FM 3-90

Tactics

JULY 2001
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 *FM 3-90

Field Manual Headquarters

No. 3-90 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 4 July 2001

TACTICS
Contents
Page

FIGURES.................................................................................................................... vi
TABLES .................................................................................................................... xii
PREFACE..................................................................................................................xiii
PART ONE TACTICAL FUNDAMENTALS
Chapter 1 THE ART OF TACTICS ...........................................................................................1-1
The Tactical Level of War.........................................................................................1-2
The Science and Art of Tactics ................................................................................1-3
Historical Example....................................................................................................1-6
Hasty Versus Deliberate Operations ........................................................................1-9
Solving Tactical Problems ......................................................................................1-13

Chapter 2 COMMON TACTICAL CONCEPTS AND GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES......2-1

Doctrinal Hierarchy ...................................................................................................2-1
The Operational Framework.....................................................................................2-3
Principles of War ......................................................................................................2-3
Tenets of Army Operations.......................................................................................2-4
The Factors of METT-TC..........................................................................................2-4
Elements of Operational Design...............................................................................2-4
Battlefield Operating Systems ..................................................................................2-5
Basic Tactical Concepts ...........................................................................................2-5
Basic Tactical Graphic Control Measures ..............................................................2-10

PART TWO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Chapter 3 THE BASICS OF THE OFFENSE............................................................................3-0
Characteristics of Offensive Operations...................................................................3-1
Historical Example....................................................................................................3-1
Types of Offensive Operations .................................................................................3-3
Common Offensive Control Measures .....................................................................3-4

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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FM 3-90

Forms of Maneuver ................................................................................................ 3-11

Common Offensive Planning Considerations ........................................................ 3-33
Transition ............................................................................................................... 3-50

Chapter 4 MOVEMENT TO CONTACT.................................................................................... 4-1

Historical Example ................................................................................................... 4-2
Organization of Forces............................................................................................. 4-3
Control Measures..................................................................................................... 4-6
Planning a Movement to Contact............................................................................. 4-8
Executing a Movement to Contact ........................................................................... 4-9
Search and Attack.................................................................................................. 4-16

Chapter 5 ATTACK .................................................................................................................. 5-0

Organization of Forces............................................................................................. 5-0
Control Measures..................................................................................................... 5-3
Planning an Attack ................................................................................................... 5-4
Preparing an Attack ............................................................................................... 5-11
Executing an Attack ............................................................................................... 5-14
Special Purpose Attacks ........................................................................................ 5-29

Chapter 6 EXPLOITATION....................................................................................................... 6-1

Organization of Forces............................................................................................. 6-2
Control Measures..................................................................................................... 6-5
Planning an Exploitation........................................................................................... 6-6
Executing an Exploitation....................................................................................... 6-10

Chapter 7 PURSUIT ................................................................................................................. 7-1

Organization of Forces............................................................................................. 7-2
Control Measures..................................................................................................... 7-5
Planning a Pursuit .................................................................................................... 7-7
Executing a Pursuit .................................................................................................. 7-8

PART THREE DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Chapter 8 BASICS OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS ............................................................... 8-1
Historical Example ................................................................................................... 8-2
Types of Defensive Operations................................................................................ 8-4
Common Defensive Control Measures .................................................................... 8-5
Common Defensive Planning Considerations ....................................................... 8-12
Common Defensive Scenarios .............................................................................. 8-30
Transition ............................................................................................................... 8-42

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 Contents

Chapter 9 THE AREA DEFENSE .............................................................................................9-1

Organization of Forces .............................................................................................9-2
Control Measures .....................................................................................................9-5
Planning an Area Defense........................................................................................9-6
Preparing an Area Defense ....................................................................................9-13
Executing an Area Defense....................................................................................9-16

Chapter 10 THE MOBILE DEFENSE .......................................................................................10-1

Historical Example..................................................................................................10-2
Organization of Forces ...........................................................................................10-3
Control Measures ...................................................................................................10-6
Planning a Mobile Defense.....................................................................................10-7
Preparing a Mobile Defense ...................................................................................10-8
Execution of a Mobile Defense...............................................................................10-9

Chapter 11 THE RETROGRADE..............................................................................................11-1

Historical Example..................................................................................................11-2
Delay.......................................................................................................................11-3
Withdrawal ............................................................................................................11-18
Retirement ............................................................................................................11-24
Combat Service Support ......................................................................................11-26
Unique Retrograde Situations ..............................................................................11-28

PART FOUR TACTICAL ENABLING OPERATIONS

Chapter 12 SECURITY OPERATIONS.....................................................................................12-0
Fundamentals of Security Operations ....................................................................12-2
Historical Example..................................................................................................12-3
General Considerations for Security Operations....................................................12-4
Screen ..................................................................................................................12-13
Guard....................................................................................................................12-19
Cover ....................................................................................................................12-25
Area Security ........................................................................................................12-31
Local Security .......................................................................................................12-32
Combat Outposts..................................................................................................12-32

Chapter 13 RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS ....................................................................13-0

Reconnaissance Objective .....................................................................................13-1
Reconnaissance Fundamentals .............................................................................13-1
Historical Example..................................................................................................13-4
Characteristics of Reconnaissance Assets ............................................................13-5

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FM 3-90

Forms of Reconnaissance ..................................................................................... 13-8

Planning a Reconnaissance ................................................................................ 13-14
Executing a Reconnaissance............................................................................... 13-17
Recuperation and Reconstitution of Reconnaissance Assets ............................. 13-19

Chapter 14 TROOP MOVEMENT ............................................................................................ 14-1

Methods of Troop Movement ................................................................................. 14-1
Administrative Movement....................................................................................... 14-3
Tactical Road March .............................................................................................. 14-3
Approach March..................................................................................................... 14-8
Movement Techniques........................................................................................... 14-9
Planning a Troop Movement................................................................................ 14-12
Preparing a Troop Movement .............................................................................. 14-15
Executing a Troop Movement .............................................................................. 14-15
Movement Control................................................................................................ 14-16

Chapter 15 RELIEF IN PLACE................................................................................................. 15-1

Organization of Forces........................................................................................... 15-2
Control Measures................................................................................................... 15-2
Planning a Relief in Place ...................................................................................... 15-2
Preparing a Relief in Place .................................................................................... 15-5
Executing a Relief in Place .................................................................................... 15-6

Chapter 16 PASSAGE OF LINES ............................................................................................ 16-0

Organization of Forces........................................................................................... 16-1
Control Measures................................................................................................... 16-1
Planning a Passage of Lines ................................................................................. 16-3
Forward Passage of Lines ..................................................................................... 16-6
Rearward Passage of Lines ................................................................................... 16-8

Appendix A ARMY BRANCHES AND TACTICAL ECHELONS ................................................A-1

Combat Arms ...........................................................................................................A-2
Combat Support .......................................................................................................A-8
Combat Service Support ........................................................................................A-11
Tactical Echelons ...................................................................................................A-15

Appendix B TACTICAL MISSION TASKS..................................................................................B-1

Actions by Friendly Force.........................................................................................B-3
Effects on Enemy Force.........................................................................................B-13

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Appendix C AIRBORNE AND AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS .................................................. C-1

Common Factors ..................................................................................................... C-1
Airborne Operations ................................................................................................ C-3
Air Assault Operations........................................................................................... C-12

Appendix D ENCIRCLEMENT OPERATIONS ........................................................................... D-0

Offensive Encirclement Operations ......................................................................... D-0
Defending Encircled ................................................................................................ D-7
Breakout from an Encirclement ............................................................................. D-10
Exfiltration .............................................................................................................. D-17
Attacking Deeper into Enemy Territory ................................................................. D-17
Linkup .................................................................................................................... D-17

Appendix E REAR AREA AND BASE SECURITY .................................................................... E-0

Command Responsibilities ...................................................................................... E-1
Control Exercised by US Area Commanders .......................................................... E-7
Base and Base Cluster Defense ........................................................................... E-10
Route Security ....................................................................................................... E-31
Convoy Security..................................................................................................... E-33

SOURCE NOTES.................................................................................Source Notes-1

GLOSSARY................................................................................................. Glossary-1
BIBILOGRAPHY ......................................................................................Biliography-0
INDEX................................................................................................................Index-0

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 Figures
Figure Page
1-1. Initial Situation ............................................................................................. 1-7
1-2. British Moves............................................................................................... 1-8
1-3. Final Battle Stage ........................................................................................ 1-8
1-4. Risk Reduction Factors ............................................................................. 1-13
2-1. Doctrinal Hierarchy of Operations ............................................................... 2-2
2-2. Flanks of a Stationary Unit .......................................................................... 2-7
2-3. Flanks of an Armor-Heavy Team Moving in an Echelon Right Formation .. 2-7
2-4. Generic Air Corridor .................................................................................. 2-12
2-5 Corps with Contiguous Areas of Operations ............................................. 2-16
2-6. Corps with Noncontiguous Areas of Operations ....................................... 2-17
2-7. Assembly Areas ........................................................................................ 2-19
2-8. Checkpoint 13 ........................................................................................... 2-19
2-9. Contact Point 8.......................................................................................... 2-20
2-10. Engagement Areas ................................................................................... 2-21
2-11. Sectors of Fire........................................................................................... 2-22
2-12. Target Reference Point ............................................................................. 2-23
2-13. Trigger Lines ............................................................................................. 2-23
2-14. Deep, Close, and Rear Areas ................................................................... 2-25
2-15. Coordinated Fire Line................................................................................ 2-27
2-16. Fire Support Coordination Line ................................................................. 2-27
2-17. Free-Fire Area........................................................................................... 2-28
2-18. A Formal Airspace Coordination Measure ................................................ 2-29
2-19. No-Fire Area.............................................................................................. 2-30
2-20. Restrictive Fire Area.................................................................................. 2-30
2-21. Restrictive Fire Line .................................................................................. 2-31
2-22. Targets ...................................................................................................... 2-31
2-23. Forward Line of Own Troops..................................................................... 2-32
2-24. Line of Contact .......................................................................................... 2-32
2-25. Named Area of Interest ............................................................................. 2-33
2-26. Obstacle Control Measure Graphics ......................................................... 2-34
2-27. Phase Lines Used with Other Control Measures ...................................... 2-37
2-28. Position Area for Artillery........................................................................... 2-38
2-29. Routes ....................................................................................................... 2-38

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 Figures

2-30. Targeted Area of Interest...........................................................................2-39

3-1. Initial Objectives...........................................................................................3-2
3-2. Attack-by-Fire Position BRANDON..............................................................3-5
3-3. Attack Positions Used with Other Common Offensive Control Measures...3-6
3-4. Axis of Advance ...........................................................................................3-6
3-5. Direction of Attack JOAN.............................................................................3-7
3-6. Final Coordination Line (FCL) ROBERT Used in Conjunction with Other
Offensive Control Measures ........................................................................3-7
3-7. Limit of Advance Used with Other Common Control Measures ..................3-8
3-8. PL DON as a LD ..........................................................................................3-8
3-9. Objective STEVE .........................................................................................3-9
3-10. Point of Departure 7.....................................................................................3-9
3-11. Probable Line of Deployment ROBERT Used with Other Control
Measures ...................................................................................................3-10
3-12. Rally Point 14.............................................................................................3-10
3-13. Support-by-Fire Position SCOTT...............................................................3-11
3-14. Single Envelopment...................................................................................3-12
3-15. Double Envelopment .................................................................................3-13
3-16. Control Measures for Conducting an Envelopment...................................3-14
3-17. Turning Movement—Turning Force Conducting the Decisive Operation..3-16
3-18. Control Measures for a Turning Movement ...............................................3-17
3-19. Infiltration Lane ..........................................................................................3-21
3-20. Linkup Point 8 ............................................................................................3-21
3-21. Penetration: Relative Combat Power.........................................................3-26
3-22. Penetration Graphic Control Measures .....................................................3-27
3-23. Penetration: The Breach............................................................................3-29
3-24. Expanding the Penetration ........................................................................3-30
3-25. Frontal Attack ............................................................................................3-31
3-26. Column Formation .....................................................................................3-36
3-27. Line Formation...........................................................................................3-37
3-28. Echelon Left Formation .............................................................................3-37
3-29. Echelon Right Formation ...........................................................................3-38
3-30. Box Formation ...........................................................................................3-38
3-31. Diamond Formation ...................................................................................3-38
3-32. Wedge Formation......................................................................................3-39
3-33. Vee Formation ...........................................................................................3-40
4-1. Soviet Moves ...............................................................................................4-3
4-2. Force Organized for a Movement to Contact ..............................................4-4
4-3. Movement to Contact Control Measures .....................................................4-7

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FM 3-90

4-4. A Column Advance Guard Attacking to Destroy a Contained Enemy

Force ......................................................................................................... 4-10
4-5. Search and Attack Control Measures ....................................................... 4-17
5-1. Minimum Attack Control Measures ............................................................. 5-3
5-2. Movement from AA to LD.......................................................................... 5-13
5-3. PLD and Assault Positions ........................................................................ 5-21
5-4. Attack of an Objective: The Breach .......................................................... 5-24
5-5. Attack of an Objective: The Assault .......................................................... 5-24
5-6. Ambush Tactical Mission Graphic............................................................. 5-29
5-7. Linear Ambush .......................................................................................... 5-31
5-8. L-Shaped Ambush .................................................................................... 5-32
5-9. Area Ambush ............................................................................................ 5-33
5-10. Major Counterattack.................................................................................. 5-35
5-11. Spoiling Attack .......................................................................................... 5-40
6-1. Exploitation Control Measures in a Contiguous AO .................................... 6-5
6-2. Brigade Exploitation: Battalions in Column Formation ................................ 6-7
6-3. Division Exploitation: Brigades Abreast, No Reserve ................................. 6-8
6-4. Brigade Exploitation: Two Battalions Forward, One in Reserve ................. 6-9
7-1. Frontal Pursuit............................................................................................. 7-3
7-2. Combination Pursuit.................................................................................... 7-4
7-3. Pursuit Control Measures............................................................................ 7-6
8-1. Movements of an Area Defense ................................................................. 8-3
8-2. Use of a BHL in a Rearward Passage of Lines........................................... 8-6
8-3. Forward Edge of the Battle Area................................................................. 8-7
8-4. Task Force Battle Position .......................................................................... 8-8
8-5. AO and Battle Position Control Measures Used in Combination ................ 8-8
8-6. Five Kinds of Battle Positions...................................................................... 8-9
8-7. Strong Point Defense ................................................................................ 8-10
8-8. Final Protective Fire .................................................................................. 8-11
8-9. Direct Fire Control Measures .................................................................... 8-11
8-10. Perimeter Defense .................................................................................... 8-33
8-11. All Company Teams on the Perimeter ...................................................... 8-33
8-12. Three Battalion TFs on Perimeter, Co/Teams Positioned in Depth .......... 8-34
8-13. Two Battalion TFs on the Perimeter, One in Reserve .............................. 8-34
8-14. Perimeter Defense Control Measures....................................................... 8-36
8-15. A Hill in Cross-Section .............................................................................. 8-39
8-16. Oblique Defilade........................................................................................ 8-40
9-1. Typical Control Measures for an Area Defense .......................................... 9-5

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 Figures

9-2. Organization of Forces for an Area Defense—Contiguous Area of

Operations ...................................................................................................9-6
9-3. Organization of Forces for an Area Defense—Noncontiguous Area of
Operations ...................................................................................................9-7
9-4. Division Conducting a Defense in Depth with Subordinate Brigades
Deployed in Noncontiguous Areas of Operations with Enemy Avenues
of Approach Depicted ................................................................................9-10
9-5. Brigade Conducting a Forward Defense in a Contiguous Area of
Operations .................................................................................................9-11
9-6. Division Counterattack...............................................................................9-13
9-7. Area Defense Using Static and Dynamic Elements ..................................9-16
9-8. Battle Handover Line .................................................................................9-18
10-1. Donbas Movements...................................................................................10-3
10-2. Mobile Defense..........................................................................................10-4
10-3. Organization of Forces for a Mobile Defense ............................................10-4
10-4. Mobile Defense Control Measures ............................................................10-6
10-5. Mobile Defense Before Commitment of Striking Force ...........................10-10
10-5. Mobile Defense After Commitment of Striking Force ..............................10-12
11-1. Withdrawal from Resaca ...........................................................................11-3
11-2. Delay Tactical Mission Graphic .................................................................11-6
11-3. Control Measures for a Delay....................................................................11-6
11-4. Delay Forward of a Specified Line for a Specified Time............................11-9
11-5. Delay from Alternate Positions ................................................................11-10
11-6. Delay from Subsequent Positions............................................................11-11
11-7. Detachment Left in Contact .....................................................................11-20
11-8. Withdrawal Control Measures .................................................................11-21
11-9. Types of Withdrawals ..............................................................................11-22
11-10. Retirement Tactical Mission Graphic.......................................................11-24
11-11. Organization of Forces for a Retirement Operation.................................11-25
11-12. Stay-Behind Force ...................................................................................11-30
12-1. Common Security Control Measures.........................................................12-5
12-2. Security Force Crossing the LD Separately from the Main Body to
Establish a Flank Screen.........................................................................12-12
12-3. Security Force Continuing to Cross the LD Separately from the
Main Body to Establish a Flank Screen ...................................................12-12
12-4. Second Technique Used by a Moving Flank Security Force to
Establish a Moving Flank Screen ............................................................12-13
12-5. Third Technique Used by a Moving Flank Security Force to
Establish a Flank Guard or Cover ...........................................................12-14
12-6. Control Measures Used in a Screen Mission ..........................................12-16

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FM 3-90

12-7. Moving Flank Screen .............................................................................. 12-17

12-8. Displacement Methods for a Flank Screen ............................................. 12-18
12-9. More Displacement Methods for a Flank Screen.................................... 12-18
12-10. Guard Locations...................................................................................... 12-19
12-11. Advance Guard for a Division Shaping Attack ........................................ 12-21
12-12. Multiple Security Forces .......................................................................... 12-22
12-13. Stationary Flank Guard ........................................................................... 12-23
12-14. Moving Flank Guard Control Measures .................................................. 12-25
12-15. Attack Using a Covering Force ............................................................... 12-27
12-16. Generic Depiction of a Defensive Cover ................................................. 12-29
12-17. Combat Outposts .................................................................................... 12-33
13-1. Mongol Army Route................................................................................... 13-4
13-2. Mongol Army Pursuit ................................................................................. 13-5
13-3. Route Reconnaissance Control Measures................................................ 13-9
13-4. Zone Reconnaissance Control Measures ............................................... 13-11
13-5. Area Reconnaissance Control Measures................................................ 13-13
14-1. Tactical Road March ................................................................................. 14-4
14-2. Route Control Measures ........................................................................... 14-5
14-3. Start Point.................................................................................................. 14-5
14-4. Release Point ............................................................................................ 14-6
14-5. Light Line................................................................................................... 14-6
14-6. Approach March........................................................................................ 14-8
14-7. Movement Techniques............................................................................ 14-10
14-8. Traveling ................................................................................................. 14-10
14-9. Traveling Overwatch ............................................................................... 14-11
14-10. Bounding Overwatch—Alternate Bounds................................................ 14-12
14-11. Bounding Overwatch—Successive Bounds............................................ 14-12
14-12. Corps Movement Control ........................................................................ 14-16
15-1. Overlay of a Brigade Relief in Place.......................................................... 15-3
16-1. Control Measures Associated with a Forward Passage of Lines .............. 16-2
16-2. Passage Point 8 ........................................................................................ 16-2
16-3. Lane .......................................................................................................... 16-2
16-4. Gap ........................................................................................................... 16-3
16-5. Forward Passage of Lines ........................................................................ 16-6
16-6. Rearward Passage of Lines .................................................................... 16-10
A-1. Combat Arms Capabilities...........................................................................A-2
A-2. Combat Support Capabilities ......................................................................A-8
A-3. Combat Service Support Capabilities .......................................................A-12

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 Figures

A-4. Airborne Battalion-Size Task Force.......................................................... A-17

A-5. Heavy Brigade Combat Team .................................................................. A-18
A-6. IBCT Organization .................................................................................... A-19
A-7. Heavy Division .......................................................................................... A-20
A-8. Representative Corps Organizational Diagram ........................................ A-21
B-1. Tactical Mission Tasks ............................................................................... B-2
B-2. Attack-by-Fire Tactical Mission Graphic ..................................................... B-3
B-3. Breach Tactical Mission Graphic ................................................................ B-4
B-4. Bypass Tactical Mission Graphic................................................................ B-4
B-5. Task Force Conducting a Fix and a Bypass............................................... B-5
B-6. Clear Tactical Mission Graphic................................................................... B-6
B-7. Follow and Assume Tactical Mission Graphic ............................................ B-9
B-8. Follow and Support Tactical Mission Graphic .......................................... B-10
B-9. Occupy Tactical Mission Graphic ............................................................. B-11
B-10. Retain Tactical Mission Graphic ............................................................... B-11
B-11. Secure Tactical Mission Graphic .............................................................. B-12
B-12. Seize Tactical Mission Graphic................................................................. B-12
B-13. Support-by-Fire Position Tactical Mission Graphic................................... B-13
B-14. Block Tactical Mission Graphic................................................................. B-13
B-15. Block Obstacle Effect Graphic.................................................................. B-14
B-16. Canalize Tactical Mission Graphic............................................................ B-14
B-17. Canalizing Terrain Enhanced by Obstacles Used with an Engagement
Area .......................................................................................................... B-14
B-18. Contain Tactical Mission Graphic ............................................................. B-15
B-19. Destroy Tactical Mission Graphic ............................................................. B-16
B-20. Disrupt Tactical Mission Graphic .............................................................. B-16
B-21. Disrupt Obstacle Effect Graphic ............................................................... B-16
B-22. Fix Tactical Mission Graphic..................................................................... B-17
B-23. Fix Obstacle Intent Graphic ...................................................................... B-17
B-24. Interdict Tactical Mission Graphic............................................................. B-18
B-25. Isolate Tactical Mission Graphic............................................................... B-18
B-26. Neutralize Tactical Mission Graphic ......................................................... B-19
B-27. Turn Tactical Mission Graphic .................................................................. B-19
B-28. Turn Obstacle Effect................................................................................. B-20
C-1. Assault Objectives ...................................................................................... C-6
C-2. Airhead Line................................................................................................ C-6
C-3. Boundaries and Fire Support Coordinating Measures for an Airhead........ C-7
C-4. Flight Routes Depicted on an Overlay ...................................................... C-14

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D-1. Inner and Outer Arms of an Encirclement...................................................D-1

D-2. Encirclement Control Measures ..................................................................D-3
D-3. Squeeze Technique ....................................................................................D-5
D-4. Hammer and Anvil Technique.....................................................................D-6
D-5. Wedge Technique.......................................................................................D-6
D-6. Encircled Armor Division’s Perimeter Defense ...........................................D-8
D-7. Organization of Forces for a Breakout Operation .....................................D-10
D-8. Breakout by an Encircled Mechanized Division ........................................D-14
D-9. Continued Breakout by an Encircled Mechanized Division .......................D-15
D-10. Linkup of a Moving Force and a Stationary Force ....................................D-18
D-11. Linkup of Two Moving Forces ...................................................................D-19
E-1. OPCON versus TACON in Rear Area and Base Security ..........................E-1
E-2. Organization of C2 Facilities in a Corps Rear Area ....................................E-4
E-3. Typical Base Defense Organization ..........................................................E-11
E-4. Security Platoon ........................................................................................E-12
E-5. Base Cluster Harrington............................................................................E-16
E-6. Convoy Security Organization ...................................................................E-35
E-7. Convoy Control Measures.........................................................................E-36

Tables
Table Page
5-1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Limited-Visibility Attacks...................... 5-8
11-1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Delay Techniques............................ 11-10
12-1. Typical Size of Security Forces for a Given Mission and Echelon ............ 12-6
12-2. Screen Movement Methods .................................................................... 12-17
13-1. Typical ISR Assets Available..................................................................... 13-6
13-2. Dedicated Reconnaissance Units and Forms of Reconnaissance
Operations................................................................................................. 13-8

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 Preface
Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a language,
a purpose, and unity of effort. Tactics is the art and science of employing all
available means to win battles and engagements. Specifically, it comprises the
actions taken by a commander to arrange units and activities in relation to each
other and the enemy.

PURPOSE
FM 3-90 introduces the basic concepts and control measures associated with the
art of tactics. It cannot be read in isolation. To understand FM 3-90, the reader
must understand the operational art, principles of war, and links between the
operational and tactical levels of war described in FM 3-0, Operations. He should
understand how the activities described in FM 3-07, Stability Operations and
Support Operations, carry over and affect offensive and defensive operations and
vice versa. He should understand the operations (plan, prepare, execute, and
assess) process described in FM 6-0, Command and Control, and how that
process relates to the military decision making process and troop-leading
procedures described in FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production. FM 3-90
also refers to joint publications (JPs). Reviewing referenced JPs will also aid in
understanding FM 3-90.
FM 3-90 focuses on the tactics used to employ available means to win in combat.
Those tactics require judgment in application. The ability to seize and secure
terrain, with its populations and productive capacity, distinguishes land forces
conducting decisive offensive and defensive operations. FM 3-90 provides a com-
mon discussion of how commanders from the battalion task force level through
the corps echelon conduct tactical offensive and defensive operations and their
supporting tactical enabling operations. It is not prescriptive, but authoritative.
Tactical fundamentals do not change with the fielding of each new piece of
equipment. However, the integration of new equipment and organizations
usually requires changes in related techniques and procedures. FM 3-90 provides
guidance in the form of combat-tested concepts and ideas modified to exploit
emerging Army and joint capabilities.

SCOPE
FM 3-90 focuses on the organization of forces, minimum essential control
measures, and general planning, preparation, and execution considerations for
each type and form of combat operation. It is the common reference for all
students of the tactical art, both in the field and the Army school system. A fam-
ily of subordinate manuals address the techniques and procedures used by
tactical combat forces at each echelon. Assessment concepts described in FM 6-0
and FM 6-22, Army Leadership, also apply. All operations process considerations
are modified as necessary to account for the specific factors of METT-TC existing
during each operation.

xiii
 Tactical enabling operations and special environments discussed in other man-
uals are not repeated in FM 3-90. That is why FM 3-90 does not discuss why
information operations (FM 3-13), river-crossing operations (FM 3-97.13), and
combined arms breaching operations (FM 3-34.2).

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION
Readers of FM 3-90 should be aware that the rules regarding the use of land
mines are evolving. A commander should seek legal guidance concerning
currently applicable rules and policies regarding land mines before directing
their employment. The rules of engagement he provides to his subordinates
should reflect those guidelines.
The historical examples used in FM 3-90 were deliberately chosen to illustrate
the fact that American tacticians should widen their areas of study of the
military profession to include other armies and other times.
In FM 3-90, the term heavy applies to armored, aviation, cavalry, mechanized
infantry and their associated combined arms elements. The term light applies to
airborne, air assault, and light infantry and their associated combined arms
elements. The term special operations forces applies to rangers, special forces,
special operations aviation, civil affairs, and psychological operations elements.
The initial brigade combat teams (IBCTs) are the prototypes of a medium force
and are included in the discussion of heavy and light forces as appropriate.
In FM 3-90, the term battalion applies to a battalion, battalion task force, or a
cavalry squadron unless differences in capabilities requires that a specific
organization be named. The term company refers to a company, company team,
battery, or troop size organization.
FM 3-90 uses planning process to indicate both the military decision making
process and troop leading procedures. Battalion-sized and larger units use the
military decision making process. Company-sized and smaller units follow troop
leading procedures.
Unless otherwise stated, whenever FM 3-90 uses the singular form of decisive
operation or shaping operation; both the singular and plural forms are included.
The glossary lists most terms used in FM 3-90 that have joint or Army
definitions. Terms for which FM 3-90 is the proponent manual (the authority) are
indicated with an asterisk. Definitions for which FM 3-90 is the proponent
manual are printed in boldface in the text. For other definitions the term is
italicized and the number of the proponent manual follows the definition.
Cross-references use the new field manual numbering system. The bibliography
lists field manuals by new number followed by old number.
Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to
men.
Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command is the proponent for
this publication. Send comments and recommended changes and the rational for
those changes to: Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort
Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-SWW, 1 Reynolds Road, Fort Leavenworth, KS
66027-1352.

xiv
 PART ONE

Tactical Fundamentals

Chapter 1

The Art of Tactics

War is, above all things, an art, employing science in all its branches
as its servant, but depending first and chiefly upon the skill of the art-
isan. It has its own rules, but not one of them is rigid and invariable.
As new implements are devised new methods result in its mechanical
execution; but over and above all its mechanical appliances, it rests
upon the complex factors of human nature, which cannot be reduced to
formulas and rules. The proper use of these thinking and animate
parts of the great machine can be divined only by the genius and in-
stinct of the commanders. No books can teach this, and no rules define
it.
Captain Francis V. Greene, 1883

Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered ar-

rangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain
and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles
and engagements (FM 3-0).

1-1. This is the capstone

manual for offensive and CONTENTS
defensive operations at The Tactical Level of War ............................ 1-2
the tactical level. This is The Science and Art of Tactics ................... 1-3
a manual for profession- The Science............................................... 1-3
als and requires dedica- The Art ....................................................... 1-4
tion and study to master. Historical Example ....................................... 1-6
It is authoritative and Hasty Versus Deliberate Operations .......... 1-9
provides guidance in the Choices and Tradeoffs............................. 1-9
form of combat-tested Risk Reduction ....................................... 1-11
concepts and ideas modi- Solving Tactical Problems......................... 1-13
fied to take advantage of
emerging Army and joint capabilities, focusing on the tactics used to employ
available means to win in combat. Those tactics are not prescriptive in nature
but require judgment in application.

1-1
FM 3-90

1-2. The tactics and supporting

Tactics is the employment of
techniques and procedures de-
units in combat.
scribed in this manual are only
starting points for the tactician, Techniques are the general and
who must understand the differ- detailed methods used by troops
ence between tactics and tech- and commanders to perform as-
niques and procedures. Tactics signed missions and functions,
always require judgment and specifically the methods of using
adaptation to the unique cir- equipment and personnel.
cumstances of a specific situa-
Procedures are standard and de-
tion. Techniques and procedures
tailed courses of action that de-
are established patterns that
scribe how to perform tasks.
can be applied repeatedly with
little or no judgment in a variety of circumstances. Tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP) provide the tactician with a set of tools to use in developing
the solution to a tactical problem. The solution to any specific problem is a
unique combination of these TTP or the creation of new ones based on a criti-
cal evaluation of the situation. The tactician determines his solution by a
thorough mastery of doctrine and existing TTP, tempered and honed by ex-
perience gained through training and operations. He uses his creativity to de-
velop solutions for which the enemy is neither prepared, nor able to cope.

THE TACTICAL LEVEL OF WAR

1-3. The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between
strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or
boundaries between them, the three levels are strategic, operational, and tac-
tical. They apply to all types of military operations.
1-4. The tactical level of war is the level of war at which battles and engage-
ments are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to
tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered ar-
rangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to
the enemy to achieve combat objectives (JP 1-02). It is important to under-
stand tactics within the context of the levels of war. The strategic and opera-
tional levels provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context,
tactical operations are reduced to a series of disconnected and unfocused ac-
tions. Engagements are linked to battles. One or more battles are linked to
winning major operations and campaigns, leading to operational success,
which can lead to strategic success. (FM 3-0 discusses major operations and
campaigns.)
1-5. A battle consists of a set of related engagements that last longer and in-
volve larger forces than an engagement (FM 3-0). Battles can affect the
course of the campaign or major operation. A battle occurs when a division,
corps, or army commander fights for one or more significant objectives. Bat-
tles are usually operationally significant, if not operationally decisive.
1-6. An engagement is a small, tactical conflict between opposing maneuver
forces, usually conducted at brigade level and below (FM 3-0). An engagement
normally lasts only a short time—minutes, hours, or a day. It can result from
one side’s deliberate offensive movement against an opponent or from a

1-2
 The Art of Tactics

chance encounter between two opponents, such as a meeting engagement. An

engagement can be a stand-alone event or one of several related engagements
comprising a battle.
1-7. Levels of command, size of units, types of equipment, or types of forces or
components are not associated with a particular level of war. National assets,
such as intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered
principally in a strategic context, are an important adjunct to tactical opera-
tions. Actions are strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or
contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. Many
times the accuracy of these labels can only be determined during historical
studies.
1-8. Advances in technology, information-age media reporting, and the com-
pression of time-space relationships contribute to the growing interrelation-
ships between the levels of war. The levels of war help commanders visualize
a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appro-
priate command. However, commanders at every level must be aware that in
a world of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut
across the three levels (see FM 3-0).

THE SCIENCE AND ART OF TACTICS

1-9. The tactician must understand and master the science and the art of tac-
tics, two distinctly different yet inseparable concepts. A tactician is an indi-
vidual devoted to mastering the science and art of tactics. Command-
ers and leaders at all echelons and supporting commissioned, warrant, and
noncommissioned staff officers must be tacticians to lead their soldiers in the
conduct of full spectrum operations.

THE SCIENCE
1-10. The science of tactics encompasses the understanding of those
military aspects of tactics—capabilities, techniques, and proced-
ures—that can be measured and codified. The science of tactics includes
the physical capabilities of friendly and enemy organizations and systems,
such as determining how long it takes a division to move a certain distance. It
also includes techniques and procedures used to accomplish specific tasks,
such as the tactical terms and control graphics that comprise the language of
tactics. While not easy, the science of tactics is fairly straightforward. Much of
what is contained in this manual is the science of tactics—techniques and
procedures for employing the various elements of the combined arms team to
achieve greater effects.
1-11. Mastery of the science of tactics is necessary for the tactician to under-
stand the physical and procedural constraints under which he must work.
These constraints include the effects of terrain, time, space, and weather on
friendly and enemy forces. However—because combat is an intensely human
activity—the solution to tactical problems cannot be reduced to a formula.
This realization necessitates the study of the art of tactics.

1-3
FM 3-90

THE ART
1-12. The art of tactics consists of three interrelated aspects: the
creative and flexible array of means to accomplish assigned mis-
sions, decision making under conditions of uncertainty when faced
with an intelligent enemy, and understanding the human dimen-
sion—the effects of combat on soldiers. An art, as opposed to a science,
requires exercising intuitive faculties that cannot be learned solely by study.
The tactician must temper his study and evolve his skill through a variety of
relevant, practical experiences. The more experience the tactician gains from
practice under a variety of circumstances, the greater his mastery of the art
of tactics.
1-13. The tactician invokes the art of tactics to solve tactical problems within
his commander’s intent by choosing from interrelated options, including—
· Types and forms of operations, forms of maneuver, and tactical mission
tasks.
· Task organization of available forces, to include allocating scarce re-
sources.
· Arrangement and choice of control measures.
· Tempo of the operation.
· Risks the commander is willing to take.
1-14. These options represent a starting point for the tactician to create a
unique solution to a specific tactical problem. Each decision represents a
choice among a range of options; each balances competing demands requiring
judgment at every turn. While there may be checklists for techniques and
procedures, there are no checklists for solving tactical problems. The com-
mander must not look for a checklist approach to tactics; instead, he must use
his experience and creativity to outthink his enemy.
1-15. There are three aspects to the art of tactics that define a competent tac-
tician. The first is the creative and flexible application of the tools available to
the commander, such as doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, training,
organizations, materiel, and soldiers in an attempt to render the enemy’s sit-
uational tactics ineffective. The tactician must understand how to train and
employ his forces in full spectrum operations. The factors of mission, enemy,
terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil considerations
(METT-TC) are variables whose infinite mutations always combine to form a
new tactical pattern. (FM 6-0 discusses the factors of METT-TC in detail.)
They never produce exactly the same situation; thus there can be no check-
lists that adequately address each unique situation. Because the enemy
changes and adapts to friendly moves during the planning, preparation, and
execution of an operation, there is no guarantee that a technique which
worked in one situation will work again. Each tactical problem is unique and
must be solved on its own merits.
1-16. The second aspect of the art of tactics is decision making under condi-
tions of uncertainty in a time-constrained environment and demonstrated by
the clash of opposing wills—a violent struggle between two hostile, thinking,
and independent opposing commanders with irreconcilable goals. Each com-
mander wants to impose his will on his opponent, defeat his opponent’s plans,

1-4
 The Art of Tactics

and destroy his opponent’s forces. Combat consists of the interplay between
these two opposing commanders, with each commander seeking to accomplish
his mission while preventing the other from doing the same. Every command-
er needs a high degree of creativity and clarity of thought to outwit a willing
and able opponent. He must quickly apply his judgment to a less than omni-
scient common operational picture provided by his command and control (C2)
system to understand the implications and opportunities afforded him by the
situation. The commander always uses the most current intelligence in order
to facilitate his visualization of the enemy and environment. That same C2
system transmits the decisions resulting from his situational understanding
to those individuals and units required to engage and destroy the enemy
force.
1-17. The third and final aspect of the art of tactics is understanding the
human dimension—what differentiates actual combat from the problems en-
countered during training and in a classroom. Combat is one of the most com-
plex human activities, characterized by violent death, friction, uncertainty,
and chance. Success depends at least as much on this human aspect as it does
on any numerical and technological superiority.

The Human Dimension—Combat at Han-sur-Nied

When only [300] yards from the bridge, the [1-317th IN] skirmish line was hit by
high explosive shells from a detachment of sixteen 40-mm. antiaircraft guns….
The armored infantry froze in their places or tried to reach the shelter of the
ditches alongside the road…, while projectiles…, fired with almost sniperlike ac-
curacy, swept…their ranks. The 231st Armored [FA BN] turned its howitzers on
the enemy…, but as the German gunners were blasted—arms and legs flying
into the air—others ran forward to serve the weapons.
…[1LT Vernon L.] Edwards’ [platoon of the 68th Tank BN] started across the
bridge. The first tank crossed successfully. The second stalled on the bridge
when the platoon commander was hit; for a brief while the tank stood there, [1LT]
Edwards’ body dangling from the open turret. The third received a direct hit and
burst into flame, but was backed off the wooden bridge by its commander after
he had ordered his crew to leave the blazing tank. During this effort…[1LT] Daniel
Nutter and [CPL] Charles Cunningham, B Company 25th Armored [EN BN], ran
forward to cut the wires leading to the demolition charges. [1LT] Nutter, at the
enemy end of the bridge, was killed just as he completed his task. [CPL]
Cunningham, who had cut the wires at the western end…raced across the
bridge, and returned with the body of his commander.
Who [ordered] the final charge probably never will be known. Perhaps it was
[LTC Sterling S.] Burnette, who had been standing erect in the open urging his
lead company on and…was mortally wounded. [CPT James A.] Craig and a few
men rushed the bridge, crossing the 100-foot span “faster than they knew how”
amidst a hail of shell fragments and tracer bullets.… [CPT] Craig disposed his
little force…and through the afternoon held the approach to the bridge against
German tanks and riflemen.

1-5
FM 3-90

1-18. The tactician cannot ignore the human aspect. He seeks to recognize
and exploit indicators of fear and weakness in his enemy, and to defeat the
enemy’s will, since soldiers remain key to generating combat power. More
than any other human activity, continuous combat operations against an in-
telligent enemy takes a toll on soldiers, severely straining their physical and
mental stamina. This creates in soldiers the tangible and intangible effects of
courage, fear, combat experience, exhaustion, isolation, confidence, thirst,
and anger. If left unchecked these effects can result in decreased vigilance,
slowed perception, inability to concentrate, communication difficulties, and
an inability to accomplish manual tasks.
1-19. Leaders must be alert to indicators of fatigue, fear, lapses in discipline
standards, and reduced morale in friendly and enemy soldiers. They must
work to counteract the effects on the friendly force while taking measures to
enhance these effects on the enemy. When the friendly force has the initia-
tive, it can force the enemy to conduct continuous operations to react to
friendly actions and then exploit the effects of continuous operations on the
enemy. These conditions can have a cumulative effect on units that can lead
to collapse. The tactician must understand how they affect human endurance
and factor them into his plans. He must understand the limits of human en-
durance in combat. This is the subtle difference between pushing soldiers be-
yond their limits to exploit success versus resting them to prevent the col-
lapse of unit cohesion. (FM 6-22.5 discusses the effects of continuous combat
operations.)

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE
1-20. The following vignette discusses the Battle of Cowpens fought during
the American Revolution. It illustrates the need for the tactician to combine
the effects of the science of tactics with his application of the tactical art.

Cowpens, 17 January 1781

On 17 January 1781, American BG Daniel Morgan defeated British LTC Tarleton
at the Cowpens in South Carolina in a battle that captures the essence of the art
of tactics—the use of intuitive faculties that cannot be learned solely by study. Al-
though outnumbered, Morgan’s troops fought and won against a previously un-
beaten opponent. The battle achieved decisive results with strategic significance.
In December 1780, Morgan was sent with 600 men into the South Carolina high-
lands under orders to protect Americans, forage, and threaten British control of
the highlands. Tarleton’s British Legion—numbering nearly 1,000 men and con-
sisting of a combined cavalry-infantry force reinforced with additional infantry and
two, three-pounder guns—was sent to pursue Morgan. By 16 January 1781,
Tarleton had closed to within six miles of Morgan’s force.
Having known of Tarleton’s mission since 14 January, Morgan obtained informa-
tion on Tarleton’s tactical style while he began to retreat. With Tarleton so close
on 16 January and his own camp nearly six miles from the Broad River, Morgan
decided to fight at the Cowpens. While the two forces were now roughly the same
size, Morgan had only about one-third the cavalry, one-third the regular line

1-6
 The Art of Tactics

infantry, and no artillery. However, his militia force’s rifles had a longer range than
the British muskets, and the terrain allowed him to mask his reserves from view.
Morgan deployed his forces on the battlefield, confident that Tarleton would not
attempt to flank his position. Rather, Morgan believed that Tarleton would initially
attack him with part of his cavalry supported by infantry, wait for confusion, and
then exploit those vulnerabilities with his cavalry reserve. This had been his pat-
tern of operations in previous engagements with the Americans.
In the main line of battle, LEGEND
Morgan placed his Continen- American Forces

tals and Virginia militia, who British Forces

SITUATION AS OF
were former Continentals, on III
920
3rd (WASHINGTON)
0700

the military crest of the rise 960

940
960

under COL Howard’s com-

980

-N
mand. They numbered 450.
940
980

-
About 150 meters downhill, 960

toward the expected reaction

940 920
CONTINENTALS
(HOWARD)
of the enemy, he stationed the 900

bulk of his militia under the

command of COL Pickens. MILITIA
(PICKENS)
Another 150 meters down the
hill, he positioned a skirmisher
line of 150 militia riflemen. SKIRMISHERS
960
940

Behind the hill, he placed LTC

Washington’s 120-strong cav- 960
920 900

alry force in reserve. Each line

was within rifle range but out 940
I

of musket range of the line be- 920 I II

hind it. As explained the night 900

LEGION
940

before, skirmishers only need- II

7th FUSILIERS
960

ed to fire one or two shots and Scale

then retire to the second line. 71st HIGHLAND

LEGION
0 100 200 300 400

yards
500

In turn, the militia in the sec-

Figure 1-1. Initial Situation
ond line only needed to fire
two volleys. Then they could retire to their left around to the rear of the hill and,
protected by the cavalry, reform. The cavalry would counterattack British cavalry
as the situation allowed, guard the militia horses, or cover a retreat if necessary.
(See Figure 1-1.)
Tarleton deployed his forces from their march formation into a line, with three
light infantry companies on the right, the Legion infantry in the center, and one
regular British battalion on the left of this main line. He stationed one troop of cav-
alry on each flank of the main line and one three-pounder gun on either side of
the Legion infantry. He kept the other regular British battalion and the remainder
of his Legion cavalry in reserve. The British immediately came under fire from the
skirmishers. Tarleton sent a troop of dragoons to disperse them while his main
forces deployed. The dragoons lost 15 of 50 men. The skirmishers retired to the
American second line.
Tarleton then assaulted the second line. His artillery opened fire, but apparently
on the third line. The American rifle fire disrupted his formation. When his forces
closed to within 50 meters of the second line, they received a volley from the

1-7
FM 3-90

militia that staggered and fur- LEGEND

ther disrupted them. The mili- American Forces

tia’s expected second volley British Forces

SITUATION AS OF
was more ragged as it began 920 0730

to withdraw. Seeing this 940

960
960
MILITIA
movement, Tarleton ordered (REFORMING)

980

-N
his right-hand troop of dra- 980 III 940

-
3rd (WASHINGTON)
goons to charge the militia as 960

CONTINENTALS
it withdrew. The American
940 920
(HOWARD)

cavalry charged this troop 900

and overwhelmed it, driving II

the dragoons off the field in

accordance with Morgan’s 7th FUSILIERS LEGION

plan. (See Figure 1-2.) EN Y

EN

Y II
I

I
As the British moved hastily
960
940

forward to assault the main 71st HIGHLAND

920 900

American position, they fur- 960

ther lost their cohesion as a 940

firefight between the two

forces ensued. Tarleton or-
920

900 940

dered his reserve infantry LEGION

960

battalion up to the left of his

line for this assault, and the
Scale
0 100 200 300 400 500

cavalry troop on his left to en- yards

circle the American line. This Figure 1-2. British Moves

move outflanked the Ameri- LEGEND
can line. Morgan and the American Forces

third-line commander recog- British Forces

SITUATION AS OF
nized the danger to their right 920 0750
flank and ordered the right 940
960

flank units to “refuse” the

960
980

flank. However, the American

-N

940
980
-

units adjoining those right 960

flank units also commenced 940 CONTINENTALS

(HOWARD)
920

moving to the rear. This sit-

900

uation could have crumbled II

IA

the American line except for

IT
MIL

Morgan’s personal order for II

7th FUSILIERS

the rest of the American line

LEGION

to move to the rear with 71st HIGHLAND 960

III
those right flank units.
940

3rd (WASHINGTON)
920 900

Seeing this apparent general 960

withdrawal, Tarleton ordered

940

his forces to close with the

Americans. They did, but suf- 920

900 940

fered further disorganization. LEGION

ENY

960

Just as the British attempted

to close, the Americans 0 100 200
Scale
300 400 500

turned and fired a volley, fol- yards

lowed by a bayonet charge Figure 1-3. Final Battle Stage

1-8
 The Art of Tactics

into the British lines. Simultaneously, Morgan’s cavalry attacked the British right
from the rear. Meanwhile, the militia, having reformed, returned to the field on the
American right and attacked the British left flank units. (See Figure 1-3.) The bat-
tle was over within an hour of Tarleton’s first assault. The British losses were 110
killed, 200 wounded, and 700 prisoners, although Tarleton personally escaped
with about 140 of his cavalry. The British could not replace the mobile forces that
Tarleton lost at the Cowpens. Without a mobile force, the British no longer had an
effective counter to American partisans and light forces. The British later won at
Guilford Court House, but suffered such heavy losses that they had to abandon
their operations in the interior of the Carolinas.
Morgan combined the science of tactics with his application of the tactical art to
defeat superior numbers of British forces under Tarleton. Morgan arrived at a
unique and creative solution to his tactical problems. Trusted information about
Tarleton’s style was a crucial part of his deployment plan. Morgan understood the
diverse military and social elements of his force (untried militia, Continentals, and
volunteers). He asked no more of any element than it could deliver and used the
strengths of each to the fullest. Daniel Morgan used tactical art to convert his
understanding of American troops, knowledge of human nature, and rapport with
his soldiers into the vital components of a brilliant tactical victory.

HASTY VERSUS DELIBERATE OPERATIONS

1-21. A hasty operation is an operation in which a commander directs
his immediately available forces, using fragmentary orders
(FRAGOs), to perform activities with minimal preparation, trading
planning and preparation time for speed of execution. A deliberate
operation is an operation in which a commander’s detailed intelli-
gence concerning the situation allows him to develop and coordinate
detailed plans, including multiple branches and sequels. He task or-
ganizes his forces specifically for the operation to provide a fully
synchronized combined arms team. He conducts extensive rehearsals
while conducting shaping operations to set the conditions for the
conduct of his decisive operation.
1-22. Most operations lie somewhere along a continuum between these two
extremes. The 9th Armored Division’s seizure of the bridge at Remagen in
March 1945 illustrates one end, a hasty operation conducted with the forces
immediately available. At the other end of the continuum is a deliberate op-
eration, such as the 1st Infantry Division’s breach operation during the
opening hours of Operation Desert Storm. Ongoing improvements in informa-
tion and C2 systems continue to assist in the development of a common op-
erational picture of friendly and enemy forces while facilitating decision
making and communicating decisions to friendly forces. These improvements
can help diminish the distinction between hasty and deliberate operations;
they cannot make that distinction irrelevant.

CHOICES AND TRADEOFFS

1-23. The commander must choose the right point along the continuum to op-
erate. His choice involves balancing several competing factors. He bases his
decision to conduct a hasty or deliberate operation on his current knowledge

1-9
FM 3-90

of the enemy situation, and his assessment of whether the assets available (to
include time), and the means to coordinate and synchronize those assets, are
adequate to accomplish the mission. If they are not he takes additional time
to plan and prepare for the operation or bring additional forces to bear on the
problem. The commander makes that choice in an environment of uncer-
tainty, which always entails some risk.
1-24. The commander may have to act based only on his available combat in-
formation in a time-constrained environment. Combat information is uneval-
uated data gathered by or provided to a commander that, due to its highly
perishable nature or the critical nature of the tactical situation, cannot be
processed into tactical intelligence or other staff products in time to meet the
commander’s information requirements (FM 6-0). The commander must un-
derstand the inherent risk of acting only on combat information since it is
vulnerable to enemy deception operations and can be misinterpreted at any
stage up through reporting channels. The unit intelligence staff helps the
commander assign a level of confidence to combat information he uses in deci-
sion making.
1-25. Uncertainty and risk are inherent in tactical operations and cannot be
eliminated. A commander cannot be successful without the capability of act-
ing under conditions of uncertainty while balancing various risks and taking
advantage of opportunities. Although the commander strives to maximize his
knowledge about his forces, the terrain and weather, civil considerations, and
the enemy, he cannot let a lack of information paralyze him. The more intelli-
gence on the enemy, the better able the commander is to make his assess-
ment. Less information means that the commander has a greater risk of
making a poor decision for the specific situation. A commander never has per-
fect intelligence, but knowing when he has enough information to make a de-
cision within the higher commander’s intent and constraints is part of the art
of tactics and is a critical skill for a commander.
1-26. The commander should take the minimum time necessary in planning
and preparing to ensure a reasonable chance of success. Reduced coordination
at the start of the operation results in less than optimum combat power
brought to bear on the enemy, but often allows for increased speed and mo-
mentum while possibly achieving surprise. The commander must balance the
effects of reduced coordination against the risk that the effects of increased
coordination will not match the enemy’s improved posture over time. The
more time the commander takes to prepare for the operation, including im-
proving his situational understanding, the more time the enemy has to pre-
pare and move additional units within supporting range or distance. Addi-
tionally, it reduces the time his subordinates have to conduct their own
planning and preparations. If the enemy can improve his disposition faster
than the friendly force can, the delays in execution decrease the commander’s
chances of success.
1-27. It is better to err on the side of speed, audacity, and momentum than on
the side of caution when conducting military operations, all else being equal.
Bold decisions give the best promise of success; however, one must differenti-
ate between calculated risks and a military gamble. A calculated risk is an
operation in which success is not a certainty but which, in case of failure,
leaves sufficient forces to cope with whatever situations arise (FM 6-0). The

1-10
 The Art of Tactics

willingness to take calculated risks requires military judgment to reduce risk

by foresight and careful planning and to determine whether the risk is worth
taking to grasp fleeting opportunities. MG Wood’s decision to advance east
toward the German border with his 4th Armored Division after the breakout
from the Normandy beachhead is an example of a justifiable calculated risk.
A military gamble is an operation that can lead either to victory or to com-
plete destruction of one’s force (FM 6-0). Rare situations can arise where even
a gamble may be justified; for example, when defeat is merely a matter of
time and the only chance lies in an operation of great risk. LTC
Chamberlain’s decision to conduct a bayonet charge with what was left of the
20th Maine on the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg is an example of a
military gamble.
1-28. The commander can be less deliberate in planning and preparing for an
operation when facing a clearly less-capable and less-prepared enemy force.
In these circumstances, the commander can forego detailed planning, exten-
sive rehearsals, and significant changes in task organization. For example, an
attacking battalion task force encountering enemy security outposts just mov-
ing into position will conduct actions on contact to immediately destroy the
outposts without the loss of momentum. It then follows that against a larger
and more prepared enemy, the commander needs more preparation time and
a larger force to succeed. If the commander determines that he cannot defeat
the enemy with the forces immediately at hand, he must determine what
additional measures he must take to be successful. The measures can include
any or all of the factors along the continuum.
1-29. This does not imply that a commander conducting a hasty operation
foregoes the advantages provided by his combined arms team. A commander
who chooses to conduct hasty operations synchronizes the employment of his
forces in his head as he issues FRAGOs. He uses tangible and intangible fac-
tors, such as the training level and experience of his subordinates, his own
experience, perception of how the enemy will react, understanding of time-
distance factors, and knowledge of the strengths of each subordinate and sup-
porting unit to achieve the required degree of synchronization.

RISK REDUCTION
1-30. An important factor in reducing a commander’s risk is how much intel-
ligence he has about the enemy. As intelligence becomes available, the com-
mander determines where along the continuum of hasty versus deliberate
operations he will operate to accomplish his mission. There is no set of rules
to determine this point—any choice entails risk. If the commander decides to
execute a hasty operation based on limited intelligence, he risks an uncoordi-
nated operation against an enemy about which he knows little. Moreover his
forces may not be strong enough to accomplish their mission with minimum
casualties. This could lead to piecemeal commitment and potential defeat in
detail. He must balance this option against the risk of waiting to attack,
which allows the enemy time to reinforce or conduct additional preparation.
1-31. When higher headquarters determines the time to start an operation,
or in a defense when the enemy initiates the operation, the commander has
little flexibility regarding where to operate along the continuum of hasty
versus deliberate operations. In these situations he must use all the time

1-11
FM 3-90

available to conduct planning and preparation. While the military decision

making process tasks used in a time-constrained environment are the same
as in the full process, many are done mentally by the commander or with less
staff involvement. Each commander decides how to shorten the process. A
commander may use the complete process to develop the plan, while a sub-
ordinate headquarters abbreviates the process. (See FM 5-0 for a discussion
of decision making in a time-constrained environment.)
1-32. The commander can reduce the risk associated with any situation by in-
creasing his knowledge of the terrain and friendly, neutral, and enemy forces.
He has a greater risk of making a poor decision if his situational under-
standing is incomplete or faulty. If the commander lacks sufficient informa-
tion to make an informed choice, his first priority must be to gain the re-
quired information to support his decision making while at the same time
taking precautions to protect his force from surprise. During an unexpected
encounter with the enemy, often an acceptable way to gain that intelligence is
to conduct a hasty attack to determine the size and disposition of the enemy
force. The commander adapts his reconnaissance and intelligence efforts to
the existing situation and picks the appropriate tools to answer his critical in-
formation requirements. For example, the commander can retask his recon-
naissance assets or increase the size of his reconnaissance effort.
1-33. A commander—supported by a digital C2 system that can access accur-
ate, real-time information—takes advantage of a different operational envi-
ronment than that facing a commander with an analog C2 system. Greatly
improved knowledge of the enemy and friendly situations facilitates his
employment of precision fires, his conduct of decisive maneuver at extended
ranges, and his provision of responsive and flexible support of his forces. The
integration of advanced information technologies, highly capable leaders, and
agile organizational systems reduces risk and facilitates the conduct of full
spectrum operations.
1-34. Risk reduction does not always mean increasing knowledge of the en-
emy at the expense of time. A commander can partially compensate for a lack
of intelligence by being flexible in his troop dispositions through an increase
in the depth of the security area, size and number of security units, and size
of the reserve. The commander’s choices of combat and movement formations
provide the versatility to allow for initial enemy contact with the smallest
possible friendly force. This allows the greatest flexibility in meeting unfore-
seen enemy dispositions. Another way to compensate for increased risk is to
allow time and resources for subordinate elements to develop the situation.
1-35. Because uncertainty exists in all military operations, every military
decision contains risk. The commander exercises tactical art when he decides
how much risk to accept. As shown in Figure 1-4, the commander has several
techniques available to reduce the risk associated in a specific operation.
Some of these techniques for reducing risk take resources from the decisive
operation, which reduces the concentration of effects at the decisive point.
1-36. The commander has the option to redirect the efforts of forces previ-
ously used to reduce his risk toward strengthening his decisive operation as
more information becomes available. In any operation, the relationship be-
tween information, uncertainty, risk, size of reserves and security forces, and

1-12
 The Art of Tactics

the disposition of the main body may change frequently. The commander
must continually weigh this balance and make adjustments as needed.
1-37. These adjustments can create problems. Too many changes or changes
made too rapidly in task organization, mission, and priorities can have nega-
tive effects on the operations process. For example, if a commander changes
the task organization of his force too frequently, the force fails to develop the
flexibility provided by teamwork. On the other hand, if he fails to change the
task organization when dictated by circumstances, the force lacks flexibility
to adapt to those changing circumstances. It is then unable to react effectively
to enemy moves or act with the concentration of effects that lead to mission
success.

LESS INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE MORE

result in

MORE UNCERTAINTY LESS

MORE RISK TO FORCE LESS

WHICH IN TURN LEADS THE

COMMANDERS TO ADJUST HIS
LARGER Reconnaissance Effort SMALLER
LARGER Size Of Reserve SMALLER
MORE Security Information FEWER
SLOWER Speed Of Operations FASTER
FEWER Simultaneous Operations MORE
LESS Attack Precision MORE

Figure 1-4. Risk Reduction Factors

SOLVING TACTICAL PROBLEMS

1-38. Success in tactical problem solving results from the aggressive, intelli-
gent, and decisive use of combat power in an environment of uncertainty, dis-
order, violence, and danger. A commander wins by being on the offense, initi-
ating combat on his own terms—at a time and place of his choosing. He never
surrenders the initiative once he gains it. He builds momentum quickly to
win decisively through the rapid application of available combat power, op-
erating inside the enemy’s decision making cycle, and mastering the transi-
tions between the defense to the offensive and vice versa. These rules of
thumb allow the commander to maximize friendly and minimize enemy com-
bat power by preventing the enemy from fighting as a combined arms force.
1-39. Offensive action is key to achieving decisive results. Tactical com-
manders conduct offensive operations to achieve their assigned missions and
objectives¾destroying enemy forces or seizing terrain¾that cumulatively
produce the theater-level effects required by the operational commander.

1-13
FM 3-90

Circumstances may require defending; however, tactical success normally

requires shifting to the offense as soon as possible. The offense ends when the
forces conducting it accomplish their missions, reach their limits of advance,
or approach culmination. Those forces then consolidate, resume the attack, or
prepare for other operations.
1-40. A commander wants to initiate combat on his own terms to give himself
important advantages. This allows him to mass the effects of his combat
power against selected inferior and isolated enemy units in vulnerable loca-
tions. Possession of the initiative allows a commander to continually seek vul-
nerable spots and shift his decisive operation when opportunities occur. A
commander seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative by—
· Maneuvering more rapidly than the enemy to gain positional advan-
tage (the place where the effects of fires are most destructive) over the
enemy.
· Employing firepower to facilitate and exploit positional advantage.
· Sustaining his forces before, during, and after the engagement with the
enemy.
· Achieving and maintaining information superiority.
· Planning beyond the initial operation and anticipating possible events.
A commander never surrenders the initiative once he gains it. He presses the
fight tenaciously and aggressively. He accepts risk while leading soldiers and
pushing systems to their limits.
1-41. The tactician, notwithstanding his status as a commander or a staff of-
ficer, seeks ways to build momentum quickly by seizing the initiative and
executing shaping, sustaining, and decisive operations at a high tempo. Mo-
mentum helps to retain and complements the initiative. Concentrating the ef-
fects of combat power at the decisive place and time overwhelms an enemy
and gains control of the situation. Rapid maneuver to place the enemy in a
disadvantageous position also builds momentum. Momentum allows the tacti-
cian to create opportunities to engage the enemy from unexpected directions
with unanticipated capabilities. Having seized the initiative, the tactician
continues to control the relative momentum by taking action to maintain
focus and pressure, controlling the tempo of operations, and creating and ex-
ploiting opportunities, while always assessing the situation and taking calcu-
lated risks.
1-42. The commander’s C2 system assists the rapid building of momentum by
allowing him to see and understand the situation so quickly that his forces
can act before the enemy forces can react to the initial situation. His opera-
tions process focuses on executing rather than planning. Modern information
systems allow compressed planning and effective incremental adjustments to
the plan during execution. This allows the commander’s forces to adapt more
quickly to emerging threats and opportunities as they are identified. Units
whose commanders can make and implement decisions faster, even to a small
degree, gain an accruing advantage that becomes significant over time;
making decisions quickly—even with incomplete information—is crucial.
1-43. The tactician chooses from a number of tactical options to create the so-
lution to the tactical problem facing him. (Chapter 2 lists these options as the
types and forms of military operations and forms of maneuver.) Although he

1-14
 The Art of Tactics

solves the specific tactical problem facing him by following the general princi-
ples outlined in this manual, there is no single, doctrinally correct, procedur-
ally derived solution to any problem. The tactician who employs the more
appropriate tactics given the existing situation has a distinct advantage over
his opponent, even if their forces have equal combat power.
1-44. The tactician uses his mastery of the art and science of tactics, his
understanding of the situation, and his judgment to create unique solutions
appropriate to the mission and the other specific factors of METT-TC. There
are usually several solutions that might work, although some will be more ef-
fective. He seeks a solution that defeats the enemy in the time available at
the least cost in men and materiel. It should be a decisive solution that pos-
tures the unit for future missions and provides for the greatest flexibility to
account for unexpected enemy actions or reactions. The solution must be in
accordance with the higher commander’s intent. A thorough understanding of
the enemy greatly assists the commander in his development of workable so-
lutions. Commander’s visualization is the doctrinal term for this process.
(FM 6-0 describes commander’s visualization.)
1-45. The tactician learns to cut to the heart of a situation, recognize its im-
portant elements, and base his decisions on those important elements as he
masters his profession. The ability to do this cannot be acquired overnight. A
tactician develops this capability after years of schooling, self-study, and
practical training experiences, which eventually develop the intuitive facul-
ties required to solve tactical problems. He rarely gets the opportunity to
practice the science and art of tactics under actual combat conditions.
1-46. Doctrine requires human judgment when applied to a specific situation.
In choosing a solution to a tactical problem, applicable laws and regulations,
the mission, the laws of physics, human behavior, and logistic realities con-
strain the tactician, not standardized techniques and procedures. The true
test of the tactician’s solution is not whether it uses the specific techniques or
procedures contained in this manual, but whether the techniques and proce-
dures used were appropriate to the situation. Tactical proficiency is not de-
fined by mastery of written doctrine, but by the ability to employ available
means to win battles and engagements. A solution may not match any previ-
ous doctrinal example; however, the language used to communicate that con-
cept must be technically precise and doctrinally consistent, using commonly
understood and accepted doctrinal terms and concepts.
1-47. Transitions between the types and forms of operations are difficult and,
during execution, may create unexpected opportunities for Army or enemy
forces. The tactician must quickly recognize such opportunities. He develops
transitions as branches during the planning process and acts on them immed-
iately as they occur. Transition between one type or form of an operation to
another is a complex operational consideration.
1-48. Tactical victory occurs when the opposing enemy force can no longer
prevent the friendly force from accomplishing its mission. That is the end
goal of all military operations. Decisive tactical victory occurs when the en-
emy no longer has the means to oppose the friendly force. It also occurs when
the enemy admits defeat and agrees to a negotiated end of hostilities. Histori-
cally, a rapid tactical victory results in fewer friendly casualties and reduced

1-15
FM 3-90

resource expenditures. However, the tactician avoids gambling his forces and
losing his combined arms synchronization in search of rapid victory.
1-49. In closing, solutions to tactical problems are a collective effort. Success
results from the commander’s plan and the ability of subordinates to execute
it. The commander must have full confidence in his subordinates’ mastery of
the art and science of tactics and in their ability to execute the chosen solu-
tion. (See FM 6-0 for a full discussion of this concept.)

1-16
 Chapter 2

Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

In war, obscurity and confusion are normal. Late, exaggerated or
misleading information, surprise situations, and counterorders are to
be expected.
Infantry in Battle, 1939

The tactician must understand the common tactical concepts and defini-
tions used by the military profession in the conduct of offensive and de-
fensive operations. This chapter introduces the doctrinal hierarchy that
forms the framework by which this manual is organized. The concepts
and terms in this chapter are common to most operations. This manual
discusses those concepts and terms specific to a type or form of operations
in the corresponding chapter. For example, Chapter 4 discusses the objec-
tive as a control measure.

DOCTRINAL HIERARCHY
2-1. Figure 2-1 on page 2-2 shows the doctrinal hierarchy and relationship
between the types and subordinate forms of operations. While an operation’s

CONTENTS
Doctrinal Hierarchy......................................2-1 Basic Tactical Graphic Control
The Operational Framework .......................2-3 Measures .............................................. 2-10
Principles of War .........................................2-3 Air Corridor........................................... 2-11
Tenets of Army Operations.........................2-4 Area of Operations and Boundaries .. 2-12
The Factors of METT-TC .............................2-4 Assembly Areas ................................... 2-18
Elements of Operational Design ................2-4 Checkpoint ........................................... 2-19
Battlefield Operating Systems....................2-5 Contact Point........................................ 2-20
Basic Tactical Concepts .............................2-5 Critical Friendly Zone .......................... 2-20
Combined Arms ......................................2-6 Direct Fire Control Measures.............. 2-20
Decisively Engaged ................................2-6 Deep, Close, and Rear Areas .............. 2-24
Defeat in Detail ........................................2-7 Fire Support Coordination
Flanks.......................................................2-7 Measures .............................................. 2-26
Maneuver .................................................2-8 Fire Support Targets............................ 2-31
Mutual Support .......................................2-8 Forward Line of Own Troops.............. 2-32
Operation .................................................2-8 Line of Contact..................................... 2-32
Piecemeal Commitment .........................2-9 Names Area of Interest ........................ 2-33
Reconstitution.........................................2-9 Obstacle Control Measures ................ 2-33
Rules of Engagement .............................2-9 Phase Line ............................................ 2-37
Supporting Distance.............................2-10 Position Area of Artillery ..................... 2-37
Supporting Range.................................2-10 Route ..................................................... 2-38
Tactical Mobility....................................2-10 Targeted Area of Interest..................... 2-38

2-1
FM 3-90

predominant characteristic labels it as an offensive, defensive, stability, or

support operation, different units involved in that operation may be con-
ducting different types and subordinate forms of operations, and often
transition rapidly from one type or subordinate form to another. The
commander rapidly shifts from one type or form of operation to another to
continually keep the enemy off balance while positioning his forces for
maximum effectiveness. Flexibility in transitioning contributes to a
successful operation. A good tactician chooses the right combinations of
combined arms to place the enemy at the maximum disadvantage.

TYPES OF
MILITARY OFFENSE DEFENSE STABILITY SUPPORT
OPNS
FORMS OF TYPES OF TYPES OF FORMS OF
MANEUVER DEFENSIVE STABILITY OPNS SUPPORT
TYPES OF —
—
Envelopment
Turning Movement
OPNS — PEACE OPNS OPNS
— AREA — FOREIGN INTERNAL – Relief Opns
MILITARY — Frontal Attack
DEFENSE DEFENSE – Support to
— Penetration — SECURITY ASSIST Incidents
OPNS — Infiltration — MOBILE — HUMANITARIAN & CIVIC Involving WMD
DEFENSE ASSIST – SPT to Civil Law
AND — RETROGRADE — SUPPORT TO Enforcement
TYPES OF
THEIR OFFENSIVE OPNS
OPERATIONS INSURGENCIES
— SUPPORT TO CD OPNS
– Community
Assistance
– Delay
SUBORD- —MOVEMENT TO CONTACT – Withdrawal
— CBTING TERRORISM
– Search and Attack — NONCOMBATANT TYPES OF
INATE —ATTACK
– Ambush*
– Retirement EVACUATION OPNS
SUPPORT
– Feint* — ARMS CONTROL
FORMS –
–
Counterattack*
Demonstration*
– Raid*
— SHOW OF FORCE OPERATIONS
*Also known as
— DOMESTIC SPT
– Spoiling Attack*
—EXPLOITATION special purpose OPNS
—PURSUIT attacks — FOREIGN
HUMANITARIAN
TYPES OF ASSISTANCE

ENABLING INFORMATION OPERATIONS COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

OPNS
•RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS •TROOP MOVEMENT
– Zone – Administrative Movement
TYPES OF – Area – Approach March
TACTICAL – Route – Road March
– Reconnaissance in Force •COMBINED ARMS BREACH OPERATIONS
ENABLING •SECURITY OPERATIONS •RIVER CROSSING OPERATIONS
OPNS – Screen – Area (includes •RELIEF IN PLACE
– Guard route and convoy) •PASSAGE OF LINES
– Cover – Local •TACTICAL INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Figure 2-1. Doctrinal Hierarchy of Operations

2-2. The commander conducts tactical enabling operations to assist the plan-
ning, preparation, and execution of any of the four types of military opera-
tions (offense, defense, stability, and support). Tactical enabling operations
are never decisive operations in the context of offensive and defensive opera-
tions; they are either shaping or sustaining operations. Part IV of this man-
ual discusses tactical enabling operations that are not the subject of a sepa-
rate field manual. The commander uses tactical enabling operations to help
him conduct military actions with minimal risk.

2-2
 Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

2-3. This hierarchy does not describe discrete, mutually exclusive operations.
All tactical missions can contain elements of several different types and sub-
ordinate forms. For example, an attacking commander may have one subordi-
nate conducting an envelopment, with another subordinate conducting a
frontal attack to fix the enemy. The enveloping force usually attacks once the
direct-pressure force makes a movement to contact while repeatedly
attacking to keep pressure on the fleeing enemy. The encircling force uses an
envelopment to conduct a series of attacks to destroy or clear enemy forces in
its path on the way to its blocking position. Once it occupies the blocking posi-
tion, the unit may transition to a defense as it blocks the retreat of the fleeing
enemy force.

THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

2-4. The operational framework consists of the arrangement of friendly forces
and resources in time, space, and purpose with respect to each other and the
enemy or situation. It consists of the area of operations, battlespace, and the
battlefield organization (FM 3-0). The framework establishes an area of geo-
graphic and operational responsibility for commanders and provides a way
for them to visualize how they will employ forces against the enemy. Army
commanders design an operational framework to accomplish their mission by
defining and arranging its three components. The commander uses the opera-
tional framework to focus combat power. Combat power is the total means of
destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply
against the opponent at a given time (JP 1-02).
2-5. As part of the military decision making process, the commander visual-
izes his battlespace and determines how to arrange his forces. The battlefield
organization is the allocation of forces in the area of operations by purpose. It
consists of three all-encompassing categories of operations: decisive, shaping,
and sustaining (FM 3-0). Purpose unifies all elements of the battlefield
organization by providing the common focus for all actions. The commander
organizes his forces according to purpose by determining whether each unit’s
operation will be decisive, shaping, or sustaining. Those decisions form the
basis of his concept of operations. He describes the area of operations (AO) in
terms of deep, close, and rear areas when the factors of METT-TC require the
use of a spatial reference. FM 3-0 explains the operational framework and
battlefield organization.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR
2-6. The nine principles of war defined in FM 3-0 provide general guidance
for conducting war and military operations other than war at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels. They are fundamental truths governing
combat operations. The principles are the enduring bedrock of Army doctrine.
First published in 1923 as general principles in Field Service Regulations
United States Army, they have stood the tests of analysis, experimentation,
and practice. They are not a checklist and their degree of application varies
with the situation. Blind adherence to these principles does not guarantee
success, but each deviation may increase the risk of failure. The principles of
war lend rigor and focus to the purely creative aspects of tactics and provide a
crucial link between pure theory and actual application.

2-3
FM 3-90

TENETS OF ARMY OPERATIONS

Principles of War
2-7. The tenets of Army operations—initiative,
agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility— · Objective
build on the principles of war. They further de- · Offensive
scribe the characteristics of successful opera- · Mass
tions. While they do not guarantee success, their · Economy of force
absence risks failure. FM 3-0 defines the tenets. · Maneuver
· Unity of command
· Security
THE FACTORS OF METT-TC · Surprise
2-8. The six factors of METT-TC—mission, · Simplicity
enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available, and civil considera-
tions—describe the unique situation in which a Tenets of Army
tactician executes the science and art of tactics. Operations
An analysis of the factors of METT-TC is critical · Initiative
during the military decision making process. The · Agility
METT-TC analytical framework is useful in as- · Depth
sessing operations planning, preparing, and exe- · Synchronization
cuting. The tactician considers these six factors · Versatility
for any type of operation. Their impact on an op-
eration will differ, but each must be considered
as factors during the commander’s visualization Factors of
process. That consideration involves both the sci- METT-TC
ence and art of tactics. For example, terrain and · Mission
weather effects on movement rates and fuel con- · Enemy
sumption are quantifiable and, therefore, part of · Terrain and weather
the science of war. Terrain and weather effects · Troops and support
on soldier morale are not totally quantifiable and available
are part of the art of war. FM 6-0 provides a de- · Time available
tailed discussion of the factors of METT-TC. · Civil considerations

ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN Elements of

2-9. A major operation begins with a design—an Operational
idea that guides the conduct (plan, prepare, exe- Design
cute, and assess) of the operation. The opera-
tional design provides a conceptual linkage of · End state and military
ends, ways, and means. The elements of opera- conditions
tional design are tools to aid the commander in · Center of gravity
visualizing major operations and shaping his in- · Decisive points and
tent. They help the commander clarify and refine objectives
his vision by providing a framework for him to · Lines of operation
describe the operation in terms of task and · Culminating point
purpose. FM 3-0 defines each of these elements. · Operational reach,
Their utility diminishes with each succeeding approach, and pauses
tactical echelon. What is envisioned as a decisive · Simultaneous and
point by the land component commander sequential operations
becomes a clearly delineated objective for a · Linear and nonlinear
battalion task force. operations
· Tempo

2-4
 Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS

2-10. There are seven battlefield operating
systems (BOS). The seven BOS definitions Battlefield Operating
from FM 7-15 are— Systems
· The intelligence system is the activity · Intelligence
to generate knowledge of and products · Maneuver
portraying the enemy and the · Fire support
environmental features required by a · Air defense
command planning, preparing, and · Mobility/countermobility/
executing operations. survivability
· The maneuver system is the movement · Combat service support
of forces to achieve a position of · Command and control
advantage with respect to enemy
forces. This system includes the employment of forces on the battlefield
in combination with direct fire or fire potential. This system also
includes the conduct of tactical tasks associated with force projection.
· The fire support system encompasses the collective and coordinated use
of target-acquisition data, indirect-fire weapons, fixed-wing aircraft,
offensive information operations, and other lethal and nonlethal means
against targets located throughout an AO.
· The air defense system is the employment of all active measures
designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of attack by hostile
aircraft and missiles after they are airborne.
· The mobility, countermobility, and survivability system.
§ Mobility operations preserve the freedom of maneuver of friendly
forces.
§ Countermobility operations deny mobility to enemy forces.
§ Survivability operations protect friendly forces from the effects of
enemy weapon systems.
· The combat service support system is the support and services provided
to sustain forces during war and military operations other than war.
· The command and control system includes all collective tasks asso-
ciated with supporting the exercise of authority and direction by a
properly designated commander over assigned and available forces in
the accomplishment of the mission.
The BOS provide the Army a common taxonomy of critical tactical activities.
They provide the commander and his staff a means of assessing the planning,
preparation, and execution of an operation in discrete subsets.

BASIC TACTICAL CONCEPTS

2-11. The following paragraphs contain basic tactical concepts common to
both offensive and defensive operations. They are listed in alphabetical order,
not in order of importance. These concepts, along with the principles of war,
tenets of Army operations, factors of METT-TC, estimates, input from other
commanders, and the commander’s experience and judgment allow him to
visualize the conduct of operations as he accomplishes his assigned mission.

2-5
FM 3-90

COMBINED ARMS
2-12. Combined arms is the synchronized or simultaneous application of
several arms—such as infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, air defense, and
aviation—to achieve an effect on the enemy that is greater than if each arm
was used against the enemy separately or in sequence (FM 3-0). Weapons and
units are more effective when they operate in concert. No single action,
weapon, branch, or arm of service generates sufficient power to achieve the
effects required to dominate an opponent.
2-13. Combined arms is more than the combat arms working together. Each
branch of the Army provides unique capabilities that complement the other
branches. A combined arms team consists of two or more arms supporting one
another. The commander takes his available combat, combat support (CS),
and combat service support (CSS) elements and forms them into a combined
arms team focused on mission accomplishment. The proper combination of
actions and systems by the combined arms team is the essence of combined
arms. The use of combined arms provides complementary and reinforcing ef-
fects and may have asymmetrical effects on an enemy force. (See FM 3-0 for
more information on symmetrical and asymmetrical effects.)
2-14. Armor, attack helicopter, and infantry units are normally the nucleus
of the combined arms team. However, emerging capabilities allow the com-
mander to use any combat arms unit, such as artillery and aviation, to form
that nucleus. The commander uses his combat arms forces in different combi-
nations to provide flexibility in conducting different types of operations in
varied terrain. For example, a commander may have his infantry lead in
mountains and cities when moving dismounted, while his armor leads in open
terrain. Attack helicopters can deliver large quantities of precision munitions
throughout the AO. A commander can conduct decisive operations using field
artillery Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) and cannons augmented
by the effects of fixed-wing aviation, given the correct conditions. Air defense
artillery destroys enemy aerial assets to assist the free movement of the
friendly force. Engineers enhance the friendly force’s mobility, degrade the
enemy’s mobility, and assist in providing for survivability of the friendly
force. Combat support and CSS members of the combined arms team support
the combined arms nucleus by combining capabilities in an appropriate
manner to support and sustain the combined arms force.

DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT
2-15. A decisive engagement is an engagement in which a unit is considered
fully committed and cannot maneuver or extricate itself. In the absence of
outside assistance, the action must be fought to a conclusion and either won
or lost with the forces at hand (JP 1-02). The unit’s mission is what usually
results in the acceptance of decisive engagement rather than the unit’s
physical ability to extricate itself. For example, a unit might become
decisively engaged to hold key terrain, defeat a specific enemy force, or secure
a specific objective. Less common is a defender’s decisive engagement as a
result of being placed in a position of disadvantage by an attacker.

2-6
 Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

DEFEAT IN DETAIL
2-16. Defeat in detail is achieved by concentrating overwhelming
combat power against separate parts of a force rather than defeating
the entire force at once. A smaller force can use this technique to achieve
success against a larger enemy. Defeat in detail can occur sequentially (de-
feat of separate elements one at a time in succession). For example, a com-
mander can mass overwhelming combat power effects against an enemy
element outside the supporting distance of the rest of the enemy force. This
allows the commander to destroy the targeted enemy element before it can be
effectively reinforced.

FLANKS
2-17. Flanks are the right
or left limits of a unit. For
a stationary unit, they are ENEMY LOCATION
designated in terms of an TEAM TEAM
enemy’s actual or expected LEFT FLANK RIGHT FLANK
location. (See Figure 2-2.)
For a moving unit, they are
defined by the direction of
movement. (See Figure 2-3.)
The commanders tries to
deny the enemy opportuni- BP 74
ties to engage his flanks be-
cause a force cannot concen-
trate as much direct fire on
the flanks as it can to the
front. Commanders seek to
engage enemy flanks for the
same reason. Figure 2-2. Flanks of a Stationary Unit

2-18. An assailable flank

is exposed to attack or
envelopment. It usually re-
sults from the terrain, the
weakness of forces, technical
DIRECTION
capability of the opponent TEAM OF
TEAM
(vertical envelopment), or a LEFT FLANK RIGHT FLANK
MOVEMENT
gap between adjacent units.
If one flank rests on highly
restrictive terrain and the
other flank is on open ter-
rain, the latter is immedi-
ately recognized as the as-
sailable flank for a heavy
ground force. The flank on
the restrictive terrain may Figure 2-3. Flanks of an Armor-Heavy Team
be assailable for a light Moving in an Echelon Right Formation
force. Sufficient room must exist for the attacking force to maneuver for the
flank to be assailable. A unit may not have an assailable flank if both flanks

2-7
FM 3-90

link into other forces. When a commander has an assailable flank, he may at-
tempt to refuse it by using various techniques, such as supplementary posi-
tions.
2-19. A flanking position is a geographical location on the flank of a
force from which effective fires can be placed on that flank. An attack-
ing commander maneuvers to occupy flanking positions against a defending
force to place destructive fires directly against enemy vulnerabilities. A
defending commander maneuvers to occupy flanking positions on the flanks
of a hostile route of advance for the same reason. A flanking position that an
advancing enemy can readily avoid has little value to the defender unless the
enemy does not realize it is occupied.

MANEUVER
2-20. Maneuver is the employment of forces on the battlefield through move-
ment in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of ad-
vantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission (JP 1-02).
Maneuver creates and exposes enemy vulnerabilities to the massed effects of
friendly combat power. A commander employs his elements of combat power
in symmetrical and asymmetrical ways so as to attain positional advantage
over an enemy and be capable of applying those massed effects.

MUTUAL SUPPORT
2-21. Mutual support is that support which units render to each other
against an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to
each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities (JP 1-02). Mu-
tual support exists between two or more positions when they support one
another by direct or indirect fire, thus preventing the enemy from attacking
one position without being fired on from one or more adjacent positions. That
same relationship applies to units moving with relation to each other, except
they can maneuver to obtain positional advantage to achieve that support. It
is normally associated with fire and movement (maneuver), although it can
also relate to the provision of CS and CSS.
2-22. In the defense, the commander selects tactical positions to achieve the
maximum degree of mutual support. Mutual support increases the strength
of defensive positions, prevents the enemy from attempting to defeat the at-
tacking friendly forces in detail, and helps prevent infiltration. In the offense,
the commander maneuvers his forces to ensure a similar degree of support
between attacking elements.

OPERATION
2-23. An operation is a military action or the carrying out of a strategic,
tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission (JP 1-02). It
includes the process of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing those
offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations needed to gain the
objectives of any engagement, battle, major action, or campaign. It also
includes activities that enable the performance of full spectrum operations,
such as security, reconnaissance, and troop movement.

2-8
 Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

PIECEMEAL COMMITMENT
2-24. Piecemeal commitment is the immediate employment of units in
combat as they become available instead of waiting for larger ag-
gregations of units to ensure mass, or the unsynchronized employ-
ment of available forces so that their combat power is not employed
effectively. Piecemeal commitment subjects the smaller committed forces to
defeat in detail and prevents the massing and synchronizing of combat power
with following combat and CS elements. However, piecemeal commitment
may be advantageous to maintain momentum and to retain or exploit the ini-
tiative. A commander may require piecemeal commitment of a unit to rein-
force a faltering operation, especially if the commitment of small units pro-
vide all of the combat power needed to avert disaster. The “pile-on” technique
associated with search and attack operations employs the piecemeal commit-
ment of troops. (See Chapter 5 for a discussion of search and attack opera-
tions.)

RECONSTITUITON
2-25. Reconstitution is those actions that commanders plan and implement to
restore units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with
mission requirements and available resources. Reconstitution operations
include regeneration and reorganization (FM 4-100.9). Reconstitution is a
total process. It is not solely a CSS operation, though CSS plays an integral
role. The commander conducts reconstitution when one of his subordinate
units becomes combat ineffective or when he can raise its combat effec-
tiveness closer to the desired level by shifting available resources. Besides
normal support actions, reconstitution may include—
· Removing the unit from combat.
· Assessing it with external assets.
· Reestablishing the chain of command.
· Training the unit for future operations.
· Reestablishing unit cohesion.
2-26. Reconstitution transcends normal day-to-day force sustainment actions.
However, it uses existing systems and units to do so. No resources exist solely
to perform reconstitution. (See FM 4-100.9.)

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
2-27. Rules of engagement (ROE) are directives issued by competent military
authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which
United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with
other forces encountered (JP 1-02). Operational requirements, policy, and law
define the commander’s ROE. Rules of engagement impact on how a com-
mander conducts his operations in all four types of military operations by im-
posing political, practical, operational, and legal limitations on his actions.
They may extend to criteria for initiating engagements with certain weapon
systems, such as employing unobserved indirect fires within the echelon rear
area, or reacting to an attack. They always recognize the right of self-defense
and the commander’s right and obligation to protect assigned personnel.
CJCSI 3121.01A establishes the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s standing ROE.

2-9
FM 3-90

Operational level commanders modify those standing ROE as necessary in

response to the factors of METT-TC.

SUPPORTING DISTANCE
2-28. Supporting distance is the distance between two units that can be
traveled in time for one to come to the aid of the other. For small units, it is
the distance between two units that can be covered effectively by their fires
(FM 3-0). Supporting distance is a factor of combat power, dispositions, com-
munications capability, and tactical mobility of friendly and enemy forces.

SUPPORTING RANGE
2-29. Supporting range is the distance one unit may be geographically
separated from a second unit, yet remain within the maximum range of the
second unit’s indirect fire weapons systems. (FM 3-0). Major factors that af-
fect supporting range are terrain relief, the range of the supporting unit’s
weapon systems, and their locations in relation to the supported unit’s posi-
tion.

TACTICAL MOBILITY
2-30. Tactical mobility is the ability to move rapidly from one part of
the battlefield to another, relative to the enemy. Tactical mobility is a
function of cross-country mobility, firepower, and protection. The terrain, soil
conditions, and weather affect cross-country mobility. Heavy ground maneu-
ver units have good tactical mobility—except in restrictive terrain—combined
with firepower and protection. They can move on the battlefield against most
enemy forces unless faced with an enemy who can defeat their protection and
cannot be suppressed by friendly fires. Light ground maneuver units have a
tactical mobility advantage against enemy heavy forces in restrictive terrain,
but limited firepower and protection. Army aviation maneuver units have
good tactical mobility in most types of terrain, good firepower, but limited
protection. Extreme weather conditions can restrict the tactical mobility of
Army aviation units.

BASIC TACTICAL GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES

2-31. This section establishes basic tactical graphic control measures common
to offensive and defensive operations. The appropriate chapters of this man-
ual discuss those graphic control measures that apply to only one type of mili-
tary operation. For example, Chapter 3 discusses the objective as a basic of-
fensive control measure since an objective is a graphic control measure that
applies only to offensive operations. These graphics apply to both automated
and hand-drawn graphic displays or overlays. This section portrays control
measures for use on situation maps, overlays, and annotated aerial photo-
graphs. They are also the standard for all simulations, to include those used
in live, virtual, and constructive environments.
2-32. Units conducting tactical operations must have clearly defined tasks
and responsibilities. The commander uses control measures to establish speci-
fic responsibilities that prevent units from impeding one another and impose
necessary restrictions. Control measures can be permissive (which allows

2-10
 Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

something to happen) or restrictive

(which limits how something is Basic Tactical Graphic
done). Control measures may be Control Measures
graphical, such as boundaries, or · Air corridor and air control points
procedural, such as target engage- · Area of operations and boundaries
ment priorities. A commander · Assembly areas
should establish only the minimum · Checkpoint
control measures necessary to pro- · Contact point
vide essential coordination and de- · Critical friendly zones
confliction between units. Control · Direct fire control measures
measures must not unduly restrict · Deep, close, and rear areas
subordinates in accomplishing their · Engagement area
missions. The commander removes · Fire support coordination measures
restrictive control measures as soon · Fire support targets
as possible. FM 1-02 discusses the · Forward line of own troops
rules for drawing control measures · Line of contact
on overlays and maps. · Named area of interest
2-33. Well-conceived control meas- · Obstacle control measures
ures facilitate the conduct of cur- · Phase lines
rent and future operations. The · Position areas for artillery
commander adjusts his control · Routes
measures as necessary to maintain · Targeted area of interest
synchronization and ensure mission
accomplishment as the tactical situation evolves. He balances the risk of in-
troducing additional friction into the operation with the benefits gained by
changing them if all of his subordinate elements do not receive the new con-
trol measures when contemplating changes to previously established control
measures.
2-34. Control measures apply to all forces: combat, CS, and CSS. The com-
mander ensures all higher-echelon control measures, such as phase lines
(PLs) and checkpoints, are incorporated into his graphic control measures.
When he reports to higher headquarters, he references only the control meas-
ures established by that headquarters.

AIR CORRIDOR AND AIR CONTROL POINTS

2-35. An air corridor is a restricted air route of travel specified for use by
friendly aircraft and established for the purpose of preventing friendly
aircraft from being fired on by friendly forces (JP 1-02). It is used to deconflict
artillery firing positions with aviation traffic. Low-level transit routes,
minimum-risk routes, standard use army aircraft flight routes, and UAV
routes are types of air corridors. An air corridor always includes air control
points. An air control point (ACP) is an easily identifiable point on the terrain
or an electronic navigational aid used to provide necessary control during air
movement. ACPs are generally designated at each point where the flight
route or air corridor makes a definite change in direction and at any other
point deemed necessary for timing or control of the operation (FM 3-52).
(Figure 2-4 on page 2-12 depicts a generic air corridor and ACPs. See FM 3-52
for more information on aerial control measures.)

2-11
FM 3-90

AREA OF OPERATIONS AND BOUNDARIES

2-36. An AO is the basic
BIRDMAN
Name: _________
control measure for all 200m
Width: _________
types of operations. An ACP 50ft AGL
Min Alt: ________
area of operations is an op- 1 Max Alt: 500ft AGL
________
erational area defined by

BI
the joint force commander

RD
for land and naval forces.
ACP
Areas of operations do not

MA
3
typically encompass the A N
IR D M

N
entire operational area of
the joint force commander,
ACP B
2
but should be large enough
for component command- Figure 2-4. Generic Air Corridor
ers to accomplish their
missions and protect their forces (JP 1-02). The joint force land component
commander (JFLCC) or the Army service component command (ASCC)
commander will in turn assign their subordinates their own AOs. Those
subordinates will further assign their subordinates AOs down to the battalion
or company level based on the factors of METT-TC. A unit assigned an AO,
the owning unit, may not change control measures imposed by a higher
headquarters within their AO. However, it may establish additional control
measures to coordinate and synchronize its operations.
2-37. Assigning an AO to a subordi-
An avenue of approach is
nate headquarters maximizes decen-
the air or ground route
tralized execution by empowering
leading to an objective (or
subordinate commanders to use their
key terrain in its path) that
own initiative to accomplish their
an attacking force can use.
assigned missions. This encourages
the use of mission command. (See FM 6-0 for a discussion of mission com-
mand.) At the same time it adds the responsibilities listed in Paragraph 2-40
below to the lower headquarters. Conversely, failure to designate subordinate
AOs maximizes centralized execution and limits the subordinates’ tactical
options. The latter choice should be made only when mandated by the factors
of METT-TC. For example, a brigade commander responsible for blocking an
enemy advance along a single avenue of approach may assign his subordinate
battalions battle positions to support a brigade engagement area (EA) instead
of subdividing his AO and the avenue of approach into battalion AOs.
2-38. A higher headquarters designates an AO using boundaries. It normally
assigns an AO to a maneuver unit, but it may also assign one to CS or CSS
units. Having an AO assigned both restricts and facilitates the movement of
units and use of fires. It restricts units not assigned responsibility for the AO
from moving through the AO. It also restricts outside units from firing into or
allowing the effects of its fires to affect the AO. Both of these restrictions can
be relaxed through coordination with the owning unit. It facilitates the move-
ment and fires of the unit assigned responsibility for, or owning, the AO. The
assigned AO must encompass enough terrain for the commander to accom-
plish his mission and protect his forces.

2-12
 Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

2-39. Ideally, the AO is smaller than the commander’s area of influence. An

area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly cap-
able of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally
under the commander’s command or control (JP 1-02). If the commander’s
area of influence is smaller than his AO, he must consider his options for ex-
tending the size of his area of influence. His options include the following
techniques:
· Changing the geographical dispositions of his current systems to in-
crease the size of his area of influence and ensure coverage of key
areas, installations, and systems.
· Requesting additional assets.
· Requesting boundary adjustments to reduce the size of his AO.
· Accepting the increased risk associated with being unable to provide
security throughout the AO.
· Moving his area of influence by phases to sequentially encompass the
entire AO.
2-40. All units assigned an AO have the following responsibilities:
· Terrain management.
· Movement control.
· Fires.
· Security.
Selected echelons have an additional responsibility to provide airspace com-
mand and control.

Terrain Management
2-41. The commander assigned an AO is responsible for terrain management
within its boundaries. A higher headquarters may dictate that another unit
position itself within a subordinate unit’s AO, but the commander assigned
the AO retains final approval authority for the exact placement. This ensures
the unit commander controlling the AO knows what units are in his AO and
where they are located so that he can deconflict operations, control move-
ment, and prevent fratricide. Only the owning commander assigns subordi-
nate unit boundaries within the AO.

Movement Control
2-42. Units may not move across boundaries into another unit’s AO without
receiving clearance from the unit owning the AO. Once assigned an AO, the
owning unit controls movement throughout the AO. The designation, mainte-
nance, route security, and control of movement along routes within an AO are
the responsibility of the owning unit unless the higher echelon’s coordinating
instructions direct otherwise. The commander may designate movement
routes as open, supervised, dispatch, reserved, or prohibited. Each route’s
designation varies based on the factors of METT-TC. FM 4-01.30 discusses
movement planning and control measures.

2-13
FM 3-90

Fires
2-43. Within its AO, the owning unit may employ any direct or indirect fire
system without receiving further clearance from superior headquarters.
There are three exceptions: The first and most common is that a unit may not
use munitions within its own AO without receiving appropriate clearance if
the effects of those munitions extend beyond its AO. For example, if a unit
wants to use smoke, its effects cannot cross boundaries into another AO
unless cleared with the adjacent owning unit. Second, higher headquarters
may explicitly restrict the use of certain munitions within an AO or parts of
an AO, such as long-duration scatterable mines. Third, higher headquarters
may impose a restrictive fire support coordinating measure (FSCM) within an
AO to protect some asset or facility, such as a no-fire area around a camp
housing dislocated civilians. These FSCM tend to be linear in nature in a con-
tiguous AO while they are more likely areas in a noncontiguous AO.
2-44. The commander may not employ indirect fires across boundaries with-
out receiving clearance from the unit into whose AO the fires will impact. He
may employ direct fires across boundaries without clearance at specific point
targets that are clearly and positively identified as enemy.

Security
2-45. The security of all units operating within the AO is the responsibility of
the owning commander. This fact does not require that commander to con-
duct area security operations throughout his AO. (See Chapter 12 for a dis-
cussion of area security responsibilities.) He must prevent surprise and pro-
vide the amount of time necessary for all units located within the AO to
effectively respond to enemy actions by employing security forces around
those units. If the commander cannot or chooses not to provide security
throughout his AO, he must clearly inform all concerned individuals of when,
where, and under what conditions he is not going to exercise this function.
The commander generally depicts these locations using permissive FSCM.
Each unit commander remains responsible for his unit’s local security.

Airspace Command and Control

2-46. Army airspace command and control (A2C2) are those actions that en-
sure the synchronized use of airspace and enhanced command and control of
forces using airspace (FM 3-52). The ground maneuver commander manages
the airspace below the coordinating altitude, using procedural control meas-
ures and positive control measures implemented by his air traffic service or-
ganization. Corps and divisions are the echelons that routinely have A2C2
responsibilities, although a commander may provide the resources to accom-
plish this function to a brigade operating independently.
2-47. Communications, standardized procedures, and liaison normally pro-
vide the commander with his required connectivity with the theater airspace
control authority. The commander ensures reliable communications through
his area communications network. He supervises airspace activities through
standardized procedures to prevent real-time conflicts among the various air-
space users while achieving the necessary flexibility to ensure the greatest
combat effectiveness. The A2C2 section of the battlefield coordination detach-
ment, co-located with the joint air operations center, provides the commander

2-14
 Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

that liaison capability with the airspace control authority (ACA). (See
FM 3-52 and JP 3-52 for additional information regarding airspace control
doctrine.)
2-48. The vertical dimension, or airspace, of the AO is inherently permissive
because all branches and services require the use of airspace. There are pro-
cedural and positive airspace control measures (ACM) available to synchro-
nize military operations in the airspace above the AO. Among the procedural
ACM is the coordinating altitude, which separates fixed- and rotary-wing air-
craft by determining an altitude below which fixed-wing aircraft will norm-
ally not fly and above which rotary-wing aircraft will normally not fly. It al-
lows the ground commander to use the airspace above his AO for his organic
aviation assets to complement ground maneuver forces, but it is not a bound-
ary for which he has responsibility. The ACA, normally the joint force air
component commander, must establish the coordinating altitude, promulgate
it through the airspace control plan, address it in the airspace control order,
and include a buffer zone for small altitude deviations. Coordinating altitudes
are permissive ACM.

Boundaries
2-49. A boundary is a line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of
facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent
units, formations, or areas (JP 0-2). The commander uses graphic control
measures to define the limits of an AO and, as such, establish ground forces’
responsibilities. He uses ACM to control the vertical dimension. The com-
mander bases his subordinates’ boundaries on clearly defined terrain fea-
tures. This requirement is less important if all units in the AO have precision
navigation capabilities. Boundaries should not split roads, rivers, or railways.
Responsibility for an avenue of approach and key terrain should belong to
only one unit. The commander adjusts his boundaries as necessary in re-
sponse to the evolving tactical situation. Any areas not delegated to a subord-
inate remain the responsibility of the commander.

Contiguous and Noncontiguous AOs

2-50. A commander has a contiguous AO when all of his subordinate
forces’ areas of operations share one or more common boundaries. A
commander has a noncontiguous AO when one or more of his sub-
ordinate forces’ areas of operations do not share a common bound-
ary. The intervening area between noncontiguous AOs remains the respon-
sibility of the higher headquarters. The commander can choose to organize
his AO so that his subordinates have contiguous or noncontiguous areas of
operations.
2-51. The forward boundary of an echelon is primarily designated to divide
responsibilities between it and its next higher echelon. Decisive or shaping
operations directed against enemy forces beyond an echelon’s forward bound-
ary are the responsibility of the next higher echelon. The higher echelon
headquarters normally assigns the lower echelon a forward boundary based
on the higher echelon’s scheme of maneuver. The ability to acquire and attack
targets in the area between the forward boundary of its subordinates and the
echelon’s forward boundary determines the exact position of that forward

2-15
FM 3-90

boundary. For example, if a division assigns a forward boundary to a brigade,

then the division conducts operations beyond the brigade’s forward boundary.
That area between the brigade’s forward boundary and the division’s forward
boundary is the division’s deep area. The rear boundary defines the rearward
limits of the unit’s area. It usually also defines the start of the next echelon’s
rear area. Lateral boundaries extend from the rear boundary to the unit’s
forward boundary. (See Figure 2-5.)

CORPS FORWARD BOUNDARY

XXX

CORPS LATERAL BOUNDARIES

CORPS DEEP AREA

DIVISION FORWARD BOUNDARIES

BRIGADE
FORWARD XX XX
BOUNDARIES DIVISION DEEP DIVISION DEEP BRIGADE
AREA AREA SECURITY
X AREAS
X X X X
X X
X
FEBA
DIVISION BRIGADE
FEBA
CLOSE LATERAL
CORPS

XXX
DIVISION
X LATERAL X
xx
XXX

AREA X BOUNDARY
BOUNDARIES CLOSE
X X AREA
X X X X
II DIVISION DIVISION
RESERVE REAR
DIVISION REAR AREA AREA BRIGADE
REAR
xx xx BOUNDARIES
CORPS
DIVISION REAR BOUNDARIES
REAR BOUNDARY
CORPS REAR AREA
XXX

Figure 2-5. Corps with Contiguous Areas of Operations

2-52. The commander bases his decision to establish contiguous AOs on his
analysis of the factors of METT-TC. Units with contiguous AOs are normally
within supporting distance of one another and may be within supporting
range. Other reasons why a commander establishes contiguous AOs include—
· Limited size of the AO in relation to the number of friendly forces.
· Decisive points in close physical proximity to each other.
· Political boundaries or enemy force concentrations require establishing
contiguous AOs.
· Reduced risk of being defeated in detail because of an incomplete op-
erational picture or when the friendly force is significantly outnum-
bered.
· Greater concentration of combat power along a single avenue of
approach or movement corridor.

2-16
 Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

2-53. A noncontiguous AO does not have distinctive forward, rear, and lateral
boundaries. It is established by a boundary that encloses the entire area.
Subordinate boundaries will be continuous, 360-degree arcs that closely ap-
proximate the subordinate unit’s area of influence. For example, the com-
mander would normally place a noncontiguous brigade boundary at the limit
of observed fires for its security forces. Because noncontiguous boundaries
must provide all-around security, they generally allow for less concentration
of combat power along a single axis. A brigade, division, or corps commander
who establishes noncontiguous AOs for his subordinates still designates an
echelon rear area. Battle positions are not AOs since a unit is not restricted
from operating outside its battle position. A commander who deploys his sub-
ordinates into battle positions is not conducting noncontiguous operations.
Chapter 8 defines a battle position.
2-54. Operations directed against enemy forces and systems outside a non-
contiguous AO are the responsibility of the organization that owns that loca-
tion. For example, in Figure 2-6 the middle enemy division is the corps’ re-
sponsibility since it is not within either of the corps’ two divisions’ AOs.

SPT
SPT
SPT DAG
III
DAG III
III
X DAG III III
III
X III
X

II III
X
II

II III II

X
II X
X
XX

II
X
X

X X
X

X
X
SPF II
X
SPF
XXX

SPF
DIVISION X DSA
AO DIVISION
ROUTE C

AO
CORPS
SPF
JSOA X
{

AO
{

BLACK XX
X X
X X
LARK

SPT (-) SPF

SPT (-)
RO
UT
EL SPF
EW
SPF IS
SPF
CORPS
DIVISION SPF REAR
REAR
X AREA
AREA III
CORPS MP
RESERVE

Figure 2-6. Corps with Noncontiguous Areas of Operations

2-55. The commander bases his decision to establish noncontiguous AOs on

his analysis of the factors of METT-TC. There is a risk associated with estab-
lishing noncontiguous AOs since units with noncontiguous AOs are normally
out of supporting range from each other. Overcoming this risk places a pre-
mium on situational understanding and tactical mobility. Reasons why a
commander establishes noncontiguous AOs include—
· Encompassing key and decisive terrain within his area of influence
when he has limited numbers of friendly forces for the size of the AO.
Key terrain is any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of
which affords a marked advantage to either combatant.

2-17
FM 3-90

Decisive terrain, when present, is key terrain whose seizure

and retention is mandatory for successful mission accomplish-
ment.
· Comparative weakness of the enemy means that subordinates do not
have to remain within supporting range or distance of one another and
can take advantage of superior situational understanding and tactical
mobility.
· Enemy concentrated in dispersed areas requires a corresponding con-
centration of friendly forces.
· Existence of large contaminated areas within his AO.
2-56. Using noncontiguous AOs place a premium on the use of innovative
means to conduct sustaining operations, including aerial resupply. A com-
mander whose subordinates have noncontiguous AOs has three basic choices
for establishing intermittent ground lines of communications (LOCs) with his
subordinates:
· Assign a subordinate the mission of providing convoy security for each
convoy. For the situation depicted in Figure 2-7, the corps could assign
the corps military police brigade the mission of providing convoy
security for critical ground convoys traveling between the corps rear
area and each division’s rear area.
· Assign a subordinate the mission of providing route security for each
sustainment route. For the situation depicted in Figure 2-7 the corps
could assign the corps armored cavalry regiment an AO that extends
four kilometers on either side of LOCs LEWIS and CLARK. The regi-
ment would be assigned the mission of route security within that AO
for the period required for sustainment convoys to travel to and from
the two subordinate divisions.
· Assume risk by having the corps support command run convoys with
only their organic self-defense capabilities, while assigning another
unit the mission of responding to enemy contacts beyond a convoy’s
self-defense capability.

ASSEMBLY AREAS
2-57. An assembly area (AA) is an area a unit occupies to prepare for
an operation. Ideally, an assembly area provides—
· Concealment from air and ground observation.
· Cover from direct fire.
· Space for dispersion; separate each AA by enough distance from other
AAs to preclude mutual interference.
· Adequate entrances, exits, and internal routes.
· Good drainage and soil conditions that can sustain the movement of the
unit’s vehicles and individual soldiers.
· Terrain masking of electromagnetic signatures.
· Terrain allowing observation of ground and air avenues into the AA.
· Sanctuary from enemy medium-range artillery fires because of its
location outside the enemy’s range.

2-18
 Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

2-58. The commander assigns each unit its own AA. In Figure 2-7, the ex-
ample of multiple units occupying one AA is a graphical shortcut taken when
the map scale would make depiction of multiple assembly areas unreadable.
In reality, the commander would subdivide AA Thomas into two smaller AAs,
one for each unit. A unit AA is normally within the AO of another unit. An
AA area is usually treated as a noncontiguous AO. This means that a unit has
the same responsibilities within its assigned AA as it has for any other AO.

AA MEADE II
II 3 68 AA ORD
3 68

OCCUPIED OCCUPIED

{
II
3 68 AA HANCOCK
AA THOMAS
II 3 68
2 13

OCCUPIED BY MULTIPLE UNITS PROPOSED/ON ORDER

Figure 2-7. Assembly Areas

2-59. The proper location of AAs contributes significantly to both security and
flexibility. It should facilitate future operations so movement to subsequent
positions can take place smoothly and quickly by concealed routes. Because of
their smaller signature, light units can use AAs closer to the enemy than
heavy units without excessive risk of enemy detection. The tactical mobility of
heavy units allows them to occupy AAs at a greater distance from the line of
departure (LD) than light units.

CHECKPOINT
2-60. A checkpoint is a predetermined

CP 13
point on the ground used to control move-
ment, tactical maneuver, and orientation.
Units can also use a checkpoint as a fire control
measure in lieu of the preferred control meas-
ure, a target reference point. Checkpoints are
useful for orientation. Units may use check-
points to supplement or as substitutes for phase
lines (PLs). They are also used in the conduct of
CSS. Figure 2-8 depicts Checkpoint 13. Figure 2-8. Checkpoint 13

2-19
FM 3-90

CONTACT POINT
2-61. A contact point is an easily identi-
fiable point on the terrain where two or
more ground units are required to make
physical contact. A commander establishes a
contact point where a PL crosses a lateral
071830Z
FEB02 8
boundary or on other identifiable terrain as a
technique to ensure coordination between two
units. He provides a date-time group to
indicate when to make that physical contact. Figure 2-9. Contact Point 8
Figure 2-9 depicts Contact Point 8.
2-62. The mutual higher commander of two moving units normally desig-
nates the location of contact points and times of contact. When one unit is sta-
tionary, its commander normally designates the location of the contact point
and the meeting time, and transmits this information to the commander of
the moving unit.

CRITICAL FRIENDLY ZONE

2-63. A critical friendly zone (CFZ) is an area, usually a friendly unit
or location, that the maneuver commander designates as critical to
the protection of an asset whose loss would seriously jeopardize the
mission. The exact size and shape of the CFZ reflects the technical charac-
teristics of the sensor coverage and varies in accordance with the terrain.
There is no specific graphic for a CFZ. The designation of a CFZ requires the
availability of a target acquisition sensor to cover that area and fire support
weapon systems to conduct counterfire. The supporting field artillery unit’s
automated fire support system is tied to that sensor to place the location of a
weapon firing into the CFZ ahead of all other targets in priority for
counterfire. This results in an immediate call for fire unless the system
operator manually overrides the automated request for fire. (For additional
information on the employment of a CFZ, see FM 3-09.12.)

DIRECT FIRE CONTROL MEASURES

2-64. The small unit commander communicates to his subordinates the
manner, method, and time to initiate, shift, and mass fires, and when to dis-
engage by using direct fire control measures. The commander should control
his unit’s fires so he can direct the engagement of enemy systems to gain the
greatest effect. The commander uses intelligence preparation of the battle-
field (IPB) and reconnaissance to determine the most advantageous way to
use direct fire control measures to mass the effects on the enemy and reduce
fratricide from direct fire systems. He must understand the characteristics of
weapon systems and available munitions (such as the danger to unprotected
soldiers when tanks fire discarding sabot ammunition over their heads or
near them). Direct fire control measures defined in this manual include
engagement criteria, engagement priorities, sectors of fire, and target
reference points. Platoon and company maneuver manuals address other
direct fire control measures, such as frontal, cross, or depth fire patterns and
simultaneous, alternating, or observed techniques of fire.

2-20
 Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

Engagement Area
2-65. An engagement area (EA) is an area where the commander in-
tends to contain and destroy an enemy force with the massed effects
of all available weapons and supporting systems. This includes organic
direct fire systems and supporting systems, such as close air support. Fig-
ure 2-10 depicts several EAs used within the context of a battalion defense.
The commander determines the size and shape of the EA by the relatively un-
obstructed intervisibility from the weapon systems in their firing positions
and the maximum range of those weapons. The commander designates EAs
to cover each enemy avenue of approach into his position. He also can use
them to designate known or suspected enemy locations. Once the commander
selects his EA, he arrays his forces in positions to concentrate overwhelming
effects into these areas. He routinely subdivides his EA into smaller EAs for
his subordinates using one or more target reference points or by prominent
terrain features. The commander assigns sectors of fires to subordinates to
prevent fratricide, but responsibility for an avenue of approach or key terrain
is never split. These sectors normally do not affect friendly maneuver. Com-
manders of units up to battalion task force size normally use this control
measure.

PL JOANN
DISENGAGEMENT
LINE EA
EA ALPHA OMEGA
+ +
NZ1542
I

NZ1540

+
I

TRIGGER
+
TRIGGER NZ1539 NZ1541
LINE/ LINE/
PL JAN PL PEGGY

I I

+
NZ1545

EA + NZ1543
TRIGGER LINE/
PL DICK

PHI
+ NZ1544
I

Figure 2-10. Engagement Areas

Engagement Criteria
2-66. Engagement criteria are protocols that specify those circum-
stances for initiating engagement with an enemy force. They may be
restrictive or permissive. For example, a company commander could tell his
1st Platoon to wait until three enemy tanks reach a target reference point

2-21
FM 3-90

within its EA before initiating fire. Another example is a battalion command-

er telling one of his company commanders not to engage an approaching en-
emy unit until it commits itself to an avenue of approach. The commander
establishes his engagement criteria in the direct fire plan. Commanders and
leaders of small tactical units use engagement criteria in conjunction with
engagement priorities and other direct fire control measures to mass fires
and control fire distribution.

Engagement Priority
2-67. Engagement priority specifies the order in which the unit en-
gages enemy systems or functions. The commander assigns engagement
priorities based on the type or level of threat at different ranges to match
organic weapon systems capabilities against enemy vulnerabilities. Engage-
ment priorities are situationally dependent. The commander uses engage-
ment priorities to distribute fires rapidly and effectively. Subordinate ele-
ments can have different engagement priorities. For example, the commander
establishes his engagement priorities so that his M2 Bradley fighting vehicles
engage enemy infantry fighting vehicles or armored personnel carriers while
his M1 Abrams tanks engage enemy tanks. Normally, units engage the most
dangerous targets first, followed by targets in depth.

Sector of Fire
2-68. A sector of fire is that
area assigned to a unit, a
crew-served weapon, or an ENCLOSED PRIMARY

individual weapon within SECTOR

SECTOR
OF FIRE
OF SECONDARY
which it will engage targets FIRE SECTOR OF FIRE

as they appear in accord-

ance with established en-
gagement priorities. (See
Figure 2-11.) Battalions and
smaller echelons primarily use SECTORS OF FIRE EXTENDING
this direct fire control measure. FROM FIRING POSITION
Each sector of fire can extend
from a firing position to the Figure 2-11. Sectors of Fire
maximum engagement range of
the weapon, or it can be an enclosed area at a distance from the firing
position. To increase the commander’s ability to concentrate fires in a certain
area, he should assign each unit or weapon system a primary sector of fire
and a secondary sector of fire. The primary sector of fire is that area in which
the assigned unit, individual, or crew-served weapon is initially responsible
for engaging and defeating the enemy. Fire shifts to the secondary sector, on
order, when there are no targets in the primary sector, or when the
commander needs to cover the movement of another friendly element. This
secondary sector of fire should correspond to another element’s primary
sector of fire to obtain mutual support. Subordinate commanders may impose
additional fire control measures as required.

2-22
 Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

Target Reference Point

2-69. A target reference point (TRP) is an
easily recognizable point on the ground,
such as a building or a road junction, used
in conjunction with engagement areas and
032
sectors of fire to initiate, distribute, and
control fires. A TRP may be a natural terrain
feature, a manmade artifact, such as a building,
or a marker emplaced by the unit. Maneuver
leaders at battalion and below designate TRPs to
define unit or individual sectors of fire and ob- Figure 2-12.
servation, usually within an EA. A TRP can also Target Reference Point
designate the center of an area where the com-
mander plans to rapidly distribute or converge fires. A task force commander
designates TRPs for his company teams. Company commanders designate
TRPs for their platoons, sections, and, in some cases, individual weapons.
Platoon leaders or subordinate leaders may designate additional TRPs for
their elements as necessary to control direct and indirect fires. The echelon
fire support officer can also designate TRPs as indirect fire targets by using
the standard target symbol with letters and numbers. Figure 2-12 depicts the
symbol for TRP 032.

Trigger Line
2-70. A trigger line is a
DIRECT-FIRE FIRE SUPPORT
phase line used to initiate TRIGGER TRIGGER
and mass fires into an LINE LINE
engagement area or an
objective at a predeter- ENY

mined range for all or like

weapon systems. It is loca- ENY
ted on identifiable terrain—
like all phase lines—that
DISTANCE THAT CAN BE CROSSED BY
crosses an EA, a direction of THE ENEMY BETWEEN THE TIME THAT
attack, or an axis of advance. INDIRECT FIRES ARE CALLED FOR
The commander can desig- AND WHEN INDIRECT FIRES IMPACT
nate one trigger line for all
weapon systems or separate
trigger lines for each weapon
Figure 2-13. Trigger Lines
or type of weapon system.
The commander specifies the engagement criteria for this specific situation.
The criteria may be either time- or event-driven, such as a certain number or
certain types of vehicles to cross the trigger line before initiating engagement.
He may reserve to himself the authority to initiate engagement by firing his
own weapon or giving the command to fire.
2-71. The commander designates a PL as the trigger line for his fire support
systems. He bases the trigger line’s location on the factors of METT-TC,
including such variables as the time of flight for artillery shells, positioning of
the guns, and the existence of quick-fire links. Its location varies from situa-
tion to situation. Its position reflects the distance that the enemy force is

2-23
FM 3-90

likely to traverse in the time it takes from when fires are requested to when
artillery rounds impact. (See Figure 2-13.) This gives time for the fire support
systems to respond to the initial call for fire. For example, in a desert envi-
ronment—a battalion task force commander’s fire support trigger line is ap-
proximately four kilometers beyond the point where he wants to engage the
enemy with indirect fires when he has M109A6 howitzers in direct support. It
is approximately six kilometers when he has M109A3 howitzers in direct sup-
port. The shorter distance reflects the more rapid response capabilities of the
M109A6 compared to the M109A3, all other factors being equal.
2-72. The commander can establish another trigger line for his most accurate
long-range weapon system in the vicinity of the area where the fire support
impacts to capitalize on the asymmetric attack. However, dust and debris
resulting from the artillery fire may prevent his direct-fire systems from
engaging the enemy. He establishes other trigger lines and TRPs for shorter-
range systems. He may give guidance to extremely proficient crews to engage
the enemy at longer than normal ranges or give them different engagement
priorities than the rest of the force, such as giving priority to engaging air de-
fense or engineer-breaching systems. This could result in losing the effect
that the sudden application of massed fires has on an enemy.
2-73. When the enemy reaches these closer trigger lines, the commander es-
tablishes a decision point to help him determine if he wants his longer-range
systems to continue to fire in depth or to concentrate his fires on a single
point. Many factors impact his decision, most of which concern the enemy and
how he maneuvers and the effects of the defending force’s fires.

DEEP, CLOSE, AND REAR AREAS

2-74. There are times when the factors of METT-TC favor a spatial organi-
zation of the entire AO. Korea is an example of large numbers of enemy units
concentrated in numerous echelons on a contiguous front across the penin-
sula. The terrain and the capabilities and doctrine of allied units require the
use of a spatial organization. The commander conducts simultaneous deci-
sive, shaping, and sustaining operations within a context of deep, close, and
rear areas when this occurs. (See Figure 2-14.)

Deep Area
2-75. When designated, the deep area is an area forward of the close area
that commanders use to shape enemy forces before they are encountered or
engaged in the close area (FM 3-0). It extends from the subordinate’s forward
boundary to the forward boundary of the controlling echelon. Thus, the deep
area relates to the close area not only in terms of geography but also in terms
of purpose and time. The extent of the deep area depends on how far out the
force can acquire information and strike targets. Commanders may place
forces or employ effects in the deep area to conduct shaping operations. Some
of these operations may involve close combat. However, most ground maneu-
ver forces stay in the close area.
2-76. New weapon systems and advanced information technology continue to
increase the capability of Army forces to engage enemy forces in depth. In the
past, deep attacks aimed to slow and disrupt the advance of enemy forces.

2-24
 Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

Today, Army forces may engage enemy formations with precision fires at
substantial distances from the close area. This capability allows the
commander to employ greater depth and simultaneity of action than ever
before when conducting operations.

CORPS FORWARD BOUNDARY

XXX

CORPS LATERAL BOUNDARIES

CORPS DEEP AREA

DIVISION FORWARD BOUNDARIES

BRIGADE
FORWARD XX XX
BOUNDARIES DIVISION DEEP DIVISION DEEP BRIGADE
AREA AREA SECURITY
X AREAS
X X X X
X X
X
FEBA
DIVISION BRIGADE
FEBA
CLOSE LATERAL
CORPS

XXX
DIVISION
X LATERAL X
xx
XXX

AREA X BOUNDARY
BOUNDARIES CLOSE
X X AREA
X X X X
II DIVISION DIVISION
RESERVE REAR
DIVISION REAR AREA AREA BRIGADE
REAR
xx xx BOUNDARIES
CORPS
DIVISION REAR BOUNDARIES
REAR BOUNDARY
CORPS REAR AREA
XXX

Figure 2-14. Deep, Close, and Rear Areas

Close Area
2-77. When designated, the close area is where forces are in immediate con-
tact with the enemy and the fighting between the committed forces and
readily available tactical reserves of both combatants is occurring, or where
commanders envision close combat taking place. Typically, the close area
assigned to a maneuver force extends from its subordinates’ rear boundaries
to its own forward boundary (FM 3-0). Typically, the close area is where the
majority of close combat occurs. It also includes the activities of forces directly
supporting the fighting elements, such as direct support field artillery and
logistics elements. The close area is historically the only location where the
commander could conduct his decisive operation. One unit may conduct the
decisive operation, while another conducts shaping operations within a close
area. Division commanders whose AOs constitute the corps close area have
the option of designating their own deep, close, and rear areas. Figure 2-14
illustrates this option.

Rear Area
2-78. Unlike close and deep areas, a rear area can be designated by the
commander regardless of the organization of his AO into contiguous or

2-25
FM 3-90

noncontiguous subordinate AOs. When designated in the context of contig-

uous AOs, the rear area for any command extends from its rear boundary
forward to the rear boundary of the next lower level of command. This area is
provided primarily for the performance of support functions and is where the
majority of the echelon’s sustaining operations occur (FM 3-0). The command-
er designates an individual responsible for conducting his sustaining opera-
tions within the rear area after considering the factors of METT-TC. He pro-
vides that individual the necessary command and control resources to direct
the echelon’s sustaining operations. At the corps and division echelons, this is
the rear command post. Those operations include the following functions that
assure his command’s freedom of action and continuity of operations:
· Combat service support.
· Rear area and base security.
· Movement control throughout the AO.
· Terrain management throughout the AO.
· Infrastructure development.
That individual may be the corps deputy commander, assistant division com-
mander (support), or the forward support battalion commander depending on
the echelon.
2-79. Regardless of the specific sustaining operations performed by an or-
ganization occupying the rear area, its focus on other-than-combat operations
leaves it more vulnerable than combat organizations in close areas. Com-
manders may protect CS and CSS units and facilities in rear areas with com-
bat forces. Geography or other circumstances may cause the commander to
designate a noncontiguous rear area. This increases the challenge associated
with providing rear area security due to the physical separation from combat
units that would otherwise occupy a contiguous close area.
2-80. Between contiguous and noncontiguous AOs, the commander chooses
the battlefield organization best suited to the tactical situation. For example,
in an area defense the proximity of the enemy, the array and density of
friendly forces, and the requirement to protect sustaining functions allows
the commander to visualize decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations in
terms of discrete areas. In contrast, within the context of a search and attack
operation, the lack of information about the enemy, the need to block enemy
escape, the existence of noncontiguous rear areas, and the nature of the AO
may preclude organization of the battlefield into discrete close, deep, and rear
areas.

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATING MEASURES

2-81. Commanders assigned an AO employ FSCM to facilitate the rapid en-
gagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly
forces. Fire support coordinating measures are either permissive or restric-
tive. Boundaries are the basic FSCM. The fire support coordinator recom-
mends FSCM to the commander based on the commander’s guidance, location
of friendly forces, scheme of maneuver, and anticipated enemy actions. Once
the commander establishes FSCM, they are entered into or posted on all the
command’s displays and databases. (FM 3-09 explains the use of all FSCM in
more detail).

2-26
 Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

Permissive FSCM
2-82. The primary purpose of permissive measures is to facilitate the attack
of targets. Once they are established, further coordination is not required to
engage targets affected by the measures. Permissive FSCM include a
coordinated fire line, fire support coordination line, and free-fire area.
2-83. Coordinated Fire Line. A
coordinated fire line (CFL) is a
line beyond which conventional,
direct, and indirect surface fire CFL (1ST BDE)
support means may fire at any 080003Z
time within the boundaries of the FLOT FLOT
establishing headquarters without
additional coordination. The pur- 3X1 1X 2
pose of the CFL is to expedite the
surface-to-surface attack of tar-
gets beyond the CFL without co-
ordination with the ground com-
Figure 2-15. Coordinated Fire Line
mander in whose area the targets
are located (JP 3-09). Brigades or divisions usually establish a CFL, although
a maneuver battalion may establish one. It is located as close as possible to
the establishing unit without interfering with maneuver forces to open up the
area beyond to fire support. A higher echelon may consolidate subordinate
unit CFLs. If this occurs, any changes to the subordinate CFLs are co-
ordinated with the subordinate headquarters. (See Figure 2-15.)
2-84. Fire Support Coordination
Line. The fire support coordination line PL III CORPS FSCL
(FSCL) is a FSCM that is established and
IRON EFF 202100Z-270800 SEP
adjusted by appropriate land or
amphibious force commanders within
III (US)

their boundaries in consultation with

XXX
GCC

superior, subordinate, supporting, and

affected commanders. [See Figure 2-16.]
The FSCL facilitates the expeditious
attack of surface targets of opportunity
beyond the coordinating measure. A Figure 2-16. Fire Support
FSCL does not divide an area of opera- Coordination Line
tions by defining a boundary between
close and deep operations or a distinct area [JP 3-09 uses zone] for close air
support. The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapon
systems using any type of ammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond an
FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow neces-
sary reaction to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements attacking targets be-
yond the FSCL must ensure that the attack will not produce adverse effects
on, or to the rear of, the line. Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-
to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land or
amphibious force commander. The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain
features. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to
commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. In exceptional circum-
stances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack

2-27
FM 3-90

of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk
of fratricide and could waste limited resources (JP 3-09).
2-85. The commander designating a FSCL remains responsible for estab-
lishing the priority, effects, and timing of fires impacting beyond the FSCL.
Coordination for attacks beyond the FSCL is through the air tasking order.
The appropriate land or amphibious commander controls attacks short of the
FSCL. That commander uses the tactical air control system or the Army air-
ground system to control the execution of close air support (CAS).
2-86. Free-Fire Area. A free-fire area (FFA)
is a specific area into which any weapon
system may fire without additional coordina-
tion with the establishing headquarters
(JP 3-09). Normally, division or higher head- FFA
quarters establish a FFA on identifiable ter- 080800-082000ZJUL
rain. (See Figure 2-17.) 1CD

Restrictive FSCM
2-87. A restrictive FSCM prevents fires into
Figure 2-17. Free-Fire Area
or beyond the control measure without
detailed coordination. The primary purpose of restrictive measures is to
provide safeguards for friendly forces. Restrictive FSCM include an airspace
coordination area, no-fire area, restrictive fire area, and restrictive fire line.
Establishing a restrictive measure imposes certain requirements for specific
coordination before the engagement of those targets affected by the measure.
2-88. Airspace Coordination Area. The airspace coordination area (ACA)
is a three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area, established by the
appropriate ground commander, in which friendly aircraft are reasonably
safe from friendly surface fires. The airspace coordination area may be formal
or informal (JP 3-09.3). Time, space, or altitude separates aircraft and indi-
rect fire. The purpose of the ACA is to allow the simultaneous attack of tar-
gets near each other by fixed-wing aircraft and other fire support means.
Several techniques may be used in this role. The technique selected depends
on the time available, tactical situation, unit SOPs, and state of training.
(FM 3-52 defines ACM.)
2-89. The airspace control authority establishes formal ACAs at the request
of the appropriate ground commander. This is normally a separate brigade or
higher-echelon commander. Formal ACAs require detailed planning. The de-
sign of the ACA’s vertical and lateral limits allows freedom of action for air
and surface fire support for the greatest number of foreseeable targets.
2-90. The echelon fire support cell coordinates the location and extent of the
ACM with the A2C2) element and the fire direction center. It is located above
the target area as recommended by the air liaison element to the fire support
cell. The type of aircraft and the ordnance dictate the size of the area. Vital
information defining the formal ACA includes minimum and maximum
altitudes, a baseline designated by grid coordinates at each end, the width of
the ACA from either side of the baseline, and effective times. (See Fig-
ure 2-18.)

2-28
 Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

III
U
XX S
ED ACA 2A
LLI D
A X 2AD
II XX US MIN ALT: 400
III MAX ALT: 2700
EFF 080600-080630Z

2A
91 XX D D
7
CS 2A X
G X D
4M

Figure 2-18. A Formal Airspace Coordination Measure

2-91. The maneuver commander may establish informal ACAs. He may sep-
arate aircraft and surface fires by distance (lateral, altitude, or a combina-
tion) or by time. Lateral separation is effective for coordinating fires against
targets that are adequately separated by at least one kilometer from flight
routes to ensure aircraft protection from the effects of friendly fires. An ex-
ample of a lateral separation technique is: “Aircraft stay west of grid line 62.”
Altitude separation is effective for coordinating fires when aircraft remain
above indirect fire trajectories and their effects. This technique is effective
when aircrews and firing units engage the same or nearby targets. An ex-
ample of altitude separation is: “Aircraft remain above 3000 feet mean sea
level in quadrant northwest of grid PK7325.”
2-92. A combination of lateral and altitude separation is the most restrictive
technique for aircraft and may be required when aircraft must cross the gun
target line of a firing unit. Time separation requires the most detailed
coordination and may be required when aircraft must fly near indirect-fire
trajectories or ordnance effects. The commander must coordinate the timing
of surface fires with aircraft routing. This ensures that even though aircraft
and surface fires may occupy the same space, they do not do so at the same
time. Surface and air-to-ground fires should be synchronized. All timing for
surface fires will be based on a specific aircraft event time. Fire support
personnel and tactical air controllers should select the separation technique
that requires the least coordination without adversely affecting timely fires or
the aircrew’s ability to safely complete the mission.

2-29
FM 3-90

2-93. No-Fire Area. A no-fire area (NFA)

is a land area designated by the appropri-
ate commander into which fires or their ef-
fects are prohibited (JP 3-09). (See Fig-
ure 2-19.) A commander uses a NFA to pro-
tect independently operating elements,
such as forward observers and special op-
NFA
erating forces. He can also use it to protect 120800-122000ZJUL
friendly forces in the rear area and for hu- 25AD
manitarian reasons, such as preventing
the inadvertent engagement of displaced
civilian concentrations, or to protect
sensitive areas, such as cultural
monuments. There are two exceptions to Figure 2-19. No-Fire Area
this rule:
· The establishing headquarters may approve fires within the NFA on a
case-by-case mission basis.
· When an enemy force within a NFA engages a friendly force, the
friendly force may engage a positively identified enemy force to defend
itself.
2-94. Restrictive Fire Area. A restric-
tive fire area (RFA) is an area in which
specific restrictions are imposed and into
which fires that exceed those restrictions RFA
will not be delivered without coordination 3-68 Armor
with the establishing headquarters
071700-072000 JUL
(JP 3-09). (See Figure 2-20.) The purpose
2nd (St Lo) Bde
of the RFA is to regulate fires into an
OPORD 7-02
area according to the stated restrictions,
such as no unguided conventional or dud-
producing munitions. Maneuver battalion
Figure 2-20. Restrictive Fire Area
or larger ground forces normally establish
RFAs. On occasion, a company operating independently may establish a RFA.
Usually, it is located on identifiable terrain, by grid or by a radius (in meters)
from a center point. The restrictions on a RFA may be shown on a map or
overlay, or reference can be made to an operation order that contains the re-
strictions.
2-95. Restrictive Fire Line. A restrictive fire line (RFL) is a line established
between converging friendly surface forces that prohibits fires or their effects
across that line (JP 3-09). Both or only one of those converging may be
moving. Fires and their effects can cross a RFL when the event has been
coordinated with the establishing and affected organizations. The purpose of
the line is to prevent interference between converging friendly forces, such as
what occurs during a linkup operation. The next higher common commander
of the converging forces establishes the RFL. Located on identifiable terrain,
it is usually located closer to the stationary force—if there is one—than to the
moving force. Alternatively, the commander can use a RFL to protect
sensitive areas, such as cultural monuments. (See Figure 2-21.)

2-30
______________________________________ Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

FIRE SUPPORT TARGETS

2-96. In the fire support context, a
target is an area designated and PL STEELE PL STEELE
RFL (XVIII CORPS)
numbered for future firing RFL (XVIII CORPS)
(JP 1-02). There are graphic con- 121200Z JUL 121200Z JUL
trol measures for point targets, cir-
cular targets, rectangular targets,
and linear targets. Figure 2-22
depicts these symbols. The
commander designates fire support
targets using a two-letter and four-
Figure 2-21. Restrictive Fire Line
digit code established in field
artillery doctrine. He may group two or more targets for simultaneous
engagement. He may also attack individual targets and groups of targets in
series or in a predetermined sequence. When this occurs, it is referred to as a
series of targets.

A1B
AG1712 AG1712 AG1706

AG1709
AG1717

POINT
TARGET GROUP OF CIRCULAR
TARGETS TARGET

A1B

A2B AG1712 AG1706

AG1711
AG1723
AG1717 AG1201
AG7005 AG1744

SANTA FPF A/1-16FA

RECTANGULAR SERIES OF LINEAR TARGET

TARGET TARGETS

Figure 2-22. Targets

2-97. Doctrine classifies each fire support target as either a planned target or
a target of opportunity. Targets of opportunity are not planned in advance
and are engaged as they present themselves in accordance with established
engagement criteria and rules of engagement. Planned targets are ones on
which fires are prearranged, although the degree of this prearrangement may
vary.
2-98. Individually planned fire support targets may be further subdivided
into scheduled and on-call fires. Scheduled targets are planned targets on

2-31
FM 3-90__________________________________________________________________________________

which field artillery and other fire support assets deliver their fires in accord-
ance with a pre-established time schedule and sequence. On-call targets are
planned targets engaged in response to a request for fires rather than in ac-
cordance with an established time schedule. An on-call target requires less
reaction time than a target of opportunity. The degree of prearrangement for
the on-call target influences the reaction time from request to execution–the
greater the prearrangement, the faster the reaction time. Priority targets are
an example of on-call targets that have short reaction times since each prio-
rity target has a fire unit placed on it when it is not engaged in other fire mis-
sions. The final protective fires (FPF) of A Battery, 1st Battalion 16th Field
Artillery in Figure 2-22 is an example of a priority target. (See FM 3-09 for
additional information regarding fire support.)

FORWARD LINE OF OWN TROOPS

2-99. The forward line of own
troops (FLOT) is a line which
FLO T FLO T
indicates the most forward (FRIENDLY PRESENT FLOT)
positions of friendly forces in
any kind of military operation
at a specific time. The forward
(FRIENDLY PLANNED OR
line of own troops normally
ON ORDER FLOT)
identifies the forward location
of covering and screening forces
(JP 1-02). In the defense, it may
be beyond, at, or short of the
forward edge of the battle area
(FEBA), depending on the tacti- Figure 2-23. Forward Line of Own Troops
cal situation. (Chapter 9 de-
fines the FEBA with other defensive control measures.) It does not include
small, long-range reconnaissance assets and similar stay-behind forces.
Friendly forces forward of the FLOT may have a restrictive fire coordination
measure, such as an RFA, placed around them to preclude fratricide. Figure
2-23 depicts the symbol for the FLOT.
LINE OF CONTACT
2-100. The line of contact (LC)
TF 2-13
is a general trace delineating
the location where friendly
and enemy forces are engaged. LC
The commander designates the en- II
EN
emy side of the LC by the abbre- 2 13 Y

viation “ENY.” In the defense, a

ENY
LC is often synonymous with the LC
FLOT. In the offense, a LC is often
combined with the LD. Chapter 4
discusses the LD. Figure 2-24 de-
TF 2-13
picts the symbol for the LC.
Figure 2-24. Line of Contact

2-32
______________________________________ Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

NAMED AREA OF INTEREST

2-101. A named area of interest
(NAI) is the geographical area
where information that will
satisfy a specific information
requirement can be collected. NAI
NAIs are usually selected to cap-
ture indications of enemy courses
of action but also may be related to AUGUSTA
battlefield and environment condi-
tions. The commander tailors the
shape of the NAI symbol to the
actual area he wants observed,
rather than using a prescribed
shape. It is possible to redesignate Figure 2-25. Named Area of Interest
a NAI as a targeted area of interest
on confirmation of enemy activity within the area, allowing a commander to
mass the effects of his combat power on that area. Figure 2-25 depicts NAI
Augusta.

OBSTACLE CONTROL MEASURES

2-102. Obstacles are any obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, fix,
turn, or block the movement of an opposing force, and to impose additional
losses in personnel, time, and equipment on the opposing force. Obstacles can
exist naturally or can be manmade, or can be a combination of both (JP 1-02).
Obstacle control measures are specific measures that simplify the
granting of obstacle-emplacing authority while providing obstacle
control. They consist of—
· Zones.
· Belts.
· Groups.
· Restrictions.
Figure 2-26 on page 2-34 summarizes these graphic control measures. Unless
he is the senior land component commander within a theater of operations, a
commander assigned an AO does not have emplacement authority for other
than protective obstacles unless specifically granted the authority by a higher
headquarters.
2-103. Procedural measures include restricting specific obstacles by type,
munitions, or point locations in a verbal or written order. They also include
higher commanders tasking subordinate units to construct or execute specific
obstacles. These are known as directed or reserve obstacles and are specified
tasks found in the unit order. FM 3-34.1 discusses the detailed procedural
methods to both restrict and direct obstacle construction.

Obstacle Zones

2-104. An obstacle zone is a division-level command and control measure, nor-

mally done graphically, to designate specific land areas where lower echelons

2-33
FM 3-90__________________________________________________________________________________

are allowed to employ tactical obstacles (JP 1-02). Corps and division
commanders use them to grant obstacle-emplacement authority to brigades
(including armored cavalry regiments and other major subordinate units).
Obstacle zones are permissive, allowing brigades to place reinforcing obsta-
cles to support their scheme of maneuver without interfering with future op-
erations.

EM P LAC EM ENT
O BS TA C LE AU TH OR ITY
C O N T RO L G RA P H IC E XA M PL E
M EA SUR E FR O M TO

CORPS D IV Le tter A
De sign ation 2
ZONE
D IV BDE Effect G ra ph ic
O ption al

3
CORPS BDE 1 1
Nu m b er
De sign ation
B EL T D IV BDE 1

BDE TF
Effect Gra ph ic
No rm a l

D IV BDE 2 Letter O bstacle G roups

Design ation in a B elt
G RO U P BDE TF 2

1
CO E ffect Sy m bol is
TF TR P the G raphic
A B

O BST ACL E
RE STR ICTE D 52 ID
AR EA ANY 12 0900-
16 2400SepXX
(O R A )

1 - R are ly don e by corp s a nd divisio ns, bu t possible.

2 - D one only w he n d irecte d and integ ra te d w ith corps o r division fire p lans.

G raphic
E ffects
Sym bols D isrupt Fix Turn Block

Figure 2-26. Obstacle Control Measure Graphics

2-34
______________________________________ Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

2-105. If the obstacle zone encompasses the entire brigade AO, another
graphic is unnecessary. Commanders may designate the entire AO as an ob-
stacle zone, with the unit boundaries defining the geographical limits of the
zone. Obstacle zones do not cross brigade boundaries. Commanders assign ob-
stacle zones to a single subordinate unit to ensure unity of effort, just as they
would when assigning defensive AOs or battle positions. This keeps tactical
obstacle responsibility along the same lines as control of direct and indirect
fires. This does not normally create vulnerabilities on the boundary between
units since the commander bases his assignment of both subordinate AOs and
obstacle zones on defined avenues of approach.
2-106. A commander does not normally assign an obstacle effect (block, fix,
turn, or disrupt) to an obstacle zone. This allows his subordinate commanders
flexibility in using obstacles. The commander should establish construction
and resourcing priorities between different obstacle zones.

Obstacle Belts
2-107. An obstacle belt is a brigade-level command and control measure,
normally given graphically, to show where within an obstacle zone the
ground tactical commander plans to limit friendly obstacle employment and
focus the defense (JP 1-02). It assigns an intent to the obstacle plan and
provides the necessary guidance on the overall effect of obstacles within a
belt. They plan obstacle belts within assigned obstacle zones to grant
obstacle-emplacement authority to their major subordinate units. Obstacle
belts also focus obstacles to support the brigade scheme of maneuver and
ensure that obstacles do not interfere with the maneuver of any higher
headquarters.
2-108. Obstacle belts are restrictive, but also direct a subordinate unit to con-
struct one or more obstacles to achieve an effect in the area. They do not spe-
cify the type or number of obstacles. Obstacle belts do not cross unit bound-
aries for the same reasons as discussed in obstacle zones. A single unit is re-
sponsible for a belt; however, a commander may assign more than one belt to
a unit.
2-109. A brigade commander normally assigns an obstacle effect and priority
to each obstacle belt. As with the obstacle zone, the target and relative loca-
tion are apparent. Adding a specific obstacle effect gives purpose and direc-
tion to battalion task force obstacle planning. When brigade commanders
assign an obstacle effect, they ensure that obstacles within the belt comple-
ment the brigade fire plan.
2-110. A corps, division, or brigade commander may authorize emplacement
authority for certain types of protective obstacles outside of obstacle zones or
belts. Normally, the commander authorizes company team and base com-
manders to emplace protective obstacles within 500 meters of their positions,
depending on the factors of METT-TC. The commander usually limits the
types of obstacles a unit may use for protective obstacles that are outside of
obstacle-control measures. For example, he may allow only wire- and
command-detonated mines outside of control measures for protective obsta-
cles. Furthermore, he may require that minefields be fenced on all sides to

2-35
FM 3-90__________________________________________________________________________________

prevent fratricide, after obtaining legal guidance concerning current rules

and policies.

Obstacle Groups
2-111. Obstacle groups are one or more individual obstacles grouped
to provide a specific obstacle effect. Task forces use obstacle groups to
ensure that company teams emplace individual obstacles supporting the task
force’s scheme of maneuver. In rare cases, brigades, divisions, or even corps
may use obstacle groups for specific tactical obstacles. Also, units integrate
obstacle groups with their direct- and indirect-fire plans. Brigade and task
force commanders can plan their placement anywhere in the obstacle zones
or belts, respectively.
2-112. Unlike obstacle zones or belts, obstacle groups are not areas but rela-
tive locations for actual obstacles. Commanders normally show obstacle
groups using the obstacle-effect graphics. When detailed planning is possible
(to include detailed on-the-ground reconnaissance), commanders may show
obstacle groups using individual obstacle graphics.
2-113. The company team commander and the engineer can adjust obstacles
in the group if the intent and link to the fire plan remain intact. Company
team commanders make minor changes to obstacles and fire-control meas-
ures based on terrain realities. For example, a commander may move a fixing
obstacle group and direct-fire TRPs a hundred meters to avoid having them
masked by rolling terrain. A major change to the obstacle group location re-
quires the approval of the commander who ordered the obstacle group em-
placement.

Individual Obstacles
2-114. Each type of individual obstacle, such as abatis, antitank ditch, booby
traps, mines and minefields, roadblocks, craters, and wire obstacles has its
associated graphic. Once a unit constructs an individual obstacle, the ob-
stacle’s location is recorded and reported through the chain of command.
Commanders must report individual obstacles in sufficient detail so any unit
moving through the area can bypass or reduce the obstacle without excessive
risk. Each headquarters is responsible to ensure exact obstacle locations are
disseminated throughout its organization. Individual obstacle graphics are
rarely shown on maps above the battalion echelon and are not depicted in
this manual. (FM 3-34.1 defines individual obstacles and establishes the
graphics for them.)

Obstacle Restrictions
2-115. Commanders may use obstacle restrictions to provide additional obsta-
cle control and to limit the specific types of obstacles used, such as no buried
mines. These restrictions ensure that subordinates do not use obstacles with
characteristics that impair future operations. It also allows commanders to
focus the use of limited resources for the decisive operation by restricting
their use elsewhere. An obstacle restricted area (ORA) is a command and
control measure used to limit the type or number of obstacles within an area
(JP 1-02). The commander with emplacement authority uses ORAs to restrict

2-36
______________________________________ Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

obstacle placement. The ORA graphic depicts the area effected, the unit
imposing the restriction, and the restrictions in effect.

PHASE LINE
2-116. A phase line (PL) is a line utilized for control and coordination of mili-
tary operations, usually a terrain feature extending across the operational
area [JP 1-02 uses zone of action] (JP 1-02). (See Figure 2-27.) A commander
establishes PLs to control the maneuver of his units. Phase lines are not
boundaries unless designated as such and do not establish any specific
responsibilities between units, unless the operations order so specifies. When
possible, the commander places them along easily recognizable terrain
features—such as roads, railroad tracks, rivers, and ridgelines—to ensure
easy identification. As with boundaries, this is less important if all units are
equipped with precision navigation devices. Some PLs have additional
designations for specific purposes, such as a LD or a probable line of
deployment (PLD). Chapter 5 discusses these specific purposes.

PL ROBERT
PL RON
X
PL JOHN

PL BASIL
LD/LC

OBJ OBJ
ATTACK ZEKE PAT
PSN OBJ
KAI

(LIMIT OF ADVANCE)
GOLD
TF 2-58
II
TF 3-67

ATTACK
PSN
ASLT
BLUE AXIS PSN
PL JOHN

PL BASIL
PL ROBERT

JAN
LD/LC

PEGGY
PL RON

Figure 2-27. Phase Lines Used with Other Control Measures

POSITION AREA FOR ARTILLERY

2-117. A position area for artillery (PAA) is an area assigned to an ar-
tillery unit where individual artillery systems can maneuver to in-
crease their survivability. A PAA is not an AO for the artillery unit
occupying it. The commander assigns PAAs for terrain management pur-
poses. Establishing a PAA lets other subordinate units know they should
avoid occupying that same terrain, thus avoiding enemy counterfire. While
the exact size of a PAA depends on the factors of METT-TC, a Paladin platoon

2-37
FM 3-90__________________________________________________________________________________

normally requires a PAA encompassing two

PAA
square kilometers, and a Multiple Launch
Rocket System (MLRS) platoon requires nine
square kilometers. (See Figure 2-28.)
2-118. The maneuver echelon operations offi-
cer (G3 or S3) of the unit that owns the ter-
rain establishes the PAA. The occupying ar- PAA PAA
tillery unit does not have the same authority
and responsibilities toward the PAA that are
PAA
associated with a unit assigned an AO. For
example, other units can move through a Figure 2-28. Position
PAA without clearing that movement with Area for Artillery
the artillery unit. The artillery unit occup-
ying a PAA establishes liaison with the unit that owns the AO where the PAA
is located. The echelon fire support officer usually conducts this liaison in ac-
cordance with standard command and support relationships. (For a discus-
sion of common command and control relationships, see FM 6-0. For a discus-
sion of artillery missions, see FM 3-09.)
2-119. The decision to establish a PAA affects A2C2 for rotary and fixed-wing
integration. A PAA is a base upon which to establish future grid-target lines
for lateral deconfliction and areas for rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft to avoid
depending on high- or low-angle artillery fires.

ROUTE
2-120. A route is the pre- 071800ZJUL00 19 RP 3
scribed course to be traveled
from a specific point of TCP 8
origin to a specific destina-
tion (JP 1-02). (See Route 50 80
40 50
Iron in Figure 2-29.) Routes 071600ZJUL00 13 A2
A2

can have different purposes. 25m

ST

20m
RU

Those purposes can be add- O

N
TE

IR 52
ed as adjectives to specify E 23
U

T
XX
RO

U AD MD
20 23 O
different types of routes. Ex- R
XX

ID AD
amples of such routes in- SP 7
LL 23
clude passing route and XX
JTF
main supply route (MSR). AA RAMONA

The commander can further

designate MSRs as open, su- Figure 2-29. Routes
pervised, dispatch, reserved,
or prohibited. The commander can assign names, numbers, or alphanumeric
designations to routes within his AO. (See FM 4-01.30 for additional informa-
tion concerning route classification and marking.)

TARGETED AREA OF INTEREST

2-121. A targeted area of interest (TAI) is the geographical area or
point along a mobility corridor where successful interdiction will
cause the enemy to abandon a particular course of action or requires
him to use specialized engineer support to continue. It is where he

2-38
______________________________________ Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

can be acquired and engaged by

friendly forces. The commander desig-
nates TAIs where he believes his unit can
best attack high-payoff targets. The unit
staff develops TAIs during the targeting TAI
process, based on the currently available
products resulting from the IPB process. WHITETAIL
These TAIs are further refined during war-
gaming and finally approved by the com-
mander during COA approval. The shape
of a TAI reflects the type of target and the
weapon system intended to engage that
target. They are normally cued by surveil- Figure 2-30.
lance assets, which include UAVs, combat Targeted Area of Interest
observation and lasing teams (COLTs),
long-range surveillance units (LSUs), fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft
using a variety of sensors, and special operations forces. A commander can
designate a TAI for any of his organic or supporting systems, including CAS.
Figure 2-30 depicts TAI Whitetail.

2-39