SCE’s
• Management of Safety Critical Elements (SCE) is
Safety Critical Elements in Asset perhaps the most demanding application of the
Management Asset Management philosophy.
• Managing the intersection/s of ‘People’,
‘Systems’ and ‘Assets’ is a critical aspect of AM
when applied to SCE’s.
Pushing the Limits of Asset Management
• The tolerance for errors or omissions is
significantly less in this application.
Dr. JA (Tony) Healy
JAHCon Physical Asset Management Pty. Ltd. 2
SCE’s SCE’s
• Safety Critical Elements (SCE’s) are those • Identification of SCE's must be based on a
systems and components (e.g. hardware, formal assessment system that is practical,
software, procedures etc.) that are designed to: credible and auditable (e.g. Criticality Analysis).
x Prevent. • Once identified, SCE's typically require:
x Control. ▫ Detailed performance standards.
x Mitigate. ▫ Critical Function Tests (CFT).
x Respond.
▫ Management of Change (MOC) controls.
x Etc.
▫ Comprehensive maintenance plans.
...to a Major Accident Event (MAE) that could
▫ Documentation.
lead to injury or death.
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▫ Etc. 4
Integration Sustainability
• All of these must integrate with other • The more challenging the application, and the
maintenance and operations tasks conducted for longer the life of the plant, the more difficult it
non-Safety Critical reasons (e.g. economic or will be to devise a system that ensures the
environmental risk criteria). equipment continues meet its performance
• PM’s performed on SCE’s can be thought of as standard over time.
the means by which an item continues to achieve • A current project involves a life extension of 30
its desired critical function/s and hence is years.
capable of ‘passing’ the CFT. • Maintaining SCE functionality over such a long
period will be very challenging.
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Target Outcomes Management of SCE’s
• For a given asset the results we wish to achieve SCE effectiveness requires a high level of system
can also place significant pressure on the Asset and equipment integrity over the asset life cycle and
Management system. across a range of areas:
▫ Equipment register (know it exists)
▫ For non safety-critical equipment we usually wish to
▫ Criticality assessment (know how important and why)
optimise on the basis of Reliability/Availability or
▫ Performance Standards (know what is expected of it)
cost (some tolerance).
▫ Operating Variation Control Procedures (how to manage
▫ For SCE’s we wish to prevent the ‘first event’ (little functional non-conformances)
tolerance). ▫ Maintenance Plans (how to preserve the functionality)
▫ CFT’s (Testing, Monitoring & Measurement, what’s
happening/changing).
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Integrated systems Integration of SCE’s
• Only when these (and other) interacting • While SCE’s are identified specifically, they
components come together successfully over remain part of the overall equipment scope of
time can we achieve the desired outcome of the plant and are managed by the normal
‘preventing the first event’. maintenance function and as part of that
• Therefore an effective and sustainable SCE equipment scope rather than as a special case.
management program is only achievable in a • SCE’s are therefore a subset of the wider asset
high quality operating and maintenance base and must be managed alongside non-SCE
environment. assets.
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Important Issues Important Issues
• CFT’s and PM’s on SCE’s often have higher • We need to see human involvement as a strength
quality requirements than typical PM’s. as well as a potential weakness.
• We need to consider how to integrate CFT’s into • We need to understand the major reasons why
the wider PM program? SCE’s have ended up in the backlog?
• What is the tolerance for human, system and
• Implementation plans for CFT’s and critical
equipment error in the CFT’s and PM’s?
PM’s should be a formal part of PM preparation.
• Appropriateness of CFT/PM for the application.
• The potential for human error should be formal
• Can we achieve the desired outcomes?
addressed as part of PM preparation.
• Can we repeatedly achieve these outcomes?
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Level of Repair Analysis Maintenance Analysis
• What impact will the LOR have on achieving the • The level of assessment carried out should be in
required Reliability? keeping with the significance of the equipment
x On-site repairs – can we restore the asset fully?
and its functions – e.g.
x OEM, on-site repairs – is the OEM effective when x RCM consistent approach (or similar rigour) for
working on site.
High Criticality items and SCE’s (must do this very
x OEM, off-site repairs – can we tolerate the delays well. Not enough just to parrot the OEM).
associated with sending the asset off site for repair?
x OEM recommendations + Review by Subject Matter
x Cost Vs. rebuild quality trade-offs.
Expert team for Medium Criticality items.
• Decisions on LOR will have a significant impact
x OEM recommendations + Review by Technical
upon on-site skills, resources and spares
Authority for Low Criticality items.
requirements and hence sustainability.
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Operating Variation Control Proc. Skills/Training
• How do we manage the increased risk when the • How do we identify the skills and level of
SCE is unavailable or at reduced effectiveness? competency we need? (TNA, usually inadequate.
Will be influenced by LOR decisions)
• Have we a procedure to manage this period of
increased risk? How effective is it? • How do we achieve the skills and competency we
need? (Training, supervised practice)
• Operating Variation Control Procedure’s (OVCP)
• How do we keep the skills current? (Regular
are the ‘second best’ way to manage the risk.
retraining – usually abysmal)
• How do we prevent the plant operating for
• How do we ensure the skills, when provided, are
expended periods on OVCP’s? (timeouts, etc.) applied correctly? (Supervision, quality controls)
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Controls Controls
• How can we provide guidance in performing • How to ensure the physical actions performed by
complex and/or critical tasks? (Much better users produce the desired effect? (Monitoring
supervision, procedures, mentors) /Auditing, consider PM effectiveness)
• How can we ensure the intended outcomes are • How can we reduce the potential for confusion
achieved? (Hold points, Monitoring/Auditing) between similar tasks? (Procedures/WI, place
• How can we reduce the likelihood that users will ‘alerts’ in the procedures)
unintentionally perform the wrong action? • How can we provide complete information
(Procedures/WI, understand how errors occur) without overwhelmed people? (Filtering, Linked
Lists)
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Controls Summary
• How can we prevent the user from omitting all • High criticality assets and SCE’s in particular
or some critical tasks? (Procedures, supervision) place greater demands upon the effectiveness of
• How do we ensure that critical pieces of our Asset Management systems because the
information are fed back to the ‘right’ people? consequences are so significant.
(Procedures, information end-users, data
• We must formally address the potential for
ownership)
failure to achieve the ‘perfect’ outcome (i.e. just
• How do we ensure that people will notice enough and no more).
indications of impending or actual defects or
failures? (Interface design, Trending, change
based alarms)
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Summary Summary
• Know the SCE exists.
• Know the risks associated with the SCE.
• Know the required performance of the SCE.
• Maintain the SCE in functional condition.
• Test the SCE for continued performance (CFT).
• Maintain the support systems and people required to make this possible.
• Focus on the Must-do items first and always.
• Resist including items as SCE when they don’t warrant it.
• Outer boundary -> SCE.
• Inner boundary -> economic.
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