Mobileye: the Future of Autonomous Vehicles

Alexis Daugherty
Dillon Keefe
Mychal Johnson
Luke Mobley

Professor Adam Wowak

Strategic Management

28 September 2017
Executive Summary

Mobileye operates as an autonomous safety mechanism provider within the automotive

industry arena primarily targeting original equipment manufacturers as buyers. Mobileye’s

vehicle of choice is internal development with the possibility of future joint ventures with OEMs.

This allows for maximum quality control and a virtually guaranteed buyer market for its products

with long development cycles. In a market with few competitors, Mobileye differentiates by

being a low cost leader with a unique product. As Mobileye has low overhead, most of its costs

are R&D, allowing for rapid expansion due to lack of traditional growing pains. The simple yet

unique technology Mobileye offers yields a vast market share in a profitable industry.

Deciding on strategic steps in the broad and competitive auto market was difficult for

Mobileye. The organization preferred being included in the Tier 2 segment as they would have

been pigeonholed if they had designated themselves as Tier 1 automotive suppliers. The

organization next needed to identify the correct strategy for minimizing the specific challenges

faced by all of those in the industry. The Five Forces model allowed Mobileye to make suitable

strategic decisions for utilizing the organizational strength in an effective manner. According to

the Five Forces model the ADAS industry is attractive and is rapidly growing.

Looking towards the future, Mobileye has a difficult decision to make regarding their

pricing strategy. As new competition attempts to enter the market, Mobileye must decide

whether to offer low-end bundles to compete or to maintain their current full pricing strategy.

This report will conclude with an analysis and recommendation for Mobileye’s future pricing

strategy.
Mobileye’s External Environment

Social - The target market for self driving vehicles includes businessmen, cab and rideshare

companies like Uber and Ola, as well as those who find multitasking attractive. Autonomous

safety mechanisms like those offered by Mobileye are not expensive in nature and add only a

small premium on the existing car price. As these mechanisms become table stakes in an

increasingly automated car market, the emergence of network effects also result in an

exponential adoption curve.

Technological - In 1999, Aviram and Shashua’s Mobileye was born out of the realization that

image recognition, through simple, low cost cameras, could be the future of autonomous safety

mechanisms. The first versions of their camera design encountered a plethora of challenges,

chief among those including depth perception recognition, thus radar was still considered the

industry leader in sensory detection. The decision to develop a “full suite” of applications and

and sell the camera and software as a single unit was a tipping point in their previously

segmented technology development process. Though this system-on-chip development process

meant a large investment of time and capital, the differentiation advantage would yield a fast

ROI. Integrating the hardware and software would also allow for optimization of visual

processing systems and dependable autonomous safety systems. Mobileye’s camera systems

were significantly less expensive than the radar based competition which would give them

another significant technological advantage. Next steps for Mobileye in technology include a

push for autonomous driving systems in addition to the current safety package offered. These

include traffic-light detection, free space estimation, debris detection, among other features.
Economic - Through analysis of the current business climate, the Mobileye case study explores

the possible effects of autonomous cars on the existing market. Mobileye’s economic

competitive advantage is primarily focused around strategic pricing as well as differentiation.

The case study also delves into competitive analysis - chief of which being Google’s possible

role in the autonomous car market. A possible partnership with Google could be beneficial for

Mobileye as Google could become their chief competitor in the future. Maintaining a lower

pricing structure is key to Mobileye’s market monopolization as they still yield a large profit

margin. Going forward, Mobileye’s pricing structure should depend on competitors and long

term R&D investment costs.

Rivalry Among Existing Competition - Mobileye’s rapid revenue growth as well as their unique

position among Tier 2 suppliers allowed them to quickly capture a large share of the autonomous

safety market. Patent and intellectual property ownership meant that competitors could not

duplicate Mobileye’s unique camera ADAS software. Long product development cycles also

contributed to Mobileye’s domination of the ADAS market since competitors could not generate

cost effective substitutes quickly. In addition, Mobileye’s existing competitors were not

strategically positioned in the Tier 2 market yet able to sell directly to OEMs. As Mobileye

shifted away from the aftermarket, shown by a reduction in aftermarket revenue from 35% to

22% in the space of three years, competition grew even more scarce as few existing autonomous

hardware and software systems providers existed.

Threat of Substitutes - The threat of substitutes is low because of the high costs of switching to

substitutes, substantial product differentiation, and the limited number of substitutes available.

Since customers couldn’t switch to other products of the same price and get the same benefits
they were getting from Mobileye, it didn’t make sense for them to switch to other substitutes.

With the substantial product differentiation, it was hard for customers to find comparable

products and services that met their needs. An example of this was the security system of the

camera-based ADAS.

Threat of New Entrants - Entry barriers are high, making the threat of new entrants low. The

profits in the industry are relatively high, but in order to enter the industry ample capital

investment is required. Moreover, new companies entering the industry are required to follow

and abide by the strict and costly rules and regulations surrounding ADAS systems. Along with

this, the high cost of R&D and lengthy time of product development makes the industry

unfavorable for new entrants.

Bargaining Power of Buyers - The bargaining power of buyers is moderate in this industry.

Customers are the large auto manufacturers who quote prices according to their demands and

customer demand. The low cost of buyers switching between competitors is also an issue for

those in the industry. Mobileye views Tier 1 businesses such as Delphi, TRW, Continental, and

Autoliv, as customers and also competitors. Some of the systems that Mobileye created,

competed with similar products of its Tier 1 partners. As Mobileye started to gain greater

“traction” with OEMs, Tier 1 partners learned that Mobileye would no longer work with them if

they would continue to make competing systems. Their buyers required special customization,

which limited the choice of buying from partners or competitors.

Bargaining Power of Suppliers - The bargaining power of suppliers is low for the industry

because the number of suppliers is substantial. Production cost can only be recovered once

economies of scale is achieved which is only possible once the suppliers sell in bulk quantity.
Establishing Industry Position Through Mitigation of Forces

Mobileye established favorable position in the industry through a series of intelligent

strategic maneuvers. Their product itself was unique and helped to establish industry position

because their single camera system was unlike any other technology in the industry. Their closest

competitors were producing dual camera systems - “stereo cameras” - that were more expensive,

more complex, and had poor performance to boot. The product itself automatically decreased the

threat of substitutes, including the fact that autonomous technologies in cars were safer, but

Mobileye took additional steps to lower this threat.

Mobileye decided early on to include their technology features together, eliminating the

need for customers to go to separate companies for different applications. Furthermore,

Mobileye’s customers such as TRW, Delphi, Continental, and Autoliv were also working to

produce their own autonomous technology. Mobileye gave them an ultimatum between ending

their internal development or ceasing to do business with them, preventing some of these

potential threats. The threat of new entrants was also lowered through the ultimatum. The threat

of remaining potential entrants in the industry are low due to the capital, initial investment and

expert knowledge required to develop these types of products.

Developing their own System-on-Chip assisted Mobileye in reducing supplier power.

After trouble with their initial supplier, Mobileye invested 3 more years, approximately $4

million dollars, and a partnership with STMicroelectronics in Geneva to develop their own chip.

This took the supplier completely out of the equation and made supplier power essentially a non

issue to Mobileye.
 Buyer power was reduced in terms of Mobileye’s corporate customers because they

chose to not only target Tier 1 companies in order to keep their streams of revenue and business

partnerships more universal with Tier 2 companies as well. The buyer power in their aftermarket

of everyday drivers was slightly different, however. Only 57% of drivers surveyed said they’d

buy autonomous technologies, while only 46% said they’d let their children ride in a car with

them. This distrust lead to greater buyer power, although Mobileye still found some success;

22% of their revenue came from their aftermarket alone in 2013.

Mobileye created a very favorable position in this rivalry of their competitors because of

their unique product, the decision to not do business exclusively with Tier 1 corporate customers,

and ability to reduce substitution. Mobileye was even able to keep a large margin of profit due to

this lack of competition, selling chips that took $10-13 to manufacture at a price of $45-55.

Mobileye’s Strategy Diamond

Arenas – Mobileye operates virtually exclusively within the automotive industry as a supplier to

car manufacturers and dealerships. Operating globally, Mobileye’s customers can be divided into

two broad segments: the original equipment manufacturers and the aftermarket. An original

equipment manufacturer, termed OEM, is a broad descriptor that defines big automakers such as

General Motors, Toyota, and Mercedes Benz. The aftermarket encompasses auto mechanics and

dealerships offering car repair and upgrade services. Mobileye’s core technologies encompass

both hardware and software. In hardware, Mobileye primarily manufactures custom ‘EyeQ’

semiconductor chips and cameras at low cost in bulk. The current software offered integrates the

hardware into Advanced Driver Assistance Systems such as lane departure warning, forward

collision warning, traffic sign and pedestrian recognition, and adaptive cruise control. Since the
software and hardware are customized to each other’s specifications, one is almost certainly

purchased with the other. Geographically, Mobileye operates globally but is focused on three

core markets: Europe, Japan, and the United States. By selling directly to OEM car

manufacturers, Mobileye cuts out Tier 1 suppliers and increases not only their profit margin but

also the value added.

Vehicles – Mobileye’s primary vehicle rests firmly in equity through internal development.

Creating custom hardware and software in house allows for maximum quality control and

eliminates possible outsource manufacturing time and resource constraints. As Mobileye begins

to establish stronger relationships with OEMs through installation of autonomous safety features

either in the manufacturing process or in the aftermarket, a movement towards joint ventures is

likely to precipitate. Aviram, Mobileye’s CEO, even explicitly revealed that “[Mobileye] went

only to OEMs for the first six years; we did not even meet with any big Tier 1s” (Mobileye: The

Future of Driverless Cars, 7). An alliance with an OEM virtually guarantees exclusive supplier

rights to Mobileye for autonomous safety services, an ideal scenario for a supplier with long

product life cycles. Though Mobileye is projected to control upwards of 80% of the autonomous

driving systems market within a few years, no apparent acquisitions of smaller companies are

currently being pursued.

Differentiators – Mobileye’s unique market position and product line results in a strong

differentiator presence in the strategy diamond. As a result of the choice vehicle being internal

development of hardware and software, Mobileye is able to maximize quality while

simultaneously minimize cost. For indirect competitors like Google and Valeo, the use of radars

and lidars as ADAS software sensors yield a higher cost structure than Mobileye’s cameras. At
the very least, a highly simplified lidar system costs suppliers $350 per unit and a radar system

costs $100-200 per unit. Mobileye’s simple monocular camera bundled together with ADAS

software is sold at $90-150 per unit directly to OEMs. Not only does this pricing strategy

undercut the competition, it also yields a significant profit margin due to the low cost of in

overhead and in-house production. In addition to being a low cost leader, Mobileye is also a

differentiator in terms of convenience and installation efficiency. By bundling the camera and

software package, the integration of software and hardware requires no customization unlike

Mobileye’s competitors. The low production overhead combined with unparalleled

customization places Mobileye in the unique position of being a market leader in cost,

differentiation, and niche focus.

Staging – Due to low factory overhead and mass shipping capabilities, Mobileye’s expansion

possibilities are exponential. Over ¾ of Mobileye’s employees are engineers and most of the

firm’s costs are allocated towards R&D in a constant effort to improve software and sensor

function. The costs allocated to factory hardware production and sales force are extremely low

due to the simplified nature of Mobileye’s product line. Expansion will come as fast as

Mobileye’s sequence of initiatives can be accomplished. A simplified version of management’s

plan starts with the sales of products to the aftermarket for post-manufacturing implementation

of systems to prove compatibility to OEMs. Aftermarket implementation is intended to serve as

an advertising tool, and as Mobileye’s OEM relationships grow, aftermarket sales are no longer

needed. This strategy is statistically shown through the decrease in sales numbers to aftermarket

buyers from 35% in 2011 to 22% in 2013 (Mobileye: The Future of Driverless Cars, 10).
Ultimately, Mobileye’s sequence of initiatives focuses on a vehicle shift from complete internal

development to alliances with OEMs to provide exclusive autonomous driver assist systems.

Economic Logic – For Mobileye, returns are obtained both through low cost leadership and, to a

lesser degree, differentiation. The simple yet unique technology that Mobileye offers its

customers yields value through high profit margins and market domination – projected to be 80%

of autonomous driving systems market (Mobileye: The Future of Driverless Cars, 1).

The Future of Mobileye’s Pricing Strategy

Mobileye is faced with a difficult decision in determining their future pricing strategy.

With very little direct competition in the past, pricing has historically been a fairly simple task.

The company has originally pursued lower margins than were believed to be able to attain in

order to increase end user demand. However, by dropping their selling price from $100 to around

$45, the company was still able to attain high margins while also keeping their prices lower than

any competitors would be able to match. Now, with the emergence of new competition in the

lower end automobile camera market with the ability to undercut Mobileye’s prices, Mobileye

must decide what type of strategy to pursue as a response.

One option would be to change their current strategy by introducing discounted low-end

bundles to combat competitors trying to get into the ADAS market. Historically, Mobileye’s

ADAS has mostly been implemented in higher-end premium cars. This is because consumers are

less price sensitive in this high-end market and are more willing to pay the $300 consumer

premium for Mobileye technology. By introducing a discounted option for OEMs wanting a

simpler ADAS system to implement into low-end cars, Mobileye will block out competitors

trying to enter the ADAS market at the lower end. This may be a good move because once these
new competitors enter the market they will be able to more easily move into the higher end of the

market eventually as well.

However, by offering discounted bundles, Mobileye will reduce the average selling price

of its product, ultimately decreasing the company’s overall margin. This would go against the

company’s historic strategy, as Mobileye has always maintained its position as a Tier 2 supplier

to keep margins high and actually was hoping to raise average selling prices in the future. Also,

offering discounted bundles comes with the risk of ultimately leading to price erosion.

Competing on a price basis with these new ADAS suppliers could cause the gap between

potential profit and realized profit to continue to widen as customers continue to demand lower

prices.

Another option for Mobileye is to maintain the full pricing strategy they are currently

pursuing. This strategy would protect the perceived value of Mobileye’s technology. Offering a

discounted bundle of a low-end ADAS could damage Mobileye’s reputation it has worked hard

over many years to grow. However, maintaining this strategy could cause some potential

negative effects. This strategy will give up some of Mobileye’s potential market share of

low-end cars in the ADAS market to competitors. Because Mobileye’s strategy has mainly

focused on higher-end cars with higher customer willingness to pay this may not seem like such

a big deal. But, as previously mentioned, allowing competition get a foothold even in the lower

market grants them greater ease to take over an even larger market share over time.

We believe that Mobileye should maintain their full pricing strategy and not offer a

discounted low-end bundle. This is the most effective way for Mobileye to keep the company’s

high margins as well as sustain their valuable brand image. The risk of losing low-end market
share to competition is mitigated by the high barriers to entry in to the ADAS market. The time it

takes for an ADAS supplier to win an OEM account is very long. This is because the testing

period for a new competitor’s system would be very long. Mobileye has been working with a

large number of OEMs for a long time and has been able to gather a considerable amount of data

and improve their system to a 99.99% accuracy. They were only able to do this by driving

millions of miles over different geographic regions with different OEMS. Ultimately,

maintaining their current pricing model leads to the highest potential profit for the firm while

also keeping the risk of market loss and brand devaluation reasonably low.