A.C. No.

L-1117             March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.

OZAETA, J.:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if
desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the
poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but
subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the
indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the
future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he
alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had
any case at law by reason thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a
member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers
of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for
a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon
27, Code of Ethics.)

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the
period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular
letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were
repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the
opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.

Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964

JESUS MA. CUI, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-

appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.

Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.

Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofile�a for defendant-appellant.
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants.

MAKALINTAL, J.:
chanrobles virtual law library

This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu. The office in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de
San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the
plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma.
Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro

Cui and Do�a Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of
charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It
acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine
Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with extensive
properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the
deed of donation executed on 2 January 1926. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders
jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they
may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them." Section 2 of
the deed of donation provides as follows:

Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos

sustituyan nuestro legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra
muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro
sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no
estuviese residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su
lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos
administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la
muerte o incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la administracion del
HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el
varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimainente de cualquiera de
nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor
Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o
farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor
impuesto o contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el
varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la
administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare persona de estas
cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI
pasara al senor Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia
Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta
Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.

Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the
Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to
Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May 1931 and the
second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio
Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of
controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the position of
administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case,
reference will be made later in this decision. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the
sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and
Do�a Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator,
Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a
"convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document.
The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma.
Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's
assumption of the [Link] chanrobles virtual law library
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff
wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to
him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand not having been complied
with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on
intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente
Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio
in their deed of donation. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective
qualifications to the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two
and therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to
section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be,
applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate
descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o
medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que
pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion." chanrobles virtual law library

The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado."
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of
Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having
passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the
other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on
29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution
promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the
position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the
phrase "titulo de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer,
but that has used in the deed of donation and considering the function or
purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretation
but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor
of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by
the [Link] chanrobles virtual law library

We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term
"titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto,
qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined
as "testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o
profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Espa�ola, Real Academia Espanola,
1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en el
derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra,
los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las
cuestiones o puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's
degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic
requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The
English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a
fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons
who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute
and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities
are devolved by law as a consequence. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under
the authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission
requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and
receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his
license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws
in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of
compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has
"successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or
university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this
purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable:
completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way.
Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil
Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal
education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to
qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the
necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be
incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado"
because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law
school or university. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the
foregoing test advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a
lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a
pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays
the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all,
because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall
"make regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall
"prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and
destitute persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to
it that the rules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict
with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of
considerable value - for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working
knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a
distinct asset.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as
against the defendant, to the office of administrator. But it is argued that
although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by
virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the
administrator may be removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude
in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral character.
Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court
on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a
fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he
assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his
moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission
to the Bar in the first place.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of

facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by
this stipulation of facts.

Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in

the sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally
speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the orderly
and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the applicant's
participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The
applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court
that he is a person of good moral character - a fit and proper person to
practice law. The court will take into consideration the applicant's character
and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge
for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and
the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443) chanrobles virtual law library

Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to

reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following
his conviction, and the requirements for reinstatement have been held to be
the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may
require a greater degree of proof than in an original admission. (7 C.J.S.,
Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)chanrobles virtual law library

The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether

applicant is "of good moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is
used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person to be
entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney, and whether his
mental qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his
duty to the public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate
and distinct from his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec.
41, p. 816).

As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking

reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that
implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office
which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll
of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous
disbarment were wiped out. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of
time amounting the prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66
(formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section 216 of Act 190), this kind of
action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to hold the
office arose.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as
long ago as 1932. On January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo
warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the administration of the
Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma.
Cui came in as intervenors. The case was dismissed by the Court of First
Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the complaint and
complaint in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from the order
of dismissal, the case was remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60
Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated
in the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby
Teodoro Cui continued as administrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal
adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant
administrator. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-

judicial maneuvers. First he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by
letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January he had
"made clear" his intention of occupying the office of administrator of the
Hospicio." He followed that up with another letter dated 4 February,
announcing that he had taken over the administration as of 1 January 1950.
Actually, however, he took his oath of office before a notary public only on 4
March 1950, after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from
the Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed
the position as stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather
muddled situation was referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary of
Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950),
correcting another opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff,
not beings lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of the Hospicio.
library
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy.
On 4 March 1950, the Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine
National Bank in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216)
because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank then
filed a third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui,
who had, as stated above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950,
having been deprived of recognition by the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that he
was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration of the
Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6
February 1954 he was able to take another oath of office as administrator
before President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a second motion to
dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon
learning that a case was pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his
Executive Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may
disregard the oath" thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted
nevertheless and the other parties in the case filed their notice of appeal
from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be
excluded as party in the appeal and the trial Court again granted the motion.
This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants thereupon instituted a
mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was
decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included
in the appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was dismiss
upon motion of the parties, who agreed that "the office of administrator and
trustee of the Hospicio ... should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings
to be initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying the
office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of
dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent administrator
was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action in quo warranto was filed against him by
plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid motion for dismissal. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this

Court as member of the Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro
Cui resigned as administrator in his favor, pursuant to the "convenio"
between them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui
took his oath of office.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court
decided the first case of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to
the trial court for further proceedings; his acceptance instead of the position
of assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as
administrator and his failure to file an action in quo warranto against said
Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the
Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of the parties precisely so that the
conflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in such an action - all
these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of
the rule that an action in quo warranto must be filed within one year after
the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff
did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of
the latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the statutory period. And
the fact that this action was filed within one year of the defendant's
assumption of office in September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's
position any better, for the basis of the action is his own right to the office
and it is from the time such right arose that the one-year limitation must be
counted, not from the date the incumbent began to discharge the duties of
said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also
a lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the
Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the
line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano
Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la
muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in the deed
itself) pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que
descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos
Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de
abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas
edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administration." Besides
being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than
he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal.
The intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the
administration by line and successively to the descendants of the nephews
named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the
last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui
line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom
the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the
terms of the deed of donation. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed

from is reversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in
intervention are dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and
intervenor-appellant.
 THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, Complainant, v. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court

VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or
coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate
and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were
classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the
purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to
the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in
connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya

addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my

intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and
your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA
ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the
grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent
which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith
perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an
Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests. He then proceeded
to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the
"grounds which could evidence the bad faith. deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous
sales agent . . .;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the
mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically
state on record that I am terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have
to resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract
against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent,
hence the need to annul the controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at
San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and
which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right
hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free
Postage - PD 26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T.
Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and
asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which
was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month.
Among other things, he said:

. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul,

cancel, rescind and voided, the "manipulated contract" entered into between
me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales
agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing
loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is
deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my
consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and
abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between
me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me.

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he
took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February
21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same
reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and
discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof. a He also
wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal
Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this
Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question,
again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into
entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996."
and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . .
(Alauya's) mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his) payments." c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995,

Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25,
1996 - to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above
mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD 26." 1
In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds

through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established
reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the

Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger,

manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his
allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as
irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with
Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the
plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the senice, or be appropriately
desciplined (sic) . . ."

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint,

Conformably with established usage that notices of resolutions emanate
from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution
in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division
Clerk of Court. 2

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" 3 in which he questioned the

authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power
pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court
investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the
Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis;
Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of Court
and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a
Royal Family . . ." 4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less

aggressive, even obsequious tones, 5 Alauya requested the former to give
him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon. 6 He
stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the
confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co.
had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan
contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya
contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary. 7 He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his
rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave
P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the
mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD 26," were
typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment
corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed
and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as
Annex J); 8 and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the
use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed
mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and
because of an honest mistake. 9

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is
"lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a
lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney"
because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the
Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor.
Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected
of any man unduly prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated
into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to
sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the
completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided
him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where
the property - subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal,
Villarosa & Co. - is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy
from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did
not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with
his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such
pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-
out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever
saw. 13

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya
prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of
"fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations." and complainant Alawi
having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the
fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk
of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two
(2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 - all of which he signed as
"Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" - in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use
the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation. 14

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made
"malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds
through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith, resulting in "undue injury
to (her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those
letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross

misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized

acts . . . prejudicial to . . (his) rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had

fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with

Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without . . (his) authority and against . . (his) will," and "concealed the real
facts . . ."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was
merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of
any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering, considering
that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.
15

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a
high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. 16
Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . at
all times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from doing acts contrary
to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety
and public interest." 17 More than once has this Court emphasized that "the
conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in
the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior
clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their
conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety
and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the
judiciary." 18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good
customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch
denunciations of acts believed - however sincerely - to be deceitful,
fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent
language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against
Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety,
without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner
consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,
supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to
vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the
Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of
conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man
of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous,
menacing, or otherwise improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected
that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times,
and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence,
restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms
might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held
conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-
fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before
Shari'a courts. 21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and
one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved
to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-
law, " because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term,
or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination,
valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of
"counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking

privilege, 22 the record contains no evidence adequately establishing the
accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the

use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language
unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he
is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future
will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-19450. May 27, 1965.]

 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIMPLICIO
VILLANUEVA, Defendant-Appellant.

Magno T. Bueser, for Defendant-Appellant.

Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW EMPLOYED IN THE GOVERNMENT; PROHIBITION TO ENGAGE

IN PRIVATE PRACTICE; MEANING. — Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for
it consists in frequent or customary actions a succession of acts of the same kind. The
practice of law by attorneys employed in the government, to fall within the prohibition
of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the
public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. The appearance as
counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the
private practice of law. The word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and
that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source
of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

2. ID.; ID.; ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY HANDLING CASE FOR RELATIVE WITH
PERMISSION OF SUPERIOR NOT IN PROHIBITED PRIVATE PRACTICE. — The isolated
appearance as a private prosecutor, previously authorized by his superior, of an
assistant city attorney in a criminal case for malicious mischief before a justice of the
peace court where the offended party is his relative, does not violate Section 32, Rule
127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from
practicing.

DECISION

PAREDES, J.:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio

Villanueva with the crime of Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court of
said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on
replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by
City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private-
prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of
his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case,
he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor
was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, Et Al., v.
Blanco, Et Al., 79 Phil. 647 wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been
appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein
qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel
then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in
the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an
order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit
Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section
32, Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which bars certain attorneys from
practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP
Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating
that he (Fule) was not actually engaged in private law practice. This Order was
appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which
rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read: jgc:[Link]

"The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the
offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with
the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case
and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the
accused.

"Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the
peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City
Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the
offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his
appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he
had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the
municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming
from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City
Attorney of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City
Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this
criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this
criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights
in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.

"In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may
appear before the Justice of the Peace Court in Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor
in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

"WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna, allowing the appearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed,
without costs." cralaw virtua1aw library

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceedings.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore
reproduced, and which We consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense
counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule
138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice
as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City
Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private
practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice
is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services (State v. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel
on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private
practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy: jgc:[Link]

"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services." cralaw virtua1aw library

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given
permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the
complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it
is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against Appellant.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]

RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, Respondents.
 Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court’s decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C: jgc:[Link]

"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
(Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides: jgc:[Link]

"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for al least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a

legal qualification to an appointive office. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Black defines "practice of law" as: jgc:[Link]

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising
and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions
taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as
an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending
litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black’s Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.).

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he: jgc:[Link]

". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights
of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or
acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated: jgc:[Link]

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters
of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving
of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance
to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-
1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and
public service.

"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he
does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice
of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a
practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW 312).

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
(111 ALR 23).

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our
review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief
statement?

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among
others, the qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that ‘They must be Members of the Philippine
Bar’ — I am quoting from the provision — ‘who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.’"

"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are
employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within
COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even
chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem
it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this
provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of
law for at least ten years is taken up.

"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?"

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA although it is auditing, will necessarily
involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now
would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Thank you." cralaw virtua1aw library

. . . (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and
two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants
with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means
"an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers
who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm
is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the
firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologies, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram,
Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as
"the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law.
(State Bar Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting
Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.)

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role
for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer’s role colors much of
both the public image and the self-perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.). [Link]:cralaw:red

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander Sycip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that
in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely describe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the
diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and
other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice will usually
perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such
as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly
different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers’ work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the
lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those
of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law
practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various
legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of

the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating
rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy
formulation, particularly "model-making" and contingency planning," has impressed upon us the
inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of
acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational
analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an
improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process,
wherein a model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected
alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the
trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-
disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can
be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional contexts and the various
approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master’s or doctorate
degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-
making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an
astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary
step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de

campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a
corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary
with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their
legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax
laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and
other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other
capacities which require an ability to deal with the law. chanrobles virtualawlibrary [Link]:[Link]

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business
of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming
involved in management. (Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one’s work actually fits into the work of the organization. This can be frustrating to
someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is
sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation

(MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter
the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous,
this is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to
experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries.
(Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25, 1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines
of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems,
a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are
we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation
Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management
issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate counsel’s
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal
function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the
corporate counsel’s total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel’s role. For that matter, the
corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that
the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation’s
strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with
global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are
competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stockholder — in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and
other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and
laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global
operations. (Emphasis supplied).

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there
are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of
collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan’s MITI is world famous. (Emphasis
supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct
group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term
and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the
group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment,
coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general,
such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial
mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective
managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of
the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming
techniques now make the systems dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including
corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied).

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a
portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties
and mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and
effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case
of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed
areas of consideration, thus: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the
general counsel’s responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is
concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities
at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the
firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation’s evolving
economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships
needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel’s Office. The general counsel has emerged in
the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm’s strategic issues, including structuring its global operations,
managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a
good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate
activities. And even if the corporate lawyer’s aim is not the understand all of the law’s effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management
issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution" or make-up of the modern
corporation. "Business Star, The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge
of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts
of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the
lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure?
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11, 1989, p. 4). chanrobles law library : red

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments
on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted
with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group,
served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate,
and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or
chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of
NAMFREL. Monsod’s work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in
its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal
capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and
lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the
Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice
Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative." (pp.
128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of
the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager,
and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country
Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis
supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the
loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into
five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower’s representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development
policies as key factors in maintaining their countries’ sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session
on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by
the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied).

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely re negotiation policies,
demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in re negotiation.
Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in
the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a
mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of
competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T.
Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (Emphasis supplied).

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of
the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also
state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a complete
debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua
non for foreign loan agreements — an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: ‘They carry no
banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of
quiet genius and serene mastery.’ (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth
Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,
a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both
the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said: [Link] : virtual law library

"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that
there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide." (Emphasis supplied).

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA
744) where it stated: jgc:[Link]

"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on
the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to
direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary
power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law." (Emphasis supplied).
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in
the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation,
the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of
bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p.
200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides: jgc:[Link]

"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without re appointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without re appointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity." cralaw virtua1aw library

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of
law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept
of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers
of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla’s definition would require generally a habitual law
practice, perhaps practiced two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or
twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice." . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional
areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that
is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practicing law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law.
The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant
case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much less a
grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Additionally, consider the following: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court
reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The
answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm
a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S.
Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is: jgc:[Link]

"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life." cralaw virtua1aw library

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who
was Samson’s beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

"No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins." cralaw virtua1aw library

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson’s eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with
righteous fury, Accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did
any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the
letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.).

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does
not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the
Commission on Appointments — that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment
thereof, be confirmed — was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted
not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of
COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My
purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties
concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod’s disqualification. Moreover, a
reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that
respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod’s comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of" practice of low for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately,
the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision
requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987
Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial
resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and
defining constitutional boundaries." cralaw virtua1aw library

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are
that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounded
duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it
connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for
that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually,
repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing
aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a
clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is
employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People v. Villanueva: 2

"Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services (State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647.) . . ." (Emphasis
supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it

prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law." It states: jgc:[Link]

"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the
public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644)
such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer
before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to
practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public
for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v.
Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of
legal knowledge and skill is within the term ‘practice of law’ (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People’s Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one
who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that
extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290
N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, `all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette Et. Al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R.
356-359).

3. Application of law, legal principle, practice, or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training
and experience is within the term `practice of law’. (Martin supra).

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-
client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but
involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he
cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989
ed., p. 30)." 3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years
at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST
TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am
persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not
do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the
rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify
his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a
continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People v. Villanueva: 4

"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services." cralaw virtua1aw library

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified
for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years prior to his appointment to such position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same.
There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting his viewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent
simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view,
this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee’s
credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it
were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing
authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the
required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualify an appointee simply because he has
passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate
proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised
citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but
whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been
too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically
toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable
feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his
activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the
insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on
matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation." cralaw virtua1aw library

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another
business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers
every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A.
Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by
some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again
going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered
a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a
doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If
he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged
in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the
Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts
. . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely
nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in
the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable." cralaw virtua1aw library

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in
the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough
that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or
regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom
dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent’s credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that
he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an
executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the
various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and
not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he
was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the
NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and
was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities
extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently
qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for
public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not
the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the
practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing
his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the
result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official
leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the
deliberations and the decision. chanrobles law library

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of
persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error.
We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief
that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in
management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant
recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is
before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has
practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he
has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can
claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if
there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding
committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in
Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened
to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate
choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional,
accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for
ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one’s decisive choice. It
means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out
with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the
Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year
period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father’s law firm. Even then his law
practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees
in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the
United States while not a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows: jgc:[Link]

"1.15.1 Respondent Monsod’s activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the
following: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American
Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation,
Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated

companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUN systems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation"

(Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has
given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support
in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of
working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving legal advice of legal services,
he was the one receiving that advice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the
practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce,
industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be
helpful. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman
accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who
has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life.
Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay
captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And
yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?.

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not
satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years.."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows: jgc:[Link]

"The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also
services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services
requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the
legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex
rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Tinkoff, 399 III. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass’n v.
People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the
practice of law.’Practicing law’ has been defined as ‘Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law
according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of
service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service
requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill.’ Without adopting that definition, we
referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel . Illinois State Bar Ass’n v. People’s Stock
Yards State Bank, 344 III. 462, 176 N.E. 901." (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776).

For one’s actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities
peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily,
to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x          x          x

"Respondent’s answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or
not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the
procuring agent. He answered: ‘Very seldom.’ In answer to the question as to how many times he had
prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-mine years of his business, he said: ‘I have no
idea.’ When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose.’ Asked if he
did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large
number of instances, he answered: ‘I don’t recall exactly what was said.’ When asked if he did not
remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and
charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he
answered: Well, I don’t believe so, that is not a practice.’ Pressed further for an answer as to his
practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally
answered: ‘I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned.’
 x          x          x

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any
legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts,
deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices
over the years and has charged for his services in that

x          x          x

". . . An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in
his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors
or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-
professional agents are properly styled ‘attorneys in fact;’ but the single word is much used as
meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an
attorney at law.’ Abb. Law Dict.’Attorney.’ ‘A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, ‘is an
officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer
of clients.’The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to
manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to
the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. . . . His rights are to be
justly compensated for his services.’ Bouv. Law Dict. tit.’Attorney.’ The transitive verb ‘practice,’ as
defined by Webster, means ‘to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a
succession of acts, as, to practice gaining; . . . to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as
a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,’ etc.
. . ." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts.
Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]): chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

x          x          x

". . . Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. . . ." (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required

component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit: jgc:[Link]

"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the
public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644)
such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer
before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to
practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA log citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115).

x          x          x

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge,
the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under
the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership
in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any
specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened
to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign
corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should
be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual
transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam
Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission
may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as
President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the
specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the
position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The
Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in
confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissents.

Endnotes:
PADILLA, J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Webster’s 3rd New International Dictionary.

2. 14 SCRA 109.

3. Commission on Appointments’ Memorandum dated 25 June 1991 RE: WHAT CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW, pp. 6-7.

4. 14 SCRA 109.