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129 views27 pages

AS15 031JS12 Lec17 2 PDF

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Ty Phan
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
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(Yesterday’s &) Today’s

Electric Power System

Lecture 17

1
eDMP: 14.43 / 15.031 / 21A.341 / 11.161
In 2010 Electricity Used 40% of Primary Energy,
Produced About 40% of CO2 Emissions; 74% to
Residential + Commercial, Supplied 46% of Energy

© Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from 2
our Creative Commons license. For more information, see [Link]
This Session and the Next

• Today:
 Essential features of electric power systems
 History & current status of the US system

• Next Monday:
 Challenges facing the system looking forward
 Opportunities provided by new technologies
 Live policy issues, being debated now

3
Key Features of Electric Power Systems
• Output is essentially not storable
 Pumped hydro, compressed air are used, but expensive

• Demand varies over time, not perfectly predicable


 Most US systems are now summer peaking, even NE

4
Graph of 2009-2010 peak forecast removed due to copyright restrictions.

5
Key Features of Electric Power Systems
• Output is essentially not storable
 Pumped hydro, compressed air are used, but expensive

• Demand varies over time, not perfectly predicable


 Most US systems are now summer peaking
 Considerable short-term variation within days

6
Graph of forecast load and actual load removed due to copyright restrictions.

7
Key Features of Electric Power Systems
• Output is essentially not storable
 Pumped hydro, compressed air are used, but expensive

• Demand varies over time, not perfectly predicable


 Most US systems are now summer-peaking
 Considerable short-term variation within days
 Frequency normally maintained by automatic control at
designated “load-following” units – not nukes or coal

• Since capacity used varies, it is efficient to mix


technologies. Suppose only two (classic) types:
 Baseload units (nuclear, coal) have high fixed (capital) cost,
low marginal (mainly fuel) cost – run as much as possible
 Peaking units (gas turbine, diesel) have relatively low fixed
costs, higher marginal cost – run only when needed
8
Coal/Nuclear baseload plants generally
huge; CCGT/gas turbines can be small

Generally baseload plants


run flat out when they run;
other plants can more easily
vary output to follow load
Photo by NRC and Jim Champion on Wikipedia Commons.

9
Consider two plants with equal capacities:
If plan to run < H* hours, the peaker is cheaper

Total
Cost

baseload

peaker

H* hours run =
10
kwh/capacity
Load Duration Curve for Britain, Continuing Two-
Technology Example; Optimal Mix (Stylized!!)

Peaker
capacity

Baseload
capacity

H*/8760
© The National Grid Company. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our
11
Creative Commons license. For more information, see [Link]
Many technologies, costs; “economic dispatch”
= turn on lowest marginal cost units first

Graph of 2008 supply curve for lower 48 NERC regions removed due to copyright restrictions.

12
Grid Architecture & Features
• Transmission & distribution generally viewed as
natural monopolies; inefficient to have two systems

13
Natural Monopoly & Its Problems
• Natural monopoly: having more than one supplier
would raise costs (significantly)
 Sub-additivity: C(X1 + X2) < C(X1) + C(X2) for all X vectors
 Global scale economies sufficient:

• What problems do natural


monopolies pose?
 Competition not viable (cable?)
 Prices above costs (deadweight
loss triangles)
 Costs likely too high (rectangles,
potentially larger)
 If products are necessities, poor → rich transfers

14
“Solutions” to Natural Monopoly
• Several policy types have been employed to deal with
natural monopolies – Examples? Characteristics?
 Government ownership (EU, LADWP, MBTA – eventually;
incentives to control employment, costs?)
 Regulation by local contract (early streetcars, buses, etc.)
 Cost-plus or rate-of-return regulation (US early 20th century
innovation; controls profits, but not costs)
 “Incentive” regulation (RPI-X; gives incentives between
infrequent reviews, but prices can get out of whack)
 Franchise bidding (compete for the market, but hard to have
fair bidding for renewals)
 Cooperatives (like the COOP, owned by their customers)

• All these become “political” in practice; none perfect


• Economists often argue for limiting their scope for efficiency
15
Grid Architecture & Features
• Transmission & distribution generally viewed as
natural monopolies; inefficient to have two systems

• Low-voltage distribution to customers: mainly a tree


structure, one path from transmission to load

• High voltage transmission from generation: a mesh


structure, generally many paths from A to B
 Reliability (within & between utilities) a key motivation, but
multiple paths cost more
 Current flows on ALL paths from A to B, with loadings
depending on impedance – Kirchhoff’s laws, not pipes
 Individual lines have stability, thermal capacities: exceeding
thermal capacity causes over-heating, sag, failure
 Increasing generation at A and load at B may cause
transmission lines elsewhere to congest – “loop flow”
16
Transmission: 3 “Interconnects”, 170k Miles;
Eastern 73%, Western 19%, ERCOT 8% of Sales

Map of power grids across the US in 2004 removed due to copyright restrictions.

17
Early history, State Regulation
• 1882: Edison’s Pearl Street Station, 100v DC to 59
nearby lighting customers
• 1880s: More local DC systems, “regulation” by
municipal franchise; concessions for use of streets
• Municipal systems (LA, Belmont), peaked at 8% of
generation in 1900 – like transit, water, etc
• 1896: Westinghouse uses AC + transformers (new) to
send power from Niagara Falls to Buffalo; AC wins
• Transmission enables geographic expansion, state
“public utility” regulation spreads from 1907
• In Europe, government firms came to dominate – Why?
18
A Federal Role Emerges
• 1906: Start selling (Cheap! Why?) surplus power from
irrigation projects, preference for municipals
• 1900-29: 14%/year growth(!), interstate holding
companies formed to drive stocks, evade regulation
• 1920: FPC (now FERC) deals with hydro (waterways
are federal), wholesale power regulation from 1935
• 1935: PUHCA outlaws multi-area holding companies,
freezes vertically integrated monopoly structure
• 1930s: Rural electric coops created, get preferential
access to cheap power from federal dams (e.g., TVA)
• 1950: Federal generation was 12% of US total
19
Characteristics of State Regulation
• Utilities: monopoly service areas (esp. post-PUHCA);
commissions: require “just & reasonable” rates

• “Rate of return” regulation: set prices so utility would


earn “fair rate of return” on investment – cost plus

• How/why might this system perform badly?


 Costs too high because no discipline
 Gold-plating (A-J) because more capital  more profit
 “Capture,” since utility is organized but consumers aren’t
 No incentive to make prices reflect cost differences over time;
differences among customers reflected politics not cost

• Why few complaints until the 1970s?


 Rapid technical change drove real prices down until then
20
An Alternative Model Appears
• 1970s: Pressures for change build
 Deregulation of wellhead natural gas, airlines, railroads,
interstate trucking lead to price reductions
 Electricity: fuel cost increases slowed demand, led to excess
generation capacity for which ratepayers must pay

• 1978: PURPA required utilities to buy from


renewables, CHP units at regulated “avoided cost”

• Early 1980s: “Why not just deregulate electricity?”


 Joskow & Schmalensee 1983,, Markets for Power: some
scope for competition, special features mean care is needed

• 1990: Privatization, vertical disintegration in England


and Wales: wholesale markets, independent grid!!
21
The US Starts to Follow, But Hits a Wall

• 1992-96: EPA expands FERC authority, FERC requires


transmission systems to be “common carriers”

• 1999: FERC enables independent grid operators (ISOs


& RTOs) with wholesale markets, some implement
• 2000-01: Prices in the CA market, which began in
1998, explode; blackouts; Enron…

• Post-California: Movement toward reform stops;


pressure to reverse in areas where capacity is tight

• Will discuss current state of play next time

22
The New, Market-Centric Model
• Competition in generation has worked elsewhere,
though need to deal with market power
 Has continued in England & Wales, now the core EU policy,
in several Latin American countries (Chile since 1982!),
 And for about 2/3 of US consumers, including New England

23
Coverage of ISO/RTO Markets (Approx)

Lots of
federal power,
preference
customers

Traditional
model

© The ISO/RTO Council. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative
Commons license. For more information, see [Link] 24
Graph of average wholesale prices removed due to copyright restrictions.

25
The Current Structure (Approx)
• 2/3 of US customers & load in ISO/RTO areas
• Transmission: about 450 entities own parts; 66%
investor-owned
• Distribution:
 2,200 publicly owned (munis, feds), 16%
 820 cooperatives, 10%
 242 Investor-owned, 66%
 Retail competitors (no wires), 8%

• Generation (huge change since 1980):


 Govt systems (incl. TVA) & coops, 16%
 Investor-owned utilities (with retail sales), 42%
 Independent producers (without retail sales), 42%
26
MIT OpenCourseWare
[Link]

15.031J / 14.43J / 21A.341J / 11.161J Energy Decisions, Markets, and Policies


Spring 2012

For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit: [Link]

Common questions

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State regulation originally helped establish public utility standards and control local electric utilities, promoting regional stability. Over time, federal roles emerged, such as the FPC (now FERC), expanding interstate regulations and addressing cross-state transmission. Key federal actions included legal frameworks like the PUHCA, fostering organized growth and managing conflicts between state policies and national interests. Federal interventions also enabled access to federal power resources, as seen in rural electric cooperatives benefiting from federal dams .

Baseload units, including nuclear and coal plants, have high fixed and low marginal costs, making them economically efficient for continuous operation to provide steady, base-level energy supply. Peaking units, such as gas turbines, have lower fixed but higher marginal costs and are utilized during peak demand periods. The optimal strategy involves running baseload plants continuously to cover consistent needs, while activating peaking units only as demand surpasses baseload capacity, thereby minimizing costs and maximizing system efficiency .

Key pressures leading to the consideration of deregulating the electricity market included rising fuel costs, which slowed demand and led to excess generation capacity. There was a growing recognition of inefficiencies under traditional regulatory frameworks and the success of deregulation in other industries, such as natural gas, airlines, and trucking. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, which required utilities to purchase energy from renewable and cogeneration sources, also prompted a reevaluation of market structures, ultimately pushing for increased competition and market-driven approaches .

The history of US electric power systems has significantly influenced current regulatory and operational structures. Initially, Edison’s Pearl Street Station began local DC systems in the 1880s. The transition to AC by Westinghouse in 1896 facilitated geographic expansion and led to state 'public utility' regulation. The 1935 PUHCA legislation established monopoly zones. Over time, pressures for deregulation arose, especially during the 1970s due to rising fuel costs, culminating in legislative changes like the 1978 PURPA, which encouraged competition from renewable sources. Post-1990s, reforms included the dismantling of vertically integrated monopolies, the creation of ISOs and RTOs, and expanded FERC authority .

'Rate of return' regulation was initially effective in ensuring utilities earned a fair return on investments by setting rates to cover costs. However, it faced criticism from the 1970s as it encouraged inefficiencies such as 'gold-plating,' where utilities invested in excessive capital to increase profits without incentives for cost control or operational efficiency. Additionally, the absence of competitive pressures allowed costs and prices to rise unchecked, as seen during periods of technical stagnation and rising fuel costs .

Electric power transmission and distribution are considered natural monopolies because it is inefficient to have competition in these areas due to high infrastructure costs and sub-additivity, where the cost of a single firm producing the entire output is lower than multiple firms. Challenges include the inability to sustain competition, leading to potential prices above costs, inefficient high costs, and socioeconomic disparities. Solutions proposed include government ownership, regulation by contracts, cost-plus regulation, incentive regulation, franchise bidding, and customer-owned cooperatives. Each solution has complexities and often becomes political, with economists sometimes advocating for limiting their scope to ensure efficiency .

Independent grid operators, ISOs and RTOs, have facilitated the development of wholesale electricity markets, enabling competition in generation and ensuring open access to transmission lines for all market participants. They have been instrumental in maintaining grid reliability and market efficiency. However, they face challenges such as potential market power abuse, the complexity of managing diverse stakeholders, and ensuring adequate investment in grid infrastructure. The 2000-01 CA energy crisis highlighted issues of market manipulation, leading to regulatory and operational adjustments to prevent recurrence .

Electric power outputs are essentially not storable due to the nature of electricity which requires immediate consumption and cannot be directly stored in large quantities. The issue of non-storability is managed by employing expensive solutions like pumped hydro or compressed air systems. Furthermore, electricity systems often have varying demand that is not perfectly predictable, necessitating the use of diverse technologies within power systems to efficiently match supply and demand. Baseload units, such as nuclear and coal plants with high fixed and low marginal costs, run continuously, whereas peaking units, like gas turbines, are used only during high demand periods to optimize efficiency .

The dual ownership structure, with about 66% of transmission owned by investor-owned entities and a mixed distribution landscape, poses challenges like potential conflicting interest between profit motives and public service obligations. This can create discrepancies in investment priorities between transmission and distribution, leading to reliability and service quality issues. In the broader system, this reflects a complex architecture with a mix of public, private, and cooperative ownership that requires coordination to ensure seamless operation and market efficiency across diverse entities .

RTO/ISO market coverage has a significant role in enhancing electricity market efficiency and reliability for about two-thirds of US consumers. These operators facilitate competitive wholesale markets and ensure consistent load distribution across regions, improving access and reducing costs through economies of scale. However, the impact varies by region, and such markets require regulatory oversight to prevent market power abuses and ensure equitable access to transmission infrastructure .

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