Jalosjos v.
COMELEC
G.R. 193237 & 193536 – October 9, 2012
J. Carpio
Topic: Elective Officials - Qualifications
Doctrine: When a crime has been given the penalty of prision mayor, it shall carry with it that of temporary absolute
disqualification and that of perpetual disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. A person suffering
from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he states
in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run
GR 193247
Petitioner: Dominador Jalosjos, Jr.
Respondents: COMELEC
GR 193536
Petitioner: Agapito Cardino
Respondents: Dominador Jalosjos, Jr., COMELEC
Case Summary: Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the
elections.
Jalosjos was running for his 3rd term. On December 6, 2009, Cardino filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made
a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office
of Mayor. Cardino further claimed that long before Jalosjos filed, he had already been convicted by final judgment for
robbery; that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted the conviction, but stated that he was already
granted probation.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC acted with GAD in ruling that Jalosjos’ probation was revoked – NO
The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final judgment is a material
fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. This means
that Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the
time he filed his certificate. Jalosjos’ ineligibility existed on the day he filed his COC, and its cancellation retroacted to the
day he filed it. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from
running for public office.
Warning – Case mentioned so many laws that are important to understanding why the Court decided the way they
did. Please bear with the number of provisions included in this digest.
Facts:
Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the elections
o Jalosjos running for his 3rd term
o On December 6, 2009, Cardino filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due
course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos
Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy
when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor
Cardino further claimed that long before Jalosjos filed, he had already been convicted by final
judgment for robber; that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence
Jalosjos admitted the conviction, but stated that he was already granted probation\
May 10, 2010: the COMELEC First Division granted Cardino’s petition and cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of
candidacy
o The COMELEC found that there was indeed a material representation made on the certificate
o That the Jalosjos’ certificate of compliance of probation was fraudulently issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet
served his sentence
o Because of this, the COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos “is not eligible by any reason of his disqualifications
August 11, 2010: COMELEC En Banc denied Jalosjos’ MFR
In 2011, Jalosjos and Cardino separately filed their Petitions with the Supreme Court
June 1, 2012: Jalosjos then filed a Manifestation which stated that “he has resigned from the position of Mayor of
the City of Dapitan – such resignation was made in deference with the provision of the OEC in relation to his
candidacy as Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur in May 2013”
o The cases were not rendered moot by the resignation; the Court clarified that in deciding the case
Issues + Held:
1. W/N the COMELEC acted with GAD in ruling that Jalosjos’ probation was revoked – NO
The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final judgment is a
material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code
o This means that Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to
run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate
o Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes
As a result, his certificate was void ab initio this means that Cardino was the only qualified
candidate and that he actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor
o The dissenting opinions to the En Banc decision erroneously limit the remedy against Jalosjos to
disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC and apply the rule on succession under the LGC
In actuality, a false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for
public office is false material representation which is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of
the OEC
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for
said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities,
highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which
he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election
purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
o Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy “that he is eligible for
said office.” a candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office
If the candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case
from running for public office, and he still states under oath that he is eligible, then the candidate
clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78
A sentence if prision mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Section 40 of the LGC and
under Section 12 of the OEC
o It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the OEC
This means that a person can file a petition under Section 40 of the LGC or under either Section 12
or Section 78 of the OEC
Section 40. LGC. Disqualifications. – the following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
…
Section 12. OEC. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months
or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any
office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after
the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period
he again becomes disqualified.
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited
under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k,
v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected,
from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not
be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election
laws.
o In addition, Article 27 of the RPC provides for the effects of prision mayor and temporary disqualification.
Under the provision, it states that the duration of penalties of prision mayor and temporary disqualification
shall be from six years and one day to 12 years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as
an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty
Article 30 then goes on to talk about the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification for public office and the effects that it shall produce:
(1) The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held,
even if conferred by popular election;
(2) The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be
elected to such office;
(3) The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of
the rights mentioned
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2
and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
(4) The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
Article 31 provide that the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public
office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects:
(1) The deprivation of the office, of employment, profession or calling affected;
(2) The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or
during the term of the sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification
Article 32 provides that the perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the
right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence,
according to the nature of the said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any
public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to
hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.
Article 42 provides that when a crime has been given the penalty of prision mayor, it shall carry
with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual disqualification from
the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
o This means that the penalty of prision mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification.
Article 30 of the RPC carries with it temporary absolute disqualification which produces the effect
of “deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected
to such office.
The duration of such temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal
penalty!
Article 32 on the other hand, provides what perpetual special disqualification means “the
offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification”
which is perpetually
BOTH TEMPORARY ABSOLUTE DISQUALIFICATION AND PERPETUAL SPECIAL
DISQUALIFICATION CONSTITUTE INELIGIBILITIES TO HOLD ELECTIVE PUBLIC
OFFICE.
A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and
commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that
he is eligible to run
o In the case of Lacuna v. Abes, Justice JBL Reyes explained the import of the accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification, he stated that:
“… the accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for
public office and for the right to vote – such disqualification to last only during the term of the
sentence… But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives
he convict of the right to vote or to be elected to hold public office perpetually, as distinguished
from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence.
The penalty of perpetual special disqualification “deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be
elected to or hold public office perpetually”
This accessory penalty takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes
final it does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict
serves his jail sentence or not
The convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually in the case
of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office
from the time his judgment of conviction became final
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 OEC because this
accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public
office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath
Under Section 74, the word “eligible” means having the right to run for elective public office,
that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities
One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office
if a person suffering from such perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of
candidacy stating that he is “eligible to run for office” as expressly required under Section 74,
then he is clearly making a false material representation
o In the case of Jalosjos, conviction for robbery by final judgment with the penalty of prision mayor carries
with it perpetual special disqualification it is not a ground for a petition under Section 68 of the OEC
because robber is NOT one of the offenses mentioned therein
There is nothing in the language of such section that will justify including the crime of robbery as
one of the offenses
A candidate for the mayor during the 2010 local elections certifies under oath four statements:
o (1) a statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized Filipino citizen;
o (2) that the candidate is not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country’
o (3) that the candidate is eligible for the office he seeks election;
o (4) a statement of the candidate’s allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
2. W/N Jalosjos made a false statement of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy when he stated under oath that
he was eligible to run for mayor – YES
What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the
OEC
o The COMELEC properly cancelled his COC
A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid
votes
The cancellation of his COC, whether done before or after the elections is immaterial because it
was cancelled on such grounds making him a void candidate from the very beginning his COC
being void ab initio
Jalosjos’ ineligibility existed on the day he filed his COC, and its cancellation retroacted to the day he filed it
o This means that Cardino ran unopposed he was the only qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010
elections
o Decisions of the SC holding that the 2 nd placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first placer is
disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the COC of the 1 st placer was valid
at the time of the filing but subsequently cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal
impediment that took effect after the filing of the COC
If COC void ab initio, then legally, the person who filed such was NEVER a candidate all
votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should NOT be counted
The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for
public office
o The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final
judgment of conviction
o The final judgment of the court is addressed NOT ONLY to the executive branch, but also to other
government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law
o W/N the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification, it is
assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run is addressed to the COMELEC
because under the Constitution, the COMELEC is duty bound to “enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election”
o The disqualification is part of the enforcement and administration of
“all laws” relating to the conduct of elections”
o To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the COC of one suffering from
perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely exemplify
Ruling: WHEREFORE,
