100% found this document useful (1 vote)
115 views3 pages

Harlan's Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson

1) Justice Harlan dissented from the majority opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, arguing that the Constitution is colorblind and does not tolerate classes of citizens. 2) He asserted that segregation laws will stimulate aggressions against black citizens and encourage attempts to circumvent the post-Civil War amendments granting citizenship and equal protection under the law. 3) Harlan concluded that separation of citizens based solely on race is a badge of servitude inconsistent with the civil freedom and equality established by the Constitution.

Uploaded by

Kyle Kirwin
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
100% found this document useful (1 vote)
115 views3 pages

Harlan's Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson

1) Justice Harlan dissented from the majority opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, arguing that the Constitution is colorblind and does not tolerate classes of citizens. 2) He asserted that segregation laws will stimulate aggressions against black citizens and encourage attempts to circumvent the post-Civil War amendments granting citizenship and equal protection under the law. 3) Harlan concluded that separation of citizens based solely on race is a badge of servitude inconsistent with the civil freedom and equality established by the Constitution.

Uploaded by

Kyle Kirwin
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

PLESSY v.

FERGUSON: Justice Harlan's Dissent (1896)

The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in
achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all
time if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.
But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is colorblind and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.

In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the
most powerful. The law regards man as man and takes no account of his surroundings or of his
color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. It is
therefore to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the
land, has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a state to regulate the enjoyment by
citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.

In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the
decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott Case. It was adjudged in that case that the
descendants of Africans who were imported into this country and sold as slaves were not
included nor intended to be included under the word "citizens" in the Constitution and could not
claim any of the rights and privileges which that instrument provided for and secured to citizens
of the United States; that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution they were "considered as
a subordinate and inferior class of beings who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and,
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but
such as those who held the power and the government might choose to grant them …

The recent amendments of the Constitution, it was supposed, had eradicated these principles
from our institutions. But it seems that set have yet, in some of the states, a dominant race-a
superior class of citizens, which assumes to regulate the enjoyment of civil rights, common to all
citizens, upon the basis of race. The present decision, it may well be apprehended, will not only
stimulate aggressions, more or less brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights of colored
citizens, but will encourage the belief that it is possible, by means of state enactments, to defeat
the beneficent purposes which the people of the United States had in view when they adopted the
recent amendments of the Constitution, by one of which the blacks of this country were made
citizens of the United States and of the states in which they respectively reside, and whose
privileges and immunities as citizens the states are forbidden to abridge,

Sixty millions of whites are in no danger from the presence here of 8 million blacks. The
destinies of the two races in this country are indissolubly linked together, and the interests of
both require that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be
planted under the sanction of law. What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly
create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races than state enactments, which, in
fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be
allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real
meaning of such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana.
1
The sure guarantee of the peace and serenity of each race is the clear, distinct, unconditional
recognition by our governments, national and state, of every right that inheres in civil freedom
and of the equality before the law of all citizens of the Untied States without regard to race, State
enactments regulating the enjoyment of rights upon the basis of race, and cunningly devised to
defeat legitimate results of the war under the pretense of recognizing equality of rights, can have
no other result than to' render permanent peace impossible and to keep alive a conflict of races,
the continuance of which must do harm to all concerned.

This question is not met by the suggestion that social equality cannot exist between the white and
black races in this country. That argument, if it can be properly regarded as one, is scarcely
worthy of consideration ; for social equality no more exists between two races when traveling in
a passenger coach or a public highway than when members of the same races sit by each other in
a streetcar or in the jury box, or stand or sit with each other in a political assembly, or when they
use in common the streets of a city or town, or when they are in the same room for the purpose of
having their names placed on the registry of voters, or when they approach the ballot box in
order to exercise the high privilege of voting.

There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become
citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely
excluded from our country, I allude to the Chinese race. But by the statute in question, a
Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach with white citizens of the United States, while
citizens of the black race in Louisiana, many of whom, perhaps, risked their lives for the
preservation of the Union, who are entitled, by law, to participate in the political control of the
state and nation, who are not excluded, by law or by reason of their race, from public stations of
any kind, and who have all the legal rights that belong to white citizens, are yet declared to be
criminals, liable to imprisonment, if they ride in a public coach occupied by citizens of the white
race.

It is scarcely just to say that a colored citizen should not object to occupying a public coach
assigned to his own race. He does not object, nor, perhaps, would he object to separate coaches
for his race, if his rights under the law were recognized. But he objects, and ought never to cease
objecting to the proposition that citizens of the white and black races can be adjudged criminals
because they sit, or claim the right to sit, in the same public coach on a public highway.

The arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of race, while they are on a public highway, is a
badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law
established by the Constitution. It cannot be justified upon any legal grounds.

If evils will result from the commingling of the two races upon public highways established for
the benefit of all, they will be infinitely less than those that will surely come from state
legislation regulating the enjoyment of civil rights upon the basis of race. We boast of the
freedom enjoyed by our people above all other peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that boast
with a state of law which, practically, puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a large
class of our fellow citizens, our equals before the law. 'The thin disguise of "equal"

2
accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead anyone, nor atone for the
wrong this day done.

You might also like