Family structure, proximity and contact
Martin Kohli, Harald Künemund & Jörg Lüdicke
Chapter 4.1
of the SHARE First Results Book
January 24, 2005
[Link]@[Link]
kunemund@[Link]
[Link]@[Link]
Current societal dynamics are putting family relations, especially those along the
generational lineage, squarely on the political and scientific agenda (cf. Kohli, 2004;
Kohli & Künemund, 2005). Contemporary aging societies are age-graded and to a
large extent age-segregated societies. Their institutions tend to be age-homogeneous
(Uhlenberg & Riley, 2000). Exchange and support among generations is critical for
maintaining age integration. In this respect the family plays a special role – it is the
prototypical institution of age-heterogeneity. The family links lives far beyond the co-
residing nuclear unit, most prominently along the generational lineage. Moreover, the
demographics of aging societies – especially the increasing longevity and proportions
of elderly people – address new demands to the family and its functions, e.g., in terms
of support and care for the elderly. For societal welfare and welfare policy it becomes
vital to assess the current state of the family and its likely evolution.
Common themes and national differences
Families in Europe today present many features common to all countries as well as
massive differences among them. As to commonalities, we expect to find a weakening
of marriage with increasing age but stability of intergenerational bonds. As to
differences, we expect to find patterns of “weak” and “strong” family regimes.
Research on these themes is sometimes like fighting against windmills: raising
empirical arguments against myths that seem to remain untouched by them. It is
widely assumed that the modern welfare state has undermined family solidarity and
the family itself. Increasing childlessness and fewer births, decreasing marriage and
increasing divorce rates, increasing numbers of singles and the decrease of
multigenerational co-residence – to name just a few widely known facts – may indeed
indicate a weakening of the family and its functions. But despite the high intuitive
plausibility of such interpretations in which large parts of the social sciences meet
with common sense, it may turn out that the family has in fact changed but not
diminished its role (cf. Künemund & Rein, 1999).
Speculation about the future of the family has been a regular feature of modernization,
mostly with the assumption of a general decline of family bonds. This restrictive view
was first transcended by research on the emotional and support relations between
adult family generations. But it is only during the last decade that we have discovered
again the full extent of the family as a kinship and especially a generational system
beyond the nuclear household (Bengtson, 2001) which ranges across several different
types of “solidarity”: spatial and emotional closeness, frequent contact, personal and
instrumental support as well as massive flows of money and goods (cf. chapters 4.2
and 4.3). SHARE provides the first possibility to chart the family generations on a
European level.
The ambivalence of marriage
We first examine to what extent elderly Europeans are living together in bonds of
marriage. In recent decades, the institution of marriage has been weakened by
diminishing rates of ever getting married and increasing rates of divorce. Our findings
show that the current elderly have not yet been strongly touched by this evolution
(Figure 1 and Table 1). Among the 50-59 year olds 76 percent of the men and 71
percent of the women live in a married couple. There is a rise of divorce in the
younger cohorts but with ten percent of the 50-59 year olds currently divorced it is
still far below the levels of those now in their 30’s or 40’s. Some of them may
remarry in the future, so that the proportion of, e.g., divorced 60-69-year olds ten
years from now cannot be predicted solely on the basis of the evolution of divorce
rates. There is also a rising proportion of never-married men, while among women the
opposite patterns holds, with the oldest group having the largest proportion of never-
married (12 percent). – mainly due to the specific historical constellation of WWII
and its aftermath.
Figure 1: Marital status (percentages by age and gender)
100
Widowed
Divorced
80
Never married
Married, living separated from spouse
60
Registered partnership
Married and living together with spouse
40
20
0
9
9
+
+
-5
-6
-7
-5
-6
-7
80
80
50
60
70
50
60
70
Men Women
But the most drastic pattern is that associated with the death of the marriage partner.
The higher longevity of women – for life expectancy at birth it is currently about 7
years – and the fact that men in couples are on average about 3-4 years older than
their wives translate into highly divergent trajectories for the two sexes as they grow
older. The proportion of widowed men increases from 2 percent (50-59) to 30 percent
(80 and older), that of widowed women from 8 to 69 percent. As a result, 63 percent
of men but only 16 percent of women over 80 still live with a (married or registered)
spouse. In some countries this loss of the marital bond is even more marked; among
the women over 80 in Greece almost nine tenths are widowed, and only one tenth still
live in marriage.
The power of generations
The family nucleus thus loses its impact with increasing age, especially among
women. This is not the case, however, for the generational structure (Figure 2 and
Table 2). Even after several decades of low fertility most European elderly still have a
family that spans several generations. Only 11 percent have no other generation alive.
The proportion rises somewhat in the older groups, but is below 15 percent except for
the women above 80 where – due to the specific burdens mentioned above – it rises to
25 percent. The most frequent constellation – between 50 percent in Germany and 59
percent in Spain – is that of three generations. Four-generation families have a share
of 16 percent, while five-generation families remain at a fraction of a percent. Even
among the youngest group, the mean number of living children in all countries
remains above or close to 2; Germany has the lowest number with 1.68 (Table 3). The
‘second demographic transition’ to low fertility in Europe thus has not yet left its
mark on parenthood among our cohorts. It does show in grandparenthood, with very
low numbers among the youngest age group in some countries such as Greece, Spain,
and Italy, even though it is unclear how many of the ‘missing’ grandchildren will still
be born.
Figure 2: Generational constellations (percentages by country)
100
1 generation
2 generations
80
3 generations
≥ 4 generations
60
40
20
0
SE DK DE NL FR CH AT IT ES GR Total
How does this translate into actual exchange and support? The first question here is
about co-residence with and geographical proximity to these other generations. This is
the one piece of evidence that seems to support the ‘modernization’ claim: In all
Western societies, co-residence among adult family generations has decreased
massively. Today, among the Europeans above 70 who have at least one living child,
only 15 percent live together with a child in the same household (Table 4).But by
extending the boundaries of „togetherness“ the situation turns out to be very different.
If one includes parents and children living not only in the same household but also in
the same house, the proportion rises from 15 to 29 percent, and by including the
neighborhood less than 1 km away, to 49 percent. 84 percent have a child living not
farther away than 25 km. The preference now seems to be for ‘intimacy at a (small)
distance’ – small enough so that relations of exchange and support may function
easily across the boundaries of the separate households (cf. Kohli et al., 2000). Thus,
even the living arrangements are not very good evidence for the claim of a
dissociation between parents and adult children. A similar result applies to the
frequency of contact (Table 5).
Weak and strong family countries
In these dimensions, however, it is the variation among countries that comes into
focus. At the European level, there are considerable differences between Scandinavia,
Central and Western Continental countries, and those of the Mediterranean. The latter
are often grouped together as ‘strong family countries’, and contrasted with the ‘weak
family countries’ of the center and north of Europe and of North America (Reher,
1998). The strength or weakness refers to cultural patterns of family loyalties,
allegiances, and authority but also to demographic patterns of co-residence with adult
children and older family members and to organizing support for the latter. The
‘strong family countries’ have had high fertility in the past but today, paradoxically,
are those with the lowest fertility (Kohler et al., 2002) – a state of affairs that is
directly linked to the strength of their family tradition. While they have evolved, in
conjunction with the other advanced countries, towards higher gender equity in
education and the labor market, gender equity in the family and in public provisions
for the family remains low. The dominant model, both culturally and in terms of
welfare state incentives, is still that of the male breadwinner. The ensuing cultural lag
in gender equity between the ‘individual-centered’ and the ‘family-centered’ worlds
increasingly turns women away from motherhood (McDonald, 2000).
Figure 3: Proximity to nearest living child (percentages by country)
100
> 100 km
25-100 km
80
1 - 25 km
Less than 1 km
60
Same building
Same household
40
20
0
SE DK DE NL FR CH AT IT ES GR Total
As mentioned above, these trends have mostly not yet directly affected the SHARE
cohorts. For them – and therefore also for the elderly in the near future – the pattern
remains one of comparatively high marriage rates and low rates of childlessness. But
they are affected in an indirect way, through the decreasing prevalence of marriage
and childbearing among their children.
Our data demonstrate that there is not only a ‘weak’-‘strong’ dichotomy but a North-
South gradient, with the Scandinavian countries generally having the least traditional
family structure, the Mediterranean countries (Spain and Italy more so than Greece)
the most traditional one, and the other continental countries lying somewhere in-
between. This already shows for the variation in marital status, e.g., divorce (Table 1).
Denmark and Sweden are at the top with 13 and 12 percent currently divorced,
followed by Germany, Austria, France and Switzerland with 9 percent, the
Netherlands with 6 percent, Greece with 4 percent, and Italy and Spain with 2 percent.
Massive differences occur with respect to co-residence (Figure 3 and Table 4). The
Mediterranean countries are characterized by very late (and increasing) ages of
leaving the parental home among adult children. This is often interpreted solely as an
effect of opportunity structures (employment and housing markets), but the variation
among countries may also be explained by a cultural tendency towards closer
intergenerational ties. While we are not able at this point to differentiate between
those who have never left the parental home and those who have moved back later or
have had their parents moving closer (cf. Attias-Donfut & Renaut, 1994), the overall
proportions are striking. In Denmark and Sweden, 13 and 15 percent of our
respondents who have at least one living child live with a child in the same household,
in the ‘center’ countries this amounts to between 20 and 27 percent, but in Italy and
Spain to 49 and 52 percent. Moving beyond the boundaries of the household yields a
similar picture. Among the 50-59 year old Mediterraneans, more than three quarters
still have a child living at home with them. Among the oldest age group, the
proportions are smaller but the differences between countries even larger: only 1
percent of the oldest Swedes and 4 percent of Danes live with a child, compared to 23
percent of Italians and 34 percent of Spaniards.
As in all such comparisons, differences should of course not be examined at the level
of nation states only; there are important regional differences as well. In Italy and
Spain, differences between north and south in terms of variables such as co-residence
may be equally large as between countries, to the point where, e.g., Northern Italy
demographically may have more in common with other Western European countries
than with the mezzogiorno. Another case in point are differences between native and
migrant populations. In Germany, the mean number of grandchildren for our
respondents is 2.05 among those who on November 1, 1989, lived in West Germany,
2.96 among those who lived in the GDR, and 3.78 among those who lived abroad and
have migrated to Germany since then.
Figure 4: Frequency of contact to most contacted child (percentages by country)
100
Never
Once a month or less often
80
Once a week or every 2 weeks
Several times a week
60
Daily
40
20
0
SE DK DE NL FR CH AT IT ES GR Total
Similar results as for proximity obtain for frequency of contact with children and
parents. As a whole, they show that the adult generations in the family, even in
countries with comparatively weaker family traditions and larger geographical
distance, remain closely linked. Contact to the most contacted child (Figure 4 and
Table 5) is daily for 42 and 45 percent in Denmark and Sweden, respectively, and for
between 47 and 55 percent in the central countries; the Mediterranean countries stand
out with between 84 and 86 percent. In all countries 70 percent or more have contact
at least several times a week; in the Mediterranean countries, it is 95 percent or more.
There are those who have no contact at all to their living child or children but in no
country do they make up more than one percent. In the older age groups contact is less
frequent, but even among those over 80 at least three fifths (in Switzerland), and more
than nine tenths (in the Mediterranean countries) are in contact with a child daily or
several times a week.
Figure 5: Frequency of contact to most contacted parent (percentages by country)
100
Never
Once a month or less often
80
Once a week or every 2 weeks
Several times a week
60
Daily
40
20
0
SE DK DE NL FR CH AT IT ES GR Total
Contact with parents (Figure 5) is somewhat less frequent, partly because there are
often several children of which only one lives close to their parents (cf. Konrad et al.,
2002) and remains in close contact. There may also be some tendency to overreport
contact with children and/or underreport contact with parents – a response pattern
associated with the often-observed difference in the ‘developmental stake’ of parents
and children (Giarrusso et al., 1995). It should be noted that the numbers here are
restricted to own parents – parents-in-law are included only where they live in the
same household. As to differences between countries, the Mediterranean countries
again stand out, while there is no noticeable gap between Scandinavia and the
Continent. Switzerland has the lowest proportion of contact with parents at least
several times a week – corresponding to the fact that parents here most often live
farther away as a result of international migration.
What is to be concluded?
In conclusion, we emphasize four points:
• For present elderly Europeans the family has remained a strong provider of
institutional and everyday integration. The historical decline of marriage has
not yet reached them directly.
• The marriage bond weakens however with increasing age, and dramatically so
for women.
• On the other hand, the multi-generational structure of the family remains
stable. Even though co-residence of the elderly with their adult children has
decreased, geographical proximity – and thus the potential for everyday
support – is high. There are moreover high rates of frequent contact with each
other.
• While this is true for Western Europe as a whole, there are important
differences among the ‘strong family countries’ in the South and the ‘weak
family countries’ in the North. The North-South gradient is especially
noticeable with respect to rates of co-residence and frequency of contact
among adult family generations.
References
Attias-Donfut, C., and S. Renaut. 1994. Vieillir avec ses enfants - Corésidence de
toujours et recohabitation. Communications 59:29-53.
Bengtson, V. L. 2001. Beyond the nuclear family: The increasing importance of
multigenerational bonds. Journal of Marriage and the Family 63:1-16.
Giarrusso, R., V. L. Bengtson, and M. Stallings. 1994. The "intergenerational stake"
hypothesis revisited. Parent-child differences in perceptions of relationships 20 years
later. In Adult intergenerational relations, eds. V. L. Bengston, K. W. Schaie, and L.
M. Burton, 227-263. New York: Springer.
Kohler, H.-P., F. C. Billari, and J. A.o Ortega. 2002. The emergence of lowest-low
fertility in Europe during the 1990s. Population and Development Review 28:641-680.
Kohli, M. 2004. Intergenerational transfers and inheritance: A comparative view. In
Intergenerational relations across time and place (Annual Review of Gerontology and
Geriatrics, Vol. 24), ed. M. Silverstein, 266-289 . New York: Springer.
Kohli, M., and H. Künemund. 2005. The middle generation in the family: Patterns of
exchange and support. In Middle adulthood: A lifespan perspective, eds. S. L. Willis
and M. Martin. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Kohli, M., H. Künemund, [Link], and M. Szydlik. 2000. Generationenbeziehungen.
In Die zweite Lebenshälfte. Gesellschaftliche Lage und Partizipation im Spiegel des
Alters-Survey, eds. M. Kohli and H. Künemund, 176-211. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
Konrad, K. A., H. Künemund, K. E. Lommerud, and J. R. Robredo. 2002. Geography
of the family. American Economic Review 92:981-998.
Künemund, H., and M. Rein. 1999. There is more to receiving than needing:
Theoretical arguments and empirical explorations of crowding in and crowding out.
Ageing and Society 19:93-121.
McDonald, P. 2000. Gender equity, social institutions and the future of fertility.
Journal of Population Research 17:1-16.
Reher, D. S. 1998. Family ties in Western Europe: Persistent contrasts. Population
and Development Review 24:203-234.
Uhlenberg, P., and M. W. Riley. 2000. Essays on age integration. The Gerontologist
40:261-308.
