G.R. No.
188921 April 18, 2012
LEO C. ROMERO and DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO and VITTORIO C. ROMERO, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, praying for the reversal of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 14 April 2009 and the subsequent Resolution dated 21
1 2
July 2009.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioners which alleged
grave abuse of discretion in the Resolutions dated 14 December 2007 and 29 January 2008 issued
by Judge Maria Susana T. Baua in her capacity as presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The said Resolutions dismissed petitioners’ complaint against private
respondents Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero.
Petitioners allege that upon their father’s death on 18 October 1974, their mother, respondent Aurora
Romero, was appointed as legal guardian who held several real and personal properties in trust for
her children. Since that year until the present, she continues to be the administrator of the
3
properties, businesses, and investments comprising the estate of her late husband.
Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that several Deeds of Sale were
registered over parcels of land that are purportedly conjugal properties of their parents. These
included the following real and personal properties:
1. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-G of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995 situated in Barrio
Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of one thousand square
meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 16142 and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 290013 in the name of Vittorio C. Romero. A warehouse stands on the lot, covered by
Declaration of Real Property No. 16142.
2. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-D of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995 situated in Barrio
Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of one thousand square
meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 405, and TCT No. 77223 in the name of
Spouses Dante Y. Romero and Aurora Cruz-Romero.
3. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-E of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995 situated in Barrio
Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of one thousand square
meters under Declaration of
Real Property No. 407 and TCT No. 77224 in the names of Spouses Dante Y. Romero and
Aurora Cruz-Romero.
4. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-H of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995 situated in Barrio
Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of one thousand square
meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 406, and TCT No. 77225 in the name of
Spouses Dante Y. Romero and Aurora Cruz-Romero.
5. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3815-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-227224 situated in Barrio
Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of four hundred ninety-four
square meters under TCT No. 113514 in the name of Aurora Cruz vda. de Romero.
6. A parcel of land located in Barangay Burgos, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an
area of more or less three hundred seventy-nine square meters under Declaration of Real
Property No. 16136. It is not yet registered under Act 496 or the Old Spanish Mortgage Law,
but registrable under Act 3344 as amended. The improvement thereon, a building classified
as a warehouse, is covered by Declaration of Real Property No. 16136 A.
7. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Burgos, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of
more or less two hundred four square meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 16139.
It is not yet registered under Act 496 or Act 3344 as amended. The improvement thereon is
covered by Declaration of Real Property No. 16140.
8. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an
area of more or less eleven thousand six hundred forty-six square meters under Declaration
of Real Property No. 724 and TCT No. 284241 in the name of Aurora P. Cruz vda. de
Romero.
9. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an
area of more or less one thousand two hundred fifty-six square meters under Declaration of
Real Property No. 725 and TCT No. 284242 in the name of Aurora P. Cruz vda. de Romero. 4
Petitioners claim that sometime in August of 2005, their brother Vittorio – through fraud,
misrepresentation and duress – succeeded in registering the above-mentioned properties in his
name through of Deeds of Sale executed by their mother, Aurora. Vittorio allegedly employed force
5
and threat upon her, and even administered drugs that rendered her weak and vulnerable. Thus,
Aurora signed the Deeds of Sale without reading or knowing their contents.
On 18 December 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Nullification of Title, and
Conveyance of Title (Amended) against private respondents Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C.
6
Romero. Respondents filed their Answer, arguing that the properties in question were acquired long
after the death of their father, Judge Dante Romero; hence, the properties cannot be considered
conjugal. They allege that the lots covered by TCT Nos. 290010, 290011, 113514, and Tax
Declaration Nos. 16136 and 11639 were paraphernal properties of Aurora which she had
mortgaged. Vittorio purportedly had to shell out substantial amounts in order to redeem them. The
lots covered by TCT Nos. 77223, 77224, and 77225 were sold by Aurora herself as attorney-in-fact
of her children on 23 November 2006, since her authority to do so had never been revoked or
modified.
On 14 December 2007, the RTC rendered its Resolution dismissing petitioners’ complaint, stating
thus:
xxx(T)he case under Special Proceedings No. 5185 remains pending in that no distribution of the
assets of the estate of the late Dante Y. Romero, nor a partition, has been effected among his
compulsory heirs. Thus, the contending claims of plaintiffs and defendants in this case could not be
adjudicated nor passed upon by this Court without first getting a definitive pronouncement from the
intestate court as to the share of each of the heirs of the late Dante Y. Romero in his estate.
Even the claim of defendant Aurora C. Romero that some of the properties being claimed by
plaintiffs in this case are her own, the same being paraphernal, is an issue which must be taken up
and established in the intestate proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)
7
The RTC denied their Motion for Reconsideration, citing Section 3, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
which bars an heir or a devisee from maintaining an action to recover the title or possession of lands
until such lands have actually been assigned. The court ruled that "plaintiffs must first cause the
termination of Special Proceedings No. 5185 to its logical conclusion before this case could be
entertained by the Court." 8
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in rendering the said Resolutions,
petitioners filed for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. On 14 April 2009, the CA rendered the
assailed judgment dismissing the Petition, ruling that the properties involved in this case are part of
the estate left to the heirs of Judge Romero, the partition of which is already subject of an intestate
proceeding filed on 6 January 1976 in the then Court of First Instance (CFI). The CA based its
9
judgment on the findings of the RTC that the inventory of the estate of Judge Romero submitted to
the CFI included the same parties, properties, rights and interests as in the case before it.
Petitioners now come to us on a Rule 45 Petition, arguing that the probate court may rule on issues
pertaining to title over property only in a provisional capacity. They assert that the CA erred in
dismissing their appeal, just because the intestate proceeding has not yet terminated. Petitioners, as
heirs, are purportedly allowed to exercise their option of filing a separate civil action in order to
protect their interests.
Thus, the singular issue in the case at bar is whether or not petitioners in this case may file a
separate civil action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of title, despite the pendency of the
settlement proceedings for the estate of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero.
Ruling of the Court
The probate court has jurisdiction to determine the issues in the present case
Petitioners assert that the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a probate or intestate court relates only to
matters having to do with the settlement of the estate of deceased persons or the appointment of
executors, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. They cite Ongsingco v. Tan, Baybayan v. Aquino and several cases which state that
10 11 12
when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased
person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance
from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, the intestate court has
no jurisdiction to adjudicate these questions. Petitioners conclude that the issue of ownership of the
properties enumerated in their Petition and included in the inventory submitted by respondent Aurora
Romero to the intestate court, must be determined in a separate civil action to resolve title. 13
The rulings in Ongsingco and Baybayan are wholly inapplicable, as they both arose out of facts
different from those in the case at bar. Baybayan involved a summary settlement for the estate of the
decedent, in which a parcel of land representing the share of decedent’s nephews and nieces was
already covered by a TCT under the name of a third party. To defeat the writ of partition issued by
the probate court, the third party, petitioners Baybayan et al., had to file a separate civil action for
quieting of their title and for damages. The issue before the Court then devolved upon the propriety
of the probate court’s order to amend the Complaint for quieting of title before the regular court.
More importantly, Baybayan pertained to a civil action involving third parties who were not heirs, and
not privy to the intestate proceedings in the probate court. The present action was instituted
precisely by heirs of Judge Romero, against their brother, who is also an heir, and their mother, who
is the administrator of the estate.
In Coca v. Borromeo, this Court allowed the probate court to provisionally pass upon the issue of
14
title, precisely because the only interested parties are all heirs to the estate, subject of the
proceeding, viz:
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a
jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which
may be waived."
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the testate or
intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule has
qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its
final determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of
title should be ventilated in a separate action.
Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare
portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from (the) inventory. The only interested
parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding. (Citations omitted.)
15
While it is true that a probate court’s determination of ownership over properties which may form part
of the estate is not final or ultimate in nature, this rule is applicable only as between the
representatives of the estate and strangers thereto. Indeed, as early as Bacquial v. Amihan, the 16
court stated thus:
xxx The rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their
interests are allowed to do so protect the same, but not for a decision on their action. In the case
of In re Estate of the deceased Paulina Vasquez Vda. de Garcia, Teresa Garcia vs. Luisa Garcia, et
al., 67 Phil., 353, this court held:
A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to
determine whether or not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to
the deceased, although such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice
to the right of interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question on the ownership or
existence of the right or credit.
To this same effect are rulings in various states of the United States.
* * * That the probate court is without jurisdiction to try the title to property as between the
representatives of an estate and strangers thereto is too well established by the authorities to require
argument.
There is also authority abroad that where the court is without jurisdiction to determine questions of
title, as for example, as between the estate and persons claiming adversely, its orders and
judgments relating to the sale do not render the issue of title res judicata. (Citations omitted,
17
emphasis supplied.)
In any case, there is no merit to petitioners’ claim that the issues raised in the case at bar pertain to
title and ownership and therefore need to be ventilated in a separate civil action. The issue before
the court is not really one of title or ownership, but the determination of which particular properties
should be included in the inventory of the estate. In Civil Case No. 18757, the RTC has listed the
properties alleged by petitioners to have been conjugal properties of their parents and, therefore,
part of the estate that was illegally sold to the respondent. Some of these real properties identified
seem to be the same real properties that form part of the inventory of the estate in the intestate
proceedings. 18
Not only do petitioners assert their legal interest as compulsory heirs, they also seek to be the
owners, pro indiviso, of the said properties. To anchor their claim, they argue that the properties are
conjugal in nature and hence form part of their inheritance. For his defense, Vittorio contends that
the lots are the paraphernal properties of Aurora that she had mortgaged, and that Vittorio
subsequently redeemed.
In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court declared that the determination of whether a
19
property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests with
the probate court:
xxx (T)he jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding the
ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized to be vested in probate
courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of the
estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means
determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. Thereafter,
distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him.
The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which each party is required to bring into
the mass whatever community property he has in his possession. To this end, and as a necessary
corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the ownership of the properties in
dispute. All the heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before the court,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents necessary to the complete
settlement of such estate, so long as no interests of third parties are affected.
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the
properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively.
This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate
the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed
among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings. xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
20
In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties subject of the allegedly illegal sale are
conjugal and constitute part of their share in the estate. To date, there has been no final inventory of
the estate or final order adjudicating the shares of the heirs. Thus, only the probate court can
competently rule on whether the properties are conjugal and form part of the estate. It is only the
probate court that can liquidate the conjugal partnership and distribute the same to the heirs, after
the debts of the estate have been paid.
Section 3, Rule 87 bars petitioners from filing the present action
Petitioners next contend that even if the probate court has the power to rule on their Complaint, the
submission of the issues in this case to the probate court is merely optional, and not mandatory
upon them. Hence, they argue, they still have the right to bring these issues in a separate civil
action, if they so choose. They argue further that Section 3, Rule 87 of the Revised Rules of Court is
not applicable to the present case.
The said provision states that:
Sec. 3. Heir may not sue until share assigned. – When an executor or administrator is appointed and
assumes the trust, no action to recover the title or possession of lands or for damages done to such
lands shall be maintained against him by an heir or devisee until there is an order of the court
assigning such lands to such heir or devisee or until the time allowed for paying debts has expired.
Petitioners believe that the above rule is subject to certain exceptions. They invoke the doctrine that
while heirs have no standing in court to sue for the recovery of property of the estate represented by
an administrator, these heirs may maintain such action if the administrator is unwilling to bring the
suit, or has allegedly participated in the act complained of.
On this contention, petitioners’ theory must again fail. There is nothing on the record that would
prove that Aurora defied the orders of the probate court or entered into sale agreements in violation
of her trust. In fact, petitioners are really accusing a co-heir, their brother Vittorio, of having acquired
certain properties which they allege to be properties of their parents.
Even if we assume the property to be conjugal and thus, part of the estate, Aurora Romero’s acts as
the administrator of the estate are subject to the sole jurisdiction of the probate court. In Acebedo v.
Abesamis, the Court stated:
21
In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, this Court made a pronouncement that it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter should be
threshed out in a separate action.
The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of
an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be
made with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate
court.22
Again, petitioners do not pose issues pertaining to title or ownership. They are, in effect, questioning
the validity of the sales made by the administrator, an issue that can only be properly threshed out
by the probate court. Paragraph 13 of petitioners’ Complaint alleges as follows:
13. The purported transfers and sales executed by Defendant Aurora C. Romero to and in favor of
Defendant Vittorio C. Romero are nullities since all were simulated, entered into without the intent
and volition of Defendant Aurora C. Romero, attended by force, intimidation, duress and fraud and
not supported with any valid or sufficient consideration and with the sole depraved intentions of
depriving the other compulsory heirs of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero of their rightful share in the
estate. (Emphasis omitted.)
23
Indeed, implicit in the requirement for judicial approval of sales of property under administration is
the recognition that the probate court has the power to rescind or nullify the disposition of a property
under administration that was effected without its authority. That petitioners have the prerogative of
24
choosing where to file their action for nullification – whether with the probate court or the regular
court – is erroneous. As held in Marcos, II v. Court of Appeals:
xxx (T)he authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with limited jurisdiction, as a probate
court over the estate of deceased individual, is not a trifling thing. The court's jurisdiction, once
invoked, and made effective, cannot be treated with indifference nor should it be ignored with
impunity by the very parties invoking its authority.
In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve
the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication; to
determine who are the heirs of the decedent; the recognition of a natural child; the status of a
woman claiming to be the legal wife of the decedent; the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the
testator; and to pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights. (Citations omitted.)
25
Thus, the validity of the sales made by Aurora, allegedly orchestrated by petitioners’ co-heir, Vittorio,
can only be determined by the probate court, because it is the probate court which is empowered to
identify the nature of the property, and that has jurisdiction over Aurora’s actions and dispositions as
administrator. In Peñaverde v. Peñaverde, the Court even adjudged the petitioners guilty of forum-
26
shopping for filing a separate civil action despite the pendency of the said petitioners’ own case
seeking that letters of administration be granted to them. Similar to the case at bar, the petitioners in
Peñaverde also sought the annulment of titles in the name of their co-heir:
The two cases filed by petitioners are: (1) Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471, which seeks letters of
administration for the estate of Mariano Peñaverde; and (2) Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which seeks
the annulment of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Mariano Peñaverde and the
annulment of titles in his name as well as the reopening of the distribution of his estate.
Evidently, in filing Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471, petitioners sought to share in the estate of Mariano,
specifically the subject land previously owned in common by Mariano and his wife, [Link] is
also what they hoped to obtain in filing Civil Case No. Q-95-24711.
Indeed, a petition for letters of administration has for its object the ultimate distribution and partition
of a decedent's estate. This is also manifestly sought in Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which precisely
calls for the "Reopening of Distribution of Estate" of Mariano Peñaverde. In both cases, petitioners
would have to prove their right to inherit from the estate of Mariano Peñaverde, albeit indirectly, as
heirs of Mariano's wife, Victorina.1âwphi1
Under the circumstances, petitioners are indeed guilty of forum-shopping.
x x x x x x x x x
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the parties to Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471 and Civil Case
No. Q-95-24711 are identical. There is also no question that the rights asserted by petitioners in both
cases are identical, i.e., the right of succession to the estate of their aunt, Victorina, wife of Mariano.
Likewise, the reliefs prayed for --- to obtain their share in the estate of Mariano --- are the same,
such relief being founded on the same facts ---their relationship to Mariano's deceased wife,
Victorina.
27
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. As the properties herein are already subject of an
intestate proceeding filed on 6 January 1976, the 14 April 2009 judgment of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 104025 finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012
LEO C. ROMERO AND DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO VS. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO AND VITTORIO C.
ROMERO
FACTS: Petitioners allege that upon their father’s death, their mother,
respondent Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal guardian who held
several real and personal properties in trust for her children. Since that
year until the present, she continues to be the administrator of the
properties, businesses, and investments comprising the estate of her late
husband. Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that
several Deeds of Sale were registered over parcels of land that are
purportedly conjugal properties of their parents. Petitioners claim that their
brother Vittorio – through fraud, misrepresentation and duress – succeeded
in registering properties in his name. Petitioners filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Sale, Nullification of Title, and Conveyance of Title. This was
denied by the trial court on the ground that it could not be adjudicated
without first getting a definitive pronouncement from the intestate
court as to the share of each of the heirs
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal was correct.
RULING: Yes. In any case, there is no merit to petitioners’ claim that the
issues raised in the case at bar pertain to title and ownership and therefore
need to be ventilated in a separate civil action. The issue before the court is
not really one of title or ownership, but the determination of which
particular properties should be included in the inventory of the estate. Not
only do petitioners assert their legal interest as compulsory heirs, they also
seek to be the owners, pro indiviso, of the said properties. To anchor their
claim, they argue that the properties are conjugal in nature and hence form
part of their inheritance. In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court declared that the determination of whether a property is conjugal or
paraphernal for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the
estate rests with the probate court.
G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA
MANALO ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35),
PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN,
ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA
MANALO, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et. Al., seeking
to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of the Regional Trial Court
and the Resolution 4 which denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February
14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita
M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M.
Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who
are all of legal age.
1âwphi1.nêt
At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in
Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's
Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45 General
Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late
Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda
filed a petition 6 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of the judicial settlement of the
estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo,
as administrator thereof.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on
February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of
the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order
'declaring the whole world in default, except the government," and set the reception of evidence of
the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of
general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo,
Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10) days within which to file their opposition
to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the
filling of an Omnibus Motion8 on July 23, 1993 seeking; (1) to seat aside and reconsider the Order of
the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time file
opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of
the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the
oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order9 which resolved, thus:
A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993,
only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses
as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and
immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present proceeding;
C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;
E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the
intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after the trial court in its Order 10 dated September 15,
1993. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the
intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members
of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its
Resolution11 promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of
the said resolution was likewise dismissed.12
The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court
which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate
despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise
involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filling of the petition but that the
same have failed.
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil
action involving members of the same family. They point out that it contains certain averments,
which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:
X X X
Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father,
TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the properties
of the deceased father TROADIO MANALO.
Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties
aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage xxx.
X X X
Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the
deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and prejudice of the
herein petitioners and their co-heirs xxx.
X X X
Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring
this suit and were forced to litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur expenses of
not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay
P200,000.00 as and attorney's fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court
xxx.13
Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section
1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed
on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with, that is, that
the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made involving members of the same family prior to the filling of
the petition pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar,
shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that
the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional
facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death
of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the
time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within he country are
foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate
rest.17 The petition is [Link] No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his
legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be
settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no
room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek
judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit;
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:
a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO
for the administration of the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a
bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.
b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been inventoried
and expenses and just debts, if any, have been paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully
determined, that the said estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed among the
legal heirs all in accordance with law.
c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and
attorney's fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance
in court in the hearing and trial of this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against
ANTONIO MANALO.18
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be
typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the
said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial
court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and
compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and
costs 19 in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its
dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil
Code.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as
irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a
probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20 and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters
and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule
has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an
action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the
answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or
its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem.21 So it should be in the instant petition for
settlement of estate.
Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered
as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of
the Rules of Court vis-à-vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply
as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which
provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.'
Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily include special
proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of
Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio
Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from
the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court
of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an
injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed
in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably
reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil
actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between
members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a
compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is know
that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than stranger.25
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No.
92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for
issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-
63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 26 the petitioners therein (private respondents herein)
merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as
among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the
settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special
jurisdiction of the probate court.
1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, JJ., concur.
RULE 72Pilar Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 129242, January 16, 2001
FACTS: Troadio Manalo died intestate and was survived by his wife, petitioner Pilar Manalo and 11
children. He left several real properties located in Manila and Tarlac including a business with offices at
Quezon City and Valenzuela. Herein respondents, who are 8 of the surviving children, filed a petition
with the RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father. On the date set for
hearing of the petition, the RTC issued an order declaring the whole world in default, except the
government. However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of
herein petitioners. The latter filed an omnibus motion which was later denied by the trial court. On
appeal to CA, petitioners argued that there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among
members of the same family as stated under Art. 151 of the Family Code, but it was also dismissed.
Hence, the present case.
ISSUE:Is the petition for the judicial settlement of the estate an ordinary civil action requiring Art. 151 of
the Family Code prior the filing of the petition?
HELD: NO. In the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the
character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition shall be controlling. As a rule, Art. 151 of the
Family Code, which requires members of the same family there must be a verified allegation of earnest
efforts at compromise, applies only to ordinary civil actions, but not to a special proceeding, like a
petition for judicial settlement of estate, which is imply for the establishment of a status, right, or
particular fact. It must be emphasized that the petitioners are not being sued in said petition for any
cause of action as no defendant was impleaded therein. Respondents merely seek to establish the fact
of death of their father and be duly recognized as heirs so that they can validly exercise their right to
participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate.
