TRANSPO CASES 21 – 35

BASCOS VS CA

FACTS: Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing Cipriano Trading Enterprise (CIPTRADE for short) entered into a hauling
contract with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corp whereby the former bound itself to haul the latter’s 2,000 m/tons of soya
bean meal to the warehouse in Calamba, Laguna. To carry out its obligation, CIPTRADE, through Cipriano,
subcontracted with Bascos to transport and to deliver 400 sacks of soya bean meal from the Manila Port Area to
Calamba, Laguna. Petitioner failed to deliver the said cargo. As a consequence of that failure, Cipriano paid Jibfair
Shipping Agency the amount of the lost goods in accordance with their contract.

Cipriano demanded reimbursement from petitioner but the latter refused to pay. Eventually, Cipriano filed a complaint
for a sum of money and damages with writ of preliminary attachment for breach of a contract of carriage. The trial court
granted the writ of preliminary attachment.

In her answer, petitioner interposed the defense that there was no contract of carriage since CIPTRADE leased her
cargo truck to load the cargo from Manila Port Area to Laguna and that the truck carrying the cargo was hijacked and
being a force majeure, exculpated petitioner from any liability

After trial, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Cipriano and against Bascos ordering the latter to pay the former
for actual damages for attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

The “Urgent Motion To Dissolve/Lift preliminary Attachment” Bascos is DENIED for being moot and academic.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but respondent Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari

ISSUE:

(1) WON petitioner a common carrier

(2) WON the hijacking referred to a force majeure

HELD: The petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

1. YES

In disputing the conclusion of the trial and appellate courts that petitioner was a common carrier, she alleged in this
petition that the contract between her and Cipriano was lease of the truck. She also stated that: she was not catering to
the general public. Thus, in her answer to the amended complaint, she said that she does business under the same
style of A.M. Bascos Trucking, offering her trucks for lease to those who have cargo to move, not to the general public
but to a few customers only in view of the fact that it is only a small business.

We agree with the respondent Court in its finding that petitioner is a common carrier.

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as “(a) person, corporation or firm, or association engaged in
the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering
their services to the public.” The test to determine a common carrier is “whether the given undertaking is a part of the
business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity
or extent of the business transacted.” 12 In this case, petitioner herself has made the admission that she was in the
trucking business, offering her trucks to those with cargo to move. Judicial admissions are conclusive and no evidence
is required to prove the same. 13

But petitioner argues that there was only a contract of lease because they offer their services only to a select group of
people. Regarding the first contention, the holding of the Court in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals 14 is instructive. In
referring to Article 1732 of the Civil Code, it held thus:

“The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or
goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a “sideline”). Article 1732
also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular
or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article
1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the general community or population,
and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that
Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.”
2. NO

Likewise, We affirm the holding of the respondent court that the loss of the goods was not due to force majeure.

Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them.
Accordingly, they are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or
deteriorated. There are very few instances when the presumption of negligence does not attach and these instances
are enumerated in Article 1734. 19 In those cases where the presumption is applied, the common carrier must prove
that it exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the presumption.

In this case, petitioner alleged that hijacking constituted force majeure which exculpated her from liability for the loss of
the cargo. In De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that hijacking, not being included in the provisions of
Article 1734, must be dealt with under the provisions of Article 1735 and thus, the common carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or negligent. To exculpate the carrier from liability arising from hijacking, he must prove that the robbers or
the hijackers acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force. This is in accordance with Article 1745 of the Civil
Code which provides:

“Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public
policy; xx

(6) That the common carrier’s liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who do not act with grave or irresistible
threat, violences or force, is dispensed with or diminished;” xx

NOTES:

1. She cited as evidence certain affidavits which referred to the contract as “lease”. These affidavits were made by
Jesus Bascos and by petitioner herself and Cipriano and CIPTRADE did not object to the presentation of affidavits by
petitioner where the transaction was referred to as a lease contract. Both the trial and appellate courts have dismissed
them as self-serving and petitioner contests the conclusion. We are bound by the appellate court’s factual conclusions.
Yet, granting that the said evidence were not self-serving, the same were not sufficient to prove that the contract was
one of lease. It must be understood that a contract is what the law defines it to be and not what it is called by the
contracting parties. Furthermore, petitioner presented no other proof of the existence of the contract of lease. He who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.

2. Having affirmed the findings of the respondent Court on the substantial issues involved, We find no reason to disturb
the conclusion that the motion to lift/dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment has been rendered moot and academic
by the decision on the merits

PILAPIL VS CA

A passenger was injured because a bystander outside the bus hurled a stone. Is the bus company liable?

No. There is no showing that any such incident previously happened so as to impose an obligation on the part of the
personnel of the bus company to warn the passengers and to take the necessary precaution. Such hurling of a stone
constitutes fortuitous event in this case. The bus company is not an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
(Pilapil v. CA, G.R. No. 52159, Dec. 22, 1989) (1994 Bar Question)

FACTS:

Petitioner Pilapil, on board respondent’s bus was hit above his eye by a stone hurled by an unidentified bystander.
Respondent’s personnel lost no time in bringing him to a hospital, but eventually petitioner partially lost his left eye’s
vision and sustained a permanent scar.

Thus, Petitioner lodged an action for recovery of damages before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur which
the latter granted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed said decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not common carriers assume risks to passengers such as the stoning in this case?

HELD: In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the business of transporting passengers and
goods, a common carrier does not give its consent to become an insurer of any and all risks to passengers and goods.
It merely undertakes to perform certain duties to the public as the law imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach
thereof.
xxx

While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers
and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute
safety of its passengers.

xxx

Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence
of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord
the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the
negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been
foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that when the violation of the
contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the
common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.

PHIL AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO, INC VS MGG MARINE SERVICE, INC

FACTS: On March 1, 1987, San Miguel Corporation insured several beer bottle cases with petitioner Philippine
American General Insurance Company. The cargo were loaded on board the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G to be transported
from Mandaue City to Bislig, Surigao del Sur.

After having been cleared by the Coast Guard Station in Cebu the previous day, the vessel left the port of
Mandaue City for Bislig, Surigao del Sur on March 2, 1987. The weather was calm when the vessel started its voyage.

The following day, M/V Peatheray Patrick-G listed and subsequently sunk off Cawit Point, Cortes, Surigao del
Sur. As a consequence thereof, the cargo belonging to San Miguel Corporation was lost.

Petitioner paid San Miguel Corporation the full amount of the cargo pursuant to the terms of their insurance
contract, and as subrogee filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City a case for collection against private
respondents to recover the amount it paid.

Meanwhile, the Board of Marine Inquiry conducted its own investigation and found that the cause of the sinking
of the vessel was the existence of strong winds and enormous waves in Surigao del Sur, a fortuitous event that could
not have been for seen at the time the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G left the port of Mandaue City. It was further held by the
Board that said fortuitous event was the proximate and only cause of the vessel's sinking.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent MGG should be held liable.

HELD: No. [Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are mandated to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them. Owing to this high degree of diligence required of them, common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to
have been at fault or negligent if the goods transported by them are lost, destroyed or if the same deteriorated.

However, this presumption of fault or negligence does not arise in the cases enumerated under Article 1734 of the Civil
Code:
Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any
of the following causes only:(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity;(2) Act of the
public enemy in war, whether international or civil;(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;(4) The
character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;(5) Order or act of competent public authority.]

In order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability where the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods
is due to a natural disaster or calamity, it must further be shown that the such natural disaster or calamity was the
proximate and only cause of the loss; there must be "an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of the injury
of the loss."Moreover, even in cases where a natural disaster is the proximate and only cause of the loss, a common
carrier is still required to exercise due diligence to prevent or minimize loss before, during and after the occurrence of
the natural disaster, for it to be exempt from liability under the law for the loss of the goods. If a common carrier fails to
exercise due diligence--or that ordinary care which the circumstances of the particular case demand -- to preserve and
protect the goods carried by it on the occasion of a natural disaster, it will be deemed to have been negligent, and the
loss will not be considered as having been due to a natural disaster under Article 1734 (1).
[In the case at bar, the issues may be narrowed down to whether the loss of the cargo was due to the occurrence of a
natural disaster, and if so, whether such natural disaster was the sole and proximate cause of the loss or whether private
respondents were partly to blame for failing to exercise due diligence to prevent the loss of the cargo.

The parties do not dispute that on the day the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G sunk, said vessel encountered strong winds
and huge waves ranging from six to ten feet in height. The vessel listed at the port side and eventually sunk at Cawit
Point, Cortes, Surigao del Sur.

The Court of Appeals, citing the decision of the Board of Marine Inquiry in the administrative case against the vessel's
crew (BMI--646-87), found that the loss of the cargo was due solely to the existence of a fortuitous event, particularly
the presence of strong winds and huge waves at Cortes, Surigao del Sur on March 3, 1987:]

GANZON VS CA

FACTS:

On November 28, 1956, Gelacio Tumambing contracted the services of Mauro B. Ganzon to haul 305 tons of scrap iron
from Mariveles, Bataan, to the port of Manila on board the lighter LCT “Batman. Pursuant to that agreement, Mauro B.
Ganzon sent his lighter “Batman” to Mariveles where it docked in three feet of water. Gelacio Tumambing delivered the
scrap iron to defendant Filomeno Niza, captain of the lighter, for loading which was actually begun on the same date by
the crew of the lighter under the captain’s supervision. When about half of the scrap iron was already loaded, Mayor
Jose Advincula of Mariveles, Bataan, arrived and demanded P5,000.00 from Gelacio Tumambing. The latter resisted
the shakedown and after a heated argument between them, Mayor Jose Advincula drew his gun and fired at Gelacio
Tumambing who sustained injuries.

After sometime, the loading of the scrap iron was resumed. But on December 4, 1956, Acting Mayor Basilio Rub,
accompanied by three policemen, ordered captain Filomeno Niza and his crew to dump the scrap iron where the lighter
was docked. The rest was brought to the compound of NASSCO. Later on Acting Mayor Rub issued a receipt stating
that the Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron.

Tumabing sued Ganzon; the latter alleged that the goods have not been unconditionally placed under his custody and
control to make him liable. The trial court dismissed the case but on appeal, respondent Court rendered a decision
reversing the decision of the trial court and ordering Ganzon to pay damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not a contract of carriage has been perfected.

HELD: Yes. By the said act of delivery, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the
common carrier, and upon their receipt by the carrier for transportation, the contract of carriage was deemed perfected.
Consequently, the petitioner-carrier’s extraordinary responsibility for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods
commenced. Pursuant to Art. 1736, such extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon the delivery, actual or
constructive, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. The fact that part of the
shipment had not been loaded on board the lighter did not impair the said contract of transportation as the goods
remained in the custody and control of the carrier, albeit still unloaded.

Before Ganzon could be absolved from responsibility on the ground that he was ordered by competent public authority
to unload the scrap iron, it must be shown that Acting Mayor Basilio Rub had the power to issue the disputed order, or
that it was lawful, or that it was issued under legal process of authority. The appellee failed to establish this. Indeed, no
authority or power of the acting mayor to issue such an order was given in evidence. Neither has it been shown that the
cargo of scrap iron belonged to the Municipality of Mariveles. What we have in the record is the stipulation of the parties
that the cargo of scrap iron was accumulated by the appellant through separate purchases here and there from private
individuals. The fact remains that the order given by the acting mayor to dump the scrap iron into the sea was part of
the pressure applied by Mayor Jose Advincula to shakedown Tumambing for P5,000.00. The order of the acting mayor
did not constitute valid authority for Ganzon and his representatives to carry out.

SOUTHERN LINES VS CA

Facts: The City of Iloilo requisitioned for rice from the National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) in Manila. NARIC,
pursuant to the order, shipped 1,726 sacks of rice consigned to the City of Iloilo on board the SS “General Wright”
belonging to the Southern Lines, Inc.

The City of Iloilo received the shipment and paid the total charged amount. However, it was discovered in the bill of
lading that there was shortage equivalent to 41 sacks of rice. The City of Iloilo filed a complaint against NARIC and the
Southern Lines, Inc. for the recovery of the amount representing the value of the shortage of the shipment of rice. The
lower court absolved NARIC, but held Southern Lines, Inc. liable to pay the shortage. CA affirmed the trial court’s
decision, hence, this petition.

Issues:

(1) W/N Southern Lines is liable for the loss or shortage of the rice shipped;

(2) W/N the action was filed on time.

Ruling: (1) YES. Under the provisions of Article 361, the defendant-carrier in order to free itself from liability was only
obliged to prove that the damages suffered by the goods were “by virtue of the nature or defect of the articles.” Under
the provisions of Article 362, the plaintiff, in order to hold the defendant liable, was obliged to prove that the damages
to the goods by virtue of their nature, occurred on account of its negligence or because the defendant did not take the
precaution adopted by careful persons.

The contention is untenable, for, if the fact of improper packing is known to the carrier or his servants, or apparent upon
ordinary observation, but it accepts the goods notwithstanding such condition, it is not relieved of liability for loss or
injury resulting therefrom. Petitioner itself frankly admitted that the strings that tied the bags of rice were broken; some
bags were with holes and plenty of rice were spilled inside the hull of the boat, and that the personnel of the boat
collected no less than 26 sacks of rice which they had distributed among themselves. This finding, which is binding upon
this Court, shows that the shortage resulted from the negligence of petitioner.

(2) YES. Respondent filed the present action, within a reasonable time after the short delivery in the shipment of the
rice was made. It should be recalled that the present action is one for the refund of the amount paid in excess, and not
for damages or the recovery of the shortage; for admittedly the respondent had paid the entire value of the 1726 sacks
of rice, subject to subsequent adjustment, as to shortages or losses. The bill of lading does not at all limit the time for
filing an action for the refund of money paid in excess.

TABACALERA INSURANCE CO. VS NORTH FRONT SHIPPING SERVICES, INC.

Facts: Sacks of grains were loaded on board a vessel owned by North Front Shipping (common carrier); the consignee:
Republic Floor Mills. The vessel was inspected by representatives of the shipper prior to the transport and was found
fitting to carry the cargo; it was also issued a Permit to Sail. The goods were successfully delivered but it was not
immediately unloaded by the consignee. There were a shortage of 23.666 metric tons and some of the merchandise
was already moldy and deteriorating. Hence, the consignee rejected all the cargo and demanded payment of damages
from the common carrier. Upon refusal, the insurance companies (petitioners) were obliged to pay. Petitioners now
allege that there was negligence on the part of the carrier. The trial court ruled that only ordinary diligence was required
since the charter-party agreement converted North Front Shipping into a private carrier.

Issues: WON North Front Shipping is a common carrier. If indeed, did it fail to exercise the required diligence and thus
should be held liable?

Held: North Front Shipping is a common carrier. Thus, it has the burden of proving that it observed extraordinary
diligence in order to avoid responsibility for the lost cargo.

The charter-party agreement between North Front Shipping Services, Inc., and Republic Flour Mills Corporation
did not in any way convert the common carrier into a private carrier. A “charter-party” is defined as a contract by which
an entire ship, or some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a specified time or usex x x

Having been in the service since 1968, the master of the vessel would have known at the outset that corn grains
that were farm wet and not properly dried would eventually deteriorate when stored in sealed and hot compartments as
in hatches of a ship. Equipped with this knowledge, the master of the vessel and his crew should have undertaken
precautionary measures to avoid or lessen the cargo’s possible deterioration as they were presumed knowledgeable
about the nature of such cargo.

But none of such measures was taken.

It did not even endeavor to establish that the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods was due to the
following: (a) flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (b) act of the public enemy in war,
whether international or civil; © act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (d) the character of the goods or
defects in the packing or in the containers; (e) order or act of competent public authority. This is a closed list. If the
cause of destruction, loss or deterioration is other than the enumerated circumstances, then the carrier is rightly liable
therefor.

However, the destruction, loss or deterioration of the cargo cannot be attributed solely to the carrier. The
consignee Republic Flour Mills Corporation is guilty of contributory negligence. It was seasonably notified of the arrival
of the barge but did not immediately start the unloading operations.

SWEETLINES, INC. VS CA

FACTS: Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tiro bought tickets for Tagbiliran City via the port of Cebu. Since many
passengers were bound for Surigao, “M/S Sweet Hope” would not be proceeding to Bohol. They went to the proper
branch office and were relocated to “M/S Sweet Town” where they were forced to agree “to hide at the cargo section to
avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippines Coastguard.” They were exposed to the scorching heat of the sun and
the dust coming from the ship’s cargo of corn grits and their tickets were not honored so they had to purchase a new
one. Because of the terrible experience they had, they sued Sweet Lines for damages and for breach of contract of
carriage before the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental who dismissed the complaint for improper venue. A
motion was premised on the condition printed at the back of the tickets and was later dismissed. Hence this instant
petition for prohibition for preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not, a common carrier engaged in inter-island shipping stipulate thru condition printed at the back
of passage tickets to its vessels that any and all actions arising out of the contract of carriage should be filed only in a
particular province or city.

HELD: No. Actions arising out of the contract of carriage should be filed not only in a particular province or city. Contract
of adhesions are not the kind of contract where the parties sit down to deliberate, discuss and agree specifically on all
its terms, but rather, one which respondents took no part at all in preparing. It is only imposed upon them when they
paid for the fare for the freight they wanted to ship.

We find and hold that Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the passage tickets should be held as void and
unenforceable for the following reasons:

1. Circumstances obligation in the inter-island ship will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers in
different parts of the country who, under Condition No. 14, will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of
Cebu;

2. Subversive of public policy on transfers of venue of actions; and

3. Philosophy underlying the provisions of transfers of venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as well as his
witnesses and to promote the ends of justice.

Hence, petition for prohibition is hereby dismissed. The restraining order is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

JUNTILLA VS FONTANAR

FACTS:
▪ Jeepney was driven by Berfol Camoro from Danao City to Cebu City. It was Clemente Fontanar but was
actually owned by defendant Fernando Banzon.
▪ When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn
turtle. Roberto Juntilla was sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the vehicle.
▪ Upon landing on the ground, he momentarily lost consciousness. When he came to his senses,
he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. He also injured his left arm, right thigh
and on his back.
▪ Because of his shock and injuries, he went back to Danao City but on the way, he discovered that his
"Omega" wrist watch worth P 852.70 was lost. Upon his arrival in Danao City, he immediately entered the
Danao City Hospital to attend to his injuries, and also requested his father-in-law to proceed immediately
to the place of the accident and look for the watch.
▪ Roberto Juntilla filed for breach of contract with damages
▪ Respondents: beyond the control since tire that exploded was newly bought and was only slightly
used
▪ RTC: favored Roberto Juntilla
 ▪ CA: Reversed since accident was due to fortuitous event
ISSUE: W/N there is a fortuitous event

HELD: NO. CA reversed, RTC reinstated.

▪ passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident
▪ at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up
▪ passenger jeepney was overloaded
▪ 3 passengers in the front seat
▪ 14 passengers in the rear
▪ caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics:
▪ (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with
his obligation, must be independent of the human will.
▪ (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it
must be impossible to avoid.
▪ (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner.
▪ (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the
creditor.
▪ In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the
human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of
mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles,
not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up
thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times
▪ the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage, and by entering into the said
contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with a due regard for all the circumstances. The
records show that this obligation was not met by the respondents
▪ respondents likewise argue that the petitioner cannot recover any amount for failure to prove such
damages during the trial
▪ findings of facts of the City Court of Cebu

VERGARA VS CA

AFRICA VS CALTEX (PHIL), INC

FACTS:

On March 18, 1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila
St. all started while a gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of
the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring house.
The spouse Bernabe and heirs of Domingo Ong herein petitioner, sued respondents Caltex (phils), Inc. and Mateo
Boquiren on negligence on the part of both of tyhem was attributed as the cause of the fire.

In the polioce and fire report they started that during the transferring of gasoline to the tank truck an unknown Filipino
Citizen lighted a cigarette and threw the burning match stick near the main valve of the of the paid underground tank.
Due to gasoline fumes, fire suddenly blazed. The respondents contend that it is not their negligence why the fire broke.
But there was no evidence presented to prove this theory and no other explanation can be had as to the reason for the
fire. Apparently also, Caltex and the branch owner failed to install a concrete firewall to contain fire if in case one
happens.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for damages.

RULING:

Caltex and Boquiren are liable. Though the one who accuses the other of negligence is the one with burden to prove,
in this case the principle of res ipsa loquitor applies. Res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself) which states:
“where the thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant
and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such control use proper care, if
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from defendant1s want of
care.” Article 1173 states that, the fault on negligence of the obligation consists in the omission of that diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of article 1171 and 2201 paragraph 2 shall apply. a fired
occurred therein an spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The person who knew or could have known how the
fire started, were Boquiren, Caltex and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is fair and
reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.

SERVANDO VS PSNC

1. Clara UyBico and AmparoServando loaded on board a vessel of Philippine Steam Navigation Co. for carriage
from Manila to Negros Occidental 1,528 cavans of rice and 44 cartons of colored paper, toys and general
merchandise.

2. The contract of carriage of cargo was evidenced by a Bill of Lading (B/L). There was a stipulation limiting the
responsibility of the carrier for loss or damage that may be caused to the shipment
a. “carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed ‘owner’s risk’ unless such loss or
damage is due to the negligence of the carrier. Nor shall the carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by
force majeure, dangers or accidents of the sea, war, public enemies, fire”.

3. Upon arrival of the vessel at its destination, the cargoes were discharged in good condition and placed inside the
warehouse of the Bureau of Customs.

4. UyBico was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice.

5. Unfortunately, the warehouse was razed by fire of unknown origin later that same day destroying the remaining
cargoes.

6. UyBico and Servando filed a claim for the value of the goods against the carrier.

7. The lower court ruled in their favor. It held that the delivery of the shipment to the warehouse is not the delivery
contemplated by Art. 1736 of the CC. And since the burning of the warehouse occurred prior to the actual or
constructive delivery of the goods, the loss is chargeable against the vessel.
Issue:Whether or not the carrier is liable for the loss of the goods.

Held:No.

1. Article 1736 of the CC imposes upon common carriers the duty to observe extraordinary diligence from the
moment the goods are unconditionally placed in their possession "until the same are delivered, actually or
constructively, by the carrier to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to
the provisions of Article 1738.” The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of
the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736; and since the burning of the warehouse
occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees, the loss is chargeable against the
appellant.

2. It should be pointed out, however, that in the bills of lading issued for the cargoes in question, the parties agreed
to limit the responsibility of the carrier. The stipulation is valid not being contrary to law, morals or public policy.
3. The petitioners however, contend that the stipulation does not bind them since it was printed at the back of the
B/L and that they did not sign the same. However, as the Court held in OngYiu vs. CA, while it may be true that a
passenger had not signed the plane ticket, he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. Such provisions have
been held to be a part of the contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's
lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation.

4. Also, where fortuitous event is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from liability
for [Link] the case at bar, the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which
happened independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could not have foreseen the event.

5. There is nothing in the record to show that the carrier incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation. It
appears that it had not only notified UyBico and Servando of the arrival of their shipment, but had demanded that the
same be withdrawn. In fact, pursuant to such demand, UyBico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the
burning of the warehouse.

6. Nor can the carrier or its employees be charged with negligence. The storage of the goods in the Customs
warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by UyBico and Servando was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and
consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government, it would be unfair to impute
negligence to the carrier, the latter having no control whatsoever over the same.

JUAN F. NAKPIL & SONS VS CA

FACTS: The Philippine Bar Association, private respondent, hired the services of the petitioner to make the plans and
specifications for the construction of their office building. The building was completed by the contractor but subsequently,
an earthquake struck causing its partial collapse and damage.

ISSUE: Is the petitioner liable for damages in this case?

RULING: Yes. The petitioner made significant deviations from the plans and specifications, thereby failing to observe
requisite workmanship standards in the construction of the building while their architect drew plans that contain defects
and other inadequacies. Both the contractor and the architect cannot escape liability for damages when the building
collapsed due to an earthquake when other buildings in the area withstood the earthquake. Further, the lower court also
found that the spirals in one of the columns on the ground floor have been cut. One who creates a dangerous condition
is still liable even if an act of God may have intervened. As such, the liability of the contractor and the architect for the
collapse of the building is solidary.

The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by
the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief.
When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man,
whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were,
and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God.

BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY VS IAC

FACTS
• A bus owned by petitioner BLTB and driven by petitioner Pon collided with a bus owned by Superlines, when the
former tried to overtake a car just as the Superlines' Bus was coming from the opposite direction.
• The collision resulted in the death of Rosales, Pamfilo and Neri, as well as injuries to the wife of Rosales, and Sales.
These people were passengers of the petitioner's bus.
• Rosales and Sales, as well as the surviving heirs of Pamfilo, Rosales and Neri instituted separate cases ih the CFI
against BLTB and Superlines, together with their drivers. Criminal cases against the drivers were also filed in a different
CFI.
• CFI ruled that only BLTB and Pon should be liable, and they were ordered jointly and severally to pay damages. On
appeal, the IAC affirmed the CFI's ruling.
• Petitioners contended that the CFI erred in ruling that the actions of private respondents are based on culpa
contractual, since if it were private respondents' intention to file an action based on culap contractual, they could have
done so by merely impleading BLTB and Pon. Instead the respondents filed an action against all defendants based on
culpa aquiliana or tort.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

WON erred in ruling that the actions of private respondents are based on culpa contractual

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

IAC anchored its decision on both culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana

The proximate cause of the death and injuries of the passengers was the negligence of the bus driver Pon, who
recklessly overtook a car despite knowing that that the bend of highway he was negotiating on had a continuous yellow
line signifying a “no-overtaking” zone.
It is presumed that a a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating
any traffic regulation.
In the instant case, the driver of the BLTB bus failed to act with diligence demanded by the circumstances. Pon should
have remembered that when a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve there is special necessity for keeping
to the right side of the road and the driver has not the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn
to the right if a car is approaching from the opposite direction comes into view.
As to the liability of the petitioners, Pon is primarily liable for his negligence in driving recklessly the truck owned by
BLTB. The liability of the BLTB itself is also primary, direct and immediate in view of the fact that the deat of or injuries
to its passengers was through the negligence of its employee.
The common carrier's liability for the death of or injuries to its passengers is based on its contractual obligation to carry
its passengers safely to their destination. They are presumed to have acted negligently unless they prove that they have
observed extaordinary diligence. In the case at bar, the appellants acted negligently.
BLTB is also solidarly liable with its driver even though the liability of the driver
springs from quasi delict while that of the bus company from contract.

VALENZUELA VS CA

Facts: At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi
lancer from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home. While travelling along Aurora Blvd., she noticed something
wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to
solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach
her home in that car’s condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, put on her emergency lights,
alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk.

She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when
she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of
defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of
the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendant’s car.
Plaintiff’s left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the
body. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a “traumatic amputation,
leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee).” She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted
with an artificial leg.

Issues:

1.) Whether or not Li was negligent.

2.) Whether or not Valenzuela was contributory negligent.

3.) Whether or not Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li’s employer is liable.

Held:

1.) Yes. A witness testified that Li’s car was being driven at a “very fast” speed, racing towards the general direction of
Araneta Avenue. He also saw the car hit Valenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield of the defendant’s Mitsubishi
Lancer, from where she eventually fell under the defendant’s car. Moreover the witness declared that he observed
Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and very near the sidewalk, contrary to Li’s allegation that Valenzuela’s car was close
to the center of the right lane.

2.) No. The Court held that Valenzuela was not negligent applying the emergency rule.

Under the “emergency rule,” an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act
without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his own negligence.

Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have
contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The
emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was
evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions. Obviously, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of
Li on the night of the accident.

3.) Yes. Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to the Court’s satisfaction, that it exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or
not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it
gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it
should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle
of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela during the accident.

Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. He admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager did
not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside the
office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company clients. These meetings, clearly, were not
strictly confined to routine hours because, as a managerial employee tasked with the job of representing his company
with its clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li
by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li – as well as the corporation – to put up the front of a highly
successful entity, increasing the latter’s goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients
by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.

ARADA VS CA
Facts: Alejandro Arada is the proprietor and operator of the firm South Negros Enterprises which has been organized
and established for more than 10 years. It is engaged in the business of small scale shipping as a common carrier,
servicing the hauling of cargoes of different corporations and companies with the five vessels it was operating. On 24
March 1982, Arada entered into a contract with San Miguel Corporation (SMC) to safely transport as a common carrier,
cargoes of the latter from San Carlos City, Negros Occidental to Mandaue City using one of Arada’s vessels, M/L Maya.
On 24 March 1982, Arada thru its crew master, Mr. Vivencio Babao, applied for a clearance with the Philippine Coast
Guard for M/L Maya to leave the port of San Carlos City, but due to a typhoon, it was denied clearance by SNI Antonio
Prestado PN who was then assigned at San Carlos City Coast Guard Detachment. On 25 March 1982 M/L Maya was
given clearance as there was no storm and the sea was calm. Hence, said vessel left for Mandaue City. While it was
navigating towards Cebu, a typhoon developed and said vessel was buffeted on all its sides by big waves. Its rudder
was destroyed and it drifted for 16 hours although its engine was running. On 27 March 1982 at about 4:00 a.m., the
vessel sank with whatever was left of its cargoes. The crew was rescued by a passing pump boat and was brought to
Calanggaman Island. Later in the afternoon, they were brought to Palompon, Leyte, where Vivencio Babao filed a marine
protest. On the basis of such marine protest, the Board of Marine Inquiry conducted a hearing of the sinking of M/L
Maya wherein SMC was duly represented. Said Board made it findings and recommendation dated 7 November 1983,
absolving the owner/operator, officers and crew of M/L Maya from any administrative liability. The Board’s report
containing its findings and recommendation was then forwarded to the headquarters of the Philippine Coast Guard for
appropriate action. On the basis of such report, the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard rendered a decision
dated 21 December 1984 in SBMI Adm. Case No. 88-82 exonerating the owner/operator officers and crew of the ill-
fated M/L Maya from any administrative liability on account of said incident.

On 25 March 1983, SMC filed a complaint in the RTC its first cause of action being for the recovery of the value of the
cargoes anchored on breach of contract of carriage. After due hearing, said court rendered a decision dated 18 July
1988, where (1) With respect to the first cause of action, claim of plaintiff is hereby dismissed; (2) Under the second
cause of action, defendant must pay plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00; (3) In the third cause of action, the defendant must
pay plaintiff the sum of P2,849.20; (4) Since the plaintiff has withheld the payment of P12,997.47 due the defendant,
the plaintiff should deduct the amount of P4,849.20 from the P12,997.47 and the balance of P8,148.27 must be paid to
the defendant; and (5) Defendant’s counterclaim not having been substantiated by evidence, is likewise dismissed. NO
COSTS.” (Orig. Record, pp. 193-195).
Thereafter, SMC appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CV 20597). In its decision promulgated on 8
April 1991, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court, and thereupon ordered Arada to pay unto the
SMC the amount of P176,824.80 representing the value of the cargo lost on board the ill-fated vessel, M/L Maya, with
interest thereon at the legal rate from date of the filing of the complaint on 25 March 1983, until fully paid, and the costs.
Hence, the petition for review on certiorari. On 20 November 1991, the Supreme Court gave due course to the petition.
Finally, it affirmed the appealed decision.

1. Common carriers defined

Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation offering their services to the public (Art. 1732 of
the New Civil Code). In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Arada was exercising its function as a common carrier
when it entered into a contract with SMC to carry and transport the latter’s cargoes. This fact is best supported by the
admission of petitioner’s son, Mr. Eric Arada, who testified as the officer-in-charge for operations of South Negros
Enterprises in Cebu City.

2. Duty of common carrier to exercise extraordinary diligence; Fortuitous event

A common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for insistent reasons of public policy is burdened by law with
the duty of exercising extraordinary diligence not only in ensuring the safety of passengers, but in caring for the goods
transported by it. The loss or destruction or deterioration of goods turned over to the common carrier for the conveyance
to a designated destination raises instantly a presumption of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier, save only
where such loss, destruction or damage arises from extreme circumstances such as a natural disaster or
calamity.(Benedicto v. IAC, G.R. No. 70876, July 19, 1990, 187 SCRA 547)

3. Natural disaster must be the proximate and only cause of the loss to exempt common carrier from liability
In order that the common carrier may be exempted from responsibility, the natural disaster must have been the
proximate and only cause of the loss. However, the common carrier must exercise due diligence to prevent or minimize
the loss before, during and after the occurrence of flood, storm or other natural disaster in order that the common carrier
may be exempted from liability for the destruction or deterioration of the goods (Article 1739, New Civil Code).

4. Failure to ascertain the location and direction of typhoon shows negligence

Vivencio Babao, the ship’s captain, knew of the impending typhoon on 24 March 1982 when the Philippine Coast Guard
denied M/L Maya the issuance of a clearance to sail. Less than 24 hours elapsed since the time of the denial of said
clearance and the time a clearance to sail was finally issued on 25 March 1982. Records will show that Babao did not
ascertain where the typhoon was headed by the use of his vessel’s barometer and radio. Neither did the captain of the
vessel monitor and record the weather conditions everyday as required by Art. 612 of the Code of Commerce. Had he
done so while navigating for 31 hours, he could have anticipated the strong winds and big waves and taken shelter.

5. PAG-ASA’s records as per March 25-27, 1982 on conditions prevailing in the vicinity of Catmon, Cebu
As per official records of the Climatological Division of the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical
Services Administration (PAG-ASA) issued by its Chief of Climatological Division, Primitivo G. Ballan, Jr. as to the
weather and sea conditions that prevailed in the vicinity of Catmon, Cebu during the period March 25-27, 1982, the sea
conditions on March 25, 1982 were slight to rough and the weather conditions then prevailing during those times were
cloudy skies with rainshowers and the small waves grew larger and larger.

6. Circumstances constitute lack of foresight and minimum vigilance over the cargoes
A common carrier is obliged to observe extraordinary diligence and the failure of Babao to ascertain the direction of the
storm and the weather condition of the path they would be traversing, constitute lack of foresight and minimum vigilance
over its cargoes taking into account the surrounding circumstances of the case.

7. Carrier’s fault or negligence presumed

While the goods are in the possession of the carrier, it is but fair that it exercises extraordinary diligence in protecting
them from loss or damage, and if loss occurs, the law presumes that it was due to the carrier’s fault or negligence; that
is necessary to protect the interest of the shipper which is at the mercy of the carrier (Art. 1756, Civil Code, Aboitiz
Shipping Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89757, Aug. 6, 1990, 188 SCRA 387).

8. Crew of M/L Maya did not have the required qualifications

The records show that the crew of M/L Maya did not have the required qualifications provided for in PD 97 or the
Philippine Merchant Marine Officers Law, all of whom were unlicensed. While it is true that they were given special
permit to man the vessel, such permit was issued at the risk and responsibility of the owner.

9. Exoneration from administrative liability does not mean exoneration from liability as common carrier
The exoneration made by the Special Board of Marine Inquiry was but with respect to the administrative liability of the
“owner/operator, officers and crew of the ill-fated” vessel. It could not have meant exoneration of Arada from liability as
a common carrier for his failure to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods it was transporting
and for the negligent acts or omissions of his employees. Such is the function of the Court, not the Special Board of
Marine Inquiry.”

10. Jurisdiction of the Board of Marine Inquiry and the Special Board of Marine Inquiry
The Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations particularly Chapter XVI thereof entitled “Marine Investigation
and Suspension and Revocation Proceedings” prescribes the Rules governing maritime casualties or accidents, the
rules and procedures in administrative investigation of all maritime cases within the jurisdiction or cognizance of the
Philippine Coast Guard and the grounds for suspension and revocation of licenses/certificates of marine officers and
seamen (1601 — SCOPE); clearly, limiting the jurisdiction of the Board of Marine Inquiry and Special Board of Marine
Inquiry to the administrative aspect of marine casualties in so far as it involves the shipowners and officers.

SALUDO, JR VS CA

FACTS: Crispina Galdo Saludo, mother of the petitioners, died in Chicago, Illinois. Pomierski and Son Funeral Home
of Chicago, made the necessary preparations and arrangements for the shipment of the remains from Chicago to the
Philippines. Pomierski brought the remains to Continental Mortuary Air Services (CMAS) at the Chicago Airport which
made the necessary arrangements such as flights, transfers, etc. CMAS booked the shipment with PAL thru the carrier’s
agent Air Care International. PAL Airway Bill Ordinary was issued wherein the requested routing was from Chicago to
San Francisco on board Trans World Airline (TWA) and from San Francisco to Manila on board PAL.

Salvacion (one of the petitioners), upon arrival at San Francisco, went to the TWA to inquire about her mother’s remains.
But she was told they did not know anything about it. She then called Pomierski that her mother’s remains were not at
the West Coast terminal. Pomierski immediately called CMAS which informed that the remains were on a plane to
Mexico City, that there were two bodies at the terminal, and somehow they were switched. CMAS called and told
Pomierski that they were sending the remains back to California via Texas.

Petitioners filed a complaint against TWA and PAL fir the misshipment and delay in the delay of the cargo containing
the remains of the late Crispina Saludo. Petitioners alleged that private respondents received the casketed remains of
Crispina on October 26, 1976, as evidenced by the issuance of PAL Airway Bill by Air Care and from said date, private
respondents were charged with the responsibility to exercise extraordinary diligence so much so that the alleged
switching of the caskets on October 27, 1976, or one day after the private respondents received the cargo, the latter
must necessarily be liable.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was delivery of the cargo upon mere issuance of the airway bill

Whether or not the delay in the delivery of the casketed remains of petitioners’ mother was due to the fault of
respondent airline companies

HELD: NO to both, but TWA was held to pay petitioners nominal damages of P40,000 for its violation of the degree of
diligence required by law to be exercised by every common carrier.

Ordinarily, a receipt is not essential to a complete delivery of goods to the carrier for transportation but, when
issued, is competent and prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence of delivery to the carrier. A bill of lading, when
properly executed and delivered to a shipper, is evidence that the carrier has received the goods described therein for
shipment. Except as modified by statute, it is a general rule as to the parties to a contract of carriage of goods in
connection with which a bill of lading is issued reciting that goods have been received for transportation, that the recital
being in essence a receipt alone, is not conclusive, but may be explained, varied or contradicted by parol or other
evidence.

In other words, on October 26, 1976 the cargo containing the casketed remains of Crispina Saludo was booked
for PAL Flight Number PR-107 leaving San Francisco for Manila on October 27, 1976, PAL Airway Bill No. 079-
01180454 was issued, not as evidence of receipt of delivery of the cargo on October 26, 1976, but merely as a
confirmation of the booking thus made for the San Francisco-Manila flight scheduled on October 27, 1976. Actually, it
was not until October 28, 1976 that PAL received physical delivery of the body at San Francisco, as duly evidenced by
the Interline Freight Transfer Manifest of the American Airline Freight System and signed for by Virgilio Rosales at
1945H, or 7:45 P.M. on said date.

Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil Code that the extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier
begins from the time the goods are delivered to the carrier. This responsibility remains in full force and effect even when
they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit, unless the shipper or owner exercises the right of stoppage in
transitu, and terminates only after the lapse of a reasonable time for the acceptance, of the goods by the consignee or
such other person entitled to receive them. And, there is delivery to the carrier when the goods are ready for and have
been placed in the exclusive possession, custody and control of the carrier for the purpose of their immediate
transportation and the carrier has accepted them. Where such a delivery has thus been accepted by the carrier, the
liability of the common carrier commences eo instanti.

Hence, while we agree with petitioners that the extraordinary diligence statutorily required to be observed by
the carrier instantaneously commences upon delivery of the goods thereto, for such duty to commence there must in
fact have been delivery of the cargo subject of the contract of carriage. Only when such fact of delivery has been
unequivocally established can the liability for loss, destruction or deterioration of goods in the custody of the carrier,
absent the excepting causes under Article 1734, attach and the presumption of fault of the carrier under Article 1735 be
invoked.

As already demonstrated, the facts in the case at bar belie the averment that there was delivery of the cargo to
the carrier on October 26, 1976. Rather, as earlier explained, the body intended to be shipped as agreed upon was
really placed in the possession and control of PAL on October 28, 1976 and it was from that date that private respondents
became responsible for the agreed cargo under their undertakings in PAL Airway Bill No. 079-01180454. Consequently,
for the switching of caskets prior thereto which was not caused by them, and subsequent events caused thereby, private
respondents cannot be held liable.

The oft-repeated rule regarding a carrier’s liability for delay is that in the absence of a special contract, a carrier
is not an insurer against delay in transportation of goods. When a common carrier undertakes to convey goods, the law
implies a contract that they shall be delivered at destination within a reasonable time, in the absence, of any agreement
as to the time of delivery. But where a carrier has made an express contract to transport and deliver property within a
specified time, it is bound to fulfill its contract and is liable for any delay, no matter from what cause it may have arisen.
This result logically follows from the well-settled rule that where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is
disabled from performing it without any default in himself, and has no remedy over, then the law will excuse him, but
where the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good notwithstanding
any accident or delay by inevitable necessity because he might have provided against it by contract. Whether or not
there has been such an undertaking on the part of the carrier to be determined from the circumstances surrounding the
case and by application of the ordinary rules for the interpretation of contracts.

Echoing the findings of the trial court, the respondent court correctly declared that —
In a similar case of delayed delivery of air cargo under a very similar stipulation contained in the airway bill which reads:
“The carrier does not obligate itself to carry the goods by any specified aircraft or on a specified time. Said carrier being
hereby authorized to deviate from the route of the shipment without any liability therefor”, our Supreme Court ruled that
common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and to deliver merchandise, and persons are not vested with the right
to prompt delivery, unless such common carriers previously assume the obligation. Said rights and obligations are
created by a specific contract entered into by the parties (Mendoza vs. PAL, 90 Phil. 836).

There is no showing by plaintiffs that such a special or specific contract had been entered into between them
and the defendant airline companies.

And this special contract for prompt delivery should call the attention of the carrier to the circumstances
surrounding the case and the approximate amount of damages to be suffered in case of delay (See Mendoza vs.
PAL, supra). There was no such contract entered into in the instant case.”

A common carrier undertaking to transport property has the implicit duty to carry and deliver it within reasonable
time, absent any particular stipulation regarding time of delivery, and to guard against delay. In case of any unreasonable
delay, the carrier shall be liable for damages immediately and proximately resulting from such neglect of duty. As found
by the trial court, the delay in the delivery of the remains of Crispina Saludo, undeniable and regrettable as it was, cannot
be attributed to the fault, negligence or malice of private respondents,a conclusion concurred in by respondent court
and which we are not inclined to disturb.