Japan OHS Debate 2010
1/2 Landes/Dilks
JAPAN CP
TEXT: Under Article II, Section 2 of the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation between Japan and
the United States, the United States federal government should negotiate a review of facility
and area arrangements with the government of Japan through the Joint Committee established
under Article XXV regarding whether and how (insert plan text).
COUNTERPLAN SOLVES - JAPAN WILL SAY YES TO THE PLAN. THEY WANT A
REDUCED US MILITARY PRESENCE, BUT THEY WANT TO BE TREATED AS EQUAL
PARTNERS IN NEGOTIATIONS.
McCurry 9 (Justin, October 13, “Japan Begins to Shake of US Foreign Policy Influence”,
[Link] LFLYNN)
The issue with the greatest potential to cause discord between Hatoyama and Obama lies much closer to home, on the southern island of Okinawa, where two-thirds of
the 50,000 US troops on Japanese soil live. Under a 2006 agreement designed to reduce the US military footprint on the island, 8,000 marines will be transferred to
Guam, a US territory in the Pacific Ocean, by 2014. The marines' base, which covers a quarter of the overcrowded city of Ginowan, will be moved to a new location on
Okinawa's west coast. But the agreement's future was thrown into doubt with the DPJ's landslide election victory in August. Hatoyama took office last month promising
to review the deal, with some
on the left of his party calling for the base to be moved to the mainland or out of Japan altogether.
Publicly,
the US says it is happy to give the Hatoyama government time to "evaluate" its stance. "We view the
United States and Japan as partners, equal partners," the US ambassador to Japan, John Roos, said last week.
"As partners, we want to listen to what they have to say and work with them on this issue." Privately, however, state department
officials have indicated to their Japanese counterparts that the base agreement is not up for negotiation. Further evidence of the shift in Tokyo's foreign policy priorities came last week when Hatoyama met his South Korean
and Chinese counterparts, Lee Myung-bak and Wen Jiabao, in Beijing for talks on the formation of an "east Asian community" inspired by the European Union. The leaders said they would explore the idea of a free-trade
pact and co-operate more closely in other areas, including climate change and sustainable growth. In the long-term, Hatoyama's east Asian vision could involve the introduction of a single currency among the three countries,
whose economies account for about 16% of the world's gross domestic product. The community could be extended to include India, Australia, New Zealand and the 10 members of the Association of South-east Asian
"Until now we have tended to be too reliant on the United States," Hatoyama said. "The Japan-US alliance
Nations.
remains important, but as a member of Asia, I would like to develop policies that focus more on Asia."
AND, THE COUNTERPLAN IS BETTER. DECREAED US MILITARY PRESENCE WITHOUT
NEGOTIATION WOULD DESTROY THE SECURITY ALLIANCE AND LEAD TO JAPANESE
RE-ARM
Sakurada 97 – , Associate Professor of International Relations in the Faculty of Integrated Arts & Sciences of the University of Tokushima in
Japan, was a research fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies (Daizo, April January 1996 1997 2000, “ The Japan-US Security Treaty: From a Japanese
Perspective”, [Link]
(CSS:NZ) from until on an Asia Foundation Fellowship., Centre for Strategic Studies Victoria University of Wellington, Santhanaraghavan )
The withdrawal of the US military forces from Japan would represent a fundamental disengagement of US
military commitments in East Asia; it would signify the end of American trustworthiness. Fearing Japan ʹs
remilitarisation, no state in the Asia‐Pacific region, except perhaps North Korea, seeks the termination of the
Treaty. Once the Treaty is abolished, Japan would be forced to consider options that Washington would
currently regard as unpalatable. Japan may decide to take on a more independent strategic role in the region.
The SDF could be developed to a greater potential, and could be used directly in support of its foreign policy goals . Strategic links with China
and Russia could be reconsidered. Moreover, Japan might have to seriously consider a nuclear option. At the
extreme both Japan and the US could grow to regard each other as hostile entities.44 The Treaty provides a
mechanism to avoid this strategic rivalry and to deepen the cooperative strategic relationship between Japan
and the United States.
Japan OHS Debate 2010
2/2 Landes/Dilks
JAPANESE RE-ARM SPARKS AN ASIAN ARMS RACE
Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin 2009, (Emma is a specialist in asian affairs and Mary Beth is an analyst in nonproliferation, ‘Japan’s
Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests’ Congressional Research Service, February 19 th)
[Link]
Any reconsideration of Japan’s policy of nuclear weapons abstention would have significant implications for
U.S. policy in East Asia. Globally, Japan’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) could
damage the most durable international non-proliferation regime. Regionally, Japan “going nuclear” could set
off a nuclear arms race with China, South Korea, and Taiwan and, in turn, India, and Pakistan may feel
compelled to further strengthen their own nuclear weapons capability. Bilaterally, assuming that Japan made
the decision without U.S. support, the move could indicate Tokyo’s lack of trust in the American commitment
to defend Japan. An erosion in the U.S.-Japan alliance could upset the geopolitical balance in East Asia, a shift
that could indicate a further strengthening of China’s position as an emerging hegemonic power. These
ramifications would likely be deeply destabilizing for the security of the Asia Pacific region and beyond.
