a temporary restraining order
above, Section 4 applies even to appeals by the respondents or accused. The provision reads: until after the required comment was filed, which indicated a prima facie showing of merit; (5)
the motion to inhibit Judge Roura precisely because of his prejudgment that the crime committed
Sec. 4. Non-appealable cases. Exceptions. — No appeal may be taken from a resolution of the was merely homicide; (6) Judge Roura's subsequent inhibition; (7) various pieces of documentary
Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding probable evidence submitted by petitioners on 30 April 1996 supporting a charge of murder, not homicide;
cause except upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the and (8) most importantly , the pending appeal with the DOJ.
showing of minifest error or grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the

7
All the foregoing demanded from any impartial mind, especially that of Judge Villon, a cautious In this case, the abuse of discretion on the part of the public prosecution and Judges Roura and
attitude as these were unmistakable indicia of the probability of a miscarriage of justice should Villon was gross, grave and palpable, denying, the State and the offended parties their day in
arraignment be precipitately held. However, Judge Villon cursorily ignored all this. While it may court, or in a constitutional sense, due process. As to said judges, such amounted to lack or excess
be true that he was not bound to await the DOJ's resolution of the appeal, as he had, procedurally of jurisdiction, or that their court was ousted of the jurisdiction in respect thereto, thereby
speaking, complete control over the case and any disposition thereof rested on his sound nullifying as having been done without jurisdiction, the denial of the motion to defer further
discretion, 68 his judicial instinct should have led him to peruse the documents submitted on 30 hearings, the denial of the motion to reconsider such denial, the arraignment of the YABUTs and
April 1996 and to initially determine, for his own enlightenment with serving the ends of justice their plea of not guilty.
as the ultimate goal, if indeed murder was the offense committed; or, he could have directed the
private prosecutor to secure a resolution on the appeal within a specified time. Given the totality These lapses by both the judges and prosecutors concerned cannot be taken lightly. We must
of circumstances, Judge Villon should have heeded our statement in Marcelo 69 that prudence, if remedy the situation before the onset of any irreversible effects. We thus have no other recourse,
not wisdom, or at least, respect for the authority of the prosecution agency, dictated that he for as Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee pronounced in Galman v. Sandiganbayan: 80
should have waited for the resolution of the appeal then pending before the DOJ. All told, Judge
Villon should not have merely acquiesced to the findings of the public prosecutor. The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand
unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They
We do not then hesitate to rule that Judge Villon committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception
the arraignment of the YABUTs on the assailed information for homicide. Again, the State and the and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose
offended parties were deprived of due process. judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement
or protection of a right or the prevention of redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed
Up to the level then of Judge Villon, two pillars of the criminal justice system failed in this case to from the pressures of politics and prejudice.
function in a manner consistent with the principle of accountability inherent in the public trust
character of a public office. Judges Roura and Villon and prosecutors Alfonso-Flores and Datu need We remind all members of the pillars of the criminal justice system that theirs is not a mere
be reminded that it is in the public interest that every crime should be punished 70 and judges ministerial task to process each accused in and out of prison, but a noble duty to preserve our
and prosecutors play a crucial role in this regard for theirs is the delicate duty to see justice done, democratic society under a rule of law.
i.e., not to allow the guilty to escape nor the innocent to
suffer. 71 Anent the third issue, it was certainly grave error for the DOJ to reconsider its 7 June 1996
resolution, holding that murder was committed and directing the Provincial Prosecutor to
Prosecutors must never forget that, in the language of Suarez v. Platon, 72 they are the accordingly amend the information, solely on the basis of the information that the YABUTs had
representatives not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation already been arraigned. In so doing, the DOJ relinquished its power of control and supervision
to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, over the Provincial Prosecutor and the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors of Pampanga; and meekly
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win every case but that justice be done. As surrendered to the latter's inappropriate conductor even hostile attitude, which amounted to
such, they are in a peculiar and every definite sense the servants of the law, whose two-fold aim neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as well as to the undue
is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. haste of Judge Roura and Villon in respect of the arraignment of the YABUTs. The sins of omission
or commission of said prosecutors and judges resulted, in light of the finding of the DOJ that the
Prosecutors are charged with the defense of the community aggrieved by a crime, and are crime committed was murder, in unwarranted benefit to the YABUTs and gross prejudice to the
expected to prosecute the public action with such zeal and vigor as if they were the ones personally State and the offended parties. The DOJ should have courageously exercised its power of control
aggrieved, but at all times cautious that they refrain from improper methods designed to secure by taking bolder steps to rectify the shocking "mistakes" so far committed and, in the final
a wrongful conviction. 73 With them lies the duty to lay before the court the pertinent facts at the analysis, to prevent further injustice and fully serve the ends of justice. The DOJ could have, even
judge's disposal with strict attention to punctilios, thereby clarifying contradictions and sealing all if belatedly, joined cause with petitioners to set aside arraignment. Further, in the exercise of its
gaps in the evidence, with a view to erasing all doubt from the court's mind as to the accused's disciplinary powers over its personnel, the DOJ could have directed the public prosecutors
innocence or guilt. concerned to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for neglect of
duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in not, inter alia, even asking the
The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and trial court to defer arraignment in view of the pendency of the appeal, informing the DOJ, from
responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice." 74 time to time, of the status of the case, and, insofar as prosecutor Datu was concerned, in
He must view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. disallowing the private prosecutor from further participating in the case.
Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies
of religious liturgy," the judge must render service with impartiality commensurate with the public Finally, the DOJ should have further inquired into the vicissitudes of the case below to determine
trust and confidence reposed in him. 75 Although the determination of a criminal case before a the regularity of arraignment, considering that the appeal was received by the DOJ as early as 23
judge lies within his exclusive jurisdiction and competence, 76 his discretion is not unfettered, but February 1996.
rather must be exercised within reasonable confines. 77 The judge's action must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended party to due process of We then rule that the equally hasty motu proprio "reconsideration" of the 7 June 1996 resolution
law. 78 of the DOJ was attended with grave abuse of discretion.

Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave
accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused 81 or the dismissal
be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an of the case 82 is void, hence double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused. If this is so in
acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party wronged, those cases, so must it be where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void, as in this case
it could also mean injustice. 79 Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, as above discussed.
on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of Judge Reynaldo Roura of 26 March 1996
denying the Motion to Defer Proceeding and of 12 April 1996 denying the motion to reconsider

8
the denial of said Motion to Defer Proceedings, and the orders of respondent Judge Sesinando the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing
Villon of 3 May 1996 resetting the arraignment to 20 May 1998 and of 25 October 1996 denying of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed
the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) are declared VOID and SET and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case
ASIDE. The arraignment of private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal
Martin Yabut and their separate pleas of not guilty are likewise declared VOID and SET ASIDE. Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while
Furthermore, the order of public respondent Secretary of Justice of 1 July 1996 is SET ASIDE and the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as
his order of 7 June 1996 REINSTATED. Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the
same court. 7
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED to comply with the order (letter)
of the Secretary of Justice of 7 June 1996 by forthwith filing with the trial court the amended On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the
information for murder. Thereafter the trial court shall proceed in said case with all reasonable aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed.
dispatch. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434.
The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both
2. G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989 petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the
accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended
Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents. proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely
reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before
such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the
REGALADO, J.: suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of
the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was
only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also
the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The
jurisdictional question. latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal
of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The
marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,
Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1 with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the
lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private
by a separation de facto between them. offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2 respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for
the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3 the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other
German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed
and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency,
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4 that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18
While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without
while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant
Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.

9
Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is
made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, 'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or
grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said
in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and
concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We
by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state,
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and in explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the
acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended
spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor. We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery
to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused
civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country,
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be
that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the
been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the
complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted
cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the
the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal
action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option. property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be
granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence,
as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the Union. ...
alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
to commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to according to their national law. ...
the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before,
or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
when he is without the legal capacity to do so. exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the
issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the
inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the
adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or
existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter. consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he
obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular
no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal
provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy
subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings on the other.
to a conclusion. 22
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that — respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article

10
333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be
afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to
adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be file a demurrer to evidence. However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro
made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, Hultman died.
until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely,
it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion 3 for leave of
declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent court to file an amended information and to admit said amended information. The amended
to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint information, 4 filed on October 31, 1991, reads:
for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on.
Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio Teehankee,
termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and Jr. y. Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident premeditation and by
requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
this case, by a valid foreign divorce. and shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby
inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused the death of said Maureen Hultman.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27
must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the Petitioner filed an opposition 5 thereto, as well as a rejoinder 6 to the reply 7 of the
offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an prosecution. On November 13, 1991, the trial court issued the questioned order admitting
issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said the amended information.
case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of
the controversy herein. At the scheduled arraignment on November 26, 1991, petitioner refused to be arraigned on
the amended information for lack of a preliminary investigation thereon. By reason of such
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and refusal, respondent judge ordered that a plea of "not guilty" be entered for petitioner.
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is Thereafter, respondent judge ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. When
hereby made permanent. petitioner's counsel manifested that he would not take part in the proceedings because of
the legal issue raised, the trial court appointed a counsel de oficio to represent herein
G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992 petitioner.

CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR., petitioner, Petitioner now raises the following issues before us:
vs.
HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. (a) Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without
preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may
legally and validly be admitted;
REGALADO, J.:
(b) Whether or not a counsel de oficio may legally and validly be appointed to represent an
In this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, petitioner principally accused who is represented by counsel of choice who refuses to participate in the proceedings
seeks: (1) to nullify the order 1 of respondent judge admitting the amended information for because of a perceived denial of due process and after a plea for appellate remedies within
murder filed in Criminal Case No. a short period is denied by the trial court; and
91-4606; (2) to nullify the arraignment and the plea of not guilty entered by order of
respondent judge when petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended information for (c) Whether or not a particular criminal case may legally and validly be rushed and
lack of preliminary investigation therefor; (3) to nullify the appointment of a counsel de preferentially scheduled for trial over and at the expense and sacrifice of other, specially
oficio/PAO lawyer to represent petitioner; (4) to prohibit respondent judge from "over- older, criminal cases. 8
speedy and preferential scheduling of the trial of the aforementioned criminal case;" and (5)
to compel respondent judge to order preliminary investigation of the crime charged in the In our resolution of January 14, 1992, we required the Solicitor General to file a comment to
amended information. the basic petition. It appearing from a further review of the record that the operative facts
and determinant issues involved in this case are sufficiently presented in the petition and the
Petitioner was originally charged on July 19, 1991 in an information 2 for the crime of annexes thereto, both in regard to the respective positions of petitioner and respondents,
frustrated murder allegedly committed as follows: the Court has decided to dispense with the aforesaid comment to obviate needless delay in
fairness to petitioner.
That on or about the 13th day of July 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, I. Petitioner avers that the additional allegation in the amended information, as herein
while armed with a handgun, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did underscored, that the accused ". . . did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Maureen attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in
Navarro Hultman on the head, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would the head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused the death of said Maureen
have caused the death of said Maureen Navarro Hultman, thereby performing all the acts of Hultman . . ." constitutes a substantial amendment since it involves a change in the nature
execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but of the offense charged, that is, from frustrated to consummated murder. Petitioner further
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause or causes independent of her will, that is, submits that "(t)here is a need then to establish that the same mortal wounds, which were
due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Maureen Navarro Hultman initially frustrated (sic) by timely and able medical assistance, ultimately caused the death
which prevented her death. of the victim, because it could have been caused by a supervening act or fact which is not

11
imputable to the offender." 9 From this, he argues that there being a substantial amendment, is exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a
the same may no longer be allowed after arraignment and during the trial. frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense
charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily
Corollary thereto, petitioner then postulates that since the amended information for murder include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is
charges an entirely different offense, involving as it does a new fact, that is, the fact of death alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to
whose cause has to be established, it is essential that another preliminary investigation on be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
the new charge be conducted before the new information can be admitted. form a part of those constituting the latter. 10

We find no merit in the petition. There are sufficient legal and jurisprudential moorings for Going now to the case at bar, it is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the
the orders of the trial court. execution of the crime of murder, hence the former is necessarily included in the latter. It is
indispensable that the essential element of intent to kill, as well as qualifying circumstances
Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: such as treachery or evident premeditation, be alleged in both an information for frustrated
murder and for murder, thereby meaning and proving that the same material allegations are
Sec. 14. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or essential to the sufficiency of the informations filed for both. This is because, except for the
form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and death of the victim, the essential elements of consummated murder likewise constitute the
during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when essential ingredients to convict herein petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder.
the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the and the amended information. What is involved here is not a variance in the nature of
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing different offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of execution of the same offense
of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided from frustrated to consummated murder. This is being the case, we hold that an amendment
the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and may also require the of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. information for murder is proper.

The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while Petitioner would insist, however, that the additional allegation on the fact of death of the
the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint. victim Maureen Navarro Hultman constitutes a substantial amendment which may no longer
be allowed after a plea has been entered. The proposition is erroneous and untenable.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may
be made before or after the defendant pleaded, but they differ in the following respects: As earlier indicated, Section 14 of Rule 110 provides that an amendment, either of form or
substance, may be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge and,
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution thereafter, as to all matters of form with leave of court.
necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge;
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. 11 Thus,
substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz: (1) new allegations
dismissed; which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction; 12 (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary from that charged in the original one; 13 (3) additional allegations which do not alter the
investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form
another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect
information; and any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription. 14

4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or We repeat that after arraignment and during the trial, amendments are allowed, but only as
to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, to matters of form and provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. 15
hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be The test of whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such
made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, amendment has been said to be whether or not a defense under the information as it
the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or
presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which does not include or not any evidence the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in
is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double the one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of
jeopardy. form and not of substance. 16

In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph Now, an objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein
of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not actually
the rule is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, and amendment of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the
information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues to
distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order. be the prosecution's theory. There is no question that whatever defense herein petitioner
may adduce under the original information for frustrated murder equally applies to the
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one amended information for murder. Under the circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible
offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense

12
that the amended information for murder is, at most, an amendment as to form which is
allowed even during the trial of the case. The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3

It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and introduced in After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional
the second information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803).
by the accused. The filing of the amended information without the requisite preliminary Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case
investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious and No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a
oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public accusation of a crime, prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the
as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. The amended information arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4
could not conceivably have come as a surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious reason Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend
that it charges essentially the same offense as that charged under the original information. proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought
Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, if the crime originally charged is related to the reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
amended charge such that an inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts that
an inquiry into the other would reveal, a new preliminary investigation is not necessary. 17 Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner
We find nothing irregular in the appointment by the trial court of a counsel de oficio for herein contested the motion.
petitioner whose counsel of record refused to participate in the proceedings because of an
alleged legal issue. Such issue having been demonstrated herein as baseless, we apprehend The Ruling of the Trial Court
his refusal to participate in the trial as causative of or contributive to the delay in the
disposition of the case. And, finally, for as long as the substantial rights of herein petitioner In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding
and other persons charged in court are not prejudiced, the scheduling of cases should be left its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the
to the sound discretion of the trial court. MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed
WHEREFORE, it being clearly apparent that respondent judge did not commit the errors the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6
speciously attributed to him, the extraordinary writs prayed for are hereby DENIED and the
instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

3. G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010 Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained
him to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner, distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for
vs. absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7
Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803.
DECISION Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No.
CARPIO, J.: 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense
of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the
The Case multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.

The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting
affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce
to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical
Property. This, despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less
in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution. grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for
The Facts the homicide and damage to property.

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. and private respondent is represented by counsel.
82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and
(2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. The Issues
82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to
seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioner’s
and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal
to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second Case No. 82366.
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

13
The Ruling of the Court Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 proof of an additional fact which the other does not."15
did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the
protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in We find for petitioner.
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366. Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in Property are Material Only to Determine
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing the Penalty
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this
Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any
the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it
of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions. would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre- arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There, the Court and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of
granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted
in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences under When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to
Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.10 the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount
equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in less than twenty-five pesos.
Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one
considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post- A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who,
arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously,
Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its would have constituted a light felony.
bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30
days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without
absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not
ipso facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to 1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the
attend the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next
arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem
No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s proper to apply.
refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered
petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of 2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of
the filing of this petition. a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366 Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act
from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
for the same offense"13 protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No.
82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the
turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases
concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that

14
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939.
the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under
hand to give. Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes.
Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365
penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1- crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the
9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying
definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-
quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which
which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi- the second prosecution was based.
offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book
II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing Quasi-Offense
new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this
field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself
imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its
(2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double
them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a
structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes: full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for
"damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution
is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was
degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence
by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences
malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative
a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v.
of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28
or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated
act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in
1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32
reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of
Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy
fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For Clause.
each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the
negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the
reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage
could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight
that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act,
but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied) the Court explained:34

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
commission results in damage, either to person or property.19 reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would
for "Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty,
element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes. it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether
the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x
[but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en

15
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz
conclusion the reasoning of Quizon. progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in
two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal
Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy
pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the
for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with
multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42
which the second prosecution was based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz
chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the
were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction case, holding: —
of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction
for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same [T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy
act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were
We reversed on the strength of Buan:38 charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries
through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or
case of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the
vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to property through
held that – reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved
in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim.
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the
be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result injured passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and
it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of
the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court
prosecutions. of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary
investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two
xxxx informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and
another for damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double
Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived
from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the
accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries
supplied) and damage to property through reckless imprudence.

Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona. In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was
charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby
Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Court’s attention: causing an accident.’ After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that
court ῾for failure of the Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with
December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be
sustaining petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision ₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the
dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice
to property through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed Montemayor —
that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical
injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the
caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of
human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance.
damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied) One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would
extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would

16
have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is offense not falling under either models – that of a single criminal negligence resulting in
an ingredient of the other. x x x multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding
to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how
xxxx should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex"
the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution
prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-
could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the
prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges
injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave
offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting
defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly,
serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even
arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to
previously cleared by the inferior court.43 impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium
period.
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence,
Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts
thus: penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave
felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the
of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not
Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting
General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor
General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the
purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or
elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we
or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the government. interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless
On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:
applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views
expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April [T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code equal to the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be
less than 25 pesos.
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed,
stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the
substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be
quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)
either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to
benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field
of the penalty for the most serious crime. demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a
single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article
"the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple
foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13,
Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences. Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution
and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus
prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in
Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1
consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-

17
A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the
to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-
crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a 4. G.R. No. 175139 April 18, 2012
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a
necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected HERMOJINA ESTORES, Petitioner,
the Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for vs.
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that SPOUSES ARTURO and LAURA SUPANGAN, Respondents.
offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code: DECISION

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through DEL CASTILLO, J.:
reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the The only issue posed before us is the propriety of the imposition of interest and attorney’s
complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected fees.
by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
Assailed in this Petition for Review1 filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the May 12,
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 83123, the dispositive portion
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before of which reads:
pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED. The rate of interest shall be six percent
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting (6%) per annum, computed from September 27, 2000 until its full payment before finality
attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide of the judgment. If the adjudged principal and the interest (or any part thereof) remain
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same unpaid thereafter, the interest rate shall be adjusted to twelve percent (12%) per annum,
alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the computed from the time the judgment becomes final and executory until it is fully satisfied.
inferior court. The award of attorney’s fees is hereby reduced to ₱100,000.00. Costs against the
defendants-appellants.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the
Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents SO ORDERED.3
his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court
of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of Also assailed is the August 31, 2006 Resolution4 denying the motion for reconsideration.
one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied) Factual Antecedents

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges On October 3, 1993, petitioner Hermojina Estores and respondent-spouses Arturo and Laura
under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant Supangan entered into a Conditional Deed of Sale5 whereby petitioner offered to sell, and
occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention respondent-spouses offered to buy, a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use. No. TCT No. 98720 located at Naic, Cavite for the sum of ₱4.7 million. The parties likewise
stipulated, among others, to wit:
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge xxxx
will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one 1. Vendor will secure approved clearance from DAR requirements of which are (sic):
information shall be filed in the same first level court.55
a) Letter request
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are b) Title
thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48,
but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non- c) Tax Declaration
prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more
serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article d) Affidavit of Aggregate Landholding – Vendor/Vendee
365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether e) Certification from the Prov’l. Assessor’s as to Landholdings of Vendor/Vendee
penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept
of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting f) Affidavit of Non-Tenancy
crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
g) Deed of Absolute Sale
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2
May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information xxxx

18
4. Vendee shall be informed as to the status of DAR clearance within 10 days upon signing provided only for the return of the downpayment in case of breach, they cannot be held liable
of the documents. to pay legal interest as well.14

xxxx In its Pre-Trial Order15 dated June 29, 2001, the RTC noted that "the parties agreed that
the principal amount of 3.5 million pesos should be returned to the [respondent-spouses] by
6. Regarding the house located within the perimeter of the subject [lot] owned by spouses the [petitioner] and the issue remaining [is] whether x x x [respondent-spouses] are entitled
[Magbago], said house shall be moved outside the perimeter of this subject property to the to legal interest thereon, damages and attorney’s fees."16
300 sq. m. area allocated for [it]. Vendor hereby accepts the responsibility of seeing to it
that such agreement is carried out before full payment of the sale is made by vendee. Trial ensued thereafter. After the presentation of the respondent-spouses’ evidence, the trial
court set the presentation of Arias and petitioner’s evidence on September 3, 2003.17
7. If and after the vendor has completed all necessary documents for registration of the title However, despite several postponements, petitioner and Arias failed to appear hence they
and the vendee fails to complete payment as per agreement, a forfeiture fee of 25% or were deemed to have waived the presentation of their evidence. Consequently, the case was
downpayment, shall be applied. However, if the vendor fails to complete necessary deemed submitted for decision.18
documents within thirty days without any sufficient reason, or without informing the vendee
of its status, vendee has the right to demand return of full amount of down payment. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

xxxx On May 7, 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision19 finding respondent-spouses entitled to
interest but only at the rate of 6% per annum and not 12% as prayed by them.20 It also
9. As to the boundaries and partition of the lots (15,018 sq. m. and 300 sq. m.) Vendee shall found respondent-spouses entitled to attorney’s fees as they were compelled to litigate to
be informed immediately of its approval by the LRC. protect their interest.21

10. The vendor assures the vendee of a peaceful transfer of ownership. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

xxxx6 WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondent-
spouses] and ordering the [petitioner and Roberto Arias] to jointly and severally:
After almost seven years from the time of the execution of the contract and notwithstanding
payment of ₱3.5 million on the part of respondent-spouses, petitioner still failed to comply 1. Pay [respondent-spouses] the principal amount of Three Million Five Hundred Thousand
with her obligation as expressly provided in paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of the contract. pesos (₱3,500,000.00) with an interest of 6% compounded annually starting October 1, 1993
Hence, in a letter7 dated September 27, 2000, respondent-spouses demanded the return of and attorney’s fee in the amount of Fifty Thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) plus 20% of the
the amount of ₱3.5 million within 15 days from receipt of the letter. In reply,8 petitioner recoverable amount from the defendants and cost of the suit.
acknowledged receipt of the ₱3.5 million and promised to return the same within 120 days.
Respondent-spouses were amenable to the proposal provided an interest of 12% The Compulsory Counter Claim is hereby dismissed for lack of factual evidence.
compounded annually shall be imposed on the ₱3.5 million.9 When petitioner still failed to
return the amount despite demand, respondent-spouses were constrained to file a SO ORDERED.22
Complaint10 for sum of money before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon against
herein petitioner as well as Roberto U. Arias (Arias) who allegedly acted as petitioner’s agent. Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3201-MN and raffled off to Branch 170. In their
complaint, respondent-spouses prayed that petitioner and Arias be ordered to: Aggrieved, petitioner and Arias filed their notice of appeal.23 The CA noted that the only
issue submitted for its resolution is "whether it is proper to impose interest for an obligation
1. Pay the principal amount of ₱3,500,000.00 plus interest of 12% compounded annually that does not involve a loan or forbearance of money in the absence of stipulation of the
starting October 1, 1993 or an estimated amount of ₱8,558,591.65; parties."24

2. Pay the following items of damages: On May 12, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming the ruling of the RTC
finding the imposition of 6% interest proper.25 However, the same shall start to run only
a) Moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00; from September 27, 2000 when respondent-spouses formally demanded the return of their
money and not from October 1993 when the contract was executed as held by the RTC. The
b) Actual damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00; CA also modified the RTC’s ruling as regards the liability of Arias. It held that Arias could not
be held solidarily liable with petitioner because he merely acted as agent of the latter.
c) Exemplary damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00; Moreover, there was no showing that he expressly bound himself to be personally liable or
that he exceeded the limits of his authority. More importantly, there was even no showing
d) [Attorney’s] fee in the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus 20% of recoverable amount from the that Arias was authorized to act as agent of petitioner.26 Anent the award of attorney’s fees,
[petitioner]. the CA found the award by the trial court (₱50,000.00 plus 20% of the recoverable amount)
excessive27 and thus reduced the same to ₱100,000.00.28
e) [C]ost of suit.11
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
In their Answer with Counterclaim,12 petitioner and Arias averred that they are willing to
return the principal amount of ₱3.5 million but without any interest as the same was not WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED. The rate of interest shall be six percent
agreed upon. In their Pre-Trial Brief,13 they reiterated that the only remaining issue between (6%) per annum, computed from September 27, 2000 until its full payment before finality
the parties is the imposition of interest. They argued that since the Conditional Deed of Sale of the judgment. If the adjudged principal and the interest (or any part thereof) remain[s]
unpaid thereafter, the interest rate shall be adjusted to twelve percent (12%) per annum,

19
computed from the time the judgment becomes final and executory until it is fully satisfied. The contract involved in this case is admittedly not a loan but a Conditional Deed of Sale.
The award of attorney’s fees is hereby reduced to ₱100,000.00. Costs against the However, the contract provides that the seller (petitioner) must return the payment made
[petitioner]. by the buyer (respondent-spouses) if the conditions are not fulfilled. There is no question
that they have in fact, not been fulfilled as the seller (petitioner) has admitted this.
SO ORDERED.29 Notwithstanding demand by the buyer (respondent-spouses), the seller (petitioner) has
failed to return the money and
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied in the August 31, 2006 Resolution of
the CA. should be considered in default from the time that demand was made on September 27,
2000.
Hence, this petition raising the sole issue of whether the imposition of interest and attorney’s
fees is proper. Even if the transaction involved a Conditional Deed of Sale, can the stipulation governing the
return of the money be considered as a forbearance of money which required payment of
Petitioner’s Arguments interest at the rate of 12%? We believe so.

Petitioner insists that she is not bound to pay interest on the ₱3.5 million because the In Crismina Garments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,33 "forbearance" was defined as a
Conditional Deed of Sale only provided for the return of the downpayment in case of failure "contractual obligation of lender or creditor to refrain during a given period of time, from
to comply with her obligations. Petitioner also argues that the award of attorney’s fees in requiring the borrower or debtor to repay a loan or debt then due and payable." This
favor of the respondent-spouses is unwarranted because it cannot be said that the latter won definition describes a loan where a debtor is given a period within which to pay a loan or
over the former since the CA even sustained her contention that the imposition of 12% debt. In such case, "forbearance of money, goods or credits" will have no distinct definition
interest compounded annually is totally uncalled for. from a loan. We believe however, that the phrase "forbearance of money, goods or credits"
is meant to have a separate meaning from a loan, otherwise there would have been no need
Respondent-spouses’ Arguments to add that phrase as a loan is already sufficiently defined in the Civil Code.34 Forbearance
of money, goods or credits should therefore refer to arrangements other than loan
Respondent-spouses aver that it is only fair that interest be imposed on the amount they agreements, where a person acquiesces to the temporary use of his money, goods or credits
paid considering that petitioner failed to return the amount upon demand and had been using pending happening of certain events or fulfillment of certain conditions. In this case, the
the ₱3.5 million for her benefit. Moreover, it is undisputed that petitioner failed to perform respondent-spouses parted with their money even before the conditions were fulfilled. They
her obligations to relocate the house outside the perimeter of the subject property and to have therefore allowed or granted forbearance to the seller (petitioner) to use their money
complete the necessary documents. As regards the attorney’s fees, they claim that they are pending fulfillment of the conditions. They were deprived of the use of their money for the
entitled to the same because they were forced to litigate when petitioner unjustly withheld period pending fulfillment of the conditions and when those conditions were breached, they
the amount. Besides, the amount awarded by the CA is even smaller compared to the filing are entitled not only to the return of the principal amount paid, but also to compensation for
fees they paid. the use of their money. And the compensation for the use of their money, absent any
stipulation, should be the same rate of legal interest applicable to a loan since the use or
Our Ruling deprivation of funds is similar to a loan.

The petition lacks merit. Petitioner’s unwarranted withholding of the money which rightfully pertains to respondent-
spouses amounts to forbearance of money which can be considered as an involuntary loan.
Interest may be imposed even in the absence of stipulation in the contract. Thus, the applicable rate of interest is 12% per annum. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,35 cited in Crismina Garments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,36 the Court
We sustain the ruling of both the RTC and the CA that it is proper to impose interest suggested the following guidelines:
notwithstanding the absence of stipulation in the contract. Article 2210 of the Civil Code
expressly provides that "[i]nterest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts
damages awarded for breach of contract." In this case, there is no question that petitioner or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions
is legally obligated to return the ₱3.5 million because of her failure to fulfill the obligation under Title XVIII on ‘Damages’ of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of
under the Conditional Deed of Sale, despite demand. She has in fact admitted that the recoverable damages.
conditions were not fulfilled and that she was willing to return the full amount of ₱3.5 million
but has not actually done so. Petitioner enjoyed the use of the money from the time it was II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
given to her30 until now. Thus, she is already in default of her obligation from the date of damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
demand, i.e., on September 27, 2000.
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e.,
The interest at the rate of 12% is applicable in the instant case. a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the
Anent the interest rate, the general rule is that the applicable rate of interest "shall be time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12%
computed in accordance with the stipulation of the parties."31 Absent any stipulation, the per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under
applicable rate of interest shall be 12% per annum "when the obligation arises out of a loan and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
or a forbearance of money, goods or credits. In other cases, it shall be six percent (6%)."32
In this case, the parties did not stipulate as to the applicable rate of interest. The only 2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an
question remaining therefore is whether the 6% as provided under Article 2209 of the Civil interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court
Code, or 12% under Central Bank Circular No. 416, is due. at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims
or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall

20
begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil This is an appeal from the Decision2 dated January 22, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05533, which affirmed in toto the Decision dated April 16, 2012 of the
is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen Pangasinan, Branch 38, in Criminal Case No. L-8966.
(at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11 of
ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
the amount finally adjudged.
In an Information3 dated August 9, 2010, the appellant was charged as follows:
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory,
the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, That on or about August 6, 2010 in the evening, in Brgy. Poblacion, Sual, Pangasinan, and
shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.37 willfully and unlawfully sell two (2) heat-sealed plastic sachets of Metamphetamine (sic)
Hydrochoride (Shabu), a prohibited drug, in exchange for ₱2,000.00 marked money to PO3
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals38 and its predecessor case, Reformina v. Benedict Julius B. Rimando, acting as poseur-buyer, and was likewise in possession, with
Tongol39 both involved torts cases and hence, there was no forbearance of money, goods, intent to sell, one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of methamphetamine Hydrochoride (Shabu)
or credits. Further, the amount claimed (i.e., damages) could not be established with without lawful authority to possess and sell the same.
reasonable certainty at the time the claim was made. Hence, we arrived at a different ruling
in those cases. Contrary to Art. II, Section 5 of RA 9165.4

Since the date of demand which is September 27, 2000 was satisfactorily established during Upon her arraignment5 on August 25, 2010, she pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
trial, then the interest rate of 12% should be reckoned from said date of demand until the Pre-trial and trial thereafter ensued.
principal amount and the interest thereon is fully satisfied.1âwphi1
The prosecution presented the testimonies of PO3 Benedict Julius B. Rimando (PO3
The award of attorney’s fees is warranted. Rimando), PO2 Alex Aficial, Jr. (PO2 Aficial), Police Senior Inspector Myrna Malojo (PSI
Malojo ), PO2 Catherine Viray (PO2 Viray), Barangay Kagawad Dioniso S. Gulen, Police
Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney’s fees may be recovered: Inspector Ma. Theresa Amor Manuel, and Police Senior Inspector Leo S. Llamas (PSI Llamas).

xxxx The prosecution evidence established that sometime in July 2010, the Chief of Police (COP)
of the Sual Police Station, Sual, Pangasinan, PSI Llamas, started conducting a surveillance
(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third on the alleged illegal drug-selling activities of appellant. At 6:00 p.m. of August 6, 2010, he
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest; called on PO3 Rimando, PO2 Aficia1, SPO2 Gulen, POI Viray and SPOl Editha Castro to an
emergency conference and instructed them to conduct a buy-bust operation on appellant
xxxx who agreed to deliver the items in front of Las Brisas Subdivision, along the National Highway
in Poblacion Sual, Pangasinan. During the briefing, the appellant was described as a woman
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and of about 4 to 5 feet tall and between 45 to 50 years old. PO3 Rimando was designated as
expenses of litigation should be recovered. the poseur-buyer and was given two (2) ₱1000 bills to be used for the operation, which were
photocopied and entered into the police blotter. PO2 Aficial had earlier coordinated with the
In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. PDEA of the intended buy bust.6

Considering the circumstances of the instant case, we find respondent-spouses entitled to At 6:30 p.m., the team walked to the area which was about 150 meters away from their
recover attorney’s fees. There is no doubt that they were forced to litigate to protect their station. PO3 Rimando and PO2 Aficial stood at the side of the highway beside the subdivision
interest, i.e., to recover their money. However, we find the amount of ₱50,000.00 more as earlier instructed by PSI Llamas while the other team members were positioned
appropriate in line with the policy enunciated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code that the award strategically. After 5 minutes of waiting, appellant came near PO3 Rimando who told the
of attorney’s fees must always be reasonable. former in Ilocano dialect that he was instructed to pick up the items and asked the appellant
whether she had the items to which the latter answered in the affirmative. PO3 Rimando
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The May 12, 2006 Decision of the Court of then handed appellant the two marked ₱1000.00 bills and the latter gave him the two (2)
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83123 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the rate of interest small plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. PO3 Rimando signaled PO2
shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum, computed from September 27, 2000 until fully Aficial, who was two meters away from him, to come over and they introduced themselves
satisfied. The award of attorney’s fees is further reduced to ₱50,000.00. as police officers. PO3 Rimando conducted a routine body search on appellant and he was
able to recover from her the marked money and another small plastic sachet she was holding
5. G.R. No. 213598 in her left hand.7

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee Appellant was brought to the Sual Police Station where PO3 Rimando marked the two plastic
vs. sachets subject of the buy-bust with "BJB-1" and "BJB-2," and the one plastic sachet
MERCELITA1 ARENAS y BONZO @ MERLY, Accused-Appellant recovered from appellant with "BJB-3." He prepared and signed the confiscation receipt of
the seized items in the presence of a barangay kagawad, a Department of Justice (DOJ)
DECISION Prosecutor, and an ABS-CBN reporter, who all affixed their signatures in the Confiscation
Receipt, as well as the appellant.8 PO2 Viray took pictures of the seized items, marked money
PERALTA, J.: as well as the signing of the receipt inside the police station.9 PO3 Rimando brought the
seized items as well as the Request for Laboratory Examination10 prepared by PSI Llamas
to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Lingayen, Pangasinan.

21
 Hence, this appeal filed by appellant. Both appellant and the Solicitor General manifested
PSI Myrna Malojo, a forensic chemist, personally received from PO3 Rimando the letter that they are adopting their Briefs filed with the CA.
request and the seized items.11 The laboratory results showed a positive result for
methamphetamine hyrochloride or shabu, and having a weight of 0.08 grams, 0.07 grams Appellant is now before us with the same issues raised before the CA, i.e., that the RTC
and 0.05 grams, respectively, which findings were contained in PSI Malojo’s initial12 and gravely erred: (1) in giving weight and credence to the conflicting testimonies of the
confirmatory13 reports. PSI Malojo sealed the seized items and placed her own markings prosecution witnesses; (2) in holding that there was a legitimate buy-bust operation; (3) in
thereon and turned them to the evidence custodian.14 She identified in court the items she convicting appellant of the crimes charged despite the failure to prove the elements of the
examined as the same items she received from PO3 Rimando15 and the latter also identified alleged sale of shabu and the chain of custody and the integrity of the allegedly seized items;
the subject items as the same items he recovered from the appellant during the buy-bust and (4) in convicting appellant under an Information which charges two offenses in violation
operation.16 of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

Appellant denied the charges alleging that at 7:00 to 8:00 a.m. of August 6, 2010, she was We find no merit in the appeal.
with a certain Mina grilling barbecue at a video bar in front of Jamaica Sual Subdivision; that
after a while, Mina's boyfriend, PSI Llamas, arrived and talked with Mina. When PSI Llamas For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following elements must be proved:
left, Mina asked her to deliver a letter to a certain Renee who owed her money. Mina called (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration;
on a tricycle driver who would bring her to Renee. When she met Renee, she handed her the and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing. What is material is the
letter from Mina and Renee gave her a sealed envelope. Upon her return to the bar, she gave proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court
the envelope to Mina who was drinking beer with PSI Llamas. She then asked permission to of the corpus delicti as evidence.22 We find all the elements necessary for appellant's
go home as she would still cook dinner but Mina told her to grill more barbecues. As she conviction for illegal sale of shabu clearly established in this case.
insisted in going home, PSI Llamas placed his right arm around her neck and called someone
on his cellphone. She tried to remove PSI Llamas' arm around her neck when a police car PO3 Rimando, the poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as the person whom he
arrived and brought her to the police station where she was forced to say something about caught in flagrante delicto selling white crystalline substance presumed to be shabu in the
the shabu which she had no knowledge of and she was later detained.17 buy-bust operation conducted by their police team; that upon appellant's receipt of the
₱2,000.00 buy-bust money from PO3 Rimando, she handed to him the two sachets of white
In rebuttal, PSI Llamas denied knowing Mina and going to the videoke bar on August 6, 201 crystalline substance which when tested yielded positive results for shabu. Appellant's
O; that he only met the appellant at the police station and was not the one who arrested delivery of the shabu to PO3 Rimando and her receipt of the marked money successfully
her.18 In her sur-rebuttal, appellant claimed that she had known PSI Llamas for about 3 consummated the buy-bust transaction. The seized shabu and the marked money were
weeks prior to her arrest and insisted that he was the one who arrested her. presented as evidence before the trial court.

On April 16, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision19 finding appellant guilty of the charged Appellant's reliance on the case of People v. Ong23wherein the Court acquitted the appellants
offenses, the dispositive portion of which reads: of the charge of illegal sale of shabu for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements
of the crime charged is misplaced. The Court found therein that the testimony of SPO1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and the prosecution having established to a moial Gonzales, who acted as the poseur-buyer, showed that he was not privy to the sale
certainty the guilt of accused MERCILITA ARENAS y BONZO @ ''Merly," this Court hereby transaction which transpired between the confidential informant, who did not testify, and the
renders judgment as follows: appellant.

1. For violation of Section 5, Art. II of RA 9165, this Court hereby sentences said accused to Here, while it appeared that it was PSI Llamas who initially dealt with appellant regarding
LIFE IMPRISONMENT, and to pay [a] fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00); the sale of shabu, it also appeared that PSI Llamas had designated PO3 Rimando as his
representative in the sale transaction with appellant. Notably, PO3 Rimando was instructed
2. For violation of Section 11, Art. II of the same Act, this Court hereby sentences said by PSI Llamas to wait at the specified area where appellant would be the first to approach
Accused to a prison term of Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day to Twenty (20) Years, and him for the sale of shabu,24 which established the fact that appellant was already informed
to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00). beforehand as to the person she was to deal with regarding the sale of shabu. Indeed,
appellant approached PO3 Rimando who was waiting at the designated area and upon receipt
SO ORDERED.20 from him of the payment of ₱2000.00, the former handed to the latter the two sachets of
shabu. The identity of appellant as the seller, as well as the object and consideration for the
The RTC found that PO3 Rimando, who acted as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust sale transaction, had been proved by the testimony of PO3 Rimando, the buyer.
operation, positively identified appellant as the one who sold and handed him the two plastic
sachets of shabu in the amount of ₱2,000.00 and the same person who received the marked We also find appellant guilty of illegal possession of shabu. The essential requisites to
money from him. It was also proven that during appellant's arrest, PO3 Rimando recovered establish illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused was in p0ssession of the
one more plastic sachet of shabu in her possession, and he marked the three plastic sachets dangerous drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused freely
with his initials; and that every link in the chain of custody of the confiscated plastic sachets and consciously possessed the dangerous drug.25 What must be proved beyond reasonable
was also established. The RTC found that PO3 Rimando testified in a frank, spontaneous and doubt is the fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself. This may be done by presenting
straightforward manner and his credibility was not crumpled on cross examination, and it the police officer who actually recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness, being the person
rejected appellant's defenses of denial and frame up. who has the direct knowledge of the possession.26

The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The fallo of its Decision reads: In the instant case, PO3 Rimando, the person who had direct knowledge of the seizure and
confiscation of the shabu from the appellant, testified that he was also able to recover
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the another plastic sachet of shabu which appellant was holding with her left hand, which
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 3 8 dated 16 April 2012 is AFFIRMED.21 testimony was corroborated by PO2 Aficial.27 As it was proved that appellant had freely and

22
consciously possessed one (1) plastic sachet of shabu without authority to do so, she can be answered the question of the counsel for the defense. P02 Aficial was not asked who were
found guilty of illegal possession of shabu. the other members of the buy-bust team. His answer was consistent with P03 Rimando's
statement that when the latter gave the pre-arranged signal, he approached P03 Rimando
The RTC and the CA correctly found that the prosecution was able to establish the chain of and they introduced themselves to accused-appellant as police officers.
custody of the seized shabu from the time they were recovered from appellant up to the time
they were presented in court. Section l(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series xxxx
of 2002,28 which implements the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, defines
chain of custody as follows: As regards the source of the information on the description of accused-appellant which
enabled the poseur-buyer to identify her, the same is a trivial matter.1âwphi1 Whether the
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized information came from PSI Llamas or a confidential informant, the fact remains that a crime
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment was committed by accused-appellant in the presence of the police officers who were
of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to members of the buy-bust team and who had the duty to immediately arrest her after the
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody consummation of the transaction. The fact also remains that the description about the seller
of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary matched accused-appellant.x x x
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in
the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. As to the alleged discrepancies in the markings of the seized items, the same are clearly
typographical errors. The transcript of PSI Malojo's testimony showed that she identified the
It was established that after PO3 Rimando seized the three plastic sachets containing white markings on the seized plastic sachets as "BJB-1'', "NJN-2" and "BJB-3." However, the follow-
crystalline substance from appellant, he was in possession of the same from confiscation up up question of the prosecutor clarified that she was actually referring to "BJB-1 ", "BJB-2"
to the police station.29 He marked the three plastic sachets at the police station, which was and "BJB-3", to wit:
only 150 meters away from the scene,30 with "BJB-1", "BJB-2" and "BJB-3."31 He prepared
the confiscation receipt in the presence of a barangay kagawad, a DOJ Prosecutor and an Q. I am showing you then Madam Witness three (3) plastic sachet (sic) will you go over the
ABS-CBN Reporter, who all affixed their signatures therein, the appellant, PO1 Viray and P02 contain (sic) to the one you are testifying "BJB-1" to "BJB-3" (sic)?
Aficial.32 PO1 Viray then took photographs of the seized items, the preparation and signing
of the confiscation receipt. PO3 Rimando then brought the request for laboratory examination A. Yes, sir.
prepared by PSI Llamas of the seized items and personally brought the same to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination.33 The universal practice is that exhibits or evidence are marked chronologically. It is highly
unlikely that the second sachet would be marked "NJN-2" when the first one was marked
PSI Malojo, the forensic chemist, personally received the said request and the three small "BJB-1" and the third one was marked "BJB-3". Notably, both Confiscation Receipt and
heat-sealed plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance with markings from PO3 Request for Laboratory Examination showed that the seized items were marked "BJB-1 ",
Rimando.34 After examining the items, PSI Malojo found them to be positive for the presence "BJB-2" and "BJB-3" consistent with the testimony of P03 Rimando. It should also be noted
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, also known as shabu, which findings were embodied in that in the computer keyboard, the letters "B" and "N" are beside each other. Hence, the
her Initial Laboratory Report and eventually, in her Final Chemistry Report. After her only logical conclusion for the purported discrepancy is that the stenographer inadvertently
examination, PSI Maloj o sealed the seized items and placed her own markings thereon, and pressed the letter "N" instead of the letter "B. "37
turned them over to the evidence custodian for safekeeping.35 During her testimony in court,
PSI Malojo identified the items she examined as the same items she received from PO3 Anent the matter of the confiscation receipt bearing the date August 5, 2010 when the buy-
Rimando. PO3 Rimando also identified in court the subject items as the same items he bust happened on August 6, 2010, P03 Rimando explained that he committed an error in
recovered from the possession of appellant during the buy-bust operation.36 placing the date August 5 which should be August 6.38 Moreover, it was established by the
testimony of Kagawad Gulen that on August 6, 2010, he was called to witness the items
We likewise agree with the CA that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the confiscated from appellant and was asked to sit beside P03 Rimando while the latter was
prosecution witnesses refer to minor details which did not relate to the crimes charged. The preparing the confiscation receipt.39 Gulen even identified in court the confiscation receipt
inconsistencies have been sufficiently explained during trial by the witnesses themselves. where his signature appeared.40
We quote with approval what the CA said:
Appellant's contention that the RTC erred in convicting him under an Information that
The alleged inconsistencies in the composition of the buy-bust team, in the identity and/or charged two offenses is not persuasive. Although the Information in this case charged two
description of accused-appellant, and in the markings on the seized items are collateral offenses which is a violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
matters and not essential elements of the crimes charged. Moreover, a scrutiny of these Procedure, which provides that "[a] complaint or information must charge only one offense,
purported inconsistencies would show that the same are not conflicting at all. except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses," nonetheless,
Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure also states that "[w]hen two
Although P02 Viray testified that she was at the office at the time P03 Rimando and P02 or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to
Aficial were conducting the buy-bust operation, it does not necessarily mean that she was object to it before trial, the court may convict the appellant of as many as are charged and
not part of the buy-bust team. P02 Viray testified that before the conduct of the buy-bust proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings
operation, she was designated by P03 Rimando to be the official photographer. She was told of fact and law in each offense."41
to take photographs after the subject operation, a task that she performed when accused-
appellant was brought to the police station. This explains why P03 Rimando included her in Appellant's failure to raise that more than one offense was charged in the Information in a
his testimony as one of the members of the buy-bust team. motion to quash42 before she pleaded to the same is deemed a waiver.43 As appellant failed
to file a motion to quash the Information, she can be convicted of the crimes charged in the
Similarly the testimony of P02 Aficial that he was with P03 Rimando during the buy-bust Information if proven.
operation is not conflicting with P03 Rimando's enumeration of the member of the buy-bust
team. P02 Aficial was asked who was with [him] during the buy-bust operation and he merely

23
We also find no merit in appellant's claim that she cannot be convicted of illegal possession By analogy, in theft cases,46 where the penalty is graduated according to the value of the
of illegal drugs as its possession is absorbed in the charge of illegal sale. thing stolen, we ruled that when the prosecution failed to establish the amount of property
taken by an independent and reliable estimate, we may fix the value of the property taken
In People v. Lacerna,44We held: based on attendant circumstances or impose the minimum penalty. Since it was proved that
appellant was in possession of shabu but the quantity was not specified in the Information,
The prevailing doctrine is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except the corresponding penalty to be imposed on her should be the minimum penalty
where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited corresponding to illegal possession of less than five grams of methamphetamine
drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended for some future hydrochloride or shabu which is penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one
dealings or use by the seller. (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,
000. 00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00).47
Here, it was established that P03 Rimando was able to recover from appellant's possession
another plastic sachet of shabu which was not the subject of the illegal sale; thus, she could Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the imposable penalty
be separately charged with illegal possession for the same. shall not fall below the minimum period set by the law; the maximum period shall not exceed
the maximum period allowed under the law; hence, the imposable penalty should be within
We find that the RTC correctly imposed on appellant the penalty of life imprisonment and a the range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
fine of ₱500,000.0045 for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
One final note. Public prosecutors are reminded to carefully prepare the criminal complaint
As to the crime of illegal possession, Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides: and Information in accordance with the law so as not to adversely affect the dispensation of
justice.
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and
a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated January
(₱l0,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall 22, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05533 is AFFIRMED with
possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity MODIFICATION only insofar as to the penalty imposable for the crime of illegal possession
thereof: so that appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
xxxx
6. G.R. No. 157472 September 28, 2007
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall
be graduated as follows: SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, Petitioner,
vs.
(1) ... HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA,
Respondents.
(2) ... and
DECISION
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
(₱400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by SSGT. Jose
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not M. Pacoy1 (petitioner) seeking to annul and set aside the Orders dated October 25, 20022
limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly- and December 18, 20023 issued by Presiding Judge Afable E. Cajigal (respondent judge) of
introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac in Criminal Case No. 02-42.
quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300)
grams of marijuana. On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner
committed as follows:
Clear from the foregoing, the quantity of the dangerous drugs is determinative of the penalty
to be imposed for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. We note, however, that That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of
the quantity of shabu found to be in appellant's possession was not indicated in the Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with
Information which is important as the law provides for the graduation of penalties. We cannot intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding
just rely on the quantity established by the prosecution, which the RTC did in imposing the officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick
penalty, without violating appellant's right to be informed of the accusation against her. The Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body which caused his instantaneous death.
RTC imposed the minimum penalty provided by law since the quantity recovered from
appellant's possession was less than 5 grams of shabu; however, it could have been different With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank.4
if the quantity recovered from appellant was more than 5 grams where the penalty imposable
is imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte,
from Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial conference
(₱500,000.00), or even the maximum penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine and trial on October 8, 2002.5
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(₱10,000,000.00), because in this case, the Court could not impose the penalty provided by However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another
law in view of the non-allegation of the true quantity in the information. Order,6 likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and
amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of

24
rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the mitigating14 circumstance which should not elevate the classification of the crime of
crime to Murder. homicide to murder.

Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word On April 30, 2003, petitioner filed herein petition for certiorari on the following grounds:
"Homicide" and instead wrote the word "Murder" in the caption and in the opening paragraph
of the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS
Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the victim’s name from JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO
"Escuita" to "Escueta."7 MURDER.

On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN
be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that DENYING THE MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION FOR MURDER.
the latter would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been
terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS
refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE
entered for him a plea of not guilty.8 INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE WHICH WAS ALREADY TERMINATED.15

On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings Petitioner alleges that despite having entered his plea of not guilty to the charge of Homicide,
Pending the Resolution of the Instant Motion9 on the ground of double jeopardy. Petitioner the public respondent ordered the amendment of the Information from Homicide to Murder
alleged that in the Information for Homicide, he was validly indicted and arraigned before a because of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank," which is in
competent court, and the case was terminated without his express consent; that when the violation of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; that the public
case for Homicide was terminated without his express consent, the subsequent filing of the respondent’s ruling that "disregard of rank" is a qualifying aggravating circumstance which
Information for Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in double jeopardy. qualified the killing of 2Lt. Escueta to murder is erroneous since, under paragraph 3, Article
14 of the Revised Penal Code, disregard of rank is only a generic aggravating circumstance
In an Order10 dated October 25, 2002,11 the respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. which serves to affect the penalty to be imposed upon the accused and does not qualify the
He ruled that a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute double jeopardy offense into a more serious crime; that even assuming that disregard of rank is a qualifying
and cannot be sustained unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting the aggravating circumstance, such is a substantial amendment which is not allowed after
defendant in the former prosecution; that petitioner was never acquitted or convicted of petitioner has entered his plea.
Homicide, since the Information for Homicide was merely corrected/or amended before trial
commenced and did not terminate the same; that the Information for Homicide was patently Petitioner next contends that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he
insufficient in substance, so no valid proceedings could be taken thereon; and that with the denied the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder, considering that the original
allegation of aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank," the crime of Homicide is Information for Homicide filed against him was terminated without his express consent; thus,
qualified to Murder. prosecuting him for the same offense would place him in double jeopardy.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion to Petitioner further argues that although the respondent judge granted his Motion for
Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious Reconsideration, he did not in fact grant the motion, since petitioner's prayer was for the
and partial manner in mandating the amendment of the charge from Homicide to Murder in respondent judge to grant the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder on the ground of
disregard of the provisions of the law and existing jurisprudence. double jeopardy; that his Motion for Reconsideration did not seek the reinstatement of the
Information for Homicide upon the dismissal of the Information for Murder, as he would again
In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the case against him was be placed in double jeopardy; thus, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, which constitutes a ground discretion in reinstating the Homicide case.
to quash the information for murder; and that to try him again for the same offense
constitutes double jeopardy. Petitioner stated that contrary to respondent judge's conclusion In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent judge's Order reinstating
that disregard of rank qualifies the killing to Murder, it is a generic aggravating circumstance the Information to Homicide after initially motu proprio ordering its amendment to Murder
which only serves to affect the imposition of the period of the penalty. Petitioner also argued renders herein petition moot and academic; that petitioner failed to establish the fourth
that the amendment and/or correction ordered by the respondent judge was substantial; element of double jeopardy, i.e., the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case
and under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this cannot be against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent; that petitioner
done, since petitioner had already been arraigned and he would be placed in double jeopardy. confuses amendment with substitution of Information; that the respondent judge's Order
dated September 12, 2002 mandated an amendment of the Information as provided under
In his Order dated December 18, 2002,12 the respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; and that amendments do
and granted the Motion for Reconsideration, thus: not entail dismissal or termination of the previous case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Inhibit is hereby DENIED while the Private respondent Col. Olimpio Escueta, father of the victim, filed his Comment alleging that
Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the respondent judge when he denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash the Amended Information, as petitioner was not placed in double
Unless ordered otherwise by the Highest Court, the presiding judge shall continue hearing jeopardy; that the proceedings under the first Information for homicide has not yet
this case. Further, the Order dated October 25, 2002 is reconsidered and the original commenced, and the case was not dismissed or terminated when the Information was
information charging the crime of homicide stands.13 amended.

In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of In his Reply, petitioner reiterates his contention that the amendment of the charge of
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that "disregard of rank" is merely a generic Homicide to Murder after his arraignment would place him in double jeopardy, considering

25
that said amendment was without his express consent; and that such amendment was
tantamount to a termination of the charge of Homicide. The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while
the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.
The parties filed their respective Memoranda.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may
Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is highly improper, for it violates be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:
the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. However, the
judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.16 A strict application of the rule of 1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution
hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge;
not involve factual but legal questions.17
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but
In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the proper legal substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be
interpretation of the provisions on amendment and substitution of information under the dismissed;
Rules of Court. It also involves the issue of double jeopardy, one of the fundamental rights
of the citizens under the Constitution which protects the accused not against the peril of 3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary
second punishment but against being tried for the same offense. These important legal investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information,
questions and in order to prevent further delay in the trial of the case warrant our relaxation another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new
of the policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. information; and

The Court’s Ruling 4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or
to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge,
The petition is not meritorious. hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be
made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn,
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge committed grave abuse the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or
of discretion in amending the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which does not include or
the charge in the Information for Homicide. The argument of petitioner -- is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double
jeopardy.
Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was already terminated without
his express consent, he cannot anymore be charged and arraigned for Murder which involve In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph
the same offense. The petitioner argued that the termination of the information for Homicide of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof,
without his express consent is equivalent to his acquittal. Thus, to charge him again, this the rule is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which
time for Murder, is tantamount to placing the petitioner in Double Jeopardy.18 necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the
information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is
is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or substitution distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.
under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to wit --
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense
form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. is exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense
court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily
include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is
xxx alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to
be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the form a part of those constituting the latter.20
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing
of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a
the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution as defined in
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. Teehankee.

with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides: While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the
only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. - When it becomes of the Information, with the crossing out of word "Homicide" and its replacement by the word
manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper "Murder." There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in
offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended Information
necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause for Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information for
to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing
offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information. of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made
in the caption and preamble from "Homicide" to "Murder" as purely formal.21
First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution under Section 14,
Rule 110. For this purpose, Teehankee v. Madayag19 is instructive, viz:

26
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.26
of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his case for
information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is homicide without his express consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced.
made; and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint
or information.22 Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or unconditional
Information are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide, there could not dismissal which terminates the case.27 And for the dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy
be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any possible clause, it must have the effect of acquittal.1âwphi1
prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.
The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial prosecutor to
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that "disrespect on account of rank" correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a new
qualified the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance,23 Information charging the proper offense as contemplated under the last paragraph of Section
we do not find that he committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court -- which, for convenience, we quote again --
of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide,
since the amendment made was only formal and did not adversely affect any substantial If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
right of petitioner. proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing
of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided
Next, we determine whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to
charge from Homicide to Murder; and subsequently, from Murder back to Homicide. give bail for their appearance at the trial.
Petitioner's claim that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
his Motion to Quash the Amended Information for Murder on the ground of double jeopardy and Section 19, Rule 119, which provides:
is not meritorious.
SEC. 19.- When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense - When it becomes
Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
which provides: offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense
necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause
SEC. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper
the following grounds: offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.

xxxx Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense charged
is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted of a crime
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or with which he was not charged in the information even if it be proven, in which case, there
the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. must be a dismissal of the charge and a substitution of a new information charging the proper
offense. Section 14 does not apply to a second information, which involves the same offense
Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information. In
jeopardy may prosper, to wit: this connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of
the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or constituting the latter.28
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge merely
or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original Information.
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which To repeat, it was the same original information that was amended by merely crossing out
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint the word "Homicide" and writing the word "Murder," instead, which showed that there was
or information. no dismissal of the homicide case.

Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy Anent the last issue, petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a in ordering that the original Information for Homicide stands after realizing that disregard of
second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.24 rank does not qualify the killing to Murder. That ruling was again a violation of his right
against double jeopardy, as he will be prosecuted anew for a charge of Homicide, which has
As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) already been terminated earlier.
before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered;
and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise We are not convinced. Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.
terminated without his express consent.25
A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent judge granted
It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case that petitioner's motion for reconsideration, not on the ground that double jeopardy exists, but
bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the on his realization that "disregard of rank" is a generic aggravating circumstance which does
not qualify the killing of the victim to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by reinstating

27
the original Information for Homicide. The requisite of double jeopardy that the first jeopardy PRIVATE RESPONDENT DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO CAUSE THE REINVESTIGATION OF
must have attached prior to the second is not present, considering that petitioner was neither THE CRIMINAL CASE BELOW WHEN THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION HAD ALREADY BEEN FILED
convicted nor acquitted; nor was the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated WITH THE LOWER COURT. HENCE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR
without his express consent.29 IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN GRANTING SUCH REINVESTIGATION DESPITE HAVING NO BASIS IN THE RULES OF
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed COURT[;]
by respondent Judge.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ADMITTING STATE
7. G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010 PROSECUTOR VELASCO’S AMENDED INFORMATION, ISSUING A WARRANT OF ARREST, AND
SETTING THE CASE BELOW FOR ARRAIGNMENT, CONSIDERING THAT THE VALIDITY AND
JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE, Petitioner, LEGALITY OF HIS ORDERS DATED 24 AND 31 JANUARY 2007, WHICH LED TO THE
vs. QUESTIONABLE REINVESTIGATION AND ILLEGAL AMENDED INFORMATION[,] ARE YET TO
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, BE RESOLVED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT (sic); [AND]
HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS, Respondents.
CONSIDERING THAT PROSECUTOR VELASCO’S FINDINGS IN HIS RESOLUTION DATED 2
DECISION FEBRUARY 2007 ARE BLATANTLY BASED ON MERE SPECULATIONS AND CONJECTURES,
WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL OR MATERIAL NEW EVIDENCE BEING ADDUCED DURING THE
CARPIO MORALES, J.: REINVESTIGATION, RESPONDENT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST ALLOWED PETITIONER’S
MOTION FOR A HEARING FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE.15
Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) assails via the present petition for review filed on May (emphasis in the original omitted)
30, 2008 the August 30, 2007 Decision1 and the April 18, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97761 that affirmed the trial court’s Orders of January 24, 31, Records show that the arraignment scheduled on March 21, 2007 pushed through during
February 7, 8, all in 2007, and denied the motion for reconsideration, respectively. which petitioner refused to plead, drawing the trial court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for
him.
Petitioner was, by Information3 of January 16, 2007, charged with homicide for the death of
Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Prior thereto or on February 23, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to
Branch 150 to which the case was raffled, presided by Judge Elmo Alameda, forthwith issued Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela16 which the trial court, after hearings thereon, granted by Order
a commitment order4 against petitioner who was placed under police custody while confined of May 21, 2007,17 it finding that the evidence of guilt for the crime of murder is not strong.
at the Makati Medical Center.5 It accordingly allowed petitioner to post bail in the amount of ₱300,000 for his provisional
liberty.
After petitioner posted a ₱40,000 cash bond which the trial court approved,6 he was released
from detention, and his arraignment was set on January 24, 2007. The trial court, absent any writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court, went on
to try petitioner under the Amended Information. By Decision of January 14, 2009, the trial
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public court found petitioner guilty of homicide, sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty
prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion7 praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion
proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to temporal as maximum. From the Decision, petitioner filed an appeal to the appellate court,
conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, during the pendency of which he filed an urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal. The appellate court denied petitioner’s
The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of January 24, 20078 deferring petitioner’s application which this Court, in G.R. No. 189122, affirmed by Decision of March 17, 2010.
arraignment and allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the
proper offense and submit a recommendation within 30 days from its inception, inter alia; The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) later argued that the present petition had been
and (2) Order of January 31, 20079 denying reconsideration of the first order. Petitioner rendered moot since the presentation of evidence, wherein petitioner actively participated,
assailed these orders via certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals. had been concluded.18

Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion before the trial court Waiver on the part of the accused must be distinguished from mootness of the petition, for
to defer acting on the public prosecutor’s recommendation on the proper offense until after in the present case, petitioner did not, by his active participation in the trial, waive his stated
the appellate court resolves his application for injunctive reliefs, or alternatively, to grant objections.
him time to comment on the prosecutor’s recommendation and thereafter set a hearing for
the judicial determination of probable cause.10 Petitioner also separately moved for the Section 26, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
inhibition of Judge Alameda with prayer to defer action on the admission of the Amended
Information.11 SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation. – An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
The trial court nonetheless issued the other assailed orders, viz: (1) Order of February 7, challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from
200712 that admitted the Amended Information13 for murder and directed the issuance of assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the
a warrant of arrest; and (2) Order of February 8, 200714 which set the arraignment on charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall
February 13, 2007. Petitioner questioned these two orders via supplemental petition before resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.
the appellate court.
By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his right to challenge the regularity of the
The appellate court dismissed petitioner’s petition, hence, his present petition, arguing that: reinvestigation of the charge against him, the validity of the admission of the Amended
Information, and the legality of his arrest under the Amended Information, as he vigorously

28
raised them prior to his arraignment. During the arraignment on March 21, 2007, petitioner
refused to enter his plea since the issues he raised were still pending resolution by the When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a
appellate court, thus prompting the trial court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him. preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without
need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with
The principle that the accused is precluded after arraignment from questioning the illegal existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may
arrest or the lack of or irregular preliminary investigation applies "only if he voluntarily enters be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis
his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto."19 of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
There must be clear and convincing proof that petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish
his right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of
intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel.
explanation of his conduct is possible.20 Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated
within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
From the given circumstances, the Court cannot reasonably infer a valid waiver on the part
of petitioner to preclude him from obtaining a definite resolution of the objections he so After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation,
timely invoked. Other than its allegation of active participation, the OSG offered no clear and the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a
convincing proof that petitioner’s participation in the trial was unconditional with the intent preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided
to voluntarily and unequivocally abandon his petition. In fact, on January 26, 2010, petitioner in this Rule. (underscoring supplied)
still moved for the early resolution of the present petition.21
A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an
Whatever delay arising from petitioner’s availment of remedies against the trial court’s offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one day
Orders cannot be imputed to petitioner to operate as a valid waiver on his part. Neither can without regard to fine.28 As an exception, the rules provide that there is no need for a
the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction be deemed as a voluntary relinquishment preliminary investigation in cases of a lawful arrest without a warrant29 involving such type
of petitioner’s principal prayer. The non-issuance of such injunctive relief only means that of offense, so long as an inquest, where available, has been conducted.30
the appellate court did not preliminarily find any exception22 to the long-standing doctrine
that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution.23 Consequently, the trial of the Inquest is defined as an informal and summary investigation conducted by a public
case took its course. prosecutor in criminal cases involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit of
a warrant of arrest issued by the court for the purpose of determining whether said persons
The petition is now moot, however, in view of the trial court’s rendition of judgment. should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court.31

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue It is imperative to first take a closer look at the predicament of both the arrested person and
of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.24 the private complainant during the brief period of inquest, to grasp the respective remedies
available to them before and after the filing of a complaint or information in court.
The judgment convicting petitioner of homicide under the Amended Information for murder
operates as a supervening event that mooted the present petition. Assuming that there is BEFORE THE FILING OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IN COURT, the private complainant
ground25 to annul the finding of probable cause for murder, there is no practical use or value may proceed in coordinating with the arresting officer and the inquest officer during the
in abrogating the concluded proceedings and retrying the case under the original Information latter’s conduct of inquest. Meanwhile, the arrested person has the option to avail of a 15-
for homicide just to arrive, more likely or even definitely, at the same conviction of homicide. day preliminary investigation, provided he duly signs a waiver of any objection against delay
Mootness would have also set in had petitioner been convicted of murder, for proof beyond in his delivery to the proper judicial authorities under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
reasonable doubt, which is much higher than probable cause, would have been established For obvious reasons, this remedy is not available to the private complainant since he cannot
in that instance. waive what he does not have. The benefit of the provisions of Article 125, which requires the
filing of a complaint or information with the proper judicial authorities within the applicable
Instead, however, of denying the petition outright on the ground of mootness, the Court period,32 belongs to the arrested person.
proceeds to resolve the legal issues in order to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, bar and public.26 In the present case, there is compelling reason to clarify the The accelerated process of inquest, owing to its summary nature and the attendant risk of
remedies available before and after the filing of an information in cases subject of inquest. running against Article 125, ends with either the prompt filing of an information in court or
the immediate release of the arrested person.33 Notably, the rules on inquest do not provide
After going over into the substance of the petition and the assailed issuances, the Court finds for a motion for reconsideration.34
no reversible error on the part of the appellate court in finding no grave abuse of discretion
in the issuance of the four trial court Orders. Contrary to petitioner’s position that private complainant should have appealed to the DOJ
Secretary, such remedy is not immediately available in cases subject of inquest.
In his first assignment of error, petitioner posits that the prosecution has no right under the
Rules to seek from the trial court an investigation or reevaluation of the case except through Noteworthy is the proviso that the appeal to the DOJ Secretary is by "petition by a proper
a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ). In cases when an accused is party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe."35 The rule referred to
arrested without a warrant, petitioner contends that the remedy of preliminary investigation is the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal,36 Section 1 of which provides that
belongs only to the accused. the Rule shall "apply to appeals from resolutions x x x in cases subject of preliminary
investigation/ reinvestigation." In cases subject of inquest, therefore, the private party
The contention lacks merit. should first avail of a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation, if any, before elevating the
matter to the DOJ Secretary.
Section 6,27 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court reads:

29
In case the inquest proceedings yield no probable cause, the private complainant may pursue
the case through the regular course of a preliminary investigation. In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the public
prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be secured. If after such re-
ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT, the rules yet provide the accused investigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw the information or otherwise
with another opportunity to ask for a preliminary investigation within five days from the time cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course of action may be taken but shall
he learns of its filing. The Rules of Court and the New Rules on Inquest are silent, however, likewise be addressed to the sound discretion of the court.46 (underscoring supplied)
on whether the private complainant could invoke, as respondent heirs of the victim did in
the present case, a similar right to ask for a reinvestigation. While Abugotal v. Judge Tiro47 held that to ferret out the truth, a trial is to be preferred to
a reinvestigation, the Court therein recognized that a trial court may, where the interest of
The Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation, subject to and in justice so requires, grant a motion for reinvestigation of a criminal case pending before it.
light of the ensuing disquisition.
Once the trial court grants the prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed
All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the to have deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought
direction and control of the public prosecutor.37 The private complainant in a criminal case the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with discretion – wide
is merely a witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the and far reaching – regarding the disposition thereof,48 subject to the trial court’s approval
reinvestigation of the case after the information had been filed in court, the proper party for of the resulting proposed course of action.
that being the public prosecutor who has the control of the prosecution of the case.38 Thus,
in cases where the private complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal Since a reinvestigation may entail a modification of the criminal information as what
action,39 and is granted the authority to prosecute,40 the private complainant, by counsel happened in the present case, the Court’s holding is bolstered by the rule on amendment of
and with the conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation. an information under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court:

In fact, the DOJ instructs that before the arraignment of the accused, trial prosecutors must A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court,
"examine the Information vis-à-vis the resolution of the investigating prosecutor in order to at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
make the necessary corrections or revisions and to ensure that the information is sufficient amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
in form and substance."41 prejudice to the rights of the accused.

x x x Since no evidence has been presented at that stage, the error would appear or be However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged
discoverable from a review of the records of the preliminary investigation. Of course, that in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion
fact may be perceived by the trial judge himself but, again, realistically it will be the by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall
prosecutor who can initially determine the same. That is why such error need not be manifest state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
or evident, nor is it required that such nuances as offenses includible in the offense charged especially the offended party.
be taken into account. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the prosecutor can and should
institute remedial measures[.]42 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing
The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of the government whose of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 11, Rule 119, provided
principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to
component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The give bail for their appearance at the trial. (emphasis supplied)
right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of
what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which In fine, before the accused enters a plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint
are best appreciated by prosecutors.43 or information may be made without leave of court.49 After the entry of a plea, only a formal
amendment may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights
The prosecution’s discretion is not boundless or infinite, however.44 The standing principle of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same
is that once an information is filed in court, any remedial measure such as a reinvestigation is beneficial to the accused.50
must be addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Interestingly, petitioner supports
this view.45 Indeed, the Court ruled in one case that: It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by amendment
prior to entry of plea. An information which is void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a
The rule is now well settled that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any ground for quashal.51 An amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court
disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the is likewise impermissible.52
accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. Although the prosecutor retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even when the case is already in Considering the general rule that an information may be amended even in substance and
court, he cannot impose his opinion upon the tribunal. For while it is true that the prosecutor even without leave of court at any time before entry of plea, does it mean that the conduct
has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed of a reinvestigation at that stage is a mere superfluity?
in court, once the case had already been brought therein any disposition the prosecutor may
deem proper thereafter It is not.

should be addressed to the court for its consideration and approval. The only qualification is Any remedial measure springing from the reinvestigation – be it a complete disposition or
that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right an intermediate modification53 of the charge – is eventually addressed to the sound
of the People to due process of law. discretion of the trial court, which must make an independent evaluation or assessment of
the merits of the case. Since the trial court would ultimately make the determination on the
xxxx proposed course of action, it is for the prosecution to consider whether a reinvestigation is

30
necessary to adduce and review the evidence for purposes of buttressing the appropriate same as those already alleged in the original Information for homicide. None of these peculiar
motion to be filed in court. circumstances obtains in the present case.

More importantly, reinvestigation is required in cases involving a substantial amendment of Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the fact that what
the information. Due process of law demands that no substantial amendment of an was conducted in the present case was a reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial
information may be admitted without conducting another or a new preliminary investigation. amendment of the Information. There is no substantial distinction between a preliminary
In Matalam v. The 2nd Division of the Sandiganbayan,54 the Court ruled that a substantial investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the
amendment in an information entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation, unless same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-
the amended information contains a charge related to or is included in the original founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof
Information. and should be held for trial.60 What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to
defend himself from the charge of murder61 after the claimed circumstances were made
The question to be resolved is whether the amendment of the Information from homicide to known to him as early as the first motion.
murder is considered a substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but a
duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation. Petitioner did not, however, make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence
on the proposed amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely
The Court answers in the affirmative. observe the proceedings and declined to actively participate, even with extreme caution, in
the reinvestigation. Mercado v. Court of Appeals states that the rules do not even require,
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and as a condition sine qua non to the validity of a preliminary investigation, the presence of the
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The respondent as long as efforts to reach him were made and an opportunity to controvert the
following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate complainant’s evidence was accorded him.62
only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2)
an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged In his second assignment of error, petitioner basically assails the hurried issuance of the last
in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of two assailed RTC Orders despite the pendency before the appellate court of the petition for
the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will certiorari challenging the first two trial court Orders allowing a reinvestigation.
assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the
accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in The Rules categorically state that the petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal
the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with case unless a temporary retraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been
additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and issued.63 The appellate court, by Resolution of February 15, 2007,64 denied petitioner’s
which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged. application for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
Supplementary efforts to seek injunctive reliefs proved futile.65 The appellate court thus did
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense not err in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it proceeded
under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, with the case and eventually arraigned the accused on March 21, 2007, there being no
and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the injunction order from the appellate court. Moreover, petitioner opted to forego appealing to
information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not the DOJ Secretary, a post-inquest remedy that was available after the reinvestigation and
change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or which could have suspended the arraignment.661avvphi1
cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each
been held to be one of form and not of substance.55 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Regarding petitioner’s protestations of haste, suffice to state that the pace in resolving
incidents of the case is not per se an indication of bias. In Santos-Concio v. Department of
Matalam adds that the mere fact that the two charges are related does not necessarily or Justice,67 the Court held:
automatically deprive the accused of his right to another preliminary investigation. Notatu
dignum is the fact that both the original Information and the amended Information in Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be
Matalam were similarly charging the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For one’s prompt dispatch
and Corrupt Practices Act. may be another’s undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the
paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar
In one case,56 it was squarely held that the amendment of the Information from homicide to each case.
to murder is "one of substance with very serious consequences."57 The amendment involved
in the present case consists of additional averments of the circumstances of treachery, The presumption of regularity includes the public officer’s official actuations in all phases of
evident premeditation, and cruelty, which qualify the offense charged from homicide to work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present
murder. It being a new and material element of the offense, petitioner should be given the contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This,
chance to adduce evidence on the matter. Not being merely clarificatory, the amendment petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panel’s initial task
essentially varies the prosecution’s original theory of the case and certainly affects not just cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular
the form but the weight of defense to be mustered by petitioner. performance of not just one but five state prosecutors.68

The Court distinguishes the factual milieus in Buhat v. CA58 and Pacoy v. Cajigal,59 wherein There is no ground for petitioner’s protestations against the DOJ Secretary’s sudden
the amendment of the caption of the Information from homicide to murder was not designation of Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco as Acting City Prosecutor of Makati
considered substantial because there was no real change in the recital of facts constituting City for the present case69 and the latter’s conformity to the motion for reinvestigation.
the offense charged as alleged in the body of the Information, as the allegations of qualifying
circumstances were already clearly embedded in the original Information. Buhat pointed out In granting the reinvestigation, Judge Alameda cannot choose the public prosecutor who will
that the original Information for homicide already alleged the use of superior strength, while conduct the reinvestigation or preliminary investigation.70 There is a hierarchy of officials in
Pacoy states that the averments in the amended Information for murder are exactly the the prosecutory arm of the executive branch headed by the Secretary of Justice71 who is

31
vested with the prerogative to appoint a special prosecutor or designate an acting prosecutor What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
to handle a particular case, which broad power of control has been recognized by judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to
jurisprudence.72 personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
As for the trial court’s ignoring the DOJ Secretary’s uncontested statements to the media submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis
which aired his opinion that if the assailant merely intended to maim and not to kill the thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable cause;
victim, one bullet would have sufficed — the DOJ Secretary reportedly uttered that "the filing and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s
of the case of homicide against ano against Leviste lintek naman eh I told you to watch over report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving
that case… there should be a report about the ballistics, about the paraffin, etc., then that’s at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.81 (emphasis and underscoring
not a complete investigation, that’s why you should use that as a ground" — no abuse of supplied)
discretion, much less a grave one, can be imputed to it.
The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for the
The statements of the DOJ Secretary do not evince a "determination to file the Information issuance of a warrant of arrest of the accused before any warrant may be issued.82 Petitioner
even in the absence of probable cause."73 On the contrary, the remarks merely underscored thus cannot, as a matter of right, insist on a hearing for judicial determination of probable
the importance of securing basic investigative reports to support a finding of probable cause. cause. Certainly, petitioner "cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the
The original Resolution even recognized that probable cause for the crime of murder cannot [judge's] examination of the records should be [since t]he extent of the judge’s examination
be determined based on the evidence obtained "[u]nless and until a more thorough depends on the exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the case require."83
investigation is conducted and eyewitness/es [is/]are presented in evidence[.]"74 In one case, the Court emphatically stated:

The trial court concluded that "the wound sustained by the victim at the back of his head, The periods provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are mandatory, and as such,
the absence of paraffin test and ballistic examination, and the handling of physical the judge must determine the presence or absence of probable cause within such periods.
evidence,"75 as rationalized by the prosecution in its motion, are sufficient circumstances The Sandiganbayan’s determination of probable cause is made ex parte and is summary in
that require further inquiry. nature, not adversarial. The Judge should not be stymied and distracted from his
determination of probable cause by needless motions for determination of probable cause
That the evidence of guilt was not strong as subsequently assessed in the bail hearings does filed by the accused.84 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
not affect the prior determination of probable cause because, as the appellate court correctly
stated, the standard of strong evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused Petitioner proceeds to discuss at length evidentiary matters, arguing that no circumstances
is markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable cause which is sufficient to initiate exist that would qualify the crime from homicide to murder.
a criminal case.76
The allegation of lack of substantial or material new evidence deserves no credence, because
In his third assignment of error, petitioner faults the trial court for not conducting, at the new pieces of evidence are not prerequisites for a valid conduct of reinvestigation. It is not
very least, a hearing for judicial determination of probable cause, considering the lack of material that no new matter or evidence was presented during the reinvestigation of the
substantial or material new evidence adduced during the reinvestigation. case. It should be stressed that reinvestigation, as the word itself implies, is merely a repeat
investigation of the case. New matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation,
Petitioner’s argument is specious. which is simply a chance for the prosecutor to review and re-evaluate its findings and the
evidence already submitted.85
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function Moreover, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in, and
that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine be subject of, a petition for review on certiorari since this Court is not a trier of facts. The
whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the Court cannot thus review the evidence adduced by the parties on the issue of the absence
crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has or presence of probable cause, as there exists no exceptional circumstances to warrant a
the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in factual review.86
court. Whether that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e.,
whether he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, In a petition for certiorari, like that filed by petitioner before the appellate court, the
is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.77 jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of
jurisdiction.1avvphi1 It is not to stray at will and resolve questions and issues beyond its
The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether competence, such as an error of judgment.87 The court’s duty in the pertinent case is
a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that confined to determining whether the executive and judicial determination of probable cause
based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Although it is
in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge possible that error may be committed in the discharge of lawful functions, this does not
cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.78 Paragraph (a), Section 5,79 Rule 112 of the render the act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of
Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed by the RTC. certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.88
To move the court to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause is a mere superfluity,
for with or without such motion, the judge is duty-bound to personally evaluate the resolution WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
of the public prosecutor and the supporting evidence. In fact, the task of the presiding judge Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97761 are AFFIRMED.
when the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence
or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.80 8. G.R. No. 140863 August 22, 2000

SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,

32
vs. from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the
HON. ROLANDO HOW, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. xxx"
Branch 257 of Parañaque and MA. FE F. BARREIRO, respondents.
By issuing the assailed order, respondent court allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion
DECISION amounting to lack/excess of jurisdiction.16 Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus
to nullify and set aside the order of respondent court dated November 15, 1999.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Petitioner limits the issues to the following:
The question raised in this instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is whether or not the
trial court can indefinitely suspend the arraignment of the accused until the petition for I.
review with the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) has been resolved.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ARRAIGN THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
The facts of this case are not disputed. DESPITE THE LAPSE OF THE TIME LIMIT OF THIRTY (30) DAYS MANDATORILY IMPOSED BY
SECTION 7, OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8493, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
On May 28, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Parañaque filed an Information1 for estafa against OF 1998"; AND
Ma. Fe Barreiro (private respondent) based on the complaint2 filed by Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc. (petitioner). The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-536 entitled II.
"People of the Philippines vs. Ma. Fe F. Barreiro" before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
City, Branch 257, presided by public respondent Judge Rolando G. How. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DEFYING SECTION 12, RULE 116, OF THE REVISED RULES
ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.17
Before the scheduled arraignment of private respondent on August 5, 1999 could take place,
respondent court issued an Order3 dated June 29, 1999, resetting the arraignment of private The instant petition is devoid of merit.
respondent on September 2, 1999 on the ground that private respondent had "filed an appeal
with the Department of Justice (DOJ)".4 Private respondent manifested in the same Order The power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after the
that she would submit a certification from the DOJ granting due course to her appeal on or information has already been filed in court is well settled. In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals,18
before the second scheduled arraignment.5 On September 24, 1999, respondent court issued reiterated in Roberts vs. Court of Appeals,19 we clarified that nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul20
an Order6 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order that previously reset forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
the arraignment of private respondent. Said order further rescheduled the arraignment of subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in court.21
private respondent to November 18, 1999.
The nature of the Justice Secretary’s power of control over prosecutors was explained in
On November 10, 1999, private respondent filed another "Motion to Defer Arraignment".7 Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals 22 in this wise:
On November 15, 1999, before the scheduled date of the arraignment of private respondent
and before the date set for the hearing of private respondent’s "Motion to Defer "Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who,
Arraignment", respondent court issued an Order8 further deferring the arraignment of under the Revised Administrative Code,23 exercises the power of direct control and
private respondent "until such time that the appeal with the said office (SOJ) is resolved".9 supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order was denied by respondent court on rulings.
November 22, 1999.10
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section[s] 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of
Petitioner bewails the fact that six months have elapsed since private respondent appeared the Code gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief
or submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court and up to now she still has to be Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of
arraigned.11 Respondent court allegedly violated due process when it issued the assailed supervision and control is delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the
order before petitioner received a copy of the "Motion to Defer Arraignment" of private Code:
respondent and before the hearing for the same motion could be conducted.12 Petitioner
points out that despite the order of respondent court dated September 26, 1999 which stated ‘(1) Supervision and Control. – Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly
that the arraignment of private respondent on November 18, 1999 is "intransferable", whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
respondent court, in utter disregard of its own order, issued the now assailed order performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify
indefinitely suspending the arraignment of private respondent.13 acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; x x x x.’

Petitioner is convinced that the twin orders further delaying the arraignment of private Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act
respondent and denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner violate Section 7, of the 4007, which read:
Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (RA 8493) and Section 12, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. ‘Section 3. x x x x

Petitioner further submits that this instant petition raises "a pure question of law of first The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the Senior State
impression"14 since "it involves the application and interpretation of a law of very recent Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall x x x perform such other duties as may be
vintage, namely Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998".15 assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice in the interest of public service.’
Petitioner mainly relies on Section 7 of said law that states that:
xxx xxx xxx
"Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between
Arraignment and Trial. – The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days

33
Section 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a
specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, We are not persuaded. The authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
division or service, the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper subordinates even after an information has already been filed in court does not present an
Department Head who shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, irreconcilable conflict with the thirty-day period prescribed by Section 7 of the Speedy Trial
modify, or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or service." Act.

‘Supervision’ and ‘control’ of a department head over his subordinates have been defined in Contrary to the urgings of petitioner, Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 prescribing
administrative law as follows: the thirty-day period for the arraignment of the accused is not absolute. In fact, Section 10
of the same law enumerates periods of delay that shall be excluded in computing the time
‘In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer within which trial must commence. The pertinent portion thereof provides that:
to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them,
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such "SEC. 10. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify time within which trial must commence:
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.’ xxx

Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and "(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any justice or judge motu
prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds propio or on motion of the accused or his/her counsel or at the request of the public
that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative prosecutor, if the justice or judge granted such continuance on the basis of his/her findings
activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public
authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies are and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a continuance
exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed."24 granted by the court in accordance with this subparagraph shall be excludable under this
section unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its
Procedurally speaking, after the filing of the information, the court is in complete control of reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance
the case and any disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion.25 The decision to outweigh the best interests of the public and the accused in a speedy trial."
suspend arraignment to await the resolution of an appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an
exercise of such discretion. Consistent with our ruling in Marcelo,26 we have since then held Accordingly, the view espoused by petitioner that the thirty-day period prescribed by Section
in a number of cases that a court can defer to the authority of the prosecution arm to resolve, 7 of the Speedy Trial Act must be strictly observed so as not to violate its right to a speedy
once and for all, the issue of whether or not sufficient ground existed to file the trial finds no support in the law itself. The exceptions provided in the Speedy Trial Act of
information.27 This is in line with our general pronouncement in Crespo28 that courts cannot 1998 reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that the concept of "speedy trial" is "a
interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion over criminal prosecution.29 Thus, public relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept."37 In fact, in implementing the
respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it suspended the arraignment of Speedy Trial Act of 1998, this Court issued SC Circular No. 38-98, Section 2 of which provides
private respondent to await the resolution of her petition for review with the Secretary of that:
Justice.
"Section 2. Time Limit for Arraignment and Pre-trial. – The arraignment, and the pre-trial if
In several cases, we have emphatically cautioned judges to refrain from arraigning the the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, shall be held within thirty (30) days from
accused precipitately to avoid a miscarriage of justice.30 In Dimatulac vs. Villon,31 the judge the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The period of the
in that case hastily arraigned the accused despite the pending appeal of the accused with pendency of a motion to quash, or for a bill of particulars, or other causes justifying
the DOJ and notwithstanding the existence of circumstances indicating the probability of suspension of arraignment shall be excluded." (Emphasis ours)
miscarriage of justice. Said judge was reminded that he should have heeded our statement
in Marcelo32 "that prudence, if not wisdom, or at least respect for the authority of the As stated earlier, prudence and wisdom dictate that the court should hold in abeyance the
prosecution agency, dictated that he (respondent judge therein) should have waited for the proceedings while the Secretary of Justice resolves the petition for review questioning the
resolution of the appeal then pending with the DOJ."33 resolution of the prosecutor. The delay in such a case is justified because the determination
of whether the delay is unreasonable, thus amounting to a transgression of the right to a
It bears stressing that the court is however not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary speedy trial, cannot be simply reduced to a mathematical process. Hence, the length of delay
of Justice since the court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the is not the lone criterion to be considered, several factors must be taken into account in
case, and may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of determining whether or not the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. The
Justice.34 Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an abdication factors to consider and balance are the duration of the delay, reason thereof, assertion of
of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine prima facie case.35 the right or failure to assert it and the prejudice caused by such delay.38

Petitioner insists that in view of the passage of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the review The importance of the review authority of the Secretary of Justice cannot be
authority of the Secretary of Justice after an information has been already filed in court may overemphasized; as earlier pointed out, it is based on the doctrine of exhaustion of
possibly transgress the right of a party to a speedy disposition of his case, in light of the administrative remedies that holds that "mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the
mandatory tenor of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 requiring that the accused must be initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected
arraigned within thirty (30) days from the filing of an information against him. Petitioner by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts."39
then impresses upon this Court that there is a need to reconcile the review authority of the
Secretary of Justice and the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, and submits that "the Secretary of We are not unmindful of the principle that while the right to a speedy trial secures rights to
Justice must review the appeal and rule thereon within a period of thirty (30) days from the the defendant, it does not preclude the rights of public justice.40 However, in this case,
date the information was filed or from the date the accused appeared in court (surrendered petitioner as private complainant in the criminal case, cannot deprive private respondent,
or arrested)"36 if only to give meaning to the Speedy Trial Act. accused therein, of her right to avail of a remedy afforded to an accused in a criminal case.

34
The immediate arraignment of private respondent would have then proscribed her right as "Section 12. Suspension of Arraignment. – The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the
accused to appeal the resolution of the prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice since Section time thereof:
4 of DOJ Order No. 223 of June 30, 1993 forestalls an appeal to the Secretary of Justice if
the accused/appellant has already been arraigned.41 Hence, in this case, the order (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
suspending the arraignment of private respondent merely allowed private respondent to renders him unable to fully understand the case against him and to plead intelligently
exhaust the administrative remedies available to her as accused in the criminal case before thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
the court could proceed to a full-blown trial. Conversely, in case the resolution is for the confinement for such purpose.
dismissal of the information, the offended party in the criminal case, herein petitioner, can
appeal the adverse resolution to the Secretary of Justice.42 In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, (b) The court finds the existence of a valid prejudicial question."
this Court aptly pointed out that:
There is nothing in the above-quoted provision that expressly or impliedly mandates that the
"the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused’s motion for review suspension of arraignment shall be limited to the cases enumerated therein. Moreover,
of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the jurisprudence has clearly established that the suspension of arraignment is not strictly limited
arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the to the two situations contemplated in said provision.53 In fine, no grave abuse of discretion
investigating prosecutor’s finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof attended the issuance of the assailed order suspending the arraignment of private
that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken therefrom to the Department respondent until her petition for review with the Secretary of Justice is resolved.
of Justice."43 (Emphasis ours)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The fact that public respondent issued the assailed order suspending the arraignment of
private respondent before the "Motion to Defer Arraignment" of private respondent could be
heard is not tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. It was well within the power of public
respondent to grant the continuance since Section 10 (f) of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998
clearly confers this authority.

Public respondent substantially complied with the requirement of Section 10 (f) of the Speedy
Trial Act when it stated its reasons for the deferment and eventual suspension of the
arraignment of private respondent in its orders dated September 24, 199944 and November
22, 199945 . In said orders, public respondent reasoned that the suspension of the
arraignment of private respondent was to give the opportunity to the accused to exhaust the
procedural remedies available,46 to allow the Secretary of Justice to review the resolution
of the City Prosecutor47 so as not to deprive the former of his power to review the action of
the latter by a precipitate trial of the case,48 and based on the discretionary power of the
trial judge to grant or deny the motion to suspend the arraignment of the accused pending
determination of her petition for review at the Department of Justice.49 Despite the absence
of a law or regulation prescribing the period within which the Secretary of Justice must
dispose of an appeal, the presumption still holds true that in the regular performance of his
functions, the Secretary of Justice will decide the appeal in the soonest possible time.
Recently, the Department of Justice issued Memorandum Order No. 12 dated July 3, 2000
mandating that the period for the disposition of appeals/petitions for review shall be 75
days.50 In view of this memorandum, the indefinite suspension of proceedings in the trial
court because of a pending petition for review with the Secretary of Justice is now unlikely
to happen.

Section 16 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court does entitle the offended party to intervene in
the criminal case if he has not waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to
institute it separately from the criminal action. However, the prosecution of the criminal case
through the private prosecutor is still under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor51 and such intervention must be with the permission of the public prosecutor.52
In this case, based on the power of control and supervision of the Secretary of Justice over
public prosecutors, the pendency of the appeal of private respondent with the Secretary of
Justice should have impelled the public prosecutor to move for the suspension of the
arraignment of private respondent. Considering that private respondent had already
informed the court of her appeal with the Secretary of Justice and had moved for the
suspension of her arraignment, the public prosecutor should have desisted from opposing
the abeyance of further proceedings.

Lastly, petitioner’s argument that the suspension of the arraignment in this case was in
violation of Section 12, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is likewise not
tenable. Section 12, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that:

35