Module 7: RULE 115 – RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Sec. 1. Rights of the accused at the trial

CASE# 233 People v. Malngan – 26 September 2006

Facts:

January 2, 2001 when the witness and his tanods saw the accused-appellant, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., hurriedly
leaving the house of her employer. She was seen to have boarded a pedicab which was driven by a person later identified as Rolando
Gruta. Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardos group later discovered that a fire gutted the house of the
employer of the housemaid. When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay Hall, he received a report from pedicab
driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he saw accused-appellant coming out of the
house. Barangay Chairman Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and the other tanods proceeded to Balasan Street and found the accused-
appellant. Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house was also burned, identified the woman as accused-
appellant, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant’s bag. Thereafter, accused-appellant EDNA confessed to Barangay
Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the Barangay Hall that she set her employers house on fire
because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that she wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to
just ride a broomstick in going [Link]-appellant was then turned over to arson investigators headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan,
who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta. Cruz, Manila where she was further investigated and then detained. When
Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to give her sworn statement, she had the opportunity to ask accused-appellant
at the latters detention cell why she did the burning of her employers house and accused-appellant replied that she set the house on fire
because when she asked permission to go home to her province, the wife of her employer shouted at her and when Mercedita Mendoza
asked accused-appellant how she burned the house, accused-appellant EDNA told her that she crumpled newspapers, lighted them with
a disposable lighter and threw them on top of the table inside the house.

Issue:

Whether or not all confession without the assistance of competent and independent counsel of the appellant-accused is inadmissible as
evidence.

Held/Ruling:

No, Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement
officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the
barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several
houses as well as killed the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights
guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellants
confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the interrogation made by the latter admittedly
conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this
reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found by the latter in
her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.

Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellants confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as
evidence do not automatically lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during custodial
investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the accused verbally admits to having committed the offense as what happened in the case at bar when accused-appellant
admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in the Separas house. The
testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for accused-appellant, admissible in evidence against her
and is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee. Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the
relationship between the individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the other; it does not concern itself with the relation
between a private individual and another private individual as both accused-appellant and prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza
undoubtedly are. Here, there is no evidence on record to show that said witness was acting under police authority, so appropriately,
accused-appellants uncounselled extrajudicial confession to said witness was properly admitted by the RTC.

CASE# 234 People v. Gines, 197 SCRA 481

Facts:
In this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner assails the Order of Judge Genaro Gines of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, San
Fernando, La Union dated October 15, 1987, which dismissed Criminal Case No. 1829 entitled "People vs. Ramon Labo, Jr. and Francis
Floresca" and the Order dated February 8, 1988 denying the motion for reconsideration.

On complaint of herein private complainant retired Supreme Court Justice Juvenal K. Guerrero in the Municipal Trial Court of San
Fernando, La Union, an information for libel was filed on January 27, 1987 before the Regional Trial Court (Branch 26) of San
Fernando, La Union against Ramon Labo, Jr., Francis Floresca and Perfecto Manaois as editor/publisher of the "People's Bagong
Taliba" in connection with the publication of the article captioned "Inihablang Ex-Justice" in its August 3, 1986 issue.

Private complainant filed a motion for postponement of hearing on the ground that he has a serious eye ailment (cataract in both eyes)
that needs immediate medical attention.

The respondent court issued an Order dismissing the case as against respondents Labo and Floresca for failure of private complainant
Justice Guerrero to appear.

The prosecution avers that when the respondent court ordered the dismissal of the case due to the absence of private complainant, the
latter was scheduled to depart for abroad for a medical check up. Thus, a motion for reconsideration dated October 19, 1987 asking for a
reinstatement of the case was filed by the prosecution, to which private respondents filed their opposition. The motion was denied on
February 8, 1988 hence the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated to entitle them to the dismissal of the case.

HELD/ RULING:

NO. Court finds that said right has not been violated in the case at bar and thus holds that the dismissal of the case as regards private
respondents Labo and Floresca is premature and erroneous. "The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the
Constitution but the same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. It secures
rights to a defendant but it does not preclude the rights of public justice..

The Court is convinced that private complainant's absences at the hearings of the case were in good faith and that he had justifiable and
meritorious reasons therefor. Said absences are evidently not capricious, oppressive, nor vexatious to the two accused who had waived
their appearance at the trial of the case. It should be remembered that the right to a speedy trial is relative, subject to reasonable delays
and postponements arising from illness, medical attention, body operations, as in the instant case where it was satisfactorily proven that
private complainant had to undergo eye operations, hospitalization and a medical check-up abroad. The subject case for libel was
dismissed on October 15, 1987, some eight and a half months after the information was filed. This period is not such an extended,
prolonged or lengthy duration as to cause capricious and vexatious delay. For, speedy trial means one that can be had as soon after
indictment is filed as the prosecution can with reasonable diligence prepare for trial (Mercado v. CFI, supra). While accused persons do
have rights, many of them choose to forget that the aggrieved also have the same rights.

The Court held in sum held that the criminal information for libel against private respondents Ramon Labo, Jr. and Francis Floresca
was validly filed, that the dismissal as to these two respondents was erroneous.

CASE# 235 People v. Quibate, 131 SCRA 80

Facts: Accused Rodolfo Quibate appeals the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Prima Baltar-
Quibate.

After the promulgation of this case, the court moto proprio cancels the promulgation upon noting that the regular counsel de oficio,
Atty. Antonio Bisnar was not around at the time and the accused refused to sign receipt of a copy of the decision and upon noting that
there was a typographical error in the decision consisting of the wrong penalty and the court noting further that the decision have not
been filed. Notifying accused and counsel of the new date of promulgation which is hereby set for March 20, 1980. On March 20, 1980,
the counsel de oficio was again absent so the court appointed a well-known practitioner in the area, Atty. Jose Alovera, to assist the
accused in the promulgation and to coordinate with the other counsel Atty. Antonio Bisnar. Promulgation was re-set to April 1, 1980.
On March 27, 1980, Atty. Alovera filed a motion to advance the date of promulgation to March 31, 1980 as counsel had to leave for Iloilo
City on April 1, 1980. The motion to advance the date of promulgation was considered on April 1, 1980. Promulgation was re-set to April
11, 1980. The appellant questions the cancellation and resetting of promulgation stating that the counsel did not have to be present
during the promulgation of judgment and that there was no need to nullify a promulgation already effected simply because the accused
refused to sign. According to the appellant's brief, the appellant refused to sign because he did not know how to write.

Issue: Whether or not the presence of counsel is essential during the promulgation of judgment

Ruling: No. It is not required that counsel for the accused must be present when judgment is promulgated for it to be valid and
effective. However, considering the level of intelligence of the accused and the serious nature of the offense, the Court had reason to
require counsel's presence during promulgation.

The court, however, followed a manifestly strange procedure when it pronounced the sentence of conviction and then immediately
afterwards, reconsidered and cancelled the whole thing on the ground, among others, that the lawyer was not present. On noticing that
there was no lawyer for the accused, the Court should have deferred the promulgation of the decision if it wanted counsel to be around.

CASE# 236 Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, 302 SCRA 102

Facts: On February 10, 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office, disclosed to his chief, Projecto
Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the post office. Among those mentioned by Merete
were Arnold Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail
sorter of the Makati Post Office. For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in
apprehending the group responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office. On February 17, 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin
dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi Village following a report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day. Tumagan
accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents in a private car. They arrived at Legaspi
Village at about 1:00 p.m. They stayed at the corner of Adelantado and Gamboa Streets, while two other teams of NBI agents waited at
Amorsolo Street, near the Esguerra Building. At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front of
the Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street. The passengers of the postal delivery jeep were Arnold Pasicolan, Jacinto Merete, and the
driver, Henry Orindai. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie
Romero and petitioner Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred the contents of the mail bag to a travelling bag. The two then secured the bag
to the back of their motorcycle. They were just in time to see Pasicolan handing over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero. At that point,
Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested the two accused. Unaware of the arrest of Romero and Marcelo, Pasicolan went back to the
postal delivery jeep and proceeded toward Pasay Road. The NBI agents followed the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested
Pasicolan. The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their headquarters. They also brought along with them the
motorcycle of Romero and Marcelo and the bag of unsorted mail found in their possession. On their way to the NBI headquarters, they
passed by the Makati Central Post Office, intending to arrest another suspect, Redentor Aguinaldo.
Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the presence of the
members of the NBI Administrative and Investigative Staff and the people transacting business with the NBI at that time. According to
Director Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very same letters confiscated from them.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the signing of the letter of the accused's when they were ask to sign during
custodial investigation without the presence of a counsel violates their right against self-incrimination
2. Whether or not the letters signed by the petitioner were inadmissible as evidence

Ruling:

1. No. Petitioners counsel says that the signing of petitioners and his co-accused's names was not a mere mechanical act but one
which required the use of intelligence and therefore constitutes self-incrimination. Petitioners counsel presumably has in mind
the ruling in Beltran v. Samson to the effect that the prohibition against compelling a man to be a witness against himself
extends to any attempt to compel the accused to furnish a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparing it with the
handwriting in a document in a prosecution for falsification. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or
the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act because it requires the application of intelligence and attention, so it was
held.

To be sure, the use of specimen handwriting in Beltran is different from the use of petitioners' signatures in this case. In that
case, the purpose was to show that the specimen handwriting matched the handwriting in the document alleged to have been
falsified and thereby show that the accused was the author of the crime (falsification) while in this case the purpose for
 securing the signature of petitioner on the envelopes was merely to authenticate the envelopes as the ones seized from him and
Ronnie Romero.

However, this purpose and petitioners signatures on the envelope, when coupled with the testimony of prosecution witnesses
that the envelopes seized from petitioner were those given to him and Romero, undoubtedly help establish the guilt of
petitioner. Since these signatures are actually evidence of admission obtained from petitioner and his co-accused under
circumstances contemplated in Art. III, 12(1) and 17 of the Constitution, they should be excluded. For indeed, petitioner and
his co-accused signed following their arrest.

2. The Supreme Court held that the letters were valid evidence. It is known that during custodial investigation, a person has the
right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. Any admission or confession made in the absence of counsel is inadmissible
as evidence. Furthermore, no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In the instant case, even though the
petitioner was asked to sign the letters, the letters are still admissible as evidence because the accused was convicted not only
by means of these letters but also by testimonies made by the NBI agents. Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the letters
were validly seized as an incident of a valid arrest and therefore can stand on their own. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is
affirmed

CASE# 237 People v. Cayago, 312 SCRA 623

Facts: For killing his own wife through strangulation and with evident premeditation, appellant was indicted for parricide. On
August 3, 1995, when Cayago was about to be brought to Camp Crame for a polygraph test, he requested permission to go to
the nearby church. Cayago requested that he be accompanied by SPO2 Delos Reyes, who agreed. Thereat, Cayago admitted to
SPO2 Delos Reyes that he killed his wife Myra Cayago and was willing to give his statement relative to said killing. SPO2 Delos
Reyes and Cayago returned to the police station and upon such information, Sr. Inspector Pajota instructed Zinampan to
secure a lawyer to assist Cayago. Zinampan then requested Atty. Reynario Campanilla, who agreed to assist Cayago. Atty.
Campanilla conferred with Cayago at the Office of the Investigation Division. After apprising Cayago of his constitutional
rights, Cayago admitted that he killed his wife. Atty. Campanilla then advised Cayago to personally write down his confession
which Cayago did for about an hour in the presence of Atty. Campanilla. Thereafter, with the aid of a tape recorder, requested
Cayago to read his admission. After informing Cayago of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination, SPO2 Delos Reyes
started taking down Cayagos extra-judicial confession again in the presence of Atty. Campanilla and who signed said statement
together with Cayago.

Issue: Whether or not the statement he gave to the police is inadmissible in evidence because of the absence of counsel

Ruling: No. Appellant’s contention that the statement he gave to the police is inadmissible in evidence because it was given
without affording him the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution has no merit. It is undisputed that appellant was not
arrested because the authorities were not yet aware of the crime. It was he himself who reported the incident to the police after
he went to the abandoned barangay hall two days later and discovered that his wife’s body was still there. The right to counsel
is afforded by Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution only to person(s) under investigation for the commission of an
offense. Custodial rights of a person are not available whenever he volunteers statements without being asked. He was not
investigated by the authorities. In fact, after appellant admitted to the police officer that he killed his wife, the officer told him
that he will be provided with a lawyer to assist him. In any case, during the subsequent events the investigation in the precinct
- appellant was assisted by a lawyer, namely, Atty. Campanilla. At the trial, the latter testified that he talked to appellant,
advised him of his constitutional rights and was present when the latter wrote his extrajudicial statement admitting that he
killed his wife. Atty. Campanilla even asked for appellants identification card to verify whether the signature he will sign in his
statement is his own.

CASE# 238 People v. Bacor, 306 SCRA 522

Facts: Upon arraignment on September 4, 1991, accused- appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial then ensued. After the prosecution
rested its case, the defense demurred to the evidence on the ground that accused’s extrajudicial confession which is the only
piece of evidence connecting him to the commission of the murder, is inadmissible for any purpose. The Omnibus Motion To
Demur and Objection To The Admissibility Of Exhibit B For The Prosecution was denied by the trial court in an order dated
June 4, 1992 after which the defense offered the testimonies of the accused himself and the latters father, Cesar Bacor. Their
main line of defense was that at the time the crime was being perpetrated, accused Victor Bacor was at home grating coconuts.
It was however also established in the course of their testimony that Barangay Seor was only about one kilometer from
Barangay SK Avancea where accused Victor lived with his parents and was accessible by means of transportation.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant validly waived his right to remain silent and, therefore, whether his confession is admissible
in evidence against him.
Ruling: Yes, he did. By voluntarily executing his extrajudicial confession, which he did in the presence of and with assistance of
counsel and after having been informed of his constitutional rights, accused effectively waived his right to remain silent

Both the trial and appellate courts correctly convicted accused on the basis of the confession since, as they noted, it was
corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti which dove-tails with the confession

All throughout the custodial investigation, Atty. Miriam Angot of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) took pains to explain
meaningfully to the accused each and every query posed by SPO3 Maharlika Ydulzura. Accused then stamped his approval to
the extrajudicial confession by affixing his signature on each and every page thereof in the presence of counsel Miriam Angot.
Each time, he was asked whether he was willing to give a statement and he said he was. This is sufficient. Contrary to accused-
appellants contention, there is no need for a separate and express written waiver of his constitutional rights. Accused-
appellant was not arrested. He presented himself to the authorities to confess to the crime because, he said, he was being
bothered by his conscience. By voluntarily executing his extrajudicial confession, which he did in the presence of and with the
assistance of counsel and after having been informed of his constitutional rights, accused-appellant effectively waived his right
to remain silent. Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the evidentiary rule that an extrajudicial confession corroborated by
evidence of the corpus delicti is sufficient to support a conviction

CASE# 239 People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 143702, Sept. 13, 2001

Facts: Accused-appellant Zaldy Medoza, argues that the confession he made to PO3 Daniel Tan at the St. Pauls Hospital where
the victim was confined, that he and Marco Aguirre had robbed Abatay is inadmissible in evidence because it was given
without the assistance of counsel while he (accused-appellant) was in custody.

Issue: Whether or not the confession made was inadmissible

Ruling: Indeed, the confession is inadmissible in evidence under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, because
it was given under custodial investigation and was made without the assistance of counsel. However, the defense failed to
object to its presentation during the trial with the result that the defense is deemed to have waived objection to its
admissibility. No error was, therefore, incurred by the trial court in admitting evidence of the confession

CASE# 240 People v. De Vera, 312 SCRA 640

Facts: Edwin de Vera y Garcia, together with Roderick Garcia, Kenneth Florendo and ElmerCastro, was charged with Murder
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City inconnection with the killing of one Frederick Capulong. De Vera and Garcia
pleaded not guilty during arraignment. The other two accused, Florendo and Castro, were at large. During trial, theprosecution
presented as witness one Bernardino Cacao who testified that he saw De Vera in thecar, where an altercation later occurred.
Thereafter, he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle anapparently disabled Capulong and shot

him in the head moments later.

Aside from Cacao’s testimony, the prosecution also presented

De Vera’s extrajudicial statement which established that he knew that Florendo intended to kill the victim and that the three
co-accused were carrying weapons and that he acted as a lookout to watch for passersby. Thereafter, the trial court convicted
DE Vera and his co-accused Garcia of the crime charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of

reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim. In ruling that the crime committed was murder, the trial
court found that the killing was attended by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. One of these was
enough to qualify the crime as murder; the two others constituted generic aggravating circumstances.

The trial court explained that the evidence established evident premeditation, for Florendo’s

group acted with deliberate forethought and tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal design. Treachery
was also proven, because the attack was planned and performed in such a way as to guarantee the execution of the criminal
design without risk to the group. There was also abuse of superior strength, because the attackers took advantage of their
superiority in numbers and weapons. Furthermore, the trial court found that it was indeed Florendo who actually shot the
victim. However, it convicted De Vera as a principal because the scientific and forensic findings on the criminal incident
directly and substantially confirmed the existence of conspiracy among the four accused. Aggrieved, de Vera appealed his
conviction before the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the constitutional rights of the accused were violated or WON the extrajudicial statement should be inadmissible

Ruling: No. In the present case, the Court is satisfied that Atty. Sansano sufficiently fulfilled the objective of this constitutional
mandate. Moreover, appellants allegations of torture must be disregarded for being unsubstantiated. To hold otherwise is to
facilitate the retraction of solemnly made statements at the mere allegation of torture, without any proof whatsoever.

The rule is that Extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.'

If the confession meets these requirements, "it is subsequently tested for voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely — without
coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and credibility, i.e., if it was consistent with the normal experience of
mankind."

When an extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the Constitution, it constitutes evidence of a high order, because
of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless
prompted by truth and conscience. The defense has the burden of proving that it was extracted by means of force, duress or
promise of reward. Appellant failed to overcome the overwhelming prosecution evidence to the contrary

CASE# 241 People v. Mayorga, 346 SCRA 458

Facts: Five-year old Leney was approached by the accused Mayorga alias Puroy who asked her to buy for him a bottle of gin
commonly known as "bagets." He then brought the child to a marshy area ("lalao") nearby where he boxed her on the face and
chest and wrung her neck until she fainted and was raped. Accused contends that Leney, during the trial, was coached by her
grandmother and thus depriving him of his right to cross examine.

Issue: WON there was violation of right to cross examination

Ruling: No. This appeal primarily hinges on the issue of credibility of witnesses. We have held that except for compelling
reasons, we cannot disturb the manner the trial courts have calibrated the credence of witnesses because of their direct
opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth. As trial courts, they can best
appreciate the verbal and non-verbal communication made by witnesses which cannot, with precise accuracy, be placed on the
records.

However, the argument that Leney has lost her credibility since she admitted that she had been coached by her grandmother
has no merit. The victim, an innocent and guileless five-year old when the crime was committed against her, cannot be
expected to recall every single detail and aspect of the brutal experience that she went through in the hands of the accused.
Besides, at the time of her testimony she had stopped schooling and did not have the gift of articulation. It is but fair that she
be guided through by her grandmother in recounting her harrowing experience which happened two (2) years before she
testified.

CASE# 242 People v. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383

Facts: On the evening of March 25, 1994, the 9yo daughter of MAXIMO Doria named MYLENE went missing

MAXIMO sought the help of their neighbors to search for her. He also asked the Barangay Captain for assistance in the search.
The search team looked everywhere but the it yielded nothing for hours. Tired and distraught, MAXIMO started his way back
home when, at about 5 meters away from his house, he saw herein accused-appellant Delfin RONDERO pumping the artesian
well. He had an ice-pick clenched in his mouth and was washing his bloodied hands

After searching, the team proceeded with the search and after some time, they found MYLENE’s lifeless body near the canteen.
Her right hand was raised above her head, which was severely bashed, and her fractured left hand was behind her back. She
was naked from the waist down and had several contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her
right hand were some hair strands

30mins later, policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot investigation. Thereafter, MAXIMO led the policemen to
the artesian well where he had seen RONDERO earlier washing his hands. The policemen found that the artesian well was
spattered with blood

After investigation, the policemen, acting on the lead as guided by MAXIMO, arrested RONDERO. Thereafter, appellant was
formally charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide and he pleaded “not guilty” at his arraignment.
Meanwhile, the hair strands which were found on the victim’s hand, together with hair specimens taken from the victim and
RONDERO, were sent to the NBI for laboratory examination.
The NBI chemist, however, found it difficult to conduct the tests because the sample provided to her were not viable for
comparison with the strands found clutched in MYLENE’s hand so the hair from both MYLENE and RONDERO must be
pulled, not cut. Thereupon, appellant RONDERO, who executed a “waiver of detention” including a waiver of his custodial
rights (under Sec 12, Article III, Const.), was allegedly convinced by a police superior to give sample hair strands. Another
police officer went to the Doria’s residence to get hair samples from MYLENE, who had not yet been interred

With viable samples now at hand, the NBI conducted the necessary tests and it found that the hair strands found on the right
hand of the victim had similar characteristics to those of RONDERO’s.

The accused-appellant avers the acquisition of his hair strands without his express written consent and without the presence of
his counsel, which, he contends is a violation of his Constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sections 12 and 17,
Article III of the Constitution

Issue: WON the evidence gathered, particularly accused-appellant’s hair strands can be admitted as evidence against him

Ruling: Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For
instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness
and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently, although
accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination,
the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any
evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are inadmissible in evidence. They
were taken without the proper search warrant from the police officers. Accused-appellant’s wife testified that the police
officers, after arresting her husband in their house, took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was
never rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” evidence
illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all
evidence subsequently obtained. Simply put, accused-appellant’s garments, having been seized in violation of his
constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as evidence.

CASE# 243 People v. Declaro, 170 SCRA 143

Facts: As a result of a traffic accident, accused was charge with slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Both the
offended party and the prosecuting fiscal, however, failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice. The case was
dismissed due to lack of interest and a motion consideration filed by the fiscal was granted.

A motion for reconsideration of the said order was filed by the fiscal on January 27, 1983. The motion for reconsideration was
granted in an order dated May 27, 1983. The case was, therefore, set for trial.

In the meanwhile, considering that the said case had been dismissed on January 19, 1983, counsel for the accused filed a
motion to dismiss Criminal Case No. 1421 on the ground that the dismissal of the prior case is a bar to the prosecution of the
latter. In an order dated March 23, 1983, the trial court dismissed Criminal Case No. 1421 on the ground of double jeopardy. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by the prosecution but this was denied on May 11, 1983.
Issue: WON there was double jeopardy and WON there was a violation of the constitutional right to speedy trial

Ruling: No. To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as that in the first.

The dismissal is with consent of the accused, hence a waiver of his right against double jeopardy. In the present case, the
accused was duly notified that the case was set for hearing on January 19, 1983. On said date of hearing neither the
complainant nor the fiscal appeared despite due notice. This was the first date of hearing after arraignment. The court a quo
should not have dismissed the case and should have instead reset the case to another date to give the prosecution another day
in court.

No, right to speedy trial was not violated. In the instant case, the complaining witness and the prosecutor failed to appear only
in the first hearing. Even if the court did not dismiss the case but merely postponed the hearing to another date, there would
not have been a denial of the right of the accused to a speedy trial. The right of the accused to have a speedy trial is violated
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when, without good cause or justifiable motive, a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without his case being tried. None of said situations exists in the present case. Surely, it
cannot be said that there was a violation of the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial. As we observed, the more
prudent step that the court a quo should have taken was to postpone the hearing to give the prosecution another opportunity to
present its case. The court a quo had in fact reconsidered its order of dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1028-N and reset it for
trial. It should have maintained said action instead of granting the motion for reconsideration of the accused. The dismissal of
the case by the trial court on the ground that the accused is entitled to a speedy trial is unwarranted under the circumstances
obtaining in this case.

CASE# 244 People v. Bernas, 130 SCRA 178

Facts: Accused was charged with 3 counts of Rape. When arraigned on the charges, appellant, with the assistance of counsel,
pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the prosecution presented its evidence. After the prosecution rested its case, appellant --
through his counsel -- manifested that he did not want to present any evidence and was submitting the case for decision, based
on the evidence presented by the prosecution.

After being satisfied that the waiver was voluntary and intelligent, the RTC considered the cases submitted for decision.
Thereafter, the prosecution moved to reopen the case, it reasoned that it had failed to present the Birth Certificate of the
victim, Evelyn Bernas, necessary to prove the minority of the victim. The court a quo granted the Motion to Reopen the case In
Criminal Cases Nos. L-1893 and L-1896, before the prosecution presented its evidence, appellant -- through his counsel --
moved for the change of his former plea of not guilty to that of guilty, a Motion which the RTC granted Appellant was thus re-
arraigned, and he pleaded guilty to the criminal charges.

The trial court held that appellant, through force and intimidation, had carnal knowledge of his two daughters: Evelyn (then 13
years old) on July 1, 1996 and May 7, 1996, and Marigen (then 15 years old) on June 10, 1996. Hence, this automatic review
before us
Issue: WON the court erred accepting accused-appellants improvident pleas of guilty to a capital offense and in failing to
conduct a searching inquiry as to whether the accused- appellant fully understood the consequences of his plea

Issue: Yes. n People v. Aranzado, the Court reiterated the rules a trial court must observe when an accused desires to plead
guilty to a capital offense: (1) The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea; (2) The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and
the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and
allow him to do so if he desires.

the Court explained how the first requirement — a "searching inquiry" — should be conducted, as follows: "(1) Ascertain from
the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent
counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated
during the investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or
placed under a state of duress either by actual threats or physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters. (2) Ask
the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to the accused the
meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty. (3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his
age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free
and informed plea of guilty. (4) Inform the accused [of] the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the
law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient
treatment or upon bad advice or because of bad promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should [h]e admit
guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under these mistaken
impressions. (5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him or make him reenact
the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him to supply missing details of significance.

CASE# 245 Churchill V. Mari et al. v. Hon. Rolando L. Gonzalez, September 12, 2011

Facts: Private Complainant Mari executed a sworn statement before the police alleging that she was raped by Private
Respondent Paloma. Preliminary Investigation ensued and a warrant of arrest against Paloma was eventually issued by MCTC.
Paloma voluntarily surrendered.

Paloma filed a motion for bail. During the hearing for bail, Petitioner failed to appear, and an Order granting bail was given to
Paloma, set at 200k.

An administrative order from SC divested the first-level courts of the authority to conduct preliminary investigation. Hence,
the records of the case was forwarded to the Public Prosecutor, who found probable cause to file the Information. RTC then
found cause to issue a warrant of arrest and Paloma was recommitted to detention.

During the different stages of arraignment, pre-trial, and trial, both Public and Private Prosecutors, as well as the Complainant
herself failed to appear despite due notice. Some of their reasons for failing to appear:

A. That there is still a pending petition for change of venue

i. Dismissed by Respondent Judge as it is not excusable for not

appearing in hearings

B. That there are other cases being handled by the Private Prosecutor

i. Dismissed by the Judge. This argument was raised on the latter part
of the case when the prosecution has already failed to appear multiple
times. Also, the accused has already invoked his right to a speedy trial.
Accused was already in jail.

The Respondent Judge eventually dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. MR likewise denied. Hence, this petition
Issue: WON the accused right to speedy trial is violated

Ruling: Yes. According to S10 of Speedy Trial Act, now embodied in S3 R119:

SEC. 3. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which
trial must commence:

(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but not
limited to the following:

xxxx

(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of
cases or transfer from other courts.

Court disagrees, a reading of the rule would show that the rule shows that the only delay that may be excluded from the time
limit are those resulting from the proceedings concerning the accused. The change of venue proceeding can only be excluded if
the accused was the one who filed for it, contrary to what happened in this case.

Further, records show that the 30-day limit in R119 S1 had already been breached. SC agrees with the RTC in observing that
the prosecution appeared to be intentionally delaying the proceedings by failing to appear on the hearings set by the court,
filing a motion for cancellation of hearing on the day of the hearing itself, or not even bothering to appear on the date they set
for hearing on their motion.

Petitioners are also mistaken that the mere pendency of their petition for change of venue would interrupt the proceedings
before the trial court. It is the same as when a petition for certiorari is filed; it does not interrupt the proceedings before the
trial court unless a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order is given.

Further, in recent jurisprudence, in determining w/n the accused is deprived of the right to speedy trial, the following factors
are to be considered:

a. Duration of the delay

b. Reason for such delay

c. Assertion of the right (to speedy trial) or failure to assert it

d. Prejudice caused by such delay

In determining the right to a speedy trial, the courts are required to do more than a mathematical equation. In this case, the
accused was already deprived of liberty for 4 months when he was first incarcerated by the MCTC, and again for 6 months after
the Information was filed before the RTC following the Adm. Order. Verily, the accused was already deprived of liberty and it is
vexatious to delay the proceedings by a mere motion for change of venue, especially so if there’s no WPI or TRO.

CASE# 246 Ivler v. Modesto-SanPedro – 17 Nov. 2010

Facts: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for
injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first
delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for
the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought
from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial
question.

Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence,
cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.

Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband.

Ruling: Yes. Reckless imprudence is a single crime and its consequence on persons and property are material only to
determine the penalty and prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense under the rule of double jeopardy.

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit
other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court's unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied
to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz.

There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru
reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon
which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought
before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the
same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered
in the affirmative.

Also, Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The confusion bedeviling the
question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize
conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing
single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple
penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the
act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting
consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

How should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with
its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or
should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be
penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied
Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences unless one consequence amounts to a light felony,
in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and
filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the
charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce
invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most
serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves
only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts.
The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as
grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried
separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime
collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity, penalizing each consequence separately. By
prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant
occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are
conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, it is held that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity
of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information
shall be filed in the same first level court.

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The provisions contained in this article shall
not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately
defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under
Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal
of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts,
undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.

CASE# 247 Dela Cruz v. People - 23 July 2014

Facts: Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman - Visayas.

The NBI received a complaint from Corazon Absin and Charito Escobido that Ariel, the live-in partner of Corazon and Charito
was picked up by unknown male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number
to the complainants, and when the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office
located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. In the said police office, they met "James" who demanded from them P100,000,
later lowered to P40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text
messages received by the complainants. A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation, which took
place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. Petitioner was required to
submit his urine for drug testing.

It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the confirmatory test result labeled as
Toxicology (Dangerous Drugs) . The version of the defense stated otherwise, petitioner claims that when he is in the NBI
Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also requested to be
allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample, to no avail.

Ruling of the RTC

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its Decision 4 dated 6 June 2007, found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of compulsory
rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months at the Cebu Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug
Dependents located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City.

Issue: WON the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is illegal and does it violate the petitioner right against self-
incrimination

Ruling: Yes. We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the subsequent affirmation by the CA, erroneous on
three counts.

The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts
listed under Article II of R.A. 9165. To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not
listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the
alleged act of extortion.

The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion. The constitutional right of an accused against self-
incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the
right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial
act.

In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge of extortion. The RTC and the CA,
therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a
mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."

The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior
to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to
submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances

CASE# 248 People v. Pepino - 12 January 2016

Facts: Two men and a woman entered the office of Edward Tan at Kilton Motors Corporation in Sucat, Parafiaque City, and
pretended to be customers. When Edward was about to receive them, one of the men, eventually identified as Pepino pulled
out a gun. Thinking that it was a holdup, Edward told Pepino that the money was inside the cashier's box. Pepino and the other
man looted the "'cashier's box, handcuffed Edward, and forced him to go with them. The abductors then confined Edward in
an apartment in Quezon City where they insisted on asking ransom from Edward’s father.

The exchange was performed eventually with the abductors and Edward’s wife Jocelyn wherein after the exchange of money
and Edward being released, the victim reported the kidnapping to Teresita Ang See, a known anti-crime crusader.

After five months, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI!) informed Edward that they had apprehended some suspects,
and invited him to identify them from a lineup consisting of seven persons: five males and two females. Edward positively
identified Pepino, Gomez, and one Mario Galgo.9 Jocelyn likewise identified Pepino.

Pepino and Gomez did not testify for their defense. The defense instead presented Zeny Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino who alleged
that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest leading to a violation of their rights.

Issue: Whether or not the illegal arrest of an accused is sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error

Ruling: No. The Court pointed out at the outset that Gomez did not question before arraignment the legality of her warrantless
arrest or the acquisition of RTC's jurisdiction over her person. Thus, Gomez is deemed to have waived any objection to her
warrantless arrest.

It is settled that any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

Appellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest as he failed to move for the quashing of the
information before the trial court. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial.

At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after a trial free from error. Simply put, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to
prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. It is much too late in the day to complain about the
warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced and had
been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against her.

CASE# 249 Ibanez v. People - 27 January 2016

Facts: Rodolfo Liberia (victim) noticed some garbage in front of his house. As a result, he uttered vernacular utterances which
angered Emilio and Boyet Ibañez, who threw stones at the victim’s forehead. Rodolfo went inside in his house and emerged
again with piece of wood in his hand. However, Ronald, Father of Emilio and Boyet held the victim and David, other sibling of
the accused, hit Rodolfo in the head. Then Boyet and Bobot simultaneously stabbed the victim in the abdomen. On the other
hand, the Ibañez refute the accusations and alleged that it was Rodolfo who stabbed Ronald and Bobot. Other accused imposed
alibi and denial as their defense.

Rodolfo filed a complaint against the Ibañez. Trial Court assigned Atty. Manzano and Atty Colasito as their counsel de officio.
However, Atty Manzano and Rodolfo failed to appear in the hearing when witnesses completed their testimonies without any
prior notice, which means that his right to cross-examine the witnesses is deemed waived. Thereafter, Trial Court appointed
Atty. Sindingan (5th counsel de officio) who handled the cross-examination of other witnesses.

Petitioners insisted that they were denied of their right to counsel when Atty. Manzano failed to appear on the said hearing and
they were divested of the opportunity to cross-examine the said two witnesses.
Issue: Whether the petitioners were deprived of their constitutionally granted right to counsel.

Ruling: No deprivation of right to counsel. In addition to the constitutional right if the accused to be heard and
counsel, Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court decrees that: SEC. 1. Rights of accused at the trial.—In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:

xxxx

(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from
arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. x x x

xxxx

On the other hand, Rule 116 of the same Rules makes it mandatory for the trial court to designate a counsel de officio for the
accused in the absence of private representation. An accused without counsel is essentially deprived of a fair hearing which is
tantamount to a grave denial of due process.

However, in the case at bar, petitioners were duly represented by a counsel de officio all throughout the proceedings except for
one hearing because Atty. mansion and Rodolfo were absent. As a result, mere opportunity to cross-examine and not the actual
cross-examination is deemed waived. The Court is not persuaded that the absence of the counsel de oficio in one of the
hearings of this case amounts to a denial of right to counsel. Nor does such absence warrant the nullification of the entire trial
court proceedings and the eventual invalidation of its ruling. There is no showing that the several appointed counsel de oficio
in any way neglected to perform their duties to the appellant and to the trial court and that the defense had suffered in any
substantial sense therefrom.

CASE# 250 People v. Sergio – 9 October 2019

Facts: Mary Jane’s neighbors, Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and Julius L. Lacanilao (Julius), taking advantage of the
former’s dire situation and susceptibility, offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in Malaysia. Mary Jane believed that
the job was a ray of hope so to pay Cristina and Julius her placement fee, she scraped whatever meager money she had,
borrowed money from her relatives and prompted her husband to sell their precious motorcycle. Mary Jane, together with
Cristina, eventually left Malaysia. However, upon their arrival in Malaysia, to Mary Jane’s dismay, she was informed by
Cristina that the job intended for her was no longer available. After a few days in Malaysia, Cristina sent Mary Jane to
Indonesia for a holiday with a promise that she will have a job upon her return. Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket and a
luggage to bring on her trip.

Upon arriving at the airport in Indonesia, Mary Jane was apprehended by the police for allegedly carrying 2.6 kilograms of
heroin inside her luggage. She was charged with drug trafficking and was eventually convicted and sentenced die by firing
squad. Her execution was originally scheduled on April 9, 2015 but later rescheduled to April 28, 2015. Mary Jane was granted
an indefinite reprieve in light of the arrest of Cristina and Julius who were later charged with qualified trafficking in person in
violation of Section 4(a) in relation to Sections 3(a) and 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208[1], illegal recruitment as penalized
under Section 6, par. (k) and (1) ofR.A. No. 8042[2] and estafa in violation of Section 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code

Pursuant to the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters entered into by Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty), the Indonesian authorities deferred indefinitely the execution of Mary Jane to afford her an
opportunity to present her case against Cristina, Julius, and “Ike” who were allegedly responsible for recruiting and exploiting
her to engage in drug trafficking.
 The Indonesian authorities however imposed among others, that in taking Mary Jane’s Testimony, she shall remain in
detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia and the questions to be propounded to her shall be in writing.

Thereafter, the State filed a “Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition
Upon Written Interrogatories.” The motion was granted by the Trial Court in a resolution. This prompted Julius and Cristina
to file a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals for grave abuse of discretion. The CA granted the petition for
Certiorari and reversed the resolution of the Trial Court.

Issue: WoN the constitutional right to confrontation of a witness was violated

Ruling: No, it was not. he deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional right to confrontation of a
witness of Cristina and Julius.

The right to confrontation of a witness is one of the fundamental basic rights of an accused. It is ingrained in our justice system
and guaranteed by no less than the 1987 Constitution as stated under its Article III, Section 14 (2), to wit:

Section 14. (1) x x x

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Emphasis supplied)

The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal proceedings but also in civil proceedings as well as in
proceedings in administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers. It has a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the
accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross-examination; and (2) secondarily, to allow the judge to
observe the deportment of the witness.

True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane face to face in light of the prevailing circumstance.
However, the terms and conditions laid down by the trial court ensure that they are given ample opportunity to cross-examine
Mary Jane by way of written interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose of their constitutional right. To recall, the trial
court requires Cristina and Julius, through their counsel, to file their comment and may raise objections to the proposed
questions in the written interrogatories submitted by the prosecution. The trial court judge shall promptly rule on the
objections. Thereafter, only the final questions would be asked by the Consul of the Philippines in Indonesia or his designated
representative. The answers of Mary Jane to the propounded questions must be written verbatim, and a transcribed copy of
the same would be given to the counsel of the accused who would, in turn, submit their proposed cross interrogatory questions
to the prosecution. Should the prosecution raise any objection thereto, the trial court judge must promptly rule on the same,
and the final cross interrogatory questions for the deposition of Mary Jane will then be conducted. Mary Jane's answers in the
cross interrogatory shall likewise be taken in verbatim and a transcribed copy thereof shall be given to the prosecution.

The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has likewise been upheld. As aptly stated in the terms and
conditions for the taking of deposition, the trial court judge will be present during the conduct of written interrogatories on
Mary Jane. This will give her ample opportunity to observe and to examine the demeanor of the witness closely. Although the
deposition is in writing, the trial court judge can still carefully perceive the reaction and deportment of Mary Jane as she
answers each question propounded to her both by the prosecution and the defense.

Indubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are equally safeguarded. The parameters laid down by the trial
court are sufficient in detail ensuring that Mary Jane will give her testimony under oath to deter lying by the threat of perjury
charge. She is still subjected to cross-examination so as to determine the presence of any falsehood in her testimony. Lastly,
the guidelines enable the trial court judge to observe her demeanor as a witness and assess her credibility.

CASE# 251 Causing v. dela Rosa – OCA IPI No.17-4663-RTJ, March 07, 2018

Facts: Atty. Causing and his client, Mabasa (Complainants), charged respondent Judge Dela Rosa with gross ignorance of the law,
gross misconduct and gross incompetence for reversing the dismissal of a criminal case wherein Mabasa was one of the accused
Complainants alleged that the Libel Cases were dismissed by former Acting Presiding Judge Gamor B. Disalo (Judge Disalo) in an Order
dated April 13, 2015 on the ground that the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated.
The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 13, 2015 Order before the RTC Br. 4 Manila, now presided by
respondent Judge Dela Rosa. Respondent Judge Dela Rosa granted the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration in the assailed
Resolution dated November 23, 2015. Complainants questioned respondent Judge Dela Rosa's November 23, 2015 Resolution granting
the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration because, according to them, it was elementary for respondent Judge Dela Rosa to know
that the prior dismissal of a criminal case due to a violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial is equivalent to a dismissal on the
merits of the case and, as such, granting the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration was tantamount to a violation of the
constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Issue: Was the right to speedy trial violated

Ruling: No The Court agrees with the OCA that it would be absurd to hold respondent Judge Dela Rosa liable for his November 23,
2015 Order when he had himself rectified this in his subsequent June 20, 2016 Order. To rule otherwise would be to render judicial
office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment. To hold otherwise "would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering
infallible judgments.

Respondent Judge Dela Rosa explained in his Comment that he had issued the November 23, 2015 Resolution because, after studying
the records, he discovered that Complainants caused much of the delay in the proceedings.

Respondent Judge Dela Rosa emphasized that the day the Libel Cases were dismissed, i.e., on April 13, 2015, was actually the date set
for the first actual trial of the cases. He stressed that the delay of almost five (5) years in the subject cases was attributable more to
Mabasa than anyone else.

CASE# 252 Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, - 31 July 2018 – G.R. Nos. 206438 & 20645

Facts: On February 10, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous complaint alleging that Amelia May Constantino,
Mary Ann Gadian, and Joy Tangan of the Vice Governor's Office, Sarangani Province committed graft and corruption by diverting
public funds given as grants or aid using barangay officials and cooperatives as "dummies."

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Audit for audit investigation

On November 17, 2011 (7 years after), the OMB filed Informations for Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents against Cagang, Camanay, Zoleta, Macagcalat, and Mangalen.

Cagang argued that there was an inordinate delay of seven (7) years in the filing of the Informations . Citing Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan and Roque v. Ombudsman, he argued that the delay violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy
disposition of cases. The OMB, on the other hand, filed a Comment/Opposition arguing that there was no showing that delay in the
filing was intentional, capricious, whimsical, or motivated by personal reasons.

Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest but it was subsequently dismissed. The
Sandiganbayan argued that there was no inordinate delay in the issuance of the information, considering that 40 different individuals
were involved with direct participation in more or less 81 different transactions.

Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed his Motion to Quash/Dismiss since the
Informations filed against him violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases
Issue: Whether or not INORDINATE DELAY exists in this case

Ruling: No. Determining the length of delay necessarily involves a query on when a case is deemed to have
commenced.

What may constitute a reasonable time to resolve a proceeding is not determined by “mere mathematical reckoning.” It requires
consideration of a number of factors, including the time required to investigate the complaint, to file the information, to conduct an
arraignment, the application for bail, pre-trial, trial proper, and the submission of the case for decision. Unforeseen circumstances, such
as unavoidable postponements or force majeure, must also be taken into account.

In Dansal v. Fernandez, this Court recognized that the right to speedy disposition of cases does not only include the period from
which a case is submitted for resolution. Rather, it covers the entire period of investigation even before trial. Thus, the right
may be invoked as early as the preliminary investigation or inquest.

Inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation violates the accused’s right to due
process and the speedy disposition of cases, and may result in the dismissal of the case against the accused. The
burden of proving delay depends on whether delay is alleged within the periods provided by law or procedural rules. If the delay is
alleged to have occurred during the given periods, the burden is on the respondent or the accused to prove that the delay was
inordinate. If the delay is alleged to have occurred beyond the given periods, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that the delay
was reasonable under the circumstances and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.

Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. Inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a
preliminary investigation will result in the dismissal of the case against the accused. Delay, however, is not determined through
mere mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding each case.

Nonetheless, the accused must invoke his or her constitutional rights in a timely manner. The failure to do so could be
considered by the courts as a waiver of right.

Admittedly, while there was delay, petitioner has not shown that he asserted his rights during this period, choosing
instead to wait until the information was filed against him with the Sandiganbayan.

The Court finds that there is no violation of the accused's right to speedy disposition of cases considering that there was
a waiver of the delay of a complex case. Definitely, granting the present Petitions and finding grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Sandiganbayan will only prejudice the due process rights of the State.

Module 8:RULE 116 – ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

Sec. 1. Arraignment and Plea: how made

CASE #253. Borja v. Mendoza, 22 SCRA 422

Facts: Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in Cebu City. However, he was not arraigned. That notwithstanding, respondent
Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was
appealed to the Court of First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged that the failure to arraign him is
a violation of his constitutional right to due process, more specifically of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him and of his right to be heard by himself and counsel. It was also alleged that without requiring him to submit his
memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered. The Solicitor General commented that the decision should be annulled
because there was no arraignment.
Issue: Whether or not Borja should be arraigned first before the trial can commence

Held/Ruling: Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was
indicted and what penal offenses he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with
full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him.

The sentence to be imposed in such a case is to be in accordance with a valid law. Due process is where the accused is “heard in a court
of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation,
upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded with the authority of a constitutional law.” An
arraignment thus becomes indispensable as the means “for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he is required
to meet.” Upon the accused being arraigned, “there is a duty laid by the Code(now the Rule of Court) upon the court to inform him of
certain rights and to extend to him, on his demand, certain others. This duty is an affirmative one which the court on its own motion
must perform unless waived.” There is no doubt that it could be waived, but here there was no such waiver, whether express or implied,
because the records clearly show that petitioner was not arraigned at all and was not represented by counsel throughout the whole
proceedings in the respondent City Court.

CASE #254. People v. Abapo, 329 SCRA 513

Facts: On January 16, 1998, Benjie Tecson filed a sworn complaint before the National Bureau of Investigation, National Capital
Region, alleging that she was first raped by her father when she was barely ten years old inside their house in Nagcarlan, Laguna. She
narrated that the first incident was repeated several more times at a rate of not less than twice a week and almost everyday when her
mother was not around. The alleged sexual congress between her and her father went on until February 1997 when Benjie finally
became pregnant.

Expedito Abapo y Siroihos was charged with raping his daughter eighty-six (86) times in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of
San Pablo. On March 18, 1998, the RTC rendered its decision convicting the accused of eighty-five (85) counts of rape. The court
imposed the supreme penalty of death for thirty-seven (37) counts of rape committed after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 and reclusion
perpetua for forty-eight (48) counts of rape committed from January 1990 to December 1993. The dispositive portion of the Judgment
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of eighty-five (85) counts of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659 .

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty to the crimes charged with the assistance of his counsel, Attorney Nena O. Palencia. The
prosecution was however ordered to adduce evidence as required by the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not the court failed in its obligation to explain fully to the accused-appellant the consequences of his plea of guilt and
the probable penalty that may be imposed upon him

Held/Ruling: Yes. While the trial court inquired as to the voluntariness of the accused-appellant's plea, it failed to explain fully to the
accused-appellant that once convicted, he could possibly be meted the death penalty. The fact that the court asked him whether he
would accept the punishment that may be imposed upon him is not a sufficient explanation to the accused of the consequences of his
plea. The importance of the court's obligation cannot be overemphasized for one cannot dispel the possibility that the accused-appellant
may have been led to believe that due to his voluntary plea of guilt, he may be imposed with the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and
not death. Such assumption is erroneous considering that death is a single and indivisible penalty, which is imposed regardless of the
presence of a mitigating circumstance. Thus, there is a need for the trial court, to take the necessary measures to see that the accused
really and truly comprehended the meaning, full significance, and consequences of his plea. The failure of the trial court to perform its
obligation is a ground to remand the case for rearraignment.

Considering that the accused-appellant entered an improvident plea of guilt, which improperly impaired the prosecution’s presentation
of the evidence, a duty mandated by the rules, the court is constrained to remand the thirty-seven (37) charges of rape to the court a quo
for rearraignment and further proceedings in accordance with the above pronouncement of the court.

CASE #255. People v. Cariaga, 64 Phil 390

Facts: This an appeal taken by the accused from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, sentencing him for the crime of
theft to one month and one day of arresto mayor, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P1.20, with the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the additional penalty of two years, four months and one day of prision
correccional, the accused being a habitual delinquent, with costs.

The first assignment of alleged error is based upon the fact that the appealed judgment states: "Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of
guilty." The appellant, without denying the fact itself, contends that the record does not show when, where or how he was arraigned.
According to him, neither does it appear of record that he was waived the right to be arraigned.

Issue: Whether or not the statement in the judgment that the accused had been arraigned and that he pleaded guilty is sufficient
compliance with the provisions of sections 16 and 25 of General Orders, No. 58
Held/Ruling: Yes. The court is of the opinion that the statement in the judgment that the accused had been arraigned and that he
pleaded guilty is sufficient compliance with the provisions of sections 16 and 25 of General Orders, No. 58, inasmuch as it may be
presumed from said statement that the law has been obeyed by causing the accused to appear before the court, and it is shown thereby
that he has really been arraigned, his plea entered personally being that of guilty. All this is not a mere conclusion as the appellant
gratuitously contends, because this court is of the opinion that generally a conclusion is the averment or denial of a fact deduced from
some evidence, or the averment or denial of a point of law derived from a law or principle of law. In this case, however, the court's
averment in the judgment that the accused was arraigned and that he pleaded guilty, is not a deduction or consequence of an evidence,
legal provision or principle of law, but a positive statement of facts.

What difference would it make if the court, after hearing the accused pleaded guilty upon arraignment, stated such facts in the judgment
rendered immediately, in open court and in the presence of said accused, or caused said arraignment and plea of the accused to be
stated in the minutes? Absolutely none. What is important and essential is that the accused be arraigned and that he enter
his plea. It is immaterial how or in what manner such facts are stated. For legal purposes, it makes no difference
whether they appear in the minutes or in the judgment itself.

CASE #256. Kummer v. People, G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013

Facts: An information was filed against petitioner Leticia Kummer and her son, Johan, a minor, for homicide. According to the
prosecution’s evidence, on June 19, 1988, the victim Jesus Mallo, accompanied by Malana went to the house of Kummer. When
Kummer opened the door, her son Johan shot Mallo twice. Kummer denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she and her
children were already asleep in the evening of June 19, 1988. The prosecution filed an information for homicide against the petitioner
and Johan. Both accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. They waived the pre-trial, and the trial on the
merits accordingly followed.

Meanwhile, the prosecutor made some amendments on the date of the complaint for a difference of only one month. Both RTC and
Court of Appeals found both the petitioner and Johan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Petitioner questioned the
sufficiency of prosecution’s evidence. She claimed that she was not arraigned on the amendment information for which she was
convicted.

Issue: Whether or not arraignment is required when there is formal amendment in a complaint or information

Held/Ruling: No. Change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is merely a formal amendment,
thus, no arraignment is required.

The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, has already been
attained when the accused was arraigned the first time. The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably come as a surprise to
the accused simply because the amendment did not charge a new offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution.

The records of the case evidently show that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of
only one month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence cited above, the change in the date of the
commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment — it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of
the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the
defense under the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of defenses used by the petitioner.
This is also true with respect to the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner. The effected amendment was of this nature and did
not need a second plea.

CASE #257. Bandoy v. Jacinto - 19 Nov. 2014

Facts: Bandoy was charged with serious illegal detention initiated by De Jesus which was raffled to Judge Jacinto’s sala. Bandoy argued
that the charge was filed by De Jesus merely to get back against him for being instrumental in the filing of charge against De Jesus for
violation of Article XXII, Section 261, Paragraph 7, number 14 of the Omnibus Election Code (Ballot Switching). Bandoy, who was the
poll watcher of Mayor Panaligan, was said to have caught De Jesus in the act of ballot switching. De Jesus is a public elementary school
teacher who was the chair of the Board of Election Inspectors of a particular precinct in Occidental Mindoro. He was alleged to be
having close ties with the rival of Villarosa, the rival of Mayor Panaligan. He was caught by a member of the media and has already been
the object of a warrant of arrest. The case was also raffled in the sala of Judge Jacinto.

Bandoy argues that Judge Jacinto has been manifestly partial towards De Jesus, allowing the latter to postpone his arraignment 7 times,
before finally pleading not guilty before Judge Jacinto inside his chambers. He also submits that the judge failed to dismiss the serious
illegal detention case against him despite the fact that De Jesus has also failed to appear whenever he was subpoenaed. Meanwhile,
Bandoy had his case reviewed under the DOJ. Secretary de Lima granted his motion and ordered the prosecutor to withdraw the case.
Judge Jacinto aslo denied the motion for withdrawal. The theory of the petitioner is that the manifest partiality by the judge against him
is because Villarosa, the candidate which De Jesus had close ties to, was the principal sponsor in Judge Jacinto’s wedding.

Issue: Whether or not the arraignment and plea to the accused can be made inside the chambers of the Judge
Held/Ruling: No. Given the exacting standards required of magistrates in the application of the law and procedure, the Court finds
Judge Jacinto, Jr. administratively guilty of gross ignorance of Rule 116 of the  Revised Rules of Court, specifically Section 1 (a) thereof
requiring arraignment of an accused to be made in open court, to wit:

Section 1. Arraignment and plea, how made. — (a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information
was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy
of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or
not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.

The procedural steps laid down in Section 1 (a) of Rule 116 are not empty rituals that a judge can take nonchalantly. Each step
constitutes an integral part of that crucial stage in criminal litigation "where the issues are joined . . . and without which the proceedings
cannot advance further."

Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense

CASE #258. Estipona v. Lobrigo - 15 August 2017

Facts: Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs).

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not
guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) of the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the
minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.

The prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the
Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which
prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of said law violates:

1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;

2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and

3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.

Issue: Whether or not Plea bargaining is a constitutional right

Held/Ruling: No. A defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than
accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to
plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition
precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the
prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or
graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.

Plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of
the case subject to court approval." There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that
both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be
encouraged because the chief virtues of the system — speed, economy, and finality — can benefit the accused, the offended party, the
prosecution, and the court.

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right.
Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

CASE #259. Daan v. Sandigan - 28 March 2008

Facts: Daan, together with accused Mayor Kuizon, were charged before this Court for three counts of malversation of public funds
involving the sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and P13,528.00, respectively, which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time
book and payrolls for given period making it appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building
of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to the charge for
malversation, the accused were also indicted before this Court for three counts of falsification of a public document by a public officer or
employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute the same with a plea of "guilty",
provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the
alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of
falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public
document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of "not
guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.

The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the main
ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its approval.

Issue: Whether or not plea bargaining can be made only during the pre-trial stage of proceedings

Held/Ruling: No. Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the
Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference. But it may also be made during the
trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is
immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already presented
several witnesses.

Case #260. Heirs of Gevero v. Guihing Agricultural Dev. Corp. (G.R. No.122619, 18 August 2006)

Facts: Nava is an employee of GADECO. In 1990, while he was driving a motorcycle, issued to him by GADECO, Nava's motorcycle
bumped the bicycle Mario Gevero was riding on. As a result of the collision, the latter died. Nava was charged with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide in an Information filed with the RTC. Before his arraignment, he manifested his intent to enter a plea of guilty to
a lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, under Article 365 of the RPC. The wife of the late Mario Gevero,
and their children consented to the plea of guilty to a lesser offense by Nava. The trial court issued an Order finding accused Nava guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and ordering him to pay a fine of
P200.00.

During the separate hearing of the civil aspect of the Criminal Case, Gevero’s wife testified that at the time of the death of her husband,
he was 30years old, earning P6,000.00 a month as a T-shirt designer and P2,000.00 as a "freelance" worker. She incurred P153,222.15
for medical, hospitalization, and burial expenses. The accused did not object to the prosecution's formal offer of these evidence. The
trial court rendered its Decision, ordering the Nava to indemnify the offended party the amount of P153,222.15 for medical,
hospitalization, and burial expenses; and to pay P8,000.00 for loss of earnings in the concept of actual or compensatory damages;
P200,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as attorney's fees; P500.00 per court appearance as may be shown on record; and
costs of suit. The writ of execution was issued but it was satisfied since the accused was insolvent. Upon motion of the heirs of the
victim, the trial court issued a writ of execution against GADECO, employer of Nava. GADECO filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
which set aside the orders of the trial court. CA ruled that the civil liability of GADECO is only P200, the damage caused to the bicycle of
Gevero and ordered the heirs of Gevero to return to GADECO the amount of P157 044.75

Issue: Whether or not the civil liability of the accused who entered a plea of guilty to a lesser offense should be for the offense for which
he was convicted

Ruling: No. Limiting Nava’s civil liability to the cost of the damage to the bicycle, clearly ignored the fact of the death of the victim. The
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide necessarily produces death. The offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property does not. Obviously, the fact of death of the victim cannot be reconciled with the accused’s plea of guilty to the
lesser offense of reckless resulting in damage to property.

Section 2, Rule 116 is silent on the effect of the plea to a lesser offense on the civil liability of the accused. However, in Amaton vs.
Aujero, the Court held that the law is not entirely bereft of solutions in such cases. In instances where a literal application of a provision
of law would lead to injustice or to a result so directly in opposition which the dictates of logic and everyday common sense as to be
unconscionable, the Civil Code admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. When a provision of law is silent or
ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a solution responsive to the vehement urge of conscience. CA should have realized that a grave
injustice will be committed against the heirs of the victim if the accused will only be Ened P200.00 corresponding to the cost of damage
to the victim's bicycle, without awarding his heirs civil liabilities corresponding to the fact of his death. Common sense dictates that the
civil liability arising from the death of a person cannot be pegged to the cost of damage to a bicycle. Moreover, to hold otherwise would
lead to the possibility that offended parties will hesitate to give their consent to a plea of guilty to a lesser offense by the accused for fear
that it would foreclose their chance to recover the appropriate civil liability.

Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense recipient of evidence

Case #261. People v. De Luna, 174 SCRA 204

Facts: De Luna was charged with Murder before the RTC of Cebu City. The accused attacked, assaulted and used personal violence to
Tricia by punching and kicking her on the different parts of her body. As a consequences of the injuries, Tricia died the next day.
Assisted by Counsel-de-Oficio, De Luna entered a plea of guilty with qualificatioon that he did not commit the crime intentionally, upon
arraignment. The accused allegedly waived his right that the prosecution present its evidence in order to determine for the court the
degree of culpability of the accused under the present charge. The trial court, rendered the decision convicting de Luna of the crime of
Murder and sentenced him to Reclusion Perpetua and indemnify the heirs of Tricia. On appeal, de Luna avers that the trial court
misappreciated the plea of guilty made by him. Appellant contends that what he admitted was the commission of the crime of Homicide
and not Murder because of the repeated qualification to his plea that he did not commit the crime intentionally. He denied the
allegations of treachery and evident premeditation in the information which are necessary to sustain a charge and subsequent
conviction for Murder.

Issue: Whether or not the accused should be convicted for Homicide

Ruling: No. In order to be valid, the plea must be an unconditional admission of guilt. It must be of such nature as to foreclose the
defendant's right to defend himself from said charge, thus leaving the court no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law. Under
the circumstances of this case, the appellant's qualified plea of guilty is not a valid plea of guilty.

Even assuming that the plea was in fact to the lesser offense of Homicide and not Murder, as stated by appellant in his appeal, the Court
cannot sustain appellant's earnest request for an immediate reduction of the penalty imposed by the trial court. This procedure would
run contrary to the explicit provisions of Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which states:

"SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused, with the consent of the offended party and the Cscal, may be allowed by the
trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable
by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary."

The consent of the fiscal and the offended party is necessary. If the plea of guilty to a lesser offense is made without the consent of the
Cscal and the offended party, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily
includes the offense charged in the former information.

Case #262. People v. Dayot, 187 SCRA 637

Facts: The accused had been charged with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide punished with reclusion perpetua to
death under Article 294, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty".
However, on Trial the accused's counsel, manifested that the accused was willing "to change his plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the
offense charged." The accused was put on the stand by his counsel which he testified that he voluntarily entering a plea of guilty. For his
part, the trial judge questioned the accused whether he was aware of the consequence of his plea of guilty. The accused replied that he
was aware of his change of heart. On this account, the trial judge rendered judgment against the accused as guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged and sentenced him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay damages.

Issue: Whether or not the judge fails to observe the procedure required when the accused enters a plea of guilty to the capital offense

Ruling: Yes. Where the accused enters a plea of guilty to the capital offense, the judge is required to accomplish three things: (1) to
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the accused's plea; (2) to require the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) to inquire whether or not the accused
wishes to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he so desires. This procedure is mandatory, and a judge who fails to
observe it commits a grave abuse of discretion.

The exchange between the judge and the accused-appellant does not persuade the Court that the accused-appellant, in subsequently
pleading guilty, fully understood the legal consequences of his plea. The Court find this from his own impressions, obviously mistaken,
that by admitting authorship of the offense, he would stay in prison for "perhaps less than ten years," although "it could also be more,"
or in other words, he would "get off lightly", relatively, than had he insisted on his innocence. As it would turn out, tragically, Judge
Villarama sentenced him in fact to life imprisonment.

Case #263. People v. Nadera, 324 SCRA 490

Facts: Accused-appellant Nadera, Jr. has four children by his wife Daisy. Daisy left for a job in Bahrain. After working abroad for
several years, she returned home and learned that her two daughters had been raped by no less than her own husband and their own
father, herein accused-appellant. They went to the police authorities of Naujan and filed a complaint against accused-appellant. Four
informations charging accusedappellant with rape on various dates were filed in the Regional Trial Court. Accused-appellant pleaded
not guilty to the charges. The trial court, however, rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of four counts of rape against his
daughters. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and three death penalties for the rapes committed.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court’s acceptance of the plea of guilty of the accused to a capital offense without making a seaching
inquiry to determine whether he understood the consequence of his plea is valid

Ruling: No. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the
trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is
predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged. In the case at
bar, the record does not show what exactly transpired at the rearraignment of accused-appellant, for what reason he changed his plea
from "not guilty" to "guilty," and whether he fully understood the consequences of his guilty plea. The only indication in the record that
accused-appellant changed his plea to guilty is the Certificates of Re-Arraignment. On what exactly accused-appellant said in entering
his plea of guilty and what exactly he had been told by the trial judge, the records shed no light. There is thus no evidence to show that
accused-appellant's guilty plea was voluntarily made or that he had fully understood the consequences of such plea.

What constitutes a searching inquiry, as explained in People v. Alicando, is that the plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed
judgment. Hence, a searching inquiry must focus on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea.

Hence, the Court find it necessary to remand the case for the proper arraignment and trial of the accused, considering not only the
accused's improvident plea of guilt but also his lawyer's neglect in representing his cause.

Case #264. People v. Molina, G.R. No. 141129-33, Dec. 14, 2001

Facts: Accused-appellant Molina was charged with attempted rape and four (4) counts of incestuous rape penalized under RA 8353
amending Art. 266 of The Revised Penal Code committed against his very own 16-year old daughter. Upon the verbal complaint of his
daughter, accused-appellant was arrested and detained at the municipal jail of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan. There is however nothing on
record from then on to account for his version of the facts. Despite his immediate arrest and the absence of a waiver under the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, accused-appellant was subjected to a regular preliminary investigation by the municipal trial judge whose
findings were affirrmed by the Provincial Prosecutor. Accused-appellant did not file a counter-affidavit to refute the charges. The
preliminary investigation took about 1 month to complete, after which, accused-appellant was transferred from the Municipal Jail to the
Provincial Jail. Molina was arraigned where he pleaded not guilty to each of the 4 charges. However, during trial, the defense counsel
manifested the desire of the accused to change his plea to guilty since he was being botherred by his conscience and by way of contrition
would like to make amends. The accused was immediately re-arraigned and entered a plea of guilty. The trial court noted that the plea
of guilty was made after the consequences of the change of plea had been duly explained to the accused by his counsel and the public
prosecutor handling the case for prosecution. But there is nothing on the record to determine what this explanation consisted of. The
defense counsel prayed for liberality from the trial court “even only by recommending the accused for executive clemency”. The trial
court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the 5 crimes charged on the basis of the change of plea by the accused from not
guilty to guilty and the testimony of witness and evidences presented by the prosecution. The PAO, in its Brief for the Appellant asserts
that accused-apellant’s plea of guilty was improvidently made.

Issue: Whether or not the plea of guilty by the accused was improvidently made

Ruling: No. The Court finds critical omissions in the procedure adopted by the trial court in the re-arraignment of accused-appellant.
For one, Sec. 1, par. (a), of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, 12 which requires that the accused-appellant must be furnished a copy of the
complaint or information with the list of witnesses to be read to him in the language or dialect known to him, was not followed by the
trial court. Record of the rearraignment merely noted that "the accused was re-arraigned and he entered a plea of guilty separately in
the five-entitled cases after the consequences of the change of plea have been duly explained to him . . ." but it does not state that copies
of the 5 Informations and the list of witnesses were given to him and the Informations read in a language that he knows. We ruled in
People v. Bello that when the death penalty is at stake, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions does not
apply.

Even the certificate of re-arraignment contradicts the statement that accused-appellant was separately re-arraigned in the 5 criminal
cases. This certificate states "complaint" (singular) rather than "complaints" (plural) since there were 5 criminal cases to which he was
allegedly pleading guilty and thus irregularly attests to his guilty plea to only 1 of the 5 Informations. Moreover, the trial court did not
conduct a searching inquiry to establish that the plea of guilty was done voluntarily with full awareness of its consequences.

Under established principles, a searching inquiry must not only comply with the requirements of Sec. 1, par. (a), of Rule 116 but must
also expound on the events that actually took place during the arraignment, the words spoken and the warnings given, with special
attention to the age of the accused, his educational attainment and socioeconomic status as well as the manner of his arrest and
detention, the provision of counsel in his behalf during the custodial and preliminary investigations, and the opportunity of his defense
counsel to confer with him. These matters are relevant since they serve as trustworthy indices of his capacity to give a free and informed
plea of guilt. Lastly, the trial court must explain the essential elements of the 5 crimes he was charged with and their respective penalties
and civil liabilities, and also direct a series of questions to defense counsel to determine whether he has conferred with the accused and
has completely explained to him the meaning of a plea of guilty. This formula is mandatory and absent any showing that it was followed,
a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been undertaken.

After a careful examination of the records, the Court that the improvident plea of guilt of accused-appellant has affected the manner by
which the prosecution and the defense conducted its presentation of the evidence, and the trial court in carefully evaluating the
evidence on record. Remand of the criminal cases for re-arraignment and further relevant proceedings is therefor proper.
Case #265. People v. Ulit - 23 February 2004

Facts: Ulit was charged by his 11 yrs. old niece of 2 counts of rape and 2 counts of acts of lasciviousness. After the prosecution rested its
case, Ulit changed his plea of “not guilty” to one count of rape and one count of acts of lasciviousness. He also manifested that he will
not adduce any evidence in his defense in the 2 other cases. Accordingly, he was convicted by the trial court of the crimes charged and
the penalty of death was imposed on him in each count of rape. Hence, this automatic review.

The Court was convinced that the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant raped the victim in
November 1996 as also declared in the sworn statement in the testimony of the victim. The trial court also convicted the appellant of
rape which happened in February 1997 on the basis of the sworn statement of the victim, testimony of her mother, the appeallant’s
statement executed in the Brgy. Chairman’s Office and the testimony of Dr. Umil. The Court also agreed with the trial court’s findings
and conclusion.

However, for the prosecution’s failure to prove the age of the victim and considering that the relationship of uncle and niece is not
covered by any of the relationship mentioned in Article 15 of the RPC, as amended, the appellant can only be convicted of rape in its
modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the crimes, the appellant should be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for
each count of rape, conformably to Art.69 of the RPC

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in sentencing the accused with a death penalty despite his admission of guilt

Ruling: No. The appellant was charged with qualified raped in raping his niece, who was a minor, punishable by death under Art.335 of
the RPC, as amended. Undoubtedly, the appellant was charged with a capital offense. When the appellant informed the trial court of his
decision to change his plea of “not guilty” to guilty, it behooved the trial court to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of his plea as mandated by Sec.6, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The raison d’etre(most important reason) for the rule is that the courts must proceed with extreme care where the imposable penalty is
death, considering that the execution of such sentence is irrevocable. Experience has shown that even innocent persons have at times
pleaded guilty. Improvident pleas of guilty to capital offense on the part of the accused must be averted since by admitting his guilt
before the trial court, the accused would forfeit his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and the
dire consequence of his plea.

Case #266. People v. Magat -31 May 2000

Facts: Accused-appellant was charged with two counts of rape committed against his own daughter. Upon arraignment, accused-
appellant pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser penalty for each case. Accordingly, he was sentenced to suffer a jail term of ten years
imprisonment for each case. After three months, the cases were revived at the instance of the complainant on the ground that the
penalty imposed was "too light." As a consequence, accused-appellant was re-arraigned on both Informations where he entered a plea of
not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. After trial, accused-appellant was found guilty by the RTC of raping his daughter on
two occasions and was sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death for each case. Hence, the present automatic review.

Accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in re-arraigning him and proceeding into trial despite the fact that he was
already convicted per Order of the trial court based on his plea of guilt. He also argued that when the court rendered judgment
convicting him, the prosecution did not appeal nor move for reconsideration or took steps to set aside the order. Consequently, the
conviction having attained finality can no longer be set aside or modified even if the prosecution later realized that the penalty imposed
was too light. Accused-appellant likewise posited that the re-arraignment and trial on the same information violated his right against
double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or not the plea of guilty of defendant was a ground to his conviction

Ruling: Yes. After careful reviewed the record of this case and the Court was convinced that the trial judge has faithfully discharged his
bounden duty as minister of the law to determine the voluntariness and full understanding of accused-appellants' plea of guilty. The
absence of the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the arraignment do not make the procedure flawed. The
minutes of the proceedings indubitably show that the judge read the Informations to the accused-appellant both in English and Tagalog,
asked him questions as to his understanding of the consequences of his plea, his educational attainment and occupation. Accused-
appellant could have known of the consequence of his plea having pleaded twice to the charges against him. In fact, in the two (2) letters
sent to the trial court judge, accused-appellant not only admitted his "sins" but also asked for forgiveness and prayed for a chance to
reform.

Under the present rule, if the accused pleads guilty to capital offense, trial courts are now enjoined: (a) to conduct searching inquiry into
the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea; (b) to require the prosecution to present evidence to prove
the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (c) to ask the accused if he so desires to present evidence in his
behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
This Court, in a long line of decisions imposed upon trial judges to comply with the procedure laid down in the rules of arraignment,
particularly the rules governing a plea of guilty to a capital offense in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of
either the trial court or of this Court, on review, as to the possibility that there might have been some misunderstanding on the part of
the accused as to the nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of
the crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties.
Apart from the circumstances that such procedure may remove any doubt that the accused fully understood the consequences of his
plea is the fact that the evidence taken thereon is essential to the fulfillment by this Court of its duty of review of automatic appeals from
death sentences.

Moreover, the prosecutin has already presented its evidence. Thus, even assuming that there was an improvident plea, the evidence on
record can sustain the conviction of the accused-appellant. While the Court has in a catena of cases set aside convictions based on pleas
of guilty in capital offenses because of the improvidence of the plea, it did so only when such plea is the sole basis of the judgment of the
condemnatory judgment.

Case #267. People v. Baharan -10 January 2011

Facts: Trinidad and Baharan were trained by Abu Sayyaf group and bombed a bus on 2005 Valentines. After the bombing, Trinidad
gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview some time after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentines Day
bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident.

Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large. They were then charged with
multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. On arraignment they pleaded guilty on the charge of multiple murder. On multiple
frustrated murder, Trinidad and Baharan pleaded not guilty.

In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their not
guilty pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty to the heavier charge of multiple murder,
creating an apparent inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them
the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment.
After the Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in accepting Trinidad and Baharan plea of guilt despite insufficiency of searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the said plea

Ruling: No. The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense
counsel whol explained the consequences of a “guilty” plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In a long line of cases, the court
reiterated that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satify themselves that
the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects,a nd
consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement is stringent and mandatory.

The Court observed that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge multiple murder based on the same act
relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge.

The Court further noted that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of
guilt one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the
other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation).

Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Court deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the searching inquiry in this
instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the
condemnatory judgment under consideration.

Sec. 4. Plea of guilty to non-capital offense, reception of evidence, discretionary

Case #268. People v. Acosta, 98 Phil. 642

Facts: Accused, together with four others, was charged before the trial court with the crime of robbery with homicide. Upon
arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. But when the case came up for trial about a month later, he withdrew his plea of not guilty
and, upon the information being read to him, entered that of guilty. After satisfying itself that the accused, who was then represented by
counsel, was aware of the consequences of his plea, the court pronounced its judgment, declaring him guilty as charged and, in view of
the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information with only the plea of guilty to mitigate the offense, sentencing him to death.

The attorney de oficio recommends that the sentence be set aside and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial, contending
that it was error to mete out so grave a penalty, on a mere plea of guilty, without first fully explaining to the accused the consequences of
such plea in view of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information.
Issue: Whether or not the plea of guilty by is enough to sustain conviction of any offense charged in the information, even a capital
offense, without the introduction of further evidence

Ruling: Yes. The essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt freely, voluntarily
and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime
charged in the information. Before passing sentence, the court first satisfied itself that the accused was well aware of the consequences
of his plea of guilty, the full import of which, in view of the aggravating circumstances alleged, must have been brought home to him by
his lawyer, who was then with him and must be supposed to have duly performed his duty as such. Hence, the trial court is not bound to
take evidence since the plea of guilty, which was advisedly entered, already supplied the necessary proof.

Case #269. People v. De Mesa, 74 Phil. 740

Facts: Conrado de Mesa pleaded guilty to the information charging him of Murder and was then and there sentenced to suffer
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P2,000.

From that sentence, he appealed to the Supreme Court. His attorney de oficio finds no error in the sentence of the trial court and in
effect recommends its confirmation.

But as the Solicitor General observes, the crime charged in the body of the information was not simple murder but the complex crime of
murder with assault upon an agent of authority, for which the penalty provided by law is death — an indivisible penalty which cannot be
affected by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. The Solicitor General recommends that the record should be remanded for a
new arraignment and trial for the accused was not fully apprised of the gravity of the offense and the consequent penalty before he
entered a plea.

Issue: Whether or not the case should be remanded for a new arraignment and trial

Ruling: Yes. The case should be remanded for a new arraignment and trial.

Inasmuch as the information charges a capital offense and there is possibility that the accused misunderstood its gravity on account of
the misleading introductory paragraph of the information wherein the offense charged was qualified as simple murder, the trial court
should have explained to the accused the true nature of the offense charged and the penalty involved in order to avoid all reasonable
possibility of the accused’s entering a plea of guilty improvidently or without a clear and precise understanding of its meaning and
effect, and should have taken the prosecution’s evidence in support of the allegations of the information in order to be able to judge
correctly the extent of defendant’s guilt.

The crime charged and described in the information has not been correctly apprehended. Had the accused been fully apprised of the
gravity of the offense and the consequent penalty, he would have perhaps not entered the plea of guilty.

Case #270. People v. Arconado, 4 SCRA 559

Facts: Charged with the crime of homicide, the accused Arconado, at first, pleaded not guilty but decided to change it to that of guilty
when the date of his trial arrived with the request, however, that he be allowed to present evidence showing the presence of several
mitigating circumstances which attended the killing. As he started proving the mitigating circumstance of unlawful aggression or in
complete self-defense, the judge ordered him to stop. Out of respect for the judge he desisted from continuing and waited until the judge
rendered its judgment.

On the day following the decision attorney for the accused- appellant filed his motion praying the court that his order prohibiting the
further presentation of evidence of mitigating circumstances be reconsidered and that accused-appellant be given the opportunity to
establish the additional mitigating circumstance either of incomplete self- defense or sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party immediately preceding the act. The motion was opposed by the fiscal and the court thereupon issued the order denying
the petition for opportunity of accused-appellant to introduce the evidence of the additional mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense. The court reasoned out that the plea of guilty entered by the accused-appellant relieved the prosecution from proving the
allegations of the information; that if the accused-appellant were allowed to prove self-defense or sufficient provocation or threat on the
part of the deceased such a case would no longer be consistent with the plea of guilty entered by the accused-appellant.

Issue: Whether or not the denial is proper

Ruling: No. It is true that the discretion is lodged with the trial court to permit or not submission of evidence of mitigating
circumstances, after a plea of guilty has been entered. But such discretion must be exercised in accordance with the facts and
circumstances of the case and said discretion should not be used to prevent the disclosure of circumstances that would mitigate in any
manner the responsibility of the accused who has pleaded guilty.

In the case at bar the records show that some of the mitigating circumstances composing that of incomplete self-defense, attended the
commission of the crime and the aims of justice would not be subserved by the denial of the motion to submit evidence of the said
mitigating circumstances. The rules of procedure were not designed to curtail the disclosure of the real facts, especially of mitigating
circumstances, that the criminal law may be applied with justice and fairness both to the prosecution and to the accused.
Were we to make the discretion of the judge in matters like the case at bar absolute, no accused would be induced to enter a plea of
guilty and thereby abbreviate in a way the proceedings and especially the trial of the case. When, as in the case at bar, the facts and
circumstances, as appearing in the record itself, justify the claim of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, we believe it
was error for the trial court to deny the privilege to submit evidence thereof.

CASE #271 People v. Digoro, 16 SCRA 376

Facts:
Camolo Digoro and two others were charged with counterfeiting of treasury and bank notes under Article 166 of the RPC before the CFI
of Lanao. Subsequently, the case was provisionally dismissed, upon the provincial fiscal's motion, with regard to the other accused.
However, an amended information was filed against Camolo captioned "For Illegal Possession of Counterfeit Treasury and Bank Notes".
The body of the amended information read, in part: “That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1959 and for sometime prior thereto, in the
Municipal District of Taraka, Province of Lanao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to possess, have in his possession, custody and control,
100-peso bill, 20-peso bill, 10-peso bill, 5-peso bill, 2-peso bill and 1-Peso bill denominations in resemblance or similitude to a genuine
treasury or bank notes issued by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines…Contrary to and in violation of Article 168 of the
Revised Penal Code.”

Camolo pleaded guilty and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of not more than ten (10) years and one (1) day and not less than six
(6) years and one (1) day and to pay the costs. However, Camolo subsequently appealed his conviction on the ground that the amended
information to which he pleaded guilty does not charge an offense.

Issue:
Whether Camolo may be convicted for violation of Article 168 under the amended information.

Ruling:
No. Possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense
under Article 168, the possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes. An information alleging possession of
false treasury and bank notes without alleging intent to use the same but only "intent to possess" them, charges no offense.

A plea of guilty to such an information therefore does not warrant conviction of the accused. It is well recognized that a plea of guilty is
an admission only of the material allegations of the information but not that the facts thus alleged constitute an offense. From the
allegations in the information to which the accused pleaded guilty, intent to use cannot be clearly inferred. It is true it was stated that
the accused possessed the false treasury and bank notes "unlawfully and feloniously ... Contrary to and in violation of Article 168 of the
Revised Penal Code". Such statements, however, are not allegations of facts but mere conclusions that the facts alleged constitute the
offense sought to be charged. Furthermore, the information alleged "intent to possess" instead of intent to use. Such allegation
precludes clear inference of intent to use, in the absence of express allegation of the latter, since intent to use entails intent to part with
the possession. Thus, the judgment of conviction must be set aside and the case should be remanded for new prosecution under an
appropriate and valid information.

ID.; ID.; PLEA OF GUILTY TO AN INFORMATION ALLEGING POSSESSION OF FALSE TREASURY AND BANK NOTES WITHOUT
ALLEGING INTENT TO USE THE SAME. — Alleging possession of false treasury and bank notes without alleging intent to use the
same but only "intent to possess" them, charges no offense. A plea of guilty to such an information, therefore, does not warrant
conviction of the accused. It is well recognized that a plea of guilty is an admission only of the material allegations of the information
but not that the facts thus alleged constitute an offense (People vs. Fortuno, 73 Phil. 407).

Sec. 5. Withdrawal Of Improvident Plea Of Guilty

CASE #272 People v. De Luna, 174 SCRA 204

Facts:
Patrick de Luna was charged with Murder before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, under the following information,
"That on or about the 17th day of December 1986, at about 7:00 P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused with deliberate intent, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Tricia by punching and kicking her on the different parts of her body thereby
inflicting upon her the following physical injuries: 'Cardio respiratory arrest, secondary to severe multiple injuries, traumatic.' and as a
consequence of said injuries Tricia died in the next day. Contrary to law." De Luna, assisted by Counsel-de-Oficio Atty. David Ompoc,
when arraigned on 23 December 1986, entered a plea of guilty with the qualification that "hindi ko sinasadya." The accused allegedly
waived his right that the prosecution present its evidence in order to determine for the court the degree of culpability of the accused
under the present charge. The trial court, on 23 December 1986, rendered the decision convicting de Luna of the crime of Murder, and
sentenced him to Reclusion Perpetua (life imprisonment) and to indemnify the heirs of Tricia the sum of P30,000.00. de Luna
appealed.
Issue:
Whether the accused may waive the presentation of evidence for the prosecution, when the accused pleaded guilty during the
arraignment.

Ruling:
The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt, freely, voluntarily, and with a full knowledge of the consequences and
meaning of his act and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the complaint or information. While it is
true that a plea of guilty admits all the allegations in the information including the aggravating and qualifying circumstances, the
repeated and emphatic qualification stated by de Luna as regards his plea of guilty should have drawn the attention of the trial court
that the plea was made without a full knowledge of its consequences. Apparently, counsel failed to advise him as to the meaning and
effect of the technical language used in the information qualifying the acts constituting the offense. In order to be valid, the plea must be
an unconditional admission of guilt. It must be of such nature as to foreclose the defendant's right to defend himself from said charge,
thus leaving the court no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law. Under the circumstances of the case, de Luna's qualified
plea of guilty is not a valid plea of guilty. While the Court has had the occasion to rule that it is permissible for an accused to enter a plea
of guilty to the crime charged with the reservation to prove mitigating circumstances, considering, however, the gravity of the offense
charged, the more prudent course for the trial court to follow is to reject the plea made by de Luna and direct the parties to submit their
respective evidence. When an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. Thus, after a plea of guilty in capital offenses, it is imperative
that the trial court requires the presentation of evidence for the prosecution to enable itself to determine the precise participation and
the degree of culpability of the accused in the perpetration of the capital offense charged. Notwithstanding the waiver made by de Luna
as to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution, the presentation of evidence should be required in order to preclude any room for
reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that there might have been some
misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the
circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in
the imposition of the prescribed penalties.

CASE #273 People v. Serrano, 85 Phil 835

Facts:
Dionisio Serrano was charged with the offense of serious physical injuries, alleged to have been inflicted upon Francisco Augusto.
In the information, it was alleged that said physical injuries "will require medical attendance for a period of more than thirty but
less than ninety days," and ". . . prevented and will prevent the said Francisco Augusto from engaging in his customary labor for the
same period of time."
On October 28, 1948, Serrano was arraigned and, waiving his right to counsel, entered a plea of guilty. A few hours later, on the
same day, he filed a petition to substitute his plea of guilty for one of not guilty upon the ground that his former plea was entered
without the benefit of counsel and he then entertained the belief that the offended party would pardon him and withdraw the
charge. The motion was denied. On November 5, 1948, judgment was rendered finding the accused- appellant guilty of serious
physical injuries as charged. Serrano filed a motion to reopen the case and that he be allowed to substitute his former plea of guilty
for another plea of guilty but of the lesser offense of slight physical injuries, upon the ground that the complainant's injuries had
not incapacitated him for work and had healed in nine days, instead of more than thirty days as alleged in the information. The trial
court, however, denied the motion; hence this appeal, with the Solicitor General seconding appellant's theory.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in refusing to reopen the case and to allow the withdrawal of the plea of guilty entered by the accused.
Ruling:
Under Rule 114, section 6 of the Rules of Court, "the court may in its discretion at any time before sentence permit a plea of guilty
to be withdrawn. If judgment of conviction has been entered thereon and the same has not become final, the court may set aside
such judgment, and allow a plea of not guilty, or, with the consent of the fiscal, allow a plea of guilty of a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the charge."
As a general rule, where it is made to appear that the accused has voluntarily entered a plea of guilty, with a full realization of its
meaning and consequences, and after the same has been clearly explained to him, the trial court's refusal to allow the withdrawal of
the plea should by no means be disturbed. However, where, as in the instant case, a clear mistake appears to have been committed
in good faith not only by the accused who was unaided by counsel, but also by the fiscal, including the court itself, with the result
that a serious injustice has been done against the accused who was convicted of an offense that was graver than the offense which in
truth he had committed, it was certainly a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court to persist in the mistake thus committed
once known and to deny a relief which under the circumstances was a simple matter of fairness to grant in order to save a person
 from the injustice of being convicted of a crime that he had never committed. There being an uncertainty in the facts pleaded in the
information with respect to the degree of culpability of the accused, it was the duty of the court to require evidence and dispel the
uncertainty as much as it was possible before fixing the penalties to be imposed. In that connection, the physician who was
attending the offended person and the offended person himself should have been made to testify. And had this been done, the court
would have found that at the time of the arraignment, the wounds of the offended person had already healed, according to his own
affidavit, and that therefore, it was an injustice to convict the accused of the graver offense charged in the information.
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULES OF; PLEA OF GUILTY, WITHDRAWAL OF; DISCRETIONARY OF TRIAL COURT. — It is
clear from the language of section 6 of Rule 114 of the rules of court that the withdrawal of the plea of guilty is not a matter of strict
right to the accused but of sound discretion to the trial court, and appellate courts shall not interfere with such discretion in the
absence of a clear abuse thereof.
2. ID.; PLEA OF GUILTY WHEN VOLUNTARILY ENTERED INTO BY AN ACCUSED; GENERAL RULE. — As a general rule,
where it is made to appear that the accused has voluntarily entered a plea of guilty, with a full realization of its meaning and
consequence and after the same has been clearly explained to him, the trial court's refusal to allow the withdrawal of the plea
should by no means be disturbed.
3. ID.; PLEA OF GUILTY ENTERED BY MISTAKE AND IN GOOD FAITH. — Where notwithstanding the ordinary precautions that
have been taken, still a clear mistake appears to have been committed in good faith not only by the accused who was unaided by
counsel, but also by the fiscal, including the court itself, with the result that a serious injustice has been done against the accused
who was convicted of an offense that was graver than the offense which in truth he had committed it was certainly a clear abuse of
discretion on the part of the court to persist in the mistake thus committed once known and to deny a relief which under the
circumstances was a simple matter of fairness to grant in order to save a person from the injustice of being convicted of a crime that
he had never committed.
4. ID.; PLEA OF GUILTY; UNCERTAINTY IN THE FACTS PLEADED; DUTY OF THE COURT. — If there is uncertainty in the
facts pleaded in the information with respect to the degree of culpability of the accused, it is the duty of the court to require
evidence and dispel the uncertainty as much as it is possible before fixing the penalties to be imposed.

Sec. 6. Duty Of Court To Inform Accused Of His Right To Counsel

CASE #274 People v. Serzo, Jr., 274 SCRA 553

Facts:
1. Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by the lower court for the stabbing/killing of Alfredo Casabal after the latter rescued
minors being held by the former.
2. Pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial on the merits.
3. The accused alleged that he was denied the right to counsel. During the arraignment he appeared without counsel,so the court
appointed a counsel de officio. Thereafter, he moved that the arraignment be reset so he can engage the services of his own counsel
however, during the arraignment, he still appeared without one. The arraignment proceeded with him being assisted by the counsel de
officio.
4. During the trial, the same counsel appeared and cross-examined for the accused.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused was denied of his right to counsel.

Ruling:
NO. Herein, the accused was provided with a counsel de officio who assisted him in all stages of the [Link] option to hire ones
counsel cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, trifle with the Rules or prejudice the equally important right of the
State and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.

The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where an accused is pitted
against the awesome prosecution machinery of the state. It is also a recognition of the accused not having the skill to protect himself
before a tribunal which has the power to take his life or liberty.

The right covers the period from custodial investigation until judgment is rendered, even on appeal. RA 7438 provides that any person
arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
The right is however not absolute and is waivable; a) the state must balance the private against the state's and offended party's equally
important right to speedy and adequate justice, and b) the right is waivable as long as the waiver is unequivocal, knowing, and
intelligently made.

ID.;ID.;ID.;RIGHT TO COUNSEL DE PARTE;NOT ABSOLUTE. — An accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be
represented either by a court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be represented by counsel is immutable,
his option to secure the services of counsel de parte,however, is not absolute. The court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a
counsel of choice against the state's and the offended party's equally important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court
may restrict the accused's option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen
counsel is not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the
like.

ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE DO NOT CONSTITUTE A DEPRIVATION OF APPELLANT'S

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL. — The facts of this case do not constitute a deprivation of appellant's constitutional right to
counsel because he was adequately represented by three court-appointed lawyers: Atty. Lina-ac, Atty. Antonano and Atty. Garcia.
Courts are not required to await indefinitely the pleasure and convenience of the accused as they are also mandated to promote the
speedy and orderly administration of justice. Nor should they countenance such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public policy
requires that the trial continue as scheduled, considering that appellant was adequately represented by counsels who were not shown to
be negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent him.

CASE #275 People v. Lamsing, 248 SCRA 472

Facts:
The case arose from the killing in the early hours of November 1, 1989 of Winnie Cabunilas, a security guard, while on duty at the
construction site of a Synergy building on Aurora Boulevard, Cubao, Quezon City.
Four days after the killing, accused-appellant was arrested by policemen, while in a drinking spree with friends at a basketball court
near the scene of the crime. He was detained and, in a police lineup, was identified by witnesses as one of those responsible for the...
death of Winnie Cabunilas.
An information was filed against him and a John Doe for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Upon being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. As the other accused was at large, trial proceeded against accused-
appellant alone.

Issue:
whether accused miranda’s rights were violated when the witness identified him from the police line up.

Ruling:
No, a police line-up does not form part of the custodial investigation. Therefore, the accused cannot yet invoke his rights in such
instances.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO COUNSEL; DOES NOT EXTEND TO POLICE LINEUPS.
— Accused-appellant complains that he was made to join a police lineup where he was identified by three persons, including Elizabeth
De los Santos, without the assistance of counsel. It was settled in Gamboa v. Cruz, however, that the right to counsel guaranteed in Art.
III, 12(1) of the Constitution does not extend to police lineups because they are not part of custodial investigations. The reason for this is
that at that point, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory. The accused's right to counsel attaches only
from the time that adversary judicial proceedings are taken against him.

Sec. 7. Appointment Of Counsel De Officio

CASE #276 Sayson v. People, 166 SCRA 680

Facts:
On March 25, 1972, an information for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of a Commercial Document was filed against the herein
petitioner, Ramon F. Sayson before the Court of First Instance of Manila for having come in possession of a blank US dollar check with
intent to defraud Ernesto Rufino, Sr. and/or Bank of America forge and falsify or cause to be forged and falsified the said check, by then
and there writing or filling or causing to be written or filled up the following words and figures: "March 10, 1972," "Atty. Norberto S.
Perez," "2,250.00" and forging the signature of the Asst. Cashier, Manager of the Bank of America, Dania Branch, making it appear, that
the said check was duly issued by the Bank of America. Arraigned on December 8, 1972, petitioner pleaded not guilty. On October 9,
1974, after several postponements, the prosecution rested its case. At the hearing of December 9, 1974, when the defense was scheduled
to present its evidence, only the petitioner appeared. He said that his counsel had another case in a different court. In the morning of
the said day, his lawyer also sent a telegram to the court requesting cancellation of the hearing because he was sick. The court denied the
motion for postponement and the case was considered submitted for decision without petitioner's evidence. The trial court rendered
judgment on January 30, 1975, finding the accused guilty.
Issue:
Was the appellant denied of his right to counsel?
Ruling:
The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio when the accused has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one
is mandatory only at the time of arraignment (Rule 116, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court). This is no longer so where the accused has
proceeded with the arraignment and the trial with a counsel of his choice but when the time for the presentation of the evidence for the
defense has arrived, he appears by himself alone and the absence of his counsel was inexcusable. At the most, the appointment of a
counsel de oficio in situations like the present case is discretionary with the trial court, which discretion will not be interfered with in
the absence of abuse. Here, the trial court had been liberal in granting the postponements secured by the petitioner himself, at the same
time admonishing the latter to be ready with his present counsel or another counsel. Notwithstanding this admonition, the petitioner
kept on attending the hearings without securing another lawyer to substitute his present counsel who was constantly absent during the
hearings. Still, as admitted by petitioner in his memorandum, the trial court, at the December 9, 1974 hearing, allowed him to look for a
lawyer but no one was available at the time . These steps undertaken by the trial court removes any doubt that its order was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is hereby DENIED.

REMEDIAL LAW; APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL DE OFICIO; DUTY OF THE COURT NO LONGER MANDATORY WHERE
ARRAIGNMENT HAS ALREADY PROCEEDED. — The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio when the accused has no counsel
of choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment [Rule 116, Section 6, Revised Rules of
Court.] This is no longer so where the accused has proceeded with the arraignment and the trial with a counsel of his choice but when
the time for the presentation of the evidence for the defense has arrived, he appears by himself alone and the absence of his counsel was
inexcusable.

CASE #277 People v. Rio, 201 SCRA 702

Facts:
Accussed-appellant Ricardo Rio was charged and convicted of the crime of rape before the RTC of Makati City and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He filed an appeal and as a consequence, the branch clerk of court forwarded records to the
CA. The appellate court, however, forwarded the records to the supreme court in view of the penalty imposed upon the accused.

However, accused-appellant in his two letters addressed to the clerk of court, manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal “due to
his poverty”. Upon inquiry of the clerk of court of the trial court, through the recommendation of the solicitor general, the accused-
appellants submits that he was no longer interested in pursuing his appeal and had in fact withdrawn his appeal. The court denied his
motion to withdraw and appointed a counsel de officio for him. All the letters revealed that the only reason he offered for the
withdrawal of his appeal is his inability to retain the services of a counsel de officio on account of his poverty.

Issue:
Whether or not the right to counsel of accused-appellant ceased upon his conviction by the trial court

Ruling:
No. This right to counsel de officio does not cease upon the conviction of an accused by the trial court. It continues, even during
appeal, such duty of the court to assign a counsel de officio persist where an accused interposes intent to appeal. Even in a case, where
the accused has signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to inquire into the reason for the withdrawal. Where it
finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, the court must assign a counsel de officio, for despite such withdrawal the duty to
protect the rights of the accused subsists and perhaps with greater reason. After all, “those who have less in life must have more in law”.

The court admonishes members of the bar to be more conscious of their duties as advocates of their clients causes whether acting de
parte or the oficio for public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his
clients' cause. Lawyers are an indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. And a lawyer who
performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client; he also serve the ends of justice, does honor
to the bar and helds maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. This is because the entrusted privilege to practice
law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.

ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY OF THE COURT TO ASSIGN ONE DE OFFICIO FOR THE ACCUSED IF HE SO DESIRES AND HE IS POOR.
— It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is
not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he
so desires and he is poor, or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.

ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO A COUNSEL DE OFFICIO; DOES NOT CEASE UPON THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCUSED BY A TRIAL
COURT. — This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction of an accused by a trial court. It continues, even during
appeal, such that the duty of the court to assign a counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes an intent to appeal. Even in a
case, such as the one at bar, where the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to inquire into the
reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, as in this case, the court must assign a
counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason.
After all, "those who have less in life must have more in law." Justice should never be limited to those who have the means. It is for
everyone, whether rich or poor. Its scales should always be balanced and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor one party
over another.

Sec. 8. Time For Counsel De Officio To Prepare For Arraignment

CASE #278 People v. Bascuguin, G.R. No. 144404, Sept. 24, 2001

Facts:
Accused Leodegario Bascuguin was charged with the crime of rape with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas,
committed against Marissa Moral on June 4, 1999. The trial court assigned a counsel de oficio when he appeared without a counsel at
his arraignment. The counsel de oficio conferred with accused-appellant for a few minutes and proceeded immediately with the
arraignment. He then pleaded guilty to the crime charged. After due trial, the court found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to
death.
Hence, this automatic review.

Issue:
Whether or not the counsel de oficio failed to effectively provide accused-appellant with qualified and competent representation in
court.

Ruling:
Yes. Both the Office of the Solicitor General and accused-appellant cried foul to the hasty consultation made by the counsel de oficio.
The Solicitor General recommended the remanding of the case to the court a quo for proper arraignment and trial.
The Court cannot admit accused-appellant's conviction on the basis of his improvident plea of guilt. The Court found that the counsel de
oficio failed to effectively provide accused-appellant with qualified and competent representation in court.

Under the present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, whenever a counsel de oficio is appointed by the court to defend the accused at
the arraignment, he shall be given a reasonable time to consult with the accused as to his plea before proceeding with he arraignment.
In this case, the Court held that the counsel de oficio's haste in proceeding with the arraignment falls short of the standard mandated by
the rules for an effective and adequate counseling. The limited time allotted for consultation with accused-appellant seriously casts
doubt on whether counsel de oficio has indeed sufficiently explained to the accused-appellant the crime charged, the meaning of his
plea, and its consequences. Thus, in the interest of substantial justice, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for further and
appropriate proceedings.

ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A REASONABLE TIME SHALL BE GIVEN TO THE COUNSEL DE OFICIO TO CONSULT WITH ACCUSED AS TO
HIS PLEA BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH THE ARRAIGNMENT. — A criminal case is a serious matter that deserves serious attention
especially in cases involving capital punishment. Under the present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, whenever a counsel de oficio
is appointed by the court to defend the accused at the arraignment, he shall be given a reasonable time to consult with the accused as to
his plea before proceeding with the arraignment. Counsel de oficio's haste in proceeding with the arraignment falls short of the standard
mandated by the rules for an effective and adequate counseling. The limited time allotted for consultation with accused-appellant
seriously casts doubt on whether counsel de oficio has indeed sufficiently explained to the accused-appellant the crime charged, the
meaning of his plea, and its consequences.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW;. REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS NOT
SATISFIED WHERE ACCUSED WAS PROVIDED WITH INADEQUATE COUNSELING; CASE AT BAR. — A criminal case involves the
personal liberty of an accused and inadequate counseling does not satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process. What is evident
in this case is that counsel de oficio merely conferred with accused-appellant and proceeded immediately with the arraignment,
indicative of his failure to effectively provide accused-appellant with qualified and competent representation in court. CEHcSI

ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED MUST BE AFFORDED A QUALIFIED AND COMPETENT REPRESENTATION; JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION CANNOT STAND UPON INVALID ARRAIGNMENT; CASE AT BAR. — We do not condone the crime committed by a
person indicted for a criminal offense. It is imperative however to balance our zealousness to punish the malefactor and the
government's prosecutory machinery directed against the accused vis-à-vis the recognition of his constitutional rights. Courts must see
to it that an accused must be afforded a qualified and competent representation. Where it appears that a counsel de oficio resorted to
procedural shortcuts that amounted to inadequate counseling, the Court will strike down the proceedings had in order to promote a
judicious dispensation of justice. Therefore, given the attendant circumstances of this case, this Court cannot send accused-appellant to
the death chamber, for no matter how outrageous the crime charged might be, or how depraved the offender would appear to be, the
uncompromising rule of law must still prevail. Verily, a judgment of conviction cannot stand upon an invalid arraignment. In the
interest of substantial justice then, this Court has no recourse but to remand the case to the trial court for further and appropriate
proceedings.
Sec. 9. Bill Of Particulars

CASE #279 People v. Abad Santos, 76 Phil. 744

Facts:
Respondent Joseph Arcache was accused of the crime of treason. On April 8, 1946, counsel for respondent Joseph Arcache verbally
petitioned the respondent judges that the prosecution should make more specific said phrase "and other similar equipments" set
forth in counts two (2) and three (3) of the information or have it stricken therefrom, unless the prosecution should furnish a bill of
particulars specifying what those "other similar equipments" were. The respondent judges granted the petition, and, at the request of
the prosecution, postponed the trial of the case to April 10, 1946, to give the special prosecutor time to prepare the bill of particulars.
On April 9, 1946, instead of submitting a bill of particulars, the special prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of said order of
the court, on the ground that it was contrary to law and that the court had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and/or with abuse thereof,
which motion for reconsideration was defined on April 10, 1946, on the ground that the alleged defect in the information could be
cured by amendment, which might be properly ordered, in the interest of justice, so that the accused might be clearly informed of the
charges against him, and thus avoid any possible surprise, without necessity on the part of the accused to plead anew to the amended
information.
The defendant merely wanted to know specifically what the alleged "other similar equipments" were, without amending the
information, in the strict sense of the term, which would require him to withdraw his previous plea of not guilty; and that the question
whether to order the filing of a bill of particulars or not is purely discretionary on the part of the lower court.
Issue:
Whether or not detailed complaint or information considered as bill of particulars be properly objected to.
Ruling:
There is no specific provision of law, in this jurisdiction, expressly authorizing the filing of specifications or bills of particulars in
criminal cases. But it is also true that, in a subsequent case, this Court held that a detailed complaint or information cannot be
properly objected to, and that the details contained therein may be properly considered as specifications or bill of particulars. It is
thus evident that, in the absence of specific provisions of law prohibiting the filing of specifications or bill of particulars in criminal
cases, their submission may be permitted, as they cannot prejudice any substantial rights of the accused. On the contrary, they will
serve to apprise the accused clearly of the charges filed against them, and thus enable them to prepare intelligently whatever defense
or defenses they might have.
Inasmuch as in criminal cases not only the liberty but even the life of the accused may be at stake, it is always wise and proper that the
accused should be fully apprised of the true charges against them, and thus avoid all and any possible surprise, which might be
detrimental to their rights and interests; and ambiguous phrases should not, therefore, be permitted in criminal complaints or
informations; and if any such phrase has been included therein, on motion of the defense, before the commencement of the trial, the
court should order either its elimination as surplusage or the filing of the necessary specification, which is but an amendment in mere
matters of form.
CASE #280 Rocaberte v. People, 193 SCRA 152

Facts:
Rocaberte and two others were charged with the crime of theft. The Information states:
That on or about the period from 1977 to December 28, 1983 at the off offshore of West Canayaon, municipal of Garcia-
Hernandez, province of Bohol, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping each other,
with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away the following properties...

Rocaberte moved to quash the information, alleging that the statement of the time of commission of the felony charged, "from 1977 to
December 1983, a period of 7 years," or "about 2,551 days," was fatally defective; there was "so great a gap as to defy approximation in
the commission of one and the same offense"; "the variance is certainly unfair to the accused for it violates their constitutional right to
be informed before the trial of the specific charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves. The trial
court denied the motion. Hence, the appeal.

Issues:
1. Is the statement of the time of the commission of the offense "between October, 1910 to August, 1912," defective?
2. Is a defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime charged a ground for a motion to quash?
3. What then is the remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of the commission of the offense with sufficient
definiteness?

Ruling:
1. The rules of criminal procedure declare that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the approximate time of the
commission of the offense. Where, however, the statement of the time of the commission of the offense is so general as to span a
number of years, i.e., "between October, 1910 to August, 1912," it has been held to be fatally defective because it deprives the accused an
opportunity to prepare his defense.

2. A defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime charged is not, however, a ground for a motion to quash under
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. Even if it were, a motion for quashal on that account will be denied since the defect is one that can be
cured by amendment.

3. The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of the commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion
for a bill of particulars.

The information against Rocaberte is indeed seriously defective. It places on him and his co-accused the unfair and unreasonable
burden of having to recall their activities over a span of more than 2,500 days. It is a burden nobody should be made to bear. The public
prosecutor must make more definite and particular the time of the commission of the crime of theft attributed to Rocaberte and his co-
defendants. If he cannot, the prosecution cannot be maintained, the case must be dismissed.

Sec. 10. Production Or Inspection Of Material Evidence In Possession Of Prosecution

Sec. 11. Suspension Of Arraignment

CASE #281 Samson v. Daway, G.R. Nos. 160054-55, July 21, 2004

Facts:
The petitioner, owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufacturing Corporation, allegedly sold or offers the sale of garment product
using the trademark 3Caterpillar ́ to the prejudice of Caterpillar, Inc., private respondent in this case. The respondent filed the case with the
RTC. The petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense charged contending that the case should be filed with the
MTC because violation of unfair competition is penalized with imprisonment not exceeding 6 years under RA 7691.

Issue:
Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual property rights?

Ruling:
The SC held that under Section 163 of the IPC, actions for unfair competition shall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate
jurisdiction under existing laws. The law contemplated in Section 163 of IPC is RA 166 otherwise known as the Trademark Law. Section
27 of the Trademark Law provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false
designation of origin and false description or representation, is lodged with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). Since
RA 7691 is a general law and IPC in relation to Trademark Law is a special law, the latter shall prevail. Actions for unfair competition
therefore should be filed with the RTC.

CASE #282 Trinidad v. Victor Ang, G.R. No. 192898, Jan. 31, 2011

Facts:
On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate City, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information
for Violation of Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the
petitioners. Petitioners then filed with the DOJ a motion for review.

On March 3, 2009 the prosecutor then filed the information with the MTcC who later on ordered the petitioners to file their counter
affidavit.
The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and Proceedings and Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants
of Arrest praying, among others, for the deferment of their arraignment in view of the pendency of their petition for review before the
DOJ. The MTCC granted the motion subject to par c, section 11 rule 116 and set their arraignment on September 10, 2009.

A petition for certiorari was then made to the RTC who held that the MTCC judge did not err in setting the arraignment of the
petitioners after the lapse of one (1) year and ten (10) months from the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ.

The petitioners then filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari essentially claiming that the 60-day limit on suspension of
arraignment is only a general rule.

Issue:
WON the motion for review is a ground for suspension of arraignment.
Held:
Yes. SC granted the motion for reconsideration and reinstate the petition for review on certiorari. The grounds for suspension of
arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. - Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the
charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President;
Provided , that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.

In Samson v. Daway, the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment,
the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny
the motion to defer arraignment

CASE #283 Aguinaldo v. Ventus - 11 March 2015

Facts:
Private respondents alleged that sometime in March and April 2002, petitioners connived in convincing them to part with their
(P260,000.00) in consideration of a pledge of two motor vehicles which the latter had misrepresented to be owned by Aguinaldo, but
turned out to be owned by one Levita de Castro. Respondents Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo Joson filed a Complaint-Affidavit for estafa
against petitioners Aguinaldo and Perez before the OCP of Manila. Perez denied the accusation against him, and claimed that his only
participation in the transaction between private respondents and Aguinaldo was limited to having initially introduced them to each
other.

Assistant City Prosecutor issued a resolution recommending both petitioners to be indicted in court for estafa. He also noted that
Aguinaldo failed to appear and to submit any controverting evidence despite the subpoena. Perez was arrested, so he filed an urgent
Motion for reduction of bail to be Posted in Cash, which the public respondent granted. Public respondent issued an order granting the
motion for withdrawal of information, and directing the recall of the arrest warrant only insofar as Aguinaldo was concerned, pending
resolution of her motion for reconsideration with the OCP.

Petitioners filed an urgent Motion for Cancellation of Arraignment, pending resolution of their motion for reconsideration filed with the
OCP of Manila. Upon the prosecution’s motion, the public respondent ordered the proceedings to be deferred until the resolution of
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Public respondent ordered the case archived pending resolution of petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration with the OCP of Manila. The OCP of Manila filed a Motion to set Case for Trial, considering that petitioners’ motions for
reconsideration and for withdrawal of the information have already been denied for lack of merit.
Public respondent issued an order directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Aguinaldo and the setting of the case for
arraignment.

Public respondent granted petitioners’ urgent motion to cancel arraignment and suspend proceedings, and motion for reconsideration.
Levita de Castro, through the Law Firm of Lapeña and Associates, filed a Motion to reinstate case and to issue warrant of Arrest. De
Castro alleged that she was the private complainant in the estafa case that had been ordered archived. Petitioners filed an opposition
alleging that de Castro is not a party to the said case, which is in active file, awaiting the resolution of their petition for review before the
DOJ.

The public respondent issued an order granting the Motion to reinstate case and to issue warrant of Arrest, thus: Pending with this
Court are (1) Motion to reinstate case and to issue warrant of Arrest against accused Aguinaldo filed by private prosecutor with
conformity of the public prosecutor. Petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari. CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether a procedural technicality that the suspension allowed for arraignment is already beyond the 60' day period may be relaxed in
the interest of an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

Ruling:
Arraignment was suspended pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration before the DOJ. However, the lapse of almost 1
year and 7 months warranted the application of the limitation of the period for suspending arraignment. While the pendency of a
petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a
period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said
period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

MODULE 9: Rule 117 – Motion To Quash

Sec. 1. Time To Move To Quash

CASE #284 People v. Givera, 349 SCRA 513

Facts:
On or about May 2 1993, the accused, conspired with Epifanio and Arturo Gayon, taking advantage of superior strength, with evident
premeditation and treachery, killed Eusebio Gardon by stabbing him with a knife striking him with a piece of stone. The trial court
rendered the accused guilty of murder. The medico legal officer testified that he sustained abrasions and fatal stab wounds. A death
certificate evidencing the death of the victim was presented by the prosecution. However, the accused denied of the crime charged and
questioned the legality of his arrest because it was without warrant.

Issue:
Whether or not Givera is deemed to have waived his right to object.

Yes. Accused-appellant claims that his arrest at the East Avenue Medical Center on May 4, 1996 was made without a warrant. This is not
true. He was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the court on April 27, 1995. However, as the records show, the warrant of arrest
was returned unserved by the arresting officer on June 7, 1995 as accused-appellant could not be found. He was finally found only on
May 4, 1996. Now, no alias warrant of arrest is needed to make the arrest. Unless specifically provided in the warrant, the same remains
enforceable until it is executed, recalled or quashed. The ten-day period provided in Rule 113, §4 is only a directive to the officer
executing the warrant to make a return to the court. At any rate, accused-appellant must be deemed to have waived his right to object
thereto because he failed to move for the quashal of the information before the trial court, entered a plea of not guilty and participated
in the trial. As this Court has held, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction
over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.

CASE #285 Suy Sui v. People, 92 Phil. 684

Facts:

The petitioner was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with a violation of Executive Order No. 331 in relation to Republic
Act No. 509. That the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and offer for sale to the public one bag
of refined sugar at P2, which price is in excess of P0.20 than that authorized by law as the maximum ceiling price of said commodity,
to wit P1.80. After trial the court found the petitioner guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine of P5,000, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to be barred from engaging in the wholesale and retail business in the Philippines for a period of five years,
with a recommendation to the President for the immediate deportation of the petitioner. From this judgment the petitioner appealed,
but the same was affirmed by the CA. The petitioner claims that, for the same refined sugar, two ceiling prices for one kilo are fixed,
namely, P0.40 and P0.45, with the result that, if P0.45 is adopted as a criterion, 10 pounds of sugar would cost approximately P2.02,
or P0.02 less than the amount for which the petitioner sold the 10-pound bag of refined sugar to Faustino Caraan. Petitioner's
contention is tenable, considering that penal statutes are to be construed strictly.

Respondent argued that the petitioner failed to raise the point not only in the Court of First Instance by a motion to quash but also in
the Court of Appeals, as a consequence of which he must be deemed to have waived the objection.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is deemed to have waived his right to object.

Ruling:
No. In the first place, under section 10, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court, failure to move to quash amounts to a waiver of all objections
which are grounds for a motion to quash, except when the complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is
without jurisdiction of the same. It is apparent that the point now raised by the petitioner is in effect that the information does not
charge an offense. In the second place, as an appeal in a criminal proceedings throws the whole case open for review, it should have
been the duty of the Court of Appeals to correct such errors as might be found in the appealed judgment, whether they are assigned or
not. (People vs. Borbano, 1 43 Off. Gaz., 478.) On the other hand, in Villareal vs. People, 2 (47 Off. Gaz., 191), we held that
notwithstanding the absence of assignments of error, the appellate court will review the record and reverse or modify the appealed
judgment, not only on grounds that the court had no jurisdiction or that the acts proved do not constitute the offense charged, but
also on prejudicial errors to the right of accused which are plain, fundamental, vital, or serious, or on errors which go to the
sufficiency of the evidence to convict; although the rule doing away with formal assignments of error does not dispense with the
necessity of pointing out technical and non- fundamental errors which do not affect the substantial rights of an accused to a fair trial,
and are not patent.
CASE #286 Los Baños v. Pedro, G.R. No. 173588, April 22, 2009

Facts:
Joel Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without authorization from the COMELEC a day before the elections.
Pedro, then filed a Motion to Quash after his Motion for Preliminary Investigation did not materialize. The RTC granted the quashal.
The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings in which Pedro objected to citing Rule 117, Sec. 8 on provisional dismissal, arguing
that the dismissal had become permanent. The public prosecutor manifested his express conformity with the motion to reopen the case
saying that the provision used applies where both the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or
where the prosecution or the offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where the information
was quashed upon motion of the accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedro’s arraignment date.

Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTC’s mandated reopening. The CA, at first granted the
reopening of the case but through Pedro's Motion for Reconsideration, his argument that a year has passed by from the receipt of the
quashal order, the CA's decision was reversed. Petitioner now argues using the same argument of the public prosecutor.

Issue:
Whether the rule on provision dismissal is applicable.

Ruling:

The SC differentiated Motion to Quash and Provisional Dismissal. Primarily, they are two separate concepts. In Motion to Quash, the
Information itself has deficiency while in Provisional Dismissal, the Information has no deficiencies. It does not follow that a motion to
quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.

In the case, the SC finds that the granting of the quashal of the RTC had no merit on the ground that there is a legal excuse or
justification in Pedro's offense. Pedro misappreciated the natures of a motion to quash and provisional dismissal. As a consequence, a
valid Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.

CASE #287 Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro - 17 November 2010

Facts:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner herein, Jason Ivler was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
with two separate offenses:

1. Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries

2. Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property

Petitioner pleaded guilty for the first charge, but moved to quash the second charge invoking double jeopardy having been convicted for
the previous offense.

MeTC however, refused quashal finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner's conviction in the first offense charged, bars his prosecution in the second offense charged.

Ruling:
Reckless imprudence is a Single Crime, its consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the penalty.
The two charges against the petitioner, arising from the same facts were prosecuted under the same provision of the RPC, as amended,
namely Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi offenses. The proposition (inferred from Art 3 of the RPC) that "reckless imprudence"
is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi offense.

The Court thru Justice JB Reyes: Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted to a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of an offense.
Tests to determine double jeopardy:
1. Whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.

CASE #288 People v. Odtuhan - 17 July 2013

Facts:

On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina). On October 28, 1993, respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon).
in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina.

On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent's petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab
initio for lack of a valid marriage license.

On November 10, 2003,... Alagon died

June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent's previous marriage with Modina.[7] She thus filed a
Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent with Bigamy.

On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion praying that he be allowed to present evidence to support his motion; that
his motion to quash be granted; and that the case be dismissed. Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds,
to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.

Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA, assailing the
denial of his motion to quash the information despite the fact that his first marriage with Modina was declared null and void ab initio
prior to the filing of the bigamy case.

Issues:

Whether or not the information for bigamy may be quashed.

Ruling:

No. A motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed
against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of information. The fundamental
test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are
hypothetically admitted would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. A motion to quash should be based on a
defect in the information which is evident on its fact.

CASE #289 Arroyo v People- 19 July 2016

Facts:

The Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and Accounts
Manager Aguas for conspiracy to commit plunder, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659.

The information reads: That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto accused
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the then President of the Philippines and Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager, all
public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official
positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount or total value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or less, [by raiding the public treasury].

Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for bail which were denied by the Sandiganbayan on the
ground that the evidence of guilt against them was strong.

After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas then separately filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that the
Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them. The same were denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there was
sufficient evidence to show that they had conspired to commit plunder. After the respective motions for reconsideration filed by GMA
and Aguas were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective petitions for certiorari.
Issue:

WON the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the demurrers to evidence

Ruling:

Yes. Notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the accused could avail
themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the
availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that
“the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or
by certiorari before judgment.” It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of
the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused
was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to
be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do so “x
x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to
show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending control over other
courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that the writ will
be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.”

The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one
side. This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is
committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as
the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Sec. 2 Forms and contents

CASE#290 People v Asuncion- 161, SCRA 490

Facts:

A former colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines named Rolando Abadilla, was charged before the Regional Trial Court, NCJR,
Quezon City, with the offense of Violation of Pres. Decree No. 1866 [Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition). Upon motion of
the accused, the respondent judge dismissed the Information on the ground that it did not allege sufficient facts to constitute an offense,
since the possession of loose firearms and explosives is not illegal perse, in view of Executive Order No. 107 which gives holders or
possessors of unlicensed firearms and ammunition a period of six (6) months from its effectivity, extended to 31 December 1987 by
Executive Order No. 222, within which to surrender the same to the proper authorities, without incurring any criminal liability therefor,
except if the unlicensed firearm or ammunition is carried outside of one’s residence, not for the purpose of surrendering the same, or
used in the commission of any other offense, and there is no allegation in said Information that the firearms and ammunition
enumerated therein were carried outside the accused’s residence or used in the commission of some other crime.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused in in violation of illegal possession of firearms

Ruling:

The contention is without merit. In People vs. Lopez, the Court already ruled that, under Republic Act No. 4, the use or the carrying of
firearms and/or ammunition was an ingredient, if not the sole ingredient, of the offense; i.e. the very acts which were punished, subject
to certain conditions, and hence, should be alleged and proved. the petitioner contends that under the allegation in the information
“that the accused without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under
his custody and control the firearms and ammunition enumerated therein,” the prosecution may prove that the accused carried the
firearms and ammunition outside of his residence. The contention is without merit. As the Court had stated in People vs. Austria, the
presentation of evidence “cannot have the effect of validating a void information, or proving an offense which does not legally exist. The
information was not merely defective but it does not charge any offense at all. Technically speaking, that information does not exist in
contemplation of law.”

Sec. 3 Grounds

CASE #291 Lacson v Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 330

Facts:

An Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group killed eleven persons who are allegedly members of the Kuratong baleleng.

The ombudsman panel recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty- six respondents including herein petitioner,
charged as principal, and herein petitioner- intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended
information before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended information,
the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law
limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the “principal accused” are government officials with Salary
Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites.
However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the
word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to
all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

Issue:

WON Sandiganbayan still has jurisdiction.

Ruling:

Yes. The Sandiganbayan still has jurisdiction. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. As the Court defines, ‘Penal laws are those acts of the
legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties thereof; or those that defines crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for
their punishment’. Republic Act 8249 is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character, thus, can be applied
retroactively. Therefore, the argument of the petitioner that the law in question has retroactive effect and may affect his right to due
process is wrong.

CASE # 292 Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, 322 SCRA 329

Facts:

Petitioner Crescente Y. Llorente, Jr. was elected municipal mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga in 1988 and again in 1992. In 1993, the
Office of the Special Prosecutor filed with the Sandiganbayan an information against Llorente for violation of Sec 3 (e), RA 3019 for
seizing 930 sawn knockdown wooden boxes belonging to a Godofredo Diamante without any search warrant and without issuing any
receipt of seizure. He and his co-accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty in 1994.
In March 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan another information against Llorente for violation of Sec 3
(f), RA 3019 for refusing to issue a Mayor’s permit to the ice plant and resawmill/box factory of R. F. Diamante and family, without
sufficient justification, after due demand and payment of license fees were made. No trial has begun for either case before the
Sandiganbayan.

On May 8 1995, Llorente was a candidate and eventually elected Congressman of the 2nd District of Zamboanga del Norte. On May 16,
1995, Congress enacted RA 7975, amending Sec 4 of PD 1606 . On July 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan, Third
Division, a motion to dismiss or transfer the first case to the RTC, Sindangan, Zamboanga. On the same date, petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan, First Division, a motion to refer the second to the same RTC.

Petitioner averred that the enactment of RA 7975 divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over criminal cases for violations of RA
3019 against municipal mayors who receive salary less than that corresponding to Grade 27, pursuant to the Index of Occupational
Services prepared by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Both Motions were denied.

Llorente filed the present petitions for certiorari. The cases were consolidated. *Meanwhile, Congress enacted RA 8249, an act
redefining the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.

Issue:

WON RA 7975 divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019, as amended, against municipal mayors.

Ruling:

No.

1. There is no merit to petitioner’s averment that the salary received by a public official dictates his salary grade. "On the contrary, it is
the official’s grade that determines his or her salary, not the other way around." "To determine whether the official is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should be made to RA 6758 and the Index of Occupational Services,
Position Titles and Salary Grades. An official’s grade is not a matter of proof, but a matter of law which the court must take judicial
notice."

2. Section 444 (d) of the Local Government Code provides that "the municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation
corresponding to Salary Grade 27 as prescribed under RA 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto." Additionally,
both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades list the municipal mayor under
Salary Grade 27. Consequently, the cases against petitioner as municipal mayor for violations of RA 3019, as amended, are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

CASE # 293 People v. Lagon, 185 SCRA 442

Facts:

In this case Libertad Lagon was charged with the crime of estafa. She had allegedly issued a check in the amount of P4,232.80 as
payment for goods or merchandise purchased, knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the check. The court dismissed
the information upon the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the court's authority to impose.

The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of
the action, and not by the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime.

At the time of the alleged commission of the crime in April 1975, jurisdiction over the offense was vested by law in the city court of
Roxas. However, by the time the criminal information was filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code had already
been amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused thereunder increased, which penalty was beyond the City court of
Roxas’ authority to impose. The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the
time of the institution of the action, and not by the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime.
Issue:

WON the city court of Roxas has jurisdiction over the offense.

Ruling:

No.

At the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on 7 July 1976, the penalty imposable for the offense charged in Criminal Case
No. 7362 had been increased. The subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law is reckoned by the law in effect at the time of the
commencement of a criminal action, rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged.

Jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to the then Court of First Instance of Roxas City considering that P.D. No. 818 had increased
the imposable penalty for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 to a level in excess of the maximum penalty which a city court
could impose. It was held that the subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the authority of the court to impose the
penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the allegations of a criminal information. It was also explained by the court that
lesser penalty may be imposed by the trial court even if the reduced penalty otherwise falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of an
inferior court.

CASE # 294 Cruz v. Sandiganbayan, 194 SCRA 474

Facts:

An information against Cruz was filed by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan. Public respondent PCGG informed the court that it will file
an amended information. The amended information that was filed against Cruz contained substantially the same allegations, with the
only amendment that Cruz was identified as "a subordinate and crony/associate of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos," and with
the additional allegation of "taking undue advantage of his public office and by using his relationship to said former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, . . . ."

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that on the face of the complaint and of the information filed with the PCGG to
support that complaint, the 'crony related crime' alleged thereon did not exist and for which reason from the very first instance, the
PCGG did not have the 'literal' justification to even entertain the matter under its enabling enactments.

Motion to Quash was denied by the respondent court, as well as the motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

WON the Sandigabayan has no jurisdiction over Cruz by reason of a jurisdictionally defective information filed by the PCGG as it had no
authority to file the same.

Ruling:

A reading of the information and the amended information that was filed by the PCGG in this case shows that Cruz is charged with a
violation of Republic Act No. 3019.

The amended information that was thereafter filed against Cruz contained substantially the same allegations, and there is no allegation
that, President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinate or close associate, as petitioner, thereby acquired ill-gotten wealth.
Consequently, the amended information that was filed against Cruz does not fall under the category of criminal actions for recovery of
ill- gotten wealth filed against a member of the family of President Marcos. What Cruz is actually charged with is for a violation of
Republic Act No. 3019. An examination of the complaint filed with respondent PCGG show that there is no evidence at all that this
alleged violation is crony-related, committed by petitioner by taking advantage of his public office, and was committed in relation with
the ill-gotten wealth being sought to be recovered aforestated.
Indeed, the said amendment appears to be an afterthought to make it fall under the type of offenses respondent PCGG may investigate
and prosecute under the law. It is a fundamental principle that when on its face the information is null and void for lack of authority to
file the same, it cannot be cured nor resurrected by an amendment.

CASE #295 Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.- 170 SCRA 190

Facts:

The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner and three other accused of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public
documents. They were ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the government.

Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to SC which soon enough affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration
but while it was pending, then President Marcos absolutely pardoned her, which she accepted.

Due to the pardon, petitioner wrote to the Calbayog City Treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post. Finance Ministry
ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was
extended the absolute pardon.

Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped
out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted. Minsitry of finance referred her letter to the
office of the president which negated her contention.

Her subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, she filed this present petition.

Issue:

WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former
position without need of a new appointment.

Ruling:
Even if the offender be pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the accessory penalties would reamin unless the same have also been
expressly remitted by the pardon. It is of no material on when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the
result would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreserved
conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent
as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes.

CASE #296 Balite v. People, 124 Phil.868

FACTS:

In December, 1958, the Democratic Labor Association declared a strike against the Cebu Stevedoring Company. Delfin Mercader, union
president, was offered by Richard Corominas & Co., a copra exporter affected by the strike, P10,000.00 as aid to the union and
presumably to pave the way for the amicable settlement of

the labor dispute. At a meeting called for the purpose, it was decided that the amount be accepted and spread amongst all the members.
However, at a subsequent meeting attended by Mercader and petitioner, the latter proposed that the amount thus offered be given
solely to the officers of the union, leaving out the members thereof. Petitioner's proposal met with vigorous opposition. Passions seemed
to have run so high that petitioner walked out of the meeting, threatened to destroy the union and to expose president Mercader.
Petitioner then pursued a smear campaign against Mercader. Petitioner met at the Cebu City waterfront members of the Marine Officers
Guild. The group was on its way to the guild's office. Petitioner then engaged Canlas in conversation whilst the latter's companions
gathered around and within hearing distance of the two. Petitioner then uttered the following words in the Cebu Visayan dialect, which,
translated into English, means: "Mr. Mercader sold the Union and the money of the Union was

swindled in the strike staged by the Democratic Labor Association against the Cebu Stevedoring Company. Atty. Mercader received
bribe money in the sum of P10,000.00 from the copra exporter Richard Corominas & Co. and another P6,000.00 from the Cebu
Stevedoring Company. The money of the Union was spent by him to his own personal benefit".

After the briefs have been filed and this case submitted for decision, the offended party, Delfin Mercader, submitted to this Court an
affidavit. He there stated that the prosecution of petitioner, his former classmate and former co- worker in the Cebu labor movement,
"was brought about by a misunderstanding in good faith among friends," that petitioner's remarks "were provoked" by Quintin Canlas
and were uttered "out of heat and passion engendered by a heated interchange between the two; that he and petitioner had `made up
and reconciled.'" He swore therein to the following: "That in conscience I hereby withdraw, condone, dismiss and waive any and all
claims, civil, criminal or administrative, that I may have against Amancio Balite due to or by reason of the misunderstanding which
brought about the filing of the said criminal case.

ISSUE:

WON the Trial Court acquired jurisdiction.

Ruling:

Taken in context, an unembroidered version of the Cebu City Charter on this point simply is this: A criminal charge is first to be lodged
with the fiscal who shall investigate the same; if warranted, he shall have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made
against the accused; thereafter, he shall have charge of the prosecution of the crime in court.

Here, the complaint was first lodged with the fiscal. He conducted a preliminary investigation. He found probable cause. He attested to
the complaint verified by the complainant. He recommended bail. He caused the complaint to be filed in the city court. In short, he
adopted the complaint as his own. These actuations of the fiscal in the case under review pass the statutory requirement. And, in a
literal sense. Because, with the verified complaint, he instituted the criminal proceeding.

The criminal proceeding herein was properly commenced. The trial court acquired jurisdiction.

CASE #297 Francisco v. CA

FACTS:

On Feb. 6, 1966, complainant Dr. Angeles, who was then the Director of the Morong Emergency Hospital, filed a case of intriguing
against honor allegedly committed on Dec. 26, 1965 against Dr. Francisco and Atty. Bernardino with the Provincial Fiscal.

The Provincial Fiscal filed an Information before the CFI in Rizal for grave oral defamation.

On Oct 8, 1966, the information was amended by adding particular statements which constituted the crime of Slander.

The RTC convicted the accused with the penalty of 4mos of arresto mayor as minimum to 1 year and 1 day of prision correccional as max
with the amount of 10,000.

The CA modified it with Simple Slander.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime of simple slander has prescribed.

RULING:

No. As contended by the OSG, to determine the prescriptive period, what should be considered is the nature of the offense charged In
the Information which is grave oral defamation. Hence, prescription is 6mos.

Applying Article 91 of the RPC which provides, “the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information,
and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted,or unjustifiably
stopped for reason not imputable to him.”

The SC enunciated the case of Olarte in putting to rest the conflict views pertaining to the running and interrupting of prescriptive
period.

- The filing of the complaint in the MTC, even it be merely for purposes of PI, or investigation, should and does, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the
merits.

As a well-known fact, proceedings in the Fiscal’s Office may terminate without conviction or acquittal.

Clearly, the filing of the complaint for intriguing against honor by the offended party, later changed by the Fiscal to grave oral
defamation, even if it were in the Fiscal’s Office. 39 days after the alleged defamatory remarks were committed or discovered by the
offended party INTERRUPTS the period of prescription.

However, the accused here was acquitted because the alleged defamatory words were not libelous per se.

CASE #298 People v. Villalon

FACTS:

De Guzman was charged with estafa thru falsification of public document on March 29, 1974. As the attorney-in-fact of Mariano Carrera
(complainant), in 1964, De Guzman forged his signature on the special power of attorney (SPA) to use it to mortgage Carrera’s parcel of
land and obtain a loan from the mortgage bank. Both documents (Power of Atty. and mortgage contract) were later registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan. The mortgage foreclosed, the land was bought by someone else, and Carrera only knew about it when
an action for ejectment was filed against him by the new owner in 1972. The trial court dismissed the case against De Guzman on the
grounds that the said crime, which was punishable by prision correcional, already prescribed, pursuant to Art. 90 of the RPC. The SC
affirmed the challenged decision of the trial court, ruling that the crime prescribed upon the public registry of the power of attorney
which is considered a notice to the whole world.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document has sufficient basis to exist in law and in fact. (YES)

2. Whether or not the crime has prescribed. (YES)

RULING:

1. Falsification is only the means necessary to commit the estafa because before the falsified document is used to defraud another, the
crime of falsification was already consummated. The damages were caused by the commission of estafa. The alleged authorization given
to De Guzman to get a loan from the Bank only pertains to the half owned by Mariano’s brother. In his testimony, Mariano only quoted
his brother .
2. The start of the prescriptive period was when the falsified SPA was registered in the Registry of Deeds on Feb. 13, 1964. In a crime of
falsification of a public document, the prescriptive period commences from the time the offended party had constructive notice of the
alleged forgery after the document was registered with the Register of Deeds.

CASE #299 People v. Mogol

FACTS:

On or about the 21st of December 1971, about 7 o’clock in the evening at MAgsaysay District, municipality of Lopez, Province of Quezon,
Edgardo Caballas, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and felonious assault, attack and stab Ernesto Sandoval
with unidentified knife causing the latter physical injuries.

Upon arraignment on February 5, 1972, the accused Caballas pleaded not guilty. 2 Before the presentation of evidence, the private
prosecutor on February 23, 1972 filed an "Urgent Motion to Amend the Complaint" to charge the offense of Frustrated Murder,
contending that a perusal of the affidavits of the witnesses for the prosecution patently shows that in the commission of the act
complained of, the accused had the manifest intention to kill the offended party.

The defense, on the other hand, in its Memorandum argued that since the accused had already entered his plea, the Court could no
longer entertain the Motion for amendment of the complaint, the intended amendment being a substantial one for a grave offense with
a higher penalty, citing Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The Motion was denied in an Order of the Municipal Court dated April 6, [Link] case, thereafter, proceeded to trial.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal order terminating the case before the respondent Judge was legal and valid?

RULING:

NO.

The dismissal order terminating the case before the respondent judges was not legal and valid.

The Court held and rule that the responded Judge erred in dismissing the case for serious physical injuries to give way to the filing of a
complaint for frustrated murder. For it is the duty of the respondent Judge to render the decision as the evidence of intent to kill the
intended victim. The judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess jurisdiction.

Since the order of dismissal was without authority and, therefore, null and void, the proceeding before the Municipal Court has not been
lawfully terminated. Accordingly, there is no second proceeding to speak of and no double jeopardy. A continuation of the proceedings
against the accused for serious physical injuries is in order.

CASE #300 People v. Hon. Tac-an

FACTS:

Private respondent Austria was charged with falsification of public official document. Out of the eleven witnesses listed in the
Information, only the first three witnesses were notified of the date of the arraignment and pre-trial.

When the case was called for pre-trial, the trial court discovered that none of the three witnesses who were allegedly earlier notified by
the court was in attendance. On motion of the accused and over the objection of the public prosecutor, the trial court issued an order
dismissing the case for failure of said witnesses to appear before it.
The public prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, but the same was denied. The People of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for the
nullification of the orders of the trial court. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the errors committed by the trial court
were mere errors of judgment which are not correctable by a writ of certiorari. The appellate court also stated that a reinstatement of
the criminal case will place the private respondent in double jeopardy.

ISSUE:

WON the trial court was correct for dismissing the case for failure of the witnesses of the prosecution to appear at the pre-trial.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court acted without jurisdiction when it dismissed the case merely because none of the witnesses
notified by the trial court appeared for the pre- trial. Under R.A. 8493 (The Speedy Trial Act of 1998), the absence during pre-trial of
any witness for the prosecution listed in the Information, whether or not said witness is the offended party or the complaining witness,
is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a criminal case.

Although under the law, pre-trial is mandatory in criminal cases, the presence of the private complainant or the complaining witness is,
however, not required. Even the presence of the accused is not required unless directed by the trial court. It is enough that the accused
is represented by his counsel. Indeed, even if none of the witnesses listed in the Information for the State appeared for pre-trial, the
same can and should proceed. After all, the public prosecutor appeared for the State.

The Court also ruled that the CA erred in ruling that the reinstatement of the case will place private respondent in double jeopardy.
When the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated. The
trial court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect,
the first jeopardy was never terminated, and remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the trial court amounts
merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.

CASE #301 Disini v. Sandigan

FACTS:

The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized
under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, and with a violation of Section 4 (a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A.
No. 3019), also known as the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Thereafter, Disini filed a motion to quash alleging that the criminal actions had been extinguished by prescription, and that the
information did not conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed the motion to quash.

Later on, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the Sandiganbayan's favorable action on his motion for
permission to travel abroad. He then entered a plea of not guilty to both informations.

The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. Disini moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the motion to quash should be granted on the grounds that (1) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction, (2) the offenses
has prescribed, and (3) Information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.

RULING:

No, the motion to quash cannot be granted since the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, the offense has not yet prescribed, and the
Information substantially complied with the prescribed form.
First ground

The motion cannot be quashed on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction. In fact, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the case pursuant to PD No. 1606 as amended. That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting the President in "[t]he recovery of all
ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities
owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office
and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship," expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-
gotten wealth covered President Marcos' immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their
private or public status.

Despite Disini's being a private individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-principal, accomplice or accessory of
a public official in the commission of the offenses charged.

Second ground

The motion to quash cannot be granted on the ground of prescription since prescription did not yet set in.

The offense of corruption of public officials as well as violation of RA 3019 prescribe in 15 years. Moreover, prescription begins to run
from the date of discovery of the crime and shall only be interrupted upon the filing of complaint or information in Court (Article 91,
Revised Penal Code).

In this case, prescription has not yet set in because it was only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the offenses
charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman.

Third ground

The motion to quash on the ground of insufficiency in form and substance cannot be granted.

The fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may be sustained based on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde
are not considered. The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there would
no longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial.

In this case, the criminal cases against have sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

The elements for corruption of public officials was sufficiently alleged in the information. This is because the facts alleged in the
information would establish the elements of the the offense of corruption of public officials. The sufficiency of the allegations in the
information charging the violation of Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld because the allegations in the information
charging the violation of Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 3019, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the offense.

Sec. 4 Amendment of Complaint or Information

Sec. 5 Effects of sustaining the motion to quash

CASE #302 Lavides v. CA

FACTS:

Petitioner Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610 for child prostitution and other sexual
abuse. His arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police at around 8:20 in the evening of
April 3, 1997, the police knocked at the door of Room 308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where petitioner was staying. When petitioner
opened the door, the police saw him with complainant Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they
arrested him.
On April 10, 1997, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate
Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the
Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged."

On April 29, 1997, nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel,
and by three other minor children.

On May 20, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to quash the information against him, except those filed in Criminal Case No. Q-97-70550 or
Q-97-70866. Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on May 23, 1997.

On May 23, 1997, the trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioner's motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to
suspend arraignment. Accordingly, petitioner was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then
ordered him released upon posting bail bonds.

On June 2, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 44316) in the Court of Appeals, assailing the trial court's order,
dated May 16, 1997, and its two orders, dated May 23, 1997, denying his motion to quash and maintaining the conditions set forth in its
order of May 16, 1997, respectively.

Petitioner concedes that the rule is that the remedy of an accused whose motion to quash is denied is not to file a petition for certiorari
but to proceed to trial without prejudice to his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash during trial on the merits or
on appeal if an adverse judgment is rendered against him. However, he argues that this case should be treated as an exception. He
contends that the Court of Appeals should not have evaded the issue of whether he should be charged under several informations
corresponding to the number of acts of child abuse allegedly committed by him against each of the complainants.

ISSUE:

Will the petition for certiorari lie from a denial of a motion to quash?

RULING:

Yes. As an exception.

In Tano v. Salvador, the Court, while holding that certiorari will not lie from a denial of a motion to quash, nevertheless recognized that
there may be cases where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal. In such cases, the accused
may resort to the appellate court to raise the issue decided against him. This is such a case. Whether petitioner is liable for just one
crime regardless of the number of sexual acts allegedly committed by him and the number of children with whom he had sexual
intercourse, or whether each act of intercourse constitutes one crime is a question that bears on the presentation of evidence by either
party. It is important to petitioner as well as to the prosecution how many crimes there are. For instance, if there is only one offense of
sexual abuse regardless of the number of children involved, it will not matter much to the prosecution whether it is able to present only
one of the complainants. On the other hand, if each act of sexual intercourse with a child constitutes a separate offense, it will matter
whether the other children are presented during the trial. The issue then should have been decided by the Court of Appeals.

CASE #303 Marcos v. Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

Two informations for malversation of public funds totalling about P97,954,000.00 were filed against petitioner and other accused with
the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner moved to quash/dismiss the two informations on grounds of denial of due process for failure to adequately inform the
accused of the charge against her, that the information stated no offense and for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner's motion to quash/dismiss, as well as her motion for reconsideration, were denied by the Sandiganbayan, ruling that the
motion had become moot since the accused had pleaded to the information.
ISSUE:

WON Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion to quash the information filed after she
had pleaded thereto.

RULING:

Yes.

It is clear that a motion to quash is not improper even after the accused had been arraigned if the same is grounded on failure to charge
an offense and lack of jurisdiction of the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy. In this case, the petitioner's
motion to quash is grounded on no offense charged and lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Sec. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution, explain

CASE #304 Milo v. Salonga

FACTS:

An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the CFI. All the
accused, including respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to
support the filing of the information. Respondent judge granted the motion to quash on the basis that the facts alleged do not constitute
the offense since Tuvera, who is a barrio captain, is not a public officer. Hence, arbitrary detention could not be committed. Tuvera also
claims that since the trial court already granted his motion to quash, jeopardy has already attached in his favor on the ground that here,
the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

ISSUE:

1. WON the respondent judge erred in granting the motion to quash filed by the accused? (YES)

2. WON the grant of motion to quash bars the prosecution for the same offense on account that double jeopardy already attached? (NO)

RULING:

1. Jurisprudence already held that barrio captains are considered as public officers for purposes of arbitrary detention.

2. An order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of denial, is a final order. It is not merely interlocutory and is therefore
immediately appealable. The accused cannot claim double jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his consent
but at his instance.

CASE #305 Caniza v. People

FACTS:

An Information was filed against petitioner Cañiza for falsification of public documents. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash contending
that the allegations in the information did not constitute an offense. She also contended that the information contained averments
which, if true would constitute a legal excuse or justification. The trial court granted the Motion to Quash and dismissed the case against
petitioner Cañiza.
A second Information was filed charging petitioner Cañiza with substantially the same offense as that charged under the previous
information. The petitioner Cañiza again moved to quash the second Information but was denied by the respondent judge.

Petitioner Cañiza filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari and raised the issue, among others, that the filing of the second
Information has placed the accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense a second time.

ISSUE:

WON an Order sustaining the motion to quash bars another prosecution.

RULING:

No.

The first Information was ordered dismissed by the trial court with the express consent of the accused — i.e., upon Motion to Quash
filed by petitioner Cañiza. Generally, a dismissal under such circumstances will not bar another prosecution for the same offense; the
defendant, in having the case against him dismissed, thereby waives his constitutional right against double jeopardy for the reason that
he effectively prevents the trial court from proceeding to trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
Application of the aforestated doctrine of waiver, however, is subject to two (2) sine qua non conditions: first, dismissal must have been
sought or induced by the defendant, either personally or through counsel; and second, such dismissal must not have been on the merits
and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal.

In this respect, the record shows that petitioner Cañiza moved to quash the first Information on grounds that the allegations made
therein did not constitute an offense and/or that the first Information contained allegations which, if true, constituted a legal excuse or
justification. These grounds are clearly directed at the sufficiency of said information to sustain the conviction of petitioner Cañiza and,
hence, indicate the absence of the first requisite in double jeopardy. Furthermore, and more importantly, dismissal of a criminal action
on this basis is not properly considered as amounting to an acquittal on the merits; from a legal standpoint, the defendant is deemed as
not having been charged with the commission of any offense whatsoever under the deficient information. Consequently, petitioner
Cañiza’s plea of second jeopardy cannot be sustained: he effectively waived his right to assert that plea when he moved to quash the first
Information filed against him.

CASE #306 People v. Silay

FACTS:

Private respondents herein, Ernesto de la Paz, Pacifico Senecio, Jr. y Sebusa, Romeo Millan y Delejero and Wilfredo Jochico y
Magalona, were charged with "falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document" under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code.

After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, private respondents moved to dismiss the charge against them on
the ground that the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on this motion,
respondent court issued its order of December 19, 1975, dismissing the case with costs de oficio principally on the ground that the acts
committed by the accused as narrated above do not constitute the crime of falsification as charged.

Private respondents claim that there was no error committed by respondent court in dismissing the case against them for insufficiency
of evidence and that for this Court to grant the present petition would place said respondents in double jeopardy.

The People (petitioner) asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable inasmuch as the case was dismissed upon motion of the
accused, and the dismissal having been made with their consent, they waived their defense of double jeopardy.
ISSUE:

Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico in double jeopardy.

RULING:

The court disagrees with the position taken by the Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. that the plea of double jeopardy is not
available in the instant situation. The revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has
been dismissed earlier due to lack of merits. It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on a motion of the accused
however this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for the evidence beyond reasonable ground which the
prosecution had not been able to do which would be tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar the prosecution of another case.

As it was stated on the requirements of a valid defense of double jeopardy it says: That there should be a valid complaint, second would
be that such complaint be filed before a competent court and to which the accused has pleaded and that defendant was previously
acquitted, convicted or dismissed or otherwise terminated without express consent of the accused in which were all present in the case
at bar. There was indeed a valid, legitimate complaint and concern against the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico which was filed at a
competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. It was also mentioned that the accused pleaded not guilty and during the time of
trial, it was proven that the case used against the accused were not sufficient to prove them guilty beyond reasonable doubt therefore
dismissing the case which translates to acquittal. It explained further that there are two instances when we can conclude that there is
jeopardy when first is that the ground for the dismissal of the case was due to insufficiency of evidence and second, when the
proceedings have been reasonably prolonged as to violate the right of the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites given, it was the
first on that is very much applicable to our case at bar where there was dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence which will
bar the approval of the petition in the case at bar for it will constitute double jeopardy on the part of the accused which the law despises.

Sec 7. Former conviction or aquital, double jeopardy.

Case # 307 People vs Ylagan (Can’t find People vs HAGAN)

Facts:

Against the appellee, Elisea Ylagan, a complaint for physical injuries in the justice of the peace court of Batangas, Province of Batangas.
After preliminary investigation, the case forwarded to the Court of First Instance, where the provincial fiscal filed an information
charging her with serious physical injuries. Upon arraignment, the defendant pleaded not guilty to the information; whereupon the
private prosecutor, with the concurrence of the deputy provincial fiscal, moved for the dismissal of the case, which motion was granted
by the court. The attorney for the defendant said nothing about the dismissal of the case.

Eleven days later, the acting provincial fiscal filed another information in the same justice of the peace court, charging the same
defendant with the same offense of serious physical injuries. After another preliminary investigation, the case was again forwarded to
the Court of First Instance, where the information filed in the justice of the peace court was reproduced. Upon arraignment, the
defendant entered a plea of double jeopardy, based on section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Issue:
Whether or not there is double jeopardy present in the case.

Ruling:
Yes. Defendant in a criminal prosecution is in legal jeopardy when placed on trial under the following conditions: (1) In a court of
competent jurisdiction; (2) upon a valid complaint or information; (3) after he has been arraigned; and (4) after he has pleaded to the
complaint of information. Tested by this standard, the court is of the opinion that the appellee has been once in jeopardy for the offense
for which she is now prosecuted. All that the law requires is that the accused has been brought to trial "in a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, after
issue properly joined." Under our system of criminal procedure, issue is properly joined after the accused has entered a plea of not
guilty. The mere calling of a witness would not add a particle to the danger, annoyance, and vexation suffered by the accused, after going
through the process of being arrested, subjected to a preliminary investigation, arraigned, and required to plead and stand trial.
Counsel for the government, however, contends that the previous case brought against the appellee was dismissed with her consent, on
the theory that the phrase "without the consent of the accused", used in section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, should be
construed to mean "over the objection of the accused" or "against the will of the accused". The court did not accept such a theory. The
court believes it is a sound rule to lay down, that the mere silence of the defendant or his failure to object to the dismissal of the case
does not constitute a consent within the meaning of section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The right not to be put in jeopardy a
second time for the offense is as important as the other constitutional right of the accused in a criminal case. Its waiver cannot, and
should not, be predicated on mere silence

Case # 308 Abay vs Garcia, 162 SCRA 665

Facts:
Petitioners were accused of the crime of direct assault. Petitioner-Accused Felix Abay, Sr. and Felix Abay, Jr. were duly arraigned and
both pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced on July 26, 1976, with Ramiro Garque testifying on direct examination and partly on cross-
examination. The trial was transferred to September 14, 1976. But again the cross-examination was not terminated so the case was
reset.
At the continuation of the trial on July 1, 1977, both accused appeared without their counsel. The trial fiscal was present, but the
complainant, Garque, who was still to be cross-examined, failed to appear despite due notice. The private prosecutor, Atty. Trocino, also
failed to appear. Whereupon, Judge Garcia verbally ordered, motu proprio, the dismissal of the case. Fiscal Lobaton did not object to
the dismissal. Both accused remained silent and later left the courtroom after the judge dictated the order of dismissal.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, Atty. Trocino, together with Garque, arrived in court and upon learning that the
criminal case was ordered dismissed, verbally moved to have the order of dismissal set aside.
In the presence of special counsel Navarro, Atty. Trocino was allowed to present evidence in support of the verbal motion for
reconsideration and to explain the failure of Garque to appear on time. In his written order of July 1, 1977, Judge Garcia granted the
verbal motion for reconsideration and set aside the verbal order of dismissal. He further ordered the resetting of the case for hearing on
another date.
Subsequently, the accused, through counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of July 1, 1977, invoking double jeopardy,
claiming that the verbal order of dismissal, even if provisional, was rendered without the express consent of the accused. The motion for
reconsideration was denied, after which the accused filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not double jeopardy attached considering the verbal order of dismissal.

Ruling:

No. Where there is a valid information and the accused has been arraigned, an order of dismissal issued by the court, motu proprio, in
the course of a trial of a criminal case, whether based on the merits or for failure of prosecution witnesses to appear, has the effect of a
judgment of acquittal and double jeopardy attaches. The order is also immediately executory. However, this order of dismissal must be
written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him conformably with the
provisions of Rule 120, Section 2 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 120, Section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).
In the instant case, it is very clear that the order was merely dictated in open court by the trial judge. There is
no showing that this verbal order of dismissal was ever reduced to writing and duly signed by him. Thus,
it did not yet attain the effect of a judgment of acquittal, so that it was still within the powers of the judge to set it
aside and enter another order, now in writing and duly signed by him, reinstating the case.

Case # 309 People vs Bao, 1600 Phil 243

Facts:

On May 13, 1955, Benedicto Bao was charged with oral defamation in the Justice of the Peace Court of Aloran, Misamis
Occidental, in a complaint filed by the offended party, Maximina Banguis. The said complaint was later amended to charge
the crime of serious oral defamation. The defendant having waived his right to the preliminary investigation and the
justice of the peace court being of the opinion that the case did not fall within its jurisdiction, the record of the case was
forwarded to the Court of First Instance of the province for trial on the merits.

Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty and the case was tried. After the prosecution had rested its
case, the accused, thru his counsel, filed a motion to quash on the grounds that the facts alleged in the information did not
constitute the crime of serious oral defamation and that the evidence presented was insufficient to convict him of any
criminal offense. The trial court dismissed the case, and in that same order the court directed the provincial fiscal to file
the corresponding action before the proper justice of the peace court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Government can file an appeal from the order of dismissal.

Ruling:

No. Court held that the dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of variance between the allegations in the information
and the evidence amounts to an acquittal. The case was dismissed after the prosecution had rested its case and upon
motion by the defendant on the grounds that the facts alleged in the information did not constitute the crime charged and
that, at any rate, the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish his guilt. This dismissal, likewise, amounts to
an acquittal or discharge of the defendant, from which the prosecution cannot appeal without doing
violence to the constitutional provision on double jeopardy.

Case # 310 People vs City of Manila, 121 SCRA 637

Facts:
The incident occurred on October 17, 1971. The following day, October 18, an information for serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence was filed against private respondent driver of the truck. On the same day, the victim Diolito de la
Cruz died.
On October 20, 1972, private respondent was arraigned on the charge of serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence. He pleaded guilty, was sentenced to one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor, and commenced
serving sentence.
On October 24, 1972, an information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed against private respondent.
On November 17, 1972, the City Court of Manila, upon motion of private respondent, issued an order dismissing the
homicide thru reckless imprudence case on the ground of double jeopardy.

· Respondent court held that the private respondent having been previously tried and convicted of serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence for the resulting death of the victim would place the accused in double jeopardy.

Issue:

WON a person who has been prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and convicted thereof
may be prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru reckless imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of the same
injuries he had suffered.

Ruling:

NO. The accused was already in jeopardy.

The victim Diolito dela Cruz died on the day the information was filed, and the accused was arraigned two (2) days after,
or on October 20, 1972. When the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was, therefore, filed on October 24,
1972, the accused-private respondent was already in jeopardy.
There would have been no problem if the victim died after arraignment, because this would have been a supervening fact
that allowed amendment of the information. However, in this case, the victim died on the same day the information for
serious physical injuries was filed, BEFORE the arraignment. Thus, jeopardy had attached and no new fact supervened
after the arraignment and conviction of the accused.

Case # 311 People vs Relova, 148 SCRA 294 (The case is long, sorry)

Facts:

Membersof the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a
search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice
Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia.

· The police discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city government and
architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. The accused admitted that the said devices were designed
purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the plant’s electric meter.

The Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an information against Manuel
Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. The case, however, was dismissed on the
ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time
of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after
discovery of the offense charged in February 1975.

Another information was filed by the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City before the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
Branch 11, against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309,
paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code.

Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, alleging that he had been previously
acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional
right against double jeopardy. The respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the case
dismissed.

Petitioner’s for MR was denied, thus this Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas
on behalf of the people, alleging that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is protection against a second
or later jeopardy of conviction for the same offense.

The petitioner stresses that the first information filed before the City Court of Batangas City was one for unlawful or
unauthorized installation of electrical wiring and devices, acts which were in violation of an ordinance of the City
Government of Batangas, where the second information was for the offense of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, thus making the 1st and 2nd information filed for different offenses.

Issue:

WON the dismissal of the first case (violation of an ordinance) can be properly pleaded by the accused in the motion to
quash of another information filed against him (for theft under the RPC) on the ground of double jeopardy.

Ruling:

YES.
The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not
available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior
prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second
sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against
double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged
subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the
same act or set of acts.

Where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is
to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two
offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which
constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.

The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the two
offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. The
question of identity of the acts which are claimed to have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a
national statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the location of such acts in time and space.
When the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be
reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the
same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an
integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a municipal
ordinance and a national statute).

In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame: from November 1974 to February
1975. During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the installation of electrical wiring and
devices in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or authorization from the municipal authorities. The
accused conceded that he effected or permitted such unauthorized installation for the very purpose of reducing electric
power bill. This corrupt intent was thus present from the very moment that such unauthorized installation began. The
immediate physical effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant
without the corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current was
integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.

The Identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute identity: the first and second offenses
may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or
is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first
or a frustration thereof.

While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense, it seems elementary that an accused
should be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single act. Otherwise, an unlawful act
or omission may give use to several prosecutions depending upon the ability of the prosecuting officer to imagine or
concoct as many offenses as can be justified by said act or omission, by simply adding or subtracting essential elements.

The dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground
that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Under the
Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense.

Case # 312 Central Bank vs CA, 171 SCRA 49

Facts:

An information for Estafa was filed against Felipe Plaza Chua and Melchor Avila Chua President and Treasurer,
respectively, of the Surigao Development Bank.

Both pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial ensued and the trial court convicted the respondents of the crime
charged. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court and acquitted private respondents.

Issue:

WON an appeal on the acquittal of the private respondents by the people is proper.

Ruling:

NO. Ordinarily, errors of judgment may be corrected in a timely appeal from the judgment on the merits. Such remedy,
however, is not available in the case at bar, the decision involved being one of acquittal. An appeal therefrom by the
People would run counter to the accused's constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.

Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the
defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy." In this jurisdiction, a judgment of acquittal is not
reviewable by a higher court, for an appeal by the government from the judgment would put the accused in second
jeopardy for the same offense.
The case of People vs. Ang Cho Kio tells us:
No error, however flagrant committed by the Court against the State, can be reserved by it for decision by the
Supreme Court when the defendant has once been in jeopardy and discharged, even though the discharge was the
result of the error committed.

Case # 313 SALDARIEGA v. HON. PANGANIBAN

DOCTRINES:

PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL: When a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the
accused, the case may be revived by the State within the periods provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule
117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY:

FACTS:

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dated April 21, 2014 filed by
Roberta S. Saldariega , through counsel, assailing the Order dated June 14, 2013 issued by respondent Presiding Judge
Elvira D.C. Panganiban, which granted the motion to reopen Criminal Case Nos. Q-1 1-173055 and Q-1 1-173056, for
allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Office of the City Prosecutor of the QC filed two informations against Saldriega for violation of Sections 5
(Sale of Dangerous Drugs) and 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article 2 of RA 9165 (Dangerous
Drugs Act).
The cases were raffled to Branch 227, RTC QC which was presided by Hon. Judge Elvira Panganiban.

Court hearings were then set. However, the principal witness for the prosecution, PO2 Nelson Villas who was
one of the arresting officers failed to attend two of the scheduled hearings for the continuation of his direct
testimony (The records show that on December 10, 2012, he testified partially on direct examination and he was notified
of the March 26, 2013 continuation of his testimony, but despite Notice in open Court, he failed to appear.)

Reason for failure: There is a deceased relative and Villas needs to accompany the body to the province.

By virtue of such failure, Judge Panganiban issued an order provisionally dismissing the case with the expressed-
consent of Saldariega.

Both PO2 Villas and PO3 Sabulaan who were the arresting officers failed to appear despite receipt of Notice.

Only the Forensic Chemist appeared who has no personal knowledge of the source of evidence she examined.

“Thus, the defense counsel invoked the right of the accused to speedy trial. The Public Prosecutor did not
object to the dismissal, provided the dismissal is only provisional. Hence, let these cases be ordered
PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED WITH THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED AND HER
COUNSEL.”

However, PO2 Villas filed a motion to Re-open the case against Saldariega, averring that his failure to appear was
due to the death of his father-in-law. Furthermore, he testified that PO3 Sabulaan was transferred at the Batasan Police
Station hence Sabulaan could not have received his subpoena which is directed at his former place of assignment.

Judge Panganiban granted the motion to re-open the case and set the cases for continuation of hearing.

Aggrieved, Saldariega filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the provisional dismissal of the
criminal cases is considered an acquittal and PO2 Villas had no personality to file the motion to re-open
the case. (Denied).

The OSG opined that Judge Panganiban did not commit any grave abuse of discretion for Saldariega did not expressly
object to the motion to revive the criminal cases.

ISSUE (as stated in the case):

W/N the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases with the consent of the accused but predicated on
failure to prosecute which violates the right of an accused to speedy trial is not equivalent to an acquittal,
such that its revival would constitute double jeopardy?

Court: No. When a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be
revived by the State within the periods provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

· A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party. Here, a perusal of the Order, dated May 16, 2013, stresses in no uncertain terms that the dismissal of
the case was provisional MEANING the case could be revived at some future time.

· If Saldariega believed that the case against her should be dismissed with prejudice, she should not have
agreed to a provisional dismissal. She should have moved for a dismissal with prejudice so that the court
would have no alternative but to require the prosecution to present its evidence.

· A perusal of the records would show that Saldariega did NOT OBJECT TO THE PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL
NOR FILED AN OPPOSITION TO OBJECT TO SUCH PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL.
· It must be noted that if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, as in this
case, the case may be revived by the State within the periods provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
· Section 8. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally dismissed
except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
· The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become
permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having
been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more
than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two
(2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. (n)

· There is no violation of due process as long as the revival of a provisionally dismissed complaint was made within the
time-bar provided under the law. In this case, Saldariega was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11 both punishable
by life imprisonment. Hence, the revival of the case which was made the same year it was provisionally dismissed (2013)
was valid.

· DOUBLE JEOPARDY:
o Further, the proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been previously
charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his acquittal or conviction, or
dismissed in any other manner without his consent. As a general rule, the following requisites must be
present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction,
(3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of
the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent. However,
there are two (2) exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of
the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to support the
charge against him; and second, where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in
violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial.
o In the instant case, while the first four requisites are present, the last requisite is lacking,
considering that here the dismissal was merely provisional and it was done with the
express consent of the accused-petitioner. Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy
with the reopening of the case against her as it is clear that the case was only provisionally dismissed by
the trial court. The requirement that the dismissal of the case must be without the consent of the accused
is not present in this case. Neither does the case fall under any of the aforementioned exceptions because,
in fact, the prosecution had failed to continue the presentation of evidence due to the absence of the
witnesses, thus, the fact of insufficiency of evidence cannot be established.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

· Generally, the prosecutor should have been the one who filed the motion to revive because it is the
prosecutor who controls the trial. But in this particular case, the defect, if there was any, was cured when the
public prosecutor later actively participated in the denial of the accused's motion for reconsideration
when she filed her Comment/Objection thereto.
o The public prosecutor opined on the motion for reconsideration that “double jeopardy has not set in,
because the provisional dismissal of the case was with the express consent of the accused.”
o Furthermore, the Court held that "although the Motion to Re-open the case was filed by the witness
without securing the conformity of the Public Prosecutor, in effect, the prosecutor has conformed to the
re-opening of the case because she (the prosecutor) finds that the failure of the witness to
appear on two (2) hearings was due to the death of the father in law on March 23, 2013 and
the death of his aunt on May 12, 2013, as substantiated by the respective Certificates of Death of the said
relatives."

· Moreover, it must be noted that Saldariega was charged with a public crime, hence, it is a victim-less crime. Unlike in
private crimes where the participation of the private offended party is generally required for the recovery of civil liability,
in the instant case, there is no particular private offended party who can actually file the motion to revive.
Hence, in some instances, as in this case, it is the arresting officer, PO2 Villas, who filed the motion to revive the case out
of his sense of duty as a police officer and compelled by his sense of obligation considering that he knew his absence was
the cause why the complaint was provisionally dismissed.

Case # 314 Leonardo A. Villalon and Erlinda Talde-Villalon v. Amelia Chan G.R. No. 196508, 24 September 2014

Facts:

On May 6, 1954, the respondent Amelia Chan married Leon Basilio Chua in a civil ceremony solemnized by then Judge
Cancio C. Garcia. The respondent claimed that her husband and the present petitioner, Leonardo A. Villalon, are one and
the same person.

During the subsistence of his marriage to Amelia, Leon Basilio Chua, allegedly contracted a second marriage with Erlinda
Talde, under the name, Leonardo A. Villalon. The marriage took place on June 2, 1993, and was solemnized by Judge Ruth
C. Santos of MTC Antipolo.

Amelia, who was then living in the United States could not personally filea case for bigamy in the Philippines, requested
Benito Yao Chua and Wilson Go to commence the criminal proceedings for the commission of the crime of bigamy against
the petitioners.

On his defense, Leonardo filed before the RTC an omnibus motion seeking to disqualify Amelia’s lawyer. He argued that
Amelia could not be represented in the bigamy case because she was not a party to the case, as she did not file the
complaint-affidavit.

The RTC granted Leonardo’s omnibus motion. However, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that the
crime of bigamy, being public in nature, can be denounced by anyone, not only by the offended party, before the
prosecuting authorities without the offended party losing her right to recover damages. Furthermore, the CA ruled that the
offended party could be deprived of the right to intervene in the criminal case only when he or she expressly waives the
action or reserve the right to institute one. No waiver was made by Amelia in this case.

Issue: Whether the disqualification of the respondent’s lawyer violated the rights to intervene and be heard in the bigamy
case.

Held:

YES

Sec. 16 of the Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly allows an offended party to intervene by
counsel in the prosecution o f the offense for the recovery of civil liability where the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is instituted with the criminal action. The civil action shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action, except when the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The fact that the respondent, who was already based abroad, had secured the services of an attorney in the Philippines
reveals her willingness and interest to participate in the prosecution of the bigamy case and to recover civil liability from
the petitioners. Thus, the RTC should have allowed, and should not have disqualified, Atty. Atencia from intervening in
the bigamy case as the respondent, being the offended party, is afforded by law the right to participate through counsel in
the prosecution of the offense with respect to the civil aspect of the case.

Issue #2 W/N The Decision of the Court of Appeals gravely transgresses the petitioners’ constitutional right to due
process of law, apart from being violative of the legal proscription against double jeopardy.
Ruling:
First, the petitioners argue that the RTC’s September 5, 2006 order dismissing the bigamy case against themhad already
become final because it was not assailed by the respondent in her petition for certiorari before the CA. The petitioners
point out that the respondent only particularly assailed the RTC’s March 3, 2006 resolution and failed to file a separate or
amended petition for certiorari to include the September 5, 2006 order as one of the assailed orders of the RTC. Based on
this assertion, the petitioners contend that the CA, in ordering the remand and re-raffle of the bigamy case to another RTC
branch, violates their right against double jeopardy.
The petitioners are mistaken. The review by the CA on whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
encompassed, not only the issuance of the March 3, 2006 resolution,but all proceedings in the bigamy case thereafter.
This is apparent from the words used by the respondent in her certiorari petition before the CA where she raised the
following supporting grounds:
1. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED 03 MARCH 2006 IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 05-
30485 WHICH HELD THAT NO CLAIM FOR CIVIL LIABILITY WAS DEEMED INSTITUTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE,
AND CONSEQUENTLY DISQUALIFYING THE OFFENDED PARTY’S COUNSEL FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE
TRIAL OF THE CASE;
2. THE HEARINGS OF THE BIGAMY CASE WHEREIN THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PRIVATE PROSECUTOR IS
EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED ARE WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION.20 (Emphasis ours) Evidently, the CA’s review is not limited to the RTC’s March 3, 2006 resolution but
also included the September 5, 2006 order that was issued by the RTC in the course of the proceedings on the bigamy
case. Thus, the RTC’s September 5, 2006 order, which isstill the subject of review by this Court, has not attained finality
and the CA’s assailed order of remanding and re-raffling the bigamy case to another trial court would not violate the
petitioners’ right against double jeopardy.
Also, the court emphasized that the RTC issued its September 5, 2006 order in defiance of the TRO issued by the CA. The
records show that the CA had issued a TRO on April 19, 2006, which should have prohibited the RTC from further
proceeding on the case. But the RTC, instead, continued with the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence and issued the
assailed September 5, 2006 order.
Under this circumstance, the RTC’s September 5, 2006 order was actually without force and effect and would not serve as
basis for the petitioners to claim that their right against double jeopardy had been violated. The RTC, clearly, acted with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing its September 5, 2006 order in view ofthe earlier TRO issued by the CA.

Case # 315 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REYNALDO TORRES, JAY TORRES, BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO
TORRES y NAVA, and RONNIE TORRES, Accused, BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA, Accused-
Appellant.

G.R. No. 189850 September 22, 2014

Facts: Siblings Reynaldo Torres (Reynaldo), Jay Torres (Jay), Ronnie Torres (Ronnie) and appellant with the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide committed against Jaime M. Espino (Espino).

The accused armed with bladed weapons, conspired and conferred with one other malefactor, with the use of force,
violence and intimidation blocked Espino’s path and forcibly grabbed his belt-bag. On the occasion of the robbery, the
accused use personal violence and abuse of superior strength which was resisted by the victim prompting the accused to
stab the former which cause his immediate death. Further, they carry away with the personal properties of the victim.

The RTC ruled that the appellant can only be liable for murder. The CA modified the decision and found the appellant
guilty of robbery with homicide.

Hence, this present appeal.

Issue: W/N The acquittal of the accused-appellant in the robbery charge should be left undisturbed as being final and
executory which cannot be overturned without violating the proscription against double jeopardy.

Whether or not the accused can be held liable for the complex crime of robbery with homicide instead of murder?

Ruling:

1. Appellant maintains that the CA erred in finding him liable for robbery with homicide as charged in the Amended
Information. He argues that his appeal to the CA was limited to his conviction for murder and excluded his acquittal for
robbery. And by appealing his conviction for murder, he does not waive his constitutional right not to be subject to double
jeopardy for the crime of robbery. He claims that even assuming that the RTC erred in acquitting him of the robbery
charge, such error can no longer be questioned on appeal.

We cannot give credence to appellant’s contentions. “An appeal in [a] criminal case opens the entire case for review on
any question including one not raised by the parties.” 26 “[W]hen an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court,
he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the
appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the appellant.”27 In other words, when appellant appealed the RTC’s judgment of conviction for murder, he
is deemed to have abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it became the duty of the
appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the appealed judgment. Thus, appellant could not have been placed
twice in jeopardy when the CA modified the ruling of the RTC by finding him guilty of robbery with homicide as charged in
the Information instead of murder.

1. Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed with further modifications the decision of the CA.

Appellant is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.

"Robbery with homicide exists ‘when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on occasion, of the robbery. To sustain
a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal
property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and
(4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A
conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely
incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during
or after the robbery’.

It is clear that the primordial intention of appellant and his companions was to rob Espino. The killing was merely
incidental, resulting by reason or on occasion of the robbery.

Nonetheless, the presence of abuse of superior strength should not result in qualifying the offense to murder. When abuse
of superior strength obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide; it is to be regarded as a generic
circumstance, robbery with homicide being a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised
40
Penal Code. With the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death imposed for committing robbery with homicide, "[t]he
generic aggravating circumstance of[abuse of superior strength] attending the killing of the victim qualifies the imposition
41
of the death penalty on [appellant]." In view, however, of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines," the penalty that must be imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua
42
without eligibility for parole.

Further, in robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages are awarded automatically without need of
allegation and evidence other than the death of the victim owing to the commission of the crime. In granting
compensatory damages, the prosecution must "prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable to the injured party. Receipts should support claims of
actual damages.’

Case # 316 JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010.

Facts:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first
delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence.

The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler
sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a
prejudicial question.

Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence,
cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.

Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion
remained unresolved.

ISSUES:

1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the MTC ordered his arrest
following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries
sustained by respondent; and

2. Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings
in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent
Ponce’s husband.

HELD:

(1) Petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to
maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and

(2) The protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366

RATIO:

1. The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a
defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to
cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and,
should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted.

ABOUT DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULING

2. The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"13
protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal
Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the
question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." - that Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Homicide and Damage to Property ".

The Court found: Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are
Material Only to Determine the Penalty
 The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent
but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes,
both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies
falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus
excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only
serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," a single mental attitude regardless of the
resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

How should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-
offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried
separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the
single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy)
applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences unless one consequence amounts
to a light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or
less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting
to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly
sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive
original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium
period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article
365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution
of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense
and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the
act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime
collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity, penalizing each consequence separately. By
prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts,
rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state
resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, it is held that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or
severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article
365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and
only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.

Case # 317 ARIEL M. LOS BAÑOS v. JOEL R. PEDRO; 22 April 2009, (Brion, J.)

FACTS:
Pedro was charged for carrying a loaded firearm without the required written authorization from the COMELEC a day
before the May 2001 elections accusation as per BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code) in Boac, Marinduque.

A Complaint was filed against him. After Inquest, the Information was filed in court. When his motion for Preliminary
Investigation was granted, it did not materialize. Hence he filed Motion to Quash arguing that the Information
“contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification and/or that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense.” He attached a COMELEC Certification that he was “exempted” from the gun ban. The RTC
granted the quashal.

Private prosecutor Ariel Los Baños, representing the checkpoint team, moved to reopen the case, as Pedro’s
COMELEC Certification was a “falsification,” and the prosecution was “deprived of due process” when the judge
quashed the information without a hearing. The RTC reopened the case, as Pedro did not object to Los Baños’ motion.
Pedro filed an MR for the RTC’s order primarily based on Section 8 of Rule 117, arguing that the dismissal had become
permanent. The RTC denied Pedro’s MR.

The CA initially denied Pedro’s petition. In his MR, Pedro manifested the exact date and time of the Marinduque
provincial prosecutor’s receipt of the quashal order to be “2:35 p.m., December 10, 2001,” and argued that based on
this date, the provisional dismissal of the case became “permanent” on December 10, 2002. Based on this information,
the CA reversed itself ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion because it failed to apply Section 8,
Rule 17 and the time-bar under this provision.

ISSUE. WON the CA is correct in applying Sec. 8, Rule 117 in this case?

HELD: NO.

In People v. Lacson, it was held that there are sine quanon requirements in the application of the time -bar rule stated
in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117. We also ruled that the time-bar under the provision is a special
procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right
or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to
prosecute the accused.

The modifier “provisional” directly suggests that the dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers to are those that are
temporary in character, and not the dismissals that are permanent. Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence,
permanent dismissals are those barred by the principle of double jeopardy, by the previous extinction of criminal
liability, by the rule on speedy trial, and the dismissals after plea without the express consent of the accused. Section
8, by its own terms, cannot cover these dismissals because they are not provisional.

A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a provisional dismissal. This is in marked
contrast with a motion to quash whose grounds are specified under Section 3. The delimitation of the grounds
available in a motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a class in itself, with specific and closely-defined
characteristics under the Rules of Court.

Section 8 simply states when a provisional dismissal can be made, i.e., when the accused expressly consents and the
offended party is given notice. The consent of the accused to a dismissal relates directly to what Section 3(i) and
Section 7 provide, i.e., the conditions for dismissals that lead to double jeopardy. This immediately suggests that a
dismissal under Section 8 – i.e., one with the express consent of the accused – is not intended to lead to double
jeopardy as provided under Section 7, but nevertheless creates a bar to further prosecution under the special terms of
Section 8.
 This feature must be read with Section 6 which provides for the effects of sustaining a motion to quash – the dismissal
is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense – unless the basis for the dismissal is the extinction of
criminal liability and double jeopardy. These unique terms, read in relation with Sections 3(i) and 7 and compared
with the consequences of Section 8, carry unavoidable implications that cannot but lead to distinctions between a
quashal and a provisional dismissal under Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for what has
been provided under Sections 4 and 5, the governing rule when a motion to quash is meritorious are the terms of
Section 6. The failure of the Rules to state under Section 6 that a Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to further
prosecution shows that the framers did not intend a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal
to be confused with one another; Section 8 operates in a world of its own separate from motion to quash, and merely
provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to dismissals other than those grounded on Section 3. Conversely, when a
dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its time-bar does not apply.

THE TAMAD TABLE: DIFFERENCES POINTED OUT BY THE SC

Point Motion to Quash Provisional Dismissal

1. Who files it Accused; (Sec,1-2, Rule Prosecution, accused, or

117) both; subject to the
conditions in (Sec. 8 Rule
117)

2. Form and Content Found in Section 2, Rule Section 2, Rule 117

117 requirements DO NOT
apply

3. Reason for use To assail the validity of the May be grounded on

criminal complaint or reasons other than the
information for defects or defects found in the
defenses apparent on information
these

4. When allowed to be Before arraignment Ok to use even when the

used (Section 1, Rule 117) trial has already
commenced as long as the
required consents are
present

5. Life span (?) (lol ewan Perpetual/ forever/for Impermanent (until the
how long it lasts… or eternity (hi antok na ako) time-bar applies at which
pwede rin nature) time it becomes a
-An information that is permanent dismissal)
quashed stays quashed
until revived (just like in - There can be no re-filing
love) after the time-bar, and
prescription is not an
-the grant of this does not immediate consideration.
per se carry any
connotation of
impermanence and
becomes so only as
provided by law or by the
 Rules.

- In re-filing the case, what

is important is the
question of whether the
action can still be brought,
i.e., whether the
prescription of action or of
the offense has set in

SUMMARY: If the problem relates to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as shown on its
face, the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking the dismissal of
the complaint or information, before arraignment and under the circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall under
provisional dismissal.

The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the Information contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification [Section 3(h), Rule 117], and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
[Section 3(a), Rule 117]. We find from our examination of the records that the Information duly charged a specific offense
and provides the details on how the offense was committed. Thus, the cited Section 3(a) ground has no merit. On the other
hand, we do not see on the face or from the averments of the Information any legal excuse or justification. This COMELEC
Certification is a matter aliunde that is not an appropriate motion to raise in, and cannot support, a motion to quash
grounded on legal excuse or justification found on the face of the Information. Significantly, no hearing was ever called to
allow the prosecution to contest the genuineness of the COMELEC certification.

The granting of the quashal of the RTC had no merit on the ground that there is a legal excuse or justification in Pedro's
offense. Pedro misappreciated the natures of a motion to quash and provisional dismissal. As a consequence, a valid
Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.

Case # 318 CO VS. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS

[RULE 117, SEC. 8] The essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, are
conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph. In this case, there is no notice of any
motion for the provisional dismissal or of the hearing which was served on the private complainant.

FACTS:

Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy, filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22
against petitioner William Co. In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed on
June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Uy received a copy
of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after. On July 2, 2004, Uy,
through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases which was granted. Co filed a petition challenging the revival
of the criminal cases. He argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing the criminal cases should be
considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to speedy trial was denied. Assuming that the criminal cases
were only provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance of
the June 9, 2003 Order, not after notice to the offended party. He also insists that both the filing of the motion to revive
and the trial court's issuance of the order granting the revival must be within the one-year period. Even assuming that the
one-year period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2, 2003 when Uy received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts
that the motion was filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap year.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provisional dismissal of the criminal case has become permanent (NO)

HELD: NO. The essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which are
conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph thereof are: (1) the prosecution with
the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both
the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the
motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally; (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. In this case,
there is no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal or of the hearing which was served on the private
complainant at least 3 days before said hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules. Furthermore, the second
paragraph of the new rule should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after
service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case
having been revived. Correlatively, when a party is represented by a counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from the court
should be sent to the latter at his/her given address pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules. The public prosecutor
cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal. Also, the
contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the court order reviving it must be made prior to the
expiration of the one-year period is not found in the Rules. Further, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is
inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy's motion to revive the criminal cases. Even if the Court will consider that 2004 is
a leap year and that the one-year period to revive the case should be reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of provisional
dismissal by Uy.

Case # 319 SALDARIEGA v. HON. PANGANIBAN

DOCTRINES:

PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL: When a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may
be revived by the State within the periods provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY:

FACTS:

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court , dated April 21, 2014 filed by Roberta S.
Saldariega , through counsel, assailing the Order dated June 14, 2013 issued by respondent Presiding Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban,
which granted the motion to reopen Criminal Case Nos. Q-1 1-173055 and Q-1 1-173056, for allegedly having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Office of the City Prosecutor of the QC filed two informations against Saldriega for violation of Sections 5 (Sale of
Dangerous Drugs) and 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article 2 of RA 9165 (Dangerous Drugs Act).

The cases were raffled to Branch 227, RTC QC which was presided by Hon. Judge Elvira Panganiban.

Court hearings were then set. However, the principal witness for the prosecution, PO2 Nelson Villas who was one of the
arresting officers failed to attend two of the scheduled hearings for the continuation of his direct testimony (The records
show that on December 10, 2012, he testified partially on direct examination and he was notified of the March 26, 2013 continuation of
his testimony, but despite Notice in open Court, he failed to appear.)

a. Reason for failure: There is a deceased relative and Villas needs to accompany the body to the province.

By virtue of such failure, Judge Panganiban issued an order provisionally dismissing the case with the expressed-consent of
Saldariega.

a. Both PO2 Villas and PO3 Sabulaan who were the arresting officers failed to appear despite receipt of Notice.

b. Only the Forensic Chemist appeared who has no personal knowledge of the source of evidence she examined.

c. “Thus, the defense counsel invoked the right of the accused to speedy trial. The Public
Prosecutor did not object to the dismissal, provided the dismissal is only provisional. Hence, let
 these cases be ordered PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED WITH THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE
ACCUSED AND HER COUNSEL.”

However, PO2 Villas filed a motion to Re-open the case against Saldariega, averring that his failure to appear was due to the death
of his father-in-law. Furthermore, he testified that PO3 Sabulaan was transferred at the Batasan Police Station hence Sabulaan could
not have received his subpoena which is directed at his former place of assignment.

Judge Panganiban granted the motion to re-open the case and set the cases for continuation of hearing.

Aggrieved, Saldariega filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases
is considered an acquittal and PO2 Villas had no personality to file the motion to re-open the case. (Denied).

The OSG opined that Judge Panganiban did not commit any grave abuse of discretion for Saldariega did not expressly object to the
motion to revive the criminal cases.

ISSUE (as stated in the case): W/N the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases with the consent of the accused but
predicated on failure to prosecute which violates the right of an accused to speedy trial is not equivalent to an
acquittal, such that its revival would constitute double jeopardy?

Court: No. When a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived by the
State within the periods provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. Here, a
perusal of the Order, dated May 16, 2013, stresses in no uncertain terms that the dismissal of the case was provisional
MEANING the case could be revived at some future time.

If Saldariega believed that the case against her should be dismissed with prejudice, she should not have agreed to a
provisional dismissal. She should have moved for a dismissal with prejudice so that the court would have no alternative but to
require the prosecution to present its evidence.

A perusal of the records would show that Saldariega did NOT OBJECT TO THE PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL NOR FILED AN
OPPOSITION TO OBJECT TO SUCH PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL.

It must be noted that if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, as in this case, the case may
be revived by the State within the periods provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides:

Section 8. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of
the accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of
any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the
case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6)
years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. (n)

There is no violation of due process as long as the revival of a provisionally dismissed complaint was made within the time-bar provided
under the law. In this case, Saldariega was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11 both punishable by life imprisonment. Hence, the
revival of the case which was made the same year it was provisionally dismissed (2013) was valid.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY:

a. Further, the proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been previously charged
with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other
manner without his consent. As a general rule, the following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach:
(1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea
entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against
him without his express consent. However, there are two (2) exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy
may attach even if the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency of
evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where there has been an unreasonable delay in the
proceedings, in violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial.

b. In the instant case, while the first four requisites are present, the last requisite is lacking, considering
that here the dismissal was merely provisional and it was done with the express consent of the
accused-petitioner. Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy with the reopening of the case against
her as it is clear that the case was only provisionally dismissed by the trial court. The requirement that the dismissal
 of the case must be without the consent of the accused is not present in this case. Neither does the case fall under any
of the aforementioned exceptions because, in fact, the prosecution had failed to continue the presentation of evidence
due to the absence of the witnesses, thus, the fact of insufficiency of evidence cannot be established.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Generally, the prosecutor should have been the one who filed the motion to revive because it is the prosecutor who controls
the trial. But in this particular case, the defect, if there was any, was cured when the public prosecutor later actively
participated in the denial of the accused's motion for reconsideration when she filed her Comment/Objection thereto.

a. The public prosecutor opined on the motion for reconsideration that “double jeopardy has not set in,
because the provisional dismissal of the case was with the express consent of the accused.”

b. Furthermore, the Court held that "although the Motion to Re-open the case was filed by the witness without
securing the conformity of the Public Prosecutor, in effect, the prosecutor has conformed to the re-opening of the
case because she (the prosecutor) finds that the failure of the witness to appear on two (2) hearings
was due to the death of the father in law on March 23, 2013 and the death of his aunt on May 12, 2013, as
substantiated by the respective Certificates of Death of the said relatives."

Moreover, it must be noted that Saldariega was charged with a public crime, hence, it is a victim-less crime. Unlike in private crimes
where the participation of the private offended party is generally required for the recovery of civil liability, in the instant case, there is no
particular private offended party who can actually file the motion to revive. Hence, in some instances, as in this case, it is
the arresting officer, PO2 Villas, who filed the motion to revive the case out of his sense of duty as a police officer and compelled by his
sense of obligation considering that he knew his absence was the cause why the complaint was provisionally dismissed.

Case # 320 U.S vs. DONATO INDUCTIVO, LUCAS LIZARONDO and FRANCISCO CHICO

FACTS:

Defendants Donato Inductivo, Lucas Lizarondo, and Francisco Chico was guilty of a violation of Act No. 1757, the Gambling Law.

The criminal complaint filed in the justice of the peace court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, was laid against four persons, Maximo
Obdulio, Lucas Lizarondo, Donato Inductivo, and Francisco Chico. Subsequently, a motion was made in the justice of the peace court by
the municipal president asking that the complaint against Maximo Obdulio be dismissed in order that he might be used as a
government witness. This motion was granted by the justice of the peace. Later, an information was filed in the Court of First Instance
against three persons, Donato Inductivo, Lucas Lizarondo, and Francisco Chico. The fourth person, Maximo Obdulio, was named as a
witness for the prosecution. The cause came to trial before the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, without any motion or demurrer to the
complaint having been presented. Claro Soriano, the chief of police, was first called as a witness for the prosecution. He testified relative
to the arrest of the three defendants and Maximo Obdulio, and identified them as collectors of the prohibited game of jueteng. Maximo
Obdulio, who was the second witness for the prosecution, was permitted to begin his testimony without objection of any sort being
raised by counsel for the defense.

Even after it was thus brought to the notice of counsel and of the court that Maximo Obdulio had been dismissed as an accused in order
to be used as a government witness, no formal objection was raised nor was any adverse action taken by the trial court. With this the
statement of the case and of the facts, judgment was rendered against the three defendants Inductivo, Lizarondo, and Chico.

It is only on appeal that counsel for defendants first argue against the competency of Maximo Obdulio as a witness because of the fact
that the provisions of Act No. 2709 were not followed

ISSUE: Whether or not questions not raised in the trial court will be considered on appeal

HELD: No. Such a contention cannot prosper, questions not raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal

An appellate court, strictly speaking, has no question of law to review if the trial court has made no ruling. This incontrovertible
proposition would be sufficient to dispose of appellants' second assignment of error. There is, however, another method of
approach leading to the same result. It is this —
 The motion intended to secure Maximo Obdulio as a government witness was, it will be recalled, filed in the justice of the peace
court: it was not filed in the court of first instance where the trial was had. The justice of the peace court was, under these
circumstances, not a "competent court" within the meaning of Act No. 2709. Conceding then that the provisions of this Act were
not followed, it is, nevertheless, not fatal, because the clear and convincing testimony of the chief of police is sufficient to warrant
the conviction of the three defendants, not taking into consideration the testimony of Maximo Obdulio at all. Parenthetically, it may
be remarked that since this is so, and since the record discloses that Maximo Obdulio was equally guilty with the other three
defendants, he can now be prosecuted for the same offense. It is a situation somewhat akin to proceedings in a court having no
jurisdiction, which is no bar to subsequent prosecution in a court which has jurisdiction of the offense.

Case # 321 ESTANISLAO ALVIOLA vs JUDGE HENRY B. AVELINO A.M. No. MTJ-P-08-1697 February 29, 2008

Facts:

Judge Henry Avelino of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pontevedra-Panay, is charged for gross neglect of duty
relative to a civil case for unlawful detainer and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 405 or "Spouses Estanislao V. Alviola
and Carmen L. Alviola v. Spouses Dullano and Theresa Suplido." Judge Avelino had not issued a pre-trial order, after the
termination of the pre-trial conference. Complainant had already filed before the sala of respondent judge a manifestation
regarding this matter but respondent Judge still failed to issue the required pre-trial order. espondent Judge admitted that
the delay in the issuance of the pre-trial order was due to the fact that he had opted to concentrate on the disposal of other
cases required to be terminated before 30 December 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC. Respondent judge, thus,
argued that he cannot be held liable for gross neglect of duty due to his efforts to unclog the courts docket of pending cases
as borne out by the record. The Office of the Court Administrator found Judge Avelino guilty of violating Paragraph 8,
Title I (A) of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC. The said provision requires judges to issue the required pre-trial order within ten (10)
days after the termination of the pre-trial conference

Issue: Whether or not the OCA finding should be affirmed

Held:

Yes. Judge Avelino is guilty of gross inefficiency. The reason for the adoption of the Rules on Summary Procedure is
precisely to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases. It is therefore not encouraging when, as in the case at bar, it
is the judge himself who occasions the delay sought to be prevented by the rule. By no means is the aim of speedy
disposition of cases served by respondent judges inaction. Section 9 (1) Rule 140, as amended, of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that undue delay in rendering an order is classified as a less serious charge punishable by suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. Judge Avelino is suspended for two months

Case # 322 NAPOCOR vs Adiong

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2060

FACTS:

NPC sought reconsideration of the order alleging that no pre-trial was conducted and yet respondent judge already passed
upon the merits of the case. NPC’s motion, however, was denied by Judge Adiong. Thus, NPC filed the present
administrative complaint, asserting that the issuance of the Resolution is contrary to and violative of the Rules of Court
because said resolution was issued by respondent judge without first conducting the requisite pre-trial conference and
despite the fact that no formal offer of exhibits was made by plaintiffs in support of their allegations.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Adion violated the Rules by not conducting Pre-Trial in a civil case.

RULING:
Judge Adiong failed to conduct a pre-trial conference in Civil Case. Respondent judge failed to conduct the pre-trial
conference itself. It is elementary and plain that the holding of such a pre-trial conference is mandatory and failure to do
so is inexcusable. When the law or procedure is so elementary, such as the provisions of the Rules of Court, not to know it
or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Such ignorance of a basic rule in court
procedure, as failing to conduct pre-trial, sadly amounts to gross ignorance and warrants a corresponding penalty.

Case # 323 Tolentino v. Laurel GR. No. 181368 (2012)

Subject Matter: Rule 18: Pre-trial; Secs. 4 and 5

Case Summary: Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land. Petitioners have occupied a portion of the
said property and developed it into fishponds. Petitioners continued to develop the area and refused to vacate the same.
Respondents then filed an action for reconveyance of property against petitioners. Petitioners were initially declared in
default by the RTC. The RTC however, set aside the Order of default and reset the pre-trial conference. Despite several
resetting of the pre-trial conference, petitioners still failed to appear. Hence, RTC allowed respondents to present evidence
ex parte. RTC ruled in favor of respondents, ordering them to vacate the said property and pay rentals. CA affirmed RTC
decision.

Petitioners argued before the SC that they were denied of due process as they were not allowed to present their evidence
before the trial court. Nonetheless, the SC ruled that they were not denied of due process.

The trial court gave petitioners every chance to air their side and even reconsidered its first order declaring petitioners in
default. Notwithstanding, petitioners and their counsel failed to take advantage of such opportunity and disregarded the
legal processes, by continuously failing to appear during the pre-trial of the case without any valid cause. Clearly, when the
trial court allowed the respondents to present evidence ex parte, it did so in accordance with Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure and with due regard to the constitutional guarantee of due process. Petitioners’ repeated failure to appear
at the pre-trial amounted to a failure to comply with the Rules and their non-presentation of evidence before the trial
court was essentially due to their fault.

Doctrine/s:

If the party who failed to appear at the pre- trial is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who
fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the
basis thereof.

Pre-trial seeks to achieve the following: (a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative
modes of dispute resolution; (b) The simplification of the issues; (c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the
pleadings; (d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary
proof; (e) The limitation of the number of witnesses; (f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a
commissioner; (g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the
action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist; (h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings;
and (i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.

Antecedent Facts:
1. Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of 1,056,275 square meters.
2. For several years, petitioners have been in actual possession of the western portion of the said
property with a total area of 620,000 square meters which they tried to develop into fishponds.
3. Respondents asked the petitioners to vacate the occupied property. However, petitioner Gustavo asked
for time to verify respondents’ claim of ownership.
4. Respondents waited for almost a year for the outcome of the intended verification, but they waited in vain until
Gustavo died.
5. Petitioners continued to develop the area they were occupying into fishponds, thereby manifesting
their unwillingness to vacate the premises and restore the possession thereof in favor of respondents.

RTC
6. Respondents filed an action to recover the property and demand payment of unearned income.
7. Petitioners were declared in default, for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference.
8. However, the trial court set aside the default order and reset the pre-trial conference.
 9. Despite several resetting of the pre-trial conference of which petitioners were notified, petitioners
failed to appear.
10. Hence, on March 21, 2000, the trial court issued an Order allowing respondents to present their
evidence ex parte, instead of declaring petitioners in default.
11. RTC ruled in favor of respondents ordering the petitioners to vacate said property and reasonable rental.

CA
12. CA affirmed the RTC decision.
13. Petitioner’s MR was denied.

Issues:
1. WON petitioners were denied their day in court. (NO)

Argument:

Petitioner argues that that they were denied their day in court, because they were not allowed to present their evidence
before the trial court which resulted in the denial of their right to due process.

Ratio:

NO – petitioners were not denied of due process.

Ø Failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences.

Ø If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed.

Ø If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte
and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present his
evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the
defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence.
o In this case, the trial court gave petitioners every chance to air their side and even
reconsidered its first order declaring petitioners in default.
o Notwithstanding, petitioners and their counsel failed to take advantage of such opportunity
and disregarded the legal processes, by continuously failing to appear during the pre-trial of the
case without any valid cause.
o Clearly, when the trial court allowed the respondents to present evidence ex parte due to the continued
failure of the petitioners to attend the pre-trial conference, it did so in accordance with Rule 18 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure and with due regard to the constitutional guarantee of due process.

Ø In The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Enario, the Court held that pre-trial cannot be taken
for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court proceedings for it serves a vital objective: the simplification, abbreviation
and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation.

Ø Pre-trial seeks to achieve the following:

(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution;

(b) The simplification of the issues;

(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;

(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof;

(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;

(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;

(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground
therefor be found to exist;

(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and

(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.

o Petitioners’ repeated failure to appear at the pre-trial amounted to a failure to comply

with the Rules and their non-presentation of evidence before the trial court was essentially
due to their fault.

Dispositive: Wherefore, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated October 18,
2007 and January 22, 2008, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 78676, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award
of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses is DELETED.

Case # 324 MANOLO P. FULE, [Link] HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 79094 June 22, 1988

Facts:
During the pre-trial, the stipulation of fact was made but it was not signed by the accused and his counsel.

At the hearing, only the prosecution presented its evidence while appellant waived the right to present evidence and, in
lieu thereof, the counsel submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted
petitioner-appellant.

Issue:
Whether or not the Stipulation of facts during the pre-trial conference without the signature of the accused and counsel
can be used as basis in convicting the accused?

Held.
No. SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial
conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by the accused and counsel.

The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily
required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in
his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused
and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the accused
did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish the elements of the
crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said
evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable doubt.
G.R. No. 123263 December 16, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, Branch 32, and ISAH V. RED
FACTS:
Private respondent, Isah V. Red, was charged with the crime of libel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thereafter, Red
filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The
Regional Trial Court granted the motion and remanded the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
The prosecution, citing the provision of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code filed a manifestation and motion to remand praying that
the case be returned to the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of libel falls on the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
HELD:
Yes, the crime of libel falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides that:
“The criminal action and civil action for damages in case of written defamation, as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense…”
Republic Act 7691, placing the exclusive and original jurisdiction of offenses punishable by not more than six years of imprisonment
under the Municipal Trial Court did superseded Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as there is no manifest legislative purpose to do
so or an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist between them.

G.R. No. 115115 July 18, 1995 CONRAD AND COMPANY, INC.
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FITRITE INC., and VICTORIA BISCUITS CO., INC.
FACTS:
Private respondents, FITRITE Inc. and Victoria Biscuits Co., Inc., are engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling and
distributing biscuits and cookies bearing the trademark “SUNSHINE” in the Philippines. Petitioner, CONRAD AND COMPANU, Inc. is
engaged in the business of importing, selling and distributing biscuits and cookies in the Philippines.
Private respondents were granted the trademark “SUNSHINE” to be used on biscuits and cookies by the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT). For quite some time, the trademark “SUNSHINE” has been used by the private
respondents in the concept of an owner on its biscuits and cookies.
Meanwhile, petitioner was designated as the exclusive importer and dealer of the products of “Sunshine Biscuits, Inc.” for sale in the
Philippines.
Private respondents then filed a case before the Regional Trial Court, seeking for remedies against infringement under Sec. 23 of
Republic Act No. 166, as amended, as well as of the remedies against unfair competition under Sec. 29 of the same statue.
Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint invoking, among others, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable in the case at bar.
HELD:
No, the doctrine finds no merit in the case at bar.
While an application for the administrative cancellation of a registered trademark falls under the exclusive cognizance of BPTTT, an
action, however, for infringement or unfair competition, as well as the remedy for injunction and relief for damages, is explicitly and
unquestionably within the competence and jurisdiction of ordinary courts.
 An application with BPTTT for an administrative cancellation of a registered trade mark cannot per se have the effect of restraining or
preventing the courts from the exercise of their lawfully conferred jurisdiction. A contrary rule would unduly expand the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction which, simply expressed, would merely behoove regular courts, in controversies involving specialized disputes, to
defer to the findings of resolutions of administrative tribunals on certain technical matters.
 
G.R. No. 169004 September 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and ROLANDO PLAZA
FACTS:
Private respondent, Rolando Plaza, is a member of the Sanguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu with a salary grade 25. He was
charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, or the Auditing Code of the Philippines for
his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received.
Private respondent then questioned the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the offense charged. Private respondent contends that he should not fall under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as he does not belong the salary grade 27 and that his violation is not among those enumerated by law to be cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan even if the offender is below salary grade 27.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of the Auditing Code of the Philippines committed by a public
official below salary grade 27.
HELD:
Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of the Auditing Code of the Philippines committed by a public
official below salary grade 27.
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the
commission of the offense. The case having been instituted on March 25, 2004 the provisions of Republic Act No. 8249 shall govern.
Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the
positions thus enumerated by RA No. 8249. Among those enumerated are members if the Sangunuiang Panlungsod. In connection
therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned
in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
G.R. No. L-14595 May 31, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HONORABLE GREGORIO MONTEJO, Judge, Court of First Instance,
Zamboanga City and Basilan City, MAYOR LEROY S. BROWN, DETECTIVE
JOAQUIN R. POLLISCO, PATROLMAN GRACIANO
LACERNA aliasDODONG, PATROLMAN MOHAMAD HASBI, SPECIAL
POLICEMAN DIONISIO DINGLASA, SPECIAL POLICEMAN
HADJARATIL, SPECIAL POLICEMAN ALO, and JOHN DOES
FACTS:
A sub-police station was established upon the orders of Mayor Leroy S. Brown in sitio Tipo-Tipo, district of Lamitan, City of Basilan.
Said substation was composed regular and special policemen all armed with pistols and high power guns. It was alleged that criminal
complaints were entertained in the said sub-station and that defendant Joaquin R. Pollisco acted as investigating officer and exercised
authority to order the apprehension of persons and their detention in the camp, for days or weeks, without due process of law and
without bringing them to the proper court.
On June 4, 1958, Yokan Awalin Tebag was arrested upon orders of Mayor Brown without any warrant or complaint filed in court. Tebag
was allegedly maltreated while being taken into the sub-station and was again mauled at the sub-station, said torture resulted to Tebag’s
death.
The private respondents were then charged with the crime of murder before the Court of First Instance of the cities of Zamboanga and
Basilan.
Senator Roseller Lim entered his appearance for the private respondents. The prosecution is questioning said appearance due to the
constitutional prohibition for senators and members of the House of Representatives to appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein
an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation of his office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime charged is committed in relation to the offices of the private respondents.
HELD:
Yes, a mere perusal of the amended information therein readily elicits an affirmative answer. It is alleged in said amended information
that "Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of
regular policemen and ... special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns" and then "established a
camp ... at Tipo-Tipo," which is under his "command, ... supervision and control," where his codefendants were stationed, entertained
criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons
without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that, in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of
Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in consequence
thereof.
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by
the main respondents herein, according to the amended information, the offense therein charged is intimately connected with their
respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions.
Indeed, they had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid
offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of
Basilan City.  
G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HON. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES, as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City, and P/COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES, P/
INSP. ADONIS C. ABETO, PO MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, PO JOSE
PAHAYUPAN, PO VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., JEANETTE YANSONDUMANCAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS, DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y
MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN
DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, CESAR PECHA, and EDGAR HILADO
FACTS:
Two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder were filed in the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City against fourteen
persons, five of whom are members of the Philippine National Police. The two cases was consolidated.
While the trial was on going, the prosecution file a motion for the transmittal of the case to the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the
trial court has no jurisdiction over the cases because the offense charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP
officers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crimes charged falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
No, the case is no longer cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Ordinarily, jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It
remains with the court until the case is finally terminated. Hence, the Sandiganbayan or the courts, as the case may be, cannot be
divested of jurisdiction over cases filed before them by reason of R.A. No. 7975. They retain their jurisdiction until the end of the
litigation.
In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases, as the informations were filed
not before it but before the Regional Trial Court. Even if we labor under the foregoing assumption that the informations in the subject
cases do charge the respondent PNP officers with offenses committed in relation to their office so that jurisdiction thereof would fall
under the Sandiganbayan, and assuming further that the informations had already been filed with the said tribunal but hearing thereon
has not begun yet, the Sandiganbayan can no longer proceed to hear the cases in view of the express provision of Section 7 of R.A. No.
7975. That section provides that upon the effectivity of the Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not yet begun in the Sandiganbayan
shall be referred to the proper courts. Hence, cases which were previously cognizable by the Sandiganbayan under P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, but are already under the jurisdiction of the courts by virtue of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7975, shall be referred
to the latter courts if hearing thereon has not yet been commenced in the Sandiganbayan.
It would, therefore, be a futile exercise to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan because the same would anyway be transferred again
to the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 7 of the new law in relation to Section 2 thereof.  
G.R. No. L-64548 July 7, 1986
ROLANDO P. BARTOLOME vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. L-64559 July 7, 1986
ELINO CORONEL Y SANTOS vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Rolando P. Bartolome and Elino Coronel Y Santon were charged with the crime of Falsification of Official document as defined and
penalized under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. It was alleged that the two conspired to make it appear on the CS
Personal Data Sheet that Bartolome has taken and passed the Career Service Professional Qualifying Examination with a rating of
73.35% and that he was a 4th year AB student at the Far Eastern University.
The charges were filed in the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offense charged falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
No, the offense is not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Under Section 4 of P.D. 1606, which created this special court:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act
No. 1379; (b) Crime committed by public officers and employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, embraced in Title VI I of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and (c) Other crimes or
offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office. (Emphasis supplied).
A careful reading of Republic Act No. 3019 and Republic Act No. 1379 will reveal that nowhere in either statute is falsification of an
official document mentioned, even tangentially or by implication.
Title VII, Book Two, of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes a wide range of offenses committed by public officers, from
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 to abuses against chastity in Article 245, but falsification of an official
document is not included. This is punished in Article 171 under Title IV, Book Two, on Crimes against Public Interest.
G.R. No. 85328 July 4, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
BIENVENIDO LEOPARTE, alias "EMBEN,"
FACTS:
Bienvenido Leoparte was charged and convicted with the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape by the Regional Trial Court of
Lucena. It was alleged in the information that the accused, Leoparte, pulled the victim, Marinel Idea, while she was on her way home
and traversing the railroad tracks. The accused then dragged her to the nearby banana plantation where the accused satisfied his carnal
desires against the victim’s will. Thereafter, the accused brought the victim to his sister’s home where he again had carnal knowledge
with the victim.

The following day, the accused brought the victim to his uncle’s home and again succeeded to have carnal knowledge with the victim
against her will. After two day, the accused the brought the victim to the house of his parents where he again successfully satisfied his
lascivious desires against the victim. All the incidents took place with the accused purporting that he and the victim had eloped and
were planning to get married.

Issues:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
Yes, The Regional Trial Court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Article 344 was not enacted for the specific purpose of benefiting the accused. When it is said that the requirement in Article 344 that a
complaint of the offended party or her relatives is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutor
proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The court's jurisdiction is vested in it by the
Judiciary Law. Such condition has been imposed out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer
the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial.
The overriding consideration in determining the issue of whether or not the condition precedent prescribed in Article 344 has been
complied with is the intent of the aggrieved party to seek judicial redress for the affront committed. In the case at bar, the active
cooperation of the offended party in the prosecution of the case, as witness, clearly indicates said intent.  
G.R. No. 192565February 28, 2012
UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES AND DESI TOMAS
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Desi Tomas was charged with perjury for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. It was alleged that Tomas
stated under oath that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues
in another tribunal or agency aside from that which is filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for the collection of sum of
money with prayer of writ of replevin filed against Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe.
Tomas filed a motion to quash arguing that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City does not have jurisdiction over the case as,
though it was notarized in Makati, the Certificate against Forum Shopping was used or submitted before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes, the Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction to try and decide the case at bar.
Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate
against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and
swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against
Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting
the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO
FACTS:
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño,
SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu,
SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two
counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to
this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners
Jose C.
Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for
the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela
Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo
Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash
the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying
said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly
heard by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
HELD:
Yes, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking
an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his
person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is
neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for
bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of
the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the
law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the
application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of
arrest.  
G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994
DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO and ROBERTO L. MENDOZA
vs.
HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro Manila, and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME
COMMISSION
FACTS:
Petitioners, Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, were both implicated as the masterminds of the kidnapping and murder of
Eugen Alexander Van Twist.
An information for the said crime was filed against the petitioners primarily on the strength of a sworn statement by Escolastico Umbal,
who admitted that he was among those who kidnapped and killed the victim upon the orders of the petitioners. Thereafter, respondent
judge, Roberto C. Diokno, ordered the arrest of the petitioners and no bail was recommended.
Petitioners, contending that their arrests was effected whimsically as there is no probable cause, questioned their arrests.
ISSUE:
Whether or not probable cause is present to warrant the order of arrest against the petitioners.
HELD:
No, probable cause do not exist to merit the order of arrest against the petitioners.
For sure, the credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare allegations, even if the State invokes its inherent right to
prosecute, are insufficient to justify sending two lawyers to jail, or anybody for that matter. More importantly, the PACC operatives who
applied for a warrant to search the dwellings of Santiago never implicated petitioners. In fact they claimed that according to Umbal, it
was Santiago, and not petitioners, who masterminded the whole affair. While there may be bits of evidence against petitioners' co-
accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings of Santiago, these do not in the least prove petitioners' complicity in the crime
charged. Based on the evidence thus far submitted there is nothing indeed, much less is there probable cause, to incriminate petitioners.
For them to stand trial and be deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law appropriately exacts much more to
sustain a warrant for their arrest — facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief that they are guilty of a
crime that in fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not been met.
 
G.R. No. L-4567 May 30, 1983
EMILIANO A. FRANCISCO and HARRY B. BERNARDINO
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
A complaint for intriguing against honor was filed against petitioners, Francisco and Bernardino on February 6, 1966 before the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. The acts constituting the complaint was allegedly perpetrated against Dr. Patrocinio Angeles on
December 26, 1965.
On May 3, 1966, an information charging the petitioners with the crime of grave oral defamation was filed before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. The information was amended upon the order of the court on October 8, 1966 amending the offense charged to
slander.
The Court of First Instance of Rizal convicted the petitioners with the offense charged, the Court of Appeals modified the conviction
finding the petitioners only guilty of simple slander.
On appeal, the petitioners raised the defense of prescription.
ISSUE:

HELD: Whether or not the crime has prescribed.

No, the crime has not prescribed.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information,
and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him."
Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court in People vs. Tayco held that the complaint or information referred to in Article 91 is
that which is filed in the proper court and not the denuncia or accusation lodged by the offended party in the Fiscal's Office. This is so,
according to the court, because under this rule it is so provided that the period shall commence to run again when the proceedings
initiated by the filing of the complaint or information terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, adding that the
proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot end there in the acquittal or conviction of the accused.
G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998
ISABELITA REODICA vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
A complaint charging petitioner, Isabelita Reodica, with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property and slight
physical injuries was filed before the Fiscal’s office on October 20, 1987.
On January 13, 1988, an information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati charging the petitioner for the abovementioned
offense. The Regional Trial Court found the victim guilty as charged, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court.
On appeal, the petitioner raised the defense of prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription has set in.
HELD:
We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, “the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or
information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in
Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by information.” However, this Section cannot be taken
to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter
prevails.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised
P e n a l C o d e , A r t i c l e 9 1 t h e r e o f a n d t h e r u l i n g s in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the
quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office three days after the vehicular mishap and
remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner’s defense of prescription of the offenses
charged in the information in this case.
 G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN
FACTS:
Virginia Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 against the respondent, Pangilinan on
September 16, 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
On December 5, 1997, a civil case was commenced by Pangilinan against Malolos for accounting, recovery of commercial documents,
enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City.
Five days thereafter or on December 10, 1997, Pangilinan filed a “Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial
Question” before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC
of Valenzuela City. The City Prosecutor approved the petition upon the recommendation of the assistant City Prosecutor on March 2,
1998.
Malolos appealed the decision of the City Prosecutor to the
Department of Justice. On January 5, 1999, reversed the resolution of the City
Prosecutor and ordered the filing of informations on violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.22. Said cases were filed before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City on November 18, 1999.
Pangilinan filed an “Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest” before MeTC, Branch
31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription has set in.
HELD:
No, the action has not prescribed.
Act No. 3326 entitled “An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin,” as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the
following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c)
xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or
by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive
period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.  
G.R. No. 127845 March 10, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
LODRIGO BAYYA
FACTS:
Respondent, Lodrigo Bayya was charged and convicted with the crime of incestuous rape as defined and penalized under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 before the Regional Trial Court in Ilagan, Isabela.
On Appeal, respondent challenged the penalty of death against him on the grounds that the information charging of the offense did not
made any mention of Republic Act 7659 and that he was only charged using Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, hence, the penalty
should be that which is provided for in the Revised Penal Code and not as provided for in Republic Act 7659. As such, in convicting him
under the provisions of Republic Act 7659, a transgression of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a transgression of the respondent’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
HELD:
Yes, the respondent may only be convicted of the charges under the information indicting him and nothing more.
In the case under scrutiny, the information does not allege the minority of the victim, Rosie S. Bayya, although the same was proven
during the trial as borne by the records. The omission is not merely formal in nature since doctrinally, an accused cannot be held liable
for more than what he is indicted for. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot
be convicted of any offense, not charged in the Complaint or information on which he is tried or therein necessarily included. He has a
right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of an offense
higher than that charged in the Complaint or information on which he is tried would constitute unauthorized denial of that right.
G.R. No. 169888 November 11, 2008 RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., City Mayor, Lucena City
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, 4th Division, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Criminal and administrative charges were filed against petitioner Ramon Y. Talaga Jr. before the Office of the Ombudsman. It was
alleged, that the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor, has unlawfully granted favors to a third party with respect to the operation of bingo
games in the city, to the damage and prejudice of the complainants. The administrative complaint was dismissed but the criminal case
was retained by the Ombudsman.
Three criminal information charging the petitioner of violation of Republic Act No. 3019 was recommended by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor. Only one information was sustained by the Sandiganbayan, the criminal information for giving unwarranted benefits to
Jose Sy Bang by approving an ordinance granting him a local franchise to operate bingo games in the city. However, said information
was reverted back to the Ombudsman for the conduct of further preliminary investigation.
Thereafter, an information charging the petitioner and the City Councilors for the aforementioned offense, alleging that the parties
conspired to perpetrate the crime. The City Councilors moved for the motion to be quashed as the information does not constitute an
offense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exist a valid information under which the petitioner stands charged.
HELD:
Yes, the information is valid.
The test in Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to
appraise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d'etre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense.
Based on the foregoing test, the Information sufficiently apprises petitioner of the charges against him. The Information charged the
petitioner of evident bad faith and manifest partiality when as Mayor of Lucena City, petitioner, in conspiracy with the City Council,
gave unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang. Moreover, it states the specific act which constituted the giving of unwarranted benefits,
namely, granting unto the said Jose Sy Bang a local franchise to operate a bingo business in Lucena City in violation of existing laws.
These allegations are clear enough for a layman to understand.
 
G.R. No. 130492 January 31, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
SALVADOR ARROJADO
FACTS:
The accused, Salvador Arrojado, and the victim, Mary Ann Arrojado was living in the same roof along with the victim’s father. The
accused was helping in taking care of the victim’s father.
One day, the accused went to the house of his cousin, Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, and reported that the victim has committed suicide.
Erlinda along with his husband and father went to the victim’s house and there they saw the already lifeless body of the victim.
Upon examination, it was revealed that the victim suffered multiple stab wounds all over her body, negating the theory of suicide.
On hearing, several witnesses testified on the strained relationship between the victim and the accused. The accused was found guilty of
murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, though not alleged in the information, may be appreciated
in the case.
HELD:
No, an aggravating circumstance to be appreciated must be alleged in the information.
The murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on December 31, 1993 which increased the penalty for murder
from reclusion temporal maximum to death to reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of confidence and in accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should have imposed the penalty of
death on accused-appellant. However, on December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect, requiring that every
complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances. This provision may be given retroactive
effect in the light of the well settled rule that “statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.” The
aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence not having been alleged in the information, the same therefore could not be
appreciated to raise accused-appellant’s sentence to death.
G.R. No. 188106 November 25, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ANTONIO DALISAY Y DESTRESA
FACTS:
Antonio Dalisay was charged and convicted with the crime of rape perpetrated against the 16 years old daughter of his live in partner.
It was alleged that even prior to the commission of rape, the accused was already repeatedly molesting the victim by inserting his fingers
in her genitalia.
An information charging the accused of the crime of rape in relation to Republic Act 7610 was then instituted before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused for the crime of qualified rape. The Court of Appeals only found
the accused guilty of the crime of simple rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the special qualifying circumstance of minority, though not alleged in the information, may be appreciated in the case at
bar.
HELD:
No, the special qualifying circumstance of minority may not be appreciated as it is not alleged in the information charging the accused
of the crime.
While it has been proven that appellant was the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim and the child was a minor at the time of
the incident, the Court cannot convict appellant of qualified rape because the special qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship were not sufficiently alleged in the information. To recall, the information here erroneously alleged that appellant was the
stepfather of the victim. Proven during the trial, however, was that appellant was not married to the victim’s mother, but was only the
common-law spouse of the latter. Following settled jurisprudence, appellant is liable only of simple rape punishable by reclusion
perpetua.
G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992
CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR.
vs.
HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petitioner, Tehankee, Jr. was charged with the crime of frustrated murder for the act of shooting Maureen Navarro Hultman on the
head, which would have caused her death if not for the timely medical intervention.
Trial ensued. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence.
However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.
The prosecution then filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file an amended information. The amended information was filed,
however, the petitioner refused to be arraigned on the said amended information for lack of preliminary investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution
has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be admitted.
HELD:
Yes, the amendment is legal and valid.
Amendments are allowed after arraignment and during the trial but only as to matters of form and provided that no prejudice is caused
to the rights of the accused. An objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily
show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the
supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime.
Under the circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended information for murder is, at most, an amendment as to
form which is allowed even during the trial of the case. It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and
introduced in the second information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the accused. The filing of
the amended information without the requisite preliminary investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble,
expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
G.R. No. 165751 April 12, 2005
DATU GUIMID P. MATALAM vs.
THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
An information charging the petitioner of violation of Section 3 € of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended was filed before the
Sandiganbayan. Said violation was for his alleged refusal to pay the back wages ordered by the Civil Service Commission.
After reinvestigation, an amended information was filed by the public prosecutor, Matalam, objected to the filing of the amended
information and filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the amended information charges an entirely new cause of action, that is, the
alleged willful, unlawful and illegal dismissal from the service of the complaining witnesses. Also, the petitioner assails that admitting
said information without a preliminary investigation would amount to a violation of his right to due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment to the information is substantial as to warrant the conduct of a new preliminary investigation.
HELD:
Yes, the amendment was indeed substantial.
The recital of facts constituting the offense charged was definitely altered. In the original information, the prohibited act allegedly
committed by petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of the private complainants, while in the
amended information, it is the illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants. However, it cannot be denied that the
alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay monetary claims is related to, and arose from, the alleged illegal dismissal from the service
of the private complainants.
If petitioner is not to be given a new preliminary investigation for the amended charge, his right will definitely be prejudiced because he
will be denied his right to present evidence to show or rebut evidence regarding the element of evident bad faith and manifest partiality
on the alleged dismissal.
He will be denied due process.
A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the
accused before trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive them of the full measure of their right to due
process.
G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010
JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE vs.
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS
ALAS
FACTS:
Petitioner, Leviste, was originally charged with the crime of homicide for the death Rafael de las Alas before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City.
After re-examination and re-investigation of the records of the case, the prosecution amended the information to reflect that the
petitioner is already charged with the crime of murder and no longer for homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment of the information is substantial as to warrant the conduct of a new preliminary investigation.
HELD:
Yes, the amendment was substantial. However, there is no need for a new preliminary investigation as the conduct of re-investigation is
of the same nature.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood
would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the
information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged
therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment
had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.
Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the fact that what was conducted in the present case was a
reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information. There is no substantial distinction between a
preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining
whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the
charge of murder after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion.
 
G.R. No. 121211 April 30, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
RONETO DEGAMO alias “Roy”
FACTS:
Accused, Degamo, was charged and convicted for the crime for rape before the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City. The Trial Court
imposed upon the accused the supreme penalty of death as the Trial Court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling and
night time.
Also, the penalty of death was imposed due to the qualifying circumstance of that by reason of the incident of rape, the victim has
become insane. However, said circumstance was only presented on the amended information submitted after the accused has already
been arraigned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment to include the circumstance “that the victim has become insane by reason of the incident of rape is
substantial.
HELD:
No, the amendment is not substantial.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense
under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence
which the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the
affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance
Tested against the foregoing guidelines, the subject amendment is clearly not one of substance as it falls under all of the formal
amendments enumerated in the Teehankee case. The insertion of the phrase that the victim has become insane by reason or on occasion
of the rape in the Information merely raised the penalty that may be imposed in case of conviction and does not charge another offense
different from that charged in the original Information. Whatever defense appellant may have raised under the original information for
rape committed with a deadly weapon equally applies to rape committed with a deadly weapon where the victim has become insane by
reason or on occasion of the rape. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of appellant. Therefore, the trial court
correctly allowed the amendment.
 G.R. No. 171271 August 31, 2006
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA
FACTS:
Accused, Tubongbanua, was charged and convicted with the crime of murder for the death of Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho by the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City.
The conviction was based on the amended information which included the aggravating circumstance of dwelling and with insult or in
disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of her rank, age or sex.
The Court of Appeals did not appreciate the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to rank, sex and age of the victim because
these circumstances were included as amendments to the information after the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment constitutes a substantial one so as to invalidate the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to
rank, sex or age of the victim.
HELD:
No, the amendments are not substantial.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense
under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence
which the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the
affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance.
Tested against these guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to
rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a substantial, amendment. These amendments do not have the effect of charging
another offense different or distinct from the charge of murder as contained in the original information. They relate only to the range of
the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of
appellant. Besides, appellant never objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of rank, age or sex. Without any objection by the defense, the
defect is deemed waived
 
G.R. No. 151785 December 10, 2007
SUSAN FRONDA-BAGGAO vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Four separate informations for illegal recruitment were filed against petitioner, Baggao, before the Regional Trial Court of Bangued.
The prosecution filed a motion to amend the informations praying that the separate informations for illegal recruitment be amended so
that there would only be one information for illegal recruitment in large scale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment is valid.
HELD:
Yes, the amendment is valid.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court,
at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of
court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the
complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court.
The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended
party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119,
provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at
the trial.
Simply stated, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be made
without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not
prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the
accused.

 
G.R. No. 160451 February 9, 2007
EDUARDO G. RICARZE vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CALTEX
PHILIPPINES, INC., PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK (PCIBANK)
FACTS:
Two informations for estafa through falsification of commercial document was filed against petitioner, Ricarze, before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City.
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIBank), unknown to the Regional Trial Court of Makati, credited the amount being
questioned in the criminal cases of estafa.
On pre-trial, the petitioner questioned the appearance of PCIBank. The petitioner averred that unless the Informations were amended
to change the private complainant to PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the substitution of Caltex by PCIBank as private complainant is tantamount to substantial amendment.
HELD:
No, there is no substantial amendment.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood
would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the
information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged
therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment
had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter
the basis of the charge in both Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of
the forged checks remained the same, and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any
surprise by virtue of the substitution.
 
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH
EKKEHARD GEILING
FACTS:
Two complaints for adultery were filed against petitioner, Pilapil, before the City Fiscal of Manila, for allegedly having an affair with a
certain William Chia and another man named Jesus Chua while her marriage with Geiling was still subsisting.
Pilapil contested said charges stating that Geiling no longer qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree in
Germany before filing the criminal charges for adultery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Geiling is an offended spouse with capacity or legal representation to initiate an action for adultery.
HELD:
The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be
the offended spouse, and nobody else. The offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action,
or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option. This policy was adopted out of consideration for the
aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must
have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. It presupposes, therefore, that
the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
In view of the valid divorce obtained by Geiling in his country, its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as Geiling is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in civil law on the matter of status of persons. Geiling, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he
filed suit.
 
G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
HERALD BLACK DACASIN vs.
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN
FACTS:
Herald, an American, and Sharon, Filipino, were married in Manila on April of 1994. In June 1999, Sharon was able to obtain a divorce
decree from the Circuit Court of Lake County, Illinois. The Illinois Circuit Court also granted sole custody of their child to Sharon.
In 2002, both parties instituted a contract agreeing to a joint custody over their child.
In 2004, Herald filed a case against Sharon alleging that Sharon had exercised sole custody over their child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
 Yes, the Regional Trial Court can take cognizance of the case.
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void.
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial
Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific performance, such as
petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner
went to the right court.
G.R. No. L-38308 December 26, 1984
MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES and MANUEL MORENO
vs.
HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., as Presiding Judge, Branch III, Court of
First Instance, Negros Oriental, PABLO E. CABAHUG, as City Fiscal of
Dumaguete, and JULIAN L. TEVES
FACTS:
Milagros Donio-Teves and Manuel Moreno are accused of and charged with adultery. Thecriminal action was initiated by a letter-
complaint thumb marked and sworn to by complainant Julian Teves, the husband of petitioner Milagros Donio-Teves. During the
preliminary investigation, Julian Teves filed a new letter-complaint attaching his affidavit. Before the scheduled arraignment, Milagros
Donio-Teves filed a Motion to Quash challenging the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the offense charged, the persons of
both accused, and the authority of respondent City Fiscal of Dumaguete to file the information. The motion was denied by the CFI.
During the pendency of the case, complainant Julian Teves died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the complainant in adultery while the case is pending a ground to dismiss the case.
HELD:
In adultery and concubinage cases, the death of the offended party is not a ground for the extinguishment of the criminal liability,
whether partial or total, of the offending spouse. The participation of the offended party is essential not for the maintenance of the
criminal action but solely for the initiation thereof. The moment the offended party initiates the action, the law will be applied in full
force beyond the control of, and in spite of the complainant, his death notwithstanding.
G.R. No. 190847 April 13, 2011
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS vs.
PETER SHERMAN, MICHAEL WHELAN, TEODOR B. LINGAN, ATTY. OFELIA B. CAJIGAL and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS
FACTS:
A criminal action for violation of the provisions of the Tariff and Custom Code of the Philippines, as amended and Republic Act 7916
was filed against private respondents for alleged non-payment of duties or taxes for the shipment of bet slips and thermal papers.
The State Prosecutor found probable cause and filed an information against the private respondents before the Court of Tax Appeals.
The Secretary of Department of Justice reversed the determination of probable cause and ordered the withdrawal of the information.
Hence, the State Prosecutor withdrew the information.
The Bureau of Customs then filed, in its own, a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Tax Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Bureau of Customs can commence the action without the participation of the State Prosecutor.
HELD:
No, the public prosecutor has power of direction and control over prosecution of criminal cases.
It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the government whose principal power and
responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully executed. Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute violators. Thus, all criminal
actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted under the direction and control of public prosecutors. In the
prosecution of special laws, however, the exigencies of public service sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors from
different government agencies to assist the public prosecutor; but this designation does not detract from the public prosecutor having
control and supervision over the case.
G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO
vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA
FACTS:
The parties in this case were involved in a vehicular accident. As a result, Casupanan filed a civil case against Laroya for Quasi-delict
and Laroya filed a criminal case against the former for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was already in its Preliminary investigation stage. Laroya filed a motion to dismiss on
the grounds of forum shopping considering the own going criminal case, which was granted.
Casupanan filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently from
the criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether or nor an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case?
HELD:
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed
instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of
the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The
suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or
filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended
party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action.
G.R. No. 174238 July 7, 2009
ANITA CHENG vs.
SPOUSES WILLIAM SY AND TESSIE SY
FACTS:
Two cases of estafa was filed by petitioner, Cheng, against the respondents, Spouses Sy, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Petitioner then filed two more criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against the respondents based on the same facts
contained in the criminal charge of estafa.
The criminal charge for estafa was dismissed for failure to prove the elements thereof, however, no pronouncement as to the civil
liability was made. The cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are likewise dismissed, no pronouncement as the civil liability was
also made.
Petitioner then filed a civil action for collection of sum of money with damages based on the same checks that are the subject of the
charges of estafa and Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the charges of estafa and Batas Pambansa Blg.22 bars the institution of a civil actions arising from the
criminal charges.
HELD:
Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the
amount of the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules
even prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is
filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even
then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioner’s rights may be fully adjudicated in
the proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on
account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this special rule governing actions for
violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable.

 
G.R. No. 175091 July 13, 2011
P/CHIEF INSPECTOR FERNANDO BILLEDO,
SPO3 RODRIGO DOMINGO, PO3 JORGE LOPEZ, FERDINAND CRUZ, and MARIANO CRUZ, vs.
WILHELMINA WAGAN, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Branch III, Pasay City, ALBERTO MINA, NILO JAY MINA AND
FERDINAND CAASI
FACTS:
Private respondents were charged for violating a city ordinance that prohibits the drinking of liquor in public places.
Thereafter, the private respondents filed a civil case against the petitioners, criminal complaints were also filed against the petitioners
before the City Prosecutor Office and the Office of the Ombudsman for unlawful arrest and violation of Republic Act No. 7348.
Both of the criminal actions against the petitioners were dismissed, however, the civil action proceeded with the trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
HELD:
Yes, the civil case falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
The subject civil case does not fall within the purview of Section 4 of
R.A. No. 8249 as the latter part of this provision contemplates only two (2) situations. First, a criminal action has been instituted before
the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts after the requisite preliminary investigation, and the corresponding civil liability must be
simultaneously instituted with it. Second, the civil case, filed ahead of the criminal case, is still pending upon the filing of the criminal
action, in which case, the civil case should be transferred to the court trying the criminal case for consolidation and joint determination.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 finds no application in this case. No criminal action has been filed before the Sandiganbayan or any
appropriate court. Thus, there is no appropriate court to which the subject civil case can be transferred or consolidated as mandated by
the said provision .It is also illogical to consider the civil case as abandoned simply because the criminal cases against petitioners were
dismissed at the preliminary stage. A reading of the latter part of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8294 suggests that the civil case will only be
considered abandoned if there is a pending criminal case and the civil case was not transferred to the court trying the criminal case for
joint determination. The criminal charges against petitioners might have been dismissed at the preliminary stage for lack of probable
cause, but it does not mean that the civil case instituted prior to the filing of the criminal complaints is already baseless as the
complainants can prove their cause of action in the civil case by mere preponderance of evidence.
G.R. Nos. 155531-34 July 29, 2005
MARY ANN RODRIGUEZ vs.
HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA, in her OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 104; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
GLADYS NOCOM
FACTS:
Petitioner Rodriguez was charged with estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. On hearing of the criminal charge of estafa, the
respondent judge allowed the appearance of a private prosecutor to try the civil aspect of the offense charged. The petitioner opposed
said appearance alleging that the private prosecutor’s appearance is barred as the civil aspect of the case is already deemed instituted in
the criminal charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is allowed to collect civil damages in both the estafa and Batas Pambansa Blg.22 cases as to warrant
the appearance of a private prosecutor in the case of estafa.
HELD:
No. Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two distinct criminal offenses: Estafa and violation
of BP 22. However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising from the single act of issuing a bouncing check in either criminal case
bars the recovery of the same civil liability in the other criminal action. While the law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the
offended party, it authorizes recovery in only one.
 
G.R. No. 175851 July 04, 2012
EMILIA LIM vs.
MINDANAO WINES & LIQUOR GALLERIA, A SINGLE PROPRIETORSHIP BUSINESS OUTFIT OWNED BY EVELYN S.
VALDEVIESO
FACTS:
Mindanao Wines and Liquor Galleria (Mindanao Wines) delivered several cases of liquors to H & E Commercial owned by Emilia Lim
who issued four checks worth P25,000.00 each. Two of these checks bounced for the reasons ‘ACCOUNT CLOSED’ and ‘DRAWN
AGAINSTINSUFFICIENT FUNDS’. Mindanao Wines demanded from H & E Commercial the payment of their value through two
separate letters but the demands went unheeded prompting Mindanao Wines to file before the MTCC for violations of BP 22. Emilia
Lim was acquitted but was made to pay civil the two amounts of checks plus interest and cost of filing fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 case includes the dismissal of the civil aspect.
HELD:
No, Acquittal from a crime does not necessarily mean absolution from civil liability. Even if the Court treats the subject dismissal as one
based on insufficiency of evidence as Emilia wants to put it, the same is still tantamount to a dismissal based on reasonable doubt. The
MTCC dismissed the criminal cases because one essential element of BP 22 was missing, i.e., the fact of the bank’s dishonor. The
evidence was insufficient to prove said element of the crime as no proof of dishonor of the checks was presented by the prosecution.
This, however, only means that the trial court cannot convict Emilia of the crime since the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases.
Conversely, the lack of such proof of dishonor does not mean that Emilia has no existing debt with Mindanao Wines, a civil aspect which
is proven by another quantum of evidence, a mere preponderance of evidence." Preponderance of evidence is defined as the weight,
credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term ‘greater weight of
the evidence’ or ‘greater weight of the credible evidence’. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than
that which is offered in opposition thereto."
 
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA FACTS:
The accused, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, was charged and convicted with the crime of rape by the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City.
Pending appeal, the accused suffered a cardio respiratory arrest resulting to his demise. The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal
aspect of the appeal and required the Solicitor General to submit his comment with regards to the civil aspect of the case.
The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People vs Sendaydiego, opined that the civil liability of the accused still exists despite his
death, thus, the case should proceed for the determination of the civil liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil liability of the accused arising from the offense charged is extinguished upon the death of the accused pending
appeal.
HELD:
Yes. The death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes the civil liability arising from the offense charged.
In pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the
prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal
thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would
constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the
criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the
institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding.
 
G.R. No. L-50691 December 5, 1994
EUSEBIO V. FONACIER, ROGELIO RAMOS, JOSEPH GONZALES and
FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN presided by HONORABLE MANUEL
PAMARAN, BERNARDO P. FERNANDEZ and ROMEO ESCAREAL, and the
TANODBAYAN CHIEF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR JUAN A. SISON and PROSECUTORS RODOLFO AQUINO and MANUEL HERRERA
FACTS:
In April 1979, Fonacier, et. al, being public officers, entered into a fixed and pre-arranged contract in the name of the Government
requiring their participation and approval with Francisco T. del Moral, a private contractor, for the delivery of Five Thousand Five
Hundred and Fifty (5,550) cubic meters of aggregate subbase. No delivery was ever made after payment of Ninety Six Thousand Six
Hundred and Three Pesos (P96,603.00) through falsified vouchers supported by falsified, spurious, irregularly prepared and
questionable documents and without the requisite delivery receipts and tally sheets approved by the accused public officers.
On October 8, 1980, Del Moral died. Counsel for Del Moral filed a motion to dismiss the petition for review on certiorari on the ground
that Del Moral died during the pendency of the case. The Solicitor General commented "petitioner's appeal should only be dismissed
insofar as his criminal liability is concerned."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused extinguishes the criminal and civil liability of the accused.
HELD:
On 29 January 1981, the Court dismissed the petition only with regard to Del Moral's criminal liability. The death of Del Moral has
extinguished the civil liability based on ex delicto. In the recent case of People vs. Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, G.R. 102007, promulgated
on 02 September 1994, the Court have ruled, and might now reiterate, that —
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law, b) Contracts, c) Quasi-contracts, d) .Delict, e) Quasi-delicts 3. Where
the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, which should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of
right by prescription.  
G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel
(petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed
an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil
case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. The RTC Quezon City held that the
pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before
the Court of Appeals. However, The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be
declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the
crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution of the action of annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the
criminal case of frustrated parricide.
HELD:
No, there is no prejudicial question in the case at bar.
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was
filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. The relationship between
the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.” However, the issue in the annulment of
marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the
offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The issue in the civil case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated
parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that was
committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled,
petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.  
G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC.
vs.
CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI
FACTS:
Petitioner, Dreamwork, instituted a criminal case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 against private respondent, Janiola, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pinas. Thereafter, the petitioner
filed a criminal information for the said offense before the Metropolitan Trial Court on February 2, 2005.
On September 20, 2006, spouses Janiola instituted a civil complaint for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement that they
entered into with the petitioner. The checks, subject of the criminal case of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, were issued in
consideration of the construction agreement.
The private respondent then filed a motion to suspend the trial in the criminal case alleging that the civil case of rescission poses a
prejudicial question that needs to be resolved first before a determination on the criminal case may be had.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a prejudicial question in the case at bar.
HELD:
No, the action for rescission does not pose a prejudicial question on the criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final
judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior
to the institution of the criminal action.
GR. No. 101236 January 30, 1992
JULIANA P. YAP vs.
MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR., Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato,
FACTS:
Private respondent, Paras, sold his share in the intestate estate of their parents to his sister, Juliana P. Yap. Nineteen years thereafter,
Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang.
When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of General Santos City. On the same date, she filed a complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the Regional Trial
Court of General Santos City.
After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against Paras with the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Glan-Malapatan, South Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.
On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused, the trial judge motu proprio issued an order dismissing the criminal case on the
ground that the criminal action for estafa is a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of an alleged double sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exist a prejudicial question in the case presented.
HELD:
No, the criminal action for estafa is not and cannot be a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of double sale.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the congnizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before
the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the
determination of the civil action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution
is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the accused.
It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of the criminal action, not the criminal action that is prejudicial to
the civil action.  

*Crispo vs Mogul* *Crespo vs Mogul*

The information is already meanwhile you have a pending case with the DOJ because you are questioning the
resolution made by the prosecutor's office.

In the case of Crispo Vs Mogul, the Supreme Court emphasized that once the case is already filed in court the jurisdiction is with the
said trial court. Whatever is the actions etc.. it should be within the sound discretion of
the judge.

G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987

MARIO FL. CRESPO vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL
COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL.

FACTS:
An information for Estafa was filed by the Fiscal against Crespo in the Criminal Circuit Court of Lucena. When the case was set for
arraignment, Crespo filed a Motion To Defer Arraingment on the ground that there was a pending Petition for Review with the
Department of Justice. Said Motion was denied by Judge Mogul. Crespo’s Motion For Reconsideration also having been denied, he filed
a TRO with the CA, which granted the same.

Thereafter, the CA granted Crespo’s Writ of Injucntion and perpetually restrained Judge Mogul from having Crespo arrainged until the
Sec. of Justice finally made his decision and ordered the Fiscal to move for dismissal of the case. The Fiscal then filed a Motion
attaching the Secretary’s Resolution calling for the dismissal of the case. Judge Mogul denied the Motion and set Crespo’s arraignment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court may refuse to grant a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Fiscal under orders from the Secretary of Justice
and still insist on the arraignment of the accused.

HELD:
Yes, it is within the power of the trial court to refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal.
Once an information is filed in court, the court’s prior permission must be secured if fiscal wants to reinvestigate the case.
While it is true that it is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case
that would warrant the prosecution of a case, the filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. The Court is the best and sole judge on
what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence.

G.R. No. L-60962 July 11, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ROLANDO MONTEVERDE y CONE alias "EDUARDO MASCARIAS
FACTS:
Rolando Monteverde along with his co-accused Reynaldo Codera Jr. were charged and convicted with the crime of robbery with rape
and meted out the ultimate penalty of death.
On appeal, Monteverde raised the following issues; 1) a) the medical certificate does not show signs of physical injuries and
spermatozoa; (2) said medical certificate and even his co-accused's confession are inadmissible against him, for being hearsay; (3)
recidivism cannot be considered against him because it was not alleged in the information; and (4) the lower court's proceedings are
void because the amended information does not contain a certification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused can still assail the lack of preliminary investigation even after plea and conviction.
HELD:
No, a valid plea on arraignment is tantamount to a waiver of the right of the accused to preliminary investigation.
While generally, a preliminary investigation is mandatory and a certification that such investigation was held is required, still this rule
does not apply if the issue is raised only after conviction. Thus, it has been held that after a plea of not guilty to the information, an
accused is deemed to have foregone the right of preliminary investigation and to have abandoned the right to question any irregularity
that surrounds it.
G.R. No. L-14732 January 28, 1961
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
JOSEFINO G. SELFAISON, NEMESIO DALISAY, DOMINGO URETA and BERNARDO BAUTISTA
FACTS:
Appellants Josefino G. Selfaison, Nemesio Dalisay, Domingo Ureta and Bernardo Bautista — in company with Arsenio Amacio,
Reynaldo Bautista, Domingo Salde and Amrafil Dalisay who were alleged to be still at large were accused in an amended information of
the crime of robbery with rape in the Court of First Instance of Capiz. After trial, Josefino G. Selfaison was found guilty and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the complainants, Angelita Sinag and Angelina Maghibon, the amounts of
P212.50 and P110, respectively, and to pay one-fourth of the cost. The other three accused namely, Nemesio Dalisay, Domingo Ureta,
and Bernardo Bautista, were found guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision
mayor to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, plus proportionate costs. From the judgment of conviction, the four named
accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but in view of the penalty imposed, that court certified the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were deprived of their right to preliminary investigation.
HELD:
No, the claim of denial of the right to preliminary investigation is not supported by any facts.
Nothing appears affirmatively on the record that such preliminary investigation has not been had. On the other hand, it is presumed
that the inferior court proceeded in accordance with law. (People vs. Silos and Bagano, G.R. No. L-5158, March 28, 1952.) At any rate,
appellants appear to have waived such right, because immediately after their arrest, they filed bonds for their release and subsequently
proceeded to trial, without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.

 
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding
Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
An information was filed charging herein petitioner Rolito Go for murder before the Regional Trial Court of Metro Manila. Petitioner
voluntarily presented himself together with his two lawyers to the police upon obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the latter.
However, he was immediately detained and denied his right of a preliminary investigation unless he executes a waiver of the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Thereafter, petitioner posted bail for his conditional release.
No preliminary investigation before the filing of the information charging Go for murder was conducted. The prosecutor ratiocinates
that Go has already waived his right to preliminary investigation when he posted bail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation.
HELD:
No, the petitioner did not waive his right to preliminary investigation.
The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a pleas at
arraignment. The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment and he,
through his counsel denied answering questions before the court unless they were afforded the proper preliminary investigation. For the
above reasons, the petition was granted and the ruling of the appellate court was set aside and nullified. The Supreme Court however,
contrary to petitioner’s allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the
information charging the latter of the crime of murder.
G.R. No. 134744 January 16, 2001
GIAN PAULO VILLAFLOR vs.
DINDO VIVAR y GOZON
FACTS:
Respondent, Vivar, was initially charged with the crime of slight physical injuries for the mauling of petitioner Villaflor. Said charge was
withdrawn when it was later discovered that the injuries sustained was more serious than they had appeared at first. A case of serious
physical injuries was then filed against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. A case of grave threat was also
filed against the respondent.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the information on grave threat was filed by the respondent contending that crime should be absorbed in
the charge of physical injuries as such threats were made in connection with the same mauling incident. The motion was denied by the
MTC.
Respondent then went to the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City by way of certiorari. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion
to quash because the cases were filed without the requisite preliminary investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed due to the absence of preliminary investigation.
HELD:
No, absence of preliminary investigation does not warrant a dismissal of a criminal action.
Preliminary investigation is "an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." A component part of due process
in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their
claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive them of the full measure of their right to due process.
However, the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.
Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court or constitute a ground for quashing the information. The trial court, instead of
dismissing the information, should hold in abeyance the proceedings and order the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary
investigation.
 
G.R. No. 130644 March 13, 1998
THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, Represented in this Suit by his mother, MARGARITA G. Present: LARRANAGA
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPPINES
FACTS:
Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention before the RTC of Cebu City. He was
arrested and was detained without the filing of the necessary Information and warrant of arrest. The petitioner alleged that he must be
released and be subject to a preliminary investigation.
However pending the resolution of the Court for the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary and
mandatory injunction filed by the petitioner, the RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioner.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation.
2) Whether or not the petitioner should be released from detention pending the investigation.
HELD:
1) Yes. Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been arraigned on October 14, 1997. The rule is that the right to
preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the t i m e o f e n t e r i n g a plea at arraignment.
Petitioner, in this case, has been actively andconsistently
demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before hewas charged in court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea during
thearrai gnment because there was a pending case in this Court regarding hisright to avail of a regular preliminary investigation.
Clearly, the acts of petit ioner and his counsel are inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminaryinvestigation is part of procedural due process.
It cannot be waived unless the waiver appears to be clear and informed.
2) No. The filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of
that detention or at l e a s t deny him the right to be released because of such [Link] originalwarrantle ss arrest of the petitioner was
doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of thepetiti oner by virtue of the
warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated,
to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal
G.R. Nos. 138859-60 February 22, 2001
ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP vs.
The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division)
FACTS:
Acting on an Affidavit-Complaint filed by a certain Erlinda Fadri, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an order dated
S e p t e m b e r 1 9 , 1 9 9 5 , naming the following as respondents: benjamin Arao, Fredireck Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo,
Efren Sissay and the city jail warden of Pagadian City. The order also required respondents, within ten days from
r e c e i p t t h e r e o f , t o s u b m i t t h e i r c o u n t e r affidavits and other pieces of controverting evidence.
The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao issued a Resolution dated January 15, 1998 recommending the prosecution of the
forenamed r e s p o n d e n t s for violation of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code andSection 3-a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic
Act No. 3019 as amended. Significantly, the name of Petitioner Alvarez A. Yusop was included as one
of the persons to be prosecuted, although he was not one of the originalrespon dents mentioned in the Order of September 19, 1995.
OmbudsmanAniano A. Desierto approved the recommendation. Accordingly, t woInformations were filed with the Sandiganbayan.
They were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24524 (violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019) and 24525(unlawful arrest under Article 269 of
the Revised Penal Code).
On April 16, 1998, an Order of Arrest was issued by the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24524. Petitioner, however, posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City on
May 20 of the same year. On thesame day, he filed a "Motion to Remand Case to the Ombudsman -Mindanao for Preliminary
Investigation."
In Resolution dated June 8, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion of petitioner for his alleged failure to submit himself to the
jurisdiction of the anti-graft court. On August 8, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, grounded again on the lack of preliminary
investigation. In an Order
d a t e d S e p t e m b e r 2 2 , 1 9 9 8 , the Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the Motion, becausepetitione r had not yet
submitted himself to its jurisdiction insofar as Criminal Case No. 24525 was concerned. On the scheduled arraignment on February 15,
1999, petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been accorded preliminary investigation. In its two assailed Orders, the
Sandigabayan rejected his claim and proceeded with the arraignment
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan may proceed with the arraignment without preliminary investigation.
2) Whether or not the filing of a bond constitute a waiver of preliminary investigation.
HELD:
1) Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 cannot justify the evasion of the requirement set forth in the Rules of Court for conducting
preliminary investigation. The law does not sanction such interpretation, for it deals merely with the finality of orders, directives and
decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman -- not the deprivation of the substantive right to a preliminary investigation. Moreover, petitioner cannot be bound by
theOmbud sman's January 15, 1998 Resolution, which recommended the filing of charges. He was not a party to the case and was not
accorded any right to present evidence on his behalf.
2 ) I n G o v . C o u r t o f A p p e a l s , this Court held that "the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to
invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment." Conversely, if the accused does invoke it before arraignment, as the
petitioner did in this case, the right is not waived. Neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver of petitioner's right to
preliminary investigation.
Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,"[a]n application for or admission to bail; shall not bar the
accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or
questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea.
The right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the
full measure of his right to due process.
 
G.R. No. 109036 July 5, 1995
BARTOLOME F. MERCADO vs.
The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION, The Honorable
CESAR C. PERALEJO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City and the Honorable CITY PROSECUTOR of
Quezon City
FACTS:
Petitioner, Mercado, was charged with a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Petitioner moved to defer his arraignment on the ground that he was not notified of the preliminary investigation. He claimed that the
private complainant deliberately provided a wrong address in the issuance of the subpoena to him. He was thus prevented from
submitting his counter-affidavit, which if considered, would have prevented the filing of the criminal case against him.
The City Prosecutor denied the claim of petitioner, stating that the subpoena was sent to the residence of the petitioner and that the
same was returned unserved. The prosecutor also avers that the presence of the accused was not a requisite to the validity of the
preliminary investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is denied of his right to preliminary investigation.
HELD:
No, Petitioner was not denied of his right to a preliminary investigation. It is uncontroverted that a subpoena was sent to his given
address but it was returned unserved. Petitioner did not dispute that the address appearing in the official receipt of his cash bond was
his address.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is for the investigating prosecutor to determine if a crime has been committed. A review of
the evidence is thus necessary to establish probable cause and if the evidence so warrants, the investigating prosecutor is duty bound to
file the corresponding information (Cruz, Jr. v. People, 233 SCRA 439 [1994]). It was ruled that preliminary investigations can be
conducted ex-parte if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or does not appear after due notice (New Rules on Criminal Procedure,
Rule 112, Section 3(d); Cf. Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 120 SCRA 659 [1983]).
 
G.R. No. 110315 January 16, 1998
RENATO CUDIA vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, The [Link] D. RUSTIA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch LVI,
Angeles City
FACTS:
Petitioner, Cudia, was arrested in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the alleged possession of unlicensed revolver. He was the brought to
Angeles City where he was detained. A preliminary investigation was conducted, consequently, an information charging the petitioner of
illegal possession of fire arms was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City.
On pre-trial, the judge called the attention of the parties to the fact that the crime was committed in Mabalacat and not in Angeles City.
Another information charging the same offense was filed against the respondent, this time by the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga.
Thereafter, the City Prosecutor of Angeles moved for the dismissal of the earlier case stating that the case is within the jurisdiction of the
Provincial Prosecutor.
The petitioner the filed a motion to quash on the ground of violation to his right against double jeopardy.
HELD:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is with merit.
HELD:
The Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare informations for offenses committed within
Pampanga but outside Angeles City. An information must be prepared and presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone
authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction. Although failure to file a motion to quash the information is a waiver
of all objections to it insofar as formal objections to pleadings are concerned, questions relating to want of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings. Moreover, since the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or
substance that conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded as
prior jeopardy, and will not be a bar to a second prosecution
 
G.R. No. 116623 March 23, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONORABLE ALFREDO GUSTILO
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ESAM GADI y ABDULLAH
FACTS:
The private respondent, Esam Gadi, was apprehended at the Manila National Airport and subsequently detained for possession of
marijuana. A criminal case for violation of the provisions of Dangerous Drug Act was then filed against the private respondent before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
Private respondent, though admitting that it is beyond the fide day period prescribed by law, filed a motion for reinvestigation alleging
that the gravity of the offense charged against him warranted the motion and that period prescribed by law to file the motion is not
mandatory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is entitled to reinvestigation (preliminary investigation)
HELD:
No, the period to ask for a reinvestigation has already lapsed.
The period for filing a motion for preliminary investigation after an information has been filed against an accused who was arrested
without a warrant has been characterized as mandatory by the Court. In People vs. Figueroa, the .Supreme Court applied Section 15,
Rule 112 of the old Rules, which is substantially reproduced in Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court
held that Section 15 of old Rule 112 granted the accused the right to ask for preliminary investigation within a period of five (5) days
from the time he learned of the filing of the information. As the accused in that case did not exercise his right within the five-day period,
his motion for "reinvestigation" was denied.
Clearly, Section 7 of Rule 112 of the present Rules gives the accused the right to ask for a preliminary investigation; but it does not give
him the right to do so after the lapse of the five-day period. This is in accord with the intent of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to make
preliminary investigation simple and speedy. The Supreme Court, elaborating on the rationale of the rules on preliminary investigation
 
G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010
JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE vs.
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS
ALAS
FACTS:
Petitioner, Leviste, was originally charged with the crime of homicide for the death Rafael de las Alas before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City.
After re-examination and re-investigation of the records of the case, the prosecution amended the information to reflect that the
petitioner is already charged with the crime of murder and no longer for homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a reinvestigation is availing in the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes, the amendment was substantial. However, there is no need for a new preliminary investigation as the conduct of re-investigation is
of the same nature.
Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the fact that what was conducted in the present case was a
reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information. There is no substantial distinction between a
preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining
whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the
charge of murder after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion.
 
G.R. No. 132422 March 30, 2004 FILADAMS PHARMA, INC. vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO FERIA
FACTS:
A complaint charging the private respondent, Feria, for estafa before the assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City was filed by
petitioner, Filadams. Said complaint was dismissed for lack of cause of action. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise
dismissed.
The petitioner then appealed the same to the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of Justice arrived at the same conclusion and dismissed
the appeal. The petitioner then raised the same issue to the Court of Appeals, but also to no avail.
ISSUES:
1) What is the nature of the conduct of preliminary investigation of the prosecutor?
2) Are the acts (appeals) resorted to by the petitioner valid?
HELD:
1) The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise
adjudication nor rulemaking functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of
the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a
quasicourt, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
2) With our ruling in Bautista that the Office of the Prosecutor was not covered by the appellate process under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, what then was petitioner's remedy from the resolution of the Assistant Prosecutor dismissing his complaint? Based on
the 1993 Revised Rules on Appeals from Resolutions in Preliminary Investigations or Reinvestigations — now the 2000 NPSRule on
Appeals — the petitioner could appeal to the Secretary of Justice. In this case, the petitioner did appeal to the Secretary of Justice but
his appeal was dismissed. His motion for reconsideration was also dismissed. Since there was no more appeal or other remedy available
in the ordinary course of law, the petitioner correctly filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion.  
G.R. No. 147932 January 25, 2006
LAILA G. DE OCAMPO vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, MAGDALENA B.
DACARRA, and ERLINDA P. ORAYAN
FACTS:
Ronald Dacarra, Magdalena’s nine-year-old son, complained of dizziness upon arriving home. When asked, Magdalena found out that
Laila G. De Ocampo, Ronald’s teacher, banged his head against that of his classmate. Due to continuous vomiting, Magdalena brought
Ronald to the hospital where he underwent an x-ray. She was informed that Ronald’s head had a fracture. He died after 5 days from the
incident, which led Magdalena to charge De Ocampo with homicide. During the inquest proceedings, the Assistant City Prosecutor ruled
that there is no concrete evidence to show proof that the banging of the heads of the two victims could be the actual and proximate
cause of the death of Ronald, further reasoning that the vehicular accident which happened two years ago may be the cause of Ronald’s
head injury. Subsequently, the case was referred to another Assistant City Prosecutor for preliminary investigation. De Ocampo invoked
the disposition of the inquest prosecutor which found insufficient evidence to support the charges against her. She reiterated that the
head-banging incident was not the proximate cause of Ronald’s death but the vehicular accident where he was involved. After the
preliminary investigation, the prosecutor found probable cause against De Ocampo for the offense charged.
De Ocampo thereafter filed a petition for review with the DOJ where she contended that the investigating prosecutor erred in
concluding that her alleged act of banging Ronald and Lorendo’s heads was the cause of Ronald’s injury. She also asserted that she was
denied due process during the preliminary investigation when the prosecutor did not conduct a clarificatory hearing and when said
prosecutor unilaterally obtained a copy of the autopsy report from the PNP Crime Laboratory. The DOJ Secretary, however, denied the
petition for review and held that Ronald’s injury was the direct and natural result of petitioner’s act of banging Ronald and Lorendo’s
heads. The Secretary also rejected De Ocampo’s claim that she is innocent as held by the inquest prosecutor because he inquest
prosecutor did not dismiss the case but merely recommended her release for further investigation since the case was not proper for
inquest and the evidence was then insufficient. Her motion for reconsideration having been denied, De Ocampo filed this present
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not De Ocampo was denied due process during the preliminary investigation.
HELD:
Petitioner was not denied due process during the preliminary investigation. A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during
preliminary investigation. Rather than being mandatory, a clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the investigating officer as
evidenced by the use of the term "may" in Section 3(e) of Rule 112. On the issue of the prosecutor’s obtaining of the autopsy report, the
Rules on preliminary investigation do not forbid the investigating prosecutor from obtaining it. Neither is there a law requiring the
investigating prosecutor to notify the parties before securing a copy of the autopsy report. The autopsy report, which states the causes of
Ronald’s death, can either absolve or condemn the petitioner. Unfortunately for petitioner, the investigating prosecutor found that the
autopsy report bolstered complainants’ allegations.
Asserting her innocence, petitioner continues to invoke the disposition of the inquest prosecutor finding insufficient evidence for the
charges against her. As correctly ruled by the DOJ Secretary, the inquest prosecutor did not dismiss the case but merely recommended
it for further investigation since it was not proper for inquest and the evidence was then insufficient. Moreover, petitioner’s active
participation in the preliminary investigation without questioning the propriety of such proceedings indicates petitioner’s agreement
with the recommendation of the inquest prosecutor for the further investigation of the case.
The instant petition was denied and the Court affirms the Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice.
G.R. No. 119990 June 21, 2004
REMBERTO C. KARA-AN vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, HON. ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, JR., HON. RAUL ARNAU
FACTS:
Kara-an wrote to Senator Ernesto Maceda imputing certain criminal acts to "the clique of six" in the Board of Directors of the Al-
Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines. Kara-an claimed that "the clique of six" granted a loan of P250,000 to Compressed
Air Machineries & Equipment Corporation (CAMEC) without a valid collateral. Kara-an also claimed that the "clique of six" approved
the real estate mortgage on CAMEC’s loan without requiring the cancellation of a prior subsisting mortgage and without securing the
written consent of the first mortgagee in violation of law. Kara-an thus asserted that the "clique of six" is liable for entering into a
contract which is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, which is punishable under RA 3019.
Senator Maceda endorsed Kara-an’s letter to Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez for appropriate investigation. The Ombudsman
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit on the ground that Kar-an, as officer-in-charge of the Makati Branch of the Islamic Bank, was
the one directly responsible in screening the qualifications of the various applicants for loan hence Kara-an filed a Motion for
Reconsideration or Reinvestigation. In said motion denied that he was the officer-in-charge of the Islamic Bank’s Makati Branch
responsible for screening loan applications in 1986. His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, he filed this petition for review
on certiorari where he contends that the Ombudsman’s failure to conduct the preliminary investigation is a breach of constitutional,
statutory and administrative mandates.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman’s failure to conduct the appropriate investigation is a breach of constitutional, statutory and
administrative mandates.
HELD:
No, the Ombudsman does not have to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint. The Ombudsman has discretion
to determine whether a preliminary investigation is proper. Should the investigating officer find the complaint devoid of merit, then he
may recommend its outright dismissal. Since the Ombudsman can dismiss a complaint outright for lack of merit, it necessarily follows
that he can also dismiss the complaint for lack of merit after the respondent’s comment to the complaint.
The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper. The occasion is not for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence but for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-founded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the offense. The Resolution of the Ombudsman denying the
Motion for Reconsideration is affirmed.  
G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998
TERESITA G. FABIAN vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as ombudsman; HON. JESUS F.
GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN
FACTS:
Teresita G. Fabian, major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation, a company engaged in
construction business, had an affair with Nestor V. Agustin, the incumbent District Engineer of Metro Manila. During their affair,
Agustin gifted PROMAT with public works contracts. When their relationship soured, Fabian filed an administrative case in the
Ombudsman against Agustin for violation of Section 19 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 36 of the Civil Service Decree.
Consequently, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondents guilty of grave misconduct and
ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. Ombudsman Desierto approved the aforesaid
resolution with modifications, by changing the penalty to suspension of one year without pay. Agustin moved for reconsideration but
Desierto inhibited himself when he discovered that the former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate." The case was
transferred to Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who exonerated private respondents from the administrative charges.
ISSUE:
Whether or not recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to appeal for the decision in an administrative proceeding of the
Ombudsman is proper.
HELD:
No, under the present Rule 45 appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final
orders of the courts. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of
Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and
adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly
authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court.
 
G.R. No. 131445 May 27, 2004
AMADO G. PEREZ (DECEASED) REPRESENTED BY HIS WIDOW GUILLERMA T. PEREZ, et al. vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, MAYOR IGNACIO R. BUNYE, CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ, et al.
FACTS:
Petitioners, members of the Kilusang Bayan ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM),
instituted two complaints at the Office of the Ombudsman against several respondents, one of whom was then Mayor Ignacio R. Bunye,
for violation of RA 3019 (also known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”). Bunye and others allegedly destroyed the doors of
the KBMBPM office while serving on petitioners the Take-Over Order of the KBMBPM management issued by then Agriculture
Secretary Carlos G. Dominguez. In disposing of said complaints, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution excluding
respondent Bunye from the criminal indictment. The petitioners assailed the exclusion in the Court of Appeals through an original
petition for certiorari and mandamus but the CA dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction in accordance with Section 27 of RA 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989). The CA likewise denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners now file this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, contending that the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the charges against Bunye. Respondents counter that the preliminary
investigation yielded insufficient evidence to charge Bunye of the offense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the
charges against Bunye.
HELD:
A preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused
must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if the
Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave
abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal
of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it. In much the same
way, the courts will be swamped with cases if they will have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time the latter decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant.
G.R. No. 171188 June 19, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
JESSIE B. CASTILLO and FELICITO R. MEJIA
FACTS:
Cesar Sarino is one of the registered owners of a piece of land located in front of SM Bacoor, Cavite. The property is being subleased to
several stallholders. Felicito R. Mejia, Municipal Building Official of Bacoor, sent to the stallholders Notices of Violation4 of the
National Building Code on the grounds that the structures they were occupying were erected without building permits and occupied by
them without the necessary certificates of occupancy having been first secured. Because of stallholders’ repeated failure to comply, a
task force from the Municipal Hall closed the stalls through the installation of galvanized iron fences.
Lessees Aquino and Samoy filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against Castillo and Mejia for violation of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Office of the Ombudsman, however, dismissed the case, for lack of probable cause, ruling
that the respondent local officials acted in good faith in effecting the closure of the stalls. Another complaint was filed by Sarino against
Castillo and Mejia in the Office of the Ombudsman, containing the same allegations as the previous complaint filed by Aquino and
Samoy. The Office of the Ombudsman now found probable cause hence the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
filed an Information against respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan which declared
that probable cause exists and thus directed the issuance of the corresponding warrants of arrest and hold departure orders. Castillo
and Mejia then filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause which was denied by the SB. However, upon motion for
reconsideration, the SB reversed its ruling and dismissed the case, holding that there is no probable cause that warrants the filing of the
present criminal case is a mere rehash of the previously dismissed criminal case filed by complainant’s lessees against respondents.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in overturning the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause resulting in the dismissal of
the case against respondents.
HELD:
Yes, corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable
cause for doing so, the judge in turn should not override the public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause to hold an accused for
trial on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient. It must be stressed
that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case
should be filed in court, and that courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the person
charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor.
Absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the prosecutor committed manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, a
judge’s determination of probable cause is limited only to the judicial kind or for the purpose of deciding whether the arrest warrants
should be issued against the accused. The SB’s challenged Resolutions are reversed and the case remanded to the SB.  
G.R. No. 70748 October 21, 1985
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
LAURENTE C. ILAGAN, et al.,
vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Minister of National Defense, et al.
FACTS:
Attorneys Laurente Ilagan, Antonio Arellano, and Marcos Risonar were arrested and detained in Camp Catitipan solely on the basis of a
Mission Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander of the Ministry of National Defense. They filed a petition for
Habeas Corpus, on the ground that the arrests were illegal and violative of the Constitution, contending that arrests may not be made
solely on the basis of Mission Orders. On the other hand, respondents asserted that the attorneys were arrested on the basis of a Decree
issued by the President, that the detained attorneys played active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the National Democratic Front and that the Writ of habeas corpus is suspended as to them by virtue of Proclamation
No. 2045-A. The Court resolved to order the temporary release of the detained attorneys on the recognizance of retired Chief Justice
Concepcion and retired Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes as their counsel.
Respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Order of Release reiterating that the suspension of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus has the effect of ousting the Court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, further arguing that the detained attorneys "were
arrested for specific acts of rebellion and economic sabotage as well as for their leadership in the CPP." Respondents also aver that an
Information for Rebellion was already filed against the attorneys in the Davao RTC, hence the petition for Habeas Corpus is already
moot and academic. Petitioners countered by contending that since the detained attorneys were not given the benefit of preliminary
investigation, they were denied their constitutional right to due process and, consequently, the Information for Rebellion filed against
them is void. Respondents maintain that a preliminary investigation was unnecessary since the detained attorneys were lawfully
arrested without a warrant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of a preliminary investigation renders the Information filed in RTC Davao void.
HELD:
No, although the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure states that no Information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court
shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, exceptions to this rule are provided for in Section 7 of
Rule 112.
Consequently, the Information filed by the City Fiscal before the Regional Trial Court of the City of Davao fell within the exception.
Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to cases when a suspect is caught in flagrante delicto or immediately thereafter, while paragraph (c) refers
to escaping prisoners. As to whether the detained attorneys fall under either of the first two instances enumerated is a question of fact,
which will need the presentation of evidence and is more properly within the province of the trial Court. The question of absence of a
proper preliminary investigation is also better inquired into by the Court below. This Court has held that the trial Court is called upon
"not to dismiss the information but hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a
reinvestigation. The petition for Habeas Corpus is dismissed for having become moot and academic. Petitioners are now detained by
virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.  
GR NOS 117952-53 FEBRUARY 14, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
DANILO DE GUZMAN
FACTS:
The two offenders were brought to the police station for questioning and detention. The police officers were without warrants of arrest
or search warrants at the time of the arrests and seizure of evidence. As the operation was conducted largely during nighttime, the police
officers were unable to secure the necessary warrants for fear of leaving the place of surveillance. The two were charged with Unlawful
Possession of Firearms and violation of Dangerous Drugs Act in the RTC. On arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to both charges but the
RTC convicted him on the two offenses. De Guzman appealed from said decision, hence this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest done is valid even without conducting a preliminary investigation beforehand.
HELD:
A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the police officers’ manner of conducting the accused-appellant’s arrest was not tainted with
any constitutional infirmity. Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. In this jurisdiction, the mere possession of a firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition is a criminal offense under PD No. 1866.
This is a valid warrantless arrest because despite word from their fellow officer, SPO1 Cuevas, that he saw accused-appellant sniff
“shabu”, they resisted the first impulse to storm the rented cottage which could have caused them to seriously disregard constitutional
safeguards. Instead, the police officers waited for the needed opening to validly arrest the accused. To their minds, it would be the
arrival of drug buyers. As the situation would have it, the arrest was necessitated by the presence of accused-appellant with a gun
obviously tucked in his pants. The decision of the RTC is therefore affirmed.
G.R. NO. 104879 MAY 6, 1994
ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, et al
FACTS:
Petitioners then filed a motion to quash a search warrant issued against him for alleged violation of Presidential Decree 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions), contending that the same was acquired from a court that does not have territorial
jurisdiction over the offense. Quezon City Judge Velasco, however, upheld the validity of the warrant, opining that the same falls under
the category of Writs and Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be served
not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court (National Capital
Judicial Region). The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence petitioners filed this present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant issued by Judge Fineza of Kalookan RTC is valid.
HELD:
Yes, the search warrant is valid. It is incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue the
search warrant, as would be the consequence of petitioners' position that only the branch of the court with jurisdiction over the place to
be searched can issue a warrant to search the same. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the
court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no such
criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in
Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction.
It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or the prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine where
they should apply for a search warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate venue of a case under the
foregoing rules. The petition is denied and the decision of the CA is affirmed.
G.R. No. 124346 June 8, 2004
YOLLY TEODOSIO y BLANCAFLOR
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Chief Inspector Federico Laciste ordered a team from the PNP Regional Office Intelligence Unit to conduct a buy-bust operation on
Teodosio who was suspected of peddling shabu hence, the team and their informer proceeded to the Teodosio’s house in Pasay at about
midnight. SPO1 Jeffrey Inciong and the informer entered the open gate of appellant’s compound and walked to his apartment while the
rest of the team observed and waited outside. After the exchange of the money earlier treated with ultraviolet powder and the shabu,
Inciong gave the signal to the other police officers and they arrested Teodosio. In the RTC, Teodosio insisted that the warrantless arrest
was not valid because the police officers framed him up for possession of shabu after the search in his apartment produced no illegal
drugs and that it should be invalidated because the police officers failed to obtain a warrant even though they had several days for such
purpose. The RTC and the CA found him guilty, hence this petition for review of the Court of Appeal’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted was illegal.
HELD:
No, the warrantless arrest was legal. Frame-up, a usual defense of those accused in drug-related cases, is viewed by the Court with
disfavor since it is an allegation that can be made with ease. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption that the arresting policemen performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.
On the argument that the officers had four days to secure a warrant but did not get one, the evidence was that the four-day period was
not enough to establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. All that the police authorities knew about appellant was the
information gathered from the informer and their surveillance of the area. Furthermore, no warrant was needed considering that the
mission was not a search but an entrapment. An arrest made after an entrapment does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is
considered a valid warrantless arrest pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. Any search resulting from a lawful
warrantless arrest is valid because the accused committed a crime in flagrante delicto, that is, the person arrested (appellant in this
case) committed a crime in the presence of the arresting officers.
 
G.R Nos. 117145-50 & 117447 March 28, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
LEONIDA MERIS y PADILLA
FACTS:
Napoleon Ramos, Nadal, Conseja and Bombarda were told by Meris that she knew someone who could help them secure employment
in Hongkong in exchange for P15,000.00 each as their placement fee. When they went to Manila, they stayed in the house of Julie
Micua who assured them of their overseas job, upon their payment of money. Two months after their downpayment, Ramos became
suspicious and later realized that Meris and Micua are fake recruiters so the six of them went to Manila and filed criminal complaints
for estafa and illegal recruitment against the accused, which led to her immediate arrest. Meris contended that she was also a victim of
Micua and, more importantly, that the warrantless arrest conducted against her was illegal. Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of
petitioners, hence Meris filed this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest made was illegal.
HELD:
No, the warrantless arrest was legal.
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by arrest or voluntary appearance in court. The record amply
demonstrates that accused-appellant voluntarily appeared in court at her arraignments, entered a plea of "not guilty" to all the charges
against her, and later actively participated in the trial. Hence, granting arguendo that accused-appellant’s arrest was defective, such is
deemed cured upon her voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. It should be stressed that the question of legality of an
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Consequently, if objections based on this ground are
waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment. The technicality cannot
render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to the
culpability of the accused
G.R. No. 107741 October 18, 1996
FRANCISCO BERNARTE, et al., vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
FACTS:
A writ of preliminary injunction ordering the petitioners to desist and refrain from occupying their portions of the disputed lands
pending litigation was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga in its capacity as a Special Agrarian Court. The Court then
deputized the Philippine National Police of Lubao and Guagua, Pampanga to issue the said writ.
After some time, the petitioners were able to garner a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, and by virtue of such, the petitioners resumed occupation and cultivation of the disputed land.
Thereafter, several policemen were dispatched in the area to enforce the earlier writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional
Trial Court. The policemen then arrested the petitioners for their refusal to vacate the area and subsequently charged them with
resistance and/or disobedience to the lawful order of persons in authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest of the petitioners that was effected without a warrant was valid.
HELD:
Yes, the warrantless arrest was valid. At the time when the arrest was effected, the RTC has not been declared as without jurisdiction
over the Agrarian case and therefore, the said writ of preliminary injunction it issued is in order. Following this, since at the time the
petitioners were arrested, the PNP team was enforcing a lawful order of the same RTC and in seriously resisting the same the appellants
intimidated the PNP team committing the alleged crime of Direct Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority, a warrant was not
necessary for their arrest.
Moreover, the petition for Habeas Corpus was not the proper remedy. Once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no
longer question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy then is the quashal of the
information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The reason for the issuance of the writ even becomes more unavailing when the
person detained files a bond for his temporary release.
G.R. No. L-31665 August 6, 1975
LEONARDO ALMEDA vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ FACTS:
Leonardo Almeda was charged, together with five others, with the crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle in the Circuit Criminal
Court of Pasig, Rizal, presided by Judge Onofre Villauz. The amount of the bond recommended for the provisional release of Almeda
was P15,000, and this was approved by the respondent judge with a direction that it be posted entirely in cash. At the hearing, Almeda
asked the trial court to allow him to post a surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required of him but such request was denied.
Because of this, Almeda filed the present special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction against respondent Judge Villaluz.
Almeda contends that the judge has no authority to require that the bond be strictly in cash.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge may require that the bond to be posted entirely in cash.
HELD:
No, the judge does not have the authority to require such. The condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his
posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter.
The sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by the court, and there should be no suggestion of
penalty on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part of the government. The allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is
authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly provide for it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by depositing
cash with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail presupposes the attendance of sureties to
whom the body of the prisoner can be delivered. And even where cash bail is allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond
primarily belongs to the accused. The trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist that the accused obtain his
provisional liberty only thru a cash bond.
The order of the judge denying the motion of the petitioner Almeda that he be allowed to post a surety bond instead of a cash bond is set
aside, without prejudice to increasing the amount of the bail bond and/or the imposition of such conditions as the respondent judge
might consider desirable and proper for the purpose of insuring the attendance of the petitioner at the trial.
 
A.M. [Link]-97-1139 October 16, 1997
ROBERTO ESPIRITU vs.
JUDGE EDUARDO JOVELLANOS, respondent.
FACTS:
While Roberto Espiritu was with a group of people, Weny Dumlao approached him and fired at him three times, which resulted to his
wounds. On the basis of this and his companion’s affidavits, SPO II Eduardo R. Yadao filed a criminal complaint for frustrated murder
in MCTC Pangasinan. After conducting a preliminary examination, Judge Jovellanos ordered the arrest of Dumlao and fixed the
amount of bail for his provisional liberty at P20,000.00, which was later reduced to P10,000.00, stating that Dumlao’s father had asked
for the reduction. Later, the Judge ordered “any peace officer under whose custody [Dumlao] may be found” to release the latter in view
of the fact that Dumlao had posted bail for P10,000.00. Thereafter, the Judge also ordered Dumlao to be released due to the fact that
Dumlao had filed a case against Roberto Espiritu and others as a result of the same incident, charging Espiritu and his companions with
a case for attempted murder and illegal possession of firearm. Espiritu sought a review in the Department of Justice, but his petition
was denied for having been filed late hence he filed the complaint in this present case, alleging irregularities committed by respondent
judge in the granting of bail and the conduct of the preliminary investigation of his complaint against Dumlao.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the granting of bail while Dumlao was not in the custody of the court and its reduction proper.
HELD:
Judge Jovellano correctly granted bail to Dumlao because he may be considered to be under constructive custody at the time when he
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court when he personally asked respondent judge to admit him to bail and reduce its
amount. We held that the accused was in the constructive custody of the law when he moved for admission to bail through his lawyers
(1) by filing the application for bail with the trial court, (2) by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts, and (3) by
unequivocably recognizing the jurisdiction of said court.

G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas but was convicted by the RTC for homicide and sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals and, while the appeal was pending, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of
flight on his part. However, the CA denied his petition for bail, ruling that Leviste failed to show that he suffers from an ailment of such
gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger and that the court made a
preliminary evaluation of petitioner’s case and made a prima facie determination that there was no reason substantial enough to
overturn the evidence of petitioner’s guilt.
Leviste now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. His
theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
ISSUE:
In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six
years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
HELD:
No, Leviste’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules.
Any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage,
where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this
will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail
pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first scenario allowing the
exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the appellate court’s stringent discretion requires that the
exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial
to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail.
Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will
simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.
Given these, the petition is dismissed.  
G.R. No. 141529 June 6, 2001
FRANCISCO YAP, JR., a.k.a. EDWIN YAP
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Yap was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional
liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings but the motion was denied by the trial court. When the records of the
case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail, invoking the last paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment on this motion, the Solicitor General opined that petitioner
may be allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the
place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant.” Yap however contended that the P5,500,000
proposed bail was violative of his right against excessive bail. The CA upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor General and
maintained the conditions and the P5,500,000 bail. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed this present petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the conditions set forth unduly restrict his constitutional liberty of abode and travel; and
(2) whether or not the P5.5M bail is violative of his right against excessive bail.
HELD:
(1) No, the right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights. Section 6,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides exemptions to the rule, such as “…national security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law.” The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the
above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which
is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence.
(2) Yes the amount is too much. Section 9 of Rule 114 provides the factors to be considered when fixing the amount of bail.
Although it cannot be controverted that the Court of Appeals, despite the possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant
petitioner bail, the setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no legal nor factual basis. Guided by the
penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence against petitioner, we believe that the amount of P200,000.00 is
more reasonable.  
G.R. No. 129670 February 1, 2000
MANOLET O. LAVIDES vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON,
Judge Presiding over Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Manolet Lavides was arrested without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. It appears that the parents of
complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16years old, had been contacted by Lavides for an
assignation that night at his room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police
received reports of petitioner’s activities. He was charged with violation of RA 7610. Lavides filed a Motion, contending that the
warrantless arrest made was illegal and that he should be allowed to post bail as a matter of right. Later, nine more Informations for
child abuse were filed against Lavides. No bail was recommended but he still filed separate applications for bail in the nine cases.
The trial court issued an order resolving the Motion of Lavides, ruling that he is allowed to post bail, under the conditions that: a) The
accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases; b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so,
his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall
proceed to trial in absentia; c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and d) Approval of the bail bonds
shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused. He thereafter filed a
motion to quash the Informations against him and to suspend his arraignment. The court however denied said motion so he was
arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. The court then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds
in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the Order.
He filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, assailing the trial court’s denial of his motion to quash and the conditions set forth in its
order. The CA declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon the validity of condition (d) on the ground that the issue
had become moot and academic since Lavides has already been arraigned. He then filed this present petition in the SC, contending that
the CA erred in not declaring condition (d) as a void condition and that his arraignment should be also considered void because it was
held pursuant to a invalid condition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the condition is void and the arraignment is invalid.
HELD:
The condition is void. Bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to
quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In
the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his
presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be
to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until
his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be
arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused’s constitutional right not to be put
on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.  
A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2018 August 3, 2007
Office of the Solicitor General vs.
Judge Antonio de Castro
FACTS:
Gao Yuan, a national of the People’s Republic of China, and her husband James Mahshi, a U.S. national, and their two young children
were on their way to a vacation in Canada when Philippine immigration officers arrested Gao Yuan and prevented her from boarding
her flight. Her arrest was by virtue of an order issued by Bureau of Immigration (BI)
Commissioner Alipio Fernandez, Jr., which, in turn, was a response to a letter from the Consul General of the PROC which alleged that
Gao Yuan was a fugitive from justice and charged with embezzlement by Chinese police and requested her arrest and deportation to
China. Gao Yuan was detained at the BI Detention Center. Mahshi filed before the RTC the petition for writ of Habeas Corpus with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. On the same day, Executive Judge Eugenio
enjoined the Commissioner from initiating any deportation proceeding against Gao Yuan. Thereafter, Judge de Castro promulgated an
Order of Release directing Commissioner Fernandez to immediately discharge the custody of Gao Yuan, she having filed her cash bond
in the amount of P250,000.00.
The RTC then took custody of Gao Yuan and clarified that it was only a provisional release for the duration of the TRO subject to certain
conditions: the posting of an additional cash bond of P100,000.00; (2) her movements were to be monitored by the court; (3) the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against her should she try to hide; and (4) the signing by Gao Yuan and her husband of an undertaking
that she will come to court at any given time she is called. Respondent based the provisional release on humanitarian reasons,
considering that Gao Yuan was merely wanted as a witness in a case in the PROC and she is a nursing mother to a 17-month old child.
Commissioner Fernandez then was compelled to file a Notice of Appeal upon Gao Yuan’s release from the BI’s custody. The OSG
contends that Gao Yuan’s release on bail is illegal since such falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Immigration and not
in the regular courts pursuant to Section 37(e) of C.A. No. 613.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has the authority to release an alien on bail while the case is pending.
HELD:
No, the RTC has no authority because the power to grant bail in deportation proceedings is vested in the BI. When an alien is detained
by the BID pursuant to an order of deportation, RTCs have no power to release said alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings,
because there is no law authorizing it.
It should be noted too that Section 37 (9) (e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, provides that “[a]ny alien under
arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner
of Immigration.” . The exercise by the Commissioner of such power is discretionary. So too, the determination of the propriety of
allowing the temporary release on bail of the alien, subject to deportation under the Immigration Act, as well as the conditions of such
release falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner, not the courts of justice. The reason for this is that the courts do not
administer immigration laws. The power of the Commissioner to grant bail in deportation proceedings should be exercised when the
alien is still under investigation, and not after the order of deportation has been issued by the BI.  
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ
FACTS:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the
Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." Said agreement took effect on June 20, 1997.
Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent,"
in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the
offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Subsequently, warrants of arrest were issued
against him. The DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent so
the NBI filed with the
RTC of Manila an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
In a petition for extradition filed by Hong Kong Special Administrative Region against Muñoz, the latter has already filed a petition for
bail which was denied by Judge Bernardo, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk."
In a motion for reconsideration, his petition for bail was granted by respondent Judge Olalia, thus he was allowed to post a
P750,000.00 bail. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the Order allowing Munoz to post bail but it was denied by Judge Olalia,
hence the instant petition where the petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a
potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings .For his part, private respondent
maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh
process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an extraditee is allowed to post bail.

HELD:
Yes. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or
her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. Records show that private respondent was arrested on
September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other
words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended
period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which
prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case
should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and
convincing evidence.  
G.R. No. 157977 February 27, 2006
EDUARDO TOLENTINO RODRIGUEZ and IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ vs.
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA–BRANCH 17, et al.
FACTS:
The case stemmed from the petition for extradition filed on March 12, 2001 by the US Government through the DOJ against the
petitioners. Petitioners applied for bail which the Regional Trial Court granted. The bail was set for one million pesos for each.
Petitioners then posted cash bonds. The US government moved for reconsideration of the grant of bail, but the motion was denied by
the trial court. Unsatisfied, the US government filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Thereafter, the Court directed the
trial court to resolve the matter of bail so in compliance with the Court’s directive, the RTC, without prior notice and hearing, cancelled
the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners filed a very urgent motion for the
reconsideration of the cancellation of their bail which was denied, hence this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a prior notice and hearing is required before the cancellation of bail in extradition cases cancelled.
HELD:
Yes. However, the issue has become moot and academic insofar as petitioner Eduardo Rodriguez is concerned as he is now in the USA
facing the charges against him. But co-petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez is here and stands on a different footing. We agree that her
bail should be restored.
The policy is that a prospective extraditee is arrested and detained to avoid his flight from justice. On the extraditee lies the burden of
showing that he will not flee once bail is granted. If after his arrest and if the trial court finds that he is no flight risk, it grants him bail.
The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that she is no
flight risk, and is entitled to provisional release.
Under these premises, and with the trial court’s knowledge that in this case, co-petitioner has offered to go on voluntary extradition;
that she and her husband had posted a cash bond of P1 million each; that her husband had already gone on voluntary extradition and is
presently in the USA undergoing trial; that the passport of co-petitioner is already in the possession of the authorities; that she never
attempted to flee; that there is an existing holddeparture order against her; and that she is now in her sixties, sickly and under medical
treatment, we believe that the benefits of continued temporary liberty on bail should not be revoked and their grant of bail should not be
cancelled, without the co-petitioner being given notice and without her being heard why her temporary liberty should not be
discontinued.  
G.R. No. 135012 September 7, 2004
ANITA ESTEBAN vs.
HON. REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, San Jose City, and GERARDO
ESTEBAN
FACTS:
Gerardo Esteban is the accused in four criminal cases. In each case, his sister-in-law, Anita Esteban, petitioner herein, posted cash bail
of P20,000.00 in each case for his temporary liberty. However, while out on bail and during the pendency of the four criminal cases,
Gerardo was once again charged with another crime for which he was arrested and detained. “Fed up with Gerardo’s actuation,”
Esteban refused to post another bail and instead, she filed with the trial court an application for the cancellation of the cash bonds she
posted in the four criminal cases and alleged that she is “terminating the cash bail by surrendering the accused who is now in jail as
certified to by the City Jail Warden.” The Judge denied her application, as well as the motion for reconsideration, hence she filed this
petition for certiorari. She contends that by surrendering the accused who is now in jail, her application for cancellation of bail in the
four criminal cases is allowed under Section 19, now Section 22, Rule 114.
ISSUE:
Whether or not she may avail of the right to cancel bail as provided under Sec. 22 of Rule 114.
HELD:
No, petitioner’s submission is misplaced. Section 22, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 22. Cancellation of bail. – Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon
surrender of the accused or proof of his death. The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal
of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction. In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the
bail.
The first paragraph of Section 22 contemplates of a situation where, among others, the surety or bondsman surrenders the accused to
the court that ordered the latter’s arrest. Thereafter, the court, upon application by the surety or bondsman, cancels the bail bond. We
hold that the cash bail cannot be cancelled. Petitioner did not surrender the accused who was charged in the four criminal cases to the
trial court. The accused was arrested and detained because he was charged in a subsequent criminal case. A cash bond may be posted
either by the accused or by any person in his behalf. However, as far as the State is concerned, the money deposited is regarded as the
money of the accused. Consequently, it can be applied in payment of any fine and costs that may be imposed by the court.  
G.R. No. 131909 February 18, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HON. ALFREDO CABRAL, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Camarines Sur and RODERICK ODIAMAR
FACTS:
Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape upon the complaint of Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary liberty, accused-
respondent filed a motion praying that he be released on bail which Buenafe opposed by presenting real, documentary and testimonial
evidence. The lower court, however, granted the motion for bail, stating that the evidence against Odiamar was not strong. Believing
that respondent was not entitled to bail as the evidence against him was strong, the prosecution filed two motions to recall the bail,
which was later dismissed by the court. The dismissal prompted Buenafe to file a petition before the Court of Appeals with prayer for
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. This petition, like its predecessors, was also denied. Still convinced by the
merit of its case, Buenafe filed the instant petition with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC is correct in allowing Odiamar to post bail even though he is charged with the crime of rape.
HELD:
Yes, Judge Cabral erred when he allowed respondent to post bail. In this case, accused-respondent was being charged with rape
qualified by the use of a deadly weapon punishable by reclusion perpetua to death and, as such, bail is discretionary and not a matter of
right. The test is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather whether it shows evident guilt or a
great presumption of guilt. The court is ministerially bound to decide which circumstances and factors are present which would show
evident guilt or presumption of guilt as defined above.
This Court has observed that the lower court’s order failed to mention and include some significant factors and circumstances which, to
the mind of this Court are strong, clear and convincing. First, it excluded the testimony of Dr. Belmonte about her psychiatric
examination of the victim as well as her findings that the latter manifested “psychotic signs and symptoms such as unusual fear,
sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor retardation, poverty of thought content as well as depressive signs and symptom.” The
lower court cannot exercise judicial discretion as to what pieces of evidence should be included in the summary. While conceding that
some prosecution evidence were enumerated, said enumeration was incomplete. An incomplete enumeration or selective inclusion of
pieces of evidence for the prosecution in the order cannot be considered a summary, for a summary is necessarily a reasonable recital of
any evidence presented by the prosecution. A “summary” that is incomplete is not a summary at all.
G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA,
Special Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA

FACTS:
An Information was filed against Defensor-Santiago with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Consequently, order of arrest was issued in said case against her by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the
Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00. . On even date, Santiago filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion
for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago," which prays that the bail bond she is posting in
the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted and states that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of the SB
for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings,". So the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing petitioner to post a
cash bond for her provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance.
She then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan
and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with her cases. One year later, the Court rendered a decision dismissing the
petition for certiorari and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order previously issued. Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan
issued a hold departure order against her by reason of her announcement, which was widely publicized in both print and broadcast
media, that she would be leaving for the US to accept a fellowship offered by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University. Santiago now filed this instant petition, arguing that the Sandiganbayan never acquired jurisdiction over her person
considering that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly posted
bail since she never personally appeared before said court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over her when she posted her bail.
*Take note also the issue about Santiago being confined in a hospital is deemed being in custody of the law.

HELD:
Yes. The Court finds and so holds that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr.
Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction
of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is
posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the
custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is effectively estopped
from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over
the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.
Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not personally appear before respondent court to file her cash bond,
thereby rendering the same ineffectual. Suffice it to say that in this case, it was petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of the
cash bond, who requested respondent court to dispense with her personal appearance until she shall have recovered sufficiently from
her vehicular accident. It is distressing that petitioner should now turn around and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate
stand on the matter and accommodating her own request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her absence.  

G.R. No. 115132 August 9, 1995

IMELDA R. MARCOS vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Imelda Marcos, former First Lady and widow of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, is the defendant in several criminal cases for
violations of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) pending before the Sandiganbayan and in the regular courts. In
two of these cases, petitioner was found guilty and was sentenced imprisonment. After conviction, she filed a "Motion for Leave to
Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and treatment by practitioners of oriental medicine in China allegedly because of "a serious and
life threatening medical condition" but the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan. She then filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and treatment in China, which was now supported by several medical reports that
were prepared by her doctor Roberto Anastacio. Mrs. Marcos contended that she needs to travel to US and Europe for treatment of
several heart diseases because the tests were not available here. Garchitorena, the presiding justice, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil,
Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Heart Center, to verify if the treatment for Mrs. Marcos’ illness was not really available here but the
same was contradicted by Dr. Patacsil. The Office of the Special Prosecutor therefore opposed the motions, contending that the absolute
necessity to go abroad was not demonstrated by Mrs. Marcos. On the other hand, the Presidential Commission on Good Government
filed a manifestation interposing no objection to petitioner's motions "primarily on humanitarian grounds provided that the accused
comply with the terms and conditions for travel as may be imposed" by respondent court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the granting of the motion to travel abroad is a matter of right of the accused or a matter of discretion by the court.
HELD:
 Yes, the granting of such motion is based on the discretion of the court. The court ruled that petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a
trip abroad. It should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in several cases, in two of
which she was convicted although the decision is still pending reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the
country and the burden was on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek medical
treatment in foreign countries.
 
G.R. No. 138859-60 February 22, 2001
ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), respondent.
FACTS:
Acting on an Affidavit-Complaint filed by a certain Erlinda Fadri, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an Order naming
Benjamin Arao, Frederick Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the city jail warden of Pagadian City as
respondents. The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao recommended the prosecution of “the aforenamed respondents” for violation
of Article 269 of the RPC. Significantly, the name of Alvarez A. Yusop, herein petitioner, was included as one of the persons to be
prosecuted, although he was not one of the original respondents mentioned in the Order of the Ombudsman. An Order of Arrest was
issued by the Sandiganbayan but it was learned later that he has already posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog
City. Yusop thereafter filed a “Motion To Remand Case To The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary Investigation” but the same
was denied by the SB for his alleged failure to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court and that his filing of bail bond
constitutes a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation. He then filed a Motion to Dismiss because he was not accorded a
preliminary investigation but it was still denied by the court under the same reason, hence this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of a bail bond constitutes waiver of petitioner’s right to preliminary investigation.
HELD:
No, the filing of a bail bond does not constitute a waiver of petitioner’s right to preliminary investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[a]n application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the
validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a
preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. x x x.” We stress that the right
to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full
measure of his right to due process. Hence, preliminary investigation with regard to him must be conducted.
G.R. No. 70746-47 September 1, 1992
BIENVENIDO O. MARCOS vs.
HON. FERNANDO S. RUIZ, RTC JUDGE, 7TH JUDICIAL REGION, TAGBILARAN CITY, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
After conducting the appropriate preliminary investigation, Acting Assistant City Fiscal Lorenzo A. Lopena of the City of Tagbilaran
filedwith the Regional Trial Court of Bohol two informations against Marcos for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. In the arraignment,
Marcos appeared but asked for a resetting on the ground that his lawyer had just withdrawn and he had to look for another lawyer. The
court granted his request and the arraignment was reset. It turned out, however, that petitioner settled his obligation with Oculam, the
complainant in the criminal case, who executed a subscribed Affidavit of Desistance in favor of petitioner.
When the cases were called, neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared so arraignment was rescheduled. At the next arraignment,
he was arraigned ex parte where he automatically entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution then presented its evidence ex-parte and
rested its case. After this, the court then rendered a decision against the petitioner, asserting that his absence means that he will no
longer present evidence. Thereafter, the trial court received an urgent motion for the resetting of the hearing filed by the petitioner
which explained the non-appearance but the same does not contain a notice of hearing to the Prosecuting Fiscal so it was denied.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was denied his rights during the course of the trial.
HELD:
No, petitioner was not denied of his rights during the trial. Considering that he had been arraigned, petitioner was not required to
appear at all the trials. Section 1 (c) of Rule 115 states that while it may be true that he has the right to be present at every stage of the
proceedings, i.e. from the arraignment to the promulgation of judgment, he can also validly waive his presence to be present after the
arraignment.
On the other hand, petitioner was denied his right to be heard when the respondent Judge capriciously and arbitrarily considered that
the case was already submitted for decision after the prosecution rested its case. The Judge blatantly disregarded Section 1(c) of Rule
115 when he considered the accused’s non-appearance during the first day of trial as a waiver of his right for the succeeding trial dates,
when such should be construed to mean that he only waived his right to be present during that day of trial.  
G.R. No. 127772 March 22, 2001
ROBERTO [Link] vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING
CORP.
FACTS:
Petitioner is one of the accused in a case for estafa thru falsification of public document and another for estafa, with respondent RCBC
as the offended party in both cases. The When the case was already scheduled for trial, the hearings were cancelled because the
Presiding Judge of RTC Makati was elevated to the Supreme Court and no trial judge was immediately appointed/detailed thereto. The
hearing set for June 21, 1995, was postponed for lack of proof of notice to all the accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17,
1995, upon request of private prosecutor, and without objection on the part of petitioner’s counsel, postponed to July 24, 1995.
However, for lack of proof of service of notice upon petitioner’s three co-accused, the hearing set for July 24, 1995, was likewise
cancelled and the cases were reset for trial on September 8 and 25, 1995. On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to appear
despite due notice hence, upon motion of petitioner’s counsel, respondent court moved that the case against Almario be dismissed for
failure to prosecute and considering that accused is entitled to a speedy trial. However, upon motion of the private prosecutor the RTC
set aside the previous Order that dismissed Almario’s case. He filed for a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the
CA, his appeal was likewise dismissed for lack of merit, hence this appeal by certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s rights to speedy trial and against double jeopardy were violated.
HELD:
The right of the accused to speedy trial and against double jeopardy had not been violated. It has been held that the right to speedy trial
may only be availed of when the trial was burdened by unreasonable delays but the fact that there was no unreasonable delay of the
proceedings is apparent from the chronology of the hearings with the reasons for their postponements or transfers. Petitioner could not
refute the appellate court's findings that petitioner's right to speedy trial had not been violated. As both the trial and appellate courts
have taken pains to demonstrate, there was no unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay in the trial. Hence, there was no violation
of petitioner's right to speedy trial as there were no unjustified postponements which had prolonged the trial for unreasonable lengths
of time.
G.R. NOS. 115236-37 JANUARY 16, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
BRYAN FERDINAND DY y LA MADRID and GIOVAN
BERNARDINO y GARCIA
FACTS:
Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan Bernardino filed separate motions for reconsideration of the decision of the Supreme Court which
affirmed the judgement of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 5, finding them guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness. In his Motion,
Giovani Bernardino alleges that the right to be arraigned is not among the rights that are susceptible to waiver or estopped, thus the
lack of arraignment cannot be deemed cured by their participation in the trial. He further contends that because of the absence of
arraignment, the courts have not acquired jurisdiction over them, hence the decision rendered against them was not valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to be arraigned may be waived or stopped.
HELD:
Yes. The allegation that there was no valid arraignment is misleading and betrays a lack of comprehension regarding the procedural
requirements of arraignment in the context of the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
In one of the Court’s decisions, it was held that the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation may not be waived.
Indeed, the defense may waive their right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of “not guilty” in their behalf. However, it
becomes altogether a different matter if the accused themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them. The defense cannot hold hostage the court by their refusal to the reading of the complaint or information.
G.R. No. L-80845 March 14, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HON. ERNESTO M. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 10, and JUAN MAGALOP y
SALVACION
FACTS:
The storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home Industries (BNSHI) in Maramag, Bukidnon, was ransacked. The value of the
missing articles was estimated at P15,298.15. The responsibility for the robbery with force upon things was laid on accused Juan
Magalop y Salvacion, Petronilo Fernandez y Cano and Ricarte Dahilan alias Ricky. At the arraignment, Magalop pleaded "guilty" while
Fernandez pleaded "not guilty." The arraignment of Dahilan was deferred as he was "not mentally well." Instead of pronouncing
judgment on Magalop who already pleaded guilty, the RTC conducted the trial, which led the prosecution to present its witnesses and
evidence. The defense having opted to waive its right to present evidence, the case was submitted for decision. In the decision,
respondent Judge acquitted accused Fernandez as well as Magalop who earlier pleaded guilty to the charge.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before us contending that the decision denying reconsideration are
"purely capricious and arbitrary, made for no proper reason at all and rendered without legal authority whatsoever, thereby amounting
to lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion, and curtailed the power of the state to punish criminals."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mangalop’s plea of guilt immediately convicts him of the crime charged.
HELD:
Yes, the essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge and understanding of
the precise nature of the crime charged in the information as well as the consequences of his plea. It is an unconditional admission of
guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no
alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances. Thus, under the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, when the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may receive evidence from the parties to determine the
penalty to be imposed.
This rule is at most directory. It will certainly be a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to persist in holding the accused
bound to his admission of guilt and sentencing him accordingly when the totality of the evidence points to his acquittal. There is no rule
which provides that simply because the accused pleaded guilty to the charge that his conviction automatically follows. Additional
evidence independent of the plea may be considered to convince the judge that it was intelligently made.  
G.R. Nos. L-30527-28 March 29, 1974
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
PANFILO PADERNAL
FACTS:
Panfilo Padernal was charged by the Prosecutor with the crime of homicide. During the arraignment, Padernal pleaded guilty. The trial
ensued for the determination of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete selfdefense but, after the testimony of Padernal, it was
proved that he may invoke complete self-defense hence the trial judge ordered that a plea of not guilty be entered by the accused, even
though the arraignment has long been done. The trial on the merits ensued and a decision acquitting accused Panfilo Padernal of the
crime of homicide with which he was charged “on the ground of reasonable doubt” was reached by the court. On the other hand, Fiscal
Alvero verbally moved for a reconsideration alleging that the accused has entered a plea of guilty which is “sufficient to sustain
conviction of the offense charged in the Information without the introduction of further evidence, the accused himself has supplied the
necessary proof of his guilt and which closes the right of the accused to defend himself and leaves the Court with no alternative but to
impose the penalty prescribed by law.” The oral motion for reconsideration was denied, as well as the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration, hence Fiscal Alvera filed this appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant may still be acquitted even though he already plead guilty during the arraignment.
HELD:
Yes, in People v. Balisacan, L-26376, August 31, 1966, this Court ruled that where the accused pleads guilty and proceeds, in a hearing to
prove mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, to state facts constituting full and complete self-defense, the trial judge
should declare his plea of guilty thereby withdrawn, order that a plea of not guilty be entered and proceed to trial on the merits. For
failure, in the Balisacan case, to follow this procedure, We ruled therein that there was deprivation of day in court against the
prosecution. An acquittal on the merits thus made without the requisite trial providing sufficient opportunity to the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, was held improper.
G.R. Nos. 163972-77 March 28, 2008
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Daan, together with Kuizon, were charged with three counts of malversation of public fund before the Sandiganbayan. In addition to the
charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted for three counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of “not guilty” and substitute the same with a plea of “guilty”,
provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the
alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of “not guilty” to the crime of
falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of “guilty”, but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public
document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of “not
guilty” thereto with a plea of “guilty”, but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
The prosecution found as acceptable the plea bargaining proposals of the accused. The Sandiganbayan, however, denied petitioner’s
Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the ground that petitioner and the prosecution failed
to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the public.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plea bargaining offer of the petitioner should be granted.
HELD:
Yes, the plea bargaining offer should be granted.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be
with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. The rules however use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion
upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for
a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience
of the accused.
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent events and higher
interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of
this Court's equity jurisdiction - Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of
law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are
incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the
circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower
courts, in order to afford equal justice to petitioner.  
G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012
EMILIO A. GONZALES III vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 196232 September 4, 2012
WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT
vs.
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
FACTS:
Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and others with Plunder and Money
Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding
that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. However, the government, represented by petitioner, Special
Prosecutor Wendell BarrerasSulit and her prosecutorial staff sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement
entered into with the accused which was agreed upon by the SB. Outraged by this deal, the House of Representatives' Committee on
Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and
adopted Committee Resolution No. 3, recommending to the President the dismissal of Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of
appropriate charges against her Deputies and for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust. The Office of the President initiated a case against Barreras-Sulit but she asserts that the
propriety of taking and continuing to take administrative disciplinary proceeding against her must depend on the final disposition by
the Sandiganbayan of the PLEBARA, explaining that if the Sandiganbayan would uphold the PLEBARA, there would no longer be any
cause of complaint against her; if not, then the situation becomes ripe for the determination of her failings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the President may validly conduct the administrative disciplinary proceedings while the disposition on the
PLEBARA is still pending.
HELS:
Yes, the Office of the President may initiate the proceedings. The incidents that have taken place subsequent to the submission in court
of the PLEBARA shows that the PLEBARA has been practically approved, and that the only thing which remains to be done by the
Sandiganbayan is to promulgate a judgment imposing the proper sentence on the accused Major General Garcia based on his new pleas
to lesser offenses.
The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is of no consequence to an administrative finding of liability against
petitioner Barreras-Sulit. While the court's determination of the propriety of a plea bargain is on the basis of the existing prosecution
evidence on record, the disciplinary authority's determination of the prosecutor's administrative liability is based on whether the plea
bargain is consistent with the conscientious consideration of the government's best interest and the diligent and efficient performance
by the prosecution of its public duty to prosecute crimes against the State. Consequently, the disciplining authority's finding of
ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the part of the prosecution, more particularly petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing
to pursue or build a strong case for the government or, in this case, entering into an agreement which the government finds "grossly
disadvantageous," could result in administrative liability, notwithstanding court approval of the plea bargaining agreement entered
into.  
G.R. No. 173588 April 22, 2009
ARIEL M. LOS BAÑOS, on behalf of P/Supt. Victor Arevalo, SPO2 Marcial
Olympia, SPO1 Rocky Mercene and PO1 Raul Adlawan, and in his personal capacity vs.
JOEL R. PEDRO
FACTS:
The Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro for violating the election gun ban, i.e., for carrying a firearm outside of
his residence or place of business without any authority from the Comelec. Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the
RTC granted but the same did not materialize because Pedro filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Information
“contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification” and attached a Comelec Certification which shows
that he was “exempted” from the gun ban. By virtue of this, the RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police and the
prosecutors to return the seized articles to Pedro. Private prosecutor Ariel Los Baños, representing the checkpoint team, moved to
reopen the case, as Pedro’s Comelec Certification was a falsification, and the prosecution was deprived of due process when the judge
quashed the information without a hearing. Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the RTC’s order primarily based on Section 8 of
Rule 117, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent. The trial court, for its part, rejected the position that Section 8, Rule 117
applies, and explained that this provision refers to situations where both the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the
dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or the offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation
where the information was quashed upon motion of the accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedro’s
a r r a i g n m e n t d a t e . P e d r o f i l e d w i t h t h e C A a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTC’s mandated
reopening which initially denied the petition but granted the same after a Motion for Reconsideration. Prosecutor Los Banos now filed
this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion to quash is considered a provisional dismissal, which became permanent one year from the prosecutor’s
receipt of the order.
HELD:
No, an examination of the whole Rule 117 tells us that a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal are far
different from one another as concepts, in their features, and legal consequences. While the provision on provisional dismissal is found
within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section
8, Rule 117 applies.
The RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling that a quashal of the Information was in order. Pedro, on the other hand, also misappreciated
the true nature, function, and utility of a motion to quash. As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of which
Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.  
G.R. No. 164170 April 16, 2009
MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA y ABDUL, ISAGANI ABDUL y SIACOR, and
SARAH LANGCO y ANGLI vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, P/C INSP. MICHAEL ANGELO BERNARDO MARTIN, P/
INSP. ALLANJING ESTRADA MEDINA, PO3 ARNOLD RAMOS ASIS, PO2
PEDRO SANTOS GUTIERREZ, PO2 IGNACIO DE PAZ, and PO2 ANTONIO SEBASTIAN BERIDA, JR.
FACTS:
Private respondents were charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom. However, the accused moved for the quashal of the
Information on the ground that the officer who filed the Information has no authority do so because it should be the Office of the
Ombudsman who filed the same. The trial court denied the motion to quash on the ground that under the ruling in People v. Mapalao,
an accused who is at large is not entitled to bail or other relief. The trial court also held that the jurisdiction and power of the
Ombudsman under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 (RA 6770), as well as Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the
Ombudsman, are not exclusive but shared or concurrent with the regular prosecutors. Thus, the authority of the Department of Justice
to investigate, file the information and prosecute the case could no longer be questioned. In a Resolution, then Secretary of Justice
Hernando B. Perez reversed the ruling of State Prosecutor Velasco and ordered the latter to cause the withdrawal or dismissal of the
Information for kidnapping for ransom. The Secretary of Justice ruled that the incident complained of was a bungled buy-bust
operation, not kidnapping for ransom. Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by then Secretary of
Justice Simeon A. Datumanong. Petitioners thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the same was also
denied, hence this petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioners must be under the custody of the law prior to the filing of a motion to quash; and
(2) Whether or not a motion to quash on the ground that it is the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
(1) No, there is nothing in the Rules governing a motion to quash which requires that the accused should be under the custody of
the law prior to the filing of a motion to quash on the ground that the officer filing the information had no authority to do so. Custody of
the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail. However, while the accused are not yet under the
custody of the law, any question on the jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any
pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when the accused invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such
jurisdiction over his person.
(2) No, the accused’s motion to quash, on the ground of lack of authority of the filing officer, would have never prospered because
as discussed earlier, the Ombudsman’s power to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government.  
G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petitioners are officers of Marcopper Mining Corp., engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque.
The Department of Justiced charged petitioners with violation of the Water Code of the Philippines, the National Pollution Control
Decree,
Philippine Mining Act and RPC for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property by reason of the discharge millions of tons of
tailings into the rivers due to their mining operation. Petitioners moved to quash the information on grounds that these were
“duplicitous” as DOJ charged more than one offense for a single act and that the Informations contain allegations which constitute legal
excuse or justification.
The MTC ruled that as far as the 3 laws are concerned, only the Information for violation of Philippine Mining Act should be
maintained. Thus, the Informations for violation of Anti-Pollution Law and the Water Code should be dismissed because the elements
constituting the aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same elements which constitute violation of the Philippine Mining Act. The
RTC reversed the said decision and ruled that there can be no absorption by one offense of the three other offenses, as the acts penalized
by these laws are separate and distinct from each other. This was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand.
HELD:
No, duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states. Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of
offenses in single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid
confusing the accused in preparing his defense. Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each
Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the
Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
G.R. Nos. 107964-66 February 1, 1999
THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES represented by the PANEL OF
PROSECUTORS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
vs.
HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN, Presiding Judge, Branch 52, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and IMELDA R. MARCOS
FACTS:
Three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 were filed against Imelda Marcos in the RTC of
Pasig. The petitioners asked for the consolidation of the three informations, hence the remaining one was re-raffled and re-assigned to
Branch 52-Manila presided by public respondent Judge Nitafan. Thereafter, without any action or filing any motion to quash the
informations coming from Marcos, respondent judge issued an order requiring petitioners to show cause why the case should not be
dismissed on the ground that it violates private respondent’s right against ex post facto law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judge can motu proprio initiate the dismissal and subsequently dismissed a criminal information or complaint without
any motion to that effect being filed by the accused based on the alleged violation of the latter’s right against ex post facto law and
double jeopardy.
HELD:
No, it is clear from Section 1 that the right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the accused. There is nothing in the rules which
authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the accused. A motion
contemplates an initial action originating from the accused. It is the latter who is in the best position to know on what ground/s he will
based his objection to the information. Otherwise, if the judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging the case of
the prosecution but also takes side with the accused. This would violate the right to a hearing before an independent and impartial
tribunal. Such independence and impartiality cannot be expected from a magistrate, such as herein respondent judge, who in his show
cause orders, orders dismissing the charges and order denying the motions for reconsideration stated and even expounded in a lengthy
disquisition with citation of authorities, the grounds and justifications to support his action. Certainly, in compliance with the orders,
the prosecution has no choice but to present arguments contradicting that of respondent judge. Obviously, however, it cannot be
expected from respondent judge to overturn the reasons he relied upon in his different orders without contradicting himself. To allow a
judge to initiate such motion even under the guise of a show cause order would result in a situation where a magistrate who is supposed
to be neutral, in effect, acts as counsel for the accused and judge as well. A combination of these two personalities in one person is
violative of due process which is a fundamental right not only of the accused but also of the prosecution.  
G.R. No. 164682 September 14, 2011
JOEL GALZOTE vs.
JONATHAN BRIONES and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The prosecution filed an Information for robbery in an uninhabited place against Galzote before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Galzote
thereafter moved to quash the said information by alleging that it was patently irregular and fatally flawed in form and in substance. He
contends that the information did not allege conspiracy and questions why his alleged co-conspirator had been convicted of the lesser
offense of malicious mischief in another case. The MeTC denied the petitioner’s motion to quash, as well as his motion for
reconsideration. Galzote elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari. The petition, however, was denied by the court.
Thereafter, he filed another petition for certiorari before the CA but the case was likewise dismissed. He now filed this present petition
for certiorari in the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner’s motion to quash the information against him was proper; and
(2) Whether or not certiorari is the right mode of appeal regarding the denial of petitioner’s motion to quash.
HELD:
(1) No. The ground used by the petitioner in his motion to quash (i.e., that his co-conspirator had been convicted of an offense
lesser than the crime of robbery) is not among the exclusive grounds enumerated under Section 3, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure that warrant the quashal of a criminal information. A facial examination of the criminal information
against the petitioner shows it to be valid and regular on its face considering its conformity with the guidelines under Section 6, Rule 110
of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Under the circumstances, the criminal information is sufficient in form and substance for it states: (a) the name of the
petitioner as the accused; (b) the offense of robbery as the designated offense committed; (c) the manner on how the offense of robbery
was committed and the petitioner’s participation were alleged with particularity; and (d) the date and the place of the commission of the
robbery were also stated therein. Thus, as the RTC correctly ruled, the petitioner can be properly tried under the allegations of the
information.
(2) No, we find no compelling reason to justify a resort to a petition for certiorari against the orders of the MeTC as the petitioner
failed to show that the factual circumstances of his case fall under any of the above exceptional circumstances. The MeTC in fact did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion as its denial of the motion to quash was consistent with the existing rules and applicable
jurisprudence.  
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE
PONCE
FACTS:
Jason Ivler was charged with the separate offenses of (1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and (2) reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property, before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. During the arraignment,
Ivler pleaded guilty on the charge of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Thereafter, Ivler, invoking his right against double jeopardy, moved to quash the charge of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property filed against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy was proper.
HELD:
Yes, the motion to quash is proper. The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses, hence the motion to quash is valid.
G.R. No. 143591 May 5, 2010
TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., et al.
vs.
MAGDALENO M. PEÑA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge
Designate of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bago City
FACTS:
The Government Prosecutor filed four informations charging Borlongan and others of four counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified
Documents. Petitioners then moved to quash the four (4) Informatiosn filed on the ground, among others, that "they were denied due
process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court.
Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. They then argued that since no such
counter-affidavit and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit
and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules. Petitioners further prayed that
the information be quashed for lack of probable cause. Lastly, petitioners posited that the criminal case should have been suspended on
the ground that the issue being threshed out in the civil case is a prejudicial question." The court denied the omnibus motion primarily
on the ground that preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case — which fell within the jurisdiction of the MTCC so
the petitioners resorted to the filing of a special civil action for Certiorari in the CA but the same was also dismissed, hence this present
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion to quash filed by petitioners was proper.
HELD:
Yes, the motion to quash should have been granted by the trial court. It is evident that in the affidavit-complaint, specifically in
paragraph 1, respondent merely introduced and identified “the board of the bank, namely, Teodoro Borlongan, Jr., Delfin Gonzales, Jr.,
Benjamin De Leon, P. Siervo
Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa and Arturo Manuel, Sr.” However, in the accusatory portion of the complaint which is
paragraph number 9, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not included among those charged with the crime of use of falsified documents under Article
172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The omission indicates that respondent did not intend to criminally implicate Mr. Ben
Lim, Jr., even as he was acknowledged to be a member of the board.
The City Prosecutor should have cautiously reviewed the complaint to determine whether there were inconsistencies which ought to
have been brought to the attention of the respondent or, on his own, considered for due evaluation. It is a big mistake to bring a man to
trial for a crime he did not commit.  
G.R. No. 153176 March 29, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HON. ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, In her capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 19, of the City of Naga and SERAFIN
SABALLEGUE
FACTS:
Saballegue was charged with violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 8282, otherwise
known as the “Social Security Act,” in an information. Said information contains a certification signed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ.
Tolentino. Saballegue pleaded not guilty so the case was set for pre-trial but, three days later, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the information was filed without the prior written authority or approval of the city prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Court. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The State
Prosecutor thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that Saballegue has waived his right to file a motion to quash when he
pleaded to the information but said motion was denied by the RTC. Hence this petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65by
the People through Regional State Prosecutor Santiago Turingan and State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused waived his right to quash the information when he pleaded to the information.
HELD:
No. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for lack of authority of the filing officer as among the grounds for a motion
to quash and the waiver of these grounds. Similar to the 1985 Rules, the Revised Rules enumerate the exceptions from the waiver,
namely: (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged; (c) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (d) that the accused has been previously convicted or
acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Apparently, the want of jurisdiction under the Rules refers to jurisdiction over the offense and the person, and not over the case.
In the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or
a prior written approval of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information was filed by an officer without authority
to file the same. As this infirmity in the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did
not err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.  
G.R. No. 139615 May 28, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
AMADEO TIRA and CONNIE TIRA
FACTS:
After surveillance and confirmation that drug activities were being conducted in the residence of the respondents, the police officials
applied for a search warrant. Armed with the warrant, the policemen went to the residence of Tira and found drug paraphernalia. After
Connie’s arrest, she filed a motion to quash search warrant, alleging that the police officers who applied for the said warrant did not
have any personal knowledge of the reported illegal activities. The motion to quash, however, was denied by the RTC hence they were
charged for violation of possession of marijuana and shabu, two offenses, in only one Information. They were both found guilty, hence
this appeal.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the dismissal of the motion to quash the warrant was proper; and
(2) Whether or not the information that charged them with two offenses valid.
HELD:
(1) Yes, the dismissal of the motion was proper. As can be gleaned from the facts, Judge Gayapa issued the search warrant after
conducting searching questions, and in consideration of the affidavit of witness Enrique Milad.
(2) The information is not valid because it charges two separate crimes: (a) possession of regulated drugs under Section 16, in
relation to Section 20, of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, for their possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug;
and, (b) violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 20 of the law, for their possession of marijuana, a prohibited drug. However,
although only one Information was filed against the appellants, nevertheless, they could be tried and convicted for the crimes alleged
therein and proved by the prosecution.
Strictly speaking, the Information is defective because it charges two crimes and the appellants should have filed a motion to quash the
Information under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court before their arraignment. They failed to do so. Hence, under Rule
120, Section 3 of the said rule, the appellants may be convicted of the crimes charged. The said Rule provides:
SEC. 3. Judgment for two or more offenses. - When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him
the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense.
They are therefore found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the two offenses.
G.R. No. 130026 May 31, 2000
ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO
FACTS:
Two informations were filed against respondent, Magat, charging him with the crime of incestuous perpetrated against his daughter,
Ann Fideli M. Magat At the arraignment, Magat pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser penalty for each case. Complainant's mother,
Ofelia Limpoco Magat, and the public prosecutor agreed with the plea bargain, so he was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for each
case. After three months, however, the cases were revived at the instance of Magat’s daughter and wife on the ground that the penalty
imposed was "too light." As a consequence, Magat was re-arraigned on both Informations where he entered a plea of not guilty. Three
months thereafter, when the trial started, Magat entered anew a plea of guilty therefore, he was sentenced to death for each case.
Because of the sentence of death, the SC had this automatic review of the case wherein Magat contends that the re-arraignment violated
his right against double jeopardy because the case has already been decided and he has already been sentenced to ten years
imprisonment for each case by the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the re-arraignment violates his right against double jeopardy.
HELD:
No. The order of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant on his own plea of guilt is void ab initio on the ground that accused-
appellant's plea is not the plea bargaining contemplated and allowed by law and the rules of procedure. The only instance where a plea
bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when an accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense.
It must be emphasized that accused-appellant did not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty to the rape charges and only bargained
for a lesser penalty. In short, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General, he did not plea bargain but made conditions on the penalty to
be imposed. This is erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense charged, accused-appellant should be sentenced to the penalty
to which he pleaded. In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea bargaining is also void ab initio
and cannot be considered to have attained finality for the simple reason that avoid judgment has no legality from its inception. Thus,
since the judgment of conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy will not lie.
 
G.R. No. 108028 July 30, 1996
CRISTINA M. HERNANDEZ
FACTS:
Respondent, Hernandez, purporting herself as the general manager of Philippine-Thai, a recruitment and placement company, was
charged with the crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale. The trial court convicted respondent as charged.
On appeal, respondent claimed that the prosecution failed to prove one of the essential elements of the offense charged, that she is not
licensed or does not have authority to engage in the business of placement and recruitment. The prosecution, however, avers that the
said element was already admitted by the respondent during the pre-trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4 of Rule 118 -- requiring an agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference to be
reduced in writing and signed by the accused and his counsel before the same may be used in evidence against the accused -- equally
applies to a stipulation of facts made during trial.
HELD:
No, said rules do not apply on stipulation of facts made during trial.
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in open court is automatically reduced into
writing and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused in the form of his
signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: "x x x an attorney who is employed to manage a party's conduct of a
lawsuit x x x has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, x x x which unless
allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive.". In fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who
is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made x x x for the purpose of dispensing with proof of
some fact, x x x they bind the client, whether made during, or even after, the trial."
The foregoing find basis in the general rule that a client is bound by the acts of his counsel who represents him. For all intents and
purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the defense of a case are the acts of his client. The rule extends even to the mistakes and negligence
committed by the lawyer except only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice to the client. No cogent reason exists to make
such exception in this case. It is worth noting that Atty. Ulep, appellant's counsel in the lower court, agreed to the stipulation of facts
proposed by the prosecution not out of mistake nor inadvertence, but obviously because the said stipulation of facts was also in
conformity to defense's theory of the case. It may be recalled that throughout the entire duration of the trial, appellant staunchly denied
ever having engaged in the recruitment business either in her personal capacity or through PhilippineThai. Therefore, it was but logical
to admit that the POEA records show that neither she nor Philippine-Thai was licensed or authorized to recruit workers.
It is true that the rights of an accused during trial are given paramount importance in our laws on criminal procedure. Among the
fundamental rights of the accused is the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. But the right of confrontation
guaranteed and secured to the accused is a personal privilege which may be waived. Thus, in the case of U.S. vs. Anastasio, this Court
deemed as a waiver of the right of confrontation, the admission by the accused that witnesses if present would testify to certain facts
stated in the affidavit of the prosecution.
In the same vein, it may be said that such an admission is a waiver of the right of an accused to present evidence on his behalf. Although
the right to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself for the protection of the accused, this right may be
waived expressly or impliedly. This is in consonance with the doctrine of waiver which recognizes that "x x x everyone has a right to
waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private
capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at
large."
The abovementioned doctrine is squarely applicable to the case at bar. Appellant was never prevented from presenting evidence
contrary to the stipulation of facts. If appellant believed that the testimony of the Chief Licensing Officer of the POEA would be
beneficial to her case, then it is the defense who should have presented him. Her continuous failure to do so during trial was a waiver of
her right to present the pertinent evidence to contradict the stipulation of facts and establish her defense
G. R. No. 146854 April 28, 2004
PASCUAL BALBARONA
FACTS:
Pascual Balbarona was charged of raping Odette M. Balbarona, his daughter before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte, Branch
2. During arraignment, Balbarona pleaded not guilty to the accusation. The prosecution and defense subsequently entered into a
stipulation of facts4 where it was admitted that the victim, Odette M. Balbarona, was appellant’s daughter and was fifteen at the time of
the alleged rape; and that appellant was then living with the victim and his two other daughters. Balbarona was convicted by the RTC
and to suffer the supreme penalty of death because of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim and the
offender is a parent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not stipulation of facts in pre-trial, which was admitted by the accused, can serve as evidence of minority of the victim.
HELD:
While the above-quoted information alleged the concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship to appellant as his daughter,
the jurisprudentially required evidence to prove such circumstance is utterly lacking. Except for the bare testimonies of the parties, no
birth certificate exists in the records to prove that the victim was fifteen (15) years old at the time she was raped by appellant. And yet
there was no showing that her birth certificate was lost or destroyed or was unavailable without the prosecution’s fault. Thus,
substitutionary evidence – the victim’s and appellant’s testimonies – was inadmissible. Much reliance is had on the stipulation of facts
embodied in the trial court’s June 22, 2000 Pre-trial Order whereby appellant admitted to the victim being his daughter and her being
fifteen (15) years old at the time of the rape incident. This Court in People v. Sitao rejected stipulation of facts as a specie of evidence to
prove the qualifying circumstances of rape: Neither can a stipulation of the parties with respect to the victim’s age be considered
sufficient proof of minority. Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death cannot be the subject of stipulation. An
accused cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or his own admissions. This strict rule
is warranted by the seriousness of the penalty of death.

G.R. No. 148000 February 27, 2003

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HON. JUDGE PATERNO V. TAC-AN (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 84, Batangas City)
and MARIO N.
AUSTRIA
FACTS:
On February 22, 2000, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Batangas City against Mario N. Austria for
falsification of public official document.
The trial court set the arraignment of the accused and the initial pretrial on August 1, 2000. Apparently, only three out of eleven
witnesses were notified of said arraignment and pre-trial. The trial court dismissed the case for failure of said witnesses to appear before
it. The public prosecutor asserted that only three were subpoenaed by the trial court. He argued further that the dismissal of the case
was not authorized under Republic Act No. 8493. However the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of witnesses during the pre-trial will amount to the dismissal of the case.
HELD:
Under R.A. 8493, the absence during pre-trial of any witness for the prosecution listed in the Information, whether or not said witness
is the offended party or the complaining witness is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a criminal case. Although under the law, pre-
trial is mandatory in criminal cases, the presence of the private complainant or the complaining witness is however not required. Even
the presence of the accused is not required unless directed by the trial court. It is enough that the accused is represented by his counsel.
Indeed, even if none of the witnesses listed in the information for the State appeared for the pre-trial, the same can and should proceed.
After all, the public prosecutor appeared for the State. The public prosecutor is vested with authority to consider those matters
catalogued in Section 2 of R.A. 8493.
G.R. No. 142848 June 30, 2006
EUGENE C. YU vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
TAGAYTAY CITY, BRANCH 18, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
JOSE M. VELASCO, SEC. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, RODOLFO OCHOA and REYNALDO DE LOS SANTOS A.K.A. "Engine,"
FACTS:
Atty. Eugene Tan, former President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and his driver Eduardo Constantino were abducted by
Pedro Lim, Bonifacio Roxas, Sgt. Edgar Allan Abalon, Mariano Hizon, Eugenio Hizon in Alabang, Muntinlupa, and brought somewhere
in Cavite where they were both shot to death. It was alleged that it was a military operation against communist rebels. An information
was then filed against the said perpetrators but after investigation, the following individuals were included namely, Eugene C. Yu, and
Patricia Lim-Yu as responsible for the commission of the offense. And the prosecution filed a “Petition to Discharge as State Witnesses
and Exclude from the Information accused Ochoa and de los Santos which was granted by the Court but contested by Eugene Yu for
lack of evidence supporting such decision invoking Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is the one applicable despite the provision of Republic
Act No. 6981 in the case at bar.
HELD:
The discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 is only one of the modes for a participant in the
commission of a crime to be a state witness. Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, is another mode of
discharge. The immunity provided under Republic Act No. 6981 is granted by the DOJ while the other is granted by the court. On the
other hand, in the discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981, only compliance with the requirement of Section 14, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is required but not the requirement of Rule 119, Section 17. An amendment of the
information made before plea which excludes some or one of the accused must be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with
notice to the offended party and with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule 110. And the prosecution of crimes appertains to
the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the
prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for
Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the
program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution.  
G.R. No. 140690 June 19, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HON. NAZAR U. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, and
SPO1 Reynaldo Lim de la Victoria
FACTS:
An Information charging the offense of Multiple Murder for the killing of members of the Bucag family in Gingoog City was filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City. Venue of the case was moved to Cagayan de Oro City by virtue of Administrative Order No. 87-
2-244. Thus, the case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18, presided by respondent Judge
Nazar U. Chaves. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and convicted. All the other accused were at large.
Two years later, Felizardo Roxas, was identified as another member of the group. Amended information was filed on to implead Roxas
as a coaccused. He engaged the services of private respondent Miguel Paderanga as his counsel. Roxas was given the opportunity to
adduce evidence in support of his defense, a preliminary investigation was conducted. In his counteraffidavit, Roxas implicated Atty.
Paderanga as the mastermind of the killings. Consequently, the amended information was again amended to include private respondent
Paderanga as one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 86-39.
Trial of the case ensued. At the hearing, the prosecution called Roxas as its first witness. Paderanga objected to the presentation of
Roxas’ testimony on the ground that the presentation of Roxas’ testimony will violate his right against self-incrimination. The trial court
ruled further that before Roxas can be presented as a witness for the prosecution, he must first be discharged as a state witness.
Otherwise put, the prosecution cannot present Roxas as a hostile witness. On June 3, 1993 the trial court issued an order denying the
prosecution’s motion for reconsideration but setting the motion for the discharge of Roxas as state witness for hearing and granted the
private respondent’s motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed the prosecution’s petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution may present the testimony of Felizardo Roxas as hostile witness.
HELD:
This is error. Clearly, the Order dated June 3, 1993 was interlocutory; it did not finally dispose of the case on its merits. As such, the
Order cannot be the proper subject of appeal. It may, however, be assailed in a special civil action for certiorari. Under the Rules of
Court then governing, the petition for certiorari may be filed within a reasonable period.
It is true that an accused cannot be made a hostile witness for the prosecution, for to do so would compel him to be a witness against
himself. However, he may testify against a co-defendant where he has agreed to do so, with full knowledge of his right and the
consequences of his acts. It is not necessary that the court discharges him first as state witness. There is nothing in the rules that says so.
There is a difference between testifying as state witness and testifying as a co-accused. In the first, the proposed state witness has to
qualify as a witness for the state, after which he is discharged as an accused and exempted from prosecution. In the second, the witness
remains an accused and can be made liable should he be found guilty of the criminal offense. The trial court must determine with
certainty, lest their right against self-incrimination be violated.  
G.R. No. 165496 February 12, 2007
HUN HYUNG PARK vs.
EUNG WON CHOI
FACTS:
Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of BP 22,otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing PNB Check No. 0077133
postdated August28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. He
pleaded not guilty.- After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to
which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the
presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.- (2/27/03) The MeTC of Makati, Branch 65 granted the
demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied.- Park appealed the civil aspect of the case
to the RTC of Makati, contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect. The RTC held that while the
evidence presented wasinsufficient to prove Choi’s criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly
granted Park’s appeal and ordered Choi to pay himP1,875,000 with legal interest.- Upon Choi’s motion for reconsideration, however,
the RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC “for further proceedings, so that Choi may adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case.” Park’s motion for reconsideration of the remand of the case having been denied, he elevated the
case to the CA which dismissed his petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent has a right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case in view of his demurrer.
HELD:
Yes. In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the
demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the
quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the
same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond
reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same
evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of
the case generally proceed. The only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is
when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as
to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue.- In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case
without any finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Choi did not assail the RTC order of
remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand.
Park posits that Choi waived his right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case (1) when the grant of the demurrer was reversed
on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33, and (2) when respondent orally opposed petitioner’s motion for reconsideration pleading that
proceedings with respect to the civil aspect of the case continue.- Petitioner’s citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect. Where a court
has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial
jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires it to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal
case being the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of
Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit
G.R. No. 132081 November 26, 2002
JOEL M. SANVICENTE vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of Dennis Wong.
At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
Petitioner begged leave to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the trial court. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion To
Dismiss (On Demurrer to Evidence), based on the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive identification of the accused is a fatal
omission warranting dismissal; (2) prosecution’s evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent.
The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case together with the civil aspect for insufficiency of evidence. The prosecution
filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but to no avail. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution may appeal the trial court’s resolution granting demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the
charges against him without violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.
HELD:
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In resolving
accused’s demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain
the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not be
disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an
acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes
an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars
a plea of double jeopardy.
G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986
SATURNINA GALMAN, et. al. vs.
SANDIGAYNBAYAN, et. al.
FACTS:
A number of members of the Philippine Military were charged for the assassination of Former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. The
fact finding committee created to determine what really occurred during that faithful day rejected the military’s version that Aquino was
killed by a lone gunman, Galman. The investigation of the board revealed that only the soldiers in the staircase with Aquino could have
shot him.
Criminal charges were filed before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan, allegedy operating under the control of President Marcos
acquitted all the accused of the crime charged.
The private respondents is now questioning the charges against them arising from the same offense that were already decided by the
Sandiganbayan alleging that the continuance of the proceedings would amount to a violation of their right against double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.
HELD:
None, Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by
public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely
disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to
be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the
people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No
double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds
nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.
G.R. No. 128587 March 16, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Manila, and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN
FACTS:
Three separate informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang for Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, Violation of the COMELEC Gun
Ban, and Illegal Possession of Firearms. During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the Informations and
instead interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives. Thus, the trial court
ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for him. Thereafter, joint trial of the three consolidated cases followed.
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion, accused Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which
to file his intended Demurrer to Evidence. Then, the prosecution filed a Manifestation to the effect that it had rested its case only in so
far as the charge for Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act is concerned, and not as regards the other two cases.
Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three cases against him for lack of a
valid arrest and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecution’s evidence against him. Herein respondent judge granted
Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitted him of all charges for lack of evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits and will amount to an acquittal.
HELD:
An order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally,
any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy hence; the
finality-of-acquittal rule is stressed. The exception to this rule is when the prosecution was denied due process of law. Such was not
present in this case.
Petitioner also used the wrong remedy before the Supreme Court; hence this petition is outrightly dismissible. The Court cannot reverse
the assailed dismissal order of the trial court by appeal without violating private respondent’s right against double jeopardy.
G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD O. SARCIA
FACTS:
Sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doña Tomasa, Municipality of
Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
and unchaste design, and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with [AAA], who was then 6 years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.8 Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim AAA; her minor cousin; her father; and Dr.
Joana Manatlao, the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. The defense presented the accusedappellant himself, who
vehemently denied committing the crimes imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court at
Guinobatan, Albay. On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape
and imposed the penalty penalty of DEATH, and to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount of (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2)
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and (3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court gravely erred in not acquitting the accused Richard Sarcia.
HELD:
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and
weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the accused.
Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed.
Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses. The date is not
an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of
commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated.
 
G.R. No. 186227 July 20, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA
FACTS:
Mantalaba a 17-year old drug pusher was arrested after a buy-bust operation. He was found guilty of violation of RA9165. It must be
noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said
appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth
Welfare Code and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, the laws that were applicable at the
time of the promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344
which provide for its retroactive application. The CA also did not suspend the sentence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mantalaba is entitled to suspended sentence.
HELD:
Mantalaba, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344
as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the
CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his
notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having
been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions
of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to
the provisions of
Article 192 of P.D. 603
G.R. No. 185960 January 25, 2012
MARINO B. ICDANG vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Marino B. Icdang, Regional Director of the Office for Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC) Region XII in Cotabato City, was charged
with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds and for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
SB’s Second Division rendered its decision convicting petitioner of malversation and acquitting him from violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019.
Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated when his counsel failed to assist him during the promulgation of the
judgment. He faults the Sandiganbayan for proceeding with the promulgation despite the petitioner not then being assisted by his
counsel, and being a layman he is not familiar with court processes and procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of the accused to due process was violated when his counsel failed to assist him during the promulgation of the
judgment.
HELD:
No. The right of the accused to due process was not violated. There is nothing in the rules that requires the presence of counsel for the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction to be valid. While notice must be served on both accused and his counsel, the latter’s
absence during the promulgation of judgment would not affect the validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right of the
accused on the merits was prejudiced by such absence of his counsel when the sentence was pronounced
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment. -- The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the
court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his
counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of
court.
G.R. No. L-24529 February 17, 1968
EDUARDO JIMENEZ vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUDGE PEDRO NAVARRO, Court of
First Instance of Rizal
FACTS:
Eduardo Jimenez, together with others, was charged with homicide in an information before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The
case was heard and tried before Judge Eulogio Mencias. The decision prepared and signed by Judge Mencias was delivered to the clerk
of court on January 16, 1965. On the same date the clerk of court issued and served notice on the petitioner to appear in court on
January 21, 1965 for the promulgation of the sentence. In view that January 21 was declared by the President a special holiday, the
promulgation of the decision could not be carried out on that day. On January 21, 1965, Judge Eulogio Mencias had reached the age of
70 and was retired on that day from the bench. Respondent Judge Pedro Navarro was immediately designated to take the place of Judge
Mencias. The former judge ordered that the sentence be promulgated on January 29, 1965, but for some reason, it was postponed to
March 1, 1965.
Jimenez filed a motion to set aside decision and promulgation thereof, on the following grounds: (a) "That the case was heard and tried
by the Hon. Eulogio Mencias and judgment was rendered by him before he retired on January 21, 1965, having reached the age of 70
years"; and (b) "That said judgment cannot be validly promulgated since it is no longer the official act of a judge, either de jure or de
facto."
ISSUE:
Whether or not judgment may validly be promulgated despite the fact that the judge who rendered it is no longer the judge at the time
of its promulgation.
HELD:
No. The decision of the judge may be promulgated even without his presence, as long as he is still a judge of that court (Luna v.
Rodriguez, 37, Phil. 186; Garchitorena v. Criscini 37 Phil. 675; Barredo v. Commission on Elections, 45 O.G. 4457; People v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-9111-9113, Aug. 28, 1956; People v. So, G.R. No. L-8732, July 30, 1957).
In the present case, what we have is not merely physical absence of the judge who penned the decision, but the cessation of termination
of his incumbency as such judge. In the case of People v. Bonifacio So y Ortega, (G.R. No. L-8732) this Court ruled:
It is well-settled that to be binding a judgment must be duly signed, and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed
it.
In criminal proceedings the Rules are more explicit. They require the judgment to be promulgated by reading the judgment or sentence
in the presence of the defendant and the judge of the court who has rendered it; and although it is true that it may be read by the clerk
"when the judge is absent or outside the province," it is implied that it may be read, provided he is still the judge therein.
Here, in the present case, when the notice for the promulgation of the decision was sent out, the judge who signed the decision was no
longer the judge of the court, and no copy of the judgment of acquittal was delivered to the appellants. With more reasons, therefore, is
there no judgment validly entered in this case.  
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1417 May 27, 2004
PETER BEJARASCO, JR. and ISABELITA BEJARASCO
vs.
JUDGE ALFREDO D. BUENCONSEJO, Municipal Trial Court, Dalaguete,
Cebu, SECUNDINO PIEDAD, Clerk of Court, and LEONISA GONZALES, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court, Argao, Cebu
FACTS:
The complainants were charged with grave threats and grave oral defamation before the MTC of Dalaguete, Cebu. According to the
complainants, the respondent judge inhibited himself from the said cases on the ground of delicadeza and that Executive Judge
Epifanio Llanos of the Regional Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, designated Judge Palmacio Calderon of the MTC of Argao, Cebu,
to hear and try the said cases. Judge Calderon conducted continuous and simultaneous trials, and the cases were submitted for decision
on June 29, 1999. Unfortunately, Judge Calderon died on December 31, 1999 without having rendered judgment on the said cases.
The complainants were surprise to receive a notice from the MTC of Argao Cebu, that their cases had been set for promulgation on May
15, 2000 by the respondent judge, who was then designated as presiding judge of the said court.
The complainants’ counsel argued that the respondent judge could not promulgate the decision since he had earlier inhibited himself
from trying the said cases, and that the judge who actually heard the case had already died. The respondent judge, however, ignored
these arguments and proceeded with the promulgation of the Decision convicting the complainants.
The complainants filed a petition for certiorari and while it was pending, investigated the signatures of the late Judge Calderon in his
decisions with the PNP Crime Laboratory. It was found out that the signatures were forged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment is valid considering the decision promulgated was penned by another judge.
HELD:
A judgment, to be valid, must have been personally and directly prepared by the judge, and duly signed by him. Corollary, a decision or
resolution of the court becomes such, for all legal intents and purposes, only from the moment of its promulgation. Promulgation of
judgment, in turn, signifies that on the date it was made, the judge or judges who signed the decision continued to support it. If at the
time of the promulgation, a judge or member of a collegiate court has already vacated his office, his vote is automatically withdrawn. In
criminal cases, promulgation of judgment is made by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was
rendered. Judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court only when the judge is absent or outside the province or city.
It is clear then, that a judge who takes over the sala of another judge who died during office cannot validly promulgate a decision
penned by the latter. In fact, decisions promulgated after the judge who penned the same had been appointed to and qualified in
another office are null and void. To be binding, a judgment must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge
whose signature appears thereon. In single courts like the regional trial courts and the municipal trial courts, a decision may no longer
be promulgated after the ponente has vacated his office.
Granting arguendo that the decision in the criminal cases was indeed signed by the late Judge Calderon, respondent Judge Buenconsejo
had no authority to promulgate the decision. Judge Calderon ceased to be the judge of that court, thus, the judgment which he signed
cannot be promulgated by another judge. Any judgment or decision is valid and binding only if both [were] penned and promulgated by
the judge during his incumbency.
Considering that the full records of the case were available for perusal, another judge could pen the decision even if he did not hear the
case in its entirety. However, since Judge Buenconsejo previously inhibited himself from hearing the criminal cases, he should have
referred the matter to his Executive Judge and assigned another judge to render judgment thereon.
G.R. No. 182748 December 13, 2011
ARNEL COLINARES vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
RTC rendered judgment finding Arnel guilty of frustrated homicide but since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law
was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent
reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the award for lost income in the
absence of evidence to support it.
Assuming Arnel committed only the lesser crime of attempted homicide with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for probation upon
remand of the case to the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he may still apply for probation having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.

HELD:
Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him
for frustrated homicide.
Probation is a mere privilege granted by the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968)
provides: “That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction.” Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from
applying for probation.
It is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals “from the judgment of conviction” is disqualified from availing himself
of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for
frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four
months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed
himself of the right had the RTC done right by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was
not probationable.
G.R. No. L-38581 March 31, 1976
LORENZO JOSE vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Lorenzo Jose was convicted of illegal possession of explosives and seeks a new trial which was denied to him by the CFI of Pampanga
and respondent CA.
Petitioner filed a motion praying that the case be reopened to permit him to present, pursuant to a reservation he had made in the
course of the trial, a permit to possess the handgrenade in question. Trial Court denied the motion. When elevated to the CA, the
Appellate Court also denied the same.
Petitioner cites certain peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case before the Supreme Court which may be classified as exceptional
enough to warrant a new trial if only to afford him an opportunity to establish his innocence of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a new trial may grant on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
HELD:
It is indeed an established rule that for a new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that (a)
the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) it must go to
the merits as ought to produce a different result if admitted.
The Court held that the circumstances presented by petitioner justify a reopening of petitioner's case to afford him the opportunity of
producing exculpating exculpating evidence. An outright acquittal from this Court which petitioner seeks as an alternative relief is not
As correctly stressed by the Solicitor General, the People is to be given the chance of examining the documentary sought to be produced,
and of cross-examining the persons who executed the same, as well as the accused himself, now petitioner, on his explanation for the
non-production of the of the evidence during the trial.
 
G.R. Nos. 96027-28 March 08, 2005
BRIG. GEN. LUTHER A. CUSTODIO HYPERLINK, CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, 2nd LT. JESUS D. CASTRO, SGT. CLARO L. LAT,
SGT.
ARNULFO B. DE MESA, C1C ROGELIO B. MORENO, C1C MARIO E. LAZAGA, SGT. FILOMENO D. MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C.
DE GUZMAN, SGT. ERNESTO M. MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M.
DESOLONG, A1C CORDOVA G. ESTELO, MSGT. PABLO S. MARTINEZ,
SGT. RUBEN AQUINO, SGT. ARNULFO ARTATES, A1C FELIZARDO
TARAN vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petitioners were members of the military who acted as Senator
Aquino’s security detail upon his arrival in Manila from his three-year sojourn in the United States. They were charged, together with
several other members of the military, before the Sandiganbayan for the killing of Senator Aquino who was fatally shot as he was
coming down from the aircraft of China Airlines at the Manila International Airport. Petitioners were also indicted for the killing of
Rolando Galman who was also gunned down at the airport tarmac.
The Sandiganbayan acquitted all the accused which includes the petitioners in its decision on December 2, 1985, however the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan were later found by the Supreme Court to be a sham trial thus nullified said proceedings, as well
as the judgment of acquittal, and ordered a re-trial of the cases.
A re-trial ensued before the Sandiganbayan. In its decision dated September 28, 1990, the Sandiganbayan, while acquitting the other
accused, found the petitioners guilty as principals of the crime of murder of Senator Aquino and Rolando Galman. The judgment
became final after the Supreme Court denied petitioners’ petition for review of the Sandiganbayan decision for failure to show reversible
error in the questioned decision, as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to allow the re-opening of the cases and the holding of a third trial to determine the
circumstances surrounding the death of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman invoking the existence of newly discovered
pieces of evidence that were not available during the second trial which could have altered the judgment of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not new-trial be granted because of newly discovered evidence.
HELD:
Before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence was discovered
after trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it
would probably change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly discovered evidence could have been very well presented during
the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered newly discovered.
The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in
fact a “newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence.” The question of whether evidence is newly
discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it
have been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance. We have held that in order that a particular
piece of evidence may be properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the
evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is
essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had
nonetheless failed to secure it.
The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exercised due diligence depends upon the
particular circumstances of each case. Nonetheless; it has been observed that the phrase is often equated with “reasonable promptness
to avoid prejudice to the defendant.” In other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good faith
component. The movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidence in support of the motion; he must
act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the
evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances and the facts known to him.
Applying the foregoing tests, we find that petitioners’ purported evidence does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that would
justify the re-opening of the case and the holding of a third trial.
The report of the forensic group may not be considered as newly discovered evidence as petitioners failed to show that it was impossible
for them to secure an independent forensic study of the physical evidence during the trial of the double murder case. It appears from
their report that the forensic group used the same physical and testimonial evidence proffered during the trial, but made their own
analysis and interpretation of said evidence.
The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by the defense during the trial of the double murder case.
Clearly, the report is not newly discovered, but rather recently sought, which is not allowed by the Rules. If at all, it only serves to
discredit the version of the prosecution which had already been weighed and assessed, and thereafter upheld by the Sandiganbayan.  
G.R. No. 128986 June 21, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CASAN MAQUILING
FACTS:
Iligan City Fiscal Ulysses V. Lagcao charged Respondent Casan Maquiling with homicide and frustrated homicide. Acting on the
petition of the private complainants, the Department of Justice subsequently directed the upgrading of the charge of homicide to
murder. To both charges, Respondent Maquiling, assisted by Counsel de Parte Moises Dalisay Jr., entered a plea of not guilty upon his
arraignment on June 5, 1989.
The trial court convicted private respondent of homicide and serious physical injuries.
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals accepted the claim of self-defense. The appellate court also noted various “flaws and
inconsistencies” in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, in effect strengthening the version set forth by the accused. It held, to
the mind of the court, the discrepancies as to the manner the accused killed the deceased are material. Irreconcilable and unexplained
contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution cast doubt on the guilt of the accused and such contradictory statements will not
sustain a judgment of conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal made by the Solicitor General placed the accused in double jeopardy and whether or not it is valid if it does.
HELD:
Although the rule states that any party may appeal from a final judgment or order, the right of the people to appeal is expressly made
subject to the proviso that such an appeal should not place the accused in double jeopardy. Consistently with this principle, it has been
held that the constitutional mandate that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense prohibits not only
a subsequent prosecution in a new and independent cause but also extends to an appeal in the same case by the prosecution after
jeopardy had attached, thereby in effect viewing such appeal as presenting a new and separate jeopardy repugnant to the fundamental
law’s provision against double jeopardy.
Ordinarily, the judicial recourse of an aggrieved party is to appeal the trial court's judgment to the Court of Appeals and thereafter, to
the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In such cases, this tribunal is limited to the
determination of whether the lower court committed reversible errors or, in other words, mistakes of judgment. A direct review by the
Supreme Court is the normal recourse of the accused, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.  
G.R. No. 103275 June 15, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HONORABLE RODOLFO M. BELLAFLOR, Assisting Judge, Branch 28, Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City, and REUBEN ALBAÑO
FACTS:
Ruben Albano was charged with the crime of arson. Upon arraignment, private respondent pleaded "not guilty". Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued and the parties rested their case before Judge Fortun.
Judge Fortun promulgated his decision convicting Albano of the crime of arson. Albano moved for the reconsideration of the said
decision and was granted and thus acquitted of the crime charged. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied. Private respondent argues that the resolution acquitting him of the offense charged has become final and executory and a
reconsideration thereof would place him under double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal by the petitioner will place the accused in double jeopardy and thus invalidates the appeal.
HELD:
Generally, protection against double jeopardy is not available where the dismissal of the case was effected at the instance of the accused.
And there are only two instances where double jeopardy will attach notwithstanding the fact the case was dismissed with the express
consent of the accused. The first is where the ground for the dismissal is insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution and the second
is where the criminal proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial (People v.
Quizada, 160 SCRA 516 [1988]). None exists in the case at bar.
Admittedly, private respondent had moved for the dismissal of the criminal case filed against him and therefore, the protective mantle
of double jeopardy does not cover him.
Secondly, private respondent cannot successfully seek refuge in the assailed resolution of respondent judge. For one thing, it was an
empty judgment of acquittal — a bare adjudication that private respondent is not guilty of the offense charged anchored on the mere
supposition that the decision rendered by Judge Fortun was a nullity. Indeed, respondent judge acquitted private respondent without
expressing the facts and the law on which it is based, as required by Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
G.R. No. 43659 December 21, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON and FEDERICO DE
GUZMAN
FACTS:
The case at bar is a special civil action for Certiorari assailing the order rendered by Judge Villalon, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order of dismissal.
Based on the Court' s records, about the antecedent facts which resulted to the order issued by the respondent judge, complainant
Mariano Carrera and his brother, Severo Carrera, are co-owners of a parcel of land located at Barrio Buenlag, Binmaley, Pangasinan.
Complainants, allegedly executed a special power of attorney before Notary Public Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr., naming private respondent
Federico de Guzman as his lawful attorney-in-fact. private respondent mortgaged the parcel of land with the People's Bank and Trust
Company in Dagupan City using the said special power of attorney, and was able to obtain the amount of P8,500.00 as a loan from the
mortgagee bank. Both the special power of attorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan.
On March 29, 1974, Criminal Case No. D-868 for estafa thru falsification of a public document was filed against private respondent. A
motion to dismiss was filed and later on granted by the respondent judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal by the prosecution is barred by reason of double jeopardy.
HELD:
The bar of double jeopardy is not involved in the present recourse. As enunciated in People vs. City Court of Manila, etc., et al.:"As a
general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or information (Section 9, Rule 113).
However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute double
jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal
or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is
purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant."
G.R. No. 170979 February 9, 2011
JUDITH YU vs.
HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The petitioner, Judith Yu, was charged and convicted with the crime of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Fourteen days
after her conviction, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial before the Regional Trial Court, alleging that she has discovered new and
material evidence that will exculpate her from the crime of estafa. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Thereafter, using the ruling on Neypes vs Court of Appeals, petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court alleging that
she had a fresh period of 15 days to perfect her appeal upon receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s denial of her motion for new trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fresh period rule is applicable in the case at bar.
HELD:
The raison d’être for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as
to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period
to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply
to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO
VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRSOF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely:
FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON.
ANTONIO N.
ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro
FACTS:
 Neypes et. al. filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary
injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Oriental Mindoro, against respondents.
In the course of the proceedings the parties filed various motions with the trial court. The court dismissed the petitioners’ complaint on
February 12, 1998 and petitioners allegedly received a copy thereof on March 3, 1998 and on the 15th day thereafter, March 18, 1998,
filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court dismissed the motion for reconsideration and was received by the
petitioners on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners
on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.
Petitioners argued that the 15-day period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final
order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days
had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It
ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998
order dismissing their complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time.
HELD:
The petitioners filed their notice on time. The appeal is within the 15 day period from notice of final judgment or final order appealed
from within which the appeal should be filed.
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the
15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for
reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled that petitioners,
having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal
upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of
15 days from receipt of the “final order” or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of
the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
The Court thus holds that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22,
1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration).  
G.R. No. 141986 July 11, 2002 NEPLUM, INC. vs.
EVELYN V. ORBESO
FACTS:
The trial court promulgated its judgment acquitting Neplum of the crime of estafa on October 29, 1999.
On 12 November 1999, the petitioner, through the private prosecutor, received its copy of the Judgment. On 29 November 1999,
petitioner filed a motion for Reconsideration (Civil Aspect) of the Judgment, considering that 27 November 1999 was a Saturday,
petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration on 29 November 1999.
On 28 January 2000, a Friday, petitioner received its copy of the 24 January 2000 Order of the Trial Court denying for lack of merit
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. On 31 January 2000, a Monday, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from the Judgment. On the
same day, petitioner filed by registered mail its 28 January 2000 Amended Notice of Appeal.
On 17 February 2000, the Trial Court issued its Challenged Order, which petitioner received through the private prosecutor on 22
February 2000, denying due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of Appeal. It accepted respondent’s arguments
that the Judgment from which the appeal was being taken had become final, because the Notice of Appeal and the Amended Notice of
Appeal were filed beyond the reglementary period. The 15-day period was counted by the trial court from the promulgation of the
Decision sought to be reviewed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 15-day period to be counted from the promulgation of the decision to the accused or from the time a copy thereof is
served on the offended party.
HELD:
It is from the time the offended party had actual or constructive knowledge of the judgment, whether it be during its promulgation or as
a consequence of the service of the notice of the decision.
Section 6, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides:
“SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or
order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is
filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the accused or his counsel.”
The italicized portion of the provision uses the conjunctive “or” in providing for the reckoning period within which an appeal must be
taken. It shall be counted from the promulgation or the notice of the judgment or order.
It is petitioner’s assertion that “the parties would always need a written reference or a copy of the judgment x x x to intelligently
examine and consider the judgment from which an appeal will be taken.” Thus, it concludes that the 15-day period for filing a notice of
appeal must be counted from the time the losing party actually receives a copy of the decision or order. Petitioner ratiocinates that it
“could not be expected to capture or memorize all the material details of the judgment during the promulgation thereof.” It likewise
poses the question: “why require all proceedings in court to be recorded in writing if the parties thereto would not be allowed the benefit
of utilizing these written [documents]?”
We clarify. Had it been the accused who appealed, we could have easily ruled that the reckoning period for filing an appeal be counted
from the promulgation of the judgment. In People v. Tamani, the Court was confronted with the question of when to count the period
within which the accused must appeal the criminal conviction. Answered the Court:
“The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly
served on appellant’s counsel by registered mail is not well-taken. The word ‘promulgation’ in section 6 should be construed as referring
to ‘judgment’, while the word ‘notice’ should be construed as referring to ‘order’.”
The interpretation in that case was very clear. The period for appeal was to be counted from the date of promulgation of the decision.
Text writers are in agreement with this interpretation.
In an earlier case, this Court explained the same interpretation in this wise:
“It may, therefore, be stated that one who desires to appeal in a criminal case must file a notice to that effect within fifteen days from the
date the decision is announced or promulgated to the defendant. And this can be done by the court either by announcing the judgment
in open court as was done in this case, or by promulgating the judgment in the manner set forth in [S]ection 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court.”
Clear as those interpretations may have been, they cannot be applied to the case at bar, because in those instances it was the accused
who appealed, while here we are confronted with the offended party’s appeal of the civil aspect only. Thus, the question arises whether
the accused-appellant’s period for appeal, as construed in the cited cases, is the same as that for the private offended party. The Court
answer in the negative.
G.R. No. 125306 December 11, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
CAFGU FRANCISCO BALTAR, JR., CAFGU PRIMO VILLANUEVA alias
“ESPOK” and ROLLY BALTAR, CAFGU PRIMO VILLANUEVA alias
“ESPOK”,
FACTS:
The trial court determined that the three accused, Baltar, Villanueva and Baltar, acted in conspiracy in the killing of Mariano Celino, Jr.
From said decision, only Primo Villanueva has appealed. He prays for the reversal of said judgment,
In this appeal, Primo Villanueva contends that the trial court erred in finding that he conspired with Rolly Baltar and Francisco Baltar,
Jr. when the latter shot and killed Mariano Celino, Jr.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused who did not appeal may be benefited by the judgment of the appellate court.
HELD:
The accused who did not appeal may be benefited by the judgment of the appellate court insofar as it is favorable and applicable to him.
In view of this conclusion that the crime committed and proved is homicide only and not murder, the SC discuss its consequences with
respect to the criminal liability of the two other accused, namely Francisco Baltar, Jr. and Rolly Baltar, who did not interpose an appeal.
Previously, the sentence imposed upon the accused who did not appeal became final, while that of his co-accused who appealed was
stayed. For it had been held that decisions of the appellate court did not in any way affect the sentence imposed upon the accused who
did not appeal, even if the appellants were subsequently acquitted or their sentences increased or reduced. Not having appealed, it was
previously held that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction over his case.
G.R. No. 147524 June 20, 2006
SEGUNDO S. LIM vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and CIRSE "CHOY" TORRALBA
FACTS:
Petitioner Lim and co-accused Boy "BG" Guingguing were convicted of libel in the RTC. A petition for review was filed by Lim but was
denied.
Meanwhile, Guingguing also filed a petition for review. The Court promulgated a judgment of acquittal in favor of Guingguing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should benefit from Guingguing’s acquittal.
HELD:
Court applied to the accused, who appealed from their judgment of conviction whose conviction became final and executor, the
favorable judgment in favor of their co-accused. The Court notes that the Decision dated September 30, 2005 in G.R. No. 128959 stated,
"the verdict of guilt with respect to Lim [herein petitioner] had already become final and executory." In any event, the Court cannot see
why a different treatment should be given to petitioner, given that the judgment is favorable to him and considering further that the
Court’s finding in its Decision dated September 30, 2005 specifically stated that "the publication of the subject advertisement by
petitioner and Lim cannot be deemed by this Court to have been done with actual malice."
The nature of appeal throws open all contents of the case. Insofar as it has become favorable to those who did not appeal, it shall affect
them. But if the judgment obtained in the appeal is not favorable to those who did not appeal, it shall not affect them.
G.R. Nos. 131799-801 February 23, 2004
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
FELICIANO ULIT y TAMPOY
FACTS:
Feliciano Ulit had sexual intercourse with his 10-year old niece in numerous occasions. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty so the
presentation of evidence started. After the prosecution rested its case, Ulit changed his plea of not guilty to guilty and manifested that he
would no longer adduce any evidence in his defense because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
crimes charged. The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of death for each count of rape. Ulit did not appeal from the decision so in view of the trial court’s imposition of the death
penalty, the said cases were brought to this Court on automatic appeal. Ulit’s sole contention is that the trial court erred in sentencing
him with a death penalty despite his admission of guilt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an automatic appeal to the SC is limited to the assigned errors that the accused presented.
HELD:
No. The appeal in a criminal case is a review de novo and the court is not limited to the assigned errors. An appeal thus opens the whole
case for review, and the appellate tribunal may consider and correct errors though unassigned and even reverse the decision of the trial
court on the grounds other than those the parties raised as errors.
Given this, even if Ulit only assigned one error, the Court ruled on other issues regarding the case, such as: the validity of the change of
his plea from not guilty to guilty; the strength of the evidence of the prosecution regarding the alleged rapes; the sufficiency of evidence
adduced by the prosecution; and the guilt of Ulit in the two crimes of rape.
G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004 PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS:
Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide,
multiple physical injuries and damage to property. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory. Accused
has jumped bail and remained at large. It is worth to mention that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of
appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by petitioner filed a notice of appeal which
was denied by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction
independently of the accused.
HELD:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat
the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability.
Both the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single
decision that has become final and executory.
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:
"Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy."
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government may do so only if the accused would not
thereby be placed in double jeopardy. Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have been
given a more severe penalty. On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil
liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to appeal as
much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them. As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120
of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or
when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has
applied for probation."
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have
abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and executory.  
G.R. No. 159116 September 30, 2009
SPS. NESTOR and FELICIDAD DADIZON
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPS. DOMINADOR and ELSA MOCORRO
FACTS:
The Mocorros spouses filed a case in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Naval, Biliran against the Dadizons to recover a parcel of land
with an area of 78 square meters and to cancel the latter's tax declaration.
Because of a judgment unfavorable to them, the Dadizons filed a notice of appeal. The Mocorros moved to dismiss the Dadizons' appeal
on the ground that the mode of appeal they had adopted was erroneous. Agreeing with the Mocorros, the CA dismissed the Dadizons'
appeal through its resolution dated February 26, 2003.11 The CA denied the Dadizons' motion for reconsideration on June 30, 2003.
Hence, the Dadizons have come to the Supreme Court to assail the dismissal of their appeal and the denial of their motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the mode appeal of the Dadizon’s was erroneous.
HELD:
The mode of appeal from the decision of the RTC via a notice of appeal adopted by the Dadizons was undoubtedly wrong. They should
have filed a Petition for Review in accordance with Rule 42, Rules of Court, which was the correct mode of appeal, considering that the
RTC had rendered the decision in question in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 169519 July 17, 2009
IRENORIO B. BALABA vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Irenorio Balaba was the assistant Municipal Treasurer of Guidulman, Bohol. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged Balaba with
Malversation of Funds. On 9 December 2002, the trial court found Balaba guilty.
On 14 January 2003, Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal, where he indicated that he would file his appeal before the Court of Appeals.
In its 15 December 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed Balaba’s appeal. The Court of Appeals declared that it had no
jurisdiction to act on the appeal because the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case.
On 27 January 2005, Balaba filed a Motion for Reconsideration and asked that he be allowed to pursue his appeal before the proper
court, the Sandiganbayan. Balaba claims that it was due to inadvertence that the notice of appeal was filed before the Court of Appeals
instead of the Sandiganbayan. Balaba adds that his appeal was dismissed on purely technical grounds. Balaba asks the Court to relax
the rules to afford him an opportunity to correct the error and fully ventilate his appeal on the merits. The Court of Appeals denied
Balaba’s motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal instead of certifying the case to the proper court.
HELD:
Upon Balaba’s conviction by the trial court, his remedy should have been an appeal to the Sandiganbayan. RA 8249 states that the
Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of the regional trial courts
whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
In Melencion v. Sandiganbayan “An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court
but shall be dismissed outright.”
In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the expiration of the period to appeal. The trial court
promulgated its Decision on 9 December 2002. Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14 January 2003. The Court of Appeals issued the
Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on 27 January 2005, clearly
beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of the trial court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when
it dismissed Balaba’s appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 173990 October 27, 2009
EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, and EDWARD RANADA
FACTS:
An Information was filed before the RTC of Davao City against Estarija, then Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority, for
violating Section 3, paragraph b of Republic Act No. 3019 and the RTC rendered a decision convicting Estarija of the crime charged and
imposing upon him a straight penalty of seven years. Estarija filed his notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
findings of RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the notice of appeal is correctly appealed before the Court of Appeals.
HELD:
Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249 reads: In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial
courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. It is manifest from
the above provision that the decisions of the Regional Trial Court -- convicting an accused who occupies a position lower than that with
salary grade 27 or those not otherwise covered by the enumeration of certain public officers in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606
as amended by Republic Act No. 8249 are to be appealed exclusively to the Sandiganbayan. Time and again, it has been held that the
right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail himself of the same must comply with the requirements
of the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost. In the instant case, instead of appealing his conviction to the Sandiganbayan,
Estarija erroneously filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, in utter disregard of paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249.
This fatal flaw committed by Estarija did not toll the running of the period for him to perfect his appeal to the Sandiganbayan. Because
of Estarija’s failure to perfect his appeal to the Sandiganbayan within the period granted therefor, the Decision of the RTC convicting
him of violating Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 has thus become final and executory.
G.R. No. 188630 February 23, 2011
FILOMENA L. VILLANUEVA vs.
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petra Martinez filed a civil action for collection of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court against Armando Villanueva, the
husband of the Assistant Regional Director of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) Filomena Villanueva. The trial court
declared Armnado in default and ordered him to pay the amount of P 1, 107, 210.90 plus fine and interest. Armando filed a petition for
prohibition before the Court of Appeals alleging that he should not be made to pay said loan as the same had long been fully paid as
shown by an official receipt evidencing his payment. The CA nullified the RTC decision on the ground that the obligation has been
settled.
Martinez filed an administrative case with the Office of the
Ombudsman charging petitioner Filomena Villanueva with violation of Sec. 7
(d) in relation to Sec. 11 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A No. 6713). The
Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct and imposed the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of
benefits and disqualification for reemployment in the government service. The Ombudsman also denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The petitioner then filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. The Court found merits in the petition and reversed and set
aside the assailed decision of the Ombudsman. Martinez filed a motion for reconsideration while the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus
Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration to which the Court of appeals denied both motions.
Aside from those cases, a criminal case was filed against the petitioner for violation of Sec. 2 (d) of R.A No. 6713 before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Claveria Cagayan (MCTC). MCTC promulgated its decision convicting petitioner and imposing penalty of 5 years
imprisonment and disqualification to hold office. Petitioner appealed the MCTC decision to the RTC of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan but the
RTC affirmed the MCTC decision. Petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation and Motion contending that the Sandiganbayan had exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over the petition. The petitioner argued that the issue of jurisdiction could not be raised for the first time before the CA in
view of the failure of the Provincial Prosecutor to bring out the same when she appealed the MCTC Decision to the RTC. She claimed to
have availed of the remedy provided under Rule 122 of the Rules of Court in good faith. The CA agreed with the OSG and the CA
dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Solicitor General has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the petition.
HELD:
In this case, the CA was correct in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Section 2 of Rule 50 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court
provides, among others, that “an appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but
shall be dismissed outright.” This has been the consistent holding of the Court.
Records also bear out that the earlier civil case against Armando, the petitioner’s husband, was also finally resolved in his favor since
the obligation had already been settled. This civil case is also intertwined with the administrative and criminal cases filed against
petitioner. Thus, it appears that the filing of the criminal case against petitioner was merely an afterthought considering that the civil
case against her husband and the administrative case against her were resolved in the couple’s favor.
Dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is not encouraged. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid and
technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. Judicial action must be guided by the
principle that a party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for
him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. When a rigid application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation.
With the dismissal of the administrative case against the petitioner, it is in the interest of substantial justice that the criminal case
against her should be reviewed on the merits by the proper tribunal following the appropriate procedures under the rules. Our legal
culture requires the presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of his
life, liberty or even property, not merely substantial evidence. It is not enough that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or a
probability of guilt. The primary consideration is whether the guilt of an accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
 
G.R. No. 144590 February 7, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ROMEO F. PARADEZA
FACTS:
On June 7, 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, was found the appellant, Romeo F. Paradeza guilty of rape and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellant then filed his notice of appeal anchored on the sole assignment of
error that the Court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused- appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the Public Attorney’s Office, as counsel for appellant, filed a motion to withdraw his appeal. The Brief for the appellant was
filed on June 1, 2001, and the Brief for the appellee was filed on November 20, 2001. The Office of the Solicitor General, in its comment
seeking stiffer penalties, pointed out that since the appellee as well as the appellant already filed briefs, under the Rules of Court, the
approval of appellant’s motion to withdraw his appeal is now a matter of discretion on the part of the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court could grant the motion to withdraw the appeal filed by accused-appellant.
HELD:
An appeal is a "resort to a superior (i.e. appellate) court to review the decision of an inferior (i.e. trial) court or administrative agency."
As a statutory remedy to correct errors which might have been committed by the lower court, the object of an appeal is simply and solely
the protection of the accused. The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and is not a natural right or part of the due process. Like
any other right or privilege, it may be waived.
A person accused and convicted of an offense may withdraw his appeal not only because he is guilty as charged. It could be due to his
prior erroneous perception of the applicable provision of law, or of the decision itself. He may feel that to seek a pardon might be the
better and faster remedy. Regardless of his reasons, in our view, he is within his rights to seek the withdrawal of his appeal. This option
should not be closed to herein accused-appellant except for clearly important substantial reasons of law and policy.
Appellant in withdrawing his appeal has accepted and recognized that the trial court’s judgment of conviction and his sentence
thereunder is conclusive upon him. His exercise of the option to withdraw appeal before the case is submitted for this Court’s decision,
but fully cognizant of its legal consequences at this stage of the case, not only saves the Court precious time and resources. It also opens
soonest the path for the reformation of the contrite offender, pursuant to the ideal of a just and compassionate society envisioned in our
fundamental law. Considering the particular circumstances of this case, this Court is not without justifiable reasons to act favorably on
his motion.
G.R. No. 158802 November 17, 2004
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA
(detained at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City)
JUNE DE VILLA vs.
THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS
FACTS:
Reynaldo De Villa was charged with the crime of rape by his niece Aileen Mendoza. The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, and sentenced him to death, to indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, to
pay the costs of the suit and to support the child, Leahlyn Mendoza. An automatic review was made, the RTC finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusión perpetua. Reynaldo is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.
Three years after the promulgation of judgment, June De Villa, the son of Reynaldo was informed during the pendency of the automatic
review of petitioner's case, of which he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine paternity and that DNA testing
could resolve the issue of paternity. Hence he sought the conduct of a blood type test and DNA test but it was denied. Convict filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration for the test but was again denied.
June DE villa, was undaunted by these challenges. He then gathered thru some help, samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de
Villa and transported them to the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the National Science Research Institute (NSRI). The identities of the
donors of the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory.
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March 21, 2003, which showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not
have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers in
petitioner's sample and those of any of the other samples, including Leahlyn's

ISSUE:
Whether or not the presentation of newly-discovered evidence be allowed through a petition to grant new trial.
HELD:
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence
was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such
weight that that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence
in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it.
Although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, the court nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for
"newlydiscovered evidence" that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could have been discovered and produced
at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by petitioner and his counsel, the court is not convinced
that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is conclusively proven
that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendoza's testimony
and positive identification as its bases. The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that the pregnancy of the victim has never been
an element of the crime of rape. Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should
be discharged. Although petitioner claims that conviction was based solely on a finding of paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not the
case. Our conviction was based on the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given credence by the trial court,
was affirmed on appeal.
G.R. No. 126170 August 27, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
EMMA MAQUILAN
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Emma Maquilan was found guilty of drug-pushing in violation of R.A. No. 6425 and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant filed a notice of appeal as a result of which the records of the case were forwarded to this Court. However, before the
Court could act on the appeal, accused-appellant moved to withdraw her appeal, as she was going to file a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus to seek her release from confinement.
The Solicitor General was ordered by the Supreme Court to comment on said withdrawal and required accused-appellant’s counsel,
Atty. de Guzman to confer with her and to determine whether in filing the motion was done voluntarily. The Solicitor General stated he
had no objection to the motion.
Atty. de Guzman informed the Court that accused-appellant had been released from prison by virtue of an order of the Regional Trial
Court issued in a habeas corpus case.
Subsequently, the Court required Judge Laviña of the Regional Trial Court to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of
court for granting the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus , considering that the appeal in this case was still pending.
ISSUE:
May an accused-appellant file for habeas corpus after withdrawal of their appeal but, without waiting for the resolution of their motion?
HELD:
The release of accused-appellant constitutes unlawful interference with the proceedings of this Court and is only somewhat mitigated by
the fact that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City appears to have been misled by accused-appellant as to the status of the decision in
Criminal Case No. S-2191. The trial court’s order granting release on habeas corpus, based as it is on the erroneous assumption that the
decision in the criminal case had become final, is void. The trial court had no jurisdiction to issue the order in question.
This case is analogous to People v. Bacang. There accused-appellants moved for the withdrawal of their appeal but, without waiting for
the resolution of their motion, they applied for and were granted pardon by the President and released from confinement. Quoting
People v. Salle,Jr., this Court ruled:
We now declare that the “conviction by final judgment” limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the
grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any
application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is
withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he
has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the
trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of
the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal
shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the
pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.
Accordingly, the Court in that case denied the accused-appellants’ motion to withdraw their appeal and ordered their rearrest. Those
responsible for their release were cited for contempt.
What was said in Bacang applies mutatis mutandis to this case. The use of the high prerogative writ as a post-conviction remedy
presupposes a final judgment by virue of which accused is detained for the service of his sentence. As a matter of fact, however, that is
not the case here as accusedappellant’s appeal is still pending.
G.R. No. 151876 June 21, 2005
SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA
FACTS:
Fernando Dimagiba issued to Susan Go thirteen checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the
due dates, were dishonored for the reason “account closed.” Subqequently, Dimagiba was prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22
(An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes,
approved on April 3, 1979). He was found guilty by the MTCC, was sentenced three months imprisonment, and was ordered to pay the
offended party the amount he owed plus interest. On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for
the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution, praying for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final decision.
Citing SC-AC No. 12-2000, he pointed out that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on
him. The MTCC denied the motion for reconsideration; Dimagiba was arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence. On
October 9, 2001, Dimagiba filed with the RTC of Baguio city a petition for writ of habeas corpus which was granted by the said court
after hearing the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy.
HELD:
No. The respondent had previously sought the modification of his sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration and in a Motion for the
Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying these motions. His
petition for writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already become final and executory, an action
deplorably amounting to forum shopping.
G.R 80812 September 2, 1992
LUZ TAN vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
A criminal charge for illegal recruitment was filed against petitioner, Tan. She pleaded “not guilty” during arraignment. The prosecution
then presented all its witnesses. The defense wasn’t able to present its witness despite several schedules of hearing. Consequently, the
trial court declared petitioner to have lost her right to present evidence and the case was deemed submitted for decision. On May 28,
1986, the trial court found the petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner then filed for a Notice of Appeal with the CA and when she could
not file her brief within the 30-day reglamentary period, she moved and was granted a 90-day extension until August 12, 1987. On
August 4, 1987, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation and motion praying that the period for the filing of Appellant’s Brief be
suspended, and that she be given five days (until August 9, 1987) to file a Motion for New Trial. The CA, on August 18, 1987, denied
aforesaid Manifestation but granted the filing of a Motion for New Trial provided that the decision of the trial court had not yet become
final on account of petitioner’s failure to file her brief. Luz Tan filed a Motion for New Trial on August 24, 1987 which motion was
denied by the court. Then, petitioner filed a motion for leave to admit Appellant’s Brief. This was denied on October 7, 1987.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing the case for an error in the procedure in the Court of Appeals.
HELD:
The petition is devoid of merit. Petitioner’s filing of the Motion for New Trial did not suspend the period for filing appellant’s brief
which was due to expire on August 12, 1987. Such assumption is not supported by the Rules of Court or any other authority. When Tan
filed her Motion for New Trial, she did not take any step to file her brief, but simply waited for the resolution of said motion, such being
subsequently denied. Petitioner was grossly negligent and had no one to blame but herself in losing her right to appeal since “the right
to appeal is a statutory right and the party who seeks to avail the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so,
the right to appeal is lost, as in the case at bar.
PERTINENT LAWS ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Sec. 32, BP 129, as amended by RA 7691
SC Adm. Circular No. 09-94
Adm. Circular No. 104 – 96
Jurisdiction of Metropolitan/Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Trial Courts in Cities
1. All civil cases, the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, and all probate proceedings, where the value of personal
property, estate or amount of demand does not exceed Php 200,000. exclusive of interest, damages, litigation and other expenses
(in Metro Manila, the amount should be Php 400,000.)

2. All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer (ejectment)

3. All civil cases which involve title to or possession of real property or any interest therein where the assessed value does not
exceed Php 20,000. (in Metro Manila Php
50,000.) exclusive of interest, damages, litigation and other expenses

4. Civil cases under the rules on summary procedure

5. All offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six years, regardless of the fine or other imposable accessory or other
penalties including the civil liability (in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, the MTC has
exclusive original jurisdiction)

6. Petitions for issuances of original certificates of titles

Jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts
A. Exclusive original jurisdiction
1. All civil cases in which the subject of litigation cannot be estimated in monetary terms

2. All civil cases which involve title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
exceeds Php 20,000. (in Metro Manila exceeding Php 50,000.) Exceptions: forcible entry and unlawful detainer of lands and buildings
3. All actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds Php 100,000 (in Metro Manila, over
Php 200,000)

4. All probate matters, both testate and intestate where the gross value of the estate
exceeds Php 100,000 (in Metro Manila, the value must exceed Php 200,000.)

5. All actions involving the marriage contract and marital relations (annulment, legal separation, support, etc)

6. All cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or quasi-judicial body

7. All civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court (JDRC) and the Court of
Agrarian Relations

8. All other cases in which the demand or the value of personal property, exclusive of interest, damages, litigation and other costs,
exceeds Php 200,000. (in Metro Manila, the value must exceed Php 400,000.)

9. Intra-corporate disputes (formerly under the SEC); intellectual property cases

B. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the lower courts
(MTCs) in their respective territorial jurisdictions

C. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against all lower courts; habeas
corpus and quo warranto

Note: Republic Act 8369, approved on October 28, 1997, established the Family Court, with jurisdiction over adoption, guardianship,
custody of children, support, acknowledgment, complaints for annulment or nullity of marriage, criminal cases where one or more of
the accused is below 18 years of age, domestic violence against women and children, etc. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
A. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, quo warranto and auxiliary writs and
processes

B. Exclusive jurisdiction over actions for the annulment of judgments rendered by the Regional Trial Courts

C. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus filed against the RTCs,
the Civil Service Commission, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, commissions and other quasi-judicial
bodies or agencies.

D. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court and RTCsover petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus filed against
lower courts and quasi-judicial bodies; petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.

E. Appellate jurisdiction over ordinary appeals from RTCs, except in cases exclusively appealable to the Supreme Court; petitions
for review from the RTCs in all cases appealed to it from the lower courts; petitions for review from the Civil Service Commission, the
Court of Tax Appeals and the other quasi-judicial bodies or agencies (e.g. National Labor Relations Commission)
Note: The Sandiganbayan handles cases of government officials and employees with salary grades 27 and above.
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
A. Original exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus filed against the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan, the Commission on Elections, Commission on Audit, and the Department of Labor and
Employment

B. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed against the
Regional Trial Courts, the Civil Service
Commission, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, the Court of Tax Appeals,
Securities and Exchange Commission, other quasi-judicial bodies

C. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus filed against the lower
courts and certain quasi-judicial bodies; petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto
D. Concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs over actions against ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls

E. Appellate jurisdiction over petitions for review on certiorari from the CA, Sandiganbayan and RTCs on questions of law only;
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is either death or reclusion perpetua (“life imprisonment”) on questions of
fact and law.
ACT NO. 3326
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS
PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO
PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following
rules:
(a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both;
(b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years;
(c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; and
(d) after twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason, which
shall prescribe after twenty years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of the law not included in the Penal
Code.

Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect on its approval.

SEC 6.; SEC 10. A.M No. 06-11-5-SC – RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE
Sec. 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing. – Post-conviction DNA testing may be available, without need of prior court order, to the
prosecution or any person convicted by final and executory judgment provided that (a) a biological sample exists, (b) such sample is
relevant to the case, and (c) the testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the judgment of conviction.
Sec. 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing – Remedy if the Results Are Favorable to the Convict. – The convict or the prosecution may file a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of origin if the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to the convict. In
the case the court, after due hearing finds the petition to be meritorious, if shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order
the release of the convict, unless continued detention is justified for a lawful cause. A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court, or with any member of said courts, which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the petition to the
court of origin and issue the appropriate orders.

MODULE #10:
Topic: Sec. 23. Demurrer to Evidence

CASE # 343. EDUARDO A. ALARILLA v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR No. 136806, 2000-08-22

Facts:
On December 1, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman, acting through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed an information with the
Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Eduardo A. Alarilla with the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the
Revised Penal Code. On the same day, a second information was filed charging petitioner of having violated section 3 (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019. These informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 23069 and 23070, respectively. The trial of Criminal Case No.
23069 proceeded. On May 19, 1998, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed a demurrer to
evidence on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove that he had committed the crime charged in the information and that
the act complained of took place while he was performing his official functions. In a resolution dated July 28, 1998, the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner's demurrer to evidence. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was similarly denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
December 17, 1998 resolution

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION
OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.

Ruling:
The petitioner claims that the elements constituting the crime of grave threats have not been proven. He insists that the prosecution had
not established that his act of pointing a gun at complainant Simeon Legaspi, assuming that it had actually occurred, constituted grave
threats. However, quite to the contrary, the Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution's evidence, standing unrebutted by any opposing
evidence, sufficiently established the crime charged.

The resolution of a demurrer to evidence should be left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion. A lower court's order of denial shall
not be disturbed, that is, the appellate courts will not review the prosecution's evidence and precipitately decide whether or not such
evidence has established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, unless accused has established that such judicial discretion
has been gravely abused, thereby amounting to a lack or excess of [Link] allegations of such abuse will not suffice. For the
special civil action of certiorari to lie, it is crucial that there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very
antithesis of judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions. To warrant the issuance of
the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the alleged lack of jurisdiction, excess thereof, or abuse of discretion must be so gross or grave, as
when power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, or the abuse must be so
patent as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all, in
contemplation of law.

When there is no showing of such grave abuse, certiorari is not the proper remedy. Rather, the appropriate recourse from an order
denying a demurrer to evidence is for the court to proceed with the trial, after which the accused may appeal from the judgment of the
lower court rendered after such trial. In the present case, we are not prepared to rule that the Sandiganbayan has gravely abused its
discretion when it denied petitioner's demurrer to evidence. Public respondent found that the prosecution's evidence satisfactorily
established the elements of the crime charged. Correspondingly, there is nothing in the records of this case nor in the pleadings of
petitioner that would show otherwise.

Case# 344. PEOPLE v. ARISTEO E. ATIENZA, GR No. 171671, 2012-06-18

Facts:
In an Information filed on June 19, 2001, respondents Aristeo E. Atienza (Mayor Atienza), then Municipal Mayor of Puerto Galera,
Oriental Mindoro, Engr. Rodrigo D. Manongsong (Engr. Manongsong), then Municipal Engineer of Puerto Galera and Crispin M.
Egarque (Egarque), a police officer stationed in Puerto Galera, were charged before the Sandiganbayan violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in Criminal Case No. 26678. Duly arraigned,
respondents entered their respective pleas of not guilty to the crime charged against them. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. To
establish its case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Mercedita Atienza (Mercedita), Alexander Singson (Alexander),
Edmundo Evora (Edmundo), and Acting Barangay Chairman Concepcion Escanillas (Escanillas). Mercedita testified that she was the
caretaker of Hondura Beach Resort, a resort owned by Edmundo in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. She narrated that on July 3,
2000, Edmundo caused the construction of a fence made of coco lumber and G.I. sheets worth P5,000.00 on his resort. On July 4,
2000, she found out that the fence that was just recently built was destroyed.
Upon the instruction of Edmundo, she reported the incident to the barangay authorities. On July 5, 2000, Edmundo again caused the
construction of a second fence on the same property worth P3,000.00. However, on the day following, the fence was again destroyed.
Mercedita stated that she was informed by some people who were there that a policeman and Engr. Manongsong were the ones who
destroyed the fence. Mercedita further testified that Edmundo instructed her to report the matter to the police. When she inquired at
the police station, Egarque admitted that he destroyed the fence upon the order of Mayor Atienza. When she asked Mayor Atienza about
the incident, the latter informed her that the fence was not good for Puerto Galera since the place was a tourist destination and that the
land was intended for the fishermen association. Mercedita added that Engr. Manongsong admitted that he destroyed the fence upon
the order of the mayor for lack of municipal permit and that the land was intended for the fishermen.
Mercedita also stated that she reported to acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas that it was Engr. Manongsong and Egarque who
destroyed the fence upon the order of the [Link] testified that he and a certain Reynaldo Gumba constructed the fence twice
on the subject property. On the morning of July 6, 2000, he saw the fence being destroyed by Engr. Manongsong and Egarque. He said
that he informed Mercedita about the incident and he accompanied the latter to the police station and the offices of Mayor Atienza and
Engr. Manongsong.
Private complainant Edmundo corroborated the testimony of Mercedita and further stated that due to the incident, he requested the
barangay chairman for a meeting.
Acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas testified that Mercedita and Alexander went to her on July 4, 2000 and July 6, 2000 to report
that the fence constructed on the property of Edmundo was destroyed by Engr. Manongsong and Egarque upon the order of Mayor
Atienza. All the exhibits offered by the prosecution were marked in evidence and were admitted on September 21, 2005, which consisted
of, among others, machine copies of transfer certificates of title, affidavits, and barangay blotters. Meanwhile, on September 22, 2004,
petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite, which was opposed by Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong.
TheSandiganbayan granted the motion. Mayor Atienza then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which petitioner opposed.
Thereafter, on October 11, 2005, Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion to Acquit by
Way of Demurrer to Evidence, which petitioner opposed. On December 6, 2005, the court a quo issued a Resolution[14] which granted
the motion. In the same resolution, the court a quo also held in abeyance the resolution of Mayor Atienza's motion for reconsideration
of the resolution granting his suspension from office. Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong filed a Demurrer to Evidence (Motion to
Acquit), which was anchored on the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. Respondents maintain that the evidence presented
were not sufficient to hold them guilty of the offense charged. Egarque filed a Manifestation that he was adopting the Demurrer to
Evidence filed by his co-accused.
On February 28, 2006, the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) issued the assailed Resolution which, among other things, granted the
Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed the case. In granting the Demurrer to Evidence, the Sandiganbayan ratiocinated that not all the
elements of the crime charged were established by the prosecution, particularly the element of manifest partiality on the part of
respondents. The Sandiganbayan held that the evidence adduced did not show that the respondents favored other persons who were
similarly situated with the private complainant.

Issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE PEOPLE DUE PROCESS WHEN IT
RESOLVED ISSUES NOT RAISED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, WITHOUT AFFORDING
THE PROSECUTION AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD THEREON.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECIDING A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT CONSIDERED MATTERS OF DEFENSE.

Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.

Respondents are charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. This crime has the following essential elements:
● The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
● He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
● His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.

In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish the
second element of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be
committed, that is, through "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence."
In Uriarte v. People, this Court explained that Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted
with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is
"manifest partiality" when there is a... clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than
another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do
moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
but wilfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. As aptly concluded
by the Sandiganbayan in the assailed resolution, the second element of the crime as charged was not sufficiently established by the
prosecution, to wit:
The presence of the first element of this offense was not disputed. The prosecution established that accused-movants were public
officers, being then the Mayor, Municipal Engineer, and member of the PNP, at the time alleged in the information. Anent the second
element, did the act of destroying the subject fences on July 4, 2000 and on July 6, 2000 allegedly by accused Manongsong and
Egarque, without giving any notice to the private complainant, amount to manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith as indicated in
the information?
Manifest partiality and evident bad faith are modes that are separate and distinct from each other so that the existence of any of these
two modes would be sufficient to satisfy the second element. Manifest partiality was not present in this case. The evidence adduced did
not show that accused-movants favored other persons who were similarly situated with the private [Link] Alexander
Singson categorically pointed accused Manongsong and Egarque as the persons who destroyed/removed the second fence. Private
complainant lamented that he was not even given notice of their intent to destroy the fence. However, the same could not be considered
evident bad faith as the prosecution evidence failed to show that the destruction was for a dishonest purpose, ill will or self interest.
Considering that the second element was not present, the Court deemed it proper not to discuss the third element.
Moreover, contrary to petitioner's contention, the prosecution was not denied due process. It is to be noted that the prosecution
participated in all the proceedings before the court a quo and has filed numerous pleadings and oppositions to the motions filed by
respondent. In fact, the prosecution has already rested its case and submitted its evidence when the demurrer was filed.
Where the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can present its side or
defend its interests in due course, there is no denial of procedural due process. What is repugnant to due process is the denial of the
opportunity to be heard, which is not present here.
Clearly, double jeopardy has set in.
The elements of double jeopardy are the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; the
court had jurisdiction; the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was
dismissed without his express consent.
The above elements are all attendant in the present case: (1) the Information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
26678 against respondents were sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. 26678; respondents were arraigned and entered their respective pleas of not guilty; and the Sandiganbayan
dismissed Criminal Case No. 26678 on a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that not all the elements of the offense as charge exist in
the case at bar, which amounts to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had.

In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Court elucidated the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and
is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the
same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a
criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy.
The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there

Verily, in criminal cases, the grant of demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order may not be appealed because this
would place the accused in double jeopardy. Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or
where the trial was a sham, thus, rendering the assailed judgment void. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the
trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. In the present case, no
such circumstances exist to warrant a departure from the general rule and reverse the findings of the Sandiganbayan.

Case # 345. Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan, G.R. No. 172777 October 19, 2011

Facts:

Sally Go-Bangayan filed a complaint for bigamy against Benjamin Bangayan and Resally Delfin. Later, Sally learned that Benjamin, Jr.
had taken Resally as his concubine whom he subsequently married under the false name, “Benjamin Z. Sojayco.” Furthermore, Sally
discovered that on September 10, 1973, Benjamin, Jr. also married a certain Azucena Alegre in Caloocan City. After pleading not guilty,
Benjamin and Resally both filed their motions for leave to file a demurrer to evidence.

Benjamin, Jr. filed his Demurrer to Evidence, praying that the criminal case for bigamy against him be dismissed for failure of the
prosecution to present sufficient evidence of his guilt. His plea was anchored on two main arguments: (1) he was not legally married to
Sally Go because of the existence of his prior marriage to Azucena; and (2) the prosecution was unable to show that he and the
“Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr.,” who married Resally, were one and the same person.

RTC dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for insufficiency of evidence. Sally Go elevated the case to the CA via
a petition for certiorari. The CA promulgated its Decision granting her petition and ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for
further proceedings. The CA held that the following pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution were sufficient to deny the
demurrer to evidence: (1) the existence of three marriages of Benjamin, Jr. to Azucena, Sally Go and Resally; (2) the letters and love
notes from Resally to Benjamin, Jr.; (3) the admission of Benjamin, Jr. as regards his marriage to Sally Go and Azucena; and (4)
Benjamin, Jr.’s admission that he and Resally were in some kind of a relationship. CA further stated that Benjamin, Jr. was mistaken in
claiming that he could not be guilty of bigamy because his marriage to Sally Go was null and void in light of the fact that he was already
married to Azucena. A judicial declaration of nullity was required in order for him to be able to use the nullity of his marriage as a
defense in a bigamy charge.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners’ right against double jeopardy was violated by the CA when it reversed the RTC Order dismissing the
criminal case against them.

Held:

Yes, Double Jeopardy had already set-in. Even if the trial court had incorrectly overlooked the evidence against the petitioners, it only
committed an error of judgment, and not one of jurisdiction, which could not be rectified by a petition for certiorari because double
jeopardy had already set in.

A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence
presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds
that the evidence is not sufficient and grants the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is one on the merits, which is
equivalent to the acquittal of the accused. Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to
evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to do so will place the accused in double
jeopardy.

Case # 346. Goodland v. Abraham. G. R. No. 196685, Dec. 14, 2011

Case # 347. People v. Lagos - 6 March 2013

Facts: Acting on a tip from a confidential informant (CI), members of the PNP’s Anti-illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force
(ADSOTF) set-up a buy-bust operation against Castel “Brian” Estacio, whom the CI claimed was selling ecstasy. Catching Estacio in
flargrante delicto, the police officers filed an information against Estacio et. al. The latter sought the inhibition of the judge (Judge
Sagum) causing Judge Sagum to do so, and the case raffled off the Judge Lagos. Judge Lagos granted Estacio et. al’s demurrer to
evidence, and subsequently acquitted them of all charges. Case was filed against Judge Lagos citing grave abuse of discretion.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Lagos committed grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling: The upreme Court is endowed with the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the go2ernment. Here, the party asking for
the review must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgmente equivalent to lack of jurisdiction a patent and
gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a vitual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in
contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of
authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice. In such event, the accused
cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy.” Judge Lagos, in granting the demurrer and his eventual acquittal of the accused, had
declared that the testimonies of the ADSOTF members were not sufficient to show the illegal sale, nor the members’ personal
knowledge thereof. The Court found the judge’s reasoning wanting : the members of the tas force themselves having acted as the
poseur-buyer, having been within the vicinity of the sale, and having found both the drugs and marked money on the person of Estacio
et al. - thus satisfying the requirements of consummation of an illegal sale of drugs. Court also found Judge Lagos’ reasoning that the
CI’s testimony was indispensable to the case in error. Court then annulled his decision, and ordered the reinstatement of the case.

348. People v. Sandigan - GR No. 197953, 5 Aug. 2015

349. Arroyo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016
FACTS:
The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately filed by former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Manager Benigno B. Aguas.

On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget
and Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other officials of PCSO and Commission on Audit whose charges were later dismissed by the
Sandiganbayan after their respective demurrers to evidence were granted, except for Uriarte and Valdes who were at large) for
conspiracy to commit plunder, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659.

The information reads: That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto xxx accused
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the then President of the Philippines xxx Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager, all
public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official
positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount or total value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or less, [by raiding the public treasury].

Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for bail which were denied by the Sandiganbayan on the
ground that the evidence of guilt against them was strong.

After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas then separately filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that the
Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them. The same were denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there was
sufficient evidence to show that they had conspired to commit plunder. After the respective motions for reconsideration filed by GMA
and Aguas were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective petitions for certiorari.

ISSUES:Whether or not the consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration of the State will amount to the violation of the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
HELD:

Yes. Granting the motion for reconsideration would violate the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

Section 21, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution states:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double jeopardy for the same offense bars not only a new and
independent prosecution but also an appeal in the same action after jeopardy had attached. As such, every acquittal becomes final
immediately upon promulgation and cannot be recalled for correction or amendment.

In the present case, the Court's consequential dismissal of Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners for insufficiency of
evidence amounted to their acquittal of the crime of plunder charged against them. With the acquittal being immediately final, granting
the State's motion for reconsideration in this case would violate the Constitutional prohibition.

It is cogent to remind in this regard that the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy provides to the accused three related
protections, specifically: protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; protection against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.

350. Cabarles v. Maceda, G.R. No. 161330, Feb. 20, 2007

FACTS
In an original action filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner Rene Cabarles seeks to annul the Order issued
by respondent Judge Maceda which cancelled the scheduled promulgation of judgment and reopened the case for reception of evidence
from two prosecution witnesses who were not presented during trial.

June 18, 1999 – Cabarles was charged with the murder of Antonio Callosa (using a fan knife).
Cabarles pleaded not guilty. The trial court scheduled the case for hearing on the following dates:
Nov 22, 2000 – Pre-trial
April 18, May 4, 11, 18, 23, 2001 – Presentation of prosecution’s evidence
June 20, 27, July 4, 18, Aug 1, 2001 - Presentation of defense evidence The prosecution had subpoenas issued to its witnesses:
Flocerfina Callosa – the mother of the deceased
Imelda Pedrosa – the alleged eyewitness
Carlos Callosa – brother of the deceased Dr. Romeo T. Salen

Police Senior Inspector of the Southern Police District (SPD) Crime Laboratory Through no fault of its own, the prosecution was unable
to present its evidence on the first four hearing dates. Instead, trial on the merits began only on May 23, 2001 when the prosecution
called Carlos Callosa to the witness stand. The testimonies of Carlos and Parejos were dispensed with, as it was agreed upon that they
would testify on matters in their sworn statements. In the June 20, 2001 hearing, the prosecution said it would offer its evidence and
rest its case should the People fail to present a witness at the next scheduled hearing. When the case was called on June 27, 2001, the
prosecution failed to present a witness. Neither Pedrosa nor Dr. Salen appeared during the said hearing. Records show that four
subpoenas were issued to Pedrosa. Three subpoenas were issued to Dr. Salen which were all returned with the notation "addressee
moved." There was no evidence, however, that subpoenas were issued to these two witnesses requiring their attendance for the June 27,
2001 hearing, which would explain why they were absent. Judge Maceda gave the prosecution a last chance. With no witness for the
August 1, 2001 hearing, the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its evidence. Thereafter, Cabarles, with leave of court, filed a
demurrer to evidence but it was denied by Judge Maceda. Two witnesses were called for the defense, accused Cabarles and Luisito
Javier, a fisherman. A day before the scheduled promulgation of judgment on April 2, 2003, Judge Maceda motu proprio issued the
questioned order reopening the case. In it, he observed that the prosecution may not have been given its day in court resulting in a
miscarriage of justice. He explained that because there was a mixup in the dates specified in the subpoena and the hearing dates of
when the case was actually heard, the prosecution was unable to present its evidence on the first four of the five hearing dates assigned
to it. According to Judge Maceda, since the prosecution was not able to present its evidence on the first four hearing dates and there was
either no return on the subpoenas subsequently issued or there was no subpoena issued at all to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen, the prosecution
should have been given a last chance to present the alleged eyewitness and the doctor.
Judge Maceda denied Cabarles’s motion for reconsideration and set the case for hearing on May 8, 2003 to hear the testimonies of
Pedrosa and Dr. Salen. The prosecution still failed to present a witness. Nonetheless, Judge Maceda, upon motion, again decided to
extend to the prosecution another chance, giving the People June 19 and July 3, 2003 as additional hearing dates. Finally, on June 19,
2003, Pedrosa took the witness stand and completed her direct examination. A few days thereafter, Cabarles filed the present petition
questioning Judge Maceda’s order, alleging that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Since trial in the lower court continued, on
July 3, 2003, the Public Attorney’s Office conducted its crossexamination of Pedrosa. On August 9, 2004, Judge Maceda deferred the
promulgation of judgment and ordered the case archived
pending this Court’s resolution of the case.

ISSUES
1) Did Judge Maceda act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing motu proprio the April 1, 2003 Order reopening the case, before
judgment was rendered, to receive the testimonies of two prosecution witnesses after both parties had rested their case?
2) Did the said order violate Cabarles’s right to due process and speedy disposition of his case?

HELD
1) YES.
The April 1, 2003 Order was issued under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence
stress the following requirements for reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the
order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order
intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within
thirty days from the issuance of the order. A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both parties had
formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is rendered, and even after promulgation but before finality of
judgment and the only controlling guideline governing a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice. This remedy of
reopening a case was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice. However, while Judge Maceda is allowed to reopen the case before
judgment is rendered, Section 24 requires that a hearing must first be conducted. Judge Maceda issued the April 1, 2003 Order without
notice and hearing and without giving the prosecution and accused an opportunity to manifest their position on the matter. This failure,
to our mind, constitutes grave abuse of discretion and goes against the due process clause of the Constitution which requires notice and
opportunity to be heard. The issuance of the said order, without the benefit of a hearing, is contrary to the express language of Section
24, Rule 119. Although the defense counsel had crossexamined Pedrosa and had participated in the proceedings after the case was
reopened by Judge Maceda, the same does not amount to a waiver of Cabarles’s objection to the April 1, 2003 Order. To be effective, a
waiver must be certain and unequivocal.

2) YES.
Although the matter of reopening a case for reception of further evidence is largely a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court
judge, this judicial action must not, however, be done whimsically, capriciously and/or unreasonably. In this particular case, the
prosecution was given ample opportunity to present all its witnesses but it failed to do so. The failure of the prosecution to take full
advantage of the opportunities given does not change the fact that it was accorded such opportunities. Since Judge Maceda issued the
questioned order without complying with the third requirement of Section 24, that there be a hearing conducted before the order to
reopen is issued, then the assailed order must be annulled and set aside for having been issued contrary to law and consequently with
grave abuse of discretion.

Re hierarchy and jurisdiction of courts

It is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper for it violates the established policy of strict observance of
the hierarchy of courts. Under the present circumstances however, we are willing to take cognizance of this case as an exception to the
principle of hierarchy of courts. Cabarles invokes the jurisdiction of this Court in the interest of speedy justice since the information
against him was filed way back in June 1999, and almost eight years thereafter, no judgment has yet been rendered. Any further delay
in the resolution of the instant petition will be prejudicial to Cabarles. Also, the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of
the petition filed directly to it for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised. Since Section 24 is a new
provision, and considering the irregularities in the issuance of the April 1, 2003 Order, it is necessary to resolve the issues raised in this
petition.

351. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 159275, Aug. 25, 2010

352. Talabon v. Warden, 78 Phil 599
353. People v. Amondina, 220 SCRA 6
354. Nazareno v. CA - 27 February 2002

355. Santos v. Orda, G.R. No. 189402, May 6, 2010

FACTS:

356. People v. Alfredo - 15 December 2010

357. People v. Abellera, 69 Phil. 623
358. People v. Silo, 99 Phil. 216
359. U.S. v. Avillar, 28 Phil. 131
360. U.S. v. Iguidez, 36 Phil. 680

Topic:
CASE#XX. Case name: follow syllabus (italicized underlin
Facts: (bold)
Body xxx (plain)
Issue: (bold)
Body xxx (plain)
Held/Ruling: (bold)
Body xxx (plain)

<<CATH VEGA 325-342>>

Topic: Rule 118, Sec 2. Pre-Trial Agreement

CASE# 325 People v. Hernandez, 260 SCRA 27

Facts:
Cristina Hernandez was charged with crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale in violation of Article 38 (a) and (b) in
relation to Article 13 (b) and (c) of the New Labor Code. Upon arraignment, she pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. Culled from the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution are the following:
1. Dec 1988 – the 14 private complainants were accompanied by Josefa Cinco to the office to Philippine Thai Association, Inc. in
Ermita to meet Hernandez.
2. Hernandez introduced herself as the general manager of Phil-Thai and that her company recruited workers for placement
abroad and asked private complainants if they wanted to work as factory workers in Taipei.
3. Enticed by the assurance of immediate employment and an $800 per month salary, private complainants applied. Hernandez
required them to pay placement and passport fees in the total amount of P22,500.00 per applicant, to be paid in three
installments.
4. When the complainants-witnesses paid the first two installments, they were issued receipts by Liza Mendoza, the alleged
treasurer of Philippine-Thai signed by the latter in the presence of Hernandez.
5. After receiving the entire amount from the witnesses, Hernandez assured them that they would be able to leave for Taipeh
sometime before the end of December, 1988.
6. But contrary to appellant's promise, complainants-witnesses were unable to leave for abroad.
7. They demanded for the return of their money but to no avail. Appellant's unfulfilled promise of employment and her refusal to
return the money that had been paid by way of placement and passport fees, triggered the filing of the complaint.
8. Hernandez denied ever meeting the complainants and that she did not know any Liza Mendoza. She admitted having an office
in Ermita but the said office belonged to B.C. Island Wood Products Corporation which was engaged in the logging business.
9. It is worthy to note that when she was questioned further, she admitted being the president of Philippine-Thai but only in a
nominal capacity, and claimed that as nominee-president, she did not participate in any of its transactions. She likewise
insisted that Philippine-Thai was engaged solely in the barong tagalog business.
Trial Court found her guilty of illegal recruitment.

Issue:
WON Section 4 of Rule 118 — requiring an agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference to be reduced in
writing and signed by the accused and his counsel before the same may be used in evidence against the accused — equally applies to a
stipulation of facts made during trial.

Held:
We resolved this issue in the negative.

A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in open court is automatically reduced into
writing and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused in the form of his
signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: ". . . an attorney who is employed to manage a party's conduct of a
lawsuit . . . has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, . . . which unless allowed
to be withdrawn are conclusive."

In fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of
his client. When such admissions are made . . . for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, . . . they bind the client, whether
made during, or even after, the trial."

Topic: Sec 3 Rule 119, Exclusions. Rule

Case#326 People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, June 5, 2009

Sec 3 Exclusions - the ff. Periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence.
Facts:
1. On November 28, 1991, an information for murder committed against Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas, against Joven de Grano (Joven), Armando de Grano (Armando), and Estanislao
Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho (Leonides), Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and
Leonardo Genil (Leonardo), who were at-large.
2. That on April 21, 1991, between 9:00 o’clock and 10:00 o’clock in the evening, in Barangay Balakilong, [M]unicipality of
Laurel, [P]rovince of Batangas, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, shoot EMMANUEL MENDOZA with
firearms, inflicting upon him eight gunshot wounds and causing his death thereby, thus committing the crime of MURDER to
the damage and prejudice of his heirs in the amount as the Honorable Court shall determine.
3. Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded "not guilty" to the crime as charged; while their co-accused Leonides,
Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large.
4. After the presentation of the parties’ respective sets of evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision:
a. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, qualified by treachery (Accused JOVEN DE GRANO,
ARMANDO DE GRANO, DOMINGO LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA)
b. Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua - indemnification P50,000.00
5. The case as against accused Leonides Landicho and Leonardo Genil is hereby sent to the files or archived cases to be revived as
soon as said accused are apprehended.
6. Let alias warrants of arrest be issued against accused Leonardo Genil and Leonides Landicho.
7. Only Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the other respondents.
8. Respondents, thru counsel, then filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated May 8, 2002, praying that the Decision dated
April 25, 2002 be reconsidered and set aside and a new one be entered acquitting them
9. Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, argues that, except for Estanislao, none of the respondents appeared at the
promulgation of the Decision. Neither did they surrender after promulgation of the judgment of conviction, nor filed a motion for leave
to avail themselves of the judicial remedies against the decision, stating the reasons for their absence.

Issue:
Whether or not RTC erred in taking cognizance of the joint motion for reconsideration despite the absence of the other accused during
the promulgation of judgment?

Held: Yes. Section 14(2),[59] Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent at the trial
but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial,
whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case,
the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived.

When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao Lacaba was present. Subsequently thereafter, without
surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at large, it
also took cognizance of the joint motion.

The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for Reconsideration with respect to the respondents who
were at large. It should have considered the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at
large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes
from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is
deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.

Topic: Sec 7 Rule 119, Public Attorney’s duties where accused is imprisoned
Case# 327 People v. Buluran, 325 SCRA 476

CASE PRINCIPLE:
There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during custodial investigation since neither one executed an extrajudicial
confession or admission.

FACTS:
There was a birthday party. There was an altercation outside the birthday party wherein the appellants stabbed the victim to death. The
appellants were arrested without warrants. The appellants were charged for murder. They entered their plea of not guilty contending
that both the appellants were in their respective homes during the incident.
The RTC rendered a decision convicting both the appellants.
Appellants appealed to SC and raised for the first time the issue that their constitutional rights were violated because they were arrested
without warrant.
Appellants also raised that their rights in custodial investigation were violated because they were not represented by a counsel.
ISSUE:
1. WON appellants can question the validity of arrest (NO)
2. WON the rights in custodial investigation were violated (NO)
RULING:
1. No. Appellants are estopped from questioning the validity of their respective arrests since they never raised this issue before
arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made
before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.
2. No. There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during custodial investigation since neither one executed an
extrajudicial confession or admission. In fact, the records show that appellants opted to remain silent during the custodial investigation.
Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial
admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction.

Topic: Sec 9 Rule 119, Remedy where accused is not brought into trial with the time limit
Case# 328 Abando v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 13951-72, March 3, 2001

Doctrine: Laws on speedy trial (R.A. 8493 in this case) does not preclude application of the provision on speedy trial in the Constitution.
in determining whether petitioner's right to a speedy trial has been violated, resort to Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution is
imperative.

FACTS:
● Abardo was the provincial assessor of Camarines Sur. He was charged by the ombudsman of falsifying
tax declarations.
● On his scheduled arraignment on July 8, 1991, Abardo filed a Mation to Quash which was subsequently
denied on September 3, 1991. He then filed a a petition for certiorari to the SC and was denied on March 5,
1992.
● While his petition was pending, Abardo filed to have his arraignment scheduled multiple times. He
was finally arraigned on July 28, 1992
● On March 20, 1997, 5 years after his arraignment , Abardo sent a letter to the ombudsman to have his
retirement pay released and the 5 year inaction has prejudiced him.
● On 1998, Abardo filed a Motion for Early resolution of his cases. Citing RA 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of
1998) That he was not arraigned in the prescribed time indicated in the law.
● Sandiganbayan said that the delay was due to Abardo’s fault and that the delay was an exceptions
provided by RA8493 (petition for certiorari for after denial of motion to quash, he asked for postponement
of arraignment and that the sandiganbayan was reorganized)

ISSUE:
WON RA 8349 precludes petitioner from invoking his right to a speedy trial? (NO)

RULING:
● The time limits provided by Republic Act No. 8493 could not be applied to the case at bar as
petitioner was arraigned way back in July 28, 1992. At that time, there was yet no statute which establishes
deadlines for arraignment and trial; and the time limits for trial imposed by Republic Act No. 8493 are
reckoned from the arraignment of the accused. Nevertheless, Republic Act No. 8493 does not preclude
application of the provision on speedy trial in the Constitution.
● Abardo was arraigned as early as July 28, 1992 or just over a year after he filed a motion to quash.
What is glaring here there was an unexplained interval of 5 years in Sandiganbayan. Granting that the delay
or interval was caused by the separate motions for reinvestigation filed by the different accused, again,
there is no explanation why the reinvestigation was unduly stretched beyond a reasonably permissible time
frame
● The fact that up to this time no trial has been set, apparently due to the inability of the Ombudsman
to complete the reinvestigation is a distressing indictment of the criminal justice system, particularly
its investigative and prosecutory pillars

Topic: Sec 11 Rule 119, Order of Trial

329. People v. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 119

Case# 329 PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN [17 SCRA 1119; G.R. NO. L-26376; 31 AUG 1966]

CASE PRINCIPLE:
In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused, the proper course should have been for the court a quo to take
defendant's plea anew and then proceed with the trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.|||

FACTS:

Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. He stabbed Leonicio Bulaoat, inflicted wounds that caused his
death. Upon being arraigned, he entered into a plea of guilty. The accused testified that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense, because
the latter was strangling him. And he further stated that after the incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities.
On the basis of the testimony of the accused, he was acquitted.

This appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals. Appellant filed its brief on September 9, 1965. No appellee's brief was filed. After
being submitted for decision without appellee's brief, the appeal was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on July 14, 1966, as
involving questions purely of law.

Prosecution appealed citing that CA committed an error in acquitting the accused when upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty.

ISSUE:
WON the RTC ERRED IN ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE LATTER'S PLEA OF GUILTY
WHEN ARRAIGNED (YES)

RULING:
A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from
said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances.

The SC explained in this case that the defendant was only allowed to testify in order to establish mitigating circumstances, for the
purpose of fixing the penalty. Said testimony, therefore, could not be taken as a trial on the merits, to determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused. In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused, the proper course should have been for the court
a quo to take defendant's plea anew and then proceed with the trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3 Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court

330. People v. Gutierrez, 302 SCRA 643

CASE PRINCIPLE:
Order of trial does not require change even in plea of self-defense as the presentation of evidence is still required to substantiate the
accused’s claim.

FACTS:
Gutierrez was charged with Murder of one Antonio Mercene. Gutierrez at first pleaded "not guilty," but later, through a new counsel,
withdrew his plea and moved for modification of the order of trial pursuant to Rule 119, Sec. 3(e) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
invoking his plea of self-defense. The trial court denied accused-appellant's motion for a modification of the order of trial. The trial
court later on found Gutierrez guilty of the crime charged.
Gutierrez now contends that the trial court erred in not allowing him in presenting his defense in an inverted order of trial upon his
counsel's motion as he invoked self-defense.
ISSUE:
WON the contention of Gutierrez is correct, and whether the lower court should have modified the order of the trial.

RULING:
The SC noted that Gutierrez’s contention to be that he should have been heard first in his defense before the prosecution presented its
evidence because of his plea of self-defense.
In Alejandro vs Pepito, the SC ruled that even in situations where the plea of self-defense is raised, the constitutional provision that no
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process still requires that in the presentation of evidence the
prosecution must go forward and present all its proof in the first instance before the accused is required to substantiate his defense
because the latter is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The change found in the present rule is based on the theory that by
pleading self-defense, the accused admits the killing and, therefore, the burden of justification is now on him. Rule 119, Sec. 3(e),
however, does not require such a change in the order of trial but only allows it in the discretion of the court. This can be seen in the use
of the permissive "may."

331. People v. Marcial - 27 Sept. 2006

CASE PRINCIPLE:
Section 3, Rule 119 reflects a discretionary nature. The order of trial may be modified and it is discretionary upon the court.

FACTS:
Two information were filed against respondents in connection with a shooting incident, one for homicide and one for frustrated
homicide.

On arraignment respondents pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against them. Pre-trial was thereafter held and terminated, resulting
in the issuance by the RTC of a pre-trial order. During hearing, petitioner made an oral motion to reverse the order of the trial on the
ground that respondents admitted committing the acts for which there were charged in the two information but interposed lawful
justifying circumstances. The motion was denied by the RTC for lack of merit. The motion for reconsideration was also denied. Thus,
this present petition.

ISSUE:
WON RTC committed any reversible error in denying the request for a reverse order of trial. (NO)

RULING:
Court finds that the RTC did not commit any reversible error in denying for a reverse order of trial, a matter which under the rules
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Rule 119, Section 3 of the Rules of Court clearly reflects the discretionary nature of
the procedure.

Rules of Court, Rule 119, Section 3(e):

When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial
may be modified.

Accordingly, RTC exercised its discretion in denying petitioner’s request for a reverse order of trial.

Topic: Sec 15 Rule 119, Examination of Witness for the Prosecution

332. People v. Webb - G.R. No. 132577, 17 August 1999

CASE PRINCIPLE:
To rule that petitioner cannot take the testimony of these witnesses by deposition is to put a premium on technicality at the expense of
the constitutional rights of the accused, which this court is not inclined to do. Particularly where the issue of the guilt or innocence of
petitioner is bound to hinge heavily upon the testimonies of his US-based witnesses, it behooves upon public respondent not only to
guarantee that accused is given a reasonable opportunity to present his evidence, but also to allow him a certain latitude in the
presentation of his evidence.

FACTS:
Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation,
the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually
ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were
aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.
During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, respondent filed on May 2, 1997, a Motion To Take Testimony By Oral
Deposition praying that he be allowed to take the testimonies of the following:

1.] Steven Bucher

2.] Debora Farmer

3.] Jaci Alston

4.] Ami Smalley

5.] John Pavlisin

before the general consul, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Philippines in lieu of presenting them as witnesses in court
alleging that the said persons are all residents of the United States and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify since the
court had no jurisdiction over them.

Webb, an accused in the crime of Rape with Homicide, filed a Motion to Take Testimony by Oral Deposition, to take the
testimonies of some vital witnesses residing in the U.S., before the proper Philippine consular authorities since the Philippine court had
no jurisdiction over them and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify.

Respondent further alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of the aforementioned individuals whose testimonies are
allegedly ‘material and indispensable’ to establish his innocence of the crime charged is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said motion averring that Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
has no application in criminal cases. The trial court denied the motion but was thereafter reversed by the COA on appeal. The trial court
denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals allowed the same.

Issue: Whether or not the judge gravely abused her discretion in the examination of witnesses.

Ruling:

While the taking of depositions pending trial is not expressly provided [for] under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, we find no
reason for public respondent to disallow the taking of the same in the manner provided for under Section 1 of Rule
23 under the circumstances of the case.
➢ To disallow petitioner to avail of the specific remedies provided under the Rules would deny him the opportunity to
adequately defend himself against the criminal charge of rape with homicide now pending before the public respondent
and, further, [it] loses sight of the object of procedure which is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties.

Depositions obtained during trial in a foreign state or country may be taken before a consular officer of the Republic of the Philippines
where the deponent resides or is officially stationed.

Section 5, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is thus clearly inapplicable in the instant case since the same relates to the
examination of witnesses under Section 4 thereof and not Section 1 of Rule 23 . Consistent with the procedure provided
[for] under Rule 23,
★ the deposition of the petitioners witnesses, which include four (4) officials of the United States government, will be taken
before a consular officer of the Philippines where these witnesses reside or are officially stationed, as the case may be.

The denial of petitioners right to present his witnesses, who are residing abroad, based on a very shaky technical ground, is tantamount
to depriving him of his constitutional right to due process.

Court rules that the denial of the deposition-taking amounts to the denial of the constitutional right to present his evidence and for the
production of evidence in his behalf. The denial is not justified by the flimsy reason that Sec. 1 of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court is not
applicable to criminal proceedings. PETITION GRANTED.

333. Go v. People - 18 July 2012

FACTS:
Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other
Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country
back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed
due to his unavailability.

The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition6 of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for
lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to
the Philippines by reason of ill health.

Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the MeTC granted the motion after the prosecution complied with the directive to submit a
Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied, prompting petitioners to file a
Petition for Certiorari before the RTC.

Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration through an Order dated March 5, 2006, the prosecution elevated the case to
the CA. the CA denied petitioners' motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not CA erred in sustaining the judicial legislation committed by the MeTC in applying the ruled on deposition-taking
in civil case to criminal cases.

Held:
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the
Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the
witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the “safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts” as it enables the
judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the
Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of
direct court testimony.

The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or
written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the
Philippines; or before any Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state
or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other party.

But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would forseeably be
unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is
pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision
reads thus:

SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or
infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may
forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in
his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the same manner as an
examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The
statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case is pending
would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to
observe the prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness'
testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused. This is the import of the Court's ruling in Vda. de Manguerra where
we further declared that –
While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot disregard the
rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the
general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction
of the rules.

334. People v. Sergio – 9 October 2019

FACTS: Mary Jane Veloso, Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and Julius L. Lacanilao (Julius) were friends and neighbors in Talavera,
Nueva Ecija. Taking advantage of her dire situation and susceptibility, Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper
in Malaysia. Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket as well as a luggage to bring on her trip. She then asked Cristina why the luggage
was heavy but the latter simply replied that because it was new. The luggage was the same bag she used on her trip to Indonesia. It was
only after she was apprehended at the airport when Mary Jane realized that it contained prohibited drugs.

The Philippine Government requested the Indonesian Government to suspend the scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed the
Indonesian Government that the recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane were already in police custody, and her testimony is vital in the
prosecution of Cristina and Julius.

The Indonesian authorities however imposed the following conditions relative to the taking of Mary Jane's testimony, viz.:

(a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;

(b) No cameras shall be allowed;

(c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present; and

(d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing.

Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon
Written Interrogatories. " It averred that the taking of Mary Jane's testimony through the use of deposition upon written
interrogatories is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court because she is out of the country and will not be able to testify
personally before the court due to her imprisonment.

Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the deposition should be made before and not during the trial. The depositions
under Rules 23 and 25 of the Rules of Court are not designed to replace the actual testimony of the witness in open court and the use
thereof is confined only in civil cases. Also, they argued that such method of taking testimony will violate their right to confront the
witness, Mary Jane, or to meet her face to face as provided under Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, they claimed that the
prosecution's reliance on the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases and the Judicial Affidavit Rule was misplaced because the
affiants therein were still subject to cross-examination.

The RTC granted the motion. CA reversed the RTC.

ISSUES:

[1] Does Rule 23 apply to criminal cases?

[2] Will allowing deposition of Mary Jane violate the right of the accused to confront the witnesses?

HELD:

On Substantive Matters

The OSG asserts that the presence of extraordinary circumstances, i.e., Mary Jane's conviction by final judgment and her detention in a
prison facility in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, while awaiting execution by firing squad; the grant by the Indonesian President of an indefinite
reprieve in view of the ongoing legal proceedings against Cristina and Julius in the Philippines; and the conditions attached to the
reprieve particularly that Mary Jane should remain in confinement in Indonesia, and any question propounded to her must only be in
writing, are more than enough grounds to have allowed the suppletory application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.

The OSG's contentions are meritorious.

The Court cannot subscribe to the pronouncement by the appellate court that the State failed to show compelling reasons to justify the
relaxation of the Rules and the suppletory application of Rule 23. The Court also cannot agree to its declaration that the constitutional
rights of Cristina and Julius to confront a witness will be violated since safeguards were set in place by the trial court precisely to protect
and preserve their rights.

Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is inapplicable in the instant case

Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure , in order for the testimony of the prosecution witness be taken
before the court where the case is being heard, it must be shown that the said prosecution witness is either: (a) too sick or infirm to
appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court, or; (b) has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning.

Surely, the case of Mary Jane does not fall under either category. Therefore, a liberal interpretation of the Rules should be allowed. We
should not silence Mary Jane and deny her and the People of their right to due process by presenting their case against the said accused.
By the CA's belief that it was rendering justice to the respondents, it totally forgot that it in effect impaired the rights of Mary Jane as
well as the People. By not allowing Mary Jane to testify through written interrogatories, the Court of Appeals deprived her of the
opportunity to prove her innocence before the Indonesian authorities and for the Philippine Government the chance to comply with the
conditions set for the grant of reprieve to Mary Jane.

The extraordinary factual circumstances

surrounding the case of Mary Jane warrant

the resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court

Is the prosecution's resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court in taking Mary Jane's testimony as a prosecution witness proper? Yes.

Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how a deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at the
same time convicted of a grave offense by final judgment and imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the
testimony of such witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent as to how to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in open
court because he is imprisoned in another country.

Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Although the rule on deposition by written
interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as
there is compelling reason.

Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant case, the Court sees no reason not to apply suppletorily the
provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure in the interest of substantial justice and fairness. Hence, the taking of testimony of
Mary Jane through a deposition by written interrogatories is in order.

The deposition by written interrogatories is pursuant to Mary Jane's right to due process

Furthermore, to disallow the written interrogatories will curtail Mary Jane's right to due process.

The benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is to ensure that all the parties have their day in court. It is in accord with
the duty of the government to follow a fair process of decision-making when it acts to deprive a person of his liberty. But just as an
accused is accorded this constitutional protection, so is the State entitled to due process in criminal prosecutions. It must likewise be
given an equal chance to present its evidence in support of a charge.

No violation of the constitutional right to confrontation of a witness

Similarly, the deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional right to confrontation of a witness of Cristina and
Julius.

The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal proceedings but also in civil proceedings as well as in proceedings
in administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers. It has a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to
test the testimony of the witness by cross-examination; and (2) secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness.

True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane face to face in light of the prevailing circumstance. However, the
terms and conditions laid down by the trial court ensure that they are given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of
written interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose of their constitutional right. To recall, the trial court requires Cristina and
Julius, through their counsel, to file their comment and may raise objections to the proposed questions in the written interrogatories
submitted by the prosecution. The trial court judge shall promptly rule on the objections. Thereafter, only the final questions
would be asked by the Consul of the Philippines in Indonesia or his designated representative. The answers of Mary
Jane to the propounded questions must be written verbatim, and a transcribed copy of the same would be given to the counsel of the
accused who would, in turn, submit their proposed cross interrogatory questions to the prosecution. Should the prosecution raised any
objection thereto, the trial court judge must promptly rule on the same, and the final cross interrogatory questions for the deposition of
Mary Jane will then be conducted. Mary Jane's answers in the cross interrogatory shall likewise be taken in verbatim and a transcribed
copy thereof shall be given to the prosecution.

The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has likewise been upheld. As aptly stated in the terms and conditions for
the taking of deposition, the trial court judge will be present during the conduct of written interrogatories on Mary Jane.

Indubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are equally safeguarded. The parameters laid down by the trial court are
sufficient in detail ensuring that Mary Jane will give her testimony under oath to deter lying by the threat of perjury charge. She is still
subjected to cross-examination so as to determine the presence of any falsehood in her testimony. Lastly, the guidelines enable the trial
court judge to observe her demeanor as a witness and assess her credibility. SO ORDERED.
Topic: Sec 16 Rule 119, Trial of Severally Accused
335. People v. De Vera, Sr., 308 SCRA 77

CASE PRINCIPLE:
When two or more accused are jointly charged with an offense, they shall be tried jointly, unless the court, in its
discretion and upon motion of the prosecutor or any accused, orders separate trial for one or more accused.

FACTS:
It was a celebration which started with revelry and ended in tragedy. The fatalities were 13-year old Gerardo Valdez y
Torres and 29-year old Perlita Ferrer y Mamorno. Accused of having killed the two victims was Cipriano De Vera,
Sr.,an uncle of Gerardo, who was charged in three separate informations, inclusive of a charge for illegal possession of
firearms. The accused tried to flee from the scene and it was speculated that the shooting was an offshoot of the land
dispute between the father of Gerardo Valdez and the accused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused for the complex crime of murder with homicide?

RULING:
YES. The trial court erred in convicting the accused for the complex crime of murder with homicide.

Appellant raises the issue of whether or not the trial court has acted rightly or has erred in convicting him for the
complex crime of murder with homicide.

Here, the Court finds for accused-appellant and quotes with approval the observation made by the Office of the
Solicitor General, viz:"The record of the case will show that three separate informations were filed against appellant,
one for the murder of Gerardo Valdez, the second for homicide for the death of Perlita Ferrer, and the third for illegal
possession of firearms.

SC has held that 'while the trial court can hold a joint trial of two or more criminal cases and can render a
consolidated decision, it cannot convict the accused of a complex crime consisting of the various crimes alleged on the
two informations' (People vs. Legaspi,246 SCRA 206, 213).

Thus, appellant cannot be held liable for the complex crime of murder with homicide but should be held liable
separately for these crimes.

Topic: Sec. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness

336. People v. Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136

CASE PRINCIPLE:
The rule disqualifying defendants from the benefit of exclusion speaks of conviction of an offense.

FACTS:
On September 6, 1950, the lifeless body of 60 yr old Teodora Sese was found in a creek at Barrio Dolores, Tarlac.

An information filed after the corresponding investigation, charges Marcelino Bacsa, Evaristo de los Santo, Pedro
Gaspar, Ernesto Gaspar and Martin Granil with crimes of robbery with homicide of the aged woman, plus multiple rape
committed on Celestina Torres, probably her relative. In February 1952, after Gregorio Bacsa had been arrested,
information was filed describing the same offenses allegedly committed by him in conspiracy with the five defendants
already mentioned.
A joint trial ensued. Discharge to be state witnesses over the objection of the defendants, Martin Granil and Marcelino
Bacsa testified for the prosecution. After weighing the evidence submitted on both sides, the district judge found
Gregorio Bacsa guilty of the crimes described in the information and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

However, for reasonable doubt, he acquitted the other three accused. Gregorio Bacsa appealed in due time.

ISSUE:
W/N the defendants must be disqualified to be discharged as state witness (NO)

RULING:
Appellant urges that Martin Granil should not have been utilized because he had reportedly confessed before a barrio
lieutenant to a previous attempt against the virtue of a married woman. Yet the rule disqualifying co-defendants
from the benefit of exclusion speaks of "conviction" of an offense which is not the case.

As to Marcelino Bacsa, the appellant points out to his having been confined at the Philippine Training School at
Welfareville for the offense of robbery. But it does not appear that at the time of releasing Marcelino the trial judge
knew this confinement. At any rate once the discharge is ordered, any future development showing that one or all of
the five conditions(sec 17, rule 119) have not actually been fulfilled may not affect the legal consequences of such
discharge — which even though erroneous, does not by itself affect the testimony of the liberated co-defendant nor
his competency to testify

The prosecution's case rested principally on the sworn assertions of Martin Granil and Marcelino Bacsa, who were two
of the original defendants, but who were discharged at the request of the fiscal.

15-year old girl Celestina Torres testified that Gregorio Bacsa who, in a secluded spot near a bamboo grove, brutally
assaulted her with the help of Evaristo de los Santos. She lost consciousness when his other companions took turns in
raping her. Her testimony tallied with that of Marcelino Bacsa, who said Evaristo de los Santos, Pedro Gaspar and
Ernesto Gaspar also ravished the unconscious girl, following the example of Gregorio Bacsa.

The appellant imputes irregularity to the trial judge in permitting the release of two defendants; because Rule 115,
sec. 9, according to him, contemplates the discharge of only one. We do not think the said Rule implies a prohibition
against the discharge of more than one co-defendant. It all depends upon the needs of the fiscal and the discretion of
the trial judge. Anyway, any error of the trial judge in this matter cannot have the effect of invalidating the testimony
of the discharged co-defendants

337. v. Aniñon, 158 SCRA 710

CASE PRINCIPLE:
A co-accused can only be discharged as a state witness provided that the requisites under Section 17, Rule 117 was satisfied. However, an
improper discharge of a co-accused cannot invalidate the latter’s acquittal, unless he failed to testify against the co-accused.

The discharge contemplated under the Rule is one effected or which can be effected at any stage of the proceedings, from the filing of
the information to the time the defense starts to offer any evidence.

FACTS:
Benjamin Aniñon and Policarpio Saycon were charged with murder. Upon arraignment, Aniñon and Saycon pleaded not guilty. In the
course of trial, Saycon was discharged and utilized as a state witness. Thereafter, the trial court convicted Aniñon. Hence, this appeal.

Aniñon contended that "it was a grave error for the Lower Court to discharge accused Policarpio Saycon after the prosecution was
practically through with the presentation of their evidence and the accused had already started in their defense in the cross-examination
of the witnesses for the prosecution.”

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the lower court erred in discharging accused Policarpio Saycon and allowing him to testify against his co-accused
Benjamin Aniñon after the prosecution was through with the presentation of their evidence.

2. Whether or not the improper discharge of Policarpio Saycon will invalidate his acquittal.
RULING:

First Issue
Yes. In Mangubat v. Sandiganbayan, the Court enumerated the requisites for a valid discharge of a defendant to be a state witness under
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

(1) Two or more persons are charged with the commission of a certain offense;
(2) The petition for discharge is filed before the defense has offered its evidence;
(3) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose discharge is requested;
(4) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said
defendant;
(5) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(6) Said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(7) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

Moreover, the discharge contemplated under the Rule is one effected or which can be effected at any stage of the proceedings, from the
filing of the information to the time the defense starts to offer any evidence.

In the instant case, the failure to comply with the requisites established by law and jurisprudence is apparent. There was no absolute
necessity for the testimony of Saycon, since the prosecution had already presented Dr. Antonio Trasmonte, who testified on the victim's
wounds and his cause of death, Lauro Ibalig, who positively identified Aniñon as the person who stabbed Cesar Agustin, and Rodolfo
Tagaboin, who corroborated Ibalig's presence at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Thus, it cannot be said that there was no
other direct evidence available for the prosecution of the offense committed except the testimony of Saycon. His testimony merely
served to corroborate and strengthen the earlier testimony of Lauro Ibalig and furnish further details on antecedent events.

Hence, Policarpio Saycon was irregularly discharged.

Second Issue

No. Under Section 18 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the acquittal of the discharged accused becomes ineffective only if he
fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused. In this case, Policarpio Saycon did not refuse to testify against his co-accused. Hence,
the irregular discharge of Policarpio Saycon, however, will not invalidate his acquittal.

338. People v. Anabe, G.R. No. 179033, Sept. 6, 2010

DOCTRINE: The uncorroborated testimony of a state witness may be sufficient when it is shown to be sincere in itself
because it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and full of details which, by their nature, could not
have been the result of deliberate afterthought. This exception, however, applies only if the state witness is an
eyewitness since the testimony would then be direct evidence.

FACTS:

In two separate Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, both dated January 15, 1998,
Feliciano Anabe y Capillan (appellant) and one Felicita Generalao y Irgulastion (Felicita), in conspiracy with
"another person (Conrada)," were charged with robbery with homicide and destructive arson. When arraigned,
appellant and Felicita pleaded not guilty. FELECITA, turned state witness.

FACTS presented on the case for the crime:

At around 8:00 p.m. of December 31, 1997, appellant instructed Felicita and Conrada to repair to their room
while he sat beside Uy who was watching television. After about an hour, Conrada went to the dining room
and saw appellant holding a knife. As Felicita followed, she saw the dead body of Uy lying on the floor covered
with a mat, and as she noticed a bloodstained knife on the table, she exclaimed, "you killed Kuya Tony!,"
which appellant admitted.

Appellant at once instructed Felicita and Conrada to leave the house, otherwise they would be suspected of
killing Uy. Appellant then hailed a taxi which the three of them boarded after he had gone back to the house
 to set it on fire. They headed for a pier in Tondo, Manilaand boarded a boat that brought them to Masbate
where they stayed in appellant's house for a week.

To appellant, Felicita was merely motivated by her desire to exculpate herself. At any rate, he argues that there was
no corroborative evidence to substantiate Felicita's testimony on material points. He thus posits that his conviction
should not be based on the alleged weakness of his defense, but on proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The People, on the other hand, maintain that a credible testimony from an accused-turned-state-witness suffices even
if uncorroborated; and that the testimony of Felicita, apart from being credible, was confirmed by the findings of
police investigators.

*No conspiracy was proven between the 3 accused.

ISSUE:

Did Felicita qualify to be discharged in the case and become a state witness? (NO)

RULING:

Felicita's testimony on appellant's confession being uncorroborated, the question is whether it can stand alone and be
given full credence. Turning an accused into a state witness is not a magic formula that cures all the deficiencies in
the prosecution's evidence. It is in fact a requirement for the discharge of an accused to be a state witness under
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court that the testimony to be given can be substantially corroborated in its
material points.

Sec. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. — When two or more persons are jointly charged with the
commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or
more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when,
after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at
a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that: XXX

(b) Ther is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except
the testimony of said accused;

(c) The tstimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; XXX

The Court is not unaware that as an exception to the general rule requiring corroboration, the uncorroborated
testimony of a state witness may be sufficient when it is shown to be sincere in itself because it is given unhesitatingly
and in a straightforward manner and full of details which, by their nature, could not have been the result of deliberate
afterthought. This exception, however, applies only if the state witness is an eyewitness since the testimony would
then be direct evidence. The above-quoted Section 17 of Rule 119 actually assumes that the testimony of the accused
sought to be discharged as a state witness would constitute direct evidence (i.e., that he or she is an eyewitness) in
that it requires that there is no other direct evidence, except the testimony of the said accused.

Where, as here, the state witness is not an eyewitness, the testimony partakes of the nature of circumstantial
evidence. The rule on circumstantial evidence thus applies. If the testimony is uncorroborated, it does not suffice. It
cannot merit full credence. Again, the rule on circumstantial evidence requires that, among other things, there is more
than one circumstance and the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused of the crime charged only if the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.

The uncorroborated testimony of Felicita does not suffice to establish that appellant committed violence on Uy. Neither
does appellant's Eight. The fact remains that the three persons present at around the time the crime was committed
ALL FLED thereafter. Appellant's involvement in every element of the crime charged must still be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, the rule is that the circumstances must be proved, and not
themselves presumed. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has
committed the offense charged.
339. Jimenez v. People - 17 Sept. 2014

CASE PRINCIPLE:
In a motion to discharge an accused to become a state witness, it is still the trial court that determines whether the prosecution’s
preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’ qualifications satisfies the procedural norms. This is a symbiotic relationship as the trial
court largely exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutor’s findings and evaluation.

FACTS:
Manuel A. Montero confessed his participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda naming Manuel J. Jimenez and several others as
co-conspirators. His statements detailed where the alleged steel casing containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the
recovery of a cadaver near the place which he pointed to. Montero filed a motion for discharge as a state witness for the prosecution, to
which Jimenez opposed. The motion to discharge was granted by Judge Zaldy B. Docena stating that the prosecution had presented
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence showing compliance with the requisites of granting the said motion.

Jimenez opposed Judge Docena’s ruling averring that the Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to
discharge because:
1) the requirements for granting a motion were not properly complied;
2) there is no absolute necessity of the testimony of Montero;
3) Montero’s testimony do not corroborate with the prosecution’s evidence;
4) and Montero is favored as a state witness though he appears to be the most guilty.

ISSUE:
Did Judge Docena gravely abuse his discretion when he granted the motion to discharge Montero as a state witness? (NO)

RULING:
Jurisprudence has defined “grave abuse of discretion” as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner. To resolve a motion to discharge under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, it only require that that the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be substantially corroborated in its
material points, not on all points.A trial judge cannot be expected or required, at the start of the trial, to inform himself with absolute
certainty of everything that may develop in the course of the trial with respect to the guilty participation of the accused. It is still the trial
court that determines whether the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’ qualifications to be a state witness
satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship is in reality a symbiotic one as the trial court, by the very nature of its role in the
administration of justice, largely exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutor’s findings and evaluation.

Topic: Sec. 18. Discharge of accused operate as acquittal

340. People v. De Guzman, 326 SCRA 131

CASE PRINCIPLE:
Non- compliance under the requirements for discharge does not invalidate the testimony provided by the discharged accused

FACTS:
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court, appellants were charged with robbery with homicide for having willfully and
feloniously killed Dr. Amadeo Belmonte and Teresa Hape and then robbed and took away, without the victims' consent, several articles
and cash. Only De Guzman, Ramos and Mosqueda were apprehended. Ancheta remained at large. When they were arraigned, the three
accused entered a plea of not guilty. At the trial and upon motion of the prosecution, Mosqueda was discharged and was utilized as state
witness. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding de Guzman and Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Unsatisfied with the verdict, appellants filed an appeal before the Court questioning the decision of the lower court. Before the decision
in this case, appellant de Guzman withdrew his appeal, leaving Ramos as the only appellant.
The contention of the appellant was that some of the requirements under Section 9 of Rule 119 for the discharge of Mosqueda to become
state witness were not strictly and properly
met, namely: 1. The absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested 2. There is no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the accused 3. Said accused does not appear to be
the most guilty. Hence, Mosqueda’s testimony shall be disregarded as his discharge was invalid.

ISSUE:
WON Mosqueda’s testimony shall be taken into account considering that the requirements under Section 9 of Rule 119 for his discharge
was not properly met? (YES)
RULING:
While this Court agrees that some of the requirements under Section 9 of Rule 119 for the discharge of Mosqueda to become state
witness were not strictly and properly met, nonetheless, this Court does not subscribe to the suggestion of the defense that Mosqueda's
testimony should be disregarded. This issue has long been settled. Although the trial court may have erred in discharging the accused,
such error would not affect the competency and the quality of the testimony of the defendant. The discharge of an accused under these
circumstances is not reversible. Once his discharge is effected, the legal consequence of acquittal follows unless the accused so
discharged fails or refuses to testify pursuant to his commitment. The order for his discharge may only be recalled in one instance, and
that is when he subsequently fails to testify against his co-accused.

341. People v. Deong, 338 SCRA 657

DOCTRINE: Any witting or unwitting error of the prosecution in asking for the discharge of an accused, and of the trial
court in granting the petition for discharge, would not deprive the discharged accused of the acquittal specified in
Section 10 of Rule 119 and of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, as long as no question of
jurisdiction is involved.

FACTS:
Rommel Deang, Melvin Espiritu, Nicson Catli and Benito Catli were charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom
with homicide. During the trial, a motion to discharge Benito to become a state witness was filed, which was opposed
by DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI. The trial court, however, granted the motion. The RTC of Angeles City rendered a
decision, finding accused Rommel Deang, Melvin Espiritu, and Nicson Catli guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide, and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of death. The capital
punishment having been imposed by the trial court, the assailed judgment is now with this Court on automatic review.

CATLI avers that the trial court erred in granting the discharge of Benito Catli when he was the most guilty of the four
accused and by giving weight to his testimony.

ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in granting the discharge of Benito Catli as one of the accused and utilizing him as state
witness (NO)

RULING:
It is within the discretion of the trial judge whether to grant the discharge of an accused to utilize him as state
witness. Assuming arguendo that the trial court did err, this Court has held several times in the past that any witting
or unwitting error of the prosecution in asking for the discharge of an accused, and of the trial court in granting the
petition for discharge, would not deprive the discharged accused of the acquittal specified in Section 10 of Rule 119
and of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, as long as no question of jurisdiction is involved. It is
also relevant to note that the improper or mistaken discharge of an accused would not affect his competence as a
witness or render inadmissible his testimony.

Topic: Sec. 20. Appointment of acting prosecutor

342. Salcedo v. Liwag, 9 SCRA 609

CASE PRINCIPLE:
Once a public prosecutor has been entrusted with the investigation of a case and has acted thereon by filing the necessary information
in court he is by law duty bound to take charge thereof until its final termination, for under the law he assumes full responsibility for his
failure or success since he is the one more adequately prepared to pursue it to its termination. He cannot be relieved therefrom except
for any ground that may constitute a legal disqualification.

FACTS:
It appears that petitioner was the one assigned by his chief to investigate the incident involving Sgt. Andres A. Lopez wherein he was allegedly
handcuffed and manhandled while performing guard duty as a result of which, because of sufficient evidence he gathered, he filed against Lt.
Romeo M. Reciña and companions three informations before the Justice of the Peace Court of Jolo, province of Sulu. Apparently these
informations were dismissed without the intervention of petitioner, and so he later refilled them.

Then a series of postponements ensued at the instance of counsel of the accused and in the process many attempts were made, not only on the
part of the accused, but even on the part of certain provincial and national officials to have petitioner relieved from the prosecution on the
alleged ground that he has taken an unusual interest in the conviction of Lt. Reciña because of a supposed rivalry over a woman.

He refused time and again to yield the prosecution of the cases even in defiance of superior orders claiming that since he has
investigated and taken action on the incident in question and the cases were already in the process of trial before the Justice of the
Peace Court of Jolo should be given the power and authority to continue the prosecution to its final termination unless it be proven that
he is disqualified to act by our Rules of Court (Section 13, Rule 115, in relation to Section 1, Rule 126).

Here he does not suffer from any disqualification as already found by said justice of the peace when counsel for the accused made an
attempt to do so. And so he considers the orders of respondents decreeing his relief unauthorized, they being an undue encroachment
on the exercise by him of his official and quasi-judicial function directly interwoven with cases which were entrusted to him to
prosecute. It is his contention that the power of control and supervision that the Secretary of Justice exercises over a public prosecutor
merely extend to administrative matters and not to those which pertain to the handling or prosecution of cases already pending in court.

In other words, he contends that once a fiscal has taken action on a case by filing the necessary information he cannot be relieved
therefrom except for any ground that may constitute a legal disqualification. To hold otherwise would be to subvert the judicial duties of
a fiscal to the detriment of public interest.

ISSUE:
WON once a fiscal has taken action on a case by filing the necessary information he cannot be relieved therefrom except for any ground
that may constitute a legal disqualification. (YES)

RULING:
There is merit in the contention that once a public prosecutor has been entrusted with the investigation of a case and has acted thereon
by filing the necessary information in court he is by law in duty bound to take charge thereof until its final termination, for under the
law he assumes full responsibility for his failure or success since he is the one more adequately prepared to pursue it to its termination.
This is more so when the attempt to relieve him is motivated by reasons that are not compatible with sound administration of justice.

Respondents contend that the Secretary of Justice merely acted on the matter pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by law over
fiscals and public prosecutors invoking in his favor the portion of the law which provides: "It (Department of Justice) shall also have
general supervision and control of the provincial sheriffs and all law officers of the Government, the provincial and city Fiscals or
attorneys and other prosecuting officers." (Section 83, in relation to Section 79 [C], Revised Administrative Code).

But this power of control and supervision can only extend to administrative matters and not when it may conflict or encroach on the
performance by the fiscal of his duties in connection with the prosecution of a case investigated and acted upon by him. To this extent
he should be given wide latitude in order that the best interest of justice may be accomplished. This is the case of petitioner.

<<CATHERINE VEGA>>>

(COURTNEY VILLAGONZALO)

Case # 361. Abejuela v. People, 200 SCRA 806

Facts: Balo, an employee of Banco Filipino and a friend of Abejuela, borrowed the latter’s passbook because “he has money to deposit
from the insurance policy of his father and that he was prohibited from opening his own savings account with Banco Filipino because he
is a savings bookkeeper”.

The bank manager discovered discrepancies with the ledgers connected to the account of Abejuela and was convinced that the
irregularities were caused by Balo who manipulated the ledger by posting fictitious deposits after banking hours.
An information was filed against Balo and Abejuela for estafa through falsification of commercial documents.

During the pendency of the case, Balo was reportedly killed by members of the NPA.

The court convicted Abejuela. He sought the reversal of his conviction. He alleged that he had no knowledge of Balo’s criminal intent
and that the presumption of innocence and the equipoise rule should be applied in his favor.

Issue: W/N Abejuela should be convicted

SC: NO.
The most that can be attributed to Abejuela was his negligence in lending his passbook and his utter gullibility.
Knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal (Balo) is essential in order that Abejuela can be convicted as an accomplice in the
crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial document.
It is axiomatic that in criminal proceedings, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary before a judgment of conviction can be
rendered.

Case #362. Maximo v. Gerochi, Jr., 144 SCRA 326

Facts:
the City Fiscal of Bacolod Eled with the Circuit Criminal Court, 12th Judicial District, Bacolod City, four (4) informations for estafa
against respondent Conchita Panghilason for issuing 4 checks that were dishonored for lack of funds.

In the judgment, it was held that the prosecution failed to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that if accused had any
obligation, it is simply civil in nature that could be properly ventilated within the context of civil law.

Issue: W/N no civil liability arising from the acts complained of may be awarded in the same judgment

Ruling: NO.
If an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily follow that no civil liability arising from the acts complained of may be awarded in the
same judgment.
the Court may acquit an accused on reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil damages already proved in the same case without
need for a separate civil action. Panghilason is ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P33,586.00 with 12% interest from July 10, 1976
until fully paid.

Sec. 3. Judgment for two or more offenses

Case #363. People v. Corral, 157 SCRA 673

Facts:
Rouben Corral was indicted for rape before the Court of First Instance of Albay upon complaint of Josephine. 8 And after trial, Rouben
was found guilty of the crime beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced, by judgment promulgated on November 20, 1985, to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua

Rouben Corral has brought this case up to this Court on appeal, basically questioning the suMciency of the evidence of the State on
which his conviction was founded.

Josephine Menghamal had been forced by the appellant to have sexual intercourse with him twice in the evening of that same day, the
latter claims that their acts of coupling — he conIrms that there had actually been two (2)

Issue: W/N Corral should be convicted for two crimes of rape

Ruling: NO.
The proofs establish the commission of two (2) crimes of rape by the appellant. Each act of forcible sexual intercourse constitutes one
distinct offense of rape. This notwithstanding, it is not legally possible to convict the offender of two (2) rapes albeit perpetrated on the
same occasion, where the information charges only one and otherwise contains no averments from which a conclusion that more than
one such offense has been committed may plainly and patently be drawn

Sec. 4. Judgments in case of variance between allegation and proof

Case #364. People v. Gallande, 325 SCRA 172

Facts:
An information for the special complex crime of rape with homicide was filed charging accused-appellant of having sexual intercourse
with one Editha Talan, a minor, 10 years of age, against her will and consent, and thereafter, with intent to kill, cover the nose and
mouth of the said minor resulting to her death and then bury her in the field.

The lower court convicted accused-appellant of the crime of murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because of the
lack of proof of carnal knowledge.

Issue: W/N the accused should be convicted for murder only

Ruling: NO
the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant of murder in an information charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the
accusatory portion of the information showed that there was no allegation of any qualifying circumstance. In rape with homicide, in
order to be convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying circumstance must be su8ciently
alleged and proved. In the absence in the information of an allegation of any qualifying circumstance, accused-appellant cannot be
convicted of murder

Case #365. People v. Arondain, G.R. 131864-65, Sept. 27, 2001

Sherjohn Arondain and Jose Precioso were accused of the crime of Frustrated Robbery with Homicide. In addition, Sherjohn Arondain
was accused of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm

police officers responded to a report of a hold-up incident near the Florete Compound, along Q. Abeto Street, Mandurriao, Iloilo City. At
the said place they found many people milling around a Chin-chin taxicab with its lights still on. Officer Melendes inspected the taxicab
and found its driver, Teodorico Parreño, Jr., dead in the driver's seat. Scattered on the floor of the cab and on the ground beneath the
open door were money bills of different denominations totaling P1,040.00. The deceased's wallet containing a small amount of money
was found beside him. Meanwhile, John Gallo, a security guard of the Florete Compound, informed the police officers that after he
heard a gunshot, he saw two male persons come out of the Chin-chin taxicab and run toward the field at the back of the Florete
Compound. Acting on the lead, the police officers requested the security guard of the compound to illuminate the field. As soon as the
searchlight was turned on, the policemen saw Arondain holding a gun. Officer Mosquito fired a warning shot, approached Arondain and
asked him where his companion was, and he pointed to Jose Precioso who was lying on his belly about 8 to 10 meters away. Found in
Arondain's possession was a .38 caliber revolver with 2 live bullets and an empty shell. It was also proved that Arondain had no license
to possess and carry firearms. When they were asked by the police officers why they shot the victim, Arondain answered that he shot the
victim because the latter resisted his demand for money. On the contrary, Arondain and Precioso interposed the theory of self-defense.

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 25 of Iloilo City convicted Arondain and Precioso with the crime Frustrated Robbery with Homicide
and the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed upon them. Likewise, Arondain was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
the penalty of death was imposed upon him

Issue: W/N Arondain should be convicted for Frustrated Robbery with Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearm?

Ruling: NO.
The court ruled that there was no proof that the victim's wallet which was found beside him was taken out from his pocket by accused-
appellant. Prosecution witness John Ballo, who saw accused-appellant come out of the victim's taxicab, never testified that accused-
appellant robbed the victim. His declaration was that accused-appellant went out of the cab carrying a gun. Nowhere in his testimony
did he say that he saw accused-appellant attempting to rob, or walking away with the money of the victim. In the absence of clear and
convincing evidence that accused-appellant committed frustrated robbery, he should only be found guilty of the crime of homicide.

Further, with the passage of Republic Act No. 8294, however, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide or murder
is no longer treated as a separate offense, but only as a special aggravating circumstance.

Moreover, under said Act, only one crime is committed, i.e., homicide or murder with the aggravating circumstance of illegal possession
of firearm, and only one penalty shall be imposed on the accused. R.A. No. 8294 favors the accused-appellant in the instant case since it
treats the two offenses for which he was charged only as a single offense

Case #366. People v. Chi Chan Liu - 21 January 2015

Facts:
The police officers received a report about two suspicious-looking boats (a fishing boat and a speed boat) that were transferring cargo.
When they approached it, the fishing boat sped away. They were able to approach the speed boat that seemed to be having an engine
trouble.
On board the speed boat, the officers found the appellants Chi Chan Liu a.k.a. Chan Que and Hui Lao Chung a.k.a. Leofe Senglao with
several transparent plastic bags containing shabu. They requested the appellants to show their identification papers but appellants
failed to do so

the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed an Information 21 with the RTC of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro,
against appellants for violation of Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of RA No. 6425 as amended by RA No.
7659

trial court found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the illegal importation of regulated drugs

Issue: W/N illegal possession is necessarily included in the illegal importation of regulated drugs

Ruling: YES

charging appellants with illegal possession when the information filed against them charges the crime of importation does not violate
their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought against them. The rule is that when there is a
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense
as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is
charged. An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former,
as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter

illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in illegal importation of dangerous drugs, convicting appellants of the
former, if duly established beyond reasonable doubt, does not amount to a violation of their right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against them. Indeed, where an accused is charged with a specific crime, he is duly informed not only of such specific
crime but also of lesser crimes or offenses included therein

Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another

Case #367. U.S. v. Guzman, 8 Phil. 21

Facts:
De Guzman and Fajardo were accused of lesiones menos graves for the personal injuries inflicted against Pedro Ignacio. Fajardo was
acquitted while De Guzman was sentenced to prision correctional, a penalty for lesiones graves.

Issue: W/N De Guzman should be convicted for lesiones graves.

Ruling: No.
The defendant was charged in the Information with the crime of lesiones menos graces. He could, therefore, not be punished for the
crime of lesiones graves, a graver offense than that with which he was charged.

His penalty was higher because of the aggravating circumstance of aleviosa.

Sec. 6. Promulgation of judgment

Case #368. People v. Mapalao, 197 SCRA 79

Facts:
The respondents were accused of Highway robbery with homicide. They pleaded not guilty.

Accused Rex Magumnang escaped from detention on September 25, 1988 when brought for medical treatment to the Baguio General
Hospital, so the trial in absentia continued as to him

After the trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the trial court on January 12, 1990 convicting the accused of the offense charged

Issue: W/N there was a valid promulgation of judgment

Ruling: YES
If upon promulgation of the judgment, the accused fails to appear without justifiable cause, despite due notice to him, his bondsmen or
counsel, he is thereby considered to have waived his right to appeal. However, if within the fifteen (15) day period of appeal he
voluntarily surrenders to the court or is otherwise arrested, then he may avail of the right to appeal within said period of appeal
 Case #369. Icdang v. People, G.R. No.185960, Jan. 25, 2012

There is nothing in the rules that requires the presence of counsel for the promulgation of the judgment of conviction to be valid.

Facts:
Marino Icdang was the Regional Director of the OSCC. A Special Audit Team was formed and noted that Icdang was granted cash
advances which remained unliquidated. He never denied that he received the amount. The Office of the Ombudsman charged him for
violation of RA 3019. The Sandiganbayan convicted Icdang of malversation. Then Icdang filed a MR requesting that he be given another
chance to present his evidence, stating that his inability to attend the trial was due to financial constraints such that even when some of
the scheduled hearings were held in Davao City and Cebu City, he still failed to attend the same.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it rendered its judgment of conviction
Ruling:
No. While notice must be served on both accused and his counsel, the latter’s absence during the promulgation of judgment would not
affect the validity of the promulgation. No substantial right of the accused on the merits was prejudiced by such absence of his counsel
when the sentence was pronounced.
Icdang never raised issue on the fact that his counsel was not around during the promulgation of the judgment in his MR which merely
prayed for reopening of the case to enable him to present liquidation documents and receipts, citing financial constraints as the reason
for his failure to attend the scheduled hearings. The defense was granted ample opportunity to present their evidence as in fact several
postponements were made on account of Atty. Iral’s health condition and Icdang’s lack of financial resources to cover transportation
costs. The Sandiganbayan exercised utmost leniency and compassion and even appointed a counsel de oficio when petitioner cited lack
of money to pay for attorney’s fees. In those instances when either Icdang or his counsel was present in court, the documentary evidence
listed during the pre-trial, allegedly in the possession of Icdang and which he undertook to present at the trial, were never produced in
court at any time. If indeed these documents existed, Icdang could have readily submitted them to the court considering the length of
time he was given to do so. From the fact that not a single document nor witness was produced by the defense in a span of four years
afforded them by the Sandiganbayan, shows that petitioner did not have those evidence in the first place

Case #370. Villena v. People, G.R. No. 184091, Jan. 31, 2011
Facts:
Petitioners were indicted for robbery (extortion).
After arraignment, where the accused all pled "not guilty," and pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. Petitioners failed to appear before
the trial court to adduce evidence in their defense. It was only PO3 Macalinao who appeared before the court to present his evidence

The RTC convicted the petitioners.

During the promulgation of judgment on September 3, 2007, petitioners again failed to appear despite proper notices to them at their
addresses of record. In the absence of petitioners, the promulgation was made pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5, Section 6, Rule 120 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the RTC issued warrants of arrest against them

They filed a notice of appeal wherein they explained that they failed to attend the promulgation of judgment because they did not
receive any notice thereof because they were transferred to another police station

RTC denied due course to petitioners' notices of appeal

The RTC issued an order denying the petitioners' motion, for failure to adduce any valid excuse or compelling justification for the
reconsideration, reversal, and setting aside of the November 20, 2007
CA nevertheless resolved to deny the same for failure to show prima facie evidence of any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC.

Issue: W/N the CA erred in upholding the RTC in its denial of their respective notices of appeal since they already contained the
required manifestation and information as to the cause of their non-appearance on the scheduled promulgation on September 3, 2007,
i.e., lack of notice

Ruling:
While it is true that an appeal is perfected upon the mere filing of a notice of appeal and that the trial court thereupon loses jurisdiction
over the case, this principle presupposes that the party filing the notice of appeal could validly avail of the remedy of appeal and had not
lost standing in court. In this case, petitioners have lost their standing in court by their unjustified failure to appear during the trial and,
more importantly, during the promulgation of judgment of conviction, and to surrender to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
petitioners did not proffer any documentary and convincing proof of their supposed transfer, not even to inform the court as to which
police station they were transferred
the accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available under the Rules of
Court against the judgment — (a) the Jling of a motion for new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment
of conviction (Rule 122). However, the Rules allow the accused to regain his standing in court in order to avail of these remedies by: (a)
his surrender, and (b) his Jling of a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies, stating therein the reasons for his absence,
within 15 days from the date of promulgation of judgment

Thus, petitioners' mere Jling of notices of appeal through their new counsel, therein only explaining their absence during the
promulgation of judgment, cannot be considered an act of surrender

(IMPTORTANT) The term "surrender" under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court contemplates an act whereby a convicted
accused physically and voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court to suffer the consequences of the verdict against him

Case #371. Cuyo v. People, G.R. No. 192164, Oct. 12, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal possession of ;rearms against Alejo. Alejo filed a complaint for perjury against petitioner.

Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in San Fernando City, La Union, found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code

Petitioner was not present during the promulgation of the judgment and was represented by his counsel instead

On 28 August 2009, petitioner ;led a Motion for Reconsideration 3 of the Decision, but the motion was subsequently denied 4 by the
MTCC on 19 October 2009. Petitioner received the Order of the MTCC denying his Motion for Reconsideration on 23 October 2009. He
subsequently ;led a Motion for Probation 5 on 5 November 2009.

On 6 January 2010, the MTCC issued an Order 6 denying petitioner's latter motion on the ground that it had been ;led beyond the
reglementary period of ;fteen (15) days as provided by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, or the Probation Law of
1976. 7 The reckoning date used by the MTCC in computing the 15 day period was the day of promulgation on 25 August 2009, tolled by
the period from the ;ling of the Motion for Reconsideration to the receipt of the Order denying the motion on 23 October 2009

petitioner moved for the reconsideration 8 of the latter order, asking for a liberal interpretation of the rules with regard to the
computation of the period for applying for probation.

The MTCC, however, denied the motion on 3 February 2010. Reference was made to Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 10 wherein the appeal
period was sought to be standardized, by establishing the rule that a fresh period of 15 days was allowed within which to ;le a notice of
appeal, counted from the receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or a motion for reconsideration. It ruled that Neypes
does not apply to Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

Cuyo asserted that the "fresh period rule" established in Neypes should also be applied to criminal cases

RTC denied the Petition and ruled that the application period had lapsed when petitioner neither surrendered nor ;led a motion for
leave to avail himself of the remedies under the Rules of Court

Issue: W/N the RTC erred in computing the 15-day period provided in the Probation Law

Ruling: NO
we agree with the RTC that the Motion for Probation was ;led out of time.
Sec. 6, Rule 120 says that “If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justi;able cause, he shall
lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within ;fteen (15) days from
promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and ;le a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall
state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justi;able cause, he shall be
allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.”

perjury is not a light felony or offense contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was therefore mandatory for petitioner to be present at the
promulgation of the judgment

Pursuant to Rule 120, Sec. 6, it is only when the accused is convicted of a light offense that a promulgation may be pronounced in the
presence of his counsel or representative. In case the accused failed to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation despite notice, and
the failure to appear was without justi;able cause, the accused shall lose all the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment.
One such remedy was the Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment of the MTCC ;led by petitioner on 28 August 2009. Absent a
motion for leave to avail of the remedies against the judgment, the MTCC should not have entertained petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. Thus, petitioner had only 15 days from 25 August 2009 or until 9 September 2009 to ;le his Motion for Probation. The
MTCC thus committed grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the motion instead of immediately denying it

Petitioner, however, did not ;le a motion for leave to avail himself of the remedies prior to ;ling his Motion for Reconsideration. The
hearing on the motion for leave would have been the proper opportunity for the parties to allege and contest whatever cause prevented
petitioner from appearing on 25 August 2009, and whether that cause was indeed justi;able. If granted, petitioner would have been
allowed to avail himself of other remedies under the Rules of Court, including a motion for reconsideration

Case #372. Jaylo v. Sandigan - 21 January 2015

Facts:
Sandiganbayan found Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona, and Habalo guilty of homicide. Jaylo was convicted for the killing of De Guzman

Considering the failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy and the attendance of any of the alleged qualifying circumstances, as well
as the failure of the defense to prove the justifying circumstance of ful;llment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right or oEce, the
Sandiganbayan ruled that the crime committed was homicide

During the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan's judgment on 17 April 2007, none of the accused appeared despite notice. 38 The court
promulgated the Decision in absentia, and the judgment was entered in the criminal docket. The bail bonds of the accused were
cancelled, and warrants for their arrest issued

On 30 April 2007, counsel for Jaylo, Valenzona, and Habalo ;led a Motion for Partial Reconsideration 39 of the Decision

The court ruled that the 15-day period from the promulgation of the judgment had long lapsed without any of the accused giving any
justi;able cause for their absence during the promulgation. Under Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, 41 Jaylo, Valenzona and
Habalo have lost the remedies available under the Rules against the Sandiganbayan's judgment of conviction, including the ;ling of a
motion for reconsideration

The court ruled that for the failure of the three to surrender and move for leave to avail themselves of a motion for reconsideration
within 15 days from the date of promulgation, the judgment has become ;nal and executory, and no action on the motion for
reconsideration can be taken. 43 It then reiterated its order to implement the warrants for the arrest of the three

Issue: W/N Sandiganbayan erred in ruling that the Petitioners are guilty of homicide even in the absence of their positive identification
as the ones who committed the crimes charged

(Petitioners argue that Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court cannot diminish, increase or modify substantive rights like the ;ling of
a motion for reconsideration provided under Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1606)

Ruling: NO.

The Sandiganbayan was correct in not taking cognizance of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration ;led by counsel for petitioners. While
the motion was ;led on 30 April 2007, it did not operate to regain the standing of petitioners in court. For one, it is not an act of
surrender that is contemplated by Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court. Moreover, nowhere in the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration was it indicated that petitioners were asking for leave to avail of the remedies against the judgment of conviction, or
that there were valid reasons for their absence at the promulgation

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction shall lose the remedies available against the said judgment.

The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence of the accused despite notice. The promulgation in absentia shall be
made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy thereof to the accused at their last known address or through
counsel. The court shall also order the arrest of the accused if the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without
justifiable cause.

When the accused on bail fail to present themselves at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction, they are considered to have lost
their standing in court. 47 Without any standing in court, the accused cannot invoke its jurisdiction to seek relief

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away substantive rights; it merely provides the manner through which an
existing right may be implemented
Like an appeal, the right to ;le a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant or privilege. As a statutory right, the ;ling of a motion for
reconsideration is to be exercised in accordance with and in the manner provided by law. Thus, a party ;ling a motion for
reconsideration must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court

It bears stressing that the provision on which petitioners base their claim states that "[a] petition for reconsideration of any ;nal order or
decision may be ;led within ;fteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the ;nal order or judgment." 51 In Social Security
Commission v. Court of Appeals, 52 we enunciated that the term "may" denotes a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. Those
granted this opportunity may choose to exercise it or not. If they do, they must comply with the conditions attached thereto

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the
Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justi;able cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of
conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment.

It is well to note that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court also provides the remedy by which the accused who were absent during
the promulgation may reverse the forfeiture of the remedies available to them against the judgment of conviction. In order to regain
their standing in court, the accused must do as follows: 1) surrender and 2) ;le a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies,
stating the reasons for their absence, within 15 days from the date of the promulgation of judgment

Case #373. Salvador v. Chua - 15 July 2015

Facts:
petitioner and his wife Marinel Salvador were charged in the RTC with estafa

On March 30, 2011, the date scheduled for the promulgation of the judgment, their counsel moved for the deferment of the
promulgation inasmuch as the petitioner was then suffering from hypertension. 4 Unconvinced of the reason, the RTC proceeded to
promulgate its decision and found the spouses guilty of estafa.

The RTC then issued a warrant for the petitioner's arrest. He was apprehended on April 7, 2011, or eight days from the promulgation of
the judgment

The petitioner filed his Motion for Leave to File Notice of Appeal and attached a medical certificate saying that he had submitted himself
to a medical consultation at the Rizal Medical Center on March 30, 2011 and had been found to be suffering from hypertension. RTC
denied the petitioner's Motion.

The case was re-raffled and the new judge fixed the bail of P 80,000 for the provisional liberty of the petitioner.

Issue: whether the petitioner had lost his right to appeal his conviction

Ruling: YES.
As the rule expressly indicates, the promulgation of the judgment of conviction may be done in absentia. The accused in such case is
allowed a period of 15 days from notice of the judgment to him or his counsel within which to appeal; otherwise, the decision becomes
final. The accused who fails to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction loses the remedies available under the Rules of
Court against the judgment. However, the Rules of Court permits him to regain his standing in court in order to avail himself of these
remedies within 15 days from the date of promulgation of the judgment conditioned upon: (a) his surrender; and (b) his filing of a
motion for leave of court to avail himself of the remedies, stating herein the reason for his absence. Should the trial court find that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he should be allowed to avail himself of the remedies within 15 days from the notice of order finding
his absence justified and allowing him the available remedies from the judgment of conviction.

Under Section 6, supra, the personal presence of the petitioner at the promulgation of the judgment in Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-
04689-CR was mandatory because the offense of which he was found guilty was not a light felony or offense.

Based on the records, the promulgation of the judgment was on March 30, 2011; hence, the petitioner had only until April 14, 2011
within which to meet the mandatory requirements under Section 6

Even assuming that he had suffered hypertension, which could have validly excused his absence from the promulgation, the petitioner
did not fulfill the other requirement of Sec. 6, to surrender himself to the trial court. The term surrender used in the rule visibly
necessitated his physical and voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court to suffer any consequences of the verdict against him.

In its assailed decision, therefore, the CA unavoidably declared the petitioner to have lost his standing in court because of his non-
compliance with Section 6, supra. His failure to fulfill the requirements rendered his conviction final and immutable. He ought to be
reminded that the right to appeal, being neither a natural right or a part of due process, is a merely statutory privilege that should be
exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law establishing the right; otherwise, it is lost.

Sec. 7. Modification of judgment

Case #374. Roallos v. People. G.R. No. 198389, Dec. 11, 2013
Facts:
On July 26, 2007, the RTC found Roallos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of sexual abuse punished under Section 5 (b),
Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. No. 7610).
Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused VIVENCIO ROALLOS Y TRILLANES is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 5 (b) of Republic Act 7610 and he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor medium as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
reclusion temporal maximum as maximum; to indemnify [AAA] in the amount of [P]20,000.00 by way of moral damages; and pay the
=ne of [P]15,000.00.

On appeal, the CA rendered the Decision dated April 29, 2011 which affirmed the RTC and modified the amount of damages.
Roallos contended that he should not be convicted for 4 reasons:
1. The information was defective
2. He was denied due process as he was not made to undergo a preliminary investigation
3. His arrest was illegal, and
4. There was unreasonable delay in the prosecution of the case.

Issue: whether the CA erred in affirming Roallos’ conviction

Ruling: NO
1. the Information is clear — Roallos was charged with the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610. In a criminal case, factual =ndings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially
when such =ndings are supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court
overlooked material and relevant matters, that this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual =ndings of the court below. 18 The
Court =nds no reason to overturn the factual =ndings as the lower courts in this case.
2. the accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity attending his arrest should he fail to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground prior to arraignment,
3. Roallos failed to substantiate his claim that his right to speedy trial was violated
4. Lastly, that neither AAA nor BBB signed the Information =led against Roallos would not render the charge against the latter
defective
The Court likewise upholds the =ne imposed by the lower courts in the amount of P15,000.00

the Court hereby modi=es the amount of moral damages and civil indemnity awarded by the CA. The RTC directed Roallos to pay AAA
moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00. The CA increased the amount of moral damages awarded by the RTC to P50,000.00 and
imposed an additional award for civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. In line with recent jurisprudence, 28 the Court deems it
proper to reduce the award of moral damages from P50,000.00 to P15,000.00, as well as the award of civil indemnity from P50,000.00
to P20,000.00.

In addition, and in conformity with current policy, the Court imposes interest on all monetary awards for damages at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid

Held: WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 29, 2011 and the
Resolution dated August 19, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32192 are hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in
that Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes is ordered to pay P15,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as civil indemnity. He is likewise
ordered to pay interest on all monetary awards for damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this
Resolution until fully satisfied.

Sec. 8. Entry of judgment

Sec. 9. Existing provisions governing suspension of sentence, prohibition and

parole, not allowed by this Rule

Case #375. Colinares v. People - 13 December 2011

Facts:
The RTC convicted Arnel Colinares for the crime of frustrated homicide. The RTC sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years
and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum
probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of
attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely aDrmed the RTC decision but
deleted the award for lost income in the absence of evidence to support it. 3 Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court on petition for
review.

Issue: Given a 9nding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced probationable penalty, whether or not he
may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court

Ruling: YES
the Court 9nds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him
should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional,
as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the
RTC.
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail
himself of probation. This requirement "outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on the result of his
appeal — that when his conviction is 9nally aDrmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence
inevitable, he now applies for probation as an 'escape hatch' thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction."
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice
between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff
penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under
this Court's greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from
judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best
warranted his conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way,
therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for probation
In a real sense, the Court's 9nding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original
conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have
found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have
afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of
probation is one of liberality towards the accused

Held: WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty from four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to pay Ru9no P. Buena the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages, without prejudice to petitioner
applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has been remanded for execution to the Regional Trial
Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.

MODULE 12: RULE 121 – NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

Sec. 1. New trial or reconsideration

Sec. 2. Grounds for new trial

Case # 376. People v. Castelo, 1 SCRA 461

Facts:
Castelo was sentenced to death for the crime of murder.
He filed a "Motion for Urgent Disposition of Petition for New Trial and Bail", dated January 9, 1961, based mainly on the ground that
the stenographic notes containing the testimonies of Edgar Bond (now deceased), Mariano Almeda, Raymundo Tal Villareal, Matias
Soriano, and Francisco Espiritu are already definitely lost; that said testimonial evidence is vital to the disposition of the case on the
merits; that the aforementioned loss of the notes would delay the filing of appellee's brief and, consequently, the termination of the
appeal, for an indefinite period of time; that to allow the continued detention of movant during the pendency of the appeal for such an
uncertain or indefinite period is violative of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Thus, it is prayed that the case be set for new trial,
and in the meantime, defendant-appellant Oscar Castelo be released on bail.

Issue: W/N the motion for new trial should be granted on the ground of missing stenographic notes
Ruling: NO
The irregularity that justifies a new trial under this Rule is, as the rule itself prescribes, one that has been committed during the trial.
There is no pretense that an actual irregularity has been committed during the trial. The proceedings have been all in accordance with
law and a decision on the merits has been duly rendered and promulgated. This present appellant has already filed his brief and no
reference to any irregularity has been made therein. All that he assails is the correctness of the decision on the merits.

The irregularity that justifies a new trial under Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, is one that has been committed during the
trial. Where the proceedings have been all in accordance with law, and decision on the merits has been duly rendered and promulgated,
the original decision which is extant in the records, need not be set aside. It is only when the decision itself has been lost and no
authentic copy thereof is obtainable, that the case be decided anew, as if it had never been decided.

We rather believe that the remedy is the reconstitution of the missing evidence as provided in Sections 14 and 15 of Act 3110

Case # 377. Ybiernas v. Gabaldon, G.R. No. 178925, June 1, 2011

Facts:
Estrella Ybiernas owned a parcel of land located in Talisay, Negros Occidental covered by a TCT. She executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
over the property in favor of her heirs, one of them is Dionisio Ybiernas.
On June 30, 1989, Bacolod RTC issued an Order in Cadastral Case No. 10, directing the registration and annotation of the Deed of
Absolute Sale on the title. Thus, the Deed of Absolute Sale and the said RTC Order were annotated on the title. [Neither the defendants
nor anyone else has challenged the validity of the mentioned judicial proceedings before the RTC.]
Respondents Tanco-Gabaldon and Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc. filed with the Pasig RTC a Complaint for sum of money and damages
against Estrella and three other individuals. Upon respondents’ motion, the Pasig RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment upon filing of a bond. The sheriff issued the corresponding writ of attachment and levied the subject property. When
Estrella’s heirs learned about the levy, Dionisio filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim, asserting the transfer of ownership to them.
The Pasig RTC resolved the Complaint for sum of money in favor of respondents, and Estrella, et al. were ordered to pay.
In the meantime, Dionisio died and was succeeded by his heirs. Petitioners filed with the Bacolod RTC a Complaint for Quieting of Title
and Damages, claiming that the levy was invalid because the property is not owned by any of the defendants in the Pasig RTC case. They
averred that the annotation of the RTC Order and the Deed of Absolute Sale on the TCT serves as notice to the whole world that the
property is no longer owned by Estrella.
Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment. The Bacolod RTC initially denied the motion. Upon petitioners’ MR, the Bacolod RTC
granted the motion for summary judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
The levy on attachment made by herein defendant Sheriff of RTC.. Pasig City on said TCT.. issued by the RD of the Province of Negros
Occidental, covering the Subject Property, is hereby DECLARED INVALID; and, consequently,
[the] Entry .. on the same TCT .. is hereby CANCELLED and DISSOLVED.
Respondents filed a notice of appeal, and it was granted by the RTC. While the appeal was pending in the CA, respondents filed an
MNT, claiming that they have discovered that the Cadastral Case did not exist and the Deed of Sale was simulated.
The CA granted respondents’ MNT. The CA denied petitioners’ MR. Petitioners subsequently filed this petition for review on certiorari

Issue: WON the RTC judgment is a final judgment

WON MNT could be allowed

Ruling:
1. YES
Only a final judgment or order, as opposed to an interlocutory order, may be the subject of a MNT.
A summary judgment is granted to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there appears from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of damages. The RTC judgment
in this case fully determined the rights and obligations of the parties relative to the case for quieting of title and left no other issue
unresolved, except the amount of damages. Hence, it is a final judgment.
Here, the trial court, in stating that “except as to the amount of damages, a summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants,” had, in effect, resolved all issues, including the right to damages in favor of the plaintiffs
(petitioners). What remained undetermined was only the amount of damages.

2. YES; We find that a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is warranted. The Rules allows the courts to grant a new
trial when there are errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused committed during the trial, or when
there exists newly discovered evidence. The grant or denial of a new trial is, generally speaking, addressed to the sound discretion of the
court which cannot be interfered with unless a clear abuse thereof is shown.
This Court has repeatedly held that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown
(1) that the evidence was discovered after trial;
(2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(3) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and
(4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.
If the alleged newly discovered evidence could have been very well presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence,
the same cannot be considered newly discovered.
The only contentious element in the case is whether the evidence could have been discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence.
The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exercised due diligence depends upon the
particular circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has been observed that the phrase is often equated with “reasonable promptness
to avoid prejudice to the defendant.” In other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good faith
component.
On the second requisite, respondents explained that they could not have discovered the evidence with reasonable diligence because they
relied in good faith on the veracity of the RTC Order dated June 30, 1989, based on the principle that the issuance of a court order, as an
act of a public officer, enjoys the presumption of regularity
As previously stated, respondents relied in good faith on the veracity of the Bacolod RTC Order which petitioners presented in court. It
was only practical for them to do so, if only to expedite the proceedings. Given this circumstance, we hold that respondents exercised
reasonable diligence in obtaining the evidence. The certifications therefore qualify as newly discovered evidence.

Case #378. Payumo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 151911, July 25, 2011
Facts:
A composite team of Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police units allegedly fired at a group of civilians instantly killing
one civilian and wounding seven others, including Edgar Payumo. The accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. During the
trial, the accused interposed the defenses of lawful performance of duty, self-defense, mistake of fact, and alibi. They insisted that the
incident was a result of a military operation, and not an ambush as claimed by the prosecution.

The Fifth Division promulgated its judgment dated November 27, 1998, convicting the accused of the crime of Murder with Multiple
Attempted Murder. The accused filed their Supplemental Omnibus Motion to Set Aside Judgment and for New Trial because there was
serious irregularity during the trial due to the erroneous admission of the testimonies of the witnesses of the petitioners, such should be
taken anew and to afford the accused the opportunity to present in evidence the records of the Judge Advocate General Office(JAGO)
relative to the shooting as to whether it was an ambush or the result of a military operation. The omnibus motion was granted.

Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the Sandiganbayan amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for nullifying the order of
conviction and granting new trial, Edgar Payumo and et. al, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and/or injunction to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the scheduled hearings for a second
new trial.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted a new trial in favor of the accused.

Held:
Yes. Rule 121, Section 2 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure enumerates the grounds for a new trial, to wit:
Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been commited during the trial;

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.

It must be emphasized that an erroneous admission or rejection of evidence by the trial court is not a ground for a new trial or reversal
of the decision if there are other independent evidence to sustain the decision, or if the rejected evidence, if it had been admitted; would
not have changed the decision.

The records of the JAGO relative to shooting incident do not meet the criteria for newly discovered evidence that would merit a new
trial. A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met:
1. that the evidence was discovered after trial;
2. that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
3. that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and
4. that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment.
It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but
nonetheless failed to secure it. In this case, however, such records could have been easily obtained by the accused and could have been
presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence.