Flores v. Drisadasdasdsadlon G.R. No.
104732
FACTS:
Respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Petitioners, who claim to be
taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of
the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the “Bases Conversion
and Development Act of 1992,”.
They maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 infringes on the following constitutional and
statutory provisions:
(a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that “[n]o elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his
tenure,” because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts
are public offices;
(b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that “The President shall appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint”, since it was Congress through the
questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts; and,
(c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code, for the reason that the appointment of
respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April
1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections.
ISSUE: Whether the provison in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 violates the constitutional
proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.
RULING:
In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective
official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board
and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription
seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude that
the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the
expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is
of no moment.
While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the
first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an
abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can
qualify. Accordingly, while the conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly
valid legislative act, the proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his
prerogative.
Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or
during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the
constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment.
Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office.