SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-44905. April 25, 1990.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAUL

MONEGRO TORRE, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Robert B. Maroma for defendant-appellant.

SYLLABUS

REMEDIAL LAW; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; MUST BE AN UNBROKEN CHAIN

TO REASONABLY AND POSITIVELY CONCLUDE THAT ACCUSED IS THE GUILTY
PERSON. — We have before ruled that to uphold a judgment of conviction on
circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be "an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion, which points to the defendant to
the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. (People vs. Colinares, L-72025,
June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 313.) Thus, too, in the case of People vs. Macatana, L-
57061, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 235, We held that from all circumstances, there
should be a combination of evidence which in the ordinary course of things,
leaves no room for doubt as to the guilt of the accused. Where the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which
is consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to convict the accused.
Indubitably, the prosecution has failed to establish an unbroken chain of
circumstances which would make Us conclude reasonably and positively that
the accused-appellant is indeed the guilty person.

DECISION

PARAS, J :p

Before Us is an appeal of Raul Monegro Torre from the Decision of the then
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, convicting him of the crime of murder
and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, together with all the
accessory penalties, and to pay the costs.

The facts as presented by the Solicitor General are as follows:

"At around 7:15 o'clock in the evening of December 26, 1975, Romeo
Diaz was found dead by Chief of Police Melquiades B. Syquio and
Patrolman Bartolome Sabando Jr. of the Zarraga Police Department
inside a public utility car, of which he was the driver, along the road in
Singangao, Zarraga, Iloilo, (tsn, pp. 11-13, March 22, 1976; tsn, p. 30,
 May 3, 1976). Dr. Jose Rafio, Chief Medico-Legal Officer of the Iloilo
Integrated National Police Force, who conducted a post mortem
examination of the cadaver of Romeo Diaz (tsn, pp. 2-4, March 22,
1976), found him with seventeen (17) stab wounds, seven of which are
fatal as they are on the thoraco-abdominal region. Diaz's death was
due to shock from the said multiple stab wounds (tsn, pp. 6-7, loc. cit.).

On the information of one Eustaquio Crisme that on December 26,

1975 he saw a person at Marymart matching the description of the
accused Raul Monegro Torre in the company of an unidentified person
talking with the deceased Romeo Diaz, Chief of Police Melquiades
Syquio arrested the accused Raul Monegro Torre (tsn, pp. 7 & 9, March
22, 1976). The accused was identified by Eustaquio Crisme as the last
person he saw with the deceased prior to the latter's death (tsn, pp. 4-
9, loc. cit)." (pp. 2-3, Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee; p. 54, Rollo).
prLL

Accused-appellant was thus charged with murder, described in the information

as follows:

"That on or about the 26th day of December, 1975, in the Municipality

of Zarraga, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Court, the above-named accused armed with a knife, conspiring,
confederating and working together with another John Doe who is still
at large, to better realize their purpose, with treachery and evident
premeditation and with a decided purpose to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab and wound one Romeo Diaz
with the arms with which they were provided, thereby inflicting upon
the latter multiple stab wounds which caused his immediate death." (p.
2, Rollo)

Accused-appellant now seeks the reversal of the trial court decision and his
acquittal because the said court committed these errors:

1. The trial court erred in ruling that the identity of the accused was
not convincingly and sufficiently established.

Specifically, the accused-appellant claims that the declaration of witness

Eustaquio Crisme that he saw the former at about 6:30 P.M. of December 26,
1975 in Marymart, Iloilo City, while he was contracting the PU vehicle driven by
Romeo Diaz does not sufficiently prove that the latter had positively identified
the accused. Accused-appellant also avers that it was not established that he
was seen inside the PU car after he boarded the same.

2. The trial court erred in not holding that the circumstantial

evidence of the prosecution was insufficient to convict the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.

Accused-appellant alleges that the prosecution presented only one

circumstance — that of having seen him in Marymart, Iloilo City contracting to
ride in victim's vehicle. The other circumstance which the trial court heavily
considered was the alleged threat hurled by the accused when he was jailed for
robbery in 1969.
 3. The trial court erred in finding that the defense of alibi has not
been clearly and convincingly established by the accused appellant.

The accused-appellant contends that his and the two other witnesses'
testimonies on his whereabouts in the evening of December 26, 1975 were
never discredited on cross-examination despite the lengthy questioning by the
trial judge and prosecution.

The Solicitor General, arguing for the People, however, contends:

1. The circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution as a matter of

law, is sufficient to support a verdict of guilt against Raul Torre.

To warrant a conviction in criminal cases upon circumstantial evidence, such

evidence must be more than one, derived from facts duly proven, and the
combination of all of them must be such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

2. The alibi is properly disregarded with the establishment by the

prosecution of appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

We intend to resolve this appeal within the bounds of well-entrenched

fundamental principles underlying a criminal prosecution. Thus, We adhere to
these tested jurisprudence.

If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more

explanations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and
the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. (People vs. Taruc,
G.R. 74655, Jan. 20, 1988; cited in Summary of 1988 S.C. Rulings, Martinez)

The fundamental axiom underlying a criminal prosecution is that before the

accused may be convicted of any crime, his guilt must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, if there are substantial facts which were overlooked by
the trial court but which could alter the results of the case in favor of the
accused, then such facts should be carefully taken into account by the
reviewing tribunal. (Formilleza vs. Sandiganbayan, L-75160, March 18, 1988;
159 SCRA 1.)

Proof to sustain conviction must survive the test of reason. Suspicion of guilt,
no matter how strong, should not be permitted to sway judgment. (People vs.
Ramos, L-76744, June 28, 1988; 162 SCRA 794; citing People vs. Bania, 134
SCRA 347.)

Only if the trial judge and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion
that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such
an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. Every circumstance
favoring his innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against the
accused must survive the test of reason. The conscience must be satisfied that
on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged: that
not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. Moral
certainty is required. (Ibid.)

We cannot now find merit in the version of the Solicitor General. His conclusion
of appellant's guilt has been based on mere conjectures and speculations. LLphil

The first circumstantial evidence of having seen the accused contracting with
the victim at the place of departure and linking the same with the death of the
victim is not fool proof. It suffers from loopholes which would make an ordinary
person doubt and think more deeply. And in the process of searching for the
truth, certain possibilities and even realities come into focus.

The prosecution's only credible witness declared that he saw the accused at
around 6:30 P.M. of December 26, 1975 in Marymart, Iloilo City, contracting the
PU car driven by Romeo Diaz. Consider the fact that in the month of December,
nightfall sets in early and that at 6:30 P.M., it is already dark. Thus, too, the
matter of distance of witness Crisme from the victim's vehicle was never shown
in the proceedings nor was the same inquired into. This would have been
material to the alleged positive identification of the accused because on a dark
night, recognizing a person would depend on how far or near he is from the
subject of identification.

Consider further the strong possibility that between Iloilo City or place of
departure up to Zarraga, the place where the alleged crime was committed
which covers a distance of 12 kilometers, another person or persons might
have boarded the victim's vehicle and attacked the latter; or the accused could
have alighted at any point (assuming that the identification was accurate)
before the crime was perpetrated.

It should be noted that the alleged companion of the accused was never
produced. Why? Simply because he was not recognized and hence, could not
be identified as to who he was.

Note that the Medico Legal Officer testified that 17 wounds were inflicted on
the victim and that two weapons might have been used by the assailant. He
also testified that it could have been possible for the assailant to inflict the
wounds with two weapons but improbable for one person to use both hands.
(tsn of Feb. 26, 1976, pp. 6 and 12); Emphasis supplied.

The other circumstantial evidence of the alleged threat made by the accused
six years before the victim was killed when he was jailed for alleged robbery is
also speculative and cannot be the basis of a conviction.

Consider this testimony of witness Antonia Diaz.

"Q Now, were you able to talk with Raul Torre or did he say
something which you heard?

"A While I was there Raul Monegro Torre talked inside the cell
and I heard it ." (tsn of May 3, 1976, p. 32) Italics supplied.
Clearly, from the above testimony, the alleged threat was not told directly to
the victim's wife, Antonia Diaz. She merely heard it.

Likewise, assuming that there was such a threat, why did it take the appellant
six long years to pursue the same? A person seeking vengeance would
normally attempt to do it while his anger is at its highest peak. He would not
wait for six years to get even with a person he intends to harm. LibLex

It appears that because the prosecution could not pin down the accused with
the first circumstantial evidence, it had to play up the circumstance of the
alleged threat overheard by the wife. Why, was the prosecution certain that no
other person could have had a motive to kill the victim? And suppose there was
such a person who really committed the murder, then We would be punishing a
man who happens to provide an alleged motive simply because he was once
indicted for robbery by the victim years ago. Something is wrong here
somewhere. The prosecution's weakness becomes more glaring.

If only to stress Our point, We have before ruled that to uphold a judgment of
conviction on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be "an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion, which points to the
defendant to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. (People vs.
Colinares, L-72025, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 313.)

Thus, too, in the case of People vs. Macatana, L-57061, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA
235, We held that from all circumstances, there should be a combination of
evidence which in the ordinary course of things, leaves no room for doubt as to
the guilt of the accused. Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence
and the other with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty
and is not sufficient to convict the accused.

Indubitably, the prosecution has failed to establish an unbroken chain of

circumstances which would make Us conclude reasonably and positively that
the accused-appellant is indeed the guilty person. LLpr

Considering the foregoing, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED
and accused-appellant is accordingly ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.