G.R. No. 210445, December 07, 2015 In Cebu, Dr.

In Cebu, Dr. Pangan removed the plate and screws thus installed by Dr. Gestuvo and
replaced them with smaller titanium plate and screws. Dr. Pangan also extracted Rosit's
NILO B. ROSIT, Petitioner, v. DAVAO DOCTORS HOSPITAL AND DR. ROLANDO G. molar that was hit with a screw and some bone fragments. Three days after the operation,
GESTUVO, Respondent. Rosit was able to eat and speak well and could open and close his mouth normally.7

On his return to Davao, Rosit demanded that Dr. Gestuvo reimburse him for the cost of the
DECISION
operation and the expenses he incurred in Cebu amounting to P140,000, as well as for the
P50,000 that Rosit would have to spend for the removal of the plate and screws that Dr.
VELASCO JR., J.: Pangan installed. Dr. Gestuvo refused to pay.8

The Case Thus, Rosit filed a civil case for damages and attorney's fees with the RTC against Dr.
Gestuvo and DDH, the suit docketed as Civil Case No. 27,354-99.

This is a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision and The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Resolution dated January 22, 20131 and November 7, 2013,2 respectively, of the Court of
Appeals, Cagayan De Oro City (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 00911-MIN. The CA Decision The RTC freed DDH from liability on the ground that it exercised the proper diligence in the
reversed the Decision dated September 14, 20043 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 in selection and supervision of Dr. Gestuvo, but adjudged Dr. Gestuvo negligent and ruled, thus:
Davao City-(RTC) in Civil Case No. 27,354-99, a suit for damages thereat which Nilo B. Rosit FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, finding the plaintiff Nilo B. Rosit to have preponderantly
(Rosit) commenced against Dr. Rolando Gestuvo (Dr. Gestuvo). established his cause of action in the complaint against defendant Dr. Rolando G. Gestuvo
only, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against said defendant, ordering the
Factual Antecedents defendant DR. ROLANDO G. GESTUVO to pay unto plaintiff NILO B. ROSIT the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On January 15, 1999, Rosit figured in a motorcycle accident. The X-ray soon taken the next
day at the Davao Doctors Hospital (DDH) showed that he fractured his jaw. Rosit was then a) the sum of ONE HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY NINE
referred to Dr. Gestuvo, a specialist in mandibular injuries,4 who, on January 19, 1999, PESOS and 13/100 (P140,199.13) representing reimbursement of actual expenses
operated on Rosit. incurred by plaintiff in the operation and re-operation of his mandible;
During the operation, Dr. Gestuvo used a metal plate fastened to the jaw with metal screws to b) the sum of TWENTY NINE THOUSAND AND SIXTY EIGHT PESOS (P29,068.00)
immobilize the mandible. As the operation required the smallest screws available, Dr. representing reimbursement of the filing fees and appearance fees;
Gestuvo cut the screws on hand to make them smaller. Dr. Gestuvo knew that there were
smaller titanium screws available in Manila, but did not so inform Rosit supposing that the c) the sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P150,000.00) as and for
latter would not be able to afford the same.5 attorney's fees;
d) the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
Following the procedure, Rosit could not properly open and close his mouth and was in pain.
X-rays done on Rosit two (2) days after the operation showed that the fracture in his jaw was e) the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
aligned but the screws used on him touched his molar. Given the X-ray results, Dr. Gestuvo
f) the costs of the suit.
referred Rosit to a dentist. The dentist who checked Rosit, Dr. Pangan, opined that another
operation is necessary and that it is to be performed in Cebu.6
For lack of merit, the complaint against defendant DAVAO DOCTORS HOSPITAL and the
Alleging that the dentist told him that the operation conducted on his mandible was improperly defendants' counterclaims are hereby ordered DISMISSED.
done, Rosit went back to Dr. Gestuvo to demand a loan to defray the cost of the additional
operation as well as the expenses of the trip to Cebu. Dr. Gestuvo gave Rosit P4,500. Cost against Dr. Rolando G. Gestuvo.

Rosit went to Cebu on February 19, 1999, still suffering from pain and could hardly open his SO ORDERED.
mouth. In so ruling, the trial court applied the res ipsa loquitur principle holding that "the need for
expert, medical testimony may be dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof
of negligence." standard in turn refers to the amount of competence associated with the proper discharge of
the profession. A physician is expected to use at least the same level of care that any other
Therefrom, both parties appealed to the CA. reasonably competent doctor would use under the same circumstances. Breach of duty
occurs when the physician fails to comply with these professional standards. If injury results
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals to the patient as a result of this breach, the physician is answerable for negligence.
(Emphasis supplied)
In its January 22, 2013 Decision, the CA modified the appealed judgment by deleting the
awards made by the trial court, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by Gestuvo is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 14, An expert witness is not necessary as the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is applicable
2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Davao City, rendered in Civil Case No. 27,354-
99 is hereby MODIFIED. The monetary awards adjudged in favor of Nilo B. Rosit are hereby To establish medical negligence, this Court has held that an expert testimony is generally
DELETED for lack of basis. required to define the standard of behavior by which the court may determine whether the
physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient. This is so considering
SO ORDERED. that the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of a patient is usually a matter of
expert opinion.10
Unlike the RTC, the CA ruled that the res ipsa loquitur principle is not applicable and that the
testimony of an expert witness is necessary for a finding of negligence. The appellate court
Solidum v. People of the Philippines 11 provides an exception. There, the Court explained that
also gave credence to Dr. Pangan's letter stating the opinion that Dr. Gestuvo did not commit
where the application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur is warranted, an expert testimony
gross negligence in his emergency management of Rosit's fractured mandible.
may be dispensed with in medical negligence cases:
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to
Rosit's motion for reconsideration was denied in the CA's November 7, 2013 Resolution.
prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the
standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the
Hence, the instant appeal.
plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury
itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity
The Issue
of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science,
and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified
The ultimate issue for our resolution is whether the appellate court correctly absolved Dr.
to by anyone familiar with the facts. x x x
Gestuvo from liability.
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations: leaving
WON res ipsa loquitur doctrine is applicable. YES of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a healthy
part of the body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part
of the body when another part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a patient's jaw was
under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff
The Court's Ruling was under the influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation for appendicitis,
among others.
The petition is impressed with merit. We have further held that resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as an exception to the
requirement of an expert testimony in medical negligence cases may be availed of if the
In Flores v. Pineda,9 the Court explained the concept of a medical negligence case and the following essential requisites are satisfied: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not
elements required for its prosecution, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused
the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered
A medical negligence case is a type of claim to redress a wrong committed by a medical must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.12
professional, that has caused bodily harm to or the death of a patient. There are four
elements involved in a medical negligence case, namely: duty, breach, injury, and In its assailed Decision, the CA refused to acknowledge the application of the res ipsa
proximate causation. loquitur doctrine on the ground that the foregoing elements are absent. In particular, the
appellate court is of the position that post-operative pain is not unusual after surgery and that
Duty refers to the standard of behavior which imposes restrictions on one's conduct. The there is no proof that the molar Dr. Pangan removed is the same molar that was hit by the
screw installed by Dr. Gestuvo in Rosit's mandible. Further, a second operation was Lastly, the third element that the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
conducted within the 5-week usual healing period of the mandibular fracture so that the action or contribution of the person injured was satisfied in this case. It was not shown that
second element cannot be considered present. Lastly, the CA pointed out that the X-ray Rosit's lung disease could have contributed to the pain. What is clear is that he suffered
examination conducted on Rosit prior to his first surgery suggests that he had "chronic because one of the screws that Dr. Gestuvo installed hit Rosit's molar.
inflammatory lung disease compatible," implying that the injury may have been due to Rosit's
peculiar condition, thus effectively negating the presence of the third element.13 Clearly then, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine finds application in the instant case and no
expert testimony is required to establish the negligence of defendant Dr. Gestuvo.
After careful consideration, this Court cannot accede to the CA's findings as it is at once
apparent from the records that the essential requisites for the application of the doctrine Petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to make an "informed consent"
of res ipsa loquitur are present.
What is more damning for Dr. Gestuvo is his failure to inform Rosit that such smaller screws
The first element was sufficiently established when Rosit proved that one of the screws were available in Manila, albeit at a higher price.16 As testified to by Dr. Gestuvo himself:
installed by Dr. Gestuvo struck his molar. It was for this issue that Dr. Gestuvo himself Court This titanium materials according to you were already available in the Philippines
referred Rosit to Dr. Pangan. In fact, the affidavit of Dr. Pangan presented by Dr. Gestuvo Alright. since the time of Rosit's accident?
himself before the trial court narrated that the same molar struck with the screw installed by
Dr. Gestuvo was examined and eventually operated on by Dr. Pangan. Dr. Gestuvo cannot Witness Yes, your Honor.
now go back and say that Dr. Pangan treated a molar different from that which was affected
by the first operation. xxxx
Court Did you inform Rosit about the existence of titanium screws and plates which
Clearly, had Dr. Gestuvo used the proper size and length of screws and placed the same in according to you is the screws and plates of choice?
the proper locations, these would not have struck Rosit's teeth causing him pain and requiring
him to undergo a corrective surgery. Witness No, your Honor.

Dr. Gestuvo knew that the screws he used on Rosit were too large as, in fact, he cut the xxxx
same with a saw.14 He also stated during trial that common sense dictated that the smallest Witness The reason I did not inform him anymore Judge because what I thought he was
screws available should be used. More importantly, he also knew that these screws were already hard up with the down payment. And if I will further introduce him this
available locally at the time of the operation.15 Yet, he did not avail of such items and went screws, the more he will not be able to afford the operation.
ahead with the larger screws and merely sawed them off. Even assuming that the screws
were already at the proper length after Dr. Gestuvo cut the same, it is apparent that he xxxx
negligently placed one of the screws in the wrong area thereby striking one of Rosit's teeth.
Court This titanium screws and plates were available then it is up to Rosit to decide
whether to use it or not because after all the material you are using is paid by the
In any event, whether the screw hit Rosit's molar because it was too long or improperly
patient himscll, is it not?
placed, both facts are the product of Dr. Gestuvo's negligence. An average man of common
intelligence would know that striking a tooth with any foreign object much less a screw would Witness Yes, that is true.
cause severe pain. Thus, the first essential requisite is present in this case.
Li v. Soliman17 made the following disquisition on the relevant Doctrine of Informed Consent
in relation to medical negligence cases, to wit:
Anent the second element for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine application, it is sufficient that the
The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient relationships goes
operation which resulted in the screw hitting Rosit's molar was, indeed, performed by Dr.
far back into English common law. x x x From a purely ethical norm, informed consent
Gestuvo. No other doctor caused such fact.
evolved into a general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose what a
reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable
The CA finds that Rosit is guilty of contributory negligence in having Dr. Pangan operate on
care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be
him during the healing period of his fractured mandible. What the CA overlooked is that it was
incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary
Dr. Gestuvo himself who referred Rosit to Dr. Pangan. Nevertheless, Dr. Pangan's
care for his own welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed
participation could not have contributed to the reality that the screw that Dr. Gestuvo installed
treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his
hit Rosit's molar.
judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable benefits.
x x x x is inadmissible and cannot be given any weight. The CA, therefore, erred when it considered
the affidavit of Dr. Pangan, mpreso for considering the same as expert testimony.
There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based
upon the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose Moreover, even if such affidavit is considered as admissible and the testimony of an expert
material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a witness, the Court is not bound by such testimony. As ruled in Ilao-Quianay v. Mapile:20
direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to Indeed, courts are not bound by expert testimonies. They may place whatever weight they
treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight
the proposed treatment." The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide,
to "point to significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the
altered her decision to undergo it." (Emphasis supplied) weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias
in favor of the side for whom he testifies, and any other matters which serve to illuminate his
The four adverted essential elements above are present here.
statements. The opinion of an expert should be considered by the court in view of all the facts
and circumstances of the case. The problem of the evaluation of expert testimony is left to the
First, Dr. Gestuvo clearly had the duty of disclosing to Rosit the risks of using the larger
discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not revicwable in the absence of an
screws for the operation. This was his obligation as the physician undertaking the operation.
abuse of that discretion.
Second, Dr. Gestuvo failed to disclose these risks to Rosit, deciding by himself that Rosit Thus, the belief of Dr. Pangan whether Dr. Gestuvo is guilty of negligence or not will not bind
could not afford to get the more expensive titanium screws. the Court. The Court must weigh and examine such testimony and decide for itself the merits
thereof.
Third, had Rosit been informed that there was a risk that the larger screws are not
appropriate for the operation and that an additional operation replacing the screws might be As discussed above, Dr. Gestuvo's negligence is clearly demonstrable by the doctrines of res
required to replace the same, as what happened in this case, Rosit would not have agreed to ipsa loquitur and informed consent.
the operation. It bears pointing out that Rosit was, in fact, able to afford the use of the smaller
titanium screws that were later used by Dr. Pangan to replace the screws that were used by Damages
Dr. Gestuvo.
For the foregoing, the trial court properly awarded Rosit actual damages after he was able to
Fourth, as a result of using the larger screws, Rosit experienced pain and could not heal prove the actual expenses that he incurred due to the negligence of Dr. Gestuvo. In Mendoza
properly because one of the screws hit his molar. This was evident from the fact that just v. Spouses Gomez,21 the Court explained that a claimant is entitled to actual damages when
three (3) days after Dr. Pangan repeated the operation conducted by Dr. Gestuvo, Rosit was the damage he sustained is the natural and probable consequences of the negligent act and
pain-free and could already speak. This is compared to the one (1) month that Rosit suffered he adequately proved the amount of such damage.
pain and could not use his mouth after the operation conducted by Dr. Gestuvo until the
operation of Dr. Pangan. Rosit is also entitled to moral damages as provided under Article 2217 of the Civil
Code,22 given the unnecessary physical suffering he endured as a consequence of
Without a doubt, Dr. Gestuvo is guilty of withholding material information which would have defendant's negligence.
been vital in the decision of Rosit in going through with the operation with the materials at
hand. Thus, Dr. Gestuvo is also guilty of negligence on this ground. To recall, from the time he was negligently operated upon by Dr. Gestuvo until three (3) days
from the corrective surgery performed by Dr. Pangan, or for a period of one (1) month, Rosit
Dr. Pangan's Affidavit is not admissible suffered pain and could not properly use his jaw to speak or eat.

The appellate court's Decision absolving Dr. Gestuvo of negligence was also anchored on a The trial court also properly awarded attorney's fees and costs of suit under Article 2208 of
letter signed by Dr. Pangan who stated the opinion that Dr. Gestuvo did not commit gross the Civil Code,23 since Rosit was compelled to litigate due to Dr. Gestuvo's refusal to pay for
negligence in his emergency management of Mr. Rosit's fractured mandible.18 Clearly, the Rosit's damages.
appellate court overlooked the elementary principle against hearsay evidence.
As to the award of exemplary damages, the same too has to be affirmed. In Mendoza,24 the
19
In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr.,  the Court reiterated the oft-repeated rule that "an affidavit is Court enumerated the requisites for the award of exemplary damages:
merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand." Here, Dr. Our jurisprudence sets certain conditions when exemplary damages may be awarded: First,
Pangan never took the witness stand to affirm the contents of his affidavit. Thus, the affidavit they may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition, among others, to
compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination DECISION
depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant.
Second, the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or BRION, J.:
compensatory damages. Third, the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the
award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, We resolve the three (3) consolidated petitions for review on Certiorari1 involving medical
oppressive or malevolent manner. negligence, commonly assailing the October 29, 2004 decision2 and the January 12, 2006
The three (3) requisites are met. Dr. Gestuvo's actions are clearly negligent. Likewise, Dr. resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 56400. This CA decision affirmed
Gestuvo acted in bad faith or in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive manner when he en totothe ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 134, Makati City.
was in breach of the doctrine of informed consent. Dr. Gestuvo had the duty to fully explain to
Rosit the risks of using large screws for the operation. More importantly, he concealed the The RTC awarded Nelson Cortejo (respondent) damages in the total amount of ₱595,000.00,
correct medical procedure of using the smaller titanium screws mainly because of his for the wrongful death of his son allegedly due to the medical negligence of the petitioning
erroneous belief that Rosit cannot afford to buy the expensive titanium screws. Such doctors and the hospital.
concealment is clearly a valid basis for an award of exemplary damages.
Factual Antecedents
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The CA Decision dated January 22, 2013
and Resolution dated November 7, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00911-MIN are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Further, the Decision dated September 14, 2004 of the The common factual antecedents are briefly summarized below.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 in Davao City in Civil Case No. 27,345-99 is
hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. On April 22, 1988, at about 11:30 in the morning, Mrs. Jesusa Cortejo brought her 11-year
old son, Edmer Cortejo (Edmer), to the Emergency Room of the San Juan de Dios Hospital
SO [Link] (SJDH) because of difficulty in breathing, chest pain, stomach pain, and fever.4

G.R. No. 171127               March 11, 2015 Dr. Ramoncito Livelo (Dr. Livelo) initially attended to and examined Edmer. In her testimony,
Mrs. Cortejo narrated that in the morning of April 20, 1988, Edmer had developed a slight
NOEL CASUMPANG, RUBY SANGA-MIRANDA and SAN JUAN DEDIOS fever that lasted for one day; a few hours upon discovery, she brought Edmer to their family
HOSPITAL, Petitioners, doctor; and two hours after administering medications, Edmer’s fever had subsided.5
vs.
NELSON CORTEJO, Respondent. After taking Edmer’s medical history, Dr. Livelo took his vital signs, body temperature, and
blood pressure.6 Based on these initial examinations and the chest x-ray test that followed,
x-----------------------x Dr. Livelo diagnosed Edmer with "bronchopneumonia.7 " Edmer’s blood was also taken for
testing, typing, and for purposes of administering antibiotics. Afterwards, Dr. Livelo gave
Edmer an antibiotic medication to lessen his fever and to loosen his phlegm.
G.R. No. 171217
Mrs. Cortejo did not know any doctor at SJDH. She used her Fortune Care card and was
DRA. RUBY SANGA-MIRANDA, Petitioner, referred to an accredited Fortune Care coordinator, who was then out of town. She was
vs. thereafter assigned to Dr. Noel Casumpang (Dr. Casumpang), a pediatrician also accredited
NELSON CORTEJO, Respondent. with Fortune Care.8

x-----------------------x At 5:30 in the afternoon of the same day, Dr. Casumpang for the first time examined Edmer in
his room. Using only a stethoscope, he confirmed the initial diagnosis of
G.R. No. 171228 "Bronchopneumonia."9

SAN JUAN DEDIOS HOSPITAL, Petitioner, At that moment, Mrs. Cortejo recalled entertaining doubts on the doctor’s diagnosis. She
vs. immediately advised Dr. Casumpang that Edmer had a high fever, and had no colds or
NELSON CORTEJO, Respondent. cough10 but Dr. Casumpang merely told her that her son’s "blood pressure is just being
active,"11 and remarked that "that’s the usual bronchopneumonia, no colds, no phlegm."12 Dr. Dr. Sanga advised Edmer’s parents that the blood test results showed that Edmer was
Casumpang next visited and examined Edmer at 9:00 in the morning the following day. 13 Still suffering from "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever." One hour later, Dr. Casumpang arrived at
suspicious about his son’s illness, Mrs. Cortejo again called Dr. Casumpang’s attention and Edmer’s room and he recommended his transfer to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), to which
stated that Edmer had a fever, throat irritation, as well as chest and stomach pain. Mrs. the respondent consented. Since the ICU was then full, Dr. Casumpang suggested to the
Cortejo also alerted Dr. Casumpang about the traces of blood in Edmer’s sputum. Despite respondent that they hire a private nurse. The respondent, however, insisted on transferring
these pieces of information, however, Dr. Casumpang simply nodded, inquired if Edmer has his son to Makati Medical Center.
an asthma, and reassured Mrs. Cortejo that Edmer’s illness is bronchopneumonia.14
After the respondent had signed the waiver, Dr. Casumpang, for the last time, checked
At around 11:30 in the morning of April 23, 1988, Edmer vomited "phlegm with blood Edmer’s condition, found that his blood pressure was stable, and noted that he was
streak"15 prompting the respondent (Edmer’s father) to request for a doctor at the nurses’ "comfortable." The respondent requested for an ambulance but he was informed that the
station.16 Forty-five minutes later, Dr. Ruby Miranda-Sanga (Dr. Sanga), one of the resident driver was nowhere to be found. This prompted him to hire a private ambulance that cost him
physicians of SJDH, arrived. She claimed that although aware that Edmer had vomited ₱600.00.23
"phlegm with blood streak," she failed to examine the blood specimen because the
respondent washed it away. She then advised the respondent to preserve the specimen for At 12:00 midnight, Edmer, accompanied by his parents and by Dr. Casumpang, was
examination. transferred to Makati Medical Center.

Thereafter, Dr. Sanga conducted a physical check-up covering Edmer’s head, eyes, nose, Dr. Casumpang immediately gave the attending physician the patient’s clinical history and
throat, lungs, skin and abdomen; and found that Edmer had a low-grade non-continuing laboratory exam results. Upon examination, the attending physician diagnosed "Dengue
fever, and rashes that were not typical of dengue fever.17 Her medical findings state: Fever Stage IV" that was already in its irreversible stage.

the patient’s rapid breathing and then the lung showed sibilant and the patient’s nose is Edmer died at 4:00 in the morning of April 24, 1988. 24 His Death Certificate indicated the
flaring which is a sign that the patient is in respiratory distress; the abdomen has negative cause of death as "Hypovolemic Shock/hemorrhagic shock;" "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever
finding; the patient has low grade fever and not continuing; and the rashes in the patient’s Stage IV."
skin were not
Believing that Edmer’s death was caused by the negligent and erroneous diagnosis of his
"Herman’s Rash" and not typical of dengue fever.18 doctors, the respondent instituted an action for damages against SJDH, and its attending
physicians: Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Sanga (collectively referred to as the "petitioners") before
At 3:00 in the afternoon, Edmer once again vomited blood. Upon seeing Dr. Sanga, the the RTC of Makati City.
respondent showed her Edmer’s blood specimen, and reported that Edmer had complained
of severe stomach pain and difficulty in moving his right leg.19 The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Dr. Sanga then examined Edmer’s "sputum with blood" and noted that he was bleeding. In a decision25 dated May 30, 1997, the RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, and awarded
Suspecting that he could be afflicted with dengue, she inserted a plastic tube in his nose, actual and moral damages, plus attorney's fees and costs.
drained the liquid from his stomach with ice cold normal saline solution, and gave an
instruction not to pull out the tube, or give the patient any oral medication. In ruling that the petitioning doctors were negligent, the RTC found untenable the petitioning
doctors’ contention that Edmer’s initial symptoms did not indicate dengue fever. It faulted
Dr. Sanga thereafter conducted a tourniquet test, which turned out to be negative.20 She them for heavily relying on the chest x-ray result and for not considering the other
likewise ordered the monitoring of the patient’s blood pressure and some blood tests. manifestations that Edmer’s parents had relayed. It held that in diagnosing and treating an
Edmer’s blood pressure was later found to be normal.21 illness, the physician’s conduct should be judged not only by what he/she saw and knew, but
also by what he/she could have reasonably seen and known. It also observed that based on
At 4:40 in the afternoon, Dr. Sanga called up Dr. Casumpang at his clinic and told him about Edmer’s signs and symptoms, his medical history and physical examination, and also the
Edmer’s condition.22 Upon being informed, Dr. Casumpang ordered several procedures done information that the petitioning doctors gathered from his family members, dengue fever was
including: hematocrit, hemoglobin, blood typing, blood transfusion and tourniquet tests. a reasonably foreseeable illness; yet, the petitioning doctors failed to take a second look,
much less, consider these indicators of dengue.
The blood test results came at about 6:00 in the evening.
The trial court also found that aside from their self-serving testimonies, the petitioning doctors because the symptoms were already evident; and agreed with the RTC that the petitioning
did not present other evidence to prove that they exercised the proper medical attention in doctors should not have solely relied on the chest-x-ray result, as it was not conclusive.
diagnosing and treating the patient, leading it to conclude that they were guilty of negligence.
The RTC also held SJDH solidarily liable with the petitioning doctors for damages based on On SJDH’s solidary liability, the CA ruled that the hospital’s liability is based on Article 2180
the following findings of facts: first, Dr. Casumpang, as consultant, is an ostensible agent of of the Civil Code. The CA opined that the control which the hospital exercises over its
SJDH because before the hospital engaged his medical services, it scrutinized and consultants, the hospital’s power to hire and terminate their services, all fulfill the employer-
determined his fitness, qualifications, and competence as a medical practitioner; and second, employee relationship requirement under Article 2180.
Dr. Sanga, as resident physician, is an employee of SJDH because like Dr. Casumpang, the
hospital, through its screening committee, scrutinized and determined her qualifications, Lastly, the CA held that SJDH failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the
fitness,and competence before engaging her services; the hospital also exercised control diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and the supervision of its physicians.
over her work.
The petitioners separately moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied their
The dispositive portion of the decision reads: motion in its resolution of January 12, 2006; hence, the present consolidated petitions
pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, ordering the latter to pay solidarily and severally plaintiff the following: The Petitions

(1) Moral damages in the amount of ₱500,000.00; I. Dr. Casumpang’s Position (G.R. No. 171127)

(2) Costs of burial and funeral in the amount of ₱45,000.00; Dr. Casumpang contends that he gave his patient medical treatment and care to the best of
his abilities, and within the proper standard of care required from physicians under similar
(3) Attorney’s fees of ₱50,000.00; and circumstances. He claims that his initial diagnosis of bronchopneumonia was supported by
the chest x-ray result.
(4) Cost of this suit.
Dr. Casumpang also contends that dengue fever occurs only after several days of
SO ORDERED. confinement. He alleged that when he had suspected that Edmer might be suffering from
dengue fever, he immediately attended and treated him.
The petitioners appealed the decision to the CA.
Dr. Casumpang likewise raised serious doubts on Dr. Jaudian’s credibility, arguing that the
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals CA erred in appreciating his testimony as an expert witness since he lacked the necessary
training, skills, and experience as a specialist in dengue fever cases.
In its decision dated October 29, 2004, the CA affirmed en toto the RTC’s ruling, finding that
SJDH and its attending physicians failed to exercise the minimum medical care, attention, II. Dr. Sanga’s Position (G.R. No. 171217)
and treatment expected of an ordinary doctor under like circumstances.
In her petition, Dr. Sanga faults the CA for holding her responsible for Edmer’s wrong
The CA found the petitioning doctors’ failure to read even the most basic signs of "dengue diagnosis, stressing that the function of making the diagnosis and undertaking the medical
fever" expected of an ordinary doctor as medical negligence. The CA also considered the treatment devolved upon Dr. Casumpang, the doctor assigned to Edmer, and who confirmed
petitioning doctors’ testimonies as self-serving, noting that they presented no other evidence "bronchopneumonia."
to prove that they exercised due diligence in diagnosing Edmer’s illness.
Dr. Sanga also alleged that she exercised prudence in performing her duties as a physician,
The CA likewise found Dr. Rodolfo Jaudian’s (Dr. Jaudian) testimony admissible. It gave underscoring that it was her professional intervention that led to the correct diagnosis of
credence to his opinion26 that: (1) given the exhibited symptoms of the patient, dengue fever "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever." Furthermore, Edmer’s Complete Blood Count (CBC) showed
should definitely be considered, and bronchopneumonia could be reasonably ruled out; and leukopenia and an increase in balance as shown by the differential count, demonstrating that
(2) dengue fever could have been detected earlier than 7:30 in the evening of April 23, 1988 Edmer’s infection, more or less, is of bacterial and not viral in nature.
Dr. Sanga as well argued that there is no causal relation between the alleged erroneous admission (i.e., one day fever,28 bacterial infection,29 and lack of hemorrhagic
diagnosis and medication for "Bronchopneumonia," and Edmer’s death due to "Dengue manifestations30), there was no reasonable indication yet that he was suffering from dengue
Hemorrhagic Fever." fever, and accordingly, their failure to diagnose dengue fever, does not constitute negligence
on their part.
Lastly, she claimed that Dr. Jaudianis not a qualified expert witness since he never presented
any evidence of formal residency training and fellowship status in Pediatrics. The Case for the Respondent

III. SJDH’s Position (G.R. No. 171228) In his comment, the respondent submits that the issues the petitioners raised are mainly
factual in nature, which a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Courts
SJDH, on the other hand, disclaims liability by asserting that Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Sanga does not allow.
are mere independent contractors and "consultants" (not employees) of the hospital. SJDH
alleges that since it did not exercise control or supervision over the consultants’ exercise of In any case, he contends that the petitioning doctors were negligent in conducting their
medical profession, there is no employer-employee relationship between them, and medical examination and diagnosis based on the following: (1) the petitioning doctors failed to
consequently, Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not apply. timely diagnose Edmer’s correct illness due to their non-observance of the proper and
acceptable standard of medical examination; (2) the petitioning doctors’ medical examination
SJDH likewise anchored the absence of employer-employee relationship on the following was not comprehensive, as they were always in a rush; and (3) the petitioning doctors
circumstances: (1) SJDH does not hire consultants; it only grants them privileges to admit employed a guessing game in diagnosing bronchopneumonia.
patients in the hospital through accreditation; (2) SJDH does not pay the consultants wages
similar to an ordinary employee; (3) the consultants earn their own professional fees directly The respondent also alleges that there is a causal connection between the petitioning
from their patients; SJDH does not fire or terminate their services; and (4) SJDH does not doctors’ negligence and Edmer’s untimely death, warranting the claim for damages.
control or interfere with the manner and the means the consultants use in the treatment of
their patients. It merely provides them with adequate space in exchange for rental payment. The respondent, too, asserted that SJDH is also negligent because it was not equipped with
proper paging system, has no bronchoscope, and its doctors are not proportionate to the
Furthermore, SJDH claims that the CA erroneously applied the control test when it treated the number of its patients. He also pointed out that out of the seven resident physicians in the
hospital’s practice of accrediting consultants as an exercise of control. It explained that the hospital, only two resident physicians were doing rounds at the time of his son’s confinement.
control contemplated by law is that which the employer exercises over the: (i) end result; and
the (ii) manner and means to be used to reach this end, and not any kind of control, however The Issues
significant, in accrediting the consultants.
The case presents to us the following issues:
SJDH moreover contends that even if the petitioning doctors are considered employees and
not merely consultants of the hospital, SJDH cannot still be held solidarily liable under Article 1. Whether or not the petitioning doctors had committed "inexcusable lack of
2180 of the Civil Code because it observed the diligence of a good father of a family in their precaution" in diagnosing and in treating the patient;
selection and supervision as shown by the following: (1) the adequate measures that the
hospital undertakes to ascertain the petitioning doctors’ qualifications and medical
competence; and (2) the documentary evidence that the petitioning doctors presented to 2. Whether or not the petitioner hospital is solidarily liable with the petitioning doctors;
prove their competence in the field of pediatrics.27
3. Whether or not there is a causal connection between the petitioners’ negligent
SJDH likewise faults the CA for ruling that the petitioning doctors are its agents, claiming that act/omission and the patient’s resulting death; and
this theory, aside from being inconsistent with the CA’s finding of employment relationship, is
unfounded because: first, the petitioning doctors are independent contractors, not agents of 4. Whether or not the lower courts erred in considering Dr. Rodolfo Tabangcora
SJDH; and second, as a medical institution, SJDH cannot practice medicine, much more, Jaudian as an expert witness.
extend its personality to physicians to practice medicine on its behalf.
Our Ruling
Lastly, SJDH maintains that the petitioning doctors arrived at an intelligently deduced and
correct diagnosis. It claimed that based on Edmer's signs and symptoms at the time of We find the petition partly meritorious.
A Petition for Review on Certiorari professional relationship, a physician owes no duty to the patient, and cannot therefore incur
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court any liability.
is Limited to Questions of Law.
A physician-patient relationship is created when a patient engages the services of a
The settled rule is that the Court’s jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule physician,36 and the latter accepts or agrees to provide care to the patient.37 The
45 of the Rules of Court is limited only to the review of pure questions of law. It is not the establishment of this relationship is consensual,38 and the acceptance by the physician
Court’s function to inquire on the veracity of the appellate court’s factual findings and essential. The mere fact that an individual approaches a physician and seeks diagnosis,
conclusions; this Court is not a trier of facts.31 advice or treatment does not create the duty of care unless the physician agrees.39

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, The consent needed to create the relationship does not always need to be express. 40 In the
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged absence of an express agreement, a physician-patient relationship may be implied from the
facts.32 physician’s affirmative action to diagnose and/or treat a patient, or in his participation in such
diagnosis and/or treatment.41 The usual illustration would be the case of a patient who goes
These consolidated petitions before us involve mixed questions of fact and law. As a rule, we to a hospital or a clinic, and is examined and treated by the doctor. In this case, we can infer,
do not resolve questions of fact. However, in determining the legal question of whether the based on the established and customary practice in the medical community that a patient-
respondent is entitled to claim damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code for the physician relationship exists.
petitioners’ alleged medical malpractice, the determination of the factual issues – i.e., whether
the petitioning doctors were grossly negligent in diagnosing the patient’s illness, whether Once a physician-patient relationship is established, the legal duty of care follows. The doctor
there is causal relation between the petitioners’ act/omission and the patient’s resulting death, accordingly becomes duty-bound to use at least the same standard of care that a reasonably
and whether Dr. Jaudian is qualified as an expert witness– must necessarily be resolved. We competent doctor would use to treat a medical condition under similar circumstances.
resolve these factual questions solely for the purpose of determining the legal issues raised.
Breach of duty occurs when the doctor fails to comply with, or improperly performs his duties
Medical Malpractice Suit as a under professional standards. This determination is both factual and legal, and is specific to
Specialized Area of Tort Law each individual case.42

The claim for damages is based on the petitioning doctors’ negligence in diagnosing and If the patient, as a result of the breach of duty, is injured in body or in health, actionable
treating the deceased Edmer, the child of the respondent. It is a medical malpractice suit, an malpractice is committed, entitling the patient to damages.43
action available to victims to redress a wrong committed by medical professionals who
caused bodily harm to, or the death of, a patient.33 As the term is used, the suit is brought To successfully claim damages, the patient must lastly prove the causal relation between the
whenever a medical practitioner or health care provider fails to meet the standards demanded negligence and the injury. This connection must be direct, natural, and should be unbroken
by his profession, or deviates from this standard, and causes injury to the patient. by any intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate
cause of the injury.44 The injury or damage is proximately caused by the physician’s
To successfully pursue a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiff (in this case, the deceased negligence when it appears, based on the evidence and the expert testimony, that the
patient’s heir) must prove that the doctor either failed to do what a reasonably prudent doctor negligence played an integral part in causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or
would have done, or did what a reasonably prudent doctor would not have done; and the act damage was either a direct result, or a reasonably probable consequence of the physician’s
or omission had caused injury to the patient. 34 The patient’s heir/s bears the burden of negligence.45
proving his/her cause of action.
a. The Relationship Between Dr. Casumpang and Edmer
The Elements of a Medical Malpractice Suit
In the present case, the physician-patient relationship between Dr. Casumpang and Edmer
The elements of medical negligence are: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate was created when the latter’s parents sought the medical services of Dr. Casumpang, and
causation. the latter knowingly accepted Edmer as a patient. Dr. Casumpang’s acceptance is implied
from his affirmative examination, diagnosis and treatment of Edmer. On the other hand,
Duty refers to the standard of behavior that imposes restrictions on one's conduct. 35 It Edmer’s parents, on their son’s behalf, manifested their consent by availing of the benefits of
requires proof of professional relationship between the physician and the patient. Without the their health care plan, and by accepting the hospital’s assigned doctor without objections.
b. The Relationship Between Dr. Sanga and Edmer the diagnosis and treatment of dengue fever; and second, the dengue fever signs and
symptoms that the attending physicians should have noticed and considered.
With respect to Dr. Sanga, her professional relationship with Edmer arose when she
assumed the obligation to provide resident supervision over the latter. As second year Both the RTC and the CA relied largely on Dr. Jaudian’s expert testimony on dengue
resident doctor tasked to do rounds and assist other physicians, Dr. Sanga is deemed to diagnosis and management to support their finding that the petitioning doctors were guilty of
have agreed to the creation of physician-patient relationship with the hospital’s patients when breach of duty of care.
she participated in the diagnosis and prescribed a course of treatment for Edmer.
Dr. Jaudian testified that Edmer’s rapid breathing, chest and stomach pain, fever, and the
The undisputed evidence shows that Dr. Sanga examined Edmer twice (at around 12:00 and presence of blood in his saliva are classic symptoms of dengue fever. According to him, if the
3:30 in the afternoon of April 23, 1988),and in both instances, she prescribed treatment and patient was admitted for chest pain, abdominal pain, and difficulty in breathing coupled with
participated in the diagnosis of Edmer’s medical condition. Her affirmative acts amounted to fever, dengue fever should definitely be considered;51 if the patient spits coffee ground with
her acceptance of the physician-patient relationship, and incidentally, the legal duty of care the presence of blood, and the patient’s platelet count drops to 47,000, it becomes a clear
that went with it. case of dengue fever, and bronchopneumonia can be reasonably ruled out.52

In Jarcia, Jr. v. People of the Philippines,46 the Court found the doctors who merely passed by Furthermore, the standard of care according to Dr. Jaudian is to administer oxygen inhalation,
and were requested to attend to the patient, liable for medical malpractice. It held that a analgesic, and fluid infusion or dextrose.53 If the patient had twice vomited fresh blood and
physician-patient relationship was established when they examined the patient, and later thrombocytopenia has already occurred, the doctor should order blood transfusion,
assured the mother that everything was fine. monitoring of the patient every 30 minutes, hemostatic to stop bleeding, and oxygen if there is
difficulty in breathing.54
In the US case of Mead v. Legacy Health System, 47 the Court also considered the rendering
of an opinion in the course of the patient’s care as the doctor’s assent to the physician-patient We find that Dr. Casumpang, as Edmer’s attending physician, did not act according to these
relationship. It ruled that the relationship was formed because of the doctor’s affirmative standards and, hence, was guilty of breach of duty. We do not find Dr. Sanga liable for the
action. Likewise, in Wax v. Johnson,48 the court found that a physician patient relationship reasons discussed below.
was formed between a physician who "contracts, agrees, undertakes, or otherwise assumes"
the obligation to provide resident supervision at a teaching hospital, and the patient with Dr. Casumpang’s Negligence
whom the doctor had no direct or indirect contract.
a. Negligence in the Diagnosis
Standard of Care and Breach of Duty
At the trial, Dr. Casumpang declared that a doctor’s impression regarding a patient’s illness is
A determination of whether or not the petitioning doctors met the required standard of care 90% based on the physical examination, the information given by the patient or the latter’s
involves a question of mixed fact and law; it is factual as medical negligence cases are highly parents, and the patient’s medical history.55 He testified that he did not consider either
technical in nature, requiring the presentation of expert witnesses to provide guidance to the dengue fever or dengue hemorrhagic fever because the patient’s history showed that Edmer
court on matters clearly falling within the domain of medical science, and legal, insofar as the had low breath and voluntary submission, and that he was up and about playing
Court, after evaluating the expert testimonies, and guided by medical literature, learned basketball.56 He based his diagnosis of bronchopneumonia on the following observations:
treatises, and its fund of common knowledge, ultimately determines whether breach of duty "difficulty in breathing, clearing run nostril, harsh breath sound, tight air, and sivilant sound."57
took place. Whether or not Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Sanga committed a breach of duty is to
be measured by the yardstick of professional standards observed by the other members of It will be recalled that during Dr. Casumpang’s first and second visits to Edmer, he already
the medical profession in good standing under similar circumstances. 49 It is in this aspect of had knowledge of Edmer’s laboratory test result (CBC), medical history, and symptoms (i.e.,
medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the professional fever, rashes, rapid breathing, chest and stomach pain, throat irritation, difficulty in breathing,
standards observed in the medical community, but also that the physician’s conduct in the and traces of blood in the sputum). However, these information did not lead Dr. Casumpang
treatment of care falls below such standard.50 to the possibility that Edmer could be suffering from either dengue fever, or dengue
hemorrhagic fever, as he clung to his diagnosis of broncho pneumonia. This means that
In the present case, expert testimony is crucial in determining first, the standard medical given the symptoms exhibited, Dr. Casumpang already ruled out the possibility of other
examinations, tests, and procedures that the attending physicians should have undertaken in diseases like dengue.
In other words, it was lost on Dr. Casumpang that the characteristic symptoms of dengue (as A: I told Dr. Casumpang… After examining my son using stethoscope and nothing more, I
Dr. Jaudian testified) are: patient’s rapid breathing; chest and stomach pain; fever; and the told Dr. Casumpang about the traces of blood in my son’s sputum and I told him what is all
presence of blood in his saliva. All these manifestations were present and known to Dr. about and he has throat irritation.
Casumpang at the time of his first and second visits to Edmer. While he noted some of these
symptoms in confirming bronchopneumonia, he did not seem to have considered the patient’s Q: What did he tell you?
other manifestations in ruling out dengue fever or dengue hemorrhagic fever. 58 To our mind,
Dr. Casumpang selectively appreciated some, and not all of the symptoms; worse, he A: He just nodded his head but he did not take the initiative of looking at the throat of my son.
casually ignored the pieces of information that could have been material in detecting dengue
fever. This is evident from the testimony of Mrs. Cortejo:
Q: So what happened after that?
TSN, Mrs. Cortejo, November 27, 1990
A: I also told Dr. Casumpang about his chest pain and also stomach pain.
Q: Now, when Dr. Casumpang visited your son for the first time at 5:30 p.m., what did he do,
if any? Q: So what did Dr. Casumpang do after you have narrated all these complaints of your son?

A: He examined my son by using stethoscope and after that, he confirmed to me that my son A: Nothing. He also noticed the rapid breathing of my son and my son was almost moving
was suffering from broncho pneumonia. because of rapid breathing and he is swaying in the bed.

Q: After he confirmed that your son was suffering broncho pneumonia, what did you say if Q: Do you know what action was taken by Dr. Casumpang when you told him that your son is
any? experiencing a rapid breathing?

A: Again, I told Dr. Casumpang, how come it was broncho pneumonia when my son has no A: No action. He just asked me if my son has an asthma but I said none.
cough or colds.
Q: So how long did Dr. Casumpang stay and attended your son on April 23?
Q: What was the answer of Dr. Casumpang to your statement?
A: More or less two (2) minutes then I followed him up to the door and I repeated about the
xxxx fever of my son.

A: And then, Dr. Casumpang answered "THAT’S THE USUAL BRONCHO PNEUMONIA, NO Q: What did he tell you, if any, regarding that information you gave him that your son had a
COLDS, NO PHLEGM." fever?

Q: How long did Dr. Casumpang stay in your son’s room? A: He said, that is broncho pneumonia, It’s only being active now. [Emphasis supplied]

A: He stayed for a minute or 2. We also find it strange why Dr. Casumpang did not even bother to check Edmer’s throat
despite knowing that as early as 9:00 in the morning of April 23, 1988, Edmer had blood
streaks in his sputum. Neither did Dr. Casumpang order confirmatory tests to confirm the
xxxx source of bleeding. The Physician’s Progress Notes59 stated: "Blood streaks on phlegm can
be due to bronchial irritation or congestion," which clearly showed that Dr. Casumpang
Q: When Dr. Casumpang arrived at 9:00 o’clock a.m. on April 23, what did you tell him, if merely assumed, without confirmatory physical examination, that bronchopneumonia caused
any? the bleeding.

xxxx Dr. Jaudian likewise opined that Dr. Casumpang’s medical examination was not
comprehensive enough to reasonably lead to a correct diagnosis.60 Dr. Casumpang only used
a stethoscope in coming up with the diagnosis that Edmer was suffering from
bronchopneumonia; he never confirmed this finding with the use of a bronchoscope. decide – based on the evidence adduced and expert opinion presented– whether a breach of
Furthermore, Dr. Casumpang based his diagnosis largely on the chest x-ray result that is duty took place.
generally inconclusive.61
Second, we clarify that a wrong diagnosis is not by itself medical malpractice. 65 Physicians
Significantly, it was only at around 5:00 in the afternoon of April 23, 1988 (after Edmer’s third are generally not liable for damages resulting from a bona fide error of judgment.
episode of bleeding) that Dr. Casumpang ordered the conduct of hematocrit, hemoglobin, Nonetheless, when the physician’s erroneous diagnosis was the result of negligent conduct
blood typing, blood transfusion and tourniquet tests. These tests came too late, as proven by: (e.g., neglect of medical history, failure to order the appropriate tests, failure to recognize
(1) the blood test results that came at about 6:00 in the evening, confirming that Edmer’s symptoms), it becomes an evidence of medical malpractice.
illness had developed to "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever;" and (2) Dr. Jaudian’s testimony that
"dengue fever could have been detected earlier than 7:30 in the evening of April 23, 1988 Third, we also note that medicine is not an exact science; 66 and doctors, or even specialists,
because the symptoms were already evident."62 are not expected to give a 100% accurate diagnosis in treating patients who come to their
clinic for consultations. Error is possible as the exercise of judgment is called for in
In Spouses Flores v. Spouses Pineda,63 a case involving a medical malpractice suit, the Court considering and reading the exhibited symptoms, the results of tests, and in arriving at
ruled that the petitioner doctors were negligent because they failed to immediately order tests definitive conclusions. But in doing all these, the doctor must have acted according to
to confirm the patient’s illness. Despite the doctors’ suspicion that the patient could be acceptable medical practice standards.
suffering from diabetes, the former still proceeded to the D&C operation. In that case, expert
testimony showed that tests should have been ordered immediately on admission to the In the present case, evidence on record established that in confirming the diagnosis of
hospital in view of the symptoms presented. The Court held: bronchopneumonia, Dr. Casumpang selectively appreciated some and not all of the
symptoms presented, and failed to promptly conduct the appropriate tests to confirm his
When a patient exhibits symptoms typical of a particular disease, these symptoms should, at findings. In sum, Dr. Casumpang failed to timely detect dengue fever, which failure, especially
the very least, alert the physician of the possibility that the patient may be afflicted with the when reasonable prudence would have shown that indications of dengue were evident and/or
suspected disease. foreseeable, constitutes negligence.

The Court also ruled that reasonable prudence would have shown that diabetes and its a. Negligence in the Treatment and Management of Dengue
complications were foreseeable harm. However, the petitioner doctors failed to take this into
consideration and proceeded with the D&C operation. Thus, the Court ruled that they failed to Apart from failing to promptly detect dengue fever, Dr. Casumpang also failed to promptly
comply with their duty to observe the standard of care to be given to hyperglycemic/diabetic undertake the proper medical management needed for this disease.
patients.
As Dr. Jaudian opined, the standard medical procedure once the patient had exhibited the
Similarly, in Jarcia,64 involving the negligence of the doctors in failing to exercise reasonable classic symptoms of dengue fever should have been: oxygen inhalation, use of analgesic,
prudence in ascertaining the extent of the patient’s injuries, this Court declared that: and infusion of fluids or dextrose;67 and once the patient had twice vomited fresh blood, the
doctor should have ordered: blood transfusion, monitoring of the patient every 30 minutes,
In failing to perform an extensive medical examination to determine the extent of Roy Jr.’s hemostatic to stop bleeding, and oxygen if there is difficulty in breathing.68
injuries, Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan were remiss of their duties as members of the medical
profession. Assuming for the sake of argument that they did not have the capacity to make Dr. Casumpang failed to measure up to these standards. The evidence strongly suggests that
such thorough evaluation at that stage, they should have referred the patient to another he ordered a transfusion of platelet concentrate instead of blood transfusion. The tourniquet
doctor with sufficient training and experience instead of assuring him and his mother that test was only conducted after Edmer’s second episode of bleeding, and the medical
everything was all right. [Emphasis supplied] management (as reflected in the records) did not include antibiotic therapy and complete
physical examination. Dr. Casumpang’s testimony states:
Even assuming that Edmer’s symptoms completely coincided with the diagnosis of
bronchopneumonia (so that this diagnosis could not be considered "wrong"), we still find Dr. Q: Now, after entertaining – After considering that the patient Edmer Cortero was already
Casumpang guilty of negligence. suffering from dengue hemorrhagic fever, what did you do, if any?

First, we emphasize that we do not decide the correctness of a doctor’s diagnosis, or the A: We ordered close monitoring of the blood pressure, the cardiac rate and respiratory rate of
accuracy of the medical findings and treatment. Our duty in medical malpractice cases is to the patient.
Q: Now, was your instructions carried on? Although Dr. Casumpang presented the testimonies of Dr. Rodolfo Jagonap and Dr.
Ellewelyn Pasion (Dr. Pasion), Personnel Officer and Medical Director of SJDH, respectively
A: Yes, sir. as well as the testimonies of Dr. Livelo and Dr. Reyes (the radiologist who read Edmer’s
chest x-ray result), these witnesses failed to dispute the standard of action that Dr. Jaudian
established in his expert opinion. We cannot consider them expert witnesses either for the
Q: What was the blood pressure of the patient?
sole reason that they did not testify on the standard of care in dengue cases.69
A: During those times, the blood pressure of the patient was even normal during those times.
On the whole, after examining the totality of the adduced evidence, we find that the lower
courts correctly did not rely on Dr. Casumpang’s claim that he exercised prudence and due
Q: How about the respiratory rate? diligence in handling Edmer’s case. Aside from being self-serving, his claim is not supported
by competent evidence. As the lower courts did, we rely on the uncontroverted fact that he
A: The respiratory rate was fast because the patient in the beginning since admission had failed, as a medical professional, to observe the most prudent medical procedure under the
difficulty in breathing. circumstances in diagnosing and treating Edmer.

Q: Then, after that, what did you do with the patient? Doctor? Dr. Sanga is Not Liable for Negligence

A: We transfused platelet concentrate and at the same time, we monitor [sic] the patient. In considering the case of Dr. Sanga, the junior resident physician who was on-duty at the
time of Edmer’s confinement, we see the need to draw distinctions between the
Q: Then, who monitor [sic] the patient? responsibilities and corresponding liability of Dr. Casumpang, as the attending physician, and
that of Dr. Sanga.
A: The pediatric resident on duty at that time.
In his testimony, Dr. Pasion declared that resident applicants are generally doctors of
Q: Now, what happened after that? medicine licensed to practice in the Philippines and who would like to pursue a particular
specialty.70 They are usually the front line doctors responsible for the first contact with the
patient. During the scope of the residency program, 71 resident physicians (or
Q: While monitoring the patient, all his vital signs were _____; his blood pressure was normal
"residents")72 function under the supervision of attending physicians73 or of the hospital’s
so we continued with the supportive management at that time.
teaching staff. Under this arrangement, residents operate merely as subordinates who usually
defer to the attending physician on the decision to be made and on the action to be taken.
Q: Now, after that?
The attending physician, on the other hand, is primarily responsible for managing the
A: In the evening of April 23, 1988, I stayed in the hospital and I was informed by the pediatric resident’s exercise of duties. While attending and resident physicians share the collective
resident on duty at around 11:15 in the evening that the blood pressure of the patient went responsibility to deliver safe and appropriate care to the patients,74 it is the attending
down to .60 palpatory. physician who assumes the principal responsibility of patient care.75 Because he/she
exercises a supervisory role over the resident, and is ultimately responsible for the diagnosis
Q: What did you do upon receipt of that information? and treatment of the patient, the standards applicable to and the liability of the resident for
medical malpractice is theoretically less than that of the attending physician. These relative
A: I immediately went up to the room of the patient and we changed the IV fluid from the burdens and distinctions, however, do not translate to immunity from the legal duty of care for
present fluid which was D5 0.3 sodium chloride to lactated ringers solution. residents,76 or from the responsibility arising from their own negligent act.

Q: You mean to say you increased the dengue [sic] of the intervenus [sic] fluid? In Jenkins v. Clark,77 the Ohio Court of Appeals held that the applicable standard of care in
medical malpractice cases involving first-year residents was that of a reasonably prudent
A: We changed the IV fluid because lactated ringers was necessary to resume the volume physician and not that of interns. According to Jenkins:
and to bring back the blood pressure, to increase the blood pressure. [Emphasis supplied]
It is clear that the standard of care required of physicians is not an individualized one but of
physicians in general in the community. In order to establish medical malpractice, it must be
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that a physician did some particular thing or A: With blood streak.
things that a physician or surgeon of ordinary skill, care and diligence would not have done
under like or similar conditions or circumstances, or that he failed or omitted to do some Q: Now, you stated specimen, were you not able to examine the specimen?
particular thing or things that a physician or surgeon of ordinary skill, care and diligence
would have done under like or similar conditions or circumstances, and that the inquiry A: No, sir, I did not because according to the father he wash [sic] his hands.
complained of was the direct result of such doing or failing to do such thing or things.
xxxx
We note that the standard of instruction given by the court was indeed a proper one. It clearly
informed the jury that the medical care required is that of reasonably careful physicians or
hospital emergency room operators, not of interns or residents. [Emphasis supplied] Q: Now, from you knowledge, what does that indicate if the patient expels a phlegm and
blood streak?
A decade later, Centman v. Cobb,78 affirmed the Jenkins ruling and held that interns and first-
year residents are "practitioners of medicine required to exercise the same standard of care A: If a patient cocked [sic] out phlegm then the specimen could have come from the lung
applicable to physicians with unlimited licenses to practice." The Indiana Court held that alone.82 [Emphasis supplied]
although a first-year resident practices under a temporary medical permit, he/she impliedly
contracts that he/she has the reasonable and ordinary qualifications of her profession and xxxx
that he/she will exercise reasonable skill, diligence, and care in treating the patient.
TSN, June 17, 1993:
We find that Dr. Sanga was not independently negligent. Although she had greater patient
exposure, and was subject to the same standard of care applicable to attending physicians, Q: Now, in the first meeting you had, when that was relayed to you by the father that Edmer
we believe that a finding of negligence should also depend on several competing factors, Cortejo had coughed out blood, what medical action did you take?
among them, her authority to make her own diagnosis, the degree of supervision of the
attending physician over her, and the shared responsibility between her and the attending A: I examined the patient and I thought that, that coughed out phlegm was a product of
physicians. broncho pneumonia.

In this case, before Dr. Sanga attended to Edmer, both Dr. Livelo and Dr. Casumpang had xxxx
diagnosed Edmer with bronchopneumonia. In her testimony, Dr. Sanga admitted that she had
been briefed about Edmer’s condition, his medical history, and initial diagnosis;79 and based
Q: So what examination did you specifically conduct to see that there was no internal
on these pieces of information, she confirmed the finding of bronchopneumonia.
bleeding? A: At that time I did not do anything to determine the cause of coughing of the
blood because I presumed that it was a mucous (sic) produced by broncho pneumonia, And
Dr. Sanga likewise duly reported to Dr. Casumpang, who admitted receiving updates besides the patient did not even show any signs of any other illness at that time.83
regarding Edmer’s condition.80 There is also evidence supporting Dr. Sanga’s claim that she
extended diligent care to Edmer. In fact, when she suspected – during Edmer’s second
Based on her statements we find that Dr. Sanga was not entirely faultless. Nevertheless, her
episode of bleeding– that Edmer could be suffering from dengue fever, she wasted no time in
failure to discern the import of Edmer’s second bleeding does not necessarily amount to
conducting the necessary tests, and promptly notified Dr. Casumpang about the incident.
negligence as the respondent himself admitted that Dr. Sanga failed to examine the blood
Indubitably, her medical assistance led to the finding of dengue fever.
specimen because he wash edit away. In addition, considering the diagnosis previously made
by two doctors, and the uncontroverted fact that the burden of final diagnosis pertains to the
We note however, that during Edmer’s second episode of bleeding,81 Dr. Sanga failed to attending physician (in this case, Dr. Casumpang), we believe that Dr. Sanga’s error was
immediately examine and note the cause of the blood specimen. Like Dr. Casumpang, she merely an honest mistake of judgment influenced in no small measure by her status in the
merely assumed that the blood in Edmer’s phlegm was caused by bronchopneumonia. Her hospital hierarchy; hence, she should not be held liable for medical negligence.
testimony states:
Dr. Jaudian’s Professional Competence and Credibility
TSN, June 8, 1993:

Q: Let us get this clear, you said that the father told you the patient cocked [sic] out phlegm.
One of the critical issues the petitioners raised in the proceedings before the lower court and In Brown v. Sims,88 a neurosurgeon was found competent to give expert testimony regarding
before this Court was Dr. Jaudian’s competence and credibility as an expert witness. The a gynecologist's standard of pre-surgical care. In that case, the court held that since
petitioners tried to discredit his expert testimony on the ground that he lacked the proper negligence was not predicated on the gynecologist’s negligent performance of the operation,
training and fellowship status in pediatrics. but primarily on the claim that the pre-operative histories and physicals were inadequate, the
neurosurgeon was competent to testify as an expert.

Frost v. Mayo Clinic89 also allowed an orthopedic surgeon to testify against a neurologist in a

WON Dr. Jaudian is competent to testify. YES medical malpractice action. The court considered that the orthopedic surgeon’s opinion on
the "immediate need for decompression" need not come from a specialist in neurosurgery.
The court held that:
● Criteria in Qualifying as an Expert Witness

It is well established that "the testimony of a qualified medical doctor cannot be excluded
The competence of an expert witness is a matter for the trial court to decide upon in the
simply because he is not a specialist x x x." The matter of "x x x training and specialization of
exercise of its discretion. The test of qualification is necessarily a relative one, depending
the witness goes to the weight rather than admissibility x x x."
upon the subject matter of the investigation, and the fitness of the expert witness.84 In our
jurisdiction, the criterion remains to be the expert witness’ special knowledge experience and
practical training that qualify him/her to explain highly technical medical matters to the Court. xxxx

In Ramos v. Court of Appeals,85 the Court found the expert witness, who is a pulmonologist, It did not appear to the court that a medical doctor had to be a specialist in neurosurgery to
not qualified to testify on the field of anesthesiology. Similarly, in Cereno v. Court of express the opinions permitted to be expressed by plaintiffs’ doctors, e.g., the immediate
Appeals,86 a 2012 case involving medical negligence, the Court excluded the testimony of an need for a decompression in the light of certain neurological deficits in a post-laminectomy
expert witness whose specialty was anesthesiology, and concluded that an anesthesiologist patient. As stated above, there was no issue as to the proper execution of the neurosurgery.
cannot be considered an expert in the field of surgery or even in surgical practices and The medical testimony supported plaintiffs’ theory of negligence and causation. (Citations
diagnosis. omitted)

Interestingly in this case, Dr. Jaudian, the expert witness was admittedly not a pediatrician but In another case,90 the court declared that it is the specialist’s knowledge of the requisite
a practicing physician who specializes in pathology.87 He likewise does not possess any subject matter, rather than his/her specialty that determines his/her qualification to testify.
formal residency training in pediatrics. Nonetheless, both the lower courts found his
knowledge acquired through study and practical experience sufficient to advance an expert Also in Evans v. Ohanesian,91 the court set a guideline in qualifying an expert witness:
opinion on dengue-related cases.
To qualify a witness as a medical expert, it must be shown that the witness (1) has the
We agree with the lower courts. required professional knowledge, learning and skill of the subject under inquiry sufficient to
qualify him to speak with authority on the subject; and (2) is familiar with the standard
A close scrutiny of Ramos and Cereno reveals that the Court primarily based the witnesses’ required of a physician under similar circumstances; where a witness has disclosed sufficient
disqualification to testify as an expert on their incapacity to shed light on the standard of care knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury, the question of the degree of
that must be observed by the defendant-physicians. That the expert witnesses’ specialties do his knowledge goes more to the weight of the evidence than to its admissibility.
not match the physicians’ practice area only constituted, at most, one of the considerations
that should not be taken out of context. After all, the sole function of a medical expert witness, xxxx
regardless of his/her specialty, is to afford assistance to the courts on medical matters, and to
explain the medical facts in issue. Nor is it critical whether a medical expert is a general practitioner or a specialist so long as he
exhibits knowledge of the subject. Where a duly licensed and practicing physician has gained
Furthermore, there was no reasonable indication in Ramos and Cereno that the expert knowledge of the standard of care applicable to a specialty in which he is not directly
witnesses possess a sufficient familiarity with the standard of care applicable to the engaged but as to which he has an opinion based on education, experience, observation, or
physicians’ specialties. US jurisprudence on medical malpractice demonstrated the trial association wit that specialty, his opinion is competent.(Emphasis supplied)
courts’ wide latitude of discretion in allowing a specialist from another field to testify against a
defendant specialist.
Finally, Brown v. Mladineo92 adhered to the principle that the witness’ familiarity, and not the To reiterate, Dr. Casumpang failed to timely diagnose Edmer with dengue fever despite the
classification by title or specialty, which should control issues regarding the expert witness’ presence of its characteristic symptoms; and as a consequence of the delayed diagnosis, he
qualifications: also failed to promptly manage Edmer’s illness. Had he immediately conducted confirmatory
tests, (i.e., tourniquet tests and series of blood tests)and promptly administered the proper
The general rule as to expert testimony in medical malpractice actions is that "a specialist in a care and management needed for dengue fever, the risk of complications or even death,
particular branch within a profession will not be required." Most courts allow a doctor to testify could have been substantially reduced.
if they are satisfied of his familiarity with the standards of a specialty, though he may not
practice the specialty himself. One court explained that "it is the scope of the witness’ Furthermore, medical literature on dengue shows that early diagnosis and management of
knowledge and not the artificial classification by title that should govern the threshold dengue is critical in reducing the risk of complications and avoiding further spread of the
question of admissibility. (Citations omitted) virus.96 That Edmer later died of "Hypovolemic Shock/hemorrhagic shock," "Dengue
Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV," a severe and fatal form of dengue fever, established the
● Application to the Present Case causal link between Dr. Casumpang’s negligence and the injury.

In the case and the facts before us, we find that Dr. Jaudian is competent to testify on the Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondent successfully proved the element
standard of care in dengue fever cases.1avvphi1 of causation.

Although he specializes in pathology, it was established during trial that he had attended not Liability of SJDH
less than 30 seminars held by the Pediatric Society, had exposure in pediatrics, had been
practicing medicine for 16 years, and had handled not less than 50 dengue related cases. We now discuss the liability of the hospital.

As a licensed medical practitioner specializing in pathology, who had practical and relevant The respondent submits that SJDH should not only be held vicariously liable for the
exposure in pediatrics and dengue related cases, we are convinced that Dr. Jaudian petitioning doctors’ negligence but also for its own negligence. He claims that SJDH fell short
demonstrated sufficient familiarity with the standard of care to be applied in dengue fever of its duty of providing its patients with the necessary facilities and equipment as shown by
cases. Furthermore, we agree that he possesses knowledge and experience sufficient to the following circumstances:
qualify him to speak with authority on the subject.
(a) SJDH was not equipped with proper paging system;
The Causation Between Dr. Casumpang’s
Negligent Act/Omission, and the Patient’s (b) the number of its doctors is not proportionate to the number of patients;
Resulting Death was Adequately Proven
(c) SJDH was not equipped with a bronchoscope;
Dr. Jaudian’s testimony strongly suggests that due to Dr. Casumpang’s failure to timely
diagnose Edmer with dengue, the latter was not immediately given the proper treatment. In (d) when Edmer’s oxygen was removed, the medical staff did not immediately
fact, even after Dr. Casumpang had discovered Edmer’s real illness, he still failed to promptly provide him with portable oxygen;
perform the standard medical procedure. We agree with these findings.
(e) when Edmer was about to be transferred to another hospital, SJDH’s was not
As the respondent had pointed out, dengue fever, if left untreated, could be a life threatening ready and had no driver; and
disease. As in any fatal diseases, it requires immediate medical attention. 93 With the correct
and timely diagnosis, coupled with the proper medical management, dengue fever is not a life
threatening disease and could easily be cured.94 (f) despite Edmer’s critical condition, there was no doctor attending to him from 5:30
p.m. of April 22, to 9:00 a.m. of April 23, 1988.
Furthermore, as Dr. Jaudian testified, with adequate intensive care, the mortality rate of
dengue fever should fall to less than 2%. Hence, the survival of the patient is directly related SJDH on the other hand disclaims liability by claiming that the petitioning doctors are not its
to early and proper management of the illness.95 employees but are mere consultants and independent contractors.
We affirm the hospital’s liability not on the basis of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but on the For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that:
basis of the doctrine of apparent authority or agency by estoppel. (1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the
There is No Employer-Employee Relationship hospital; (2) where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must
also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff
acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care
Between SJDH and the Petitioning Doctors
and prudence. (Emphasis supplied)
In determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists between the parties, the
The doctrine was applied in Nogales v. Capitol Medical Center101 where this Court, through
following elements must be present: (1) selection and engagement of services; (2) payment
the ponencia of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, discussed the two factors in determining
of wages; (3) the power to hire and fire; and (4) the power to control not only the end to be
hospital liability as follows:
achieved, but the means to be used in reaching such an end.97

The first factor focuses on the hospital’s manifestations and is sometimes described as an
Control, which is the most crucial among the elements, is not present in this case.
inquiry whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the
Based on the records, no evidence exists showing that SJDH exercised any degree of control hospital. In this regard, the hospital need not make express representations to the patient that
over the means, methods of procedure and manner by which the petitioning doctors the treating physician is an employee of the hospital; rather a representation may be general
conducted and performed their medical profession. SJDH did not control their diagnosis and and implied.
treatment. Likewise, no evidence was presented to show that SJDH monitored, supervised,
or directed the petitioning doctors in the treatment and management of Edmer’s case. In
xxxx
these lights, the petitioning doctors were not employees of SJDH, but were mere independent
contractors.
The second factor focuses on the patient's reliance. It is sometimes characterized as an
inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent,
SJDH is Solidarily Liable Based
consistent with ordinary care and prudence. (Citation omitted)
on The Principle of Agency or Doctrine
of Apparent Authority
In sum, a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician (or an
independent contractor) providing care at the hospital if the plaintiff can prove these two
Despite the absence of employer-employee relationship between SJDH and the petitioning
factors: first, the hospital’s manifestations; and second, the patient’s reliance.
doctors, SJDH is not free from liability.98

a. Hospital’s manifestations
As a rule, hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its independent contractors. However,
it may be found liable if the physician or independent contractor acts as an ostensible agent
of the hospital. This exception is also known as the "doctrine of apparent authority."99 It involves an inquiry on whether the hospital acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable
person to conclude that the individual alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of
the hospital. As pointed out in Nogales, the hospital need not make express representations
The US case of Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital100 abrogated the hospitals’ immunity
to the patient that the physician or independent contractor is an employee of the hospital;
to vicarious liability of independent contractor physicians. In that case, the Illinois Supreme
representation may be general and implied.102
Court held that under the doctrine of apparent authority, hospitals could be found vicariously
liable for the negligence of an independent contractor:
In Pamperin v. Trinity Memorial Hospital,103 questions were raised on "what acts by the
hospital or its agent are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual
Therefore, we hold that, under the doctrine of apparent authority, a hospital can be held
was an agent of the hospital." In ruling that the hospital’s manifestations can be proven
vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital,
without the express representation by the hospital, the court relied on several cases from
regardless of whether the physician is an independent contractor, unless the patient knows,
other jurisdictions, and held that:
or should have known, that the physician is an independent contractor. The elements of the
action have been set out as follows:
 (1) the hospital, by providing emergency room care and by failing to advise patients accredited member of Fortune Care, but also as a member of its medical staff. SJDH cannot
that they were being treated by the hospital’s agent and not its employee, has now disclaim liability since there is no showing that Mrs. Cortejo or the respondent knew, or
created the appearance of agency; and should have known, that Dr. Casumpang is only an independent contractor of the hospital. In
this case, estoppel has already set in.
(2) patients entering the hospital through the emergency room, could properly
assume that the treating doctors and staff of the hospital were acting on its We also stress that Mrs. Cortejo’s use of health care plan (Fortune Care) did not affect
behalf.1âwphi1 SJDH’s liability. The only effect of the availment of her Fortune Care card benefits is that her
choice of physician is limited only to physicians who are accredited with Fortune Care. Thus,
In this case, the court considered the act of the hospital of holding itself out as provider of her use of health care plan in this case only limited the choice of doctors (or coverage of
complete medical care, and considered the hospital to have impliedly created the appearance services, amount etc.) and not the liability of doctors or the hospital.
of authority.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court PARTLY GRANTS the consolidated
b. Patient’s reliance petitions. The Court finds Dr. Noel Casumpang and San Juan de Dios Hospital solidarily
liable for negligent medical practice. We SET ASIDE the finding of liability as to Dr. Ruby
Miranda-Sanga. The amounts of ₱45,000.00 as actual damages and ₱500,000.00 as moral
It involves an inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance on the conduct of the hospital
damages should each earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed
or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.104
from the date of the judgment of the trial court. The Court AFFIRMS the rest of the Decision
dated October 29, 2004 and the Resolution dated January 12, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No.
In Pamperin, the court held that the important consideration in determining the patient’s 56400.
reliance is: whether the plaintiff is seeking care from the hospital itself or whether the plaintiff
is looking to the hospital merely as a place for his/her personal physician to provide medical
SO ORDERED.
care.105 Thus, this requirement is deemed satisfied if the plaintiff can prove that he/she relied
upon the hospital to provide care and treatment, rather than upon a specific physician. In this
case, we shall limit the determination of the hospital’s apparent authority to Dr. Casumpang, G.R. No. 200013               January 14, 2015
in view of our finding that Dr. Sanga is not liable for negligence.
BETTY GEPULLE-GARBO, represented by Attorney-in-Fact, MINDA G. ROSALES (now
SJDH Clothed Dr. Casumpang With Apparent Authority represented by her new Attorney-in-Fact, GARY LLOYD G. ROSALES), Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES VICTOREY ANTONIO GARABATO and JOSEPHINE S.
SJDH impliedly held out and clothed Dr. Casumpang with apparent authority leading the
GARABATO, Respondents.
respondent to believe that he is an employee or agent of the hospital.

DECISION
Based on the records, the respondent relied on SJDH rather than upon Dr. Casumpang, to
care and treat his son Edmer. His testimony during trial showed that he and his wife did not
know any doctors at SJDH; they also did not know that Dr. Casumpang was an independent VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
contractor. They brought their son to SJDH for diagnosis because of their family doctor’s
referral. The referral did not specifically point to Dr. Casumpang or even to Dr. Sanga, but to Before us is a petition1 for review on certiorari seeking to. reverse and set aside the May 20,
SJDH. Significantly, the respondent had relied on SJDH’s representation of Dr. Casumpang’s 2011 Decision2 and January 5, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA:-G.R. CV
authority. To recall, when Mrs. Cortejo presented her Fortune Care card, she was initially No. 87912 affirming the August 7, 2006 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay
referred to the Fortune Care coordinator, who was then out of town. She was thereafter City, Branch 108 dismissing the petition5 for cancellation of certificate of title filed by petitioner
referred to Dr. Casumpang, who is also accredited with Fortune Care. In both instances, Betty Gepulle-Garbo against respondents Victorey and Josephine Garabato, for insufficiency
SJDH through its agent failed to advise Mrs. Cortejo that Dr. Casumpang is an independent of evidence.
contractor.
The facts of the case follow.
Mrs. Cortejo accepted Dr. Casumpang’s services on the reasonable belief that such were
being provided by SJDH or its employees, agents, or servants. By referring Dr. Casumpang
to care and treat for Edmer, SJDH impliedly held out Dr. Casumpang, not only as an
Nick Garbo6 (Nick) was married to Eduviges Garabato (Eduviges) sometime before 1978. In addition, to support her claim that Florence is not entitled to the property, she presented an
During their marriage, they had a daughter named Florence Garabato (Florence) who in turn Agreement of Partition15 where Florence is one of the parties. Petitioner contended that
had a son out of wedlock, respondent Victorey Antonio Garabato (Victorey). During the Florence is thus not entitled to the subject property since she already received her share.
subsistence of Nick and Eduviges’ marriage, Nick cohabited with petitioner Betty Gepulle- Petitioner also admitted that said agreement was never signed by Florence.
Garbo (Betty).
Petitioner presented as witness, Mr. Bienvenido Albacea, a handwriting expert and retired
On June 17, 1977, a Deed of Sale7 was executed between Eduviges and Florence whereby employee of the NBI, who at the time of the conduct of the examination of the subject deed of
the former sold tothe latter a 303-square meter parcel of land, covered by Transfer Certificate sale was a Document Examiner II of the NBI. Albacea stated that in 1992, he was requested
of Title (TCT) No. 17986, in Pasay City. The deed of sale was signed by Nick Garbo. to examine the signatures of Nick appearing in the deeds of sale dated June 17, 1977 and
June 15, 1977 and comparedit with the specimen signatures appearing in the Alien
On May 12, 1978, Eduviges passed away. Three months after, on August 12, 1978, Nick Registration Form No. 3,16 a document17 from the Treasurer’s Office of Pasay City and
married Betty. On October 26, 1988, Florence registered the property in her name and was several receipts18 issued by Nick to his lessees. After he conducted an examination of the
issued TCT No. 126959.8 Florence died on March 4, 1992 while Nick died on February 28, signatures in these documents, he concluded that the questioned and the standard
1996. signatures of Nick were not written by one and the same person.

In 1996, respondent Victorey, married to co-respondent Josephine, registered the subject Petitioner also presented as witness Mr. Reynaldo Buenaventura who testified that he has
property in his name by virtue of a Deed of Sale9 executed by Florence in his favor. On leased the subject property since 1972 and has paid the rent to petitioner.
October 15, 1996, respondent was issued TCT No. 136900.10
On the other hand, respondent Victorey denied that Florence forged the signature of Nick
11
On August 2, 2001, petitioner filed a petition  for cancellation of TCT No. 136900 against Garbo. He admitted that he purchased the property from Florence for a valid consideration
respondents. She impugns the validity of the June 17, 1977 Deed of Sale on the ground that and registered it late because he had no money. Respondent Victorey presented a document
the signatures of Nick and Eduviges were forged by Florence. Petitioner also assailed the entitled Affidavit of Waiver19 dated June 17, 1977 executed by Nick stating that Eduviges
deed of sale between Florence and Victorey. acquired a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 17986 and that Nick did not contribute a single
centavo tobuy the parcel of land. It further stated that Nick waived all his rights, title and
interest and possession to land in favor of his wife, Eduviges.
Petitioner claimed that Nick had previously sought the examination of his alleged signature on
the June 17, 1977 Deed of Sale by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI
examiner allegedly found that the questioned signature and the standard signatures of Nick In its August 7, 2006 Decision,20 the RTC dismissed the complaint for cancellation of title filed
were not written by one and the same person. Petitioner further alleged that Nick had filed a by petitioner. The dispositive portion of the decision states, to wit:
criminal complaint for falsification against Florence though the case was dismissed due to
lack of probable cause. In addition, petitioner averred that on February 6, 1993, Nick wrote a WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, after study of the evidence presented, this Court
letter12 to respondent Victorey reminding him that the subject property was his despite the finds that plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence her cause of action.
transfer of title. Petitioner prayed for the cancellation of TCT No. 136900 and the issuance of Accordingly, the complaint for cancellation of certificate of title is hereby DISMISSED for
a new certificate of title in her name. insufficiency of evidence.

Victorey and Josephine denied the allegation of forgery. They raise that the action had Defendant’s counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
prescribed and/or barred by laches. Further they claimed that Betty has no cause of action as
the subject property is the paraphernal property of Eduviges. Lastly, they assert that the sale No pronouncement as to costs.
was regular, valid and genuine. They asserted that the signatures appearing on the deeds of
sale are true and genuine signatures of the parties including Nick Garbo.13 SO ORDERED.21

During the trial, petitioner asserted that Nick left real properties including the property covered The RTC held that petitioner failed to prove that the signatures of Nick and Eduviges Garbo
by TCT No. 136900. She claimed that by virtue of a holographic will14 executed by Nick on were forgeries. The RTC did not give credence to the testimony of Albacea, holding that
December 30, 1980, the subject property was bequeathed to her. In the same will, he courts are not bound by expert testimonies and that the relative weight and sufficiency of
disinherited his daughter, Florence. Petitioner admitted that the said holographic will was expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide. There was no
never probated. evidence presented to prove Nick’s ownership over the subject land. The RTC also noted that
from the time the assailed deed ofsale and the affidavit of waiver were executed on June 17, product of a tracing process from that of her alleged signature in the June 15, 1977 Deed of
1977 until the subject property was registered in Florence Garabato’s name on October 26, Sale and which would show by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged signature of
1988, Nick never instituted a civil case to question the alleged forgery by his daughter. It was Eduviges Garbo in the questioned Deed of Sale dated June 17, 1977 is fake or a forgery.
only after Nick’s death that petitioner filed the civil suit.
Petitioner also assailed the validity of the subsequent deed of sale executed between
The RTC, likewise, did not find any legal ground to declare the deed of sale between Florence and respondentVictorey and notarized in 1996. Petitioner claims that the said deed
Florence and respondent Victorey invalid. Petitioner merely questioned the validity of the of sale although notarized is a mere private document because Florence could not appear
deed of sale without any allegations. Petitioner failed to present any evidence to show why before the notary public in 1996 because she died in 1992.
said document should be nullified.
Respondents assert that in a petition for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling that petitioner failed to prove by clear, positive and raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court. Respondents submit that the trial court
convincing proof of forgery in Nick’s signature in the deed of sale. The CA also held that Mr. and the CA did not err in their observation that there is nothing in petitioner’s testimony which
Albacea’s opinion as to the truth or falsity of the signature of Nick Garbo is not binding and showed forgery committed by the respondents. Respondents aver that the CA did not err
conclusive upon the court since the request for examination of the deed of sale was not upon when it found failure on the partof the petitioner to meet the criteria for determining whether a
the order of the trial court but at the instance of the petitioner. Such examination brings signature was forged. Respondents stress that Albacea who though claimed to have found
suspicion as to the bias or prejudice of the examining party. Moreover, whileit was concluded variance in the compared signatures did not however point out distinguishing marks,
that there was variance in the compared signatures, such mere variance cannot be characteristics and discrepancies in and between the genuine and false specimens of writing
considered conclusive proof that the signature was forged. The CA also emphasized that the which would ordinarily escape notice or detection by an untrained observer. According to
deed of sale being a notarized document bears the presumption of regularity in its execution. respondents, petitioner failed to present evidence or justification to show why the subject
document should be nullified.
As to the deed of sale between Florence and Victorey, the CA agreed with the trial court that
aside from presenting the xerox copy of the deed of sale, petitioner failed to present any The Court is essentially presented the question of whether the signatures of Nick and
evidence to show why said document should be nullified. The appellate court stated that Eduviges appearing on the instruments were forged.
petitioner merely questioned the fact that the document was notarized long after the death of
Florence. However, the fact that the document was notarized long after Florence’s death Petition is without merit.
does not mean that her signature was a forgery, absent any evidence showing such.
The issue raised by petitioner is essentially factual in nature, the determination of which is
Hence, this petition. best left to the courts below.1âwphi1 Well settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts.23 The function of the Court in petitions for review on certiorari is limited to
Petitioner insists that the signatures of Nick and Eduviges Garbo on the June 17, 1977 Deed reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. 24 As a matter of
of Sale executed in favor of Florence were forged. To support her claim, petitioner sound practice and procedure, the Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings of
reproduced for reference the signatures of Nick in the earlier deed of sale dated June 15, trial courts, more so, when as here, such findings are undisturbed by the appellate
1977 and compared it with Nick’s signature in the assailed Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of court.25 Stated otherwise, the Court refrains from further scrutiny of factual findings of trial
Waiver both dated June 17, 1977. She pointed out that Nick’s signatures in the three courts, more so when those findings are affirmed by the CA. To do otherwise would defeat
documents are congruent and exactly alike in all details and are products of a tracing process the very essence of Rule 45 and would convert the Court into a trier of facts, which is not
from his alleged signature in the Deed of Sale dated June 15, 1977. As evidence, petitioner meant to be. Certainly the rule admits exceptions26 none, however, is applicable to the case
presented the findings of the handwriting expert, Bienvenido Albacea in the Questioned at bar. Absent any application of any of the recognized exceptions, this Court is bound by the
Documents Report No. 109-29222 dated February 26, 1992 stating that the questioned and findings of fact by the lower courts.27
the standard signatures of Nick Garbo were not written by one and the same person. In
addition, petitioner avers that since 1972, Nick was the one collecting the rentals on the In any event, Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is
subject premises and after his death, herein petitioner. Petitioner also asserts that a close the duty of a party to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the
comparison of the alleged signature of Eduviges Garbo in the questioned Deed of Sale dated amount of evidence required by law.28
June 17, 1977 and her alleged signature in the Deed ofSale dated June 15, 1977 would show
that the said two signatures are exactly alike in all details which would also show that the As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
alleged signature of Eduviges Garbo in the questioned Deed of Sale dated June 17, 1977 isa evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. 29 One who alleges forgery has
the burden to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of case fell within the limited exceptions for disturbing conclusiveness of factual findings of lower
greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.30 The fact of courts. The petitioner having not shown any reason for us to disturb the ruling of the courts a
forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and quo, we are constrained to affirm the decision of the CA.
the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized to have been
forged.31 WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The May 20, 2011 Decision
and the January 5, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87912 are
WON Albacea is competent to testify. NO AFFIRMED.

In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission, United Presbyterian Church, USA,32 the With costs against the petitioner.
Court identified and explained the factors involved in the examination and comparison of
handwritings: SO ORDERED.

x x x [T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its G.R. No. 186533               August 9, 2010
general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities
as regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
shades, etc., that may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are vs.
not decisive on the question of the former’s authenticity. The result of examinations of EFREN CASTILLO, Accused-Appellant.
questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is,
at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The
position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned DECISION
signature is written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen
and/or paper used, play an important role on the general appearance of the signature. PEREZ, J.:
Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or
circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a questioned handwriting, much This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 7 November 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between that G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00030-MIN which affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated 14 April
questioned handwriting and an authentic one.33 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gingoog City, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 43, in
Criminal Case No. 2000-211 finding herein appellant Efren Castillo guilty beyond reasonable
The opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the court, the expert’s doubt of the crime of rape under Article 266-A, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code,
function being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own committed against AAA,3 thereby imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
opinion.34 This principle holds true especially when the question involved is mere handwriting appellate court further ordered the appellant to pay AAA ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, in
similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of addition to the ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the trial court.
the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones.35 A finding of forgery does
not dependentirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must In a Complaint4 dated 10 July 2000, appellant was charged by AAA, assisted by her mother,
conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a BBB, with the crime of rape committed as follows:
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.36
That sometime in March 2000, in XXX, XXX City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
Here, both the RTC and CA found that Albacea did not explain the manner of examination of this Honorable Court, the above-named [appellant], did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully
the specimen signatures in reaching his conclusion. Albacea did not point out distinguishing and feloniously force and intimidate AAA, known by the [appellant] to be mentally retarded,
marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of and then forcibly committed sexual intercourse with the said AAA, against her will.
writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection by an untrained observer.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 266-A, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, as
The Court also aptly ruled that courts are not bound by expert testimonies especially that the amended by [Republic Act No.] 8353.5
examination was upon the initiative of Nick and Betty and they had complete control on what
documents and specimens to be examined by the NBI. Betty, in coming before us, had the When arraigned6 on 23 August 2000, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT
onus of showing that the signatures were forged. She fell short of demonstrating that her GUILTY to the crime charged.
At the pre-trial conference, both the prosecution and the defense failed to make any AAA’s hymen showed healed lacerations at 3 o’clock and 9 o’clock positions which could
stipulation of facts.7 The pre-trial conference was then terminated and trial on the merits have been caused by a blunt object or by violence or by reason of sexual intercourse. An
ensued. examination of AAA’s vaginal canal yielded negative result for spermatozoa but another
contusion was found therein.13 The result of AAA’s physical examination was reduced into
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: AAA, the private offended party; Dr. writing as evidenced by Medico-Legal Certificate14 dated 11 May 2000.
Thessa Marie Antillon-Malimas (Dr. Antillon-Malimas),8 the doctor in Gingoog District Hospital
who examined AAA; BBB, the mother of AAA, who was also presented as rebuttal witness; Subsequently, AAA executed her sworn statement15 before Senior Police Officer 4 Myrna Z.
and Myrna delos Reyes-Villanueva, the Guidance Psychologist at the Northern Mindanao Palad (SPO4 Palad), the investigator at Gingoog City Police Station.
Medical Center who conducted psychological tests on AAA to determine her mental capacity.
AAA was also subjected to psychological tests to determine her mental capacity. The
On the basis of the testimonies of the aforesaid witnesses, the prosecution established that psychological tests administered by Myrna Delos Reyes-Villanueva on AAA consist of the
AAA was 18 years old9 when she was raped by the appellant. She is the eldest of the four Draw-A-Person Test and the Bender Visual Motor Test. The aforesaid psychological tests
children of BBB and CCC, the deceased father of AAA. She began attending school when showed that AAA has poor visual motor coordination and low level mental functioning not
she was already eight years old. AAA, however, was not able to finish her Grade I level within her chronological age, i.e., 21 years old at the time of her examination. In view of that
primarily because of her epileptic seizures which started when she was nine years old. Since result, Myrna Delos Reyes-Villanueva concluded that AAA is suffering from mild to moderate
then she suffered epileptic seizures at least once a month. During attacks, AAA trembles and mental retardation with a mental age of 8 to 12 years old and can be educated up to Grade VI
becomes stiff. AAA also had difficulty understanding her lessons in school, she cannot write level. She also noted that AAA lacked personal hygiene and has a vague concept of big
well and she had poor memory. Compared to her younger siblings, AAA had difficulty numbers and time, like days of the week. She further declared that AAA’s instinct to resist
following instructions given to her at home and in school.10 any sexual assault is always there; however, with her low level mental functioning she could
easily be deceived or persuaded by a man to engage into sexual intercourse.16 The result of
AAA’s ordeal began sometime in March 2000 when she approached the appellant in order to AAA’s psychological tests was also reduced into writing as evidenced by a Psychological
collect his debt for the rice cake he bought from her mother. Instead of settling his account, Report17 dated 2 September 2003.
the appellant cuddled AAA until they reached the house of a certain Atok located in Barangay
Agay-ayan, Gingoog City. Once inside, the appellant made her lie down on the bed and For its part, the defense presented Rolando Castillo (Rolando), appellant’s father, and the
removed her short pants and panty. The appellant subsequently removed his pants and appellant himself whose testimony consists mainly of bare denial and alibi.
underwear. When both of them were already naked, the appellant mounted AAA and
successfully inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. AAA felt pain. After satisfying his bestial The appellant denied having raped AAA. He stated that it was impossible for him to rape AAA
desire, the appellant instructed AAA to go home.11 in March 2000 because for the entire period of the said month he was harvesting coconuts
from the land of a certain Elizabeth Camus from 7:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. or 6:00 p.m. every
Days thereafter, such awful experience of AAA was repeated when she was on her way to day. Similarly, the house of Atok, where the first rape incident allegedly happened, was
visit her aunt’s house. The appellant, who was then standing by the mango grove, already demolished as early as 1998 and he was one of those who dismantled the said
approached AAA, walked along with her and led her to a nearby chapel also in Agay-ayan, house.18
Gingoog City. While outside the chapel, the appellant undressed AAA by removing her short
pants and panty. The appellant likewise removed his pants and underwear. In a standing On 9 May 2000, the appellant admits that he went to the house of his uncle in Buenavista,
position, the appellant, once again, inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina and successfully had Agusan del Norte. He stayed there until he received a letter from his father sometime in June
sexual intercourse with her.12 Thereafter, AAA told her mother, BBB, what the appellant did to 2000 informing him that a rape case was filed against him by AAA and advising him to go
her. home. The appellant then decided to go home in Agay-ayan, Gingoog City. Upon arrival, his
father immediately inquired if the rape charged against him was true to which he replied in the
On 11 May 2000, BBB accompanied AAA at Gingoog District Hospital where she was negative.19
examined by Dr. Antillon-Malimas. Upon examination, Dr. Antillon-Malimas found that AAA
had a 7x6 cm. contusion hematoma lateral aspect of the right buttocks which could have On 15 August 2000, two months after his arrival in Agay-ayan, Gingoog City, the appellant,
been caused by a blunt force or violence applied on the area. Based on the appearance of his father, and a certain Eddie Camus went to AAA’s place to ask her mother to have the
the contusion, it could have been sustained two days prior to AAA’s examination and it would case settled. The appellant asked AAA’s mother, BBB, why her family filed a case against
exist for a period of four to five days. Dr. Antillon-Malimas’ findings on AAA’s genitalia, him when he did not do anything to her daughter, AAA, to which BBB allegedly responded,
particularly the vulva, revealed no swelling, no tenderness and no contusion. Her findings on "Just forgive me because the case was already filed in court." They went home thereafter.20
The appellant also insisted that he was not arrested; instead, he surrendered voluntarily to 8353, DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
the Barangay Captain of Agay-ayan, Gingoog City, upon the advice of his father. It was the BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.27
Barangay Captain of Agay-ayan, Gingoog City, who accompanied him to the police station.21
The Court of Appeals, taking into consideration the aforesaid assignment of errors and after a
Likewise, the appellant claimed that he does not know of any reason why AAA would impute thorough study of the records of the case, rendered the assailed Decision dated 7 November
such a grave offense against him. The only thing he could remember was AAA’s mother, 2008, affirming appellant’s conviction for rape with the modification for an additional award of
BBB, who got angry at him when he told her to get married since she is now a widow. Since ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. The records were then forwarded to this Court for further
then BBB did not talk to him anymore. The appellant believed this could be the reason why review.
AAA’s family charged him with rape.22
This Court affirms appellant’s conviction.
The defense likewise presented appellant’s father, Rolando, who categorically admitted that
AAA is mentally retarded.23 Rolando also disclosed that he accompanied the appellant to Appellant contends that the records are bereft of any evidence that would conclusively show
AAA’s place to talk to her mother and ask forgiveness in case the charge against him was that AAA was suffering from mental retardation. BBB’s declaration that AAA is a slow thinker
true so that the matter will no longer reach the court. The appellant then asked forgiveness does not sufficiently establish AAA’s mental retardation. Further, the "expert witness
from AAA’s mother by saying, "Ya, forgive me because the charge against me is not true." qualification" of the prosecution’s supposed expert witness is highly questionable because
Then BBB allegedly replied, "We cannot withdraw the case ‘Fren because it was already filed she had not acquired any doctorate degree in the field of psychology or psychiatry. More so,
in court." Rolando also divulged that immediately after they went to AAA’s house, there were the psychological tests administered by her on AAA were inadequate to establish AAA’s
already police officers who were about to arrest the appellant but the latter ran away. When mental capacity.
the appellant went home, he told him to surrender, which the appellant obeyed.24
Appellant anchors his argument for acquittal on the alleged failure of the prosecution to
On rebuttal, BBB disclosed that even prior to the filing of the instant case the appellant establish AAA’s mental retardation to make him guilty of rape under Article 266-A, par. 1(b),
already admitted that he truly molested AAA. The appellant, indeed, went to their house in of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant concludes that his guilt has not been proven beyond
August 2000 asking forgiveness from her but she told him that the case was already in court. reasonable doubt.
BBB also clarified that the house of Atok where the first rape incident happened was not yet
demolished in 1998. The house demolition happened only in 2000. She was certain about We reject appellant’s position.
this because during the demolition she was there gathering firewood.25
In rape cases, the gravamen of the offense is sexual intercourse with a woman against her
The trial court, convinced on the merits of the prosecution’s case, rendered a Decision on 14 will or without her consent.28 Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as
April 2004, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and amended by Republic Act No. 8353, states:
sentenced him to an imprisonment term of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to indemnify
AAA in the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed.
The records were originally transmitted to this Court on appeal. In view, however, of this
Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo,26 the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for 1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
intermediate review. circumstances:

In his brief, the appellant assigned the following errors: a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT [AAA] IS A MENTAL b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
RETARDATE DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE SUCH
MENTAL RETARDATION. c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE [APPELLANT] OF d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
THE CRIME OF RAPE UNDER ARTICLE 266-A, par. 1(B), AS AMENDED BY R.A. though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. [Emphasis supplied].
It can be deduced from the aforequoted provision that for the charge of rape to prosper, the what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter.36 Thus, even though the
prosecution must prove that; (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he Guidance Psychologist who examined AAA may not qualify as an expert witness, though the
accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when she is deprived of reason or psychological tests conducted by her on AAA may not be accurate to determine AAA’s
otherwise unconscious, or when she is under 12 years of age or is demented. 29 The term mental capacity, such circumstance is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause.
"woman deprived of reason" includes one suffering from mental retardation. 30 Clearly, carnal
knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under the aforesaid provisions of In the case at bench, BBB testified that AAA has been suffering from epilepsy since she was
law. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary as a mental retardate is not capable of nine years old, which is one of the reasons why AAA was not able to finish her Grade I level.
giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress AAA also had to stop schooling because she had difficulties understanding her lessons in
between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter.31 school, she cannot write well, she had poor memory and she had difficulty answering even
the simplest question asked of her. BBB further stated that AAA is the eldest of her four
In People v. Dalandas,32 citing People v. Dumanon,33 this Court held that mental retardation children; however, compared to her younger siblings, AAA had a hard time comprehending
can be proven by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the testimony of the instructions given to her at home and in school.
witnesses and even the observation by the trial court.34
In the same way, though the Guidance Psychologist who examined AAA may not be qualified
WON the testimony of the Guidance Psychologist is admissible in evidence as ordinary as an expert witness, her observations, however, as regards the appearance, manner, habits
witness. YES and behavior of AAA, is also admissible in evidence as an ordinary witness’ testimony. Even
before the Guidance Psychologist administered the psychological tests on AAA, she already
Section 50, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence explicitly provides: noticed that AAA lacked personal hygiene. While conversing with AAA, she observed that
AAA has low level mental functioning as she has difficulty understanding simple things, has a
vague concept of big numbers and time ─ like days of the week, and has regressed behavior
SEC. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. – The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is
that is not congruent to her age, i.e., 21 years old at the time of her examination. She also
given, may be received in evidence regarding-
stated that she was not able to administer the Purdue Non-Language Test, which is an
Intelligence Quotient Test, on AAA due to the latter’s inability to identify the items therein.
(a) x x x
This Court, in People v. Dalandas, clarified that a mental retardate, in general, exhibits a slow
(b) x x x rate of maturation, physical and/or psychological, as well as impaired learning capacity.
Further, the mental retardation of persons and the degrees thereof may be manifested by
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. their overt acts, appearance, attitude and behavior. The dentition, manner of walking, ability
to feed oneself or attend to personal hygiene, capacity to develop resistance or immunity to
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or infection, dependency on others for protection and care and inability to achieve intelligible
appearance of a person. [Emphasis supplied]. speech may be indicative of the degree of mental retardation of a person. All these may be
testified on by ordinary witnesses who come in contact with an alleged mental retardate.37
Accordingly, it is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or
mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe It bears stressing that the deprivation of reason contemplated by law need not be complete;
the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question. Commonly, it is required mental abnormality or deficiency is sufficient.38 Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that AAA’s
that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he impaired learning capacity, lack of personal hygiene and difficulty in answering simple
can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: "A non-expert witness may questions, as testified to by her mother and the Guidance Psychologist who had an
give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based upon conversations or opportunity to observe her appearance, manner, habits and behavior, are indicative that she
dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact is truly suffering from some degree of mental retardation.
bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness’ own knowledge and observation, he
having first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as More telling is the trial court’s own observation on AAA’s manner of testifying that confirms
the basis for his opinion." 35 the fact that AAA is a mental retardate, to wit:

The mother of an offended party in a rape case, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the Court: Alright, Order.
physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and
The prosecution presented their first witness in the person of the victim herself, AAA, who they reached the house of a certain Atok. Once inside, the appellant made her lie down on
seemed to be a retardate. the bed and removed her short pants and panty. The appellant subsequently undressed
himself and inserted his penis into her vagina. On the second rape, AAA similarly recalled
The witness finds it hard to answer simple questions and it has to be repeated to ask how the appellant led her to a nearby chapel. While they were outside the chapel, the
questions in a simple way as possible in order for her to understand. appellant undressed her and likewise removed his shorts and underwear and had sexual
intercourse with her in a standing position. Such testimony of AAA can be characterized as
categorical and straightforward. Also, as noted by the trial court, although AAA could not
In the course of her direct testimony it developed and appeared that she was already tired
easily grasp the questions asked, her answers were nonetheless marked with candidness
and she could not concentrate well probably because of her predicament she being also an
even as they were given simplemindedly.
epileptic and it is for this reason that the prosecution and the defense agreed that the cross
examination of the witness be continued later in order to give her a chance to rest x x
x.39 [Emphases supplied.] It bears emphasis that the competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as
witnesses have been upheld by this Court where it is shown that they can communicate their
ordeal capably and consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the complainant’s
For purposes of determining the mental capacity of a person, this Court held that the personal
accusations, it even lends greater credence to her testimony, that, someone as feeble-
observation of the trial judge suffices even in the absence of an expert opinion.40 Hence, the
minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if
aforesaid findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and respect being in the best
she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the accused.42 Moreover, it is settled
position as it had the opportunity to hear and observe the demeanor, conduct and attitude of
that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
AAA while testifying.
that she has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies the exacting
standard of credibility needed to convict the accused.43
Surprisingly, though the appellant vehemently contends that the prosecution was not able to
establish AAA’s mental retardation, he failed to notice that his own father, Rolando, during his
It is also worth stressing that during AAA’s testimony, she positively identified the appellant as
testimony before the court a quo, categorically admitted and confirmed that, indeed, AAA is
the person who had raped her.44 Thus, the straightforward narration of AAA of what
mentally retarded and feeble-minded. Here we quote appellant’s father’s testimony:
transpired, accompanied by her categorical identification of appellant as the malefactor,
sealed the case for the prosecution.45
Q: Will you agree with me that this AAA is somewhat mentally retardate?
The fact of sexual congress between AAA and the appellant was also supported by the
A: Yes, Sir. That is really true. medical findings of healed hymenal lacerations at 3 o’clock and 9 o’clock positions which,
according to Dr. Antillon-Malimas, could have resulted from sexual intercourse. When the
xxxx victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physician’s finding of penetration, there is sufficient
foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge.
Q: But you knew for a fact that this AAA is a feeble-minded? Laceration, whether healed or fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible
defloration.46 Thus, the said medical findings, together with the straightforward testimony of
A: Yes, Your Honor.41 AAA, even strengthens her claim of sexual violation by appellant.

Such testimony puts beyond doubt that AAA is truly a mental retardate. Her condition was so The records also failed to show that AAA was prompted by ill motive in imputing such a grave
apparent to people who have had an opportunity to interact and deal with her that even offense against the appellant. The absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of the
appellant’s own father, who happens to be AAA’s neighbor, could not deny her mental state. prosecution witnesses to testify against the appellant strongly tends to sustain the conclusion
The prosecution evidence settled this issue. that no such improper motive exists and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and
credit.47 The claim of the appellant that his remark on AAA’s mother, that since she was
already a widow she should already get married, could possibly trigger the filing of this case
As well and as much established is the fact of sexual congress between the appellant and
against him is highly implausible. As the trial court had stated, it is quite unbelievable that
AAA.
BBB’s anger could have been triggered by such an innocuous joke to the extent of allowing
the examination of AAA’s private parts and subjecting AAA to the humiliation of declaring in
AAA was able to recall and narrate in detail before the court a quo how she was ravished by open court the sexual molestation she underwent in the hands of the appellant. Besides, no
the appellant on two occasions; first, at the house of a certain Atok and second, outside the mother in her right mind would possibly stoop so low as to subject her daughter to the
chapel. On the first rape incident, AAA vividly described how the appellant cuddled her until hardships and shame concomitant to a rape prosecution just to assuage her own hurt
feelings. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it court correctly convicted the appellant for the crime of simple rape 54 under Article 266-A, par.
will subject her daughter to embarrassment and even stigma. It is hard to believe that a 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua.55
mother would sacrifice her own daughter and present her to be the subject of a public trial if
she, in fact, has not been motivated by an honest desire to have the culprit punished.48 Anent the award of damages, civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of the fact
of rape while moral damages is awarded upon such finding without need of further proof
It is also worthy to note the testimony of the appellant that he, together with his father, and a because it is assumed that a rape victim had actually suffered moral injuries entitling the
certain Eddie Camus, went to the house of AAA to have the case settled, which testimony victim to such award.56 Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are awarded under Article
was corroborated by his own father. Appellant’s father went further in saying that they went to 223057 of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
AAA’s house to ask for forgiveness. AAA’s mother, BBB, confirmed appellant’s importunity. qualifying.58 Thus, this Court similarly affirms the ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00
This Court has ruled that an act of asking for forgiveness is undeniably indicative of guilt.49 If moral damages awarded by the lower courts to AAA. However, there being no aggravating
the appellant so believed that he did not commit any wrongdoing against AAA, he would not circumstance that can be considered, no exemplary damages can be awarded to AAA.
bother to go to AAA’s house to have the case settled and to ask for forgiveness.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
The array of the prosecution evidence stresses the weakness of appellant’s defense of denial H.C. No. 00030-MIN dated 7 November 2008 finding herein appellant guilty beyond
and alibi. reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is hereby AFFIRMED.

Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and, unless supported by clear and convincing SO ORDERED.
evidence, the same cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the victim, who in a simple
and straightforward manner, convincingly identified the appellant who sexually molested G.R. No. 166470               August 7, 2009
her.50 For alibi to prosper, the accused must show that it was impossible for him to have been
at the scene of the commission of the crime at the time of its commission.511avvphi1 CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-1 and NATIVIDAD CRUZ-
HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
In the instant case, the appellant claimed that he cannot rape AAA in March 2000 because for vs.
the entire period of the said month he was harvesting coconuts from the land of a certain JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, Respondent.
Elizabeth Camus from 7:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. or 6:00 p.m. every day. Similarly, the house
of Atok, where the first rape incident allegedly happened, was already demolished as early as x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
1998 and he was one of those who dismantled the said house. However, these assertions of
the appellant remained uncorroborated. He also failed to show the physical impossibility of
his presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. As can be inferred from G.R. No. 169217
his testimony, he left Agay-ayan, Gingoog City, only in May 2000, so at the time the rape
incidents happened sometime in March 2000, he was still in the place where the crime was CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-SAGUN and TERESA C.
committed. HERNANDEZ-VILLA ABRILLE, Petitioners,
vs.
In sum, AAA’s straightforward testimony, as well as her unwavering and positive identification JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS,2 Respondent.
of the appellant as her defiler and tormentor, corroborated by the medical findings conducted
by Dr. Antillon-Malimas, was sufficient to convict the appellant. The flimsy and self-serving DECISION
defenses of denial and alibi of the appellant failed to destroy the truthfulness and the
credibility of AAA’s testimony.52 CORONA, J.:

Although the complaint specifically alleged the circumstance of appellant’s knowledge of the Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses
victim’s mental retardation at the time of the commission of the crime of rape, which qualifies Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to
the crime and makes it punishable by death under Article 266-B, paragraph 1053 of the complications during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal
Revised Penal Code, as amended, the prosecution did not adduce any evidence to prove the uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.
same during trial. This Court, therefore, is fully convinced that the trial court and the appellate
On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children, On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship10 in the Regional Trial Court
petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of
Hernandez-Villa Abrille. herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind.

Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same.
valuable real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively estimated at ₱50 million in
1997). Natividad denied that Marilou Subdivision belonged to Lulu. Since she and her late husband
were the registered owners of the said property, it was allegedly part of their conjugal
Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She was then 10 partnership.
years old and studying at La Consolacion College. However, due to her "violent personality,"
Lulu stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5. Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for their part, claimed that the issue of Lulu’s competency
had been settled in 1968 (upon her emancipation) when the court ordered her legal guardian
In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her and maternal uncle, Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the properties for her to manage.
estate.3 Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education, Felix
continued to exercise actual administration of Lulu’s properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993, They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and, for that reason, aware of the consequences
petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties. of executing an SPA. Furthermore, whether or not Cecilio and Ma. Victoria acted within the
scope of their respective authorities could not be determined in a guardianship proceeding,
During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993), Felix and petitioners such matter being the proper subject of an ordinary civil action.
undertook various "projects" involving Lulu’s real properties. In 1974, Felix allegedly
purchased one of Lulu’s properties for an undisclosed amount to develop the Marilou Petitioners also admitted that the property developed into the Marilou Subdivision was among
Subdivision.4 In 1995, Ma. Victoria informed Lulu that her 11-hectare Montalban, Rizal those parcels of land Lulu inherited from the San Juan family. However, because the "sale"
property5 was under litigation. Thus, Lulu signed a special power of attorney6 (SPA) believing between Felix and Lulu had taken place in 1974, questions regarding its legality were already
that she was authorizing Ma. Victoria to appear in court on her behalf when she was in fact barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, its validity could no longer be impugned, or so they
unknowingly authorizing her half-sister to sell the said property to the Manila Electric claimed.
Company for ₱18,206,400.7 Thereafter, Cecilio asked Lulu to authorize him to lease her 45-
hectare property in Montalban, Rizal to Oxford Concrete Aggregates for ₱58,500 per month During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy and
so that she could have a car and driver at her disposal. experiences with the San Juan and Hernandez families. Lulu identified and described her
parents, stepmother, half-siblings and maternal relatives. She claimed inheriting tracts of land
In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita from the San Juan family. However, these properties were dissipated by the Hernandez
San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate. She family as they lived a "luxurious" lifestyle. When asked to explain this allegation, Lulu said
confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners’ Montalban, Rizal that her stepmother and half-siblings rode in cars while she was made to ride a tricycle.
home and was receiving a measly daily allowance of ₱400 for her food and medication.
Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulu’s examinations which revealed the
Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. alarming state of her health.11 Not only was Lulu severely afflicted with diabetes mellitus and
She later found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room lit by a single fluorescent lamp suffering from its complications,12 she also had an existing artheroselorotic cardiovascular
without running water. Since she had not been given a proper toilet, Lulu urinated and disease (which was aggravated by her obesity). Furthermore, they unanimously opined that
defecated in the garden. Due to Lulu's poor hygiene, respondent brought her to several in view of Lulu’s intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental state, she
physicians for medical examination. Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis, would not be able to care for herself and self-administer her medications.
rheumatism and diabetes from which she was suffering several complications.8
In a decision dated September 25, 2001,13 the RTC concluded that, due to her weak physical
Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an inventory and accounting of Lulu’s estate from and mental condition, there was a need to appoint a legal guardian over the person and
petitioners.9 However, the demand was ignored. property of Lulu. Thus, it declared Lulu an incompetent and appointed respondent as
guardian over the person and property of Lulu on a ₱1 million bond.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration asserting that the ₱1 million bond was grossly Petitioners claim that the opinions of Lulu's attending physicians23 regarding her mental state
insufficient to secure Lulu’s ₱50-million estate against fraudulent loss or dissipation. 14 The were inadmissible in evidence as they were not experts in psychiatry. Respondent therefore
motion, however, was denied.15 failed to prove that Lulu's illnesses rendered her an incompetent. She should have been
presumed to be of sound mind and/or in full possession of her mental capacity. For this
On July 2, 2002, petitioners appealed the September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC to the reason, Lulu should be allowed to live with them since under Articles 194 to 196 of the Family
Court of Appeals (CA).16 The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75760. Code,24 legitimate brothers and sisters, whether half-blood or full-blood are required to
support each other fully.
On December 29, 2004, the CA issued a decision affirming the September 25, 2001 decision
of the RTC (in the petition for guardianship) in toto.17 It held that respondent presented Respondent, on the other hand, reiterated her arguments before the courts a quo. She
sufficient evidence to prove that Lulu, because of her illnesses and low educational disclosed that Lulu had been confined in [Link], a psychosocial rehabilitation center
attainment, needed assistance in taking care of herself and managing her affairs considering and convalescent home care facility in Quezon City, since 2004 due to violent and destructive
the extent of her estate. With regard to the respondent’s appointment as the legal guardian, behavior. She also had delusions of being physically and sexually abused by "Boy Negro"
the CA found that, since Lulu did not trust petitioners, none of them was qualified to be her and imaginary pets she called "Michael" and "Madonna."25 The November 21, 2005 medical
legal guardian.1avvphi1 Because guardianship was a trust relationship, the RTC was bound report26 stated Lulu had unspecified mental retardation with psychosis but claimed significant
to appoint someone Lulu clearly trusted. improvements in her behavior.

Petitioners now assail the December 29, 2004 decision of the CA in this Court in a petition for WON Lulu’s attending physician’s testimonies are admissible in evidence. YES
review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 166470.18
We find the petition to be without merit.
Meanwhile, Lulu moved into 8 R. Santos St., Marikina City (Marikina apartment) and was
provided with two housemaids tasked to care for her. Sometime in November 2003, Lulu was Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give his opinion
abducted from her Marikina apartment. Jovita immediately sought the assistance of the on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.27 Lulu's attending
Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER) division of the Philippine National Police. physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly
observe her behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was below average and her
The PACER subsequently discovered that petitioners were keeping Lulu somewhere in mental stage below normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence.
Rodriguez, Rizal. Despite their initial hostility to the investigation, Ma. Victoria and Cecilio
subsequently contacted the PACER to inform them that Lulu voluntarily left with Natividad Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary. 28 The
because her guardian had allegedly been maltreating her.19 observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence29 establishing the person's state of
mental sanity will suffice.30 Here, the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu
On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus20 in the CA alleging that personally when she testified before the RTC.
petitioners abducted Lulu and were holding her captive in an undisclosed location in
Rodriguez, Rizal. Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, 31 persons who, though of sound mind but by
reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of
On April 26, 2005, the CA granted the petition for habeas corpus, ruling that Jovita, as her themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may
legal guardian, was entitled to her custody. 21 properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was
incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments
and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said decision but it was denied in a resolution
require a reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly
dated July 12, 2005.22 Aggrieved, they filed this petition for review on certiorari docketed as
involves questions of fact.
G.R. No. 169217. This was consolidated with G.R. No. 166470.

As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a petition for review. We only
The basic issue in petitions of this nature is whether the person is an incompetent who
take cognizance of questions of fact in exceptional circumstances, none of which is present in
requires the appointment of a judicial guardian over her person and property.
this case.32 We thus adopt the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA.1avvph!1
Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate courts’ finding as to For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals’
the propriety of respondent's appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu.33 We therefore Decision3 dated January 8, 1998, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 44180, the dispositive portion of which
affirm her appointment as such. Consequently, respondent is tasked to care for and take full reads:
custody of Lulu, and manage her estate as well.34
"WHEREFORE, Resolution No. 966213 dated September 23, 1996 and Resolution
Inasmuch as respondent’s appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu was proper, the No. 972423 dated April 11, 1997 of the respondent Civil Service Commission are
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in her favor was also in order. hereby set aside. The complaint against petitioner Allyson Belagan filed by
Magdalena Gapuz is hereby DISMISSED.
A writ of habeas corpus  extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which
the rightful custody of person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.35 Respondent, as the The dismissal of petitioner Belagan is lifted and he is hereby ordered to be
judicial guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care for and protect her ward. For her to perform immediately reinstated to his position without loss of seniority, retirement, backwages
her obligation, respondent must have custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ and other rights and benefits.
of habeas corpus after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her ward.36
SO ORDERED."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DENIED.
The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate complaints filed respectively by Magdalena
Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to respondent, Lulu’s legal guardian, an Gapuz, founder/directress of the "Mother and Child Learning Center," and Ligaya Annawi, a
accurate and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds they unlawfully appropriated public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School, against respondent Dr. Allyson
for themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez, within thirty (30) days Belagan, Superintendent of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), all
from receipt of this decision. If warranted, the proper complaints should also be filed against from Baguio City. Magdalena charged respondent with sexual indignities and harassment,
them for any criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and various malfeasances.
Hernandez’s estate and her unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal guardian.
Magdalena’s sworn complaint alleges that sometime in March 1994, she filed an application
Treble costs against petitioners. with the DECS Office in Baguio City for a permit to operate a pre-school. One of the
requisites for the issuance of the permit was the inspection of the school premises by the
SO ORDERED. DECS Division Office. Since the officer assigned to conduct the inspection was not present,
respondent volunteered his services. Sometime in June 1994, respondent and complainant
visited the school. In the course of the inspection, while both were descending the stairs of
G.R. No. 132164             October 19, 2004
the second floor, respondent suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her
cheek. Dumbfounded, she muttered, "Sir, is this part of the inspection? Pati ba naman kayo
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, sa DECS wala ng values?" Respondent merely sheepishly smiled. At that time, there were no
vs. other people in the area.
ALLYSON BELAGAN, respondent.
Fearful that her application might be jeopardized and that her husband might harm
DECISION respondent, Magdalena just kept quiet.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Several days later, Magdalena went to the DECS Division Office and asked respondent, "Sir,
kumusta yung application ko?" His reply was "Mag-date muna tayo." She declined, explaining
When the credibility of a witness is sought to be impeached by proof of his reputation, it is that she is married. She then left and reported the matter to DECS Assistant Superintendent
necessary that the reputation shown should be that which existed before the occurrence of Peter Ngabit.
the circumstances out of which the litigation arose,1 or at the time of the trial and prior thereto,
but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit. 2 This is because a person of Magdalena never returned to the DECS Division Office to follow up her application. However,
derogatory character or reputation can still change or reform himself. she was forced to reveal the incidents to her husband when he asked why the permit has not
yet been released. Thereupon, they went to the office of the respondent. He merely denied
having a personal relationship with Magdalena.
Thereafter, respondent forwarded to the DECS Regional Director his recommendation to teacher of Baguio City, while in the performance of his official duties and
approve Magdalena’s application for a permit to operate a pre-school. taking advantage of his office.

Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena read from a local newspaper that certain female Consequently, respondent Allyson Belagan is HEREBY ORDERED DISMISSED
employees of the DECS in Baguio City were charging a high-ranking DECS official with from the government service, with prejudice to reinstatement and all his retirement
sexual harassment. Upon inquiry, she learned that the official being complained of was benefits and other remunerations due him are HEREBY DECLARED FORFEITED in
respondent. She then wrote a letter-complaint for sexual indignities and harassment to former favor of the government.
DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria.
SO ORDERED."5
On October 4, 1994, respondent was placed under suspension.
Upon appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), on September 23, 1996, promulgated
On the part of Ligaya Annawi, she alleged in her complaint that on four separate occasions, Resolution No. 9662136 affirming the Decision of the DECS Secretary in the case filed by
respondent touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins, embraced her from Magdalena but dismissing the complaint of Ligaya. The CSC ruled that respondent’s
behind and pulled her close to him, his organ pressing the lower part of her back. transgression against Magdalena constitutes grave misconduct. Thus:

Ligaya also charged respondent with: (1) delaying the payment of the teachers’ "The acts of Belagan are serious breach of good conduct since he was holding a
salaries; (2) failing to release the pay differentials of substitute teachers; (3) willfully refusing position which requires the incumbent thereof to maintain a high degree of moral
to release the teachers’ uniforms, proportionate allowances and productivity pay; uprightness. As Division Superintendent, Belagan represents an institution tasked to
and (4) failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion Board, as required by the DECS mold the character of children. Furthermore, one of his duties is to ensure that
rules and regulations. teachers in his division conduct themselves properly and observe the proper
discipline. Any improper behavior on his part will seriously impair his moral
The DECS conducted a joint investigation of the complaints of Magdalena and Ligaya. In his ascendancy over the teachers and students which can not be tolerated. Therefore,
defense, respondent denied their charge of sexual harassment. However, he presented his misconduct towards an applicant for a permit to operate a private pre-
evidence to disprove Ligaya’s imputation of dereliction of duty. school cannot be treated lightly and constitutes the offense of grave
misconduct.
On January 9, 1995, the DECS Secretary rendered a Joint Decision 4 finding respondent guilty
of four (4) counts of sexual "indignities or harassments" committed against Ligaya; and two WHEREFORE, respondent Allyson Belagan is hereby found guilty of grave
(2) counts of "sexual advances or indignities" against Magdalena. He was ordered dismissed misconduct and imposed the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with all the
from the service. The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads: accessory penalties. The decision of the DECS Secretary is modified accordingly."7

"WHEREFORE, foregoing disquisitions duly considered, decision is hereby rendered On October 29, 1996, respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, contending
in the two above-entitled cases, finding: that he has never been charged of any offense in his thirty-seven (37) years of service. By
contrast, Magdalena was charged with several offenses before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Baguio City, thus:
a) Respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the DECS Baguio City
Schools Division GUILTY of the four counts of sexual indignities or
harassments committed against the person and honor of complainant Miss "1. Criminal Case No. 43416 for LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION (December 3, 1980)
Ligaya Annawi, a Baguio City public school teacher, while in the performance
of his official duties and taking advantage of his office. He is, however, 2. Criminal Case No. 45629 for SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES (May 13, 1982)
ABSOLVED of all the other charges of administrative malfeasance or
dereliction of duty. 3. Criminal Case No. 45630 for GRAVE THREATS (May 13, 1982)

b) Respondent Baguio City Superintendent Allyson Belagan likewise GUILTY 4. Criminal Case No. 45914 for GRAVE THREATS (June 24, 1982)
of the two counts of sexual advances or indignities committed against the
person and honor of complainant Mrs. Magdalena Gapuz, a private school 5. Criminal Case No. 51532 for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF (January 25, 1985)
 6. Criminal Case No. 51533 for LIGHT THREATS (January 25, 1985) 2. Teresita De Los Santos vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 86-8-26-8) for GRAVE
THREATS & ORAL DEFAMATION
7. Criminal Case No. 51556 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (January 30, 1985)
3. Mrs. Conchita Ballesteros vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 029) for ORAL
8. Criminal Case No. 51818 for LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION (March 18, 1985) DEFAMATION and FALSE ACCUSATION

9. Criminal Case No. 51819 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (March 18, 1985) 4. Mrs. Clara Baoas vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 030) for HARASSMENT and
THREATS
10. Criminal Case No. 51820 for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF (March 18, 1985)
5. GABRIELA SILANG TANOD FORCES vs. Gapuz (Case No. 031) for HABITUAL
TROUBLE MAKER
11. Criminal Case No. 51821 for UNJUST VEXATION (March 18, 1985)

6. Pablo Ortiz vs. Gapuz (November 1, 1979) for ORAL DEFAMATION

12. Criminal Case No. 62173 for UNJUST VEXATION (May 29, 1991)

7. C. Ballesteros vs. Gapuz (September 11, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION

13. Criminal Case No. 62172 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (May 29, 1991)

8. Mrs. Liza Ancheta vs. Gapuz (September 27, 1978) for RUMOR MONGERING
14. Criminal Case No. 62754 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (December 2, 1986)

9. Mr. Pananin (Beneco Personnel) (October 8, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION

15. Criminal Case No. 55642 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (December 2, 1986)

10. Mrs. Minda Valdez vs. Gapuz (November 6, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION
16. Criminal Case No. 55423 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (October 24, 1986)

11. WOMEN’S CLUB vs. GAPUZ (February 9, 1979) for ORAL DEFAMATION
17. Criminal Case No. 55846 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (November 4, 1986)

12. Vistro Salcedo case (May 8, 1979)

18. Criminal Case No. 55800 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (January 7, 1987)
      Where Mrs. Gapuz was spreading rumors against Barangay Captain and Police
Chief
19. Criminal Case No. 57312 for UNJUST VEXATION (November 29, 1987)
13. Demolition Scandal (May 10, 1979)
20. Criminal Case No. 55643 for SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES (December 13,       Where she called all the residents of their Barangay for an emergency meeting
1985) and where she shouted invectives against the residents

21. Criminal Case No. 53404 for UNJUST VEXATION (December 13, 1985) 14. Incident of June 13, 1979
      Mrs. Gapuz shouted invectives against the Barangay Sanitary Inspector
22. Criminal Case No. 55422 for UNJUST VEXATION (October 24, 1986)"8
15. Incident of August 25, 1979
In addition, the following complaints against Magdalena were filed with the Barangay       Mrs. Gapuz shouted invectives against the servants of Mr. De Leon
Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, both in Baguio City:
16. Incident of August 26, 1979
"1. Ordana vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 11-19-02-A) for GRAVE THREATS, UNJUST       Mrs. Gapuz terrorized the council meeting
VEXATION, RUMOR MONGERING
17. Incident of September 2, 1978
      Mrs. Clara Baoas was harassed by Mrs. Gapuz
 18. Incident of September 9, 1979 male would attempt to steal a kiss." In fact, her "record immediately raises an alarm in any
      Mrs. Gapuz quarreled with Mrs. C. Ballesteros during the council meeting one who may cross her path."11 In absolving respondent from the charges, the Appellate
Court considered his "unblemished" service record for 37 years.
19. Incident of September 10, 1979
      Mrs. Gapuz was hurling invectives along her alley in the early morning Unsatisfied, the CSC, through the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition raising the
following assignments of error:
20. Incident of September 13, 1979
      Mrs. Gapuz tapped electric wire from Mrs. Tessie de los Santos with the latter’s "I. The Supreme Court may rule on factual issues raised on appeal where the Court
consent of Appeals misappreciated the facts. Furthermore, where the findings of the Court of
Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other, the Supreme Court may review
21. Incident of September 21, 1979 the record and evidence. The Court of Appeals erred in not giving credence to the
      Mrs. Gapuz was shouting and hurling invectives scandalously around her testimony of complainant Magdalena Gapuz despite convincing and overwhelming
residence signs of its truthfulness.

22. Incident of September 21, 1979 II. The Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it failed to give due weight
      Mrs. Gapuz was shouting, complaining about alleged poisoned sardines near the to the findings of the DECS, which conducted the administrative investigation,
premises of her residence which killed her hen. specifically with respect to the credibility of the witnesses presented.

23. Incident of September 23, 1979 III. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondent should be penalized under
      Mrs. Gapuz was shouting unpleasant words around the neighborhood. She did Sec. 22 (o) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V and not Sec. 22 (e) of said
not like the actuations of a bayanihan group near the waiting shed."9 rules."12

Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed against Magdalena cast doubt on her In his comment, respondent maintains that Magdalena’s derogatory record undermines the
character, integrity, and credibility. verity of her charge and that the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing it.

In its Resolution No. 97242310 dated April 11, 1997, the CSC denied respondent’s motion for The petition is impressed with merit.
reconsideration, holding that:
The pivotal issue before us is whether complaining witness, Magdalena Gapuz, is credible.
"The character of a woman who was the subject of a sexual assault is of minor YES
significance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the person accused of
having committed the offense. This is so because even a prostitute or a woman of ill This is a question of fact which, as a general rule, is not subject to this Court’s review.
repute may become a victim of said offense.
It is a rule of long standing that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, if supported by
As such, the fact that complainant Magdalena Gapuz is shown to have had cases substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this
before the regular courts for various offenses and was condemned by her community Court.13 This Court is, after all, not a trier of facts. One of the exceptions, however, is when
for wrongful behavior does not discount the possibility that she was in fact telling the the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court or a quasi-
truth when she cried about the lecherous advances made to her by the respondent. x judicial body, like petitioner herein.14
x x"
Here, the Court of Appeals and the CSC are poles apart in their appreciation of Magdalena’s
Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. As stated earlier, it derogatory record. While the former considered it of "vital and paramount importance" in
reversed the CSC Resolutions and dismissed Magdalena’s complaint. determining the truth of her charge, the latter dismissed it as of "minor significance." This
contrariety propels us to the elusive area of character and reputation evidence.
The Appellate Court held that Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being
questionable. Given her aggressiveness and propensity for trouble, "she is not one whom any
Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence
controversy.15 One statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e., Section 51 (a) that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote here: testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be
shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he
"SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible;  exceptions. – has been convicted of an offense."

(a) In Criminal Cases: Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by testifying in her own behalf, opened
herself to character or reputation attack pursuant to the principle that a party who becomes a
witness in his own behalf places himself in the same position as any other witness, and may
xxx     xxx
be impeached by an attack on his character or reputation.23
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the character or
proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the
reputation of a complaining witness in a sexual charge is a proper subject of inquiry. This
probability or improbability of the offense charged."
leads us to the ultimate question – is Magdalena’s derogatory record sufficient to discredit her
credibility?
It will be readily observed that the above provision pertains only to criminal cases, not to
administrative offenses. And even assuming that this technical rule of evidence can be
A careful review of the record yields a negative answer.
applied here, still, we cannot sustain respondent’s posture.

First, most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City relate to acts
Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved under this
committed in the 80’s, particularly, 1985 and 1986. With respect to the complaints filed with
provision. Only those which would establish the probability or improbability of the offense
the Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, the acts complained of
charged. This means that the character evidence must be limited to the traits and
took place in 1978 to 1979. In the instant administrative case, the offense was committed in
characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.16 Thus, on a charge of rape -
1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are no longer reliable proofs of Magdalena’s
character for chastity, on a charge of assault - character for peaceableness or violence, and
character or reputation. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in according much weight to
on a charge of embezzlement - character for honesty.17 In one rape case, where it was
such evidence. Settled is the principle that evidence of one’s character or reputation must be
established that the alleged victim was morally loose and apparently uncaring about her
confined to a time not too remote from the time in question.24 In other words, what is to be
chastity, we found the conviction of the accused doubtful.18
determined is the character or reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior
thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit.25 Hence, to say that
In the present administrative case for sexual harassment, respondent did not offer evidence Magdalena’s credibility is diminished by proofs of tarnished reputation existing almost a
that has a bearing on Magdalena’s chastity. What he presented are charges for grave oral decade ago is unreasonable. It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from
defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed the path of moral righteousness can never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is
against her. Certainly, these pieces of evidence are inadmissible under the above provision capable to change or reform.
because they do not establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of the criminal
Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what respondent was trying to establish is cases specified by respondent. The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions
Magdalena’s lack of credibility and not the probability or the improbability of the charge. In is that it is not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that he has been
this regard, a different provision applies. charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of
impairing his credibility.26 This view has usually been based upon one or more of the following
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given. It refers grounds or theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge against the witness does not logically
to a person’s integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief. 19 A witness may be tend to affect his credibility, (b) that innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a
discredited by evidence attacking his general reputation for truth,20 honesty21 or crime, (c) that one accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally
integrity.22 Section 11, Rule 132 of the same Revised Rules on Evidence reads: established, and (d) that a witness may not be impeached or discredited by evidence of
particular acts of misconduct.27 Significantly, the same Section 11, Rule 132 of our Revised
"SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party’s witness. –A witness may be impeached Rules on Evidence provides that a witness may not be impeached by evidence of particular
by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence wrongful acts. Such evidence is rejected because of the confusion of issues and the waste of
time that would be involved, and because the witness may not be prepared to expose the Q Second time?
falsity of such wrongful acts.28 As it happened in this case, Magdalena was not able to explain
or rebut each of the charges against her listed by respondent. A Yes, sir. We were going down, sir.

But more than anything else, what convinces us to sustain the Resolution of the CSC is the Q And you were going down?
fact that it is supported by substantial evidence. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
Magdalena testified in a straightforward, candid and spontaneous manner. Her testimony is A Yes, sir.
replete with details, such as the number of times she and respondent inspected the pre-
school, the specific part of the stairs where respondent kissed her, and the matter about her
transient boarders during summer. Magdalena would not have normally thought about these Q Do you recall what portion of the stairs where you were during the alleged kissing?
details if she were not telling the truth. We quote her testimony during the cross-examination
conducted by DECS Assistant Secretary Romeo Capinpin and Undersecretary Antonio A Sir, on the topmost of the stairs.
Nachura, thus:
Q Before you went down?
"Q Was there any conversation between you and Dr. Belagan during the inspection
on the first floor and the second floor? A Yes, sir. At the topmost because there is a base floor going up to the stairs and it
has 16 steps.
A There was, sir. It was a casual conversation that we had with regard to my family,
background, how the school came about, how I started with the project. That was all, Q So, it was not on the 16th step but still on the topmost?
sir.
A Yes sir.
Q Nothing about any form of sexual harassment, in words or in deeds?
Q Part of the floor of the building?
A Sir, because he inspected the second floor twice, sir. We went up to the stairs
twice, sir. A Yes, sir. Topmost, sir?

Q Why? ASEC R. CAPINPIN:

A I really don’t know what was the reason behind, sir. But on the second inspection, Q Will you kindly tell us your relative position at that time?
sir, I told him that as of that time I had some transients with me. I was making use of
the premises for transients because that was summer then, sir. And I already started
A Sir, on the second time that we went up and I mentioned about these transients
paying the place so I said, ‘Sir, I have some transients with me in the evening’ and he
that I had then and he wanted to stay in the place in one of the rooms and then I
said, You know Mrs. Gapuz, I am interested to stay in one of the rooms as one your
declined and I was still showing the rooms simultaneously. On the last, the biggest
boarders. But I respectfully declined saying, ‘Sir, I think for delicadeza I cannot
room that I had, he said, ‘No. Never mind, I am not going to see that anymore.’ So he
accept you. Not that I don’t want you to be here but people might think that I am
waited for me there and upon reaching the place, as I was to step down on the first
keeping you here and that would prejudice my permit, sir.’
step going down, he placed his arm and held me tightly and planted the kiss on my
cheek, sir.
ASEC R. CAPINPIN:
Q You said that he wanted to stay in one of the rooms?
Q When did the alleged kissing occur? Was it during the first time that you went up
with him or the second time?
A Yes, sir, as a boarder.
A No, sir, on the second time, sir.
Q Is that room used for transients?
 A During that time, sir, during the summertime, I made use of the time to get some Q What transpired between you and Mrs. Gapuz in your office?
transients.
A When she came to my Office, she was relating about that and she was even
Q And he was telling you that he wanted to occupy one of the rooms? insulting me saying among others that I was a useless fixture in that Office because I
cannot do anything with the processing of her paper or application.
A Yes, but I declined, sir for delicadeza.
Q It says here that she would relate the incident to you. Did she relate any
Q At that time, there were no transients yet. incident?

A When he came over for the inspection sir, nobody was there."29 A Yes, she did sir.

The above testimony does not stand in isolation. It is corroborated by Peter Ngabit, DECS Q What was that incident all about?
Assistant Division Superintendent. Ngabit testified that Magdalena reported to him that
respondent kissed her and asked her for a "date." A She was saying that when Mr. Belagan went to visit her school, he stole a
kiss from her and that she was saying that when she asked Supt. Belagan for
"Q I would like to call your attention to Exhibit ‘A’ which is the affidavit of Mrs. her papers, she was asked for a date before the Indorsement. After that, she
Magdalena B. Gapuz, particularly item no. 8, and may I read for your information – left."30
‘That the Monday after the incident, I went to the DECS Division Office expecting to
get favorable recommendation from the DECS Regional Office for the issuance of my With Magdalena’s positive testimony and that of Ngabit, how can we disregard the findings of
permit. That I proceeded to the Superintendent and asked him, ‘Sir, kumusta ‘yung the DECS and the CSC? Surely, we cannot debunk it simply because of the Court of
application ko’ and he said, ‘mag date muna tayo’ but I refused and explained that I Appeals’ outdated characterization of Magdalena as a woman of bad reputation. There are a
am married, after which I proceeded to the Office of Asst. Superintendent Peter number of cases where the triers of fact believe the testimony of a witness of bad
Ngabit to relate the incident and then left the Division Office.’ Do you remember if character31 and refuse to believe one of good character.32 As a matter of fact, even a witness
Mrs. Gapuz went to your Office on the particular day? who has been convicted a number of times is worthy of belief, when he testified in a
straightforward and convincing manner.33
A Yes, sir.
At this juncture, it bears stressing that more than anybody else, it is the DECS investigating
Q What time was that? officials who are in a better position to determine whether Magdalena is telling the truth
considering that they were able to hear and observe her deportment and manner of
testifying.34
A I cannot remember, sir.

In reversing the CSC’s Resolutions, the Court of Appeals ruled that "there is ample evidence
Q Was it morning, afternoon?
to show that Magdalena had a motive" in accusing respondent, i.e., to pressure him to issue a
permit. This is unconvincing. The record shows that respondent had already issued the
A I think it was in the morning, sir. permit when Magdalena filed her letter-complaint. Indeed, she had no more reason to charge
respondent administratively, except of course to vindicate her honor.
Q Morning.
Petitioner prays that we sustain its ruling penalizing respondent for grave misconduct and not
A Yes, sir. merely for disgraceful or immoral conduct which is punishable by suspension for six (6)
months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense. 35 Misconduct means intentional
Q Early morning? wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a
government official.36 To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or
A About noon, sir. be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. 37 In
grave misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest.38 Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some January 8, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44180 is REVERSED. The CSC Resolution Nos. 966213
benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.39 This is and 972423 are AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that respondent ALLYSON
apparently present in respondent’s case as it concerns not only a stolen kiss but also a BELAGAN is SUSPENDED from office without pay for ONE (1) YEAR, with full credit of his
demand for a "date," an unlawful consideration for the issuance of a permit to operate a pre- preventive suspension.
school. Respondent’s act clearly constitutes grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal.40
SO ORDERED.
We are, however, not inclined to impose the penalty of dismissal from the service.
Respondent has served the government for a period of 37 years, during which, he made a G.R. No. 139070      May 29, 2002
steady ascent from an Elementary Grade School Teacher to Schools Division
Superintendent. In devoting the best years of his life to the education department, he PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
received numerous awards.41 This is the first time he is being administratively charged. He is vs.
in the edge of retirement. In fact, he had filed his application for retirement when Magdalena NOEL LEE, accused-appellant.
filed her complaint. Section 16, Rule XIV, of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive
Order No. 292 provides:
PUNO, J.:
"SEC. 16. In the determination of penalties to be imposed, mitigating and aggravating
circumstances may be considered. x x x." On automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 127 in
Criminal Case No. C-54012 (98), which sentenced accused-appellant Noel Lee to death for
the murder of Joseph Marquez.
The mitigating circumstances are enumerated in Section 53, Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,42 which reads in part:
On May 27, 1998, an Information was filed against accused-appellant charging him with the
crime of murder committed as follows:
"SEC. 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances. – In
the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and
alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be "That on or about the 29th day of September 1996, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila,
considered. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot one JOSEPH MARQUEZ y LAGANDI,
The following circumstances shall be appreciated: with the use of a handgun, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries,
which ultimately caused the victim’s death.
xxx     xxx
CONTRARY TO LAW."1
j. length of service
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. At the trial, the prosecution presented the
xxx     xxx following witnesses: (a) Herminia Marquez, the mother of the victim; (b) Dr. Darwin Corpuz, a
resident doctor at the Manila Caloocan University (MCU) Hospital; (c) PO2 Rodelio Ortiz, a
l. and other analogous cases." police officer who examined the crime scene; and (d) Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, a medico-legal
officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory.
Conformably with our ruling in a similar case of sexual harassment, 43 and respondent’s length
of service, unblemished record in the past and numerous awards, 44 the penalty of suspension The prosecution established the following facts: At 9:00 in the evening of September 29,
from office without pay for one (1) year is in order. 1996, Herminia Marquez, 46 years of age and her son, Joseph, 26 years of age, were in the
living room of their house located at No. 173 General Evangelista St., Bagong Barrio,
While we will not condone the wrongdoing of public officers and employees, however, neither Caloocan City. The living room was brightly lit by a circular fluorescent lamp in the ceiling.
will we negate any move to recognize and remunerate their lengthy service in the Outside their house was an alley leading to General Evangelista Street. The alley was bright
government. and bustling with people and activity. There were women sewing garments on one side and
on the other was a store catering to customers. In their living room, mother and son were (3) Contusion, right eyebrow, measuring 3 x 2 cm, 3 cm from the anterior
watching a basketball game on television. Herminia was seated on an armchair and the midline.
television set was to her left. Across her, Joseph sat on a sofa against the wall and window of
their house and the television was to his right. Herminia looked away from the game and There are subdural and subarachnoidal hemorrhages.
casually glanced at her son. To her complete surprise, she saw a hand holding a gun coming
out of the open window behind Joseph. She looked up and saw accused-appellant Noel Lee Stomach is ¼ full of partially digested food particles and positive for alcoholic
peering through the window and holding the gun aimed at Joseph. Before she could warn odor.
him, Joseph turned his body towards the window, and simultaneously, appellant fired his gun
hitting Joseph’s head. Joseph slumped on the sofa. Herminia stood up but could not move as
accused-appellant fired a second shot at Joseph and three (3) shots more— two hit the sofa CONCLUSION:
and one hit the cement floor. When no more shots were fired, Herminia ran to the window
and saw accused-appellant, in a blue sando, flee towards the direction of his house. Herminia Cause of death is intracranial hemorrhage as a result of gunshot wounds. Head."3
turned to her son, dragged his body to the door and shouted for help. With the aid of her
neighbor and kumpare, Herminia brought Joseph to the MCU Hospital where he later At the time of his death, Joseph was employed as driver by the Santos Enterprises Freight
died.1âwphi1.nêt Services earning P250.00 a day.4 He left behind two children by his live-in partner who are
now under his mother’s care and support. Herminia spent approximately P90,000.00 for the
Police investigators arrived at the hospital and inquired about the shooting incident. Herminia funeral and burial expenses of her deceased son. The expenses were supported by
told them that her son was shot by Noel Lee. From the hospital, Herminia went to the St. receipts5 and admitted by the defense.6
Martin Funeral Homes where Joseph’s body was brought. Thereafter, she proceeded to the
Caloocan City Police Headquarters where she gave her sworn statement about the shooting.2 Herminia filed a complaint for murder against accused-appellant. The complaint, docketed as
I.S. No. 96-3246, was however dismissed for insufficiency of evidence in a Resolution dated
Upon request of the Caloocan City police, a post-mortem examination was made on Joseph’s December 4, 1996 by Prosecutor Dionisio C. Sison with the approval of Caloocan City
body. Dr. Rosaline O. Cosidon, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Prosecutor Rosauro J. Silverio.7 Herminia appealed the order of dismissal to the Secretary of
made the following findings: Justice. In a letter dated March 16, 1998, Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III reversed and
set aside the appealed Resolution and ordered the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City to file an
"FINDINGS: information for murder against the accused-appellant.8 Accordingly, the Information was filed
and a warrant of arrest issued against accused-appellant on June 8, 1998. On October 16,
1998, appellant was arrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Fairly developed, fairly nourished male cadaver in rigor mortis with postmortem
lividity at the dependent portions of the body. Conjunctiva are pale, Lips and nailbeds
are cyanotic. A needle puncture mark was noted at the dorsum of the right hand. Appellant is a well-known figure in their neighborhood and has several criminal cases
pending against him in Caloocan City. He was charged with frustrated homicide in 1984 and
attempted murder in 1989.9
HEAD:
For his defense, accused-appellant presented two witnesses: (a) Orlando Bermudez, a
(1) Gunshot wound, frontal region, measuring 0.5 x 0.5 cm, just right of the neighbor; and (b) himself. He denies the killing of Joseph Marquez. He claims that from 8:00
anterior midline, 161 cm from heel, with an upbraded collar, measuring 0.2 to 10:00 in the evening of September 29, 1996, he was in his house located at 317 M. de
cm superiorly and laterally, 0.1 cm medially and inferiorly directed Castro St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. He was having some drinks with his neighbor,
posteriorwards, downwards and to the left fracturing the frontal bone, Orlando Bermudez, and his driver, Nelson Columba. They were enjoying themselves,
lacerating the brain. A deformed slug was recovered embedded at the left drinking and singing with the videoke. Also in the house were his wife, children and
cerebral hemisphere of the brain. household help. At 10:00 P.M., Orlando and Nelson went home and accused-appellant went
to sleep. He woke up at 5:30 in the morning of the following day and learned that Joseph
(2) Gunshot wound, occipital region, measuring 0.5 x 0.5 cm, 2 cm left of the Marquez, a neighbor, was shot to death. To appellant’s surprise, he was tagged as Joseph’s
posterior midline, 162 cm from heel, with a uniform 0.2 cm upbraded collar, killer.10
directed slightly anteriorwards, downwards and lateralwards, fracturing the
occipital bone and lacerating the brain. A deformed slug was recovered at the Accused-appellant had known the victim since childhood and their houses are only two
left auricular region. blocks apart. Joseph had a bad reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and drug addict.
Six days before his death, on September 23, 1996, accused-appellant caught Joseph inside II
his car trying to steal his car stereo. Joseph scampered away. As proof of the victim’s bad
reputation, appellant presented a letter handwritten by his mother, Herminia, addressed to THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HASTILY TAGGING THE ACCUSED-
Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo of Caloocan City, and sent through PO3 Willy Tuazon and his wife, APPELLANT, NOEL LEE, AS THE ASSAILANT BASED MERELY ON THE BIASED
Baby Ruth. In the letter, Herminia was surrendering her son to the Mayor for rehabilitation DECLARATION OF THE MOTHER WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE SHADY
because he was hooked on shabu, a prohibited drug, and was a thief. Herminia was scared CHARACTER OF THE VICTIM AGAINST WHOM OTHERS MIGHT HAVE AN AXE
that eventually Joseph might not just steal but kill her and everyone in their household TO GRIND.
because of his drug habit.11
III
The accused-appellant likewise explained the two criminal cases filed against him in 1984
and 1989. The information for attempted murder was dismissed as a result of the victim’s THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS DECISION OF FINDING GUILT ON
desistance while in the frustrated homicide case, the real assailant appeared and admitted THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT EVEN RAISING A FINGER IN
his crime.12 SATISFYING ITSELF THAT THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OBTAINING IN 1996 ARE
STILL PREVAILING IN 1999 WHEN THE CASE WAS TRIED ON THE MERITS SO
In a decision dated June 22, 1999, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty and AS TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF THE ASSAILANT BEYOND DOUBT.
sentenced him to the penalty of death. The court also ordered appellant to pay the heirs of
the victim civil indemnity of P50,000.00, actual damages of P90,000.00, moral damages of IV
P60,000.00 and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Thus:
THE COURT A QUO GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN TREATING WITH LENIENCY
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered and the prosecution having HERMINIA MARQUEZ’S VACILLATION WITH RESPECT TO THE "BUTAS NG
established beyond an iota of doubt the guilt of accused NOEL LEE of the crime of BINTANA" AS CONTAINED IN HER SWORN STATEMENT AND THE "BUKAS NA
Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as BINTANA" AS PER HER REPAIRED TESTIMONY—A SERIOUS PROCEDURAL
amended by R.A. 7659, this court, in view of the presence of the generic aggravating ANOMALY THAT ASSAULTED THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED-
circumstance of dwelling and without any mitigating circumstance to offset it, hereby APPELLANT.
sentences the said accused to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the
legal heirs of the deceased civil indemnity of P50,000.00; to pay the private
complainant actual damages of P90,000.00 plus moral and exemplary damages of V
P60,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively; and to pay the costs.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE EXTREME PENALTY
Consistent with the provisions of Section 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal OF DEATH UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE OBVIOUS REASONABLE
Procedure, as amended, let the entire records hereof including the complete DOUBT."14
transcripts of stenographic notes be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic
review and judgment, within the reglementary period set forth in said section. The assigned errors principally involve the issue of the credibility of Herminia Marquez, the
lone prosecution eyewitness. Accused-appellant claims that the trial court should not have
SO ORDERED.13 accepted Herminia’s testimony because it is biased, incredible and inconsistent.

Hence, this appeal. Before us, accused-appellant assigns the following errors: Herminia’s testimony on direct examination is as follows:

I "x      x      x

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE SELF- ATTY. OPENA: Now who was your companion, if any, at that time?
SERVING AND CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONY OF THE MOTHER OF THE
VICTIM, HERMINIA MARQUEZ, WHOSE NARRATION OF THE CHAIN OF WITNESS: Me and my son, Joseph Marquez, and the wife upstairs putting the baby
OCCURRENCE THAT LED TO THE DEATH OF JOSEPH MARQUEZ WAS to sleep.
BEYOND BELIEF.
Q:       What were you and your son, Joseph, doing then? A:       Hollow block, po.

A:       Watching TV. Q:       How high is that hollow block that you were referring to?

Q:       Will you please tell us your position, I am referring to you and your son in COURT: She said three feet.
relation to the television set where you are watching the show.
ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:
A:       We were facing each other while watching television which is on the left side.
Q:       Which is higher, that sofa which is posted near the window or the hollow
Q:       Will you please tell us where exactly was your son, Joseph, seated while block?
watching television?
A:       Hollow block.
A:       At the end most of the sofa.
Q:       By how many inches or feet?
Q:       The sofa you are referring to is the one near the window.
A:       About half a foot.
A:       Yes, sir. Dikit lang po.
Q:       You said the sofa was long. Will you please tell us in what portion of your sofa
Q:       Will you give us an idea or describe to us that window which you mentioned your son Joseph was seated?
awhile ago?
ATTY. VARGAS: Already answered, your Honor. She said dulo, end of the sofa.
A:       Transparent glass.
COURT: Sustained.
Q:       How high is it from the ground?
ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:
COURT: Which one?
Q:       When you said end of sofa which portion, the left side or the right side?
ATTY. OPENA: The window glass?
A:       The right.
WITNESS: About three feet from the ground.
Q:       Now, while you and your son were watching television, was there anything
ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS: unusual that transpired?

Q:       You said three feet. What do you mean by that? Is that window elevated from A:       Yes, sir.
the ground?
Q:       Tell us what was that all about.
A:       The same height as this court window which is about three feet from the
ground, and from one another about four by four window [sic], three feet by the A:       Mayroon po akong napansin na kamay na nakatutok sa anak ko. Nakita ko po
ground. si Noel Lee na nakatayo sa may bintana.

Q:       Now, you demonstrated by showing a portion, you mean to tell us that window Q:       What do you mean by the word "kamay?"
was mounted on a concrete or hollow block?
A:       Hawak hawak po niya iyong baril, nakatutok po sa anak ko. COURT: How about the other one?

Q:       What did you do with what you saw? A:       Doon po sa semento.

A:       Nakita ko pong gumanoon siya, sumilip na ganoon, sabay putok ng baril. ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:
Tumingin po siya sa may bintana, ganoon po, sabay putok ng baril.
Q:       And who fired these shots?
COURT: You said he turned the head. Who turned the head? Sino ang gumanyan sa
sinabi mo? A:       Noel Lee.

A:       (Witness demonstrating that the victim peeped through the window). Q:       That Noel Lee that you are referring to, will you please point at him if he is
around?
Q:       And then?
A:       (Witness going down the witness stand and pointing to accused Noel Lee).
A:       At the same time the firing of the gun [sic] and I saw my son slumped.
Q:       How do you know that it was Noel Lee who shot your son?
ATTY. OPENA TO THE WITNESS:
A:       Kitang kita ko po. Magkatapat po kami.
Q:       And after your son was slumped, what did you do?
Q:       Will you please describe to us?
A:       I went to my son and carried him to take him to the hospital.
A:       Maliwanag po kasi ang ilaw. Maliwanag din po sa labas, may nananahi doon.
Q:       How many shots did you hear? Nandoon po kaming dalawa ng anak ko nanonood ng television. (Witness sobbing in
tears). Napakasakit sa akin. Hindi ko man lang naipagtanggol and anak ko.
A:       Five shots.
COURT: She was emotionally upset.
Q:       That was prior to helping your son?
ATTY. OPENA: I’ll just make it on record that the witness was emotionally upset. May
A:       Yes, sir. I ask if she can still testify?

Q:       And how many times was your son hit? x x x      x x x      x x x

ATTY. VARGAS: WITNESS: Masakit lang po sa loob ko ang pagkawala ng anak ko.

Q:       Objection, your honor. It was already answered. Because according to her it ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:
was five shots.
Q:       You saw that the light was bright. Where were those lights coming from?
COURT: It does not follow that the victim was hit. So, the witness may answer.
A:       Maliwanag po sa loob ng bahay namin dahil may fluorescent na bilog. Saka sa
WITNESS: Twice, Two shots hit my son, two shots on the sofa and one shot on the labas may nananahi po doon sa alley katapat ng bahay namin. At saka po doon sa
cement. kabila, tindahan po tapat po namin, kaya maliwanag ang ilaw.

Q:       After trying to help your son, what happened?

 A:       I was able to hold on to my son up to the door. Upon reaching the door, I explained that she was unable to warn Joseph because she was shocked by the sight of
asked the help of my kumpare. accused-appellant aiming a gun at her son. The tragic events unfolded so fast and by the
time she took hold of herself, her son had been shot dead.
Q:       Meanwhile, what did the accused do after shooting five times?
A son’s death in his mother’s house and in her presence is a painful and agonizing
A:       He ran to the alley to go home. experience that is not easy for a mother to forget, even with the passing of time. Herminia’s
testimony shows that she was living with a conscience that haunted and blamed her own self
for failing to protect her son or, at least, save him from death.
Q:       Now you said he ran to an alley towards the direction of their house. Do you
know where his house is located?
Nonetheless, accused-appellant points out inconsistencies in the eyewitness’ testimony. In
her affidavit of September 30, 1996 given before PO2 Rodelio Ortiz, Herminia declared that
A:       Yes, sir. 142 M. de Castro Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.
while she and Joseph were watching television, she saw a hand holding a gun pointed at her
son. The hand and the gun came out of a hole in the window, i.e., "butas  ng bintana." On
Q:       How far is that from your residence? cross-examination, Herminia stated that she saw a hand holding a gun in the open window,
i.e., "bukas  na bintana." According to accused-appellant, this inconsistency is a serious flaw
A:       More or less 150 to 200 meters. which cannot be repaired by her statement on the witness stand.

Q:       Where did you finally bring your son? The inconsistency between her affidavit and her testimony was satisfactorily explained by
Herminia on cross-examination:
A:       MCU.
"x x x      x x x      x x x
Q:       When you say MCU, are you referring to MCU Hospital?
ATTY. VARGAS
A:       Yes, sir. MCU Hospital.
Q:       You said that you saw a hand from a hole in the window with a gun, is that
Q:       At MCU, life-saving devices were attached to my son. Later, after reaching correct?
11:00, he died.
A:       Bukas na bintana. Not from a hole but from an open window.
COURT: 11:00 P.M.?
Q:       Madam witness, do you recall having executed a sworn statement before the
A:       Yes, ma’am. police, right after the shooting of your son?

Q:       Same day? A:       Yes, sir.

A:       Yes, ma’am. Q:       I will read to you paragraph 8 of your statement which is already marked as
your Exhibit "A" in which is stated as follows: "Isalaysay mo nga sa akin ang buong
x x x      x x x      x x x."15 pangyayari? Answer: Sa mga oras ng alas 9:00 ng gabi petsa 29 ng Setyembre 1996
habang ang aking anak ay nanonood ng palabas sa TV ng basketball malapit sa
kanyang bintana sa labas at ako naman ay nakaupo sa sopa katapat ko siya subalit
Herminia’s testimony is positive, clear and straightforward. She did not waver in her narration
medyo malayo ng konti sa kanya, mayroon akong napansin na kamay na may hawak
of the shooting incident, neither did she waffle in recounting her son’s death. She was
ng baril at nakaumang sa aking anak sa may butas ng bintana," do you recall that?
subjected by defense counsel to rigorous cross and re-cross examinations and yet she stuck
to her testimony given in the direct examination. She readily gave specific details of the crime
scene, e.g., the physical arrangement of the sofa and the television set, the height of the A:       Opo.
sofa, the wall and the window, because the crime happened right in her own living room. She
 Q:       What you saw from that butas is a hand with a gun, is that correct? Accused-appellant argues that since Herminia declared in her affidavit that she saw a hand
coming from the window, she did not see the person holding the gun, let alone who fired
A:       Opo. it.22 A complete reading of the pertinent portion of Herminia’s affidavit will refute appellant’s
arguments, viz:
Q:       Madam witness, your window is just like the window of this courtroom?
"x x x      x x x      x x x
A:       Yes, sir.
T - Isalaysay mo nga sa akin and buong pangyayari?
Q:       In your testimony, you did not mention what part of the window was that hand
holding a gun that you saw? Is that correct? S – Sa mga oras ng alas 9:00 ng gabi, petsa 29 ng Setyembre 1996, habang ang
aking anak ay nanonood ng palabas sa T.V. ng basketball malapit sa aming bintanan
[sic] sa labas, at ako naman ay nakaupo sa sopa katapat ko siya subalit medyo
A:       Hindi naman po butas, kundi bukas na bintana. Nakabukas iyong bintana
malayo ng kaunti sa kanya, mayroon akong napansin akong [sic] kamay na hawak-
namin.
hawak na baril na nakaumang sa aking anak sa butas na bintana na nakaawang,
maya-maya ng kaunti ay nakarinig na ako ng putok at ang unang putok ay tumama
Q:       So in your sinumpaang salaysay in the statement that you said butas na sa ulo ng aking anak kaya napayuko siya, pagkatapos noon ay sunod-sunod na ang
bintana is not correct? putok na narinig ko, mga limang beses, kaya kitang kita ko siya ng lapitan ko ang
aking anak at nakita ko itong si NOEL LEE, pagkatapos noon ay tumakbo na ito
A:       Mali ho kasi, hindi ko na napansin iyan, kasi ito napansin ko, kinorect ko. papalabas ng iskinita papunta sa kanila.

COURT: You show to the witness. There, butas na bintana. x x x      x x x      x x x."23

WITNESS: Mali po ang letra, Bukas hindi butas. It is thus clear that when Herminia approached her son, she saw that the person firing the
gun was accused-appellant. Appellant continued firing and then ran away towards the
x x x      x x x      x x x."16 direction of his house. This account is not inconsistent with the witness’ testimony in open
court.
Herminia corrected her affidavit by saying in open court that she saw the hand and the gun
coming out of the open window, not from a hole in the window. In her direct testimony, Herminia’s declarations are based on her actual account of the commission of the crime. She
Herminia presented a photograph of her living room just the way it looked from her side on had no ill motive to accuse appellant of killing her son, or at least, testify falsely against
the night of the shooting.17 The sofa on which Joseph was seated is against the wall, with the appellant. Accused-appellant himself admitted that he and Herminia have been neighbors for
window a few inches above the wall. The window is made of transparent glass with six (6) years and have known each other for a long time. Appellant is engaged in the business of
vertical glass panes pushing outwards. The entire window is enclosed by iron grills with big buying and selling scrap plastic and Herminia used to work for him as an agent. 24 She would
spaces in between the grills. The living room is well-lit and the area outside the house is also not have pointed to appellant if not for the fact that it was him whom she saw shoot her
lit by a fluorescent lamp. son.1âwphi1.nêt

Between Herminia’s testimony in open court and her sworn statement, any inconsistency Indeed, the Solicitor General points out that it was appellant himself who had strong motive to
therein does not necessarily discredit the witness.18 Affidavits are generally considered harm or kill Joseph.25 Appellant revealed that six days before the shooting, he caught Joseph
inferior to open court declarations because affidavits are taken ex-parte and are almost inside his car attempting to steal the stereo. The alibi that appellant was drinking with his
always incomplete and inaccurate.19 Oftentimes, they are executed when the affiant’s mental friends that fateful night of September 29, 1996 does not rule out the possibility that he could
faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The victim’s house is
incident that transpired.20 They are usually not prepared by the affiant himself but by another merely two blocks away from appellant’s house and could be reached in several minutes.26
who suggests words to the affiant, or worse, uses his own language in taking the affiant’s
statements.21 The lone eyewitness’ account of the killing finds support in the medico-legal report. Dr.
Rosalie Cosidon found that the deceased sustained two gunshot wounds—one to the right of
the forehead, and the other, to the left side of the back of the victim’s head.27 Two slugs were
recovered from the victim’s head. Judging from the location and number of wounds reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to have the aspects of a popularity contest
sustained, Dr. Cosidon theorized that the assailant could have been more than two feet away rather than a factual inquiry into the merits of the case. After all, the business of the court is to
from the victim.28 Both gunshot wounds were serious and fatal.29 try the case, and not the man; and a very bad man may have a righteous cause.34 There are
exceptions to this rule however and Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in both
Accused-appellant makes capital of Joseph’s bad reputation in their community. He alleges criminal and civil cases.
that the victim’s drug habit led him to commit other crimes and he may have been shot by any
of the persons from whom he had stolen. 30 As proof of Joseph’s bad character, appellant In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Rule 130 provides that the accused may
presented Herminia’s letter to Mayor Malonzo seeking his assistance for Joseph’s prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
rehabilitation from drugs. On rebuttal, Herminia admitted that she wrote such letter to Mayor charged. When the accused presents proof of his good moral character, this strengthens the
Malonzo but denied anything about her son’s thievery.31 presumption of innocence, and where good character and reputation are established, an
inference arises that the accused did not commit the crime charged. This view proceeds from
Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on the theory that a person of good character and high reputation is not likely to have committed
Evidence, viz: the act charged against him.35 Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the prosecution may not prove
the bad moral character of the accused except only in rebuttal and when such evidence is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. This is intended to avoid unfair
WON the proof of bad moral character of the victim is relevant in this case. NO
prejudice to the accused who might otherwise be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he is a person of bad character. 36 The offering of character evidence on his behalf is
"Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:-- a privilege of the defendant, and the prosecution cannot comment on the failure of the
defendant to produce such evidence.37 Once the defendant raises the issue of his good
(a) In Criminal Cases: character, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of the defendant’s bad character.
Otherwise, a defendant, secure from refutation, would have a license to unscrupulously
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the impose a false character upon the tribunal.38
moral trait involved in the offense charged.
Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to character evidence of
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character the accused.39 And this evidence must be "pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. charged," meaning, that the character evidence must be relevant and germane to the kind of
the act charged,40 e.g., on a charge of rape, character for chastity; on a charge of assault,
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it character for peacefulness or violence; on a charge for embezzlement, character for honesty
tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of and integrity.41 Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule refers to the character of
the offense charged. the offended party.42 Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the offended party may
be proved "if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of
the offense charged." Such evidence is most commonly offered to support a claim of self-
x x x      x x x      x x x."
defense in an assault or homicide case or a claim of consent in a rape case.43

Character is defined to be the possession by a person of certain qualities of mind and morals,
In the Philippine setting, proof of the moral character of the offended party is applied with
distinguishing him from others. It is the opinion generally entertained of a person derived from
frequency in sex offenses and homicide.44 In rape and acts of lasciviousness or in any
the common report of the people who are acquainted with him; his reputation.32 "Good moral
prosecution involving an unchaste act perpetrated by a man against a woman where the
character" includes all the elements essential to make up such a character; among these are
willingness of a woman is material, the woman’s character as to her chastity is admissible to
common honesty and veracity, especially in all professional intercourse; a character that
show whether or not she consented to the man’s act.45 The exception to this is when the
measures up as good among people of the community in which the person lives, or that is up
woman’s consent is immaterial such as in statutory rape 46 or rape with violence or
to the standard of the average citizen; that status which attaches to a man of good behavior
intimidation.47 In the crimes of qualified seduction48 or consented abduction,49 the offended
and upright conduct.33
party must be a "virgin," which is "presumed if she is unmarried and of good reputation," 50 or
a "virtuous woman of good reputation."51 The crime of simple seduction involves "the
The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under
determining a controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if eighteen years of age x x x." 52 The burden of proof that the complainant is a woman of good
the issues in the case were allowed to be influenced by evidence of the character or
reputation lies in the prosecution, and the accused may introduce evidence that the improbability of the offense charged and, at the same time, qualifies the killing of Joseph
complainant is a woman of bad reputation.53 Marquez to murder.

In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is admissible in two situations: (1) As to the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, this cannot be appreciated to
as evidence of the deceased’s aggression; and (2) as evidence of the state of mind of the increase the penalty in the absence of direct evidence showing that accused-appellant
accused.54 The pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the deceased or his deliberately planned and prepared the killing of the victim.60
calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in determining
whether the deceased or the accused was the aggressor.55 When the evidence tends to Neither can the aggravating circumstance of dwelling found by the trial court be applied in the
prove self-defense, the known violent character of the deceased is also admissible to show instant case. The Information alleges only treachery and evident premeditation, not dwelling.
that it produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a Under Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint or
justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary.56 Information must specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances in the commission of
the offense.61 The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000,
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the and Section 8, Rule 110 is favorable to the accused. It may be applied retroactively to the
probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was instant case.
the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection between
the deceased’s drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused- Accordingly, without the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the penalty of death was
appellant. In light of the positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victim’s erroneously imposed by the trial court. There being no aggravating circumstance, there is no
bad character he could have been killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is basis for the award of exemplary damages.62
pure and simple speculation.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision dated June 22, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan
Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder City, Branch 127 in Criminal Case No. C-54012 (98) is affirmed insofar as accused-appellant
committed with treachery and premeditation. In People v. Soliman,57 a murder case, the Noel Lee is found guilty of murder for the death of Joseph Marquez. The death sentence
defense tried to prove the violent, quarrelsome or provocative character of the deceased. imposed by the trial court is however reduced to reclusion perpetua, there having been no
Upon objection of the prosecution, the trial court disallowed the same. The Supreme Court aggravating circumstance in the commission of said crime. Except for the award of exemplary
held: damages, the award of civil indemnity, other damages and costs are likewise affirmed.

"x x x While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to SO ORDERED.
determine the probability or improbability of the commission of an offense
(Section 15, Rule 123),58 such is not necessary in the crime of murder where the
killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of such
character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show "that it has produced a
reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable
conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 3, p. 126). This rule does not apply to cases of
murder."59

In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with murder committed through treachery
and evident premeditation. The evidence shows that there was treachery. Joseph was sitting
in his living room watching television when accused-appellant peeped through the window
and, without any warning, shot him twice in the head. There was no opportunity at all for the
victim to defend himself or retaliate against his attacker. The suddenness and
unexpectedness of the attack ensured his death without risk to the assailant. Following the
ruling in People v. Soliman, where the killing of the victim was attended by treachery, proof
of the victim’s bad character is not necessary. The presence of this aggravating circumstance
negates the necessity of proving the victim’s bad character to establish the probability or