Q2.
Ans. Pakistan Position in Afghan War of 1980s.
Bordering the troubled Afghanistan and Iran on the west, Pakistan also shares a border with
India in the east, and with China in the north. A larger and more populous country than
Afghanistan. Pakistan is a Muslim country with an ethnic majority of Punjabis. Throughout most
of the 1970s, Pakistan was ruled by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the leader of Pakistan's People's Party
(PPP). In 1977, as a result of public unrest, Bhutto offered to hold free elections. Due to strong
opposition from the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), the outcome of the elections was
expected to be close however, Bhutto won two-thirds of the National Assembly seats. The PNA
claimed fraud, and called for a new election. Bhutto initially refused, which resulted in
outbreaks of violence. The violence culminated on July 15, 1977, when the Pakistan army
removed Bhutto from power, and declared martial law. Upon the imposition of such martial
law, and until new elections could be held, General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq temporarily installed
himself as leader.' Zia did not hold these elections immediately, but instead scheduled them for
late 1979. As the new election date neared, Zia, fearing defeat, again cancelled the elections. At
this time, the PPP formed the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), in
opposition of Zia." When valid elections were finally held in 1985, the MRD called for a
boycott."' This strategy backfired on the MRD, however, as large numbers of voters turned out
and the lack of opposition to Zia resulted in his retaining office. Upon taking office again, Zia set
the next elections for 1990.Zia's government shares many of the characteristics of a typical
military rule: censorship, imprisonment without trial, and other human rights violations. Still,
Zia's position remains strong, largely due to recent improvements in the Pakistan economy.
Regardless of the results of the 1990 elections, it is very likely that the military will have a
strong influence over all of Pakistan's policy decisions for years to come.
Pakistan's Response to the Soviet Invasion
Pakistan's Initial Reaction.-When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan suddenly became a
"front-line" state. Pakistan was no longer separated from the Soviets by the Afghan mountains;
it now had to face a 13,000 mile border that was, for all practical purposes, a Soviet border.
Overnight, Pakistan became of "vital interest" to the United States, which pledged its military
support. On the surface, Pakistan did not seem alarmed by the Soviet invasion, for there was
very little troop movement in Pakistan. There was, however, one obvious change in Pakistan:
the country was suddenly flooded with Afghan refugees. These refugees migrated across the
Pakistan border to avoid Soviet air raids and over the next few years, millions of Afghan
refugees made their home in Pakistan. The current number of Afghan citizens living in Pakistan
now stands at more than 2.9 million. The refugees have caused many problems for Pakistan,
including a shortage of jobs and a shortage of pasture land. Pakistan has also put itself at risk
with Afghanistan and the Soviet Union by providing help to the refugees.
Beyond aid to the Afghan refugees, Pakistan's initial response was cautious, as it feared a direct
Soviet conflict. Zia's initial strategy was twofold: First, mobilize support from Islamic countries
and the West against the Soviet invasion; second, strengthen Pakistan's military defense by
seeking aid from a foreign power. Pakistan did mobilize support in opposition to the Soviet
invasion by strongly condemning the Soviet action. The invasion was universally protested, and
was also condemned by the Islamic Conference in early 1980. While these countries were
voicing their objection to the Soviet actions and implementing part one of Zia's strategy,
Pakistan began a search for a powerful ally. After unsuccessfully attempting to mend relations
with India, Pakistan rejected an initial offer of help from the U.S. Meanwhile, Pakistan began
receiving aid from China and the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia. Pakistan, however, still
wanted to find one powerful ally willing to give full support. Finally, in 1981, with President
Reagan in office, the U.S. made a second offer, and Pakistan accepted. Pakistan had successfully
achieved both of its initial goals," but one large question still loomed, whether or not to support
the Afghan rebels and risk a direct Soviet conflict.
War on Terror after 9/11.
Rarely does a country fight the same war twice in one generation. Even rarer is to fight it twice
from opposite sides. Yet that is in many ways what America is doing today in Afghanistan. In the
1980s the CIA engineered the largest covert operation in its history to defeat the Soviet army in
Afghanistan working from a safe haven in Pakistan. Today America is fighting a Taliban-led
insurgency in Afghanistan operating from a safe haven in Pakistan. Many suggest that the
outcome will be the same for America and its NATO allies as it was for the Soviet Union—
ultimate defeat at the hands of the insurgency. That analysis misses the many fundamental
differences between the two wars. But it is also important to note the one major similarity
between them: the key role played by Pakistan, which could again determine the outcome.
The most critical differences are goals and objectives. America intervened in Afghanistan in
2001 on the side of the Northern Alliance to topple the Taliban Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
only after it had been used as a base for the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks in America.
The American goal, endorsed by the UN and NATO, was self-defence against a government that
had allowed its territory to be used for an act of war against another state. From the beginning,
America has had no ambition to dominate or subjugate the Afghan people, or to stay in
Afghanistan once the threat posed by al-Qaeda had been removed and the Taliban defeated.
President Barack Obama said this again in his speech outlining his new policy for Afghanistan
and Pakistan on March 27th 2009.
The Soviet invasion in 1979 was a different matter. Its goal was to shore up a communist regime
that was on the brink of collapse. The Soviet leadership wanted an Afghanistan that would be
like other Soviet satellite states, that is, under virtual Soviet imperial rule with only the façade
of independence.
The Soviet invasion and the attempt to impose communism on a rural and largely illiterate
Islamic country produced the predictable result: a mass national uprising. In contrast, polls
show most Afghans have supported the coalition forces that overthrew the Taliban from 2001
onwards, although that support is now dwindling as the coalition has failed to provide law and
order and reconstruction. The Taliban insurgency is very much restricted to the Pashtun
community. It has little appeal to the almost 60% of Afghans who are not Pashtun. The Soviet
Union’s task was much more difficult than the one facing NATO today.
The Soviets responded with a ferocity and brutality that made the situation even worse. At
least 1.5m Afghans were killed, another 5m or so fled the country to Iran and Pakistan, and
millions more were displaced inside the country. A country that began the war as one of the
poorest in the world was systemically impoverished and even emptied of its people. The Soviets
carpet-bombed cities such as Kandahar, whose population fell from 250,000 to 25,000. Millions
of land mines were planted all over the country, with no maps kept of where they had been
laid. Nothing even approaching this level of horror is happening today in Afghanistan.
If the differences between the American and Soviet experience are significant, there is also at
least one major similarity: the role played by Pakistan. In the 1980s, Pakistan was the base for
the Saudi-American alliance behind the mujahideen. Today, Pakistan is the safe haven of the
Taliban insurgency and its logistical supply line. Pakistan also serves as the major logistical line
for the NATO forces in Afghanistan. Over 80% of the supplies coalition forces depend on to
survive arrive via Pakistan from the port of Karachi. Geography effectively precludes an
alternative, unless the alliance is willing to rely on either Russia or Iran for its logistics.
So Pakistan has unusually strong leverage on both sides of the war. This winter, Pakistani police
for the first time began arresting senior Afghan Taliban leaders, but the campaign was not
sustained and proved to be a one-off. It is widely assumed in Pakistan that American and
European patience to fight it out in Afghanistan is eroding, an assumption reinforced by polls
that show support for the conflict steady declining on both sides of the Atlantic. Mr Obama’s
mid-2011 deadline has been interpreted by many as signalling an early withdrawal, despite his
aides’ attempts to suggest otherwise.
Pakistan’s passive support of the Taliban is thus a useful hedge against the day when NATO
decides to start pulling out and gives up the struggle. Pakistan will then have a relationship with
the Pashtun future of southern and eastern Afghanistan and will have an asset in the struggle
for post-NATO Afghanistan. Thus it is crucial that the alliance makes it clear to Islamabad that
the Taliban are not going to succeed on the battlefield and that Pakistan must aggressively
weaken both the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban.
There is no inherent reason for the NATO war in Afghanistan to follow the pattern of the Soviet
war. The differences between the two outweigh the similarities, especially in what most
Afghans want for their country. While pundits may find the cliché that Afghanistan is the
graveyard of empire simplistically attractive, there is every reason to believe smart policies can
avoid such an outcome—but much depends on Pakistan.
Q.3 Arguments for CPEC is a game changer
Times are changing where the world is transforming and Asia remains at the epicentre of this
21st century transformation. Quite evidently, the centre of economic power is shifting from the
West towards the East. In this regard, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides Pakistan and the
surrounding countries great opportunity by giving and integrating platform for over 3 Billion
people in Central, West, South Asia as well as Middle East and Africa. BRI total trade is
estimated between $4 Trillion to $8 Trillion. In addition to this, the project will cover 69
countries with 40% of the world’s GDP and 65% of the world’s population. Under the project,
there will be 56 economic zones with $18.5 billion investment and the project will also allow
relocation of 85 million jobs.
China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship project of the BRI and its vision.
Furthermore, CPEC is expected to alter the geopolitical and strategic landscape of Asia and has
enormous potential to reshape the economic outlook of regional states. CPEC provides
opportunity for Pakistan to become a logistic and economic hub for South Asia, Central and
Western Asia, Middle East and Western China. Additionally, though CPEC, a small economy like
Pakistan is being physically connected with one of the world’s largest economy. The importance
of CPEC project can be highlighted by the fact that this project is game changer for Pakistan as it
is expected to address the weakness of the country. Furthermore, CPEC is also the corridor to
attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Pakistan in the infrastructure, power and
construction sector. Gawadar Port due to its natural advantages has the potential to surpass
the neighbouring ports in terms of trading activity as the port provides the shortest route for
China as well as Central Asian Countries.
The CPEC is intended to promote connectivity across Pakistan with a network of highways,
railways, and pipelines accompanied by energy, industrial, and other infrastructure
development projects to address critical energy shortages needed to boost Pakistan’s economic
growth. CPEC development targets include three stages according to officials: first target which
is expected to be completed in 2020 includes period of market cultivation in which major
bottlenecks for Pakistan’s economic and social development shall be addressed to boost the
economic growth. In addition, the second target, which is expected to be accomplished by
2025, contains periods of expansion and development. The third target is the period of maturity
which includes the endogenous mechanism for sustainable economic growth when CPEC will be
ready to play leadership role in the region. The third target is expected to be completed in
2030.
Completion of the CPEC project will provide Pakistan with new corridors of success and
economic prosperity. Scholars have also linked the success of this project with stable security of
Pakistan along with other regional countries. Though hurdles have been witnessed in running
the project, yet the scale of development is increasing and officials are hopeful to meet the
project deadlines as this would provide new avenues of success for Pakistan in the years to
come. CPEC has been compared to the Marshall Plan for the rebuilding of post-World War II
Europe in its potential impact on the region, and numerous countries have shown interest in
participating in the initiative.
Q.5 18th amendment
Positive Side of 18th amendment
As Pakistan reels from the inevitable gloom and doom that comes in the aftermath of yet
another capitulation before extremist groups, the spectre of another threat to democracy lurks
in the background. Rumours abound, not without credence, of a move to repeal — or at least
— water down the 18th Amendment to the constitution. An Amendment, that some quarters
have called a catalyst for turning Pakistan into a confederation. Such claims fail to understand
both the importance of the amendment and its true impact. A move to repeal the
18th Amendment, if it were to happen, would be disastrous for Pakistan’s fragile democracy.
Before the 18th Amendment, the Constitution’s claim that Pakistan was a federation was
nothing more than a hyperbolic statement on a piece of paper. The 18 th Amendment paved the
way for Pakistan to become a proper federation, rather than the centralised unitary system it
had been for so long. It was the 18th Amendment that realised what federal republics all over
the world have known for centuries: that federalism is far better than a unitary system because
it prevents the tyranny that comes so easily when power is concentrated in one place. The
mitigation of the circumstances that give rise to tyranny is necessary in a country that has for so
long battled with strongman rulers dictating policy from the center. When convincing the
American people that a federal system would be to their benefit, Alexander Hamilton would
make this same point in the Federalist 28: ‘Power being almost always the rival of power, the
general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state
governments, and these will have the same dispositions towards the general government.’
While correlation does not imply causation, we can at least give some credit to the
18th Amendment for allowing two peaceful democratic transitions of power in its wake. This by
itself should be argument enough for all political parties to be united to make sure that the
repeal of the 18th Amendment never happens. However, to put the rumblings of repeal to rest,
let me point out some other distinct advantages of provincial autonomy that might sway those
who still believe that federalism is a bad idea to see the light.
The most obvious advantage of federalism is the promotion of efficiency through the division of
labour. The provinces are closer and more in touch with local issues, therefore, it makes sense
to allocate responsibility for their particular issues into their hands. The Federal Government
can then concentrate on larger national issues, such as national security, transportation and our
ballooning national debt. Another, lesser known, benefit of federalism is the promotion of
experimentation within the provinces that can lead to innovative policies and legislation that
can serve as models for the rest of the country. This is why Justice Brandeis of the Supreme
Court of the United States said of federalism that: ‘a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the entire country.’ The state of Massachusetts would try such a novel experiment by creating a
universal healthcare system. A system that would prove so successful, it would galvanise the
Democratic Party to replicate it for the entire nation.
It should not be a surprise that voter participation increased in Pakistan’s elections at both the
provincial and federal levels after the 18th amendment, since this is another clear advantage of
creating a system of provincial autonomy. Federalism fosters greater citizen participation in
government. To the people living in each respective province, local governments and provincial
legislatures are far more approachable and far less enervated than the Federal Government —
which may never be able to understand their specific geographic and cultural issues. They will
realise that their localised issues are far more likely to be addressed by the provinces than the
Federal Government, because it is easier for the provinces to react to these issues.
Of course, none of the benefits I have described would amount for anything if the
18th Amendment hadn’t given the provinces autonomy and ownership over their own
resources. The greatest legacy of the 18th Amendment was with regards to its restructuring of
the National Finance Commission (NFC) award. The insertion of Article 160 (3A) meant that the
share of the provinces in each NFC award could not be less than the share given in the previous
award. Nor could the Federal Government encroach upon the 57% share of fiscal resources
given to the provinces. This was by far the most powerful measure to ensure provincial
autonomy that the 18th Amendment brought about. Exploitation by the center of a province’s
resources can lead to friction of catastrophic proportions. Think about a one such incident in
our country’s history that happened in 1971 and you will realise what I mean. Even if the rest of
the 18th Amendment stands, if the NFC and share of fiscal resources given to the provinces is
tampered with, the 18th Amendment will have lost its soul.
Critics of the 18th Amendment believe that by restraining the federal government from limiting
the resources allocated to the provinces, the 18th Amendment has limited expenditure for the
single biggest priority for Pakistan: national security. We don’t need to get into a debate about
whether this should be Pakistan’s number one priority, if we can show that this claim is just
untrue. Dr Hafeez Pasha debunks this myth and writes that in 2016-2017 the net revenue
receipts of the Federal Government were Rs2583 billion, while the expenditure needed for debt
servicing and defense was Rs2237 billion. This left a surplus of Rs347 billion for the federal
government to meet other expenses. What this shows is that Pakistan’s favorite monetary
splurge project: defense spending, won’t be facing any financial crisis because of the
18th Amendment.
The distinct advantages of federalism: its prevention of tyranny, fostering of innovation,
promotion of efficiency, and increased citizen participation should make all political parties
resolute in resisting any move to repeal the 18th Amendment. A country that has repeatedly
tried and failed to extract beneficial results from the ‘strong center’ model of government
should be prevented from a relapse that may be nigh impossible to rehabilitate again.
Negative Side of 18th Amendment
The 1973 Constitution did not include the ‘right to health’ as a fundamental right. The subject
of health could only be legislated on jointly with the provinces under the Concurrent Legislative
List. The latter was supposed to be revised by 1983 but was not. The federal health ministry was
not structured or equipped for national functions; its approach was ad hoc and reactionary as
seen in the building and managing of hospitals and running national programmes, with weak
provincial ownership.
The 18th Amendment abolished the Concurrent List, and transferred health legislation and
execution to the provinces, though the subject was still not considered a fundamental right.
Medicines and issues pertaining to health service delivery were fully devolved, while those
linked to medical education and human resource stayed within the federal ambit.
Devolution of health is a critical first step towards health reforms. Many countries simply alter
institutional roles which serve little purpose in the absence of structural changes. Others launch
universal healthcare systems, which prove ineffective as service delivery is not improved.
The devolved health model, which is common across developed and developing countries,
brings health providers closer to consumers, and improves health management and delivery.
However, critical functions such as regulating health services, devising a national health policy,
fulfilling international commitments and disseminating information and research still require
unified ownership.
Many federal republics regulate health at the national level, so that federating units do not
struggle when it comes to accepting each others’ standards or waste resources in duplicating
efforts. There is strong justification for formulating health regulations and policy at the national
level. For one, regulations aim to set standards in quality, cost and volume with regard to
service delivery, medicines, education and human resource. Through the efforts of a few
accomplished health and policy experts in the country, the creation of a Federal Ministry of
National Health Services Regulation and Coordination in 2013 was crucial for these reasons. But
although the need to regulate drugs and medicines was addressed through the formation of a
drug regulator, the need for national regulations for service delivery remains unfulfilled.
Similarly, a national health policy developed with full provincial endorsement is a dire need.
This is to establish core national values and principles, stipulate standards for provincial
compliance and ensure social equity among the provinces. The policy must not be prescriptive
regarding service delivery and financial matters — the provinces can strategise independently
— but should provide guidelines for health information, disease management, international
compliance, and trade in health.
The last national health policy in 2001 saw only partial implementation. A revision in 2010 was
not followed through in anticipation of devolution. Then a National Health Vision in 2016,
formed after much federal-provincial consultation, also fell through the cracks. Although not a
policy document, the Vision put new constitutional roles in context, noted the challenges, and
laid down a strategic vision.
In fiscal terms, the quantum of the provincial share has increased over the years. Once
allocated, how much is spent on health is a provincial prerogative, since health financing
matters are fully devolved. This includes devising strategies for pooling resources and
procurement, as it is closely tied with service delivery. This is a proven model for cost-effective
budgeting, planning and procurement. It also allows for a single-payer mechanism for attracting
private-sector participation. The private sector already plays an oversized role in Pakistan’s
health systems and can be engaged extremely effectively to the benefit of all stakeholders —
the users, the governments and the operators.
With all its benefits, decentralised service delivery brings challenges in administration and
execution capabilities. Add to this the coordination with national institutions and oversight. The
devolved model bears fruit only with diligent, if gradual, capacity enhancement at district levels
for managing the delivery of primary, secondary and tertiary care. The provinces’ main role
should, therefore, be governance and procurement. District and local challenges are no secret,
but the provincial role is necessary for robustness of the health reform construct.
The envisioned federal role must progress from the legacy of owning and managing hospitals.
Ownership and management of hospitals and other facilities would be better in the hands of
whoever is responsible for service delivery. But the constitutional list of federal subjects
includes all agencies and institutions for research, professional or technical training or
promotion of special studies. This leaves the door open for interpretation.
The Supreme Court recently handed back ownership and management of several hospitals in
Lahore and Karachi to the federal government. It ruled that they were handed over to the
provinces over an erroneous interpretation of the 18th Amendment, and that the centre
reserved the right to build and run hospitals.
One respects the intricacies of legislation and their interpretation, but health infrastructure is
unequivocally positioned better with the party manning the delivery nodes. If there are any
weaknesses, the answer lies in developing institutional capabilities. Interestingly, anecdotal
evidence suggests that delivery of care had in fact improved in all these institutions.
The raging debate over control of hospitals may aggravate further as other facilities could
receive similar legal treatment. This would bring into question the willingness and motivation of
those responsible for delivering health, leading to weaker delivery. The ensuing political and
legal battles risk complicating an already fragile public health environment.
Federal institutions must focus on regulation and policy while provinces should spend their
energies on improving strategy and delivery. A national health policy and regulations will
provide momentum to health reforms, while capacity development at provincial and district
levels will sustain them.
Devolution of health is a critical first step towards health reforms and Pakistan’s efforts are to
be lauded. The challenge now is to move forward, not back.
