1.

Effect of failure to allege assessed value of property

 G.R. No. 221815, November 29, 2017 - GLYNNA FORONDA-CRYSTAL v. ANIANA

LAWAS SON,

“To determine the assessed value, which would in turn determine the court with appropriate
jurisdiction, an examination of the allegations in the complaint is necessary. It is a hornbook
doctrine that the court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine
whether a suit is within its jurisdiction.28 According to the case of Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Cruz,
et al.,29 only these facts can be the basis of the court's competence to take cognizance of a case,
and that one cannot advert to anything not set forth in the complaint, such as evidence adduced at
the trial, to determine the nature of the action thereby initiated.30

It is not a surprise, therefore, that a failure to allege the assessed value of a real property in
the complaint would result to a dismissal of the case. This is because absent any allegation in
the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or
the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. Indeed, the courts
cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land. 31 This is the
same ratio put forth by the Court in the case of Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Cruz, et al.,32 where the
case was dismissed partly on the basis of the following:

The complaint did not contain any such allegation on the assessed value of the property. There is
no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of
petitioners. Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it
cannot be determined whether it is the RTC or the MTC which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the petitioners' action.33 (Citations omitted)

In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals,34 the Court had no qualms in dismissing the case for failing
to allege the assessed value of the subject property. Similar to Spouses Cruz,35Quinagoran36 held
that: "Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessed value of
the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to dismiss. Consequently, all
proceedings in the RTC are null and void, and the CA erred in affirming the RTC."

This is not to say, however, that there is no room for a liberal interpretation of this rule.
In Tumpag v. Tumpag,37 the Court, through Justice Brion, provided for an instance when an
exception to the strict application could be allowed. It said:

Generally, the court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether
a suit is within its jurisdiction. There may be instances, however, when a rigid application of this
rule may result in defeating substantial justice or in prejudice to a party's substantial right.38

In that case, there was also no allegation of the assessed value of the property. However, the
Court pointed out that the facts contained in the Declaration of Real Property, which was
attached to the complaint, could have facially resolved the question on jurisdiction and
would have rendered the lengthy litigation on that very point unnecessary. 39 In essence, the
Court said that the failure to allege the real property's assessed value in the complaint would not
be fatal if, in the documents annexed to the complaint, an allegation of the assessed value could
be found.

A reading of the quoted cases would reveal a pattern which would invariably guide both the
bench and the bar in similar situations. Based on the foregoing, the rule on determining the
assessed value of a real property, insofar as the identification of the jurisdiction of the first and
second level courts is concerned, would be two-tiered:

First, the general rule is that jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the real property
as alleged in the complaint; and

Second, the rule would be liberally applied if the assessed value of the property, while not
alleged in the complaint, could still be identified through a facial examination of the documents
already attached to the complaint.

Indeed, it is by adopting this two-tiered rule that the Court could dispense with a catena of cases
specifically dealing with issues concerning jurisdiction over real properties.

In upholding these afore-quoted rule, however, the Court is not unmindful of the cases
of Barangay Piapi v. Talip40 and Trayvilla v. Sejas41 where the market value of the property,
instead of the assessed value thereof, was used by the Court as basis for determining jurisdiction.

In Barangay Piapi,42 the complaint did not allege the assessed value of the subject property.
What it alleged was the market value thereof. The Court held that, in the absence of an allegation
of assessed value in the complaint, the Court shall consider the alleged market value to determine
jurisdiction.”

2. Assessed value not alleged but it can be gleaned from the tax
declaration:
In the same case above-stated:

“Section 7 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 7 Clerks of Regional Trial Courts.—

a) For filing an action or a permissive OR COMPULSORY counter-claim, CROSS-CLAIM, or

money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing a third-party, fourth-party, etc.
complaint, or a complaint-in-intervention, if the total sum claimed, INCLUSIVE OF
INTERESTS, PENALTIES, SURCHARGES, DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND, AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS and/or in cases involving
property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE
CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE,
THE STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN LITIGATION AS ALLEGED BY THE CLAIMANT, is: x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Two things must be said of this: first, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court concerns the amount of the
prescribed filing and docket fees, the payment of which bestows upon the courts the jurisdiction
to entertain the pleadings to be filed; 44 and second, the latest iteration of the same provision
already deleted the phrase "estimated value thereof," such that the determination of the amount
of prescribed filing and docket fees are now based on the following: (a) the fair market value of
the real property in litigation stated in the current tax declaration or current zonal
valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; or (b) the stated value of the real or personal
property in litigation as alleged by the claimant.

A reading of the discourse on this would indicate that the jurisdiction referred to above does not
deal with the delineation of the jurisdictions of the first and second level courts, but with the
acquisition of jurisdiction by the courts through the payment of the prescribed filing and docket
fees.

This is the same tenor of the Court's decision in Trayvilla. In that case, where no assessed value
was likewise alleged in the complaint, the Court determined jurisdiction by considering the
actual amount by which the property was purchased and as written in the Amended Complaint.
The Court stated that:

However, the CA failed to consider that in determining jurisdiction, it could rely on the
declaration made in the Amended Complaint that the property is valued at P6,000,00. The
handwritten document sued upon and the pleadings indicate that the property was
purchased by petitioners for the price of P6,000.00. For purposes of filing the civil case
against respondents, this amount should be the stated value of the property in the absence
of a current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the BIR.45 (Emphasis supplied)

But then again, like the discussion on Barangay Piapi above, Trayvilla was one which dealt with
the payment of the required filing and docket fees. The crux of the case was the acquisition of
jurisdiction by payment of docket fees, and not the delineation of the jurisdiction of the first and
second level courts. In fact, Trayvilla interchangeably used the terms "assessed value" and
"market value" in a manner that does not even recognize a difference.

Like Barangay Piapi, therefore, Spouses Trayvilla must not be read in the context of jurisdiction

of first and second level courts as contemplated in the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended,46 where the assessed values of the properties are required. These cases must perforce
be read in the context of the determination of the actual amount of prescribed filing and docket
fees provided for in Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
Having laid out the essential rules in determining the jurisdiction of the first and second level
courts for civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, the Court now shifts focus to the specific circumstances that surround the current case.

In here, the respondent failed to allege in her complaint the assessed value of the subject
property. Rather, what she included therein was an allegation of its market value amounting to
P200,000.00.47 In the course of the trial, the petitioner asserted that the assessed value of the
property as stated in the tax declaration was merely P1,030.00, and therefore the RTC lacked
jurisdiction.

The question thus posed before this Court was whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction, and in the affirmative, whether or not the RTC decision should be
rendered void for being issued without jurisdiction.

As discussed above, settled is the requirement that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended, required the allegation of the real property's assessed value in the complaint. That the
complaint in the present case did not aver the assessed value of the property is a violation of the
law, and generally would be dismissed because the court which would exercise jurisdiction over
the case could not be identified.

However, a liberal interpretation of this law, as opined by the Court in  Tumpag,48 would

necessitate an examination of the documents annexed to the complaint. In this instance, the
complaint referred to Tax Declaration No. 16408A, attached therein as Annex "B," which
naturally would contain the assessed value of the property. A perusal thereof would reveal
that the property was valued at P2,826.00.

On this basis, it is clear that it is the MTC, and not the RTC, that has jurisdiction over the case.
The RTC should have upheld its Order dated November 8, 2006 which dismissed the same.
Consequently, the decision that it rendered is null and void.”

3. Estoppel
A doctrine in American jurisprudence whereby a party creating an appearance of fact
which is not true is held bound by that appearance as against another person who has
acted on the faith of it. (Strong v. Gutierrez Repide, 6 Phil. 685).

which is provided for in Articles 1431 and 1433 of the New Civil Code in conjunction with
Section 3, paragraph (a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, all of which provide:

Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.' '

Art. 1433. Estoppel may be in pais or by deed.

 Sec. 3. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:

(a) Whenever a party has,by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to
falsify it.

and which was enunciated in the following decisions of the Supreme Court:

Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted
to falsify it.

Estoppel arises when one, by his acts, representations, or admissions, or by his silence
when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence induces
another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such
belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of
such facts (Huyatid v. Huyatid 47265-R, Jan. 4, 1978).

The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good
faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act,
representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and
who reasonably relied thereon. Said doctrine springs from equitable principles and the
equities of the case. It is designed to aid the law in the administration of justice where
without its aid injustice might result.' (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, L-
30831, November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 368)

By its letter dated May 22, 1970, defendant-appellant PNB led plaintiff-appellee to believe
that his property covered by TCT T-52705 would no longer be included as collateral in the
sugar crop loan of defendant Leticia de la Vina Sepe for the year 1971-72. It led said
plaintiff-appellee to believe that his property as of said year will no longer be encumbered
and will be free from any lien or mortgage. Plaintiff-appellee had the light to rely on said
belief, because of the aforementioned act and declaration of defendant-appellant bank. Under
the laws and jurisprudence aforequoted, defendant-appellant bank can no longer be allowed
to deny or falsify its act or declaration, or to renege from it. This is one of the conclusive
presumptions provided for by the Rules of Court. (pp. 37, 38-39, Rollo.)

4. Prescription of right to file action

PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS
 By lapse of time fixed by law
 30 years
 action over immovables from time possession is lost
 10 years
  mortgage action
 upon written contract
 upon obligation created by law
 upon a judgement
 8 years
 action to recover movables from time possession is lost
 6 years
 upon an oral contract
 upon a quasi-contract
 5 years
 actions where periods are not fixed by law
 4 years
 upon injury to rights of plaintiff
 upon a quasi-delict
 1 year
 for forcible entry & detainer
 for defamation