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N A S A TECHNICAL NOTE NASA TN 0-7920 1

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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT -

SPACECRAFT RELATIVE MOTION
AND RECONTACT ANALYSES

Robert E. McAdams, Chdrles J. Gott,

and Afmland L. Wi'llidmson
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texus 77058

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS A N D SPACE A D M I N I S T R A T I O N W A S H I N G T O N , D. C. APRIL 1975

 -
1. Report No. 2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No.
NASA TN D-7920
5. Report Date
April 1975
6. Performing Organization Code
JSC- 04521
7. Authorb) 8. Performing Organization Report No.
Robert E . McAdams, Charles J. Gott, and JSC S-421
Marland L. Williamson
10. Work Unit No.
9. Performing Organization Name and Address 942-22-20-00-72
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 1 1 . Contract or Grant No.
Houston, Texas 77058
13. Type of Report and Period Covered
2. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address Technical Note
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 14. Sponsoring Agency Code
Washington, D. C. 20546

5. Supplementary Notes

8. Abmact

Potential collision o r accidental recontact problems between the spacecraft and other space
vehicles (or components) existed during most of the Apollo missions. These problems were
identified before each Apollo flight, and appropriate solutions for eliminating o r minimizing the
chance of collision were determined through relative motion analyses. This report presents a
summary of the identification, solution, and analysis process f o r some of the more significant
of these separation problems. In addition, the scope of responsibility, the development of the
study effort, and the computer simulation development, which supported the analysis process,
are described.

7. Key Words (Suggested by Author(s)) 18. Distribution Statemect

' Crew Safety Collision Avoidance STAR Subject Category:
* Vehicle Safety Accident Prevention 12 (Astronautics, General)
' Flight Safety ' Collision Research
Spacecraft Separation
' Separation P a r a m e t e r s

9. Security Classif. (of this report) 20. Security Classif. (of this page) 21. NO. of Pages 22. Price'
Unclassified Unclassified 21 $3.25
 APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

The material submitted for the Apollo Experience Reports

(a series of NASA Technical Notes) w a s reviewed and ap-
proved by a NASA Editorial Review Board a t the Lyndon B.
Johnson Space Center consisting of the following members:
Scott H. Simpkinson (Chairman), Richard R. Baldwin,
J a m e s R. Bates, William M. Bland, Jr. , Aleck C. Bond,
Robert P. Burt, C h r i s C. Critzos, John M. Eggleston,
E. M. Fields, Donald T. Gregory, Edward B. Hamblett, Jr. ,
Kenneth F. Hecht, David N. Holman ( E d i t o r h e c r e t a r y ) ,
and C a r l R. Huss. The p r i m e reviewer for this report
was Scott H. Simpkinson.
 CONTENTS

Section Page

SUMMARY ...................................... 1

INTRODVCTION ................................... 1

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEPARATION STUDY EFFORT ............ 2

COMPUTER SIMULATION DE VE LOPME NT .................... 3

SUMMARY O F SIGNIFICANT SEPARATION STUDIES FOR EACH

APOLLO MISSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
....... 5

Apollol ...................................... 5

Apollo2 ...................................... 6

Apollo3 ...................................... 6

Apollo4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Apollo5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Apollo6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Apollo7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Apollo8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Apollo9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Apollo10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Apolloll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Apollo12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Apollo13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Apollo14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Apollo15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Apollo16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Apollo17..................................... 17

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

iii
 APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT
SPACECRAFT RELATIVE MOTION AND RECONTACT ANALYSES
By Robert E. McAdams, C h a rl e s J . Gott, and M a r l a n d L. William son
Lyndon 6 . Johnson Space Center

SUMMARY

The use of a separable space vehicle during the Apollo P r o g r a m required that
premission planning include the definition of separation procedures that would avoid
accidental recontact and ensure maximum crew safety. Potential collision o r acciden-
tal recontact problems between the spacecraft and other space vehicles (or components)
existed during most of the Apollo missions. These problems w e r e identified before
each Apollo flight, and appropriate solutions f o r eliminating or minimizing the chance
of collision w e r e determined through relative motion analyses. More than 50 individ-
ual separation procedures w e r e designed, analyzed, and documented f o r each of the
final Apollo flights. The more significant of these separation studies and the acciden-
tal recontact problems associated with them are presented in this report; information
is given f o r each of the Apollo missions.

After initial planning for the Apollo Program was underway, it became obvious
that a large, well-organized, and well-managed separation study would be required to
supplement the total mission planning effort. The development of t h i s effort and the
scope of the responsibilities involved in meeting the requirement are discussed in this
report. In addition, the computer simulation development that made possible the solu-
tions to the many separation problems encountered is summarized.

INTRODUCTION

The p r i m a r y reason f o r a spacecraft-separation study w a s to identify potential

collision o r accidental recontact problems between the spacecraft and other space
vehicles (or components) and to determine, by performing relative motion analyses,
appropriate solutions to eliminate o r minimize the chance of collision. Th’e identifica-
tion of problem areas was accomplished by analyzing and verifying that the premission
nominal and contingency operational spacecraft separation sequences and procedures
were free of accidental recontact problems or, if no separation procedure existed, by
defining procedures that were free of accidental recontact problems. In addition, the
separation study effort included the verification that integrated separation system
hardware did not have inherent recontact problems, particularly with respect to motion
occurring immediately after the separation event; for example, the mechanical ejection
of the lunar module (LM) f r o m the spacecraft lunar module adapter (SLA). The follow-
ing objectives were included in the separation study e f f o r t : identification of safe space-
c r a f t operational limits (e. g. , the maximum permissible spacecraft attitude rates
during LM extraction f r o m the SLA); confirmation of previously defined operational
separation sequences and procedures f o r subsequent missions; validation of recommen-
dations for mission rules; investigation of the sensitivities of separation dynamics f o r
various spacecraft and space vehicle configurations; and graphic presentation and
illustration of the relative motions of various space vehicles (or components) in a
separation procedures handbook f o r each Apollo mission. The r e s u l t s of the separation
study efforts were required and used in flight planning, hardware design, crew proce-
d u r e s and checklists, sepai-atttioii t i ~ h f i i c j u z ~red-timc
, ~~issic a
EL?PPO,P~, a ~ pestflight
d
mission evaluations. A l l r e s u l t s were officially documented and published as f o r m a l
separation procedures (internal notes) at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
(JSC) (formerly the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC)). A significant study effort w a s
necessary t o provide the required analyses f o r the spacecraft elements and s y s t e m s
modes of operation in the Apollo Program.

As an aid to the r e a d e r , where necessary the original units of measure have been
converted t o the equivalent value in the Systgme International d'Unit6s (SI). The SI
units a r e written first, and the original units are written parenthetically thereafter.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEPARATION STUDY EFFORT

During e a r l y phases of the manned spacecraft programs, only a s m a l l separation

study effort w a s established. Project Mercury and the Gemini Program consisted of
flights that involved relatively simple separation procedures f o r a s m a l l number of
modules o r components. However, the Apollo Program consisted of flights that
involved separation procedures of g r e a t e r complexity than those of earlier programs,
because of an increase in the number of modules and components requiring separation.
The possible abort o r alternate missions f u r t h e r complicated the magnitude of the
analysis required. Therefore, the separation study effort w a s greatly expanded for
the Apollo missions to ensure that all accidental recontact problems would be identified
and resolved o r reduced to an acceptable level of probability before each flight.

The study of potential recontact problems began during 1964 as part of the Apollo
trajectory definition effort being performed at MSC. Various MSC organizations, with
the assistance of the prime and support contractors f o r the Apollo Program, w e r e
originally involved in the identification of the potential collision problems and the
definition of corrective action to avoid these problems. In addition, generalized sepa-
ration studies w e r e performed by a support contractor. In November 1966, the scope
of this support was altered f r o m studies of a general nature to studies directly applica-
ble to specific Apollo missions. During t h i s time, no single MSC organization had
overall responsibility f o r the analyses. Conseqilently, c r e w procedures, separation
techniques, control modes, and operational requirements w e r e obtained f r o m a variety
of sources. Because of t h i s fact, it was recognized that efficiency and mission opera-
tions could be improved by assigning the functional responsibility of performing the
Apollo separation and recontact analysis t o a single organization. Because the problem
w a s basically operational in nature, the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the
MSC was selected f o r t h i s t a s k in June 1967.

2
 The scope of the separation analyses was defined officially to include the following
objectives.

1. Evaluate operationally the separation modes defined f o r each Apollo mission.

2. Verify separation techniques, identify accidental recontact problem areas,

establish a sequence of events, and recommend procedural o r technical changes when-
e v e r necessary.

3. Develop the necessary analytical procedures and techniques required to per-

f o r m a detailed analysis.

The Apollo Joint Separation and Recontact Working Group, composed of r e p r e -

sentatives f r o m the p r i m e and support contractors and of appropriate MSC personnel,
was established i n May 1968. At these working group meetings, which w e r e
chaired by MSC personnel, the knowledge and capabilities of the prime and support
contractors w e r e used by seeking their technical expertise to aid in decisionmaking and
by using t h e i r capability to supply most of the input d a t a required f o r separation anal-
yses. In addition, the working group assisted each organization in recognizing and
understanding the problems faced by the other organizations; achieved the goal of
coordinating the activities of the different participating organizations in the separation
study effort; and minimized duplications, e r r o r s , and confusion.

The separation and recontact effort for the Apollo Program remained with the
FOD through the final Apollo mission. A broad base of experience was developed by
placing the responsibility f o r the separation and recontact effort with one organization.
T h i s experience proved advantageous in solving the Apollo separation problems.

COMPUTER SIMULATION DEVELOPMENT

The use of separable spacecraft modules o r components f o r the Apollo Program

required the development of procedures and maneuvers t o ensure a safe and proper
separation. The analysis included nonnominal situations to reduce the possibility of
accidental recontact o r collision should a contingency occur. The recontact could have
occurred during the actual separation o r ejection p r o c e s s o r subsequently during the
resulting relative motion of the separated components. The analysis required the use
of three- and six-degree-of -freedom computer programs so that all Apollo separation
sequencing could be fully and accurately simulated. To better understand the complex-
ity of the problem and the system modeling required to perform the analysis, the fol-
lowing separation events are given in the order of occurrence during a typical lunar
landing mission:

1. The launch escape tower (LET) from the command and service module (CSM)

2. The CSM f r o m the SLA panels and the Saturn IVB (S-IVB)

3. The SLA panels from the S-IVB

3
 4. The LM from the S-IVB

5. The service module (SM) scientific instrument module (SIM) bay door f r o m
the CSM

6. The CSM f r o m the LM

7. The LM ascent stage f r o m the LM descent stage

8. The LM from the CSM

9. The subsatellite f r o m the CSM

10. The experiment instrument booms f r o m the CSM

11. The docking ring and probe adapter f r o m the CSM

12. The CM from the SM

One of the primary problems that had t o be solved was the inadequacy of the
available three- and six-degree -of -freedom computer p r o g r a m s to provide the simula-
tion capability required to analyze the many Apollo separation events. Therefore, the
evolution of the required simulation capabilities was important to the overall experi-
ence gained f r o m the Apollo Program in the separation study effort.

Originally, the computer simulation capability was a multivehicle, three-

degree-of -freedom program that had been modified to perform simple separation
studies. To increase the efficiency in running general parametric studies, separation
computer programs t o be run on an analog computer system w e r e developed in
mid-1966. Late in 1966, the analog capability evolved into a hybrid computer concept
in which the advantages of a digital and analog system were combined into one com-
puter. In mid-1967, a detailed review of the Apollo separation and recontact simulation
capability resulted in a decision to continue the support contractor's hybrid programing
effort then in p r o g r e s s and to transfer this capability t o the MSC hybrid system when
the effort w a s completed. During the s a m e period, MSC personnel had expanded and
modified the original two-vehicle, three-degree-of -freedom digital program t o accom-
modate simultaneously as many as eight vehicles; t h i s expansion, combined with the
aforementioned planned t r a n s f e r of the support contractor's hybrid program effort to
MSC, was expected to provide all the simulation capability necessary to analyze the
separation sequences f o r future Apollo missions.

Because of rigid schedules and the l a r g e volume of productivity that was

required, the original decision to move all the hybrid capability to MSC w a s altered to
retain a portion of the capability at the support contractor facility and t o divide the
desired capabilities between the two hybrid systems. The altered plan also provided
f o r the retention of the entire set of hybrid capabilities in a digital program that w a s
developed f o r verification. Initially, the purpose of t h i s digital program w a s to pro-
vide a verification base f o r the two hybrid p r o g r a m s and to provide an analysis capa-
bility f o r time-critical problems. However, as the Apollo P r o g r a m entered the
operational phase, the hybrid capabilities could not provide the required output because
of the increase in time-critical problems and the constraints of the associated

4
schedules. Thus, the u s e of these p r o g r a m s diminished to such apoint that all maintenance
and updating efforts w e r e terminated; and all further analysis was performed by using
an all-digital simulation. Termination of t.he hybrid cqxibility a!!owed the c6ficeiiti-a-
tion of all r e s o u r c e s on the all-digital program, named Dynamic Analyzer f o r Separa-
tion and Recontact, which proved advantageous for solving the separation analysis
problem.

SUMMARY OF S I GNI FI CANT SEPARATION STUD IES

FOR EACH APOLLOMISSION

Many separation studies were performed during the Apollo .Program. The more
significant of these analyses, the accidental recontact problems identified, and the
solutions to these problems f o r each of the Apollo missions are described in this
r e p o r t to emphasize the importance of comprehensive detailed project planning. With-
out t h i s detailed planning, some of the problem areas presented and discussed h e r e
would have remained unidentified and unsolved; they could have become critical real-
time problems, jeopardizing crew safety and mission success. The following discus-
sion of the more significant separation problem areas emphasizes the impact of these
problem areas on c r e w safety and mission success. The discussion demonstrates that,
through detailed comprehensive planning, these problem situations can be identified
and resolved before the mission r a t h e r than during real time o r after the flight.

Apollo 1
The first Apollo mission was an unmanned ballistic mission performed t o assess
the maximum total heat rate on the command module (CM) at supercircular entry
velocities and t o evaluate the Saturn IB (S-IB) launch vehicle.

Possible recontact situations between the CSM and S-IVB, between the CM and
SM, and between the CM and S-IVB were investigated before the mission. Results
indicated that the CSM separation f r o m the S-IVB could be performed with SM reaction
control system (RCS)separation maneuvers as small as 11 seconds in duration and
still remain free of recontact problems.

A p a r a m e t r i c CSM separation study indicated that separation distances varied

only slightly when the CM and the SM w e r e separated at attitudes between 0" and loo",
plus-X axis above the local horizontal plane. Therefore, an attitude of 60" above the
local horizontal plane w a s selected f o r the first Apollo mission primarily because
separation at t h i s attitude required very little CM orientation to achieve the entry
attitude.

A determination of when the S-IB should be shut down to allow the launch escape
vehicle (LEV) t o perform a safe abort separation of the CM from the S-IVB was the
objective of another analysis. The r e s u l t s of this analysis indicated that, to ensure no
recontact between the aborting LEV and the S-IB, the time f o r booster engine cutoff
enable should be 40 seconds after lift-off. This booster engine cutoff time was accepted
by the United States A i r Force E a s t e r n Test Range safety personnel.

5
 Apollo 2
No separation studies were performed f o r the Apollo 2 mission because it was a
test of the launch vehicle only. The spacecraft was not flown; therefore, no separation
procedures were required.

Apollo 3
The evaluation of the S-IB launch vehicle and a test on the performance of the
spacecraft heat shield during a high-heat-load, long-duration entry w e r e iiie pi-iiiie
objectives of the Apollo 3 mission.

Separation studies of the CSM and S-IVB indicated that a 0.91-m/sec ( 3 ft/sec)
separation maneuver would be sufficient t o preclude recontact. The CM/SM study
showed that, f o r abort and nominal entries, SM separation f r o m the CM at 60" above
the positive local horizontal would yield maximum separation clearances. In addition,
the study showed that, if the CM s e r v i c e propulsion system (SPS) failed to ignite a t the
time of the first burn, accidental recontact could be avoided by extending the CSM RCS
plus-X translation to 75 seconds, by initiating the S-IVB engine cutoff, and by ensuring
the S-IVB attitude control during venting.

Apollo 4
The unmanned Apollo 4 mission used the S-IVB to i n s e r t the spacecraft into a
c i r c u l a r Earth parking orbit and t o perform a simulated translunar injection maneuver
to place the spacecraft on a highly elliptical Earth-intersecting trajectory.

Only two separations, CSM/S-IVB and CM/SM, w e r e associated with the Apollo 4
mission; however, s e v e r a l accidental recontact problems w e r e identified. During the
launch phase, if a n abort occurred involving an SPS ignition failure, recontact between
the CSM and the S-IVB would be imminent. This problem could be avoided by com-
manding the S-IVB ullage maneuver off upon S-IVB abort shutdown.

F o r the nominal CSM/S-IVB separation sequence, an inoperative SPS could r e s u l t

in recontact between the spacecraft and fragments of the destructed S-IVB after the
planned bulkhead-reversal test. The solution f o r avoiding t h i s problem w a s t o estab-
lish warning times, f o r the crew and ground control, that would provide sufficient t i m e
t o enable a two-jet o r four-jet RCS separation to achieve a safe separation clearance
and avoid recontact with the d e b r i s .

Another potential problem area concerned the possibility of the LEV recontacting
the Saturn IV booster if a launch phase abort occurred. If the booster w e r e t o cut off
at approximately 42 seconds after lift-off, the 243.8-meter (800 foot) constraint on
lateral separation distance between the LEV and the booster would be violated. There-
fore, the recommendation that the booster enable cutoff setting be 30 seconds o r less
w a s implemented to ensure adequate separation clearances.

6
~ Apollo 5
I The Apollo 5 mission was flown primarily to test the LM i n a near-Earth-orbital
After orbit insertinn, the aerodynamic
environment for verifiration nf LM s y s t e m s .
shroud w a s separated from the S-IVB and then the four SLA panels were opened. After
S-IVB/LM separation, LM abort staging using the ascent propulsion system w a s
planned.

The nOXin31 aerodynamic shroud jettison procedure was foilnd to be free of recon-
tact problems, and recommendations w e r e made for shroud jettison procedures to be
used in the event of an abort mission. The S-IVB passivation experiment procedures
w e r e analyzed, and the r e s u l t s were used to define the safe range of operational atti-
tudes that would avoid potential collisions during the experiment. The LM abort staging
sequence was free of recontact problems as planned.

Apollo 6
The Apollo 6 mission was s i m i l a r to the Apollo 4 mission in that a translunar
injection burn w a s simulated. Following translunar injection, it w a s planned that the
S-IVB attitude propulsion system would perform a reorientation maneuver to the CSM
SPS retrograde burn attitude; then the CSM would separate and r e t u r n to Earth. The
separation analysis of t h i s procedure indicated that the S-IVB would probably recontact
the CSM if the S-IVB attitude propulsion system failed to properly orient the CSM to the
c o r r e c t burn attitude. A solution t o the problem specified that the CSM, and not the
S-IVB, should orient to the burn attitude and that the CSM should perform a 10-second,
four-jet RCS translation to achieve adequate clearance from the S-IVB. T h i s solution
w a s a l s o recommended to preclude a possible recontact problem for an e a r l y t r a n s -
lunar injection burn termination.

Another CSM/S-IVB recontact problem w a s identified f o r an alternate E a r t h

parking orbit where the S-IVB was to be positioned above and in front of the CSM at the
t i m e of the SPS burn ignition. A procedure w a s designed to eliminate recontact f o r
t h i s case by proper orbital positioning of the CSM/S-IVB separation maneuver at one
revolution before the first SPS burn.

Apollo 7
Apollo 7, the first manned Apollo mission, was flown to evaluate the crew/
spacecraft operational compatibility, t o evaluate a transposition and simulated docking
exercise, and to evaluate a CSM-active rendezvous procedure.

A l l CSM/S-IVB separations investigated were free of recontact prnblems except

f o r launch phase a b o r t s after the LET jettison in which the SPS thrust-vector-control
rate damping w a s used. This recontact possibility, which w a s identified t o exist at any
t i m e during the entire launch phase, could be procedurally avoided by requiring a
faster crew reaction in identifying and initiating an abort.

7
 A relative motion analysis of the transposition and docking simulation exercise,
and of the CSM-active rendezvous, indicated that all sequences w e r e free of accidental
recontact problems.

Beginning with the Apollo 7 mission, the separation attitude f o r the CM and SM
was changed from an in-plane attitude used on previous Apollo missions to an out-of-
plane attitude. The new separation attitude w a s to be attained by inertially holding the
deorbit burn attitude and yawing the CSM 45" out of the orbit plane. This procedure
would preclude a possible recontact between the CM and SM f o r any entry, r e g a r d l e s s
of the aerodynamic lift profile of either vehicle. The recommendation was made and
accepted to perform tiis out-of-piane 5ivI jeiiisuri as s w u r i as possible &ei* deoi-bit burn
cutoff to increase the separation distances during entry.

Procedures w e r e designed f o r a contingency in which nominal CSM separation

from the S-IVB could not be accomplished. If t h i s failure occurred, only the CM would
be separated from the SM/S-IVB configuration, and the mission would be terminated.

Postflight analysis of the SM relative motion f r o m the CM w a s made f o r t h i s

mission because of a deviation between the actual SM trajectory, which w a s determined
by r a d a r tracking, and the predicted trajectory. The reconstructed trajectory indi-
cated a total relative separation delta velocity (AV) of approximately 9.14 m/sec
(30 ft/sec), which was much s m a l l e r than the predicted 88.39 m/sec (290 ft/sec). The
reduction in relative separation velocity occurred because the SM failed t o remain
spin stabilized throughout the complete separation maneuver. However, the analysis
indicated that, although the separation velocity had been reduced significantly, the
reduction did not c r e a t e a recontact problem between the CM and SM during entry.

Apollo 8
The Apollo 8 mission was the first manned flight in which the three-stage
Saturn V rocket booster was used and the first mission in which the crew orbited the
Moon. Therefore, new separation procedures and analyses were required f o r almost
every phase of the mission. Abort and alternate mission plans were new and w e r e thor-
oughly analyzed f o r identification of possible recontact problems. The same kind of
CSM evasive maneuver used during the Apollo 7 mission to evade the S-IVB w a s not
applicable f o r the Apollo 8 mission because the Earth-orbital effects on relative motion
could not be used advantageously. The evasive maneuver f o r the Apollo 8 mission
would be required after the translunar injection burn; therefore, the separation tra-
jectory would not be perturbed significantly by orbital effects. The CSM evasive
maneuver was redesigned to consist of a 0.46-m/sec ( 1 . 5 ft/sec) RCS translation along
the positive radius vector of the Earth (away f r o m the Earth). The maneuver w a s
designed to be initiated with the spacecraft located in a stationkeeping position
15.2 m e t e r s (50 feet) ahead of and 12.2 m e t e r s (40 feet) above the S-IVB, with the
CSM apex pointed toward the Earth.

The CSM minus-X RCS translation should have produced an adequate, safe d i s -
placement f r o m the S-IVB and avoided any recontact problems during the launch
vehicle lunar targeting maneuvers. However, the actual stationkeeping maneuvers
w e r e not executed correctly; at the time for the nominal evasive maneuver, the space-
c r a f t was not located in the c o r r e c t stationkeeping position. This fact was unknown to

8
the crew o r ground control at the time and, thus, the evasive maneuver was executed
f r o m the incorrect relative position. The objective of satisfactorily evading the S-IVB
w a s not achieved, and this f a i l u r e was soon confirmed through visual tracking reported
hy the p r p w . -4 secnfic! grGflnd-cnmputec! evasi...e rnLqeu\'cr -3;;sdefined, relayed to the
crew in real time, and executed satisfactorily to alleviate the unfavorable relative
position between the two vehicles. Postflight analysis of this problem revealed that
the spacecraft did not orient the full 180" in the pitch plane after initially separating
f r o m the S-IVB, which was necessary to null the separation velocity completely and
therefore esta3lish a stationkeeping position. In addition, the spacecraft plus-X axis
could not be alined visually along the negative radius vector as originally planned f o r
the first evasive maneuver. A s a result, the spacecraft attitudes were approximately
15" and 45" in e r r o r f o r the first and second maneuvers, respectively.

It w a s evident that f o r future missions each stationkeeping and evasive maneuver

should be defined to include the following: (1) specific spacecraft inertial measurement
unit gimbal attitudes that are computed and simulated before the mission and updated
in real time and (2)visual, out-the-window monitoring attitudes of the S-IVB o r any
other space vehicle in the vicinity of the spacecraft when maneuvers are planned.

The Apollo 8 mission was also the first mission during which the SLA panels w e r e
jettisoned f r o m the S-IVB. The primary objective of jettisoning the four panels was to
prevent the SM RCS thrust plumes f r o m reflecting off the deployed panels and onto the
LM. At spacecraft separation, i h e SLA was pyrotechnically severed f r o m the SM and
into four panels that w e r e hinged to the S-IVB. As the CSM translated forward, the
four panels deployed o r rotated outward from the S-IVB and LM; and, after opening
through an angle of approximately go", they were spring 6jected from the S-IVB with
a velocity of 2.44 m/sec (8 ft/sec) o r g r e a t e r .
An analysis w a s performed to determine if the panel jettisons would c r e a t e any
potential recontact problems with the spacecraft f o r the nominal mission, f o r launch-
phase o r Earth-orbital aborts, o r f o r alternate missions. The r e s u l t s indicated
adequate separation clearances f o r all phases of flight, with the single exception of
r e t r o g r a d e mode I11 SPS aborts. For this particular abort, the essential retrograde
mode I11 burn would cause the spacecraft t o fly in and through the area in which the
four panels had been jettisoned. However, the low probability of a mode I11 retrograde
abort combined with the low probability of recontact was considered acceptable.

Apollo 9
The Apollo 9 mission was a 10-day, Earth-orbital mission that w a s flown to
demonstrate the combined operational capability of the CSM and LM to perform selected
functions of the lunar landing mission.

The following nominal separations were analyzed f o r the immediate, close-in,

and eventual recontact regions: CSM separation from the S-IVB, jettison of the four
SLA panels, LM ejection from the S-IVB, LM undocking from the CM, LM staging,
LM ascent stage jettison from the CSM, and CM/SM separation.

9
 Following transposition and docking, the CSM/LM configuration was spring
ejected from the S-IVB. This was the first Apollo mission in which the docked con-
figuration used four compressed springs to expel itself f r o m the S-IVB. Originally, it
had been planned to use the CSM RCS t h r u s t e r s to withdraw the LM; however, primarily
because of jet plume impingement onto the LM, the withdrawal technique was replaced
by the spring-ejection method. This w a s the same kind of problem that resulted in the
decision to jettison the four SLA panels on the Apollo 8 mission. The LM ejection
procedure was evaluated and proved to be a successful separation technique f o r
Apollo 9 and subsequent missions.
rnr
of~ ai ~piaiiiied
1 ne p e r r ~ o r r ~ i i ~ e posiej eciioii CSTVT/LTVT
Eai-iii-oi-biidi maneuver io
evade the S-IVB w a s based on premission separation and recontact analysis. A
minus-X RCS translation burn was to be performed in a pitched-down attitude, taking
advantage of the continuous propulsive venting of liquid hydrogen f r o m the S-IVB and
advantage of the orbital motion effects to produce the desired separation clearances.

For LM jettison and subsequent ascent propulsion system testing, the spacecraft
w a s t o be placed in a safe relative position with respect to the LM by orienting the
CSM/LM configuration to the ascent propulsion system burn attitude and then holding
the configuration inertially stable. Before executing the burn, the CSM w a s to jettison
the LM, maneuver to a stationkeeping position, execute a pitchdown and yaw out-of-
plane orientation maneuver, and then perform a four-jet minus-X RCS evasive maneu-
v e r to obtain the desired displacement between the CSM and the LM ascent stage. T h i s
procedure would permit as much as a 0.61-m/sec (2 ft/sec) e r r o r in stationkeeping
relative velocities and would still ensure a safe separation distance at the t i m e of
ascent propulsion system ignition. It was designed to avoid the repetition of problems
experienced during the Apollo 8 mission because of stationkeeping maneuver e r r o r s .

A new SLA panel separation and recontact evaluation w a s based on new attitudes
and resultant velocities that encompassed the higher panel-deployment rates of 60 to
74 deg/sec observed in the Apollo 7 postflight analysis. The higher opening rate of
74 deg/sec could result in panel jettisons at a maximum attitude of 130" and at a
maximum velocity of 4.27 m/sec (14 ft/sec). Minimum values previously analyzed
w e r e 90" and 2.44 m/sec (8 ft/sec). The new separation attitudes and jettison veloc-
ities were f r e e of recontact problems f o r all mission phases except f o r the retrograde
mode III abort region, which was previously identified.

Apollo 10
The Apollo 1 0 mission was flown to evaluate the LM operationally in lunar orbit
while separated from the CSM. No landing w a s attempted, but the LM did maneuver
into a low perigee orbit s i m i l a r to the one f r o m which a landing would be attempted on
the next Apollo mission.

The Apollo 1 0 mission was the first mission f o r which a separation procedures
handbook was published in addition to the separation analysis summary document. The
procedures handbook w a s originated primarily to furnish the flight controllers a con-
venient separation reference during premission simulations and during the actual
mission. It proved to be a valuable aid and w a s published f o r each of the remaining
Apollo missions.

10
 Beginning with the Apollo 1 0 mission, a more conservative transposition and
docking procedure w a s defined, with only minor changes f r o m the one used on the
Apollo 7 and 9 missions. The initial separation velocity and the first nulling maneuver
.&?,by reduced in magn;,u& te sax,..re-R.CS p . Q p e ~ ~ ~z2d
f i t t e decrease the EeparatiQE d i s -
tance f r o m the S-IVB. The new transposition and docking procedure was found safe,
and w a s used without change f o r the remaining Apollo missions.

P r i m a r i l y t o conserve RCS fuel and to eliminate the effects of e r r o r s f o r s m a l l

RCS maneuvers, a decision was made to use the CSM SPS for the post-transposition-
docking-and-extraction evasive maneuver f r o m the S-IVB. This was a new separation
procedure f o r the Apollo 1 0 mission; and subsequent analysis revealed that, if the
S-IVB liquid hydrogen propulsive vent did not close before LM ejection, a potential
recontact problem would exist between the S-IVB and LM after ejection. Therefore, a
decision was made to orient the CSM t o the evasive maneuver attitude immediately
after ejection and t o perform a 5-second plus-X RCS translation, if necessary.

During the nominal lunar rendezvous, the LM descent stage was planned to be
jettisoned in a posigrade direction 10 minutes before the ascent-stage insertion
maneuver, which was performed in a retrograde direction 27" above the local horizon-
tal. If LM staging w e r e performed as planned at 10 minutes before the insertion
maneuver, then the LM descent stage would be ahead and above the ascent stage at the
t i m e of the insertion maneuver, and there would be no possibility of recontact. How-
e v e r , if staging w e r e executed early, then the t r a j e c t o r i e s of the two vehicles would
intersect. The descent stage would have required 65 minutes t o reach this intersection
point, and the LM ascent stage would have required 2 minutes t o reach the same point.
Consequently, if staging had been performed at 63 minutes before the insertion maneu-
ver, the ascent stage would have recontacted the descent stage 2 minutes after the
insertion maneuver. For t h i s reason, early staging was to have been avoided. To
ensure that the descent stage was in a safe relative position f o r the ascent stage i n s e r -
tion burn, and thus avoid any accidental recontact problems, it w a s recommended that
staging not be performed between 53 and 73 minutes before the insertion maneuver.

After staging, the descent-stage motion relative to the CSM was retrograde; and,
because of the longer orbital period, the descent stage would approach the CSM f r o m
a posigrade direction approximately 15 revolutions later. Real-time monitoring of this
relative motion problem was performed to determine if a CSM out-of-plane evasive
maneuver w a s required. The crewmen saw the descent stage approaching, but it was
determined through real-time computations that the descent stage would p a s s to the
rear of the spacecraft with adequate separation clearance. No CSM evasive maneuvers
w e r e required.

Originally, the procedure f o r LM ascent-stage jettison was planned t o be the

s a m e as that used during the Apollo 9 mission, in which the ascent propulsion system
w a s allowed to burn to fuel depletion. At the crew's preference, the procedure was
changed to the extent that, after ascent-stage jettison, the CSM would maneuver f r o m
a position below the LM to one above it and then perform a radially upward evasive
maneuver of 0.61 m/sec (2 ft/sec). This would cause the spacecraft t o translate above
and behind the LM and place the crew in a favorable relative position f o r observing the
ascent propulsion burn. Upon ascent-stage jettison, however, a separation velocity,
which was l a r g e r than predicted, was imparted to the CM and LM f r o m the severance
of the docking tunnel. This caused the spacecraft to translate rapidly below and ahead

11
of the LM, which resulted in sunlight interference in the CM windows when visual
acquisition of the LM was attempted. Therefore, the crew-preferred relative position
was not attained because the necessary CSM maneuvers t o achieve that position w e r e
not attempted. The CSM drifted below and ahead of the LM instead of above and behind.
However, no recontact problems were detected. A separation velocity that was higher
than expected was probably produced by higher-than-expected g a s p r e s s u r e i n the
docking tunnel,

Apollo 11
The Apollo 11 mission was flown to attempt the first manned lunar landing, to
conduct exploration and scientific experiments, and to r e t r i e v e lunar soil and rock
sample s .
F o r the Apollo 11 mission, the LM ascent stage did not contain enough propellant
t o achieve solar orbit with a fuel depletion burn as had been done on the Apollo 10
mission. Instead, the separation procedure f o r the ascent stage was altered to leave
it in lunar orbit and place the CSM in a safe position to continue the nominal time line.
The jettison sequence f o r the LM w a s planned and executed with a local spacecraft
pitch attitude of 45" and a four-jet minus-X RCS translation for a AV of 0.30 m/sec
(1 ft/sec), to avoid any possible recontact.

Possible ascent-stage recontact with the descent-stage plume deflectors during

lift-off from the lunar surface was investigated f o r t h i s first lunar landing mission.
Lunar slopes as steep as 45", which was the static stability limit of the LM, w e r e con-
sidered. Results of the analysis indicated that even f o r a worst-case (45") slope, a
minimum clearance of over 18 centimeters (7 inches) w a s maintained between the
ascent stage and the plume deflectors of the descent stage.

Immediate recontact problems associated with the LM RCS staging under nonnom-
inal and alternate mission conditions were a l s o investigated. Nominal LM staging
under abort-guidance-section control could best be performed with narrow dead-band
l i m i t s for r a t e s less than 6 deg/sec; and, f o r rates of 6 deg/sec o r g r e a t e r , staging
could best be accomplished with a l-second plus-X RCS d i r e c t ullage maneuver without
LM digital autopilot o r abort-guidance-section control. No control mode was available
that would completely eliminate interstage recontact f o r an inadvertent staging. Recon-
tact would most likely occur between the ascent-stage fuel tank brace and the jet plume
deflector supports approximately 10 seconds after inadvertent staging when narrow
dead band w a s used and the ascent propulsion system igniiiion signal delay was 0 sec-
onds. For nominal, powered-descent, abort-staging procedures, a recontact situation
existed at the environmental control system lines when the descent propulsion system
tail-off thrust was nominal o r g r e a t e r than nominal. To avoid t h i s problem, a
decision was made t o use plus-X RCS translation at LM staging.

For CM/SM separation, a minus-X RCS separation burn to fuel depletion w a s

planned to increase the SM entry velocity and d e c r e a s e the flightpath angle so the SM
would graze the E a r t h atmosphere and "skip out" into an orbit with an apogee g r e a t e r
than 926 000 kilometers (500 000 nautical miles). However, based on crew sightings
of the SM and based on the atmospheric breakup, it w a s concluded that the SM s e p a r a -
tion sequence was not occurring as predicted. Although t h e r e w a s no apparent

12
recontact problem, the fact that the Apollo 11 crew saw the SM when they should not
have and the fact that r a d a r tracking of the Apollo 1 0 SM a l s o indicated t h i s anomaly
prompted a detailed study of the SM stability and trajectory deviation after separation.
The purpose of the study w a s to determine if an unstable SM coi-ilc! r e s ~ l in t the devi&,ed
t r a j e c t o r y and, if so, t o determine the cause of the SM instability following separation.
If possible, a new procedure that would ensure a stable SM separation burn would be
defined and verified. Particular emphasis w a s given t o the effect of propellant slosh,
which w a s shown t o be capable of producing the erratic SM behavior that w a s actually
observed. Two dynamic models of propellant slosh were developed and w e r e used to
analyze the SM jettison procedure. The r e s u l t s led t o the use of a new jettison proce-
d u r e that would ensure stable SM a t t i h d e s during the separation burn. The new
procedure involved reducing the RCS r o l l thrust duration f r o m 5.5 t o 2.0 seconds and
setting the minus-X RCS burn to a duration of 25 seconds instead of a burn to propellant
depletion. These changes w e r e used f o r the Apollo 1 3 mission and subsequent
missions. Sufficient time was not available to make the necessary SM hardware
changes f o r the Apollo 1 2 mission; therefore, SM separation w a s performed using the
burn-to-fuel-depletion sequence of the Apollo 11 mission.

Apollo 12
The Apollo 12 mission was flown to continue lunar surface exploration and scien-
tific experiments and to retrieve lunar soil and rock samples f r o m a different surface
area than the Apollo 11 mission.

For the Apollo 12 mission, the attitude propulsion system burn, which was used
on the Apollo 11 mission to target the S-IVB f o r a preselected lunar impact point, w a s
a l s o used as an evasive maneuver. This action deleted the requirement f o r a space-
craft SPS evasive burn following transposition, docking, and extraction. The new
evasive procedure was analyzed f o r the Apollo 1 2 mission and verified as being free
of recontact problems. After CSM/LM ejection from the S-IVB, the spacecraft was
oriented to a viewing attitude that would enable the crew to visually monitor the S-IVB
evasive maneuver sequence. The spacecraft vieiving attitude a l s o doubled as a backup
CSM evasive maneuver attitude.

Apollo 13
The Apollo 1 3 mission was flown to continue lunar surface exploration and experi-
ments and to collect additional soil and rock samples. Analysis of the Apollo 1 3 launch
vehicle operational trajectory indicated that the procedure f o r mode I1 aborts of orien-
ting the CM t o the entry attitude p r i o r to SM jettison w a s not the best procedure t o
produce maximum separation distances during entry. The analysis indicated that
orientation t o the CM entry attitude before the SM separation w a s satisfactory f o r an
abort f r o m a nominal booster trajectory. However, certain other aborts (e. g., an
abort resulting from a time-of-free-fall limit-line violation) would result in SM jettison
n e a r the time-of-entry interface that, if performed with the CM oriented t o the entry
attitude, would reduce significantly the separation clearances. Therefore, a decision
was made to jettison the SM immediately following the RCS abort maneuver before the
orientation of the CM to the entry attitude.

13
 The lunar descent phase abort procedures were entirely different f r o m those
previously planned f o r the Apollo 11 and 1 3 missions because the CSM was to perform
the descent orbit insertion maneuver f o r the Apollo 13 mission. The new procedures
w e r e evaluated and potential recontact problems w e r e identified. The most probable
opportunity f o r a recontact problem to develop would be for a powered descent abort
that w a s initiated at approximately 1 0 minutes and 10 seconds after the f i r s t powered
descent initiation maneuver. If an abort occurred at t h i s time, a recontact problem
between the CSM and the LM ascent stage would exist. T h i s problem w a s resolved by
specifying that the LM execute an out-of-plane velocity component in its insertion
maneuver, o r that the CSM perform an out-of-plane maneuver at the time of LM i n s e r -
tion. Subseqiieiit iliziieuvers during X X E ~ ~ Z V O EWOU!~! null the effects of the out-of-
plane avoidance maneuvers, but only after the dangers of an accidental collision had
passed.

When the Apollo 1 3 SM oxygen tanks ruptured during translunar coast, no e m e r -

gency procedure had been defined f o r the exact situation in which the SM w a s inopera-
tive and unusable f o r r e t u r n to Earth. However, a premission separation procedure
had been defined f o r returning to E a r t h with the LM, jettisoning it 1 hour before entry,
and then jettisoning the SM before entry interface. This procedure specified that the
SM was to produce the separation velocity required f o r LM jettison by using its RCS.
Because t h i s system w a s now inoperative, a technique w a s developed f o r using the LM
RCS to produce the SM jettison velocity and using the LM docking tunnel p r e s s u r e to
produce the LM separation velocity. The separation attitudes f o r the SM and LM were
the same as those defined in the premission analysis f o r LM jettison 1 hour before
entry interface.

The SM jettison procedure was defined by the following: aline the LM plus-X
axis along the positive radius vector, away from Earth; yaw out-of-plane t o the south
of the CM groundtrack; perform an LM RCS four-jet plus-X translation burn f o r a
velocity of 0.15 m/sec (0.5 ft/sec); jettison the S M ; and perform an LM minus-X
translation burn f o r a velocity of 0.15 m/sec (0.5 ft/sec) to null the original maneuver.
This separation maneuver, performed with the push-pull technique, was to occur
2 hours before entry interface and leave the CM docked with the LM.

The LM/CM separation procedure that was planned t o occur 1 hour before entry
interface was analyzed f o r separation velocity values of 0.30, 0.61, and 0.91 m/sec
(1.0, 2.0, and 3.0 ft/sec). The r e s u l t s provided a parametric evaluation of the rela-
tive separation distances f o r various LM separation velocity values. The evaluation
w a s necessary because of the uncertainty associated with the prediction of separation
velocity resulting from severing the pressurized docking tunnel between the LM and
CM. The LM jettison attitude w a s to be attained by alining the CM plus-X axis with
the positive radius and yawing 45" out-of-plane t o the south, which w a s the s a m e as
that used f o r the SM.

As the Apollo 1 3 mission progressed, other separation t i m e s and procedures

w e r e evaluated. For SM jettison, separation t i m e s of 3.5, 4.5, 5.5, 6.5, and
7.5 hours before entry interface were assessed. It w a s discovered during these simu-
lations that, because of the earlier jettison t i m e s then under consideration, the SM
out-of -plane jettison would not r e s u l t in g r e a t e r separation clearances. Consequently,
the recommendation w a s made that SM jettison be performed in-plane to achieve the
maximum separation displacement f r o m the CM. The latest separation procedures,

14
in which SM jettison was set at 4.5 hours before entry interface and LM jettison at
1.0 hour before entry interface, w e r e furnished to the flight controllers and verified
as being free of any recontact problems.

The actual SM and LM separations w e r e not performed exactly as had been

planned. The SM jettison occurred 4 hours 40 minutes before entry, r a t h e r than the
expected 4.5 hours before entry interface. The separation velocity of 0.58 m/sec
(1.9 ft/sec) achieved f r o m the push-pull technique w a s l a r g e r than the predicted
0.30 m/sec (1 €t/sec). As a result, the separation distances between the SM and the
CM and LM w e r e g r e a t e r than predictions made before separation. The LM jettison
occurred approximately 11 minutes earlier than planned and in an unplanned, but
acceptable, attitude. The LM was jettisoned 64" out-of-plane to the north r a t h e r than
45" out-of-plane to the south, and the pitch attitude of 64" above the local horizontal
should have been 90". The actual separation velocity was 0.76 m/sec (2.5 ft/sec),
0.15 m/sec (0.5 ft/sec) higher than the highest value considered before jettison. This
combination of differences resulted in a decrease in total separation range from that
predicted. At entry interface, the LM/CM clearance was 1372 m e t e r s (4500 feet),
approximately 1067 m e t e r s (3500 feet) c l o s e r than previously estimated; however, no
recontact problems were evident and none were reported.

Apollo 14
The Apollo 14 mission was flown to continue lunar surface exploration, to conduct
scientific experiments, and t o collect lunar surface samples. During t h i s mission, the
CSM encountered difficulty in performing a satisfactory docking with the LM/S-IVB
configuration after translunar injection. Because of t h i s problem, plans f o r using the
backup evasive maneuver separation technique were considered. After s e v e r a l
attempts, a successful docking was finally accomplished, and the nominal post t r a n s -
position, docking, and extraction evasive maneuver sequence was used. Using the
s a m e procedures that had been developed f o r previous missions, all other separation
phases of the mission were nominal and without incident.

Several new contingency procedures were developed f o r the Apollo 14 mission

but were not required. These procedures included a method f o r safely returning the
crew if the SLA failed to separate from the CSM after the translunar injection maneu-
ver. This method would involve flying the complete launch vehicle/spacecraft config-
uration through a translunar coast, around the Moon, and t o a t r a n s e a r t h coast; and
then executing a CM separation before Earth entry. Specific separation procedures
w e r e a l s o developed and documented to cover an SM contingency of the type that
occurred on the Apollo 1 3 mission after the translunar injection.

Apol lo 15
The Apollo 15 mission was flown to continue lunar surface exploration, to conduct
scientific experiments, and to collect lunar surface samples. This was the first
Apollo mission to u s e the lunar roving vehicle (LRV) to aid i n surface exploration and
sample collection and also the first mission to place a subsatellite i n lunar orbit.

15
 The addition of another interstage oxygen quick-disconnect line necessitated
stage-separation studies of the Apollo 15 LM f o r the nominal lift-off sequence, f o r the
a b o r t s from main powered descent, f o r an RCS staging, and f o r an inadvertent staging.
This high-pressure line would exert approximately 4448 newtons (1000 pounds) of addi-
tional force between the stages when it was severed at separation, substantially modi-
fying the LM staging dynamics. The Apollo 15 analysis indicated that the RCS and
inadvertent staging dynamics w e r e improved by the addition of t h i s interstage oxygen
line, and the separation sequence f o r the nominal lunar lift-off staging precluded a
recontact with o r without the additional oxygen line. However, the Apollo 15 analysis
did indicate the possibility that one of the plus-X RCS t h r u s t e r s k i r t s could be in the
-p4Lll
rCL of, aid recontact, one of the four thrust plume deflectem as they cdlzipsec! eut-
ward during staging. This situation would exist only f o r aborts initiated after descent
engine shutdown during the main powered descent phase, and the recontact problem
could only occur f o r negative pitch rates combined with equal positive r o l l rates on the
LM during staging, which was not expected to occur.

New nominal separation procedures were required f o r the Apollo 15 mission

because of the addition of the SIM t o the mission configuration. The SIM, which w a s
installed in one of the SM structural bays, contained scientific experiment instruments
f o r use in lunar orbit, The structural metal surface of the SM, covering the SIM f o r
protection, w a s designed to be severed pyrotechnically and jettisoned before instru-
ment use. A jettison procedure was defined and used successfully 4.5 hours before
lunar orbit insertion. One of the instruments contained in the scientific instrument bay
was a subsatellite that was designed to be jettisoned and left in lunar orbit. On the
Apollo 15 mission, the subsatellite was jettisoned a t the orbital ascending node, normal
to the ecliptic plane, toward the north, on revolution 73. This jettison attitude and the
1.22-mIsec (4 ft/sec) jettison velocity ensured adequate separation c l e a r a n c e s between
the subsatellite and the CSM f o r the Apollo 15 mission.

New contingency jettison procedures f o r the two experiment instrument booms

w e r e developed f o r use in the event that one of the booms, which were deployed to a
length of 6.10 m e t e r s (20 feet), failed to retract satisfactorily into the SIM bay. The
booms, which must be retracted before all major SPS maneuvers, were designed to be
jettisoned f r o m the SM in the event of an unsatisfactory retraction.

Apollo 16
The Apollo 16 mission was flown to continue lunar orbit and surface experiments
and f o r lunar surface exploration and sample collections. The LRV and subsatellite
w e r e also used on Apollo 16.

The Apollo 1 5 nominal separation procedures w e r e used on the Apollo 16 mission

except for the final jettison of the LM ascent stage, which occurred in lunar orbit after
rendezvous and docking on revolution 53. The CSM 0.61-m/sec (2 ft/sec) evasive
maneuver f r o m the ascent stage was executed at 5 minutes after the LM jettison and
w a s made in a posigrade instead of a retrograde direction as w a s planned f o r the
previous missions. This change ensured that the CSM would be pointed away f r o m the
LM ascent stage f o r the evasive maneuver, even if it w a s delayed as much as
45 minutes.

16
 No new contingency procedures w e r e developed f o r the Apollo 16 mission. The
s a m e contingency o r alternate mission procedures developed f o r previous Apollo
missions would have been used, if required.

Apollo 17
The final Apollo mission w a s flown to continue lunar surface sample collections,
to continue exploration, and to conduct orbital and surface scientific experiments.

The final lunar landing mission of the Apollo P r o g r a m used separation procedures
identical t o the previous mission with the addition of jettison procedures f o r the two
high-frequency antenna booms of the lunar sounder experiment. These two antennas
w e r e nominally retracted into t h e scientific instrument bay of the SM, but would have
to be jettisoned if a retraction failure occurred. No failure occurred, however, but
jettison procedures w e r e defined and verified before the Apollo 17 mission. No other
accidental recontact problem areas w e r e identified o r encountered during this mission.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

F o r each of the Apollo missions, all separation procedures f o r the nominal,

alternate, and abort mission time lines w e r e documented and published in one docu-
ment. The separation procedures handbook became a valuable aid i n quickly d e t e r -
mining the c o r r e c t separation sequencing to be used in the event a contingency
developed during the mission. The handbook concisely described each separation
sequence, pictorially depicted the vehicles being separated in t h e i r c o r r e c t separation
attitude, and graphically presented the resulting relative motions for each vehicle.
For some separations, the spacecraft out-the-window viewing attitudes were provided
s o the crew could visually t r a c k what they were separating from.

The Apollo spacecraft separation and recontact study effort progressed f r o m

s m a l l parametric separation analyses for the first two missions to major evaluations
of all separation sequences f o r the remaining missions. The r e s u l t s and recommenda-
tions of these analyses w e r e obtained from many organizations, both Government and
contractor. A close working relationship was maintained among the personnel p e r -
forming the separation studies, the flight c r e w support personnel, the flight con-
t r o l l e r s , and the support contractors.

Use of the spacecraft prime contractors later in the program helped make the
total effort a s u c c e s s because of t h e i r knowledge of the s t r u c t u r e s and subsystems of
the spacecraft. The establishment of the Apollo Joint Separation and Recontact Working
Group, an informal organization with representatives f r o m the prime and support
contractors, aided significantly in obtaining full cooperation f r o m the various organiza-
tions and individuals involved in the separation activities. F r o m the experience gained
to date, it is recommended that, f o r future programs, the spacecraft prime contrac-
t o r s be included in the major separation and recontact analyses, starting at the begin-
ning of the program.

17
 F o r large complicated s y s t e m s like those involved in the Apollo Program, the
need f o r t h i s type of analysis and r e s u l t s should be recognized e a r l y in the program,
and the overall responsibility should be assigned to a single organization. Preparation
should be made t o handle all interfaces h all operational modes, including failure
situations.

Based on the Apollo experience, it was very difficult and inefficient t o develop
the large, complicated computer tools at widely dispersed geographical locations, on
different computer hardware, and with several groups involved. F o r future activities
n zn~!ysis
i-eijiiiring large, cijrnpkx c o i ~ p u t e rp r ~ g r ~ ~mi d g effcxts, c ~ ~ ~ ~ ! i d is
ati~n
mandatory f o r gaining efficiency in identifying and solving recontact problems.

Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center

National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Houston, Texas, October 31, 1974
924-22-20-00-72

18 NASA-Langley, 1975 S-421