An Arms Control Association Report

What Are
Nuclear Weapons For?
Recommendations for Restructuring
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces

Revised and updated October 2007

Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby

An Arms Control Association Report

What Are
Nuclear Weapons For?
Recommendations for Restructuring
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces

Revised and updated October 2007

Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby

About the Authors
Sidney D. Drell is professor of physics emeritus at Stanford University’s Linear Accelerator Center and a senior
fellow at its Hoover Institution. For many years he has been an advisor to the U.S. government on technical issues
relating to international security and arms control, including membership on the President’s Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board and Science Advisory Committee. Honors recognizing his contributions to both physics and
international security include the Enrico Fermi Medal, the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, and
election to the National Academy of Sciences.

Ambassador James E. Goodby is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a nonresident senior fellow at
the Brookings Institution. He has held several senior government positions dedicated to nuclear arms control
and nonproliferation, including Deputy to the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) from 2000–2001, Special Representative of President Clinton for the
security and dismantlement of nuclear weapons from 1995–1996, chief negotiator for nuclear threat reduction
agreements from 1993–1994, and vice-chair of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty talks
from 1982 –1983.

Drell and Goodby are co-authors of The Gravest Danger: Nuclear Weapons, Hoover Institution Press, 2003.

Acknowledgements

The authors extend thanks to Daryl Kimball and Wade Boese of the Arms Control Association, who reviewed and
commented on earlier drafts of the manuscript, and to the staff of the Arms Control Association and to Bonnie
Rose who helped facilitate editing and production. Goodby extends his thanks to the Hoover Institution, the
Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars for their assistance.

The authors and the Arms Control Association also acknowledge the generous support of the Ploughshares Fund,
without which the time and resources necessary to write, produce, and distribute What Are Nuclear Weapons For?
would not have been available. We are also grateful to Sally James of Cutting Edge Design for layout and design of
the report, and to Brian Allen for his copyediting skills.

Responsibility for the report’s content and recommendations are solely those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect those of the staff, directors, or members of the Arms Control Association.

©Arms Control Association, April 2005 and October 2007.

   Table of Contents

v Executive Summary

1 Introduction

3 Section 1: A New Strategic Paradigm and Its Implications

9 Section 2: Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century

14 Section 3: Implications for U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces

19 Section 4: Are New U.S. Nuclear Weapons Needed?

23 Section 5: Including Other Nuclear-Weapon States

26 Section 6: Why the Urgency?

28 Appendix 1: Cold War Thinking About Nuclear Weapons

32 Appendix 2: U.S. and Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces

Executive Summary

T
he role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense planning needs a fresh look. The United

States and Russia have now officially adopted a policy of cooperation against the

new threats, faced by both nations, of terrorists and unstable or irresponsible

governments acquiring nuclear weapons. This replaces the former adversarial relationship of
nuclear deterrence based on mutual assured destruction. As stated in the Joint Declaration

of Presidents Bush and Putin of November 13, 2001: “The United States and Russia have

overcome the legacy of the Cold War. Neither country regards the other as an enemy or

threat.” What then are the anticipated missions and targets for the thousands of nuclear

warheads remaining in their arsenals?

Based on an analysis of the present and prospective  100 Minuteman III ICBMs in hardened silos,
threats that define missions for U.S. nuclear weapons each with a single W87.
we conclude that the strategic arsenal required by the
United States can be reduced to considerably lower  20–25 B2 and B52H bombers configured for
numbers. We recommend a U.S. force structure of 500 gravity bombs or air-launched cruise missiles.
operationally deployed nuclear warheads, plus 500  
in a responsive force. The United States and Russia
Responsive Force
should cooperate to achieve this in the year 2012. We
propose, as a specific suggestion for the individual  Three Trident submarines, each loaded with
components of a “500 + 500 in 2012” force for the 96 warheads, in transit or being replenished in
United States, the following: port for their next missions as part of a Ready
  Responsive Force for a rapidly building crisis,
plus two or three unarmed boats in overhaul.
Operationally Deployed Force
 Three Trident submarines on station at sea,  50 –100 additional Minuteman III missiles
each loaded with 24 missiles and 96 warheads taken off alert and without warheads, and
(a mix of low-yield W76s and high-yield 20–25 bombers, unarmed, in maintenance and
W88s). Reducing the D5 missiles from their training, all of which would comprise a Strategic
Responsive Force, for a more slowly building
What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

full complement of eight warheads to four

per missile will substantially increase their confrontation.
maximum operating areas.  
  The same total numbers of missiles and This force is composed of existing warheads and
warheads could be distributed on a larger delivery systems and requires no new nuclear weapons.
number of Trident submarines in the interest of It retains the current diversity of systems as a hedge
greater operational flexibility and survivability, against common failure modes. We believe that, if
albeit at higher operational costs. other nuclear-armed nations cooperate, nuclear deter-


 rence might be maintained entirely with a responsive see important opportunities for the United States
force, with the responsive force consisting of no more to seize that would improve its national security by
than the 500 warheads that are initially postulated strengthening the nonproliferation regime. To this
for the operationally deployed force. A world without end, timely initiatives by the nuclear-weapon states
nuclear weapons should be the ultimate goal. to significantly reduce their nuclear arsenals and to
We find no need for designing new nuclear restrain the development of new nuclear weapons
weapons against potential new threats, believing can play an important role by addressing increasingly
that those weapons which the United States has voiced concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon nations
already developed to counter the Soviet Union will about the discriminatory nature of the nuclear
be sufficient for new threats. To the contrary, we do Nonproliferation Treaty.
Arms Control Association

vi
 introduction

What Are Nuclear

Weapons For?

T
he role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense planning needs a fresh look. Although the

U.S.-Soviet superpower competition that gave rise to the building and deployment

of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons ended more than a decade and a half ago,

the thinking of that era dangerously persists. Yesterday’s doctrines are no longer appropriate

for today’s realities. The traditional role of deterrence has diminished with Russia’s ongoing

transition from strategic foe to partner. The new threats faced by the international community

do not present situations where the net effect of using nuclear weapons except in the most

extreme circumstances would benefit U.S. interests. The U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and

attendant doctrines should be adjusted to minimize the salience of nuclear weapons and to

ensure that they are truly weapons of last choice. Adopting such a posture would support the

nation’s highest national security priority: preventing the use of nuclear weapons and their

proliferation to terrorists and to additional states.

Official U.S. thinking about nuclear weapons nuclear weapons capabilities through the possession
has changed many times since the first nuclear of the entire nuclear fuel cycle.
explosions in 1945. These changes reflected evolving The history of the nuclear age shows that concepts
assessments of what it would take to deter a well- of what it takes to have a sufficient nuclear weapons
armed adversary, the Soviet Union, from attacking capability were far from immutable and that the
the United States, its allies, or its vital interests. unique character of nuclear weapons became
In turn, the reassessments resulted in changes in ingrained in the nuclear-age culture. A sense of
strategic planning, targeting, and the types and doom persists even today, but in an attenuated form.
numbers of weapons in the U.S. stockpile, all of The first atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
which are interrelated. The clarity of the bipolar U.S.- Nagasaki in August 1945 had a destructive energy
Soviet world has given way to the ambiguities and 10,000 times larger than previous explosive devices.
uncertainties of a world where international security Within a decade, the United States and the Soviet
is threatened by transnational terrorists, unstable and Union designed and built thermonuclear bombs, the
What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

failed states, and regimes that scorn a world order so-called hydrogen bombs, a thousand times more
based on broadly accepted principles. The dangers powerful than fission bombs. Fearful for the fate of
inherent in such a stew are magnified by easier civilization and of humanity itself, a shocked world
access to nuclear technology, inadequately protected asked why these terrible weapons existed. Under what
stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched circumstances and for what purpose could the use of
uranium—the two key fissile materials needed to the world’s most destructive mass-terror weapons ever
build nuclear weapons—the growing availability be justified? Could or would civilized people actually
of missiles worldwide, black market nuclear supply use them again, causing the indiscriminate deaths of
networks, and a trend toward acquisition of “latent” innocent civilians on an unprecedented scale?


 As nuclear arsenals grew larger and the “secret” both expanded their forces to numbers exceeding
technologies behind them became more widely tens of thousands of warheads on several thousand
available, a deeper understanding of the horrors launchers capable of delivering several thousand
of a nuclear conflict spread throughout the world. megatons of destructive energy. This was done despite
This awareness was sharpened a greater understanding and fear
by repeated tests of hydrogen The U.S. nuclear weapons of the devastating consequences of
bombs that could destroy all life using nuclear explosives in combat,
stockpile and attendant
and structures within a distance even at a much lower level. The
of approximately ten kilometers
doctrines should be evolution of the deterrence concept
around a single bomb’s detonation adjusted to minimize and the highlights of the nuclear
point. That scale of potential the salience of nuclear age are discussed in Appendix 1.
destruction was unprecedented weapons and to ensure Despite the excessive numbers,
in human history, and it became that they are truly not because of them, policy choices
obvious that such weapons could of governments and a good measure
weapons of last choice.
not be treated simply as more of luck brought the world through
effective and efficient tools for the danger years without a nuclear
waging war. Instead, the value of such weapons began conflict and with broad agreement on the need to
to be seen by U.S. political leaders almost from the limit the spread of materials and advanced technology
outset as a means of deterring a Soviet attack on necessary for building nuclear arsenals. The two
the United States or its allies. Soviet political leaders superpower rivals averted a direct clash, in part because
eventually accepted the same view, in reverse. the existence of nuclear weapons had the effect of
Perversely, the two adversaries’ arsenals grew imposing prudence on a Cold War confrontation that
rapidly to senseless numbers in the name of had the potential for erupting into World War III. This
deterrence, which was defined as requiring nuclear prudential effect surely would have been achieved
forces that could survive an adversary’s all-out at far lower levels of nuclear stockpiles and could be
first strike and respond with an attack capable of achieved with a very different force structure than that
delivering massive destruction on the initial attacker. currently planned by the United States for a wholly
Over time, the United States and the Soviet Union different era and set of security challenges.
Arms Control Association


 SECTION 1

A New Strategic Paradigm

and Its Implications

T
he stage had been set for a fundamental transition in U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear

relations as early as the end of the Reagan administration in 1988, but Presidents

George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton failed to fully realize the opportunity presented

by the winding down and eventual end of the Cold War. Bush, Ronald Reagan’s vice

president and successor, chose to remain within the Cold War arms control paradigm of

retaining nuclear forces sufficient to respond to an all-out Soviet nuclear attack by inflicting

complete annihilation on that country, its military forces, and its people if necessary. Bush

stayed with this inherited course partly because of his uncertainty about the irreversibility

of political changes taking place in Russia. Still, he signed two major strategic nuclear arms

reduction agreements, START I and START II, and initiated reciprocal U.S.-Soviet withdrawals

of tactical, or “battlefield,” nuclear weapons.

Clinton, who became president in 1993, made III and frustrated further progress in U.S.-Russian
essentially the same decision to remain within the strategic nuclear reductions. In October 1999, the
Cold War arms control paradigm, although his Senate even rejected Clinton’s prize achievement, the
freedom of action during his last years in office 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
was significantly constrained by a hostile Congress. President George W. Bush took office in January
Yet, he enlarged and modified the arms control 2001, halfway through the sixth decade of the nuclear
agenda with his strong support for the Nunn-Lugar era, with a new vision for America’s foreign policy.
Cooperative Threat Reduction program to help Russia In part, his thinking embraced ideas long advocated
and other former Soviet states secure and dispose of by a group of policy entrepreneurs known as the
their surplus nuclear forces and materials following neoconservatives, who had been highly suspicious of
the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. Although U.S. arms limitations agreements involving nations
accomplishing much, more remains to be done in that could not be trusted, in their view, to keep their
this area. promises. They adapted their ideology rapidly to
Clinton also sought to devise a framework for a post-Cold War circumstances by arguing that formal
START III to reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear forces bilateral arms control agreements with a friendly
What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

dramatically. Russian President Boris Yeltsin accepted Russia were no longer appropriate to the changed
in principle the notion of a START III at a 1997 relationship. Global arms control agreements were a
meeting in Helsinki, but Russia at the same time snare and a delusion because they equated the “good
remained staunchly opposed to U.S. missile defense guys” with the “bad guys” and unduly constrained
plans and any tinkering with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic U.S. freedom of action. Bush essentially accepted that
Missile (ABM) Treaty banning nationwide ballistic point of view.
missile defenses. This Russian opposition combined Bush also quickly initiated steps to impose his
with congressional pressure to advance a national own vision on the U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear
missile defense system ultimately stalled START relationship. His new paradigm was overdue in the


 White House

On July 31, 1991, President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev sign the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START).

sense that his father and Clinton might have been the changed threat environment that the U.S.
able to act more rapidly to move out of the shadow of administration saw at that time:
mutual U.S.-Russian nuclear deterrence had political A number of state and non-state entities have
circumstances at home and abroad been more acquired or are actively seeking to acquire weapons
favorable. They were not able to do so, but George W. of mass destruction. It is clear, and has recently
Bush made a major effort during his first year in office been demonstrated, that some of these entities
to define a new relationship between Russia and the are prepared to employ these weapons against the
United States. Moreover, a number of states are
United States. Bush and Russian President Vladimir developing ballistic missiles, including long-range
Putin on November 13, 2001, released a document, ballistic missiles, as a means of delivering weapons
“Joint Statement on a New Relationship Between the of mass destruction. These events pose a direct
United States and Russia,” announcing an alliance- threat to the territory and security of the United
like relationship between the two countries. The two States and jeopardize its supreme interests.
presidents bluntly stated that “[t]he United States
and Russia have overcome the legacy of the Cold As to the Russian nuclear threat posed to the
War. Neither country regards the other as an enemy United States, the U.S. note stated, “We have entered
or threat.” They called for “the creation of a new into a new strategic relationship with Russia that is
strategic framework to ensure the mutual security cooperative rather than adversarial.”
of the United States and Russia, and the world Taken at face value, the two statements would
community.” They asserted, as a fact, not merely an seem to mark the formal end of the era of mutual
aspiration, “that the members of NATO and Russia nuclear deterrence between Russia and the
are increasingly allied against terrorism, regional United States. Yet, concerns persist that these two
instability and other contemporary threats.” declarations by Bush did not reflect objective reality
Having reinforced the proposition that Russia and were primarily connected to the impending
and the United States were partners in mutual abrogation of a treaty that he and his supporters had
security facing adversaries bent on acquiring nuclear long disliked. Either way, a valid question remains:
weapons, Bush felt able to achieve one of his Has mutual nuclear deterrence between the United
major goals: U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. States and Russia really ended? The ABM Treaty,
The president announced this act in a December which had been the cornerstone of the mutual
13, 2001, Diplomatic Note, which gave notice to
Arms Control Association

deterrence relationship between the Soviet Union

the governments of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the United States, was no longer necessary, in
and Ukraine—the recognized successor parties to the judgment of the Bush administration. Putin
the treaty after the Soviet Union’s breakup—that obviously did not share that view, describing the
the United States intended to withdraw from the U.S. action as a “mistake.” Furthermore, a Pentagon
agreement at the end of the six-month waiting report submitted December 31, 2001, to Congress
period as allowed in the treaty. That note describes showed how far the two countries still had to travel


 to truly erase nuclear deterrence from their national contingency involving Russia, while plausible, is not
memories. expected.”
In this congressionally mandated report, known Presumably driven by these concerns, the report
as the Nuclear Posture Review, then-Secretary of concluded that 1,700–2,200 nuclear warheads in
Defense Donald Rumsfeld laid out the direction for the operationally deployed strategic force by 2012
U.S. nuclear forces over the following five to 10 years. would support U.S. deterrence policy and thus meet
In a larger sense, the document began connecting U.S. security needs. The Responsive Force, those
what Bush had been saying about the U.S.-Russian weapons not operationally deployed, would contain
relationship with what the U.S. defense establishment several thousand more nuclear warheads, while U.S.
actually did. The previous review, conducted by the strategic bombers and missiles would be retained
Clinton administration in 1994, had concluded that rather than being destroyed. Later, in June 2004 the
the capabilities of the former Soviet Union remained Bush administration announced that total holdings of
a major concern in assessing the military requirement nuclear warheads would be cut almost in half, leading
for U.S. strategic nuclear forces. The authors of the to estimates that there will be approximately 6,000
earlier report argued that the United States must warheads in the total U.S. stockpile (i.e., warheads
be prepared for the possible emergence of a hostile operationally deployed plus those in reserve) in 2012
Russian government or the failure of the arms control after those reductions have been made. (Some more
process in the former Soviet Union. recent estimates quote numbers close to 5,000.)
In contrast, Rumsfeld wrote in his foreword to Planning and budgeting functions in the U.S. defense
Congress that the United States “will no longer plan, establishment for the nuclear forces obviously still
size, or sustain its forces as though Russia presented assign a heavier weight to Russia’s nuclear capabilities
merely a smaller version of the threat posed by the than should be the case given the changed
former Soviet Union.” Yet, in the report’s body, the relationship formalized by Bush and Putin.
Department of Defense hedged, asserting, “Russia’s Legally binding codification of the U.S. nuclear
nuclear forces and programs nevertheless remain a planning recommendations came in the form of the
concern…in the event that U.S. relations with Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also
significantly worsen in the future, the U.S. may have known as the Moscow Treaty, signed by Bush and
to revise its nuclear force levels and posture.” The Putin in Moscow on May 24, 2002. The treaty commits
Pentagon planned to accomplish this by drawing on the two countries to having no more than 1,700–2,200
what it called a Responsive Force, essentially a reserve operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads each
force, which could be available “in weeks, months, by December 31, 2012, although there was no agreed
or even years.” The report stated that “operationally definition of what was to be counted in that aggregate
deployed forces” are sized “to meet the U.S. defense and after that date there would be no numerical limits.
goals in the context of immediate, and unexpected The November 13, 2001, Joint Statement was cited in
contingencies.” As the report explained, “[A] justifying the commitment. The two countries agreed
that compliance with the treaty’s provisions would be
verified by the procedures and systems agreed to in the
1991 START, which will expire in 2009 unless extended
or modified by the two states.
More interesting and potentially more important
than SORT was a Joint Declaration issued by the
two presidents the same day. That declaration,
reinforcing the ones made several months earlier,
affirmed that “the era in which the United States and
Russia saw each other as an enemy or strategic threat
has ended.” It outlined several topics for further
discussion, including:
What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

 Joint research and development of missile defense

White House

technologies;

 Cooperation on missile defense for Europe;

Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George
W. Bush sign the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty  Strategic offensive reductions to the lowest
(SORT) on May 24, 2002. SORT commits the United States levels consistent with their national security
and Russia to operationally deploy less than 2,200 strategic
warheads each by December 31, 2012, after which the limit
requirements and alliance obligations, reflecting
expires. the new nature of their strategic relations; and


  Measures, including transparency, to supplement China. Tensions in the Taiwan Strait eased somewhat
further strategic offensive reductions. following the 2004 Taiwanese elections, which tended
to reaffirm the “one China” doctrine supported by
A vigorous implementation of these programs would the United States and China. They rose again with
have helped consolidate the changed relationship the passage of the anti-secession law in Beijing in
in practical ways, but too little has been done to March 2005, but the Nuclear Posture Review had
implement the joint declaration. longer-range reasons for worrying about China in
Furthermore, Russia’s harsh reaction to the Bush its discussion of sizing the nuclear force. It called
administration’s proposal for strategic ballistic missile attention to “China’s still-developing strategic
defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic objectives and its ongoing modernization of its
demonstrate that U.S. offensive and defensive missile nuclear and non-nuclear forces.”
capabilities still preoccupy Moscow. Clearly, the task China’s long-range strategic nuclear forces (i.e.,
of escaping from the mutual assured destruction trap those capable of striking U.S. territory) have held
has not been completed, nor is it fully reflected in the steady at about two dozen single-warhead missiles
Defense Department’s budgeting and planning or in for many years. China’s military modernization has
the sizing of the operationally deployed and reserve emphasized survivability of their nuclear forces and a
nuclear forces. The challenge to change the remaining non-nuclear buildup, including aircraft and missiles
missions of these forces to conform to Bush’s policy based opposite Taiwan. Thus far, the evidence is not
statements still remains unmet. clear as to whether its nuclear modernization plans
Even so, the Bush administration has emphatically include a major increase in force levels. As a rapidly
asserted that nuclear deterrence should be erased rising economic power, however, China has the
from the relationship with Russia. Particularly striking long-run potential to be a formidable military power.
was Bush’s December 13, 2001, statement that “the So, in addition to the role of U.S. nuclear forces in
greatest threats to both our countries come not from assuring allies such as Japan and South Korea and
each other, or from other big powers in the world, encouraging prudent behavior on all sides, the Bush
but from terrorists who strike without warning, or administration’s notion of dissuading any future
rogue states who seek weapons of mass destruction.” military competition with the United States comes
This implies that the size and characteristics of U.S. into play.
nuclear deterrent forces should be determined by This concept of dissuasion broadens the definition
the terrorist or rogue state threat, not by Russia or of how nuclear weapons can play a part in today’s
other major nations. The Bush administration also diplomacy. It warrants careful examination because
has accepted as a planning principle the idea that the the Bush administration emphasizes its importance
appearance of unanticipated threats in the strategic as a different concept from deterrence. In fact, the
environment can be accommodated by activating distinction between them depends on individual
elements of what it calls the Responsive Force. An circumstances. Against a major nuclear power
important component of this planning concept, such as Russia, the distinction between deterrence
which is a contemporary version of “reconstitution,” and dissuasion is somewhat artificial. When the
is the infrastructure for nuclear weaponry, as Bush administration’s September 2002 National
discussed in the Nuclear Posture Review. Security Strategy of the United States speaks of
dissuading potential adversaries from pursuing a
military buildup, the idea amounts to deterring
Rethinking Deterrence
a peacetime activity from occurring that could
Planning for U.S. nuclear forces will inevitably take present a future threat to peace and security. There
into account plausible scenarios in which the use of are ways to accomplish this that do not rely on
nuclear weapons by the United States might seem an instantly useable force, for example, the threat
to decision-makers of the future to be a necessary of a U.S. military buildup, but the idea also has
option, although a thoroughly unattractive one. Our been applied to would-be “peer competitors” in
thesis is that, even if one accepted the validity of the hope of dissuading such nations from even
these scenarios, some of which we describe below, thinking of competing with U.S. military forces.
the requirements for nuclear weapons do not add up Thus, the National Security Strategy states that “[o]ur
Arms Control Association

to anything like the Bush administration’s projected forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential
numbers. Our view is that most of the potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in
military tasks we cite could be accomplished with hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the
modern conventional weapons. United States.”
An example of “well recognized current dangers” Overwhelming destructive force is a convincing
in the Nuclear Posture Review is “a military deterrent to the use of force against U.S. interests, but
confrontation over the status of Taiwan” with it has its limits. History does not support the notion


that superior force in itself is sufficient to dissuade a them. As to the notion that new nuclear weapons
weaker state from strengthening its defenses. Recent are needed because existing ones cannot reach
experiences in Korea, the Middle East, and South Asia deep underground bunkers where weapons of mass
does not support it either. Instead of encouraging destruction may be stored, it is doubtful that having
restraint, an arms race is the typical result. It would new nuclear bunker busters in the U.S. inventory
not make sense to indulge in nuclear overkill in would dissuade an adversary convinced of the need
the attempt to persuade China for a nuclear deterrent. (See Section
not to try to surpass U.S. power. History does not support IV for further discussion of this
Many other factors, especially the notion that superior issue.) Neither the vast nuclear
economic ones, will help determine force in itself is sufficient superiority of the United States,
that decision. Increasing U.S. nor the prospect of a U.S. ballistic
to dissuade a weaker
operationally deployed forces to missile defense system, succeeded
dissuade China from building the
state from strengthening in stopping North Korea’s drive to
kinds of forces that it thinks are its defenses. build and test a nuclear weapon
necessary to achieve its regional of its own. Iran has continued its
goals would probably have an effect opposite to the pursuit of ballistic missiles and uranium enrichment.
one intended. With respect to Iran, unlike North Korea, the United
To be effective, a dissuasive posture must be States has been reluctant to offer any substantial
accompanied by explicit incentives. Otherwise, it is upfront incentives, relying more on pressure and
merely another variant of assured destruction—useful threats. As noted above, the dissuasive effect of
in deterring attack, less useful in dissuading an nuclear weapons is likely to be most effective when
adversary from improving his military position. coupled with measures that meet the adversary’s
security and economic requirements.
As to deterring the use of nuclear weapons, the
New Goals for Deterrence?
administration and most independent experts
For the foreseeable future, there are no other “big acknowledge that nuclear deterrence has little effect
powers” that U.S. nuclear forces need to deter, on suicidal, fanatical terrorists. Otherwise, no role for
dissuade, or defeat. France, Israel, India, Pakistan, U.S. nuclear weapons in any mode is very likely in the
and the United Kingdom have nuclear weapons but case of terrorists. The best way of blocking nuclear-
are not currently adversaries, and their nuclear forces armed terrorism is to prevent nuclear weapons or
are much smaller than those of the United States. materials from escaping the control of responsible
Hence, the remainder of this discussion can turn to governments.
the implications of the new strategic paradigm for What about the rogue states of the world?
what Bush has called the “crossroads of radicalism They surely have something of value to lose if a
and technology”: rogue states and terrorist groups nuclear attack were launched against them. Nuclear
that try to acquire nuclear weapons and who, if deterrence probably would work to prevent the use
successful, might then think of using them against of nuclear weapons by Iran, for example, against
their enemies, including the United States. the United States or its allies. North Korea is already
It is not out of the question that a war could a small-scale nuclear-weapon state, but powerful
yet develop from one or the other of the two most neighbors all around North Korea contain it. The
pressing proliferation situations, Iran and North first use of nuclear weapons by North Korea cannot
Korea, but what role could U.S. nuclear weapons play? be excluded under some unlikely circumstances, but
Nuclear weapons might be thought to be necessary a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent can be had at very
if a conventional war got out of hand. Some analysts low levels of forces and certainly without acquiring
suggest that a nuclear weapon might be used against new nuclear weapons. For example, a last-ditch
a stockpile of biological agents, for example, as a suicidal gesture by North Korea’s leadership in the
means of pre-emptively eliminating a developing endgame of a losing war cannot be ruled out, but the
threat before it matures. Deep underground, hardened levels and types of U.S. nuclear forces are irrelevant
What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

shelters have been mentioned as possible targets for to this situation.

nuclear weapons because non-nuclear weapons might U.S. military and intelligence documents also
not be powerful enough. Yet, the potential targets identify Syria as a potential nuclear proliferant. Then-
for nuclear weapons appear to be very small, as the CIA director George Tenet told the Senate that Syrian
following analysis suggests. nuclear intentions were being “closely monitored.”
U.S. nuclear weapons have not been useful in He reported that Syria was developing longer-range
preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by missile programs, such as Scud D. There is no
states determined to have them and will clearly not indication that U.S. nuclear weapons would come into
dissuade al Qaeda from attempting to make or steal play in this situation any more than they did in Iraq.


 As to other “generic” rogue states, it may be that, cases to pre-empt emerging threats. The two cases of
if substantial U.S. conventional forces could not be Iran and North Korea already show that military force
brought to bear in a war launched by a rogue state has its limitations. Using nuclear weapons would
against a U.S. friend or ally, nuclear weapons might be very unlikely and not only because the regional
be seen as the only answer, especially if the aggressor political and human costs would be very high. Most
had used biological or chemical weapons. This worst- decisions to initiate preventive action have to be
case scenario, of course, is what has caused the Bush taken under conditions of huge uncertainty. There
administration to declare that it will use military will inevitably be gaps and incorrect information
force, not excluding nuclear weapons, to anticipate about essential facts. This is the very nature of
an emerging threat posed by such weapons. This intelligence information and is one of the reasons for
was the administration’s case for war against Iraq. exhausting all possible avenues of diplomacy before
Such a decision would have very serious adverse relying on force.
consequences, as will be discussed in Section II To sum up, even without ruling out a possibility,
Is it likely that there will be many instances where however unlikely it may seem today, of circumstances
an anticipatory action against a rogue state to prevent that would lead the United States to resort to first use
a nuclear weapons capability could be prosecuted? of nuclear weapons, the numerical requirements for
Probably not, as we elaborated in more detail in The U.S. warheads to prevent nuclear use by rogue states or
Gravest Danger: Nuclear Weapons.1 In fact, the 2002 terrorists are very low. It is not nuclear deterrence but
National Security Strategy stipulates that force, non- activities such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction
nuclear as well as nuclear, would not be used in all program that are key to preventing nuclear terrorism.

1. Sidney Drell and James Goodby, The Gravest Danger: Nuclear Weapons (Hoover Institution Press, 2003).
Arms Control Association


 SECTION 2

Nuclear Deterrence in
the 21st Century

N
uclear deterrence theory and practice were developed and implemented in a

unique historical era, one in which the protagonists competed in a highly focused

bipolar mode in the arena of nuclear weaponry. (See Appendix 1.) The United

States and the Soviet Union came to share many beliefs about nuclear weapons and they

cooperated, both formally and tacitly, through much of the Cold War to make sure that their

nuclear weapons were not used against each other. Nevertheless, it was an imperfect way, at

best, of managing nuclear competition. By the 1980s, both governments were convinced that

deterrence required them to maintain nuclear forces that could survive a first strike and then

launch a retaliatory strike capable of delivering assured destruction against the other. It was a

prescription for overkill on a scale unique in history.

Illustrative of this thinking was an article written essence of the whole deterrence concept.” He was
by Paul Nitze in Foreign Policy in the winter of one of the first to try to answer the question “How
1976–77.2 Nitze tried to answer the question “How much is enough?” Nitze had adapted the assured
much is enough?” He argued that, “to keep the destruction idea to the technology of succeeding
Soviet population hostage to a countervalue attack,” decades and had made the case that U.S. presidents
the United States needed “something of the order should have options other than an all-out attack on
of 3,000 deliverable megatons remaining in reserve Soviet population and industry even after a Soviet
after a counterforce exchange.” A counterforce attack attack aimed at U.S. nuclear strike forces. It is unlikely
is limited to targets of military value, such as actual that the combination of circumstances that made
weapons systems and command posts, whereas a such an extravagant version of nuclear deterrence
countervalue strike targets an adversary’s population, almost inevitable will appear again.
society, and economy. Nitze’s prescription translated In the present era, what is being said about the
into a strategic nuclear force of several thousand case where dissuasion and deterrence both fail and a
missiles and bombers capable of delivering many confrontation should come with a big power armed
thousands of warheads. This effort was required, with nuclear weapons? The February 2004 report of the
Nitze believed, because the Soviets were bent on Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic
What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

“deterring the deterrent.” They wanted to be able, Strike Forces suggested that the United States should
after a counterforce attack on the United States, to try first to transform relations through dissuasion and
have sufficient reserve megatonnage to hold the U.S. assurance. If that failed, the objectives should be:
population and industry hostages.
Analyses of this type were a direct outgrowth of  “To dissuade, to deter, and to prevail, while
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s early 1960s minimizing the prospects of unwanted escalation
conclusion that “assured destruction is the very and damage to allies; and

2. Nitze, Paul H., “Deterring Our Deterrent,” Foreign Policy, no. 25 (Winter 1976–1977) pp. 195–210.


  To terminate the conflict as quickly as possible on upset strategic stability. In Section III, we will discuss
terms consistent with U.S. values and objectives.” appropriate and much smaller transitional force
deployments, taking into account the historical
There is nothing here about protracted nuclear war. baggage that acts as a brake on more rapid reductions,
Rather, the emphasis is on avoiding escalation and as well as other deterrent tasks.
ending the conflict.
The task before us now is to analyze how
Present Adversaries
deterrence/dissuasion works in present circumstances
and what are the implications for the size of the U.S. The cases of present adversaries, such as North Korea
nuclear arsenal: and Iran, are more complex. The five permanent
members of the UN Security Council (China,
 in the case of former adversaries (i.e., Russia) France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States) plus Germany and others are engaged in
 in the case of present adversaries an effort to persuade Iran to comply with Security
Council Resolutions that call upon it to answer the
 in the case of potential adversaries International Atomic Energy Agency’s outstanding
questions about its past nuclear activities and to
 in regional conflicts, for example, the Middle East suspend its uranium enrichment program and other
sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities. Iran claims its
 in the special cases of the threatened use of uranium enrichment program is meant to support
biological and chemical weapons, where the peaceful nuclear activities, but such a capability can
Bush administration has reserved the right to use also allow for the production of highly enriched
nuclear weapons if attacked with such weapons. uranium for weapons purposes. The current strategy,
which involves targeted sanctions and diplomatic
The connection between nuclear deterrence and isolation and calls for tougher international
other forms of military deterrence exercised by the inspections, has not slowed Iran’s enrichment
United States should also be considered in relation to program. Direct negotiations between leading states
the objective of preventing both nuclear proliferation and Iran are not currently underway.
and the use of nuclear weapons. Earlier efforts at dissuasion failed to prevent North
Korea from resuming plutonium production in
2003 and testing a nuclear device in 2006. However,
Russia
diplomatic efforts through six party talks involving
The bipolar nuclear competition of the Cold War China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and
era has largely been liquidated, but the legacy of the United States have recently produced limited,
those days still exists in a lingering mistrust between but important and promising breakthroughs. On
Moscow and Washington. Excessive nuclear force February 13, the six parties agreed to a step-by-step
deployments furnish evidence of this enduring process for halting and eventually disabling North
mistrust, as do Russian reactions to U.S. proposals for Korea’s nuclear facilities and for moving towards a
ballistic missile defense deployments in Poland and normalized relationship. Since then, the International
the Czech Republic. Atomic Energy Agency has verified that North Korea
If the Bush-Putin statements are taken literally, has shut down its main nuclear complex at Yongbyon
it should suffice to have a responsive force to and North Korea has committed to disable key
hedge against renewed hostility in the U.S.-Russian facilities and make a full declaration of its nuclear
relationship. Ready-to-launch, operationally deployed program by the end of 2007. In the two cases of Iran
nuclear forces should not be required between two and North Korea, what does it mean for dissuasion to
countries that mutually declared in November 2001 fail, and what should the United States do if North
that they do not regard each other as an enemy or Korea or Iran openly deploys nuclear forces and
threat. Deterrence/dissuasion, in the case of Russia, engages in threatening policies or actions?
now should be seen logically as applying to peacetime An anticipatory U.S. attack might be expected as
behavior, not to the existential act of launching a the next step, according to the theoretical deterrence
Arms Control Association

strategic nuclear attack. Thus, the threat of activating ladder constructed by the Bush administration. The
a “responsive force” of the type described in the administration has said, however, that military action
Nuclear Posture Review should dissuade or deter is not always appropriate, and so far, the option of
Russia from embarking on a renewed nuclear arms preventive war has not been exercised in the case of
race. Further verifiable U.S.-Russian nuclear weapons North Korea, the more advanced of the two potential
reductions would also decrease the possibility that new nuclear-weapon states and the only one to
either side could quickly rearm in a way that would claim it already has nuclear weapons. In fact, Bush

10
has emphasized that the circumstances in this case by the U.S. “nuclear umbrella.” The presence of that
demand a diplomatic approach. The administration umbrella has made it easier for the Japanese and
reiterated this position even after the North Korean other allies to continue their renunciation of nuclear
test of 2006. With respect to Iran, U.S. officials have weapons. There now are pressures coming from some
suggested that “all options are on the table.” However, quarters in Japan to amend Japan’s constitution
if diplomacy and targeted sanctions are to be pursued with regard to the renunciation of war. Japan’s non-
with any reasonable hope for success, the North nuclear-weapon status has also been questioned. The
Korean case illustrates that incentives and direct role of the U.S. nuclear umbrella may still be useful
diplomacy must be included among the tools used. in thwarting a nuclear arms race between China and
Unadorned threats of assured destruction of targets Japan, but the form of that umbrella need not be like
in Iran may stiffen the position of hardliners in Iran the one that exists today.
who believe the country should keep the nuclear If deterrence of a Chinese attack on Taiwan were
weapon option open in order to help deter such an to fail, the U.S. response would very likely be a
attack. Actual attacks, particularly if they involve move to defend Taiwan. U.S. use of nuclear weapons
nuclear weapons, that produce massive destruction would almost certainly not be the first step in an
would be perceived to be out of proportion with the attempt to convince China to stop military action,
potential threat that Iran might acquire uranium but one cannot totally rule out that there could be
enrichment capabilities. Such a response would pose a certain narrow circumstances in which a limited
risk of a wider war in an already volatile region. Such nuclear response might be considered. A credible U.S.
an attack may not succeed in destroying all of Iran’s deterrent against potential Chinese threats can be
nuclear-related assets and may only set back Iran’s managed while reducing the number of warheads.
program temporarily. The United States certainly does not need additional
Deterrence with respect to Iran may be forced to nuclear weapons to achieve some dissuasive effect.
return to its more limited Cold War-era function of What should the United States do if China began
preventing an Iranian attack on the United States a buildup of the type that the Soviet Union began
or Iran’s neighbors in the region. Containment, the after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis? For quite a while,
other component of U.S. Cold War strategy, also present or even greatly reduced U.S. nuclear force
seems relevant with respect to Iran if current efforts levels would suffice to maintain the direct deterrent
to dissuade and deter Iran from improving its nuclear effect against a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Present
capabilities continue to fall short. The familiar U.S. superiority is such that a number of years would
options of countervalue and counterforce will be pass before the buildup of China’s nuclear forces
available for deterrence, although on a scale that is would require adjustments to the allocation of U.S.
miniscule as compared with U.S.-Soviet competition. warheads to target the new threat or reinforce the
deterrent against any imprudent behavior. There is
no doubt that, in the present situation where peace
Potential Adversaries
is conditional, the U.S. government would see a need
Like Russia, China presents a special case. The United for maintaining the capability for an appropriate
States and China are working fairly closely together nuclear response. Further, that course of events would
on security issues and are strongly linked by trade have repercussions in the U.S.-Russian relationship.
and financial interests. Nevertheless, it is understood The U.S. nuclear force structure is only one of the
that China’s long-range retaliatory capability has the factors influencing China’s force posture decisions,
United States in its crosshairs in some way. Similarly, but deeper reductions in U.S. operationally deployed
the target list for U.S. nuclear forces presumably nuclear forces than presently contemplated might
includes a growing number of Chinese targets. contribute to dissuading China from a major buildup.
Taiwan, of course, could become a major flashpoint This point is discussed further in Section V.
in the bilateral relationship at any moment. China
remains a potential adversary. The adversarial
Regional Conflicts
relationship and the concomitant threat of nuclear
What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

attack have not been formally excluded from the Europe, where the nuclear confrontation was most
U.S.-Chinese relationship as they have from the U.S.- intense during the Cold War, is not likely to be the
Russian relationship, but U.S. policymakers have not scene of conflict or disputes that would rise to the
invoked the threat of nuclear retaliation as a response threshold where nuclear deterrence would become a
to potential Chinese incursions in the Taiwan Strait consideration. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
since President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration. (NATO) commits each of its 26 members to regard
As the Nuclear Posture Review states, nuclear the security of other members as its own. A response
weapons can assure allies, and this is particularly the to an attack on any one of them could include the
case with Japan, a country that has set great store counter-use of U.S. nuclear weapons according to

11
 NATO doctrine, but as a practical matter, nuclear attack on Pakistan to stop a war that Pakistan had
deterrence has essentially disappeared from NATO’s started? The answer is no in both cases; it is simply
missions. No doubt the attraction of NATO for eastern inconceivable. The only plausible situations in
European countries lies in the connection it affords which U.S. nuclear deterrence might come into play
to overall U.S. military strength. Attractive power is in South Asia is in the context of a radical Islamist
not to be lightly dismissed, but this is as far as it goes, government in Pakistan gaining control of its nuclear
as far as the present-day role of nuclear deterrence is program or reassurance to India in the event of a
concerned. Reportedly, the United States maintains serious dispute with China. These contingencies are
a stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. No not out of the question, but the effect of U.S. nuclear
need exists for them under present circumstances, deterrence is apt to be marginal in either case.
and they, like similar Russian nuclear systems, should A crisis in Northeast Asia has more potential for
be consolidated in rear areas in the United States and erupting into a conflict. As already discussed, the
Russia, and ultimately eliminated. assured destruction/containment type of deterrence
Three other regions where simmering disputes have is essentially where things stand now. The three U.S.
boiled over into open conflict and could do so again goals are to deter North Korea from invading South
are the Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast Asia. Korea, to deter North Korea from launching missile
In the Middle East, the United States has been and attacks against Japan or South Korea, and to deter
remains an active player in regional security issues. North Korea from using nuclear weapons under any
In 1973, President Richard Nixon put U.S. nuclear circumstances. Actual U.S. use of nuclear weapons
forces on alert to send a warning signal to the Soviets would probably be constrained by the opinions of
that they should not intervene in the Middle Eastern all of North Korea’s neighbors, but that should not
war of that year. Prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, diminish their deterrent effect against Pyongyang’s
Secretary of State James Baker hinted at the use of use of nuclear weapons, except perhaps as a last
nuclear weapons if Saddam Hussein used chemical or desperate act of a defeated regime.
biological weapons. A stated if unsubstantiated reason
for the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was to
Biological and Chemical Weapons
eliminate the possibility that Iraq would build nuclear
weapons. The dispute with Iran over its nuclear pro- In many of the cases discussed so far, preventing
grams has evoked some media and even official discus- an adversary’s use of biological or chemical
sion of air attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, like the weapons would be a key U.S. goal, as it was in the
1981 Israeli attack that destroyed Iraq’s Osirak reactor. Persian Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In
In such a volatile region, where nuclear weapons neither case was a threat to use nuclear weapons
have figured in several disputes, it is reasonable to made explicit. War crimes trials against any Iraqi
think that U.S. nuclear weapons must exercise some commanders who authorized the use of “weapons
deterrent effect. If a war with Iran were to occur, of mass destruction” were explicitly guaranteed by
for example, U.S. nuclear weapons looming in the the United States. Other countries with biological
background might suggest to Tehran that the war or chemical weapons could give rise to similar
should be limited and terminated as soon as possible. challenges in the future. Deterrence, not necessarily
In other cases, their deterrent effect is probably nuclear, would have two components in each
negligible as compared with Israel’s own nuclear situation: to dissuade development, deployment,
deterrent and other actions that the United States is and plans for use of biological or chemical weapons
capable of taking. Their deterrent effect against use and to deter the actual use of such weapons.
of biological or chemical weapons by Hussein in the The first objective, one of those that seems to be
Persian Gulf War is far from clear. George H. W. Bush included in the Bush administration’s strategy, is
apparently believed that the threat of regime change important but will be difficult to accomplish in
would be a more effective deterrent than the use of practice. Biological and chemical weapons can be
nuclear weapons, and perhaps it was. The most likely manufactured covertly and relatively easily. More
result, if deterrence failed in the Middle East, would than 15 countries, several of which are hostile to
be a war fought with conventional weapons and, as the United States, are believed to be pursuing or
is being demonstrated in Iraq, by asymmetric warfare already to possess such arms, of which perhaps up
Arms Control Association

on the part of U.S. adversaries. to one-third are “states of concern.” They see these
South Asia presents even fewer scenarios where as their own deterrents and will be reluctant to
U.S. nuclear weapons would deter or dissuade a give them up. Once again, this type of dissuasion,
protagonist from taking actions that the United States which is aimed at influencing other countries’ force
wanted to prevent. Would Washington authorize the structure decisions, cannot be carried out effectively,
use of U.S. nuclear weapons against India to stop an if at all, without accompanying incentives. One of
Indian attack against Pakistan? Would it consider an the most important incentives would be to improve

12
the security situation for the countries concerned by deterrent available to the United States in every case.
settling regional disputes. Experts spend a great deal of their time wondering
The other goal of preventing biological or whether a threat to use nuclear weapons is credible.
chemical weapons use in combat may be easier to A weapon that has not been used in combat for 60
achieve, although the record of the Iran-Iraq War years is not a weapon that is used lightly, and the
waged in the 1980s is not very encouraging on this consequences of its possible use are so dire that even
score. Of course, the United States was not directly the most irresponsible of rogues probably is impressed.
involved, aside from providing Hussein intelligence To make the consequences less dire by making them
information, but no effort was made to punish Iraq “more useable” by lowering their yields is probably
for initiating chemical weapons attacks. In a case not going to do much to influence such people. Here,
where U.S. or allied forces might be involved in the the subject is deterrence, and images in the minds of
future, an explicit U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons dictators are what count.
in retaliation for use of chemical or biological What is credible beyond doubt is that the United
weapons might be considered. Before voicing that States has built the world’s most effective and
threat, however, it must be weighed against other powerful war-fighting force, excluding its nuclear
very troubling considerations, including the issue weapons. In fact, to the extent that the United
of whether nuclear weapons should be used against States depends on nuclear weapons to make a point,
non-nuclear-weapon states, the the more this will encourage
advisability of ending 60 years of asymmetric warfare and biological
The United States
non-use of nuclear weapons in and chemical weapons use on the
combat, and whether a nuclear
only diminishes its part of U.S. enemies and the less
response is proportional to a own advantages and effective future U.S. fighting forces
biological or chemical weapons strengths by pursuing will be.
attack. Nuclear weapons are nuclear weapons policies The Nuclear Posture Review
unique in their terrifying that boost the perceived treats nuclear weapons as an
potential for massive destruction embedded element in U.S. offensive
value of biological and
on an unprecedented scale. forces. Of course, in the real world
Their capability for widespread
chemical weapons in the nuclear weapons are not treated
destruction vastly exceeds that of eyes of others. simply as an extension of the most
chemical weapons. For now, this powerful conventional forces.
also holds true for biological weapons, which should They are treated separately. Their use would require
be feared primarily for their terror-creating potential, exceptional circumstances, and no president has seen
although ultimately they may come to rival nuclear such exceptional circumstances, even in the midst of
weapons as a threat to populations on a global scale. two otherwise unwinnable wars, Korea and Vietnam.
A policy of “calculated ambiguity” regarding the Wisely, U.S. military leaders think of nuclear weapons
U.S. response to an adversary’s use of chemical or as the ultimate deterrent and not just as another
biological weapons is preferable to a more explicit weapon. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
threat. Unrivaled in conventional military power, the and future Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed
United States only diminishes its own advantages and this perspective clearly in his 1995 autobiography.
strengths by pursuing nuclear weapons policies that “No matter how small these nuclear payloads were,
boost the perceived value of biological and chemical we would be crossing a threshold. Using nukes at
weapons in the eyes of others. this point would mark one of the most significant
political and military decisions since Hiroshima,”
Powell wrote.3 An assessment about whether nuclear
Nuclear Deterrence in Context
weapons should be used always takes place in the
This discussion underscores the point that nuclear context of whether there is some non-nuclear weapon
deterrence cannot be considered in a vacuum, nor that could do the job. In short, nuclear weapons are
can it be seen as the only or even the most powerful not weapons of first choice, but of last choice.
What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

3. Powell, Colin L. and Joseph Persico, My American Journey, Random House. 1995, pg. 324.

13
 Section 3 Implications for U.S.
Strategic Nuclear Forces
U.S. Nuclear Force Size

I
n his foreword to the Nuclear Posture Review, Rumsfeld supported “a credible deterrent

at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with U.S. and allied security.” Based on

the analysis in the preceding sections, the Nuclear Posture Review’s conclusions should

be updated and reversed. It appears to be entirely possible and feasible to maintain a credible

U.S. deterrent at much lower levels of nuclear weapons than were recommended in that

report. It may have been reasonable to err on the high side at that time. The report implied

that, stating, “[I]n a fluid security environment, the precise nuclear force level necessary

for the future cannot be predicted with certainty.… [T]he range of between 1,700 and 2,200

warheads provides a degree of flexibility.” It is very difficult to escape from the mutual

deterrence mindset, even after conditions have changed very considerably, but we think the

United States and Russia, the two nations that possess more than 90 percent of the world’s

nuclear weapons, can do better than they have.

As the preceding analysis pointed out, the Russia lowest possible levels consistent with their national
contingency, which is the danger of a hostile security requirements and alliance obligations, and
government taking power in the future, can be met reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations.”
through greater reliance on a smaller responsive That declaration described SORT as “a major step
force than currently planned and which need not be in this direction.” A straightforward reading of this
available in a matter of days or weeks, but months passage implies that the two presidents did not see
or even years. If operationally deployed nuclear the treaty as the last word in strategic offensive
warheads are not the prime deterrent against possible reductions. Furthermore, the treaty itself included
Russian actions, then they can be reduced to lower a clause that it could be “superseded earlier [than
levels earlier than the date of 2012 prescribed both in 2012] by a subsequent agreement.” The Consultative
the Nuclear Posture Review and in SORT. Certainly, Group for Strategic Security, which was established
the number could be much lower than the 3,696 by the Moscow Declaration, could determine how
operationally deployed U.S. warhead level announced to accomplish this revision. Chaired by the foreign
Arms Control Association

by the U.S. government in 2007. and defense ministers of each country, this group has
Lower warhead levels reached more rapidly not yet proved effective or developed an agenda for
would be consistent with the Bush-Putin November addressing important issues such as this.
13, 2001, statement that “neither country regards We believe that SORT should be amended to set
the other as an enemy or threat.” It also would a ceiling of 500 operationally deployed strategic
be consistent with the 2002 Moscow Declaration warheads. This would be accomplished during a
in which Bush and Putin stated their intentions transition period that might last five years. Another
“to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the 500 warheads could be held for the Responsive Force.

14
Deeper reductions could be considered and possibly
implemented during the five-year transition period,
taking into account developments in China, among
other things. The rationale for this conclusion follows.
First, as to the number of potential targets, we as-
sume that Russian nuclear forces will decrease in num-
bers comparable to what we are proposing for the U.S.
force. For reasons having as much to do with historical
and political baggage as with military requirements,
this assumption will be a major determinant of the
size of the U.S. operationally deployed force, as it
appears to be today. Even given the history, however,
the numbers assigned to deterrence are much too
high. In addition, the United States should, as we have
argued, maintain a Responsive Force to counter the
possibility of a resurgent and hostile Russia. Under
these assumptions and taking into account the new
relationship with Russia that Bush has proclaimed,
we estimate that a U.S. strategic force of some 500
operationally deployed warheads would be more
than adequate for deterrence. Borrowing the notion
of the Nuclear Posture Review, this force level would
be enough to provide a degree of flexibility in a fluid
security environment.
This number is large enough to deal with the
U.S. Navy, Gene Royer

targets described generically in the Nuclear Posture

Review as “instruments of political control and
military power…leadership and military capabilities,
particularly weapons of mass destruction, military
command facilities and other centers of control
and infrastructure that support military forces.” We The U.S. Navy currently has 14 Trident nuclear-powered
estimate these military targets, under the conditions submarines for delivering nuclear weapons.
we postulate, to number between 200 and 300, and we
have sized the operationally deployed force of strategic strategic warning signals on a timescale of a year or
warheads at a larger number of 500 for reasons of more—a Strategic Responsive Force. This use of the
operational conservatism.4 The excess allows for force Responsive Force underscores the need for sustaining
readiness concerns, multiple targeting where needed, an infrastructure for supporting it as well as the need
and the possibility of very sudden and unexpected to provide this force with appropriate hardening and
surprises from Russia, for example, a breakdown in its concealment. As we look ahead a few years into the
military command and control caused by technical future, the total Responsive Force should have 400–500
failures or a takeover by renegades. As Russia and the warheads, a number comparable to the operationally
United States move farther away from the nuclear deployed one. This number would be adequate to target
deterrent trap in which they are still ensnared, the roughly 200 additional Russian sites, for example,
sizing of their stockpiles would depend on other those affecting industrial recovery—the major nodes
concerns and could be further reduced. in the electric power grid and air, ground, and rail
The 500 operationally deployed warheads would transportation systems, as well as major industrial sites.
be augmented by those from the Responsive Force, These targets and the forces to attack them may be
which would be configured in two parts, the first viewed, we hope, as only temporary remnants of the
What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

able to respond to a rapidly building crisis—a Ready Cold War policy of assured destruction that may be
Responsive Force—and a second able to respond to discarded before long in the dustbin of history.

4. Pavel Podvig at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation has suggested a notional Russian strategic nuclear force structure
in the future. His analysis, based on their current production programs for a total force size of 1,500 warheads, suggests their strategic rocket forces
sized to 600 warheads on 150 launchers and 500 warheads on their submarine force. These numbers will presumably decrease by agreement in
proportion to the lowered ceilings proposed for the U.S. forces. See [Link]
  See also: The Nuclear Turning Point, Harold A. Feiveson, editor, Brookings Institution Press, 1999; The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,
National Academies of Science Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academies Press, 1997; and Deutch, John, “A
Nuclear Posture for Today,” Foreign Affairs (Jan./Feb. 2005).

15
 Eventually we may hope to escape the nuclear
deterrence trap and get rid of all nuclear weapons.
That was the vision that President Reagan and General
Secretary Gorbachev brought to their Reykjavik
Summit in 1986. The challenge to rekindle that
vision and to develope a strategy to realize it was
addressed at a conference at Stanford University’s
Hoover Institution in 2006 and work toward that goal
is continuing with growing interest. (See article by
George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam
Nunn in The Wall Street Journal on January 4, 2007.)
In time, given the cooperation of other nations,
nuclear deterrence might be maintained entirely with
a Responsive Force without an operationally deployed
force. That Responsive Force could consist of
considerably fewer than 1,000 warheads, perhaps no
more than the 500 that we postulate would initially
be in the operationally deployed force.

Operationally Deployed Force

 Three Trident submarines on station at
sea, each loaded with 24 missiles and 96
warheads (a mix of low-yield W76s and U.S. Air Force

high-yield W88s). Reducing the D5 missiles’

full complement of eight warheads to four
per missile will substantially increase their
maximum operating areas. The United States currently deploys 500 Minuteman III
  The same numbers of missiles and warheads intercontinental ballistic missiles.
could be distributed on a larger number of
Trident submarines in the interest of greater
operational flexibility and survivability, albeit  50–100 additional Minuteman III missiles
at higher operational costs. taken off alert and without warheads, and
20–25 bombers, unarmed, in maintenance
 100 Minuteman III ICBMs in hardened silos, and training, all of which would comprise a
each with a single W87 warhead. Strategic Responsive Force, for a more slowly
building confrontation.
 20–25 B2 and B52H bombers configured for
gravity bombs or air-launched cruise missiles. Throughout the Cold War the United States
insisted on maintaining a triad of strategic nuclear
delivery systems—bombers plus land-based and sea-
Responsive Force
based ballistic missiles—to avoid common failure
 Three Trident submarines, each loaded with modes and vulnerabilities. There is value in retaining
96 warheads, in transit or being replenished this diversity as the total stockpile is decreased to
in port5 for their next missions as part of a 1,000 warheads, as a way of preserving flexibility and
Ready Responsive Force for a rapidly building confidence in reliability so long as operational costs
crisis, plus two or three unarmed boats in do not exceed their perceived value.
overhaul. The structure of the notional force of 1,000
warheads we are proposing is based on the existing
Arms Control Association

5. With reduced numbers of warheads below their current loadings, the Trident SLBMs will have significantly larger maximum flight ranges. For
example, decreasing the modern Trident D5 loading from the current 8 warheads to 4 as proposed here translates into a 50 percent increase in
the missile’s maximum range from 4,100 nautical miles to 6,200 nautical miles. This in turn means substantial target coverage while the boats are
in port as well as during transit. (See: John R. Harvey and Stefan Michalowski, “Nuclear Weapons Safety: The Case of Trident,” Science and Global
Security, 1994, vol. 4). In the event of further force reductions, to say a total of 500 warheads, there would most likely be a further reduction in
the number of warheads carried by each individual boat in order to sustain a flexible on- station and in- port refurbishing cycle. This could be
accomplished either by sealing off some of the 24 launch tubes on each Trident, or further downloading the number of warheads per missile,
thereby further increasing their maximum range.

16
e­ lements of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and its delivery storage. As the Nuclear Posture Review states,
systems: ballistic missile-armed submarines; land- “[D]elivery systems will not be retired following
based ICBMs; and cruise missiles and strategic bomb- initial reductions and downloaded warheads will be
ers. It is designed specifically to meet in a timely man- retained as needed for the responsive force.” If the
ner today’s urgent challenge to take advantage of the Responsive Force is to serve as insurance against the
opportunity opened by the new U.S.-Russian strategic need for a buildup, the Departments of Defense and
relationship. We believe that mov- Energy will have to treat it as such,
ing out of the deterrence trap more Bold actions by the two including assigning resources to the
expeditiously would help Russia powers that still possess upkeep of the delivery systems and
and the United States work more more than 90 percent warheads and contingency plans for
cooperatively against the looming reactivating the force.
of the world’s nuclear
threat of nuclear weapons prolifera- The U.S. nuclear warhead
tion into dangerous hands. Bold
warheads would be infrastructure must also be
actions by the two powers that still a powerful stimulus maintained and updated as required
possess more than 90 percent of the toward preserving and if more reliance is to be placed on
world’s nuclear warheads would be a further strengthening a the Responsive Force to sustain
powerful stimulus toward preserving nonproliferation regime and back up a credible nuclear
and further strengthening a nonpro- deterrent. Planning to maintain a
that is under severe
liferation regime that is under severe nuclear force structure of a given
strain. Meeting their commitments
strain. size must include an infrastructure
under Article VI of the 1968 nuclear able to refurbish or remanufacture
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to reduce their nuclear the limited-lifetime components of a nuclear warhead
arsenals and work toward an eventual, no matter how as required. These components include, for example,
distant goal of eliminating them would be good for a gas boost system that contains tritium with a
the nonproliferation regime. Moreover, it would also half-life for radioactive decay of 12.3 years and the
be good for their bilateral relationship. plutonium that constitutes the fission fuel.
In sum, we propose an appropriate U.S. force The radiation environment created by the
structure of 500 operationally deployed warheads, plutonium in the so-called pit of a nuclear weapon
plus 288 warheads in a Rapid Responsive Force, and can lead to changes in its crystal structure that
delivery systems in a Strategic Responsive Force may affect its explosive performance, resulting in
capable of deploying up to 212 additional warheads. warhead failure. The stockpile stewardship program
The United States and Russia should cooperate at the national weapons laboratories in the United
toward achieving this over the next five years, States is increasing the understanding on which
leading to forces of “500 plus 500 by 2012.” It is a to base confidence in the lifetime of existing pits
practical and timely step en route to the ultimate and in calculating the number of new ones that
goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. We recognize will have to be manufactured annually to maintain
that achieving that vision would require a world an arsenal. For example, in 2003, the Department
fundamentally different from today’s world, but the of Energy estimated that a 1,000-warhead arsenal
first steps can lead to changed circumstances and with pits that can age to 45 years before they need
changed political and security relationships. This replacement requires an annual production rate,
initiative can help pave a path toward realizing a on average, of fewer than 23 certified pits.6 This is
vision that has been embraced by many world leaders well within currently envisaged U.S. production
and U.S. presidents since 1945. capacity and would remain true for a force double
the size we recommend. In 2006, Department of
Energy studies on plutonium aging found that
To Sustain This Force
most U.S. warhead types will not be affected by
Several existing defense programs will have to be aging for 85 years or longer, further reducing pit
carried forward with the appropriate priority in order remanufacture rate requirements. Such issues
What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

to sustain a credible deterrent at lower levels. The first illustrate the necessity of maintaining a nuclear
is stewardship of the Responsive Force. The current warhead production infrastructure for as long as
Defense Department plan is to achieve reductions to the United States retains a nuclear force, but the
1,700 –2,200 operationally deployed warheads in the requirements are quite modest compared to Cold War
later stages of the process by downloading warheads levels, with their much larger numbers of warheads
from missiles and bombers and putting them into and shorter anticipated pit lifetimes. The nuclear

6. “Modern Pit Facility Draft Environmental Impact Statement,” National Nuclear Security Administration, January 4, 2003.
See <[Link]

17
 infrastructure must also sustain confidence in the delivery systems beyond those now slated for the
long-term reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons as the operationally deployed and responsive forces.
United States works to reduce the size of its arsenal The United States should encourage other nuclear-
drastically. Currently, a comprehensive and rigorous armed states to adopt similar procedures as a step
science-based stockpile stewardship program is being toward bringing them into a global nuclear arms
successfully pursued at the Los Alamos, Lawrence reduction program.
Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories. This
program gives strong assurance that the current U.S.
Contingencies Involving
nuclear stockpile is reliable and will remain so for the
Other Nations
foreseeable future.
More emphasis on adaptive planning also will As we noted earlier, future contingency planners are
be required to meet the contingencies discussed likely to consider whether nuclear weapons are needed
in preceding sections of this paper. As the Nuclear to deal with conceivable wartime scenarios. Our view,
Posture Review explains, “[A]daptive planning is to repeat, is that modern non-nuclear weapons almost
used to generate war plans quickly in time-critical certainly would be able to handle most foreseeable
situations.” This will probably require an upgrading of military challenges. Even if one assumes otherwise,
U.S. command and control capabilities. the target list would not generate requirements for
There are three final comments to be made on large numbers of nuclear warheads. Potential Chinese
force size. First, the warhead numbers we discuss targets are likely to cover the same generic list as
here are for the strategic nuclear forces and do not for Russia, cited above, including their strategic
include the tactical nuclear arsenal. Reductions in the strike forces, command and control centers, major
numbers of tactical weapons will have to be included military bases, and ports in the vicinity of Taiwan.
in implementing the strategic force reductions. The With China’s long-range nuclear forces remaining
force structure we have outlined is a very conservative at anything like their present levels, we do not
one in terms of target coverage, allowing for the fact believe this should generate U.S. force requirements
that the door is closing too slowly on the Cold War in addition to the numbers we have proposed for
orthodoxy of assured destruction thinking by the hypothetical emergencies involving Russia. The same
United States and Russia. After a transition stage of warhead can be targeted against multiple designated
surely less than a decade, a further halving of the ground zeros. Yet, if there were drastic changes in the
total warhead levels should follow, with all remaining worldwide strategic picture that led the United States
warheads being assigned to a Responsive Force. to simultaneous major nuclear confrontations against
Second, this number of warheads would also Russia and China, the United States would evidently
cover for deterrence purposes all the other potential begin a major buildup of its own. This would take
targets in other countries, assuming nuclear restraint time, but so would a major Chinese buildup. The
elsewhere in the world. It is not necessary to have a interim force configuration of “500+500” that we
separate deterrent force for each potential or present propose provides a ready basis for such U.S. action.
adversary because two or more nuclear conflicts at the The warhead delivery capacity of the Trident force can
same time is a very unlikely scenario. Pre-planning be doubled above the level to which we have proposed
and adaptive planning can make use of deployed downloading it, and as we have described earlier, the
warheads for a variety of contingencies. Massive United States would maintain a functioning nuclear
pre-planned attack options are relics of the past and infrastructure.
should be left in that status. Regarding potential targets in North Korea or Iran,
Third, in order to insure against the possibility of the list would be much shorter because the territories
negotiated force reductions being rapidly reversed and are smaller, and the numbers of defense-related
to provide confidence to the rest of the world, the installations are much fewer than in Russia and
United States and Russia should negotiate verifiable China. That list would very likely be limited to single
procedures for destroying excess warheads and digits in each country.
Arms Control Association

18
 SECTION 4

Are New U.S. Nuclear

Weapons Needed?

A
lthough the systems we propose for the “500+500” force were designed against

a very different Cold War threat, they can readily be adapted to meet today’s

challenges to U.S. national security. Here, we will discuss potential benefits as well

as problems with undertaking some of the technical changes that may be considered for

adapting U.S. forces to the new post-Cold War strategic environment. In some cases, the

changes would be straightforward and valuable to implement and are already underway.

Others of questionable military value might prove more harmful than helpful to U.S.

national security due to their potential, even likely negative impact on efforts to sustain and

strengthen the nonproliferation regime. They should be rejected.

The United States has built and currently is proceeding, relying on comprehensive surveillance,
maintains a nuclear arsenal that is robust and reliable forensics, diagnostics, extensive simulations with new
and should remain so for the foreseeable future. computers, and experiments with advanced facilities.
Congressional pressure during George H. W. Bush’s In fact, it has served to enhance confidence in the
presidency led the U.S. government to recognize arsenal and in the U.S. ability to hear and heed any
that there was no need to develop and test new warning bells of unanticipated problems that may
nuclear warhead designs. This helped lead to the develop in the future.
U.S. moratorium on underground nuclear tests that One direct way to simplify the process of certifying
is still in effect. As a consequence, existing warheads the reliability and effectiveness of the warheads and
are remaining in the arsenal for more years than to sustain this confidence over a longer period of time
originally anticipated and longer than had been is to increase their performance margins. An example
the case during the first five decades of the nuclear of this is to further enhance the explosive energy
era, during which the arsenal was being regularly provided by the primary stage of a nuclear weapon
modernized with new designs based on technological above the minimum required to ignite the secondary,
advances. An enhanced, multifaceted, science-based or main, stage of a nuclear weapon. A straightforward
program of stockpile stewardship was established way to do this that requires no explosive testing to
in 1994 to provide confidence to the U.S. weapons validate is by adjusting the boost gas fill in the primary
community and, through it, to the government that during scheduled maintenance or remanufacturing
the health of the stockpile and the way in which activities. This is an example of an existing process for
What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

special bomb materials age is well understood. maintaining long-term high confidence in the arsenal.
This strong technical and scientific program at the It is already available, has high merit, and should
national weapons laboratories is providing a deeper continue to be implemented.7 This approach is the
understanding of the performance of these weapons. appropriate focus of effort for the Reliable Replacement
Maintaining and refurbishing the warheads, as well as Warhead (RRW) program currently being funded at the
sustaining the competence of the weapons scientists, U.S. national weapons laboratories.

7. Executive Summary, JASON Report on Nuclear Testing, JSR-95-320 (August 1, 1995).

19
 The key question for the RRW program is: can Such warheads will deliver a shock to destroy an
we achieve its goals of increasing confidence in the underground bunker that is 10–20 times stronger
nuclear arsenal and its long-term safety, reliability, than that of the same warhead exploded at or above
and use control without underground testing? We do the earth’s surface, in which case much more of its
not know the answer to that question at present, and blast energy would be spent in the atmosphere.
unless an informed scientific consensus can answer Many hardened underground targets are at
it positively, the RRW program should not move relatively shallow depths of some 30 meters,
forward into a development stage toward manufactur- particularly large industrial targets for manufacturing
ing warheads with new or modified designs. To do so weapons or producing fissile material to fuel nuclear
would be a mistake. It takes an extraordinary flight weapons. Other targets of very high value are
of imagination to postulate a modern new arsenal more likely to be buried at depths of 300 meters or
composed of such untested designs that would be more and reinforced to withstand over-pressures of
more reliable, safe, and effective than the current U.S. 1,000 atmospheres or more. Assuming the optimal
arsenal based on more than 1,000 tests since 1945. A penetration capability into the earth, taking into
comprehensive and rigorous stockpile maintenance account experimental data and known limits on
program confirms and sustains this material strengths, a warhead’s
high confidence. If testing were It takes an extraordinary yield would have to be significantly
to be resumed, the damage to the larger than 100 kilotons for the
flight of imagination to
broader nonproliferation regime, shock from its blast to reach down
and thus to U.S. security interests,
postulate a modern new to 300 meters with enough strength
would far outweigh any conceivable arsenal composed of such to destroy such targets. That is
advantages to be gained from the untested designs that certainly not a low-yield weapon.
new designs. Other nuclear-weapon would be more reliable, The primitive atomic bomb that
states, most notably China, would safe, and effective than pulverized Hiroshima had a yield
surely follow the U.S. testing lead. of only
the current U.S. arsenal
Non-nuclear-weapon states would 15 kilotons.
interpret resumed U.S. nuclear test-
based on more than Low-yield warheads, with
ing as a repudiation of Washington’s 1,000 tests since 1945. yields less than five kilotons,
NPT commitments, which could offer a possibility of attacking
have serious implications for how they might then underground military targets at shallow depths,
view their own treaty obligations. particularly those containing biological and
Two initiatives proposed by the Bush chemical weapons. Their alleged value is that the
administration for developing new earth-penetrating reduced collateral damage they would cause makes
weapons have also raised serious concerns. One them more useable. It is unavoidable, however,
called for developing advanced concepts for very low- that any such warhead that has penetrated into
yield weapons that were advocated as being “more the earth as deep as it can before detonating will
useable” for limited military missions, particularly still create a huge cloud of radioactive debris and
against shallow underground targets, because of the a very large crater. The blast of even a very low-
reduced collateral damage they would cause. They yield, one-kiloton earth penetrator, detonated at
were also proposed for neutralizing stored biological its maximum penetration depth of 15 meters into
and chemical agents without dispersing them widely. dry hard rock, will eject more than one million
A second program, called the Robust Nuclear Earth cubic feet of radioactive debris from a crater about
Penetrator (RNEP) program, would have converted an the size of ground zero at the World Trade Center.
existing high-yield, air-delivered nuclear bomb into A nuclear weapon with at least a 100-kiloton yield
an earth penetrator to make it more effective against capable of destroying a hardened target 300 meters
deeply buried and hardened targets. underground will dig a much larger crater and create
The need for such earth-penetrating weapons is a substantially greater amount of radioactive debris.
highlighted in the Nuclear Posture Review, in order The technical realities of nuclear weapons and
“to defeat emerging threats such as hardened and their value in destroying biological and chemical
deeply buried targets” of military interest being built weapons must also not be exaggerated. In order
Arms Control Association

in many countries. to neutralize the deadly effects of biological

The effectiveness of warheads for destroying pathogens and chemical gases, they must be
hardened underground targets is enhanced if their subjected to very high temperatures or radiation
designs are sufficiently rugged so that, when delivered levels. The energetic neutrons and gamma rays
by aircraft or missile, they can be rammed into the emitted in a nuclear explosion that create such
earth intact and penetrate some three or more meters extreme conditions, however, do not travel many
into the earth without damage before detonating. meters from the point of an explosion underground

20
U.S. Air Force

The B61-11 bomb being dropped here is an earth penetrator currently in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Congress rejected the Bush
administration proposal for modifications to the high-yield B83 warhead to make it an earth-penetrator as well.

before they are absorbed by the earth. In contrast, the only superpower to develop and deploy new low-
shock from the explosion will extend out far and yield nuclear weapons as bunker busters that are
wide, as is observed in earthquakes, spreading debris presumably “more useable” in limited war-fighting
from large craters, as discussed above, that very situations, would send a clear, negative signal about
likely will contain sizable quantities of the deadly the nonproliferation regime to non-nuclear-weapon
agents.8 Therefore, they would be more likely to states. If the United States, the strongest nation in
spread these agents widely rather than to destroy the world, concluded that it could not protect its
them completely. vital interests without relying on a newly developed
On quantitative technical grounds, one is led to nuclear weapon, it would be a clear signal to other
conclude that low-yield penetrators are of marginal nations that nuclear weapons are necessary for their
military value, useful only for relatively shallow security purposes too. This would hardly contribute
targets. The collateral damage they cause may be to dissuading them from joining the nuclear club.
reduced due to their lower yield, but the physical de- In fact, because resumed nuclear explosive testing
struction, not to mention the political fallout, would might eventually be required for a newly designed
still be very considerable. Recalling Eisenhower’s weapon, the United States would most likely deal a
warning in 1956 that, with nuclear weapons, “we are fatal blow to the nonproliferation regime in order
rapidly getting to the point that no war can be won” to have a capability of questionable military value.
and that, although conventional wars can be fought Such concerns led Congress to refuse funding for this
to exhaustion and surrender, nuclear war can come concept in the fiscal year 2005 budget, and no new
close to “destruction of the enemy and suicide,” does funding request has been made since.
it make any sense at all to cross the nuclear threshold, The argument for the RNEP initiative to develop
especially for limited military missions? a high-yield earth-penetrating weapon is based on
What is the likely impact on U.S. security of a the goal of holding at risk hardened and deeply
What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

new initiative for new low-yield weapons? First, the buried targets at depths of 300 meters or more. In this
United States already possesses tested and deployed instance, we are talking about weapons with yields
weapons, both conventional and nuclear, that of hundreds of kilotons to megatons. This wartime
would be effective for missions against shallow situation may be one in which conventional weapons
bunkers. In view of that, a decision by the world’s might not be able to do the job, and thus a nuclear

8. May, M. and Haldeman Z., “Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons Against Buried Biological Agents,” pgs. 91–114; and, and Nelson R. W., Nuclear
‘Bunker Busters’ Would More Likely Disperse than Destroy Buried Stockpiles of Biological and Chemical Agents,” pgs. 69-90, Science and Global
Security, vol. 12, nos. 1–2, 2004.

21
 weapon might be required. As such, this requirement and resources that can be sealed off by conventional
needs thorough analysis. munitions if their positions can be pinpointed.
The need for such a capability was recognized These vulnerabilities can be exploited with accurate
and addressed appropriately for many years during intelligence; specialized delivery systems; tailored
the Cold War. The Soviet Union no longer exists, munitions; and when possible, special forces on the
however, and, in words of Bush and Putin, neither ground at the critical sites. The United States is, as it
the United States nor Russia “regards the other as an should be, working on important projects to achieve
enemy or threat” but as “increasingly allied against gains in the effectiveness of tactics such as these. It is
terrorism.” not necessary to destroy hardened
If any new threats are emerging underground targets physically by
It is not necessary
in other countries with deeper and crushing them with large nuclear
harder targets than those presented
to destroy hardened blasts in order to defeat them as a
by the former Soviet Union, the underground targets threat.
United States has a number of physically by crushing Given enormous U.S.
options for holding them at risk. them with large nuclear intelligence and conventional
One, of course, is to target them blasts in order to defeat military assets, not to mention
with several of our existing nuclear its great relative strength, there
them as a threat.
bombs with the highest yields. is no credible military case for
Furthermore, the effectiveness RNEP. Recognizing existing U.S.
of these weapons can be greatly enhanced by military capabilities, including high-yield nuclear
improvements in precision of delivery and in accuracy warheads, and the likely harmful impact of such
of the intelligence in locating and identifying such an initiative by the world’s only superpower on
targets. The United States also has a substantial ability international efforts to preserve and strengthen the
to render hardened underground targets ineffective nonproliferation regime, the Congress determined
with conventional military systems. These kinds the additional capabilities of new nuclear bunker-
of targets have vulnerable points, such as air ducts buster weapons are not worth the high costs and
and tunnel entrances for personnel, equipment, eliminated funding for this program.

Arms Control Association

22
 SECTION 5

Including Other
Nuclear-Weapon States

W
e suggested above that a significant buildup of China’s strategic nuclear

forces could adversely affect the builddown that Russia and the United States

should carry out in the next few years. The broader point is that each of the

de jure and de facto nuclear-weapon states will have to be involved in some fashion in the

effort to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in international security relations. Given

the up-and-down history of the U.S.-Russian relationship, it would be prudent to pursue

further verifiable reductions in operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads and

delivery systems through new legally binding arrangements. Other nuclear-armed countries

could reciprocate the actions of Russia and the United States, thus moving all closer toward

zero nuclear weapons. The actions that each of the states directly involved might take are

described below.

China deployed nuclear forces. The point here is that the

reductions programs we are advocating require an
We suggested in The Gravest Danger that a U.S.-
effort to resolve or at least contain regional conflicts.
China Consultative Group for Strategic Security be
The impact on requirements for U.S. operationally
established, along the lines of the U.S.-Russia group.
deployed warheads of a worsening situation in
This could be a vehicle for exchanging information
regional conflict situations would be minimal, as
concerning strategic nuclear force structures in each
noted above. Yet, the impact on the force levels of
country. For China, a key agenda item probably
other states, for example, China, could be more
would be the U.S. ballistic missile defense program,
pronounced, and this could unravel the effort to
while for the United States, the Chinese ICBM
reduce the salience of nuclear weapons on a global
modernization programs would be of interest. If both
scale.
sides were convinced that their worst-case threat
In addition to political negotiations between India
scenarios would probably not materialize, nuclear
and Pakistan over Kashmir, measures to improve the
restraint would be easier to manage.
safety and security of Indian and Pakistani nuclear
What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

forces would have a positive effect on the regional

India and Pakistan security environment. Indian and Pakistani coopera-
tion with other nuclear-weapon states in this regard
Both countries are already showing restraint in
could run afoul of the NPT, but if properly calculated,
their nuclear programs. In the environment we
the effort should strengthen the NPT regime.
are projecting, third-country threats such as China
would not increase to the level where a response,
in the case of India, would be required. That said, Israel
the tensions between the two countries of the
Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be
subcontinent could foster a buildup of operationally
the first step in including Israel in a program to

23
 reduce the salience of nuclear weapons globally. The United Kingdom
Thereafter, the most likely diplomatic track would and France
be a resumption of discussions concerning a nuclear-
Both countries have very capable nuclear forces
weapon-free zone in the Middle East.
and force levels that would loom larger as the
United States and Russia reduced their operationally
Iran deployed nuclear warheads to the levels we believe
should be possible. This suggests the United Kingdom
Since mid-2006, negotiations between Iran, France,
and France would want to consider their force
Germany, and the United Kingdom regarding
requirements in light of the levels that the United
Iran’s uranium enrichment program have broken
States and Russia are actually able to achieve. As in
down. The UN Security Council has called on Iran
other cases, such as China, the mechanism to record
to suspend the program, yet Iran has proceeded.
any revised force levels would be through unilateral
If negotiations resume, it is possible that Iran can
decisions announced in consultations with other
be persuaded to suspend its enrichment and other
concerned states, probably in this case meaning
sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities. This would
Russia, first and foremost.
likely require the extension of negative security
assurances, and in that case, the United States will
have to make a strategic decision about its future Cooperation in Ballistic Missile
relations with Iran. Iran will have to do the same. Defense
The most immediate need would be to reassure Iran
If the holdings of nuclear weapons by the United
that U.S. forces in the Middle East are not a threat
States and other countries can be brought down to
to its security and in fact can serve Iran’s interests in
very low levels, an idea discussed during the Reagan
that volatile region of the world.
presidency should be reconsidered, that of “defense
dominance.” In principle, there should be a crossover
North Korea point in the offense-defense equation where defensive
capabilities against ballistic missiles exceed the ability
As progress in six-party negotiations with North
of an attacker to penetrate ballistic missile defenses.
Korea suggest, it is not too late to reverse the North
In Reykjavik in 1986, Reagan discussed with Soviet
Korean nuclear weapons program, although the
leader Mikhail Gorbachev a plan to
prospects for doing that remain
zero out all U.S. and Soviet ballistic
uncertain. North Korea is a key factor
missiles and to cooperate fully in
in decisions that other Asian states
ballistic missile defenses. In doing
may make concerning their own
so, Reagan was quite consciously
nuclear weapons status. Of these,
pursuing this argument to its logical
Japan is the most consequential
conclusion. Is it too much to think
because a Japanese decision to
that such action may define a path
acquire nuclear weapons would
leading to a world free of the curse of
trigger rethinking in other Asian
nuclear weapons?
states. For that reason, efforts to
We suggested in The Gravest
engage North Korea, as in the six-
Danger that international
party talks, are essential. Failing
cooperation in ballistic missile
to do so or having tried and failed
defense should be a key component
to reach an accommodation, the
of a multinational coalition to
only resort will be containment, in
combat the further spread of
which the United States and other
nuclear weapons capabilities. In
regional powers should cooperate,
an environment where total global
of course, in a nonprovocative
numbers of deployed warheads
fashion. This calls for a positive
on ballistic missiles are in the few
program of cooperation among all of
hundreds, it would make sense to
North Korea’s neighbors and others,
have a joint ballistic missile defense
Arms Control Association

rather than mobilizing a narrowly

program among cooperating states.
constructed anti-North Korean In August 1998, North Korea
surprised the United States by It would help to stabilize their own
alliance. As in the Middle East and
conducting a flight test of its Taepo strategic nuclear relationships with
South Asia, an effort to reduce the
Dong-1 medium-range ballistic each other and would link them in
salience of nuclear weapons globally missile. The missile’s third stage an effort to thwart the ambitions of
requires attention to the resolution failed. North Korea tested several
noncooperating states. A cooperative
or containment of regional conflicts. types of missiles in mid-2006.

24
Pete Souza, White House

President Ronald Reagan at the Reykjavik summit in October 1986 with (left) White House chief of staff Donald T. Regan
and national security adviser John M. Poindexter. At Reykjavik, Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev discussed
eliminating all ballistic missiles, but they failed to reach an agreement because of a dispute over U.S. missile defense efforts.

program to develop an international, satellite-based missile defense activities, but little has been done
early warning system against potential missile in this regard. Instead, U.S. and Russian leaders are
attacks could further strengthen these relationships. at odds over plans for U.S. ballistic missile defenses
The principal requirement for membership in this and radars in Eastern Europe, and Russia claims to
coalition would be a firm agreement that each of be accelerating its missile modernization programs
them will act in accordance with the prescriptions of in response to what it believes could become a
the NPT. Bush and Putin formally agreed at Moscow significant threat to its shrinking land-based nuclear-
in May 2002 that they would cooperate in ballistic armed offensive ballistic missile force.

What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

25
 Section 6

Why the Urgency?

W
hy not let well enough alone and take deeper reductions in U.S. nuclear forces

after 2012? Has the matter become more urgent since a few years ago? In our

view, it has. There are four factors that necessitate deeper reductions faster.

 The nonproliferation regime needs to be put into effect through the mechanism of the NPT;
strengthened, and it can be by a visible effort by (2) the post-Cold War regime established mainly
Russia and the United States to reduce the salience through the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction
of nuclear weapons in their force postures. program sponsored originally by Senators Sam
Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), and (3)
 Neither Russia nor the United States will resolve the set of multinational arrangements put in place
their most basic national security problems during Bush’s first term, including the Global Threat
through maintaining higher levels of nuclear Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security
weapons than necessary. Rather, they should focus Initiative (PSI), and UN Security Council Resolution
more intently on preventing the acquisition of 1540, designed to strengthen national controls
nuclear materials by terrorist groups, an almost over fissile material. Each of these three layers of
certain outcome if present trends continue.

 A tipping point has been reached in Asia that could

lead to a nuclear arms race there and to pressures
on Russia and the United States to increase, rather
than reduce, their nuclear forces.

 Budgetary pressures in Russia and in the United

States indicate that, where unnecessary defense
expenditures can be avoided in favor of a more
rational use of resources, perhaps in other areas of
defense, this should be done.

To amplify these points, first, as to the non-

proliferation regime, then-CIA Director George
Tenet told the Senate on March 9, 2004, that the
proliferation picture “is changing before our eyes;
changing at a rate I have not seen since the end of
U.S. Department of Energy

the Cold War.” It is a time when the outcome of a

decades-long nonproliferation effort hangs in the
balance. A failure to move vigorously to maintain
Arms Control Association

the nonproliferation regime could lead to a world far

more dangerous than at present.
Here, it should be recalled that the
nonproliferation regime consists of several layers “Grable” was a 15 kiloton nuclear test explosion fired on
of defenses: (1) the global norms established by the May 25, 1953 at the Nevada Test Site. The United States
conducted a total of 1,032 nuclear detonations; the Soviet
NPT, monitored by the International Atomic Energy Union conducted 750 test explosions. A total of eight states
Agency (IAEA), and supporting export control regimes have conducted 2,053 nuclear explosions since 1945.

26
defense would be strengthened by a more dramatic land-based version of its Topol-M ICBM and a new
U.S.-Russian turn away from reliance on nuclear sea-based ballistic missile, the Bulava.
weapons and a turn toward stronger support for the China is also increasing its defense spending, is
nonproliferation regime. building up its short-range missile numbers, and
Second, the spread of nuclear technology, may soon begin to field a new generation of strategic
particularly for enriching uranium, has heightened nuclear-capable missiles.
concerns that terrorists or rogue nations will acquire Is another nuclear arms race just over the horizon?
nuclear weapons. Regarding U.S. and Russian security, Quite possibly. Action is needed now to head it off,
it is generally agreed that the gravest threat they each and not just because the results in themselves would
face is at the crossroads of technology and radicalism, be catastrophic. The sad and ironic fact is that these
as Bush has put it. National resources and energy competitive efforts would do nothing to deal with the
spent on supporting a higher level of strategic nuclear more urgent threats of nuclear terrorism and of the
forces than necessary means that those national increasing probability that, somewhere in the world,
efforts are being misdirected. nuclear weapons will be used in warfare. In fact, a
Third, in India and probably China, national new arms race would only make the problem worse.
decisions are pending about how far to go in For all these reasons, we judge that the urgency
developing strategic offensive forces. North Korea of getting on with deeper reductions in U.S. and
and Iran may have nuclear weapons capabilities. If Russian operationally deployed nuclear warheads
the battle to hold back this potential surge of nuclear is greater than the two nations’ leaders thought in
buildups is lost, decisions will be made by other 2001 and 2002. Both leaders clearly envisaged deeper
countries, certainly including Japan reductions and enshrined the idea
and probably, ultimately, Russia and in a solemn document they signed.
It is wrong-headed to
the United States, which will restart Now is the time to move toward
a nuclear arms race. For more than
place more reliance on that vision.
three decades, the nonproliferation nuclear weapons when The U.S. priority should be
regime has successfully staved off the nation’s chief priority timely and bold actions, consistent
dire predictions that dozens of is in preventing the with U.S. national security needs,
countries would arm themselves further spread of these to shore up international support
with nuclear weapons, but that for the nonproliferation regime.
weapons.
nuclear nightmare could still unfold Elsewhere in The Gravest Danger,
if existing nuclear-weapon states we have written of the need to
reverse their downward trend. buttress the NPT with adequate means of verifying
Fourth, regarding the budgetary squeeze, the and enforcing compliance. This includes the PSI
Bush administration has regularly sought nearly to intercept proliferation in progress; the creation
$6.5 billion for funding nuclear weapons programs, of regional centers under international control
an increase over the fiscal 2006 appropriation. Last for supplying enriched uranium as fuel for power
year, Congress did not grant the administration’s reactors and reprocessing plutonium; enhanced
entire request, in particular for the research of earth- support for an expanded Cooperative Threat
penetrating nuclear warheads and enhancing test Reduction program; and the Additional Protocol
site readiness. Congressional motivation in rejecting allowing IAEA on-site inspections as appropriate. We
the administration’s request is exactly the same as have also called for economic and security guarantees
the argument being made here: it is wrong-headed as the “carrots” to accompany the enforcement
to place more reliance on nuclear weapons when the “sticks” for NPT compliance. The proposal presented
nation’s chief priority is in preventing the further above sets a practical, short-term goal for nuclear
spread of these weapons. force reductions that the United States could initiate
Fifth, in Russia, overall defense spending is rising. jointly with Russia and that the other nuclear powers
The program includes money for modernizing could subsequently join. We see it as enhancing the
strategic offensive forces, among them the nonproliferation regime by encouraging the present
What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

development of a mysterious weapon, purported to nuclear-weapon states to collaborate more effectively

be a hypersonic cruise missile, touted by Putin. Russia together to roll back nuclear proliferation before it is
is also pushing ahead with plans to field a mobile, too late.

27
 Appendix 1 Cold War Thinking
About Nuclear Weapons

The First Decade, 1945–54 satellite, in 1957, signaling the advent of the age
of ICBMs. Soon, the two superpowers could deliver
During the first decade after the obliteration of hydrogen bombs anywhere in the world within about
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and following the failure of 30 minutes. Fears of a devastating surprise attack
U.S.-Soviet discussions about the possibility of mutual haunted military planners and political leaders. The
nuclear restraint, an all-out technical-industrial race response was not to rid the world of these weapons
to develop nuclear weapons began. The U.S. arsenal but rather to make them more survivable. France
grew rapidly, driven by advancing technology and (1959) and China (1964) joined the United States,
by mounting fears of the expansionist policies of the the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom as
Soviet autocrat, Joseph Stalin. Starting with only a nuclear-weapon states. The size of the world’s nuclear
few primitive fission bombs in 1945, the U.S. arsenal, arsenals ballooned from slightly more than 3,000 in
supported by a rapidly expanding production base, 1955 to more than 37,000 by 1965, with more than
exceeded 3,000 bombs by 1955.9 These weapons were 99 percent held by the United States (approximately
mostly aircraft-delivered gravity bombs, but some 31,000) and the Soviet Union (an estimated 6,000).
low-yield weapons were also developed for battlefield Yet, also in this period, serious diplomatic discourse
use if needed to repel a Soviet attack on Western and formal negotiations between the West and the
Europe. The danger of the actual use of nuclear Soviet Union were resumed, after a lapse of several
weapons in combat, whether in Asia or in the event years, to address the risks of nuclear weapons. These
of an attack on Western Europe, loomed menacingly risks included not only their use in combat, but also
since the early years of the Cold War, which were the environmental and health hazards created by
marked by repeated crises, including the 1948 Berlin nuclear fallout from test explosions and the spread
blockade and North Korea’s 1950 invasion of South of nuclear weapons to other countries. The question
Korea. The test of the first Soviet atomic bomb in “What are nuclear weapons for?” was broadened to
1949, followed by a Soviet buildup to an arsenal of include:
several hundred bombs by 1955, raised tensions in an
environment in which fear and suspicion were already  How can choices in force structure reduce the risk
pervasive. A wider range of military options became of pre-emptive use of these weapons in combat?
possible for both sides, given the growing numbers
and sophistication of nuclear weapons and delivery  Through diplomatic means, can we make a start
systems. in containing the dangers of an unrestrained arms
Competition in building hydrogen bombs (two- race, of radioactive fallout, and of proliferation of
stage fission-fusion bombs) commenced with the nuclear weapons?
detonation of the initial U.S. device in 1952 and of
the Russian one not long after. By the end of the first In practice, as can be seen from the numbers
nuclear decade, 1945–1954, the United Kingdom also above, the fear of surprise nuclear attack did next to
had become a nuclear-weapon state. nothing to limit the overall magnitude of the buildup
of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces. In fact, it spurred
The Second Decade, 1955–64 the buildup. The enormous growth during this decade
Arms Control Association

was driven not only by political forces reacting to the

During the second decade of the nuclear era, the strategic dangers on the world scene, but also by the
buildup of nuclear arsenals accelerated. The Soviet irresistible lure of technology—multiple warheads
Union launched Sputnik, the first earth-orbiting on a single missile and much greater accuracy, for

9. This and the following estimates of force levels are taken from R.S. Norris and T.B. Cochran, Nuclear Weapons Databook: U.S.-U.S.S.R./Russian
Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces, 1945–96. (Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources Defense Council, January 1997).

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example—which opened doors for new missions Following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, President
for nuclear weapons. It was a matter of worst-case John F. Kennedy stepped up efforts to achieve a treaty
threat analysis feeding the most optimistic technical banning nuclear weapons testing. This succeeded in
projections. part in 1963 with a limited treaty ruling out all tests
Mounting fears about nuclear war were driven except those conducted underground.
during this period by a number of events: the Soviet A technical effort had been initiated earlier, under
repression of the 1956 Hungarian uprising, the 1957 Eisenhower and starting with the U-2 flights, to
Soviet launch of Sputnik, the 1961 construction of penetrate the Iron Curtain by photo and electronic
the Berlin Wall, and the test of the Soviet Union’s reconnaissance from space to gauge the growing
largest nuclear device that same year. The 1962 Cuban threats better, without either under- or overestimating
missile crisis appeared to give confirmation to the them. Eventually, this made it possible to begin the
inevitability of nuclear catastrophe. negotiation of subsequent strategic nuclear arms
Of key importance for the United States in those agreements with verifiable limits on offensive nuclear
circumstances was the survivability of its deterrent deployments.
forces. This problem was managed by deploying a Throughout this decade, there was a growing
broad array of retaliatory systems to ensure a capacity appreciation that the only rational mission for
for inflicting massive and unacceptable destruction in nuclear weapons was for a second-strike retaliation
response to any pre-emptive first strike by an enemy. as a way of deterring potential enemy attack. In the
This force included the B-52 bombers that could take Kennedy administration, U.S. doctrine began to
off under severe threat conditions and be recalled emphasize conventional arms buildups as the more
if desired; a land-based ICBM force in hardened realistic alternative response to threats. Kennedy
underground silos that could be destroyed only by graphically expressed the dangers nuclear arsenals
weapons targeted and delivered with precise accuracy posed to survival on June 10, 1963:
and little, if any, warning; and a mobile naval force of
Total war makes no sense in an age when
nuclear-powered Polaris submarines with prolonged great powers can maintain large and relatively
underwater endurance that could sail undetected invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender
and thus were invulnerable to a potential first strike. without resort to those forces. It makes no sense
The U.S. strategic triad was put in place during this in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains
almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all
decade. It remains in place today.
of the Allied air forces in the Second World War. It
The stated U.S. force mission was not pre-emption, makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons
but deterrence by threat of nuclear retaliation. It was produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by
to convince the Soviet Union that, no matter how wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners
successful a nuclear attack on the United States and of the globe and to generations yet unborn.
its forces might be, U.S. retaliatory capability would
inflict unacceptable devastation on the attacker. The
Soviet Union made similar claims about its intentions The Third Decade, 1965–74
and forces, but it was increasingly difficult for either During the third decade of the nuclear era,
side to accept such assurances at face value. the concept of deterrence by mutual assured
So, it had become politically important to destruction was elaborated, with added nuances and
moderate and, if possible, dispel fears of nuclear requirements. With improving accuracy of missiles
pre-emption. Otherwise, those fears would drive and the variety of reliable nuclear warheads being
out all possibility of finding a cooperative solution deployed, both nations started developing strike
to the nuclear dilemma and become a self- forces with counterforce capability against hardened
fulfilling prophesy. As early as 1956, the creation military and industrial targets. Technology inspired
and deployment of thermonuclear weapons led scenarios of controlled strikes, that is, limited attacks
Eisenhower to remark, “We are rapidly getting to by nuclear weapons as opposed to an all-out massive
the point that no war can be won.” He added that strike, and protracted nuclear war. It also inspired
conventional wars can be fought to exhaustion concerns that the advantages of a first strike might
What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

and surrender, but nuclear war can come close to tempt an opponent to attack in order to end up
“destruction of the enemy and suicide.” In this spirit, “relatively better off” in the nuclear rubble. War-
Eisenhower led an effort to initiate a broad dialogue fighting doctrines replaced simple massive retaliation
on nuclear dangers and also peaceful benefits, with threats as the best means of sustaining nuclear
the 1955 Atoms for Peace Conference and the 1956 deterrence.
creation of the IAEA. Technological advances in weaponry were
Additional diplomatic initiatives to limit the accompanied by broadening diplomatic efforts to
explosive testing of nuclear weapons were pursued try to cap the nuclear arms competition. Two new
at a disarmament conference in London in 1957. nations, India and presumably Israel, became ­

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 de facto nuclear-weapon states during this period, and negotiations. It recognized the limits of technology in
concerns about proliferation led to the negotiation providing such a defense but allowed for thin system
of the NPT, which entered into force in 1970. This deployments, more for cosmetic than real military
treaty became the cornerstone of a worldwide effort purpose. In the United States, these deployments were
to freeze the number of nuclear-weapon states. As eventually dismantled, being of little or no value.
expressed in the preamble to the NPT and in Article At the same time, the United States and the Soviet
VI of that treaty, the original five nuclear-weapon Union signed an Interim Agreement to limit their
states were committed to efforts to reduce the nuclear number of deployed ICBMs and submarine-launched
arms competition and eventually to eliminate nuclear ballistic missiles as well as their modernization
weapons. programs. The treaty also recognized the legitimacy of
The rate of growth in the total numbers of nuclear verifying treaty compliance using national technical
weapons slowed somewhat during this period. The means (i.e., satellites in earth-circling orbits).
total inventories of the two superpowers reached Despite these successes, the two superpowers
47,000, comprising more than 98 percent of the remained poised eyeball to eyeball, with their nuclear
world’s total. While the estimated U.S. total decreased pistols cocked. Mutual assured destruction, a phrase
slightly to 27,000, the Soviet Union’s arsenal increased popularized by McNamara, continued to be accepted
to 20,000. As the U.S. and Soviet numbers of nuclear as an inescapable condition of the nuclear age.
weapons converged, their negotiations focused on Nuclear weapons were not used in the bitter war in
limiting those forces directly threatening each other’s Vietnam, just as they had not been used earlier in
homeland. These negotiations became known as the Korea. This extended the tradition of non-use, even in
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The advent of otherwise unwinnable conflicts.
multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles
(MIRVs), which enabled single missiles to deliver
The Fourth Decade, 1975–84
multiple warheads with precision against separate
targets, complicated the SALT negotiations. The fourth decade of the nuclear era was a period
A first strike by MIRVed ICBMs targeted against the in which force modernization continued apace and
silos of an opponent’s ICBM force could destroy many the size of the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile
more missiles than used in the attack. This ratio would almost doubled to approximately 39,000 while the
thereby give an advantage to the first attacker by U.S. force shrank slightly to 23,000 warheads. The
seriously diminishing the opponent’s retaliatory force. two superpowers continued to possess more than 98
MIRVing had the result of significantly increasing percent of all the nuclear weapons in the world and
the total number of warheads and opened up the the nuclear club was enlarged, surreptitiously, by only
possibility of targeting a broader array of industrial one nation, South Africa. After the ABM Treaty and
sites and military installations. Yet, negotiations two strategic offensive arms limitation treaties, SALT I
failed to limit MIRVing. New targets were added to and SALT II, little negotiating progress was made with
an already long list in the war plans. The increasing the Soviet Union under several years of transitional
accuracy of missiles made counterforce a more leaders in the Kremlin and as anti-détente attitude
attractive strategic option. Post-war recovery of the hardened in the United States. President Jimmy Carter
enemy also became a consideration for targeteers. withdrew SALT II from Senate consideration following
MIRVing pointed to a conclusion that it would be the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
more important for arms control agreements to focus Soviet deployment of MIRVed SS-20 missiles,
on limiting warheads rather than delivery systems. designed to target Western Europe, led to
However, the technology of photoreconnaissance countermeasures by NATO in the form of
satellites circling the earth in space could not count intermediate-range nuclear forces. The decision to
the individual warheads, and the state of U.S.-Soviet deploy these forces, made by NATO in 1979, was
relations was such that direct inspection of the implemented in 1983 after a failed negotiation to
delivery vehicles was unacceptable. Therefore, the limit such deployments on both sides.
arms control talks focused on limiting the number of When Reagan took office in 1981, he proposed
long-range bombers and missile launchers for nuclear that the total number of nuclear warheads should
weapons. be reduced rather than simply capped at higher
Arms Control Association

Ballistic missile defense had been under study in levels. Later, in 1983, he launched perhaps the most
the United States since shortly after World War II. contentious and potentially significant initiative in
The first major U.S. effort to deploy some defenses this decade: the proposal to build a missile defense
against a nuclear attack commenced in the last years shield, despite the ABM Treaty’s prohibitions, in an
of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration and, effort to break out of the doctrine of mutual assured
before that, in the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the destruction by providing significant protection
ABM Treaty was concluded in 1972 as part of the SALT against ballistic missile attack.

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The Fifth Decade, 1985–94 Shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991, Bush and Gorbachev also agreed to reciprocal
In the fifth decade of the nuclear era, fundamental
unilateral steps to reduce their tactical nuclear
political developments took place in relations
weapon systems. In 1992, beginning with the
between the United States and the Soviet Union.
unilateral declaration by Bush of a moratorium on
With the rise of Gorbachev and the development of
underground nuclear explosive testing in response to
a productive relationship between him and Reagan,
congressional pressure, the path to negotiations on a
a number of assumptions about the threat were
lasting ban on all nuclear testing was opened. These
swept away on both sides. In the aftermath of the
developments played an effective role in the 1995
deadly 1986 accident at the Soviet nuclear reactor
indefinite extension of the NPT.
in Chernobyl, worldwide concern about the dangers
By the end of this fifth decade of the nuclear era
of nuclear conflict were heightened significantly,
in 1994, there had been a drop of roughly one-third
especially in the Soviet Union.
in the total nuclear forces in the world, with the U.S.
At the landmark October 1986 meeting between
number dropping to slightly less than 15,000 and
Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik, the two leaders
Russia reducing to approximately 27,000. This decade
discussed the elimination of all ballistic missile
ended with no net increase in the number of nuclear-
systems. Stymied by differences on what limits to put
weapon states, but the group was joined by Pakistan,
on ABM research and development, they settled for
while South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons. Also
progress in the negotiations to ban all intermediate-
during this period, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus,
range ballistic missiles. This culminated in a treaty
which had become de facto nuclear-weapon states
which they signed in 1987 to eliminate all such
upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, renounced
ground-launched missiles from U.S. and Soviet
any nuclear ambitions and returned nuclear warheads
arsenals. Beyond that, the impulse given to nuclear
stationed on their soil to Russia.
reductions at Reykjavik led to enough progress in the
This era marked significant progress in the
strategic arms reduction talks (START) thereafter that
rethinking of the purpose of nuclear weapons.
an agreement was within reach by 1989 when George
Renewed consideration was given to certain
H. W. Bush took office. Bush and Gorbachev signed
questions.
the START I treaty in July 1991. This treaty, for the
first time, called for major reductions in the number
 How many nuclear weapons are enough?
of accountable strategic nuclear warheads and for a
ceiling on such warheads of 6,000 for each country.
 What is the remaining mission for nuclear
This progress was based on procedures allowing on-
weapons after the Cold War?
site inspection that made verifying limits on numbers
of warheads for each type of missile and aircraft
 How can the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon
possible. Further progress in negotiations between
countries about the discriminatory nature of the
Bush and Yeltsin led to agreement on deeper cuts in
nonproliferation regime be met?
strategic forces, to 3,000 –3,500, formalized with the
January 1993 signing of START II. This treaty never
The fact of mutual assured destruction as a basis
entered into force, however, even after modification
for nuclear deterrence between the United States
by Clinton and Yeltsin in 1997 to accommodate
and Russia remained long after the collapse of the
some practical Russian concerns about the pace of
Soviet Union. Eventually, new thinking challenged
reductions. Moscow announced that it would no
the notions of deterrence based upon mutual assured
longer consider itself bound by its START II signature
destruction, and with this came a realization that the
following the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
high levels of nuclear weapons that still existed could
in June 2002. The Kremlin’s act was largely symbolic
not be justified.
given the conclusion of SORT a month earlier.
What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

31
 Appendix 2 U.S. and Russian
Strategic Nuclear Forces

Current U. S. Strategic Nuclear Forces

(As of January 1, 2007)

Strategic Nuclear Strategic Nuclear

START-Accountable”1
Delivery Vehicles Warheads

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) 550 1,600

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) 432 3,168

Bombers 243 1,098

Total 1,225 5,866

Current Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces

(As of January 1, 2007)
Strategic Nuclear Strategic Nuclear
START-Accountable”1
Delivery Vehicles Warheads

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) 530 2,146

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) 272 1,392

Bombers 78 624

Total 880 4,162

1. The United States and Russia met the START I implementation deadline of December 5, 2001, seven years after the treaty’s entry into force. The
treaty limits the United States and Russia each to no more than 6,000 “accountable” warheads and 1,600 delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers).

source : START Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) of January 1, 2007.

Arms Control Association

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The Arms Control Association (ACA), founded in 1971, is a national
nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of
and support for effective arms control policies. Through its public education and media
programs and its magazine, Arms Control Today (ACT), ACA provides policy-makers, the
press and the interested public with authoritative information, analysis and commentary
on arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, and related national security
issues. In addition to the regular press briefings ACA holds on major arms control
developments, the Association’s staff provides commentary and analysis on a broad
spectrum of issues for journalists and scholars both in the United States and abroad.
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202-463-8270 • fax: 202-463-8273