G.R. No.

199310               February 19, 2014 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares
(Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were originally
owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
planted different kinds of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker
vs.
and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P.
parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the
INOCENCIO, Respondent.
lots until the same were purchased by the respondent in 1989.

DECISION
The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced
REYES, J.: by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision2 dated In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the
November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. following documents: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989
90503. The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated May 16, 2007 of the executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the respondent; 13 (2)
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land survey plans of the subject properties;14 (3) technical descriptions of
Registration Case No. N-11465. the subject properties;15 (4) Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate; 16 (5) tax
declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002; 17 and (6)
certifications dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D.
The Facts Calamno (Calamno), Senior Forest Management Specialist of the
DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed and disposable lands of the public domain.18
an application4 with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two
parcels of land situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s application
identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastre, for registration should be denied since the subject parcels of land are
with an area of 29,945 square meters and 20,357 sq m, respectively. not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it
pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic Act No.
On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the Order5 finding the 485019 (R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located
respondent’s application for registration sufficient in form and at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public
substance and setting it for initial hearing on February 21, 2002. The lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga,
scheduled initial hearing was later reset to May 30, 2002.6 The Notice testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed that, upon preliminary
of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, April 1, 2002 evaluation of the subject properties, based on the topographic map of
issue, Volume 98, No. 13, pages 1631-16337 and in the March 21, Taguig, which was prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the
2002 issue of People’s Balita,8 a newspaper of general circulation in then Department of National Defense-Bureau of Coast in April 1966,
the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was likewise posted in a he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below
conspicuous place on Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, as well as in a 12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the subject properties on
conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the City hall of Taguig, September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of
Metro Manila.9 the subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.

On May 30, 2002, when the RTC called the case for initial hearing, On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed
only the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as that, based on the actual topographic survey of the subject properties
oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the elevations of the
LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to subject properties, contrary to LLDA’s claim, are above 12.50 m.
the respondent’s application for registration.10 Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068 has an elevation
ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No. 3077
ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.
On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition11 to the respondent’s
application for registration, asserting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are
not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. On The RTC Ruling
the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), on July 16,
2002, likewise filed its Opposition,12 alleging that the respondent failed On May 16, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, 20 which granted the
to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, respondent’s application for registration of title to the subject
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels properties, viz:
of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered confirming

Trial on the merits of the respondent’s application ensued thereafter. the title of the applicant Remman Enterprises Incorporated over a
parcels of land [sic] consisting of 29,945 square meters (Lot 3068) and
The respondent presented four witnesses: Teresita Villaroya, the 20,357 (Lot 3077) both situated in Brgy. Napindan, Taguig, Taguig,
respondent’s corporate secretary; Ronnie Inocencio, an employee of
the respondent and the one authorized by it to file the application for Metro Manila more particularly described in the Technical Descriptions
registration with the RTC; Cenon Cerquena (Cerquena), the caretaker Ap-04-003103 and Swo-00-001769 respectively and ordering their
of the subject properties since 1957; and Engineer Mariano Flotildes registration under the Property Registration Decree in the name of
(Engr. Flotildes), a geodetic engineer hired by the respondent to Remman Enterprises Incorporated.
conduct a topographic survey of the subject properties.

SO ORDERED.21
For its part, the LLDA presented the testimonies of Engineers Ramon
Magalonga (Engr. Magalonga) and Christopher A. Pedrezuela (Engr.
Pedrezuela), who are both geodetic engineers employed by the LLDA. The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove that the subject
properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. The RTC opined that the elevations of the subject properties
Essentially, the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses showed that are very much higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.50 m and,
the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC pointed out that
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of LLDA’s claim that the elevation of the subject properties is below 12.50
land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos. m is hearsay since the same was merely based on the topographic
map that was prepared using an aerial survey on March 2, 1966; that In opposing the instant application for registration, appellant relies
nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was indeed merely on the Topographic Map dated March 2, 1966, prepared by
conducted on March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data for the Commodore Pathfinder, which allegedly shows that the subject parcels
preparation of the topographic map. of land are so situated in the submerge[d] [lake water] of Laguna Lake.
The said data was gathered through aerial photography over the area
of Taguig conducted on March 2, 1966. However, nobody testified on
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not
the due execution and authenticity of the said document. As regards
always remain the same; that the elevations of the subject properties
the testimony of the witness for LLDA, Engr. Ramon Magalonga, that
may have already changed since 1966 when the supposed aerial
the subject parcels of land are below the 12.5 meter elevation, the
survey, from which the topographic map used by LLDA was based,
same can be considered inaccurate aside from being hearsay
was conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the method used by Engr.
considering his admission that his findings were based merely on the
Magalonga in measuring the elevations of the subject properties,
evaluation conducted by DPWH and FF Cruz. x x x.24 (Citations
pointing out that:
omitted)

Further, in finding that the elevation of the subject lots are below 12.5
The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to present
meters, oppositor’s witness merely compared their elevation to the
certifications issued by the DENR, attesting that the subject properties
elevation of the particular portion of the lake dike which he used as his
form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
[benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the
which was not disputed by the petitioner. The CA further ruled that the
subject lots. Also, the elevation of the said portion of the lake dike that
respondent was able to prove, through the testimonies of its witnesses,
was then under the construction by FF Cruz was allegedly 12.79
that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
meters and after finding that the elevation of the subject lots are lower
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties prior to
than the said [benchmark] or reference point, said witness suddenly
June 12, 1945.
jumped to a conclusion that the elevation was below 12.5 meters. x x
x.
Hence, the instant petition.
Moreover, the finding of LLDA’s witness was based on hearsay as said
witness admitted that it was DPWH or the FF Cruz who determined the The Issue
elevation of the portion of the lake dike which he used as the
[benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in
subject lots and that he has no personal knowledge as to how the
affirming the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007, which granted the
DPWH and FF Cruz determined the elevation of the said [benchmark]
application for registration filed by the respondent.
or reference point and he only learn[ed] that its elevation is 12.79
meters from the information he got from FF Cruz.22
The Court’s Ruling
Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed
below 12.50 m, the RTC opined that the same could not be considered The petition is meritorious.
part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under Section
41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those areas that
The petitioner maintains that the lower courts erred in granting the
can be covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual
respondent’s application for registration since the subject properties do
maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those
not form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
parcels of land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna
domain. The petitioner insists that the elevations of the subject
Lake form part of its bed and not those that are already far from it,
properties are below the reglementary level of 12.50 m and, pursuant
which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC pointed out
to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, are considered part of the bed of
that the subject properties are more than a kilometer away from the
Laguna Lake.
shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry and waterless even when
the waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise
found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its That the elevations of the subject properties are above the
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of fact by the lower courts,
and notorious possession of the subject properties as early as 1943. which this Court, generally may not disregard. It is a long-standing
policy of this Court that the findings of facts of the RTC which were
adopted and affirmed by the CA are generally deemed conclusive and
The petitioner appealed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007 to the
binding. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual
CA.
findings of the lower courts unless there are substantial reasons for
doing so.25
The CA Ruling
That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake,
On November 10, 2011, the CA, by way of the assailed however, does not necessarily mean that they already form part of the
Decision,23 affirmed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007. The CA alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is still
found that the respondent was able to establish that the subject incumbent upon the respondent to prove, with well-nigh
properties are part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed part of
domain; that the same are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, as the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. While
claimed by the petitioner. Thus: deference is due to the lower courts’ finding that the elevations of the
subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m and,
hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake pursuant to Section
The evidence submitted by the appellee is sufficient to warrant
41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the Court nevertheless finds that the
registration of the subject lands in its name. Appellee’s witness Engr.
respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement to registration of title to
Mariano Flotildes, who conducted an actual area verification of the
the subject properties.
subject lots, ably proved that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot
No. 3068 is 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest portion is 15
meters. As to the other lot, it was found [out] that the elevation of the "Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution,
lowest portion of Lot No. 3077 is also 12.6 meters and the elevation of all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source
its highest portion is 15 meters. Said elevations are higher than the of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing
reglementary elevation of 12.5 meters as provided for under paragraph to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
11, Section 41 of R.A. No. 4850, as amended. State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person
by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden
of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands
of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)
must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and
must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification
is alienable or disposable."26 through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the
The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject
official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to
properties under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
152927, which provides that:

Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain.
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
She submitted only the survey map and technical description of the
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
land which bears no information regarding the land’s classification. She
did not bother to establish the status of the land by any certification
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession she complied with all requisites for registration of title under Section
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain 14(1) of P.D. 1529.34 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in
xxxx support of its application for registration are thus not sufficient to prove
that the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR
Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of respondent to present a copy of the original classification approved by
imperfect or incomplete titles to public land acquired under Section the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting
amended by P.D. No. 1073. 28 Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, the application for registration in spite of the failure of the respondent
applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish: first, that to prove by well-nigh incontrovertible evidence that the subject
the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the properties are alienable and disposable.
public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N.
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.29 Properties, which was promulgated on June 26, 2008, must be applied
prospectively, asserting that decisions of this Court form part of the law
of the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the no retroactive effect. The respondent points out that its application for
subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the registration of title to the subject properties was filed and was granted
public domain, the respondent presented two certifications 30 issued by by the RTC prior to the Court’s promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N.
Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the Properties. Accordingly, that it failed to present a copy of the original
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain "under Project No. classification covering the subject properties approved by the DENR
27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy,
January 3, 1968." the respondent claims, would not warrant the denial of its application
for registration.
However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are
insufficient to prove that the subject properties are alienable and The Court does not agree.
disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.,31 the Court clarified that, in addition to the certification issued by
the proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable and Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for registration was
disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR filed and granted by RTC prior to the Court’s ruling in T.A.N.
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of Properties, the pronouncements in that case may be applied to the
public domain as alienable and disposable. They must present a copy present case; it is not antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of laws
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary that the
certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the records. Thus: interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law from the
date it was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a law carried into effect.35 "Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the
land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration passage of a new law, but consists merely of a construction or
must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land interpretation of a pre-existing one."36
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by the Court in
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land subsequent cases notwithstanding that the applications for registration
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved were filed and granted by the lower courts prior to the promulgation of
by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal T.A.N. Properties.
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to
prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to
In Republic v. Medida,37 the application for registration of the subject
do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
properties therein was filed on October 22, 2004 and was granted by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
the trial court on June 21, 2006. Similarly, in Republic v. Jaralve, 38 the
disposable.32 (Emphasis ours)
application for registration of the subject property therein was filed on
October 22, 1996 and was granted by the trial court on November 15,
In Republic v. Roche,33 the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the 2002. In the foregoing cases, notwithstanding that the applications for
ruling in T.A.N. Properties, viz: registration were filed and granted by the trial courts prior to the
promulgation of T.A.N. Properties, this Court applied the
pronouncements in T.A.N. Properties and denied the applications for
Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of registration on the ground, inter alia, that the applicants therein failed
proving the status of the land. In this connection, the Court has held to present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy.
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the predecessors-in-interest, contrary to Cerquena's testimony, have been
respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and its in possession and occupation of the subject properties in the manner
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, required by law.
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and that it and its
To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
possession and occupation of the subject properties since 1943, the and notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12,
respondent presented the testimony of Cerquena. Cerquena testified 1945, or earlier, the respondent's application for registration should be
that the subject properties were originally owned by Jaime who denied.1âwphi1
supposedly possessed and cultivated the same since 1943; that
sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the subject properties to Salvador and
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the
Mijares who, in turn, sold the same to the respondent in 1989.
instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 10, 2011
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90503, which affirmed the
The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of Decision dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
the possession and occupation of the subject properties by the Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N-11465 is hereby
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of
well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of Remman Enterprises, Inc. in Land Registration Case No. N-11465 is
the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. DENIED for lack of merit.
Indeed, other than the testimony of Cerquena, the respondent failed to
present any other evidence to prove the character of the possession
SO ORDERED.
and occupation by it and its predecessors-in-interest of the subject
properties.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529,
proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate
the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession WE CONCUR:
and occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for
land registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere
conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual
possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own
property.39

Although Cerquena testified that the respondent and its predecessors-

in-interest cultivated the subject properties, by planting different crops
thereon, his testimony is bereft of any specificity as to the nature of
such cultivation as to warrant the conclusion that they have been
indeed in possession and occupation of the subject properties in the
manner required by law. There was no showing as to the number of
crops that are planted in the subject properties or to the volume of the
produce harvested from the crops supposedly planted thereon.

Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its

predecessors-in-interest have indeed planted crops on the subject
properties, it does not necessarily follow that the subject properties
have been possessed and occupied by them in the manner
contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops in the subject
properties may only have amounted to mere casual cultivation, which
is not the possession and occupation required by law.

"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does
not constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him,
possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land,
however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers
title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with
regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the
occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under
claim of ownership for the required number of years."40

Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject
properties presented by the respondent were only for 2002. The
respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired the
subject properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the subject property since 1943, it
was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of
taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership." 41 That the
subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 2002
gives rise to the presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or
possession of the subject properties starting that year. Likewise, no
improvement or plantings were declared or noted in the said tax
declarations. This fact belies the claim that the respondent and its