I.
Testamentary Capacity and Intent - 5 cases
CONSUELO SEVILLE JUTIC, JUAN JUTIC, CELESTINO SEVILLE, TIBURCIO
SEVILLE, RAVELLO SEVILLE, SONITA SEVILLE, LUCY SEVILLE, EPIFANIA
SEVILLE, NARACY SEVILLE, EMMANUEL SEVILLE, ORLANDO MANICAN,
and PACIFICO MANICAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, VICENTE SULLAN, TRINIDAD SULLAN,
TERESITA SULLAN, ULYSSES SULLAN, ALEJANDRINO SULLAN,
BUENAVENTURA SEVILLE, and ZOILO SEVILLE, respondents
G.R. No. L-44628 August 27, 1987
FACTS:
Vicente Sullan with other respondents filed a complaint with the Court of
First Instance in Tagum for the Partition and Accounting of Properties of
the late Arsenio Seville.
On September 19, 1972 the Court of First Instance render judgment in
favour of Vicente Sullan. Later on 1972 the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the lower court.
On May 24, 1968 Arsenio Seville mortgage properties to the Philippine
National Bank ( PNB ) without the consent of Melquiades Seville.
On May 15, 1970 Arsenio Seville died leaving no debt and no last will and
testament.
The heirs of Melquiades Seville are claiming ownership of the properties
and improvements thereon based on the instrument executed by
Arsenio Seville in favour of Melquiades Seville.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid donation from Arsenio Seville to
Melquiades Seville.
RULING:
No. There was no valid donation. It is not a concrete and formal act of
giving or donating. The Supreme Court cited Albada v. Court of Appeals
where the question to be resolved in the instant case. If there was a
disposition of the property in question made by the deceased Belen
Aldaba in favor of herein petitioners. If the property was only intended
for petitioners then, at the time of its writing, the property had not yet
been disposed of in their favor. There is no evidence in the record that
such intention was effectively carried out after the writing of the note.
It was a mere intention or a desire on the part of Arsenio Seville that in
the event of his death at some future time, his properties should go to
Melquiades Seville.
It is quite apparent that Arsenio Seville was thinking of succession
Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake
of the nature of testamentary provisions and shall be governed by the
rules established in the title... on succession (Art. 728, Civil Code).
Arsenio dealt with the land and entered into transactions as its owner.
All these happened with the knowledge and acquiescence of the
supposed donee, Melquiades Seville
VICENTE ALDABA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR ALDABA, ET AL., respondents
G.R. No. L-21676 February 28, 1969
Rodas and Almeda for petitioners.
Dakila F. Castro and Associates for respondents.
FACTS:
On February 25, 1955, Belen Aldaba died abd left properties for her
presumptive heirs.
On June 24, 1955, the presumptive heirs of Estanislao Bautista and Cesar
Aldaba executed an extrajudicial deed of partition left by Belen Aldaba
On August 26, 1957, Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista executed a
deed whereby the two lots that were alloted to Cesar Aldaba were ceded
to Emmanuel Bautista in exchange of the latter's lot situated at San Juan,
Rizal by virtue of the deed of extra-judicial partition and the deed of
exchange.
On August 22, 1959, a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila
was filed against Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista and the Register
of Deeds of Manila, alleging that they had become the owners of the two
lots in question, and praying that the deed of partition entered into by
Estanislao Bautista and Cesar Aldaba be declared null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a disposition of property by Belen in favour of
the petitioners.
RULING:
No. The conditions to constitute a donation cum causa onerosa are not
present in the instant case, and the claim of petitioners that the two lots
in question were donated to them by Belen Aldaba cannot be sustained.
The Supreme Court further emphasized that there was no express
agreement between the parties and that the respondents did not expect
to be compensated.
MANUEL TORRES, petitioner-appellant and
LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, appellant,
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-24569 February 26, 1926
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS:
In 1924, Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila leaving a will. At the
age of 76, the testator’s health was not in a good condition which
prompted his first cousin, Margarita Lopez to use it as basis for her
opposition for the probate the will of the former.
Margarita Lope used the grounds that the testator lack the mental
capacity due to advancing age, dementia and a series of surgical and
medical problems.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the there was sufficient Mentality of the Testator to
make a will.
RULING:
Yes. Two of the subscribing witnesses to the will, one a physician clearly
to the regular manner in which the will was executed and to the
testator’s mental condition. The other subscribing witness, also, a
physician on the contrary testified to a fact which, if substantiated,
would require the court to disallow the will. The attending physician and
three other eminent members of the medical fraternity, who were
present at the execution of the will, expressed opinion sentirely
favorable to the capacity of the testator. As against this we have the
professional speculations of three other equally eminent members of the
medical profession when the will was executed. The advantage on those
facts is all with those who offer the will for probate.
The Supreme Court held that Tomas Rodriguez comprehended the
nature of the transaction in which he was engaged, given that the will is
very short and could easily be understood. He had two conferences with
his lawyer, Judge Mina, and knew what the will was to contain. The will
was read to him by Mr. Legarda. He signed the will and its two copies in
the proper places at the bottom and on the left margin. At that time the
testator recollected the property to be disposed of and the persons who
would naturally be supposed to have claims upon him. While for some
months prior to the making of the will he had not manage his property
he seem to have retained a distinct recollection of what it consisted and
of his income.
RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
GUERRERO, J.:
FACTS:
In June 24, 1961 Lutarga Santiago filed for the probate of a will of the
late Isabel Gabriel in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The testator died
on June 7, 1961 at the age of 86.
The action for probate was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales on the
grounds that the will is not genuine and that at the time of its execution,
the testator lacked testamentary capacity due to her advance age.
On February 1, 1962 the court of first instance rendered judgement
disallowing the probate of the will. The court of appeals allowed the
probate of will upon
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the testator was mentally capable to execute a will.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the conclusion reached by the Court of
Appeals that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or
memorandum appears to be fully supported by the following facts or
evidence appearing on record.
Thus, Isabel Gabriel, despite her age, was particularly active in her
business affairs as she actively managed the affairs of the movie business
ISABELITA Theater, paying the aparatistas herself until June 4, 1961, 3
days before her death. She was the widow of the late Eligio Naval,
former Governor of Rizal Province and acted as coadministratrix in the
Intestate Estate of her deceased husband Eligio Naval. The text of the
win was in Tagalog, a dialect known and understood by her and in the
light of all the circumstances, the Supreme Court agree with the
respondent Court that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or
memorandum, a fact unanimously testified to by the three attesting
witnesses and the notary public himself.
CATALINA BUGNAO, proponent-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL., contestants-appellants.
G.R. No. 4445 September 18, 1909
CARSON, J.:
FACTS:
Catalina Bugnao, the sole beneficiary thereunder, and probate was
contested by the appellants, who are brothers and sisters of the
deceased, and who would be entitled to share in the distribution of his
estate, if probate were denied, as it appears that the deceased left no
heirs in the direct ascending or descending line.
The appellants contended that evidence on record is not sufficient to
establish the execution of the will in the manner prescribed by law and
that the testator was not physically and mentally incapable of making a
will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testator was mentally capable of making the will
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the testator was mentally capable of
making the will is in our opinion fully established by the testimony of the
subscribing witnesses who swore positively that, at the time of its
execution, he was of sound mind and memory.
Further, the law provides that testamentary capacity is the ability to
comprehend the nature of the transaction which the testator is engaged
at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the person
who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator. In
this case, the testator was found to be of sound mind and memory
during the execution of the will.
II. Essential elements and Characteristics of a Will
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
DAVID REY GUZMAN, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact,
LOLITA G. ABELA, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN,
MEYCAUAYAN BRANCH, respondents
G.R. No. 132964 February 18, 2000
BELLOSILLO, J.
FACTS:
In 1968 Simeon Guzman died leaving his sole heirs parcels of
land.
On 29 December 1970 the heirs of Simeon Guzman executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon
Guzman dividing and adjudicating to themselves all the
property belonging to the estate of Simeon.
On 10 December 1981 Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed
assigning, transferring and conveying to her son David her
undivided one-half (1/2) interest on all the parcels of land
subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of Simeon Guzman.
On 1994, Atty. Batongbacal wrote the OSG andfurnished it with
documents showing that David’s ownership of ½ of the estate
was defective. He argued that Art. XII of the Constitution only
allows Filipinos to acquire private lands in the country. The only
instances when a foreigner may acquire private property are by
hereditary succession and if he was formerly a natural-born
citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship. Moreover, it contends
that the Deeds of Quitclaim executed by Helen were really
donations inter vivos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation complied with the Essential
elements required by law.
RULING:
No. Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer
of the properties by virtue of a Deed of Quitclaim resulted in
the (1) reduction of her patrimony as donor and the (2)
consequent increase in the patrimony of David as donee.
However, Helen’s (3) intention to perform an act of liberality in
favor of David was not sufficiently established. The 2 Quitclaims
reveal that Helen intended to convey to her son certain parcels
of land and to re-affirm it, she executed a waiver and
renunciation of her rights over these properties. It is clear that
Helen merely contemplated a waiver of her rights, title, interest
over the lands in favor of David, not a donation. She was also
aware that donation was not possible.
Moreover, the essential element of acceptance in the proper
form and registration to make the donation valid is lacking. The
SPA executed by David in favor of Atty. Abela was not his
acceptance, but an acknowledgment that David owns the
property referred to and that he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell
the same in his name. Further, there was nothing in the SPA to
show that he indeed accept the donation.
However, the inexistence of a donation does not make the
repudiation of Helen in favor David valid. There is NO valid
repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted her
share of the inheritance when she, together with David,
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate,
dividing and adjudicating between them all the properties. By
virtue of that settlement, the properties were registered in
their names and for 11 years, they possessed the land in the
concept of owner. Thus, the 2 Quitclaims have no legal force
and effect. Helen still owns half of the property.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE
JESUS AND BIBIANA ROXAS DE JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS &
PEDRO ROXAS DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR.
134 SCRA 245
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed
administrator. After Letters of Administration had been granted
to the petitioner, he delivered to the lower court a document
purporting to be the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus.
On May 26, 1973, respondent Judge Jose Colayco set the
hearing of the probate of the holographic Win on July 21, 1973.
On August 24, 1973, respondent Judge Jose C. Colayco issued
an order allowing the probate of the holographic Will which he
found to have been duly executed in accordance with law.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the date “FEB./61 ” appearing on the
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a
valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
Yes. It is a valid date. This will not be the first time that this
Court departs from a strict and literal application of the
statutory requirements regarding the due execution of Wills.
The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the
provisions of the law wills consists in the liberalization of the
manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the
testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but with
sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the
commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the testator. If a Will has been
executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the
law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise
thereof is obviated, said Will should be admitted to probate
(Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282).
If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all
the requisites, although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient
if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such
requisite is actually attained by the form followed by the
testator. In Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476, we ruled that: The
object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is
to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth
and authenticity.
In particular, a complete date is required to provide against
such contingencies as that of two competing Wills executed on
the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on
which a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There
is no such contingency in this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found
no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was
there any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no
question that the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by the
testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is also
no question as to its genuineness and due execution. All the
children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the
holographic Will of their mother and that she had the
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said Will.
The objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz
Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally defective because
the date “FEB./61 ” appearing on the holographic Will is not
sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This
objection is too technical to be entertained.
As a general rule, the “date” in a holographic Will should
include the day, month, and year of its execution. However,
when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad
faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the
Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date
“FEB./61” appearing on the holographic Will is a valid
compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the
holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of
substantial compliance.
TESTATE estate of Carlos Gil, deceased. ISABEL HERREROS VDA.
DE GIL, administratrix-appellee,
vs.
PILAR GIL VDA. DE MURCIANO, oppositor-appellant
G.R. No. L-3362 March 1, 1951
JUGO, J.
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance of Manila admitted to probate the
will of the late Carlos Gil. However, such probate was opposed
by Pilar Gil Vda. de Murciano citing several errors. One of which
is that the attestation clause does not state the alleged testator
signed the will but by witnesses only.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will complied with the elements required
by law.
RULING:
No. The decision appealed from is reversed, denying the
probate of the alleged will and declaring intestate the estate of
the deceased Carlos Gil. Under Section 618 of Act No. 190,
(before it was amended) But the absence of such form of
attestation shall not render the will invalid if it proven that the
will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.
However, Act No. 2645 of the Philippine Legislature, passed on
July 1, 1916, besides increasing the contents of the attestation
clause, entirely suppressed the above-quoted provision.
This would show that the purpose of the amending act was to
surround the execution of a will with greater guarantees and
solemnities. It is contended that the deficiency in the
attestation clause is cured by the last paragraph of the body of
the alleged will. At first glance, it is queer that the alleged
testator should have made an attestation clause, which is the
function of the witness. But the important point is that he
attests or certifies his own signature, or, to be accurate, his
signature certifies itself. It is evident that one cannot certify his
own signature, for it does not increase the evidence of its
authenticity. It would be like lifting one's self by his own
bootstraps. Consequently, the last paragraph of the will cannot
cure in any way the fatal defect of the attestation clause of the
witnesses. Adding zero to an insufficient amount does not
make it sufficient. It is said that the rules of statutory
construction are applicable to documents and wills.
This is true, but said rules apply to the body of the will,
containing the testamentary provisions, but not to the
attestation clause, which must be so clear that it should not
require any construction.
MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S.
CABATINGAN, Petitioners,
v.
THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, namely, LUZ M.
BOQUIA, PERLA M. ABELLA, ESTRELLA M. CAÑETE, LOURDES M.
YUSON, and JULIA L. MAYOL, HEIRS OF GENOVIVA C.
NATIVIDAD namely, OSCAR C. NATIVIDAD, OLGA NATIVIDAD,
ODETTE NATIVIDAD, OPHELIA NATIVIDAD, RICHARD
NATIVIDAD, RAYMUND NATIVIDAD, RICHIE NATIVIDAD, SONIA
NATIVIDAD and ENCARNACION CABATINGAN VDA. DE
TRINIDAD, ALFREDO CABATINGAN and JESUSA C. NAVADA,
Respondents
G.R. No. 131953. June 5, 2002
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J
FACTS:
On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor
of her brother, Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of
Donation.
Sometime in 1995, the testator Conchita Cabatingan died.
Thereafter learning of the existence of the foregoing donations,
respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue for
an action for Annulment and Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of
Donations and Accounting.
On January 1995, The court a quo ruled that the donations are
donations mortis causa and declared it null and void for failure
to comply with the requisites of Article 806 of the Civil Code on
solemnities of wills and testaments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed donations are valid by complying
with the requisites of law.
RULING:
No. Donee while the donor is still alive.‖ In determining
whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following
characteristics must be taken into account:(1) It conveys no
title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;(2) That before his death,
the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by
means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; and(3) That the transfer should be void if
the transferor should survive the transferee.
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa
is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any
clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to
petitioners prior to Cabatingan‘s death.
The phrase to become effective upon the death of the donor
admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not
intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to
petitioners during her lifetime As the donation is in the nature
of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will should
have been complied with under Article 728 of the Civil Code,
otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect.
The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary
public of the donor and the done, the documents were not
executed in the manner provided for under the above-quoted
provisions of law.
CONCEPCION FELIX VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GERONIMO RODRIGUEZ., ET AL., defendants-appellees
G.R. No. L-23002 July 31, 1967
REYES, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
On March 6, 1953, Domingo Rodriguez died intestate intestate
and was survived by his widow and children. On the same year
the children and grandchildren of the deceased entered into an
extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased.
On October 12, 1954, the Rodriguez children executed another
document granting unto the widow lifetime usufruct over one-
third of the fishpond.
The widow later on questioned the validity of this extrajudicial
partition, saying that she entered such contract under duress,
violence and intimidation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Concepcion Felix Vda. De Rodriguez can claim
delacration of nullity on the grounds of vitiated consent.
RULING:
No, because the property was conjugal. The property becomes
conjugal when it was transferred to the plaintiff by her
daughter and registered under the spouses name with the
consent of the parties thereto was voluntary.
The court held that the property became conjugal the moment
it was transferred by the appellant’s daughter; and in this case
through succession and her knowledge of the said transfer
cannot be denied because she was even a party of it.
III. Witnesses to Wills
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF
DOROTEA PEREZ, (deceased): APOLONIO TABOADA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of Court of First Instance of Southern
Leyte, (Branch III, Maasin), respondent.
G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982
GUTIERREZ, JR. J
FACTS:
In the petition for the probate of the will of the late Dorotea Perez, the
trial court issued the question denying the probate of the will of Dorotea
Perez for want of a formality in its execution.
The three subscribing witnesses did not sign at the same place or at the
end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one another. They merely to
sign the page, where the end of the will is found, at the left hand margin
of that page
Instead of complying with the order of the trial court, the petitioner filed
a manifestation and motion, ex parte praying for a thirty-day period
within which to deliberate on any step to be taken as a result of the
disallowance of the will however, it was still denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the instrumental witnesses shall sign at the end of the
will in the presence of the testator and of another to make the notarial
will valid.
RULING:
Yes. Under Art. 805 of the Civil code, the will must be subscribed or
signed at its end by the testator himself or by the testator’s name written
by another person in his presence and by his express direction and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
In this case, it was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfied the
purpose of identification.
FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CESARIO SINGSON, oppositor-appellee.
G.R. No. L-14003 August 5, 1960
REYES, J.B.L., J
FACTS:
When the testator died, Petitioner Francisco Azaola submitted for
probate a holographic will of the late Yance.
However, the probate was opposed and was denied by the court of first
instance on the ground that Article 811 of the civil code requires that the
proponent must present three witnesses who could declare the will and
signature in writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested cannot
prove that the will was written by the testatrix herself.
Petitioner appealed on the grounds that he was not bound to produce
witnesses since the authenticity was not in questioned and that article
811 of the Civil code does not require it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 811 requires the mandatory three witnesses
RULING:
No. Due to the fact that the authenticity of the will was not contested or
questions, the petitioner was not required to produce more than one
witness. Even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested,
Article 811 ca not be interpreted to require the compulsory presentation
of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator in
holographic will as held by the Supreme Court.
The law leaves it to the trial court if experts are still needed. Hence the
rule requiring production of three witnesses in holographic wills must be
deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
GONZALES
V.
Court of Appeals
90 SCRA 183
GUERRERO, J.
FACTS:
On June 24, 1961, Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal for the probate of a will alleged to have been
executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel which died on June 7, 1961.
Such Action also includes designating therein petitioner as the principal
beneficiary and executrix
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales, a niece of Isabel, on the
following grounds: 1. the will is not genuine, 2. will was not executed and
attested as required by law, 3. the decedent at the time of the making of
the will did not have testamentary capacity due to her age and sickness,
and 4. the will was procured through undue influence.
The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of
Appeals Reversed the said decision of the trial court.
The petitioner filed a petition for review with Supreme Court claiming
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the will of the decedent
was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely
no proof that the three instrumental witnesses are trustworthy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a witness be considered competent under Art 820-821
and still not be considered credible as required by Art. 805
RULING:
Yes. The petitioner submits that the term credible in Article 805 requires
something more than just being competent and, therefore, a witness in
addition to being competent under Articles 820-821 must also be
credible under Art. 805.
The competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is
determined by the statute (Art. 820 and 821), whereas his credibility
depends on the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief
and conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth.
In the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de
Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that:
“Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible
witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says.
Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given
matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to
believe or not to believe his testimony.
Agapitan N. Cruz, Petitioner
vs.
Hon. Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of
First Instance of Cebu and Manuel B. Lugay, Respondents
G.R. No. L-32213. November 26, 1973
ESGUERRA, J.
FACTS:
Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving spouse of the late Valente Z. Cruz opposed
the probate of the will of the former at the Court of First Instance of
Cebu Alleging the will was executed through fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was
execute without the testator having been fully informed of the content
thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the
supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with
law.
Notwithstanding her objection, the Court of first instance allowed the
probate of the said last will and testament.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Notary Public acknowledging the will may be an
instrumental witness in the execution of the will.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that the last will and testament in question
was not executed in accordance with the law. The notary public before
whom the will was acknowledge before himself him having singed the
will. Furthermore, the function of a notary public is to guard against any
illegal or immoral arrangement. That function would be defeated if the
notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses
For them he would be interested sustaining the validity of the will as it
directly involves him and the validity of his own act.
NATIVIDAD I. VDA. DE ROXAS
VS.
POTENCIANO PECSON, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, MARIA
ROXAS AND PEDRO ROXAS
G.R. No. L-2211, December 20, 1948
PARAS, J.
FACTS:
On July 14, 1946, Pablo M. Roxas died leaving properties in the
municipality of Bulacan.
The opposition, Maria and Pedro Roxas, sister and brother respectively
of the deceased, filed a petition for the administration of the estate in
special intestate proceeding and Maria Roxas was appointed special
administrix upon an ex-parte petition.
The petitioner Natividad Vela, de Roxas, widow of Pablo M. Roxas, filed a
petition for the probate of an alleged will of her deceased husband, and
for her appointment as executrix of his estate designated in said will with
the same court. Upon agreement of both parties, the intestate
proceeding was dismissed and ordered closed by the court.
On August 10, 1946, the petitioner Natividad Vela, de Roxas, widow of
Pablo M. Roxas, filed a petition for the probate, of an alleged will of her
deceased husband, and for her appointment as executrix of his estate
designated in said will.
The respondent judge rendered his resolution appointing the petitioner
as special adninistratrix only of all the conjugal properties of the
deceased, and Maria as special adminatrix of all capital or properties
belonging exclusively to the deceased Pablo M. Roxas
ISSUES:
Whether or not relatives can act as witnesses in a will.
RULING:
Yes. The law does not bar relatives either of the testator of the heirs or
legatees from acting as witnesses. In the normal course of things and to
be sure that the witnesses would not let the beneficiaries down, the
testator may be inclined to employ, as attesting witnesses, relatives of
such beneficiaries, if not wholly disinterested persons.
Further, under the will, Reynaldo Roxas (adulterous son of Pablo Roxas)
is named a legatee on equal footing with the petitioner, and the attesting
witnesses are not related whatsoever with him.
Lastly, whereas the three attesting witnesses have no direct interest in
the subject matter of the will, oppositor Maria Roxas, like the other
oppositor Pedro Roxas, is an intestate heir of Pablo Roxas and, therefore,
naturally interested in having the probate of said will disallowed.
IV. Issues on Forms of Will (10)
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and
Efraim Santibañez entered into a loan agreement. The amount was
intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor..
On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement for
the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor.
Efraim and Edmund executed another promissory note and a Continuing
Guaranty Agreement for the later loan.
On 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings
commenced before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City.
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his
legitimate heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the
probate court.
RULING:
The probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of
the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The
said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and
distribution of the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among
the heirs until after the will has been probated.
Any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The
joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the
tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its
execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of
their late father’s holographic will covering the said tractors
V. Revocation of Wills
VI. Testamentary Dispositions
VII. Allowance and Disallowance of Wills ( 15 )
VIII. Institution of Heirs
IX. Legitime
X. Reserva Troncal
XI. Disinheritance
XII. Legal or Intestate Succession
XIII. Right of Representation
XIV. Capacity to Succeed by Will or Intestacy
XV. Acceptance and Repudiation of Inheritance
