DIVISION

[ GR No. 133535, Sep 09, 1999 ]

LILIA B. ORGANO v. SANDIGANBAYAN +

DECISION

372 Phil. 816

PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari with
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order assailing the
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division,[1] that denied
petitioner's motion to quash the information in the case below, for lack of
merit.

We grant the petition.

The facts are as follows:

On August 15, 1997, Special Prosecution Officer Jose T. de Jesus, Jr., filed
with the Sandiganbayan an Information against petitioner, together with
others, for the crime of "plunder" or violation of R. A. No. 7080, as
amended by R. A. No. 7659.[2]

The Information reads as follows:

"That on or about 05 November 1996, or sometime prior or subsequent

thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Dominga S. Manalili, Teopisto A. Sapitula, Jose
dP. Marcelo, Lilia B. Organo, being then public officers and taking
advantage of their official positions as employees of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Region 7, Quezon City, and Gil R. Erencio, Reynaldo S. Enriquez
and Luis S. Se, Jr., conspiring, confabulating and confederating with one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass and
acquire funds belonging to the National Government by opening an
unauthorized bank account with the Landbank of the Philippines, West
Triangle Branch, Diliman, Quezon City, for and in behalf of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and deposit therein money belonging to the government
of the Philippines, consisting of revenue tax payments, then withdraw
therefrom the total sum of Pesos: One Hundred Ninety Three Million Five
Hundred Sixty Five Thousand Seventy Nine & 64/100 (P193,565,079.64)
Philippine Currency, between November, 1996 to February, 1997, without
proper authority, through checks made payable to themselves and/or the
sole proprietorship firms of the above named private persons, thereby
succeeding in misappropriating, converting, misusing and/or malversing
said public funds tantamount to a raid on the public treasury, to their own
personal gains, advantages and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforestated amount"[3]
On August 20, 1997, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to
quash information for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the
Sandiganbayan no longer had jurisdiction over the case under R. A. 8249,
approved on February 5, 1997.

On September 29, 1997, without first resolving petitioner's motion to quash

information, the Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest against all the
accused in the case.

On November 28, 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying

petitioner's motion to quash the information for lack of merit.

On December 9, 1997, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for

reconsideration, reiterating the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the case
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8249, approved on February 5, 1997.

On April 28, 1998, after one hundred forty (140) days from its filing, the
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration ruling that she should first surrender to the court before
she may file any further pleading with the court.

Hence, this petition.

On June 23, 1998, the Court resolved to require the respondents to

comment on the petition, not to file a motion to dismiss, within ten (10)
days from notice.[4]

On September 14, 1998, the Office of the Special Prosecutor, representing

the People of the Philippines, filed its comment.[5]

On January 4, 1999, the Solicitor General filed his comment. [6]

We give due course to the petition.

At issue is whether the Sandiganbayan at the time of the filing of the

information on August 15, 1997 had jurisdiction over the case, in view of the
enactment on February 5, 1997 of Republic Act No. 8249, vesting in the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over offenses and felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by public officers and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of Section 4 in relation to their office where the
accused holds a position with salary grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Petitioner contends that since none of the accused holds a position with
Salary Grade "27" and higher, jurisdiction over the case falls with the
Regional Trial Court.[7] On the other hand, respondent Sandiganbayan's
position is that Republic Act No. 7080 which defines and penalizes the
crime of "plunder" vests in the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction thereof, and
since it is a special law, it constitutes an exception to the general law,
Republic Act No. 8249.[8]

Republic Act No. 7080, Section 3 provides:

"Until otherwise provided by law, all pro-sections under this Act shall

be within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan."
This law was enacted on September 23, 1991, and was effective on October
7, 1991.

On February 5, 1997, Republic Act No. 8249 was approved, further defining
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Section 4 of the law provides:

"Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:

"x x x
"b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in sub-
section a of this section in relation to their office.

"x x x

"In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding
to Salary Grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended." [9]
This latest enactment collated the provisions on the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. It is a special law enacted to declog the Sandiganbayan
of "small fry" cases. In an unusual manner, the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as a trial court was made to depend not on the penalty
imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the
rank and salary grade of accused government officials and employees.

However, the crime of "plunder" defined in Republic Act No. 7080, as

amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was provisionally placed within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan "until otherwise provided by
law."[10] Republic Act No. 8429, enacted on February 5, 1997 is the special
law that provided for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan "otherwise"
than that prescribed in Republic Act No. 7080.

Consequently, we rule that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the

crime of plunder unless committed by public officials and employees
occupying the positions with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758) in relation to their office.

In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though none of the accused

occupied positions with Salary Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, entitling
petitioner to the relief prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for certiorari

and ANNULS the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, dated November 20,
1997, and April 28, 1998, in Criminal Case No. 24100.

The Court orders the Sandiganbayan to forthwith refer the case to the court
of proper jurisdiction.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. Davide, Jr.,

C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.

[1]
 Narciso S. Nario, J., ponente, Sabino R. de Leon, Jr. and Teresita
Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concurring.
[2]
 Docketed as Criminal Case No. 24100.
[3]
 Annex "F", Petition, Rollo, pp. 36-43, on p. 37.
[4]
 Rollo, p. 54.
[5]
 Rollo, pp. 71-79.
[6]
 Rollo, pp. 94-107.
[7]
 Petition, Rollo, pp. 3-22, at pp. 9-11.
[8]
 Comment, Rollo, pp. 96-107, at pp. 98-99.
[9]
 Vol. 93, No. 15, Official Gazette, pp. 2282-2283
[10]
 Republic Act No. 7080, Section 3.
618 Phil. 346

VELASCO JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two (2) consolidated petitions under Rule 65, each
interposed by petitioner Clarita D. Garcia, with application for injunctive
relief. In the first petition for mandamus and/or certiorari, docketed
as G.R. No. 170122, petitioner seeks to nullify and set aside the August 5,
2005 Order,[1] as reiterated in another Order dated August 26, 2005, both
issued by the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, which effectively denied the
petitioner's motion to dismiss and/or to quash Civil Case No. 0193, a suit
for forfeiture commenced by the Republic of the Philippines against the
petitioner and her immediate family. The second petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 171381, seeks to nullify and set aside the November
9, 2005 Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as it
likewise denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss and/or quash Civil Case
No. 0196, another forfeiture case involving the same parties but for
different properties.

The Facts

To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate

amount of PhP 143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his
wife, herein petitioner Clarita, children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy
Mark (collectively, the Garcias) had allegedly amassed and acquired, the
Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), pursuant to
Republic Act No. (RA) 1379,[3] filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) on
October 29, 2004 a petition for the forfeiture of those properties. This
petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 0193, was eventually raffled to the
Fourth Division of the anti-graft court.

Civil Case No. 0193 was followed by the filing on July 5, 2005 of another
forfeiture case, docketed as Civil Case No. 0196, this time to recover funds
and properties amounting to PhP 202,005,980.55. Civil Case No. 0196
would eventually be raffled also to the Fourth Division of the SB. For
convenience and clarity, Civil Case No. 0193 shall hereinafter be also
referred to as Forfeiture I and Civil Case No. 0196 as Forfeiture II.
Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture
I, the OMB charged the Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080
(plunder) under an Information dated April 5, 2005 which placed the value
of the property and funds plundered at PhP 303,272,005.99. Docketed
as Crim. Case No. 28107, the Information was raffled off to the Second
Division of the SB. The plunder charge, as the parties' pleadings seem to
indicate, covered substantially the same properties identified in both
forfeiture cases.

After the filing of Forfeiture I, the following events transpired in relation to

the case:

(1) The corresponding summons were issued and all served on

Gen. Garcia at his place of detention. Per the Sheriff's Return[4] dated
November 2, 2005, the summons were duly served on respondent Garcias.
Earlier, or on October 29, 2004, the SB issued a writ of attachment in favor
of the Republic, an issuance which Gen. Garcia challenged before this
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 165835.

Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of

the SB's lack of jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture. The
OMB countered with a motion to expunge and to declare the Garcias in
default. To the OMB's motion, the Garcias interposed an opposition in
which they manifested that they have meanwhile repaired to the Court
on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 165835 to nullify the writ of attachment
SB issued in which case the SB should defer action on the forfeiture case as
a matter of judicial courtesy.

(2) By Resolution[5] of January 20, 2005, the SB denied the motion to

dismiss; declared the same motion as pro forma and hence without tolling
effect on the period to answer. The same resolution declared the Garcias
in default.

Another resolution[6] denied the Garcias' motion for reconsideration and/or

to admit answer, and set a date for the ex-parte presentation of the
Republic's evidence.

A second motion for reconsideration was also denied on February 23, 2005,
pursuant to the prohibited pleading rule.

(3) Despite the standing default order, the Garcias moved for the transfer
and consolidation of Forfeiture I with the plunder case which were
respectively pending in different divisions of the SB, contending that such
consolidation is mandatory under RA 8249.[7]

On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that
the forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the criminal case of plunder.

(4) On July 26, 2005, the Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to
quash Forfeiture I on, inter alia, the following grounds: (a) the filing of the
plunder case ousted the SB 4th Division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture
case; and (b) that the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible
double jeopardy entanglements.

By Order[8] of August 5, 2005, the SB merely noted the motion in view of

movants having been declared in default which has yet to be lifted.

It is upon the foregoing factual antecedents that petitioner Clarita has

interposed her first special civil action for mandamus and/or certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 170122, raising the following issues:

I. Whether or not the [SB] 4th Division acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion x x x in issuing its challenged
order of August 5, 2005 and August 26 2005 that merely "Noted without
action," hence refused to resolve petitioner's motion to dismiss and/or to
quash by virtue of petitioner's prior default in that:

A. For lack of proper and valid service of summons, the [SB]

4th Division could not have acquired jurisdiction over petitioner's, [and her
children's] x x x persons, much less make them become the true "parties-
litigants, contestants or legal adversaries" in forfeiture I. As the [SB] has
not validly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner's [and her children's] x
x x persons, they could not possibly be declared in default, nor can a valid
judgment by default be rendered against them.

B. Even then, mere declaration in default does not per se bar petitioner

from challenging the [SB] 4th Division's lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of forfeiture I as the same can be raised anytime, even after final
judgment. In the absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter, any and all
proceedings before the [SB] are null and void.

C. Contrary to its August 26, 2005 rejection of petitioner's motion for

reconsideration of the first challenged order that the issue of jurisdiction
raised therein had already been passed upon by [the SB 4th Division's]
resolution of May 20, 2005, the records clearly show that the grounds
relied upon by petitioner in her motion to dismiss and/or to quash dated
July 26, 2005 were entirely different, separate and distinct from the
grounds set forth in petitioner's manifestation and motion [to consolidate]
dated April 15, 2005 that was denied by it per its resolution of May 20,
2005.

D. In any event, the [SB] 4th Division has been ousted of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of forfeiture I upon the filing of the main plunder case
against petitioner that mandates the automatic forfeiture of the subject
properties in forfeiture cases I & II as a function or adjunct of any
conviction for plunder.

E. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was
impliedly repealed by the plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic
forfeiture mechanism.

F. Since the sought forfeiture includes properties purportedly located in the

USA, any penal conviction for forfeiture in this case cannot be enforced
outside of the Philippines x x x.

G. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is

imperative that the matter of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main
plunder case to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements, and to avoid
possible conflicting decisions by 2 divisions of the [SB] on the matter of
forfeiture as a penal sanction.[9] (Emphasis added.)

With respect to Forfeiture II, the following events and proceedings

occurred or were taken after the petition for Forfeiture II was filed:
(1) On July 12, 2005, the SB sheriff served the corresponding summons. In
his return of July 13, 2005, the sheriff stated giving the copies of the
summons to the OIC/Custodian of the PNP Detention Center
who in turn handed them to Gen. Garcia. The general signed his
receipt of the summons, but as to those pertaining to the other
respondents, Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the same, but with the
following qualifying note: "I'm receiving the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl,
Juan Paolo & Timothy - but these copies will not guarantee it being served
to the above-named (sic)."

(2) On July 26, 2005, Clarita and her children, thru special appearance of
counsel, filed a motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II primarily
for lack of jurisdiction over their persons and on the subject matter thereof
which is now covered by the plunder case.

To the above motion, the Republic filed its opposition with a motion for
alternative service of summons. The motion for alternative service would be
repeated in another motion of August 25, 2005.

(3) By Joint Resolution of November 9, 2005, the SB denied both the

petitioner's motion to dismiss and/or to quash and the Republic's motion
for alternative service of summons.

On January 24, 2006, the SB denied petitioner's motion for partial

reconsideration.[10]

From the last two issuances adverted to, Clarita has come to this Court via
the instant petition for certiorari, docketed as GR No. 171381. As there
submitted, the SB 4th Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Joint Resolution dated
November 9, 2005 and its Resolution of January 24, 2006 denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss and/or to quash in that:

A. Based on its own finding that summons was improperly served on

petitioner, the [SB] ought to have dismissed forfeiture II for lack of
jurisdiction over petitioner's person x x x.

B. By virtue of the plunder case filed with the [SB] Second Division that
mandates the automatic forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties upon
conviction, the [SB] Fourth Division has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of forfeiture.

C. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was
impliedly repealed by the plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic
forfeiture mechanism.

D. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is

imperative that the matter of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main
plunder case to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements and worse
conflicting decisions by 2 divisions of the Sandiganbayan on the matter of
forfeiture as a penal sanction.[11] (Emphasis added.)

Per Resolution of the Court dated March 13, 2006, G.R. No.

170122 and G.R. No. 171381 were consolidated.

The Court's Ruling

The petitions are partly meritorious.

The core issue tendered in these consolidated cases ultimately boils down
to the question of jurisdiction and may thusly be couched into whether the
Fourth Division of the SB has acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner--and her three sons for that matter--considering that, first, vis-
à-vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I) and 0196 (Forfeiture II), summons
against her have been ineffectively or improperly served and, second, that
the plunder case--Crim. Case No. 28107--has already been filed and
pending with another division of the SB, i.e., Second Division of the SB.

Plunder Case in Crim. Case No. 28107 Did Not Absorb

the Forfeiture Cases in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196

Petitioner maintains that the SB 4th Division has no jurisdiction over the

subject matter of Forfeitures I and II as both cases are now covered or
included in the plunder case against the Garcias. Or as petitioner puts it a
bit differently, the filing of the main plunder case (Crim. Case No. 28107),
with its automatic forfeiture mechanism in the event of conviction, ousted
the SB 4th Division of its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
forfeiture cases. The inclusion of the forfeiture cases with the plunder case
is necessary, so petitioner claims, to obviate possible double jeopardy
entanglements and colliding case dispositions. Prescinding from these
premises, petitioner would ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the SB
4th Division for not granting its separate motions to dismiss the two
forfeiture petitions and/or to consolidate them with the plunder case on the
foregoing ground.

Petitioner's contention is untenable. And in response to what she suggests

in some of her pleadings, let it be stated at the outset that the SB has
jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under RA 1379, albeit the proceeding
thereunder is civil in nature. We said so in Garcia v.
Sandiganbayan[12] involving no less than petitioner's husband questioning
certain orders issued in Forfeiture I case.

Petitioner's posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the

plunder case, thus depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over
the civil cases, is flawed by the assumptions holding it together, the first
assumption being that the forfeiture cases are the corresponding civil
action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB
4th Division in its May 20, 2005 Resolution,[13] the civil liability for forfeiture
cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense, thus:

Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to
recover unlawfully acquired properties. The action of forfeiture arises when
a "public officer or employee [acquires] during his incumbency an amount
of property which is manifestly out of proportion of his salary x x x and to
his other lawful income x x x."[14] Such amount of property is then
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.[15] Thus "if the
respondent [public official] is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court
that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall
declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such
judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State.[16] x x x
(Citations in the original.)

Lest it be overlooked, Executive Order No. (EO) 14, Series of 1986, albeit
defining only the jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten wealth of
former President Marcos, his immediate family and business associates,
authorizes under its Sec. 3[17] the filing of forfeiture suits under RA 1379
which will proceed independently of any criminal proceedings. The Court,
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[18] interpreted this provision as empowering
the Presidential Commission on Good Government to file independent civil
actions separate from the criminal actions.

Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Case Have Separate Causes of

Action; the Former Is Civil in Nature while the Latter Is Criminal

It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA 1379

arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case,
thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder charged in Crim. Case
No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is
sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in
furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Sec. 4
of RA 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is
"sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy [to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth]." On the other hand, all
that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA
1379 is the disproportion of respondent's properties to his legitimate
income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. As
correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the
properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a
determination of a specific overt act committed by the respondent public
officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth.[19]

Given the foregoing considerations, petitioner's thesis on possible double

jeopardy entanglements should a judgment of conviction ensue in Crim.
Case 28107 collapses entirely. Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept,
refers to jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,[20] suggesting that
double jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions.
Proceedings under RA 1379 are, to repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary
corollary, one who is sued under RA 1379 may be proceeded against for a
criminal offense. Thus, the filing of a case under that law is not barred by
the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in Crim. Case 28107 for
plunder.

Moreover, given the variance in the nature and subject matter of the
proceedings between the plunder case and the subject forfeiture cases,
petitioner's apprehension about the likelihood of conflicting decisions of
two different divisions of the anti-graft court on the matter of forfeiture as a
penal sanction is specious at best. What the SB said in this regard merits
approving citation:

On the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction, respondents argue that the

division where the plunder case is pending may issue a decision that would
collide or be in conflict with the decision by this division on the forfeiture
case. They refer to a situation where this Court's Second Division may
exonerate the respondents in the plunder case while the Fourth Division
grant the petition for forfeiture for the same properties in favor of the state
or vice versa.

Suffice it to say that the variance in the decisions of both divisions does not
give rise to a conflict. After all, forfeiture in the plunder case requires the
attendance of facts and circumstances separate and distinct from that in the
forfeiture case. Between the two (2) cases, there is no causal connection in
the facts sought to be established and the issues sought to be addressed. As
a result, the decision of this Court in one does not have a bearing on the
other.

There is also no conflict even if the decisions in both cases result in an order
for the forfeiture of the subject properties. The forfeiture following a
conviction in the plunder case will apply only to those ill-gotten wealth not
recovered by the forfeiture case and vise (sic) versa. This is on the
assumption that the information on plunder and the petition for forfeiture
cover the same set of properties.[21]

RA 7080 Did Not Repeal RA 1379

Petitioner takes a different tack in her bid to prove that SB erred in not
dismissing Forfeitures I and II with her assertion that RA 7080 impliedly
repealed RA 1379. We are not convinced.

Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a

repeal, expressly or impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute
which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the act of any public officer who
by himself or in connivance with members of his family amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of at
least PhP 50 million. On the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in nature, in
that it does not make a crime the act of a public official acquiring during his
incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion of his
salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of the
State to recover the properties which were not lawfully acquired by the
officer.

It has often been said that all doubts must be resolved against any implied
repeal and all efforts should be exerted to harmonize and give effect to all
laws and provisions on the same subject. To be sure, both RA 1379 and RA
7080 can very well be harmonized. The Court perceives no irreconcilable
conflict between them. One can be enforced without nullifying the other.

Sandiganbayan Did Not Acquire Jurisdiction over

the Persons of Petitioner and Her Children

On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not
acquire jurisdiction over her person and that of her children due to a
defective substituted service of summons. There is merit in petitioner's
contention.

Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides
for the requirements of a valid substituted service of summons, thus:

SEC. 7. Substituted service.--If the defendant cannot be served within a

reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on
defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to
be bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever
mode authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a
court acquires jurisdiction over a person.[22]

In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II

were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained
at the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing
his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted service of summons for
both Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her children through
Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted
services of summons were invalid for being irregular and defective.

In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,[23] we broke down the requirements to be:

(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on

substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be
served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service within a
reasonable time. Reasonable time being "so much time as is necessary
under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do,
conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done,
having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other
party."[24] Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff must show several
attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times on at least two (2)
different dates.

(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return
of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted
personal service.

(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion

residing at defendant's house or residence; or on a competent person in
charge of defendant's office or regular place of business.

From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted

service of summons was made on petitioner and her children, as the service
made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first two (2)
requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of summons.
Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly complied with as the
substituted service was made not at petitioner's house or residence but in
the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the
latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid substituted service
of summons was made.

The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendants, however, admits of
exceptions, as when the party voluntarily submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by asking affirmative relief.[25] In the instant case,
the Republic asserts that petitioner is estopped from questioning improper
service of summons since the improvident service of summons in both
forfeiture cases had been cured by their (petitioner and her children)
voluntary appearance in the forfeiture cases. The Republic points to the
various pleadings filed by petitioner and her children during the subject
forfeiture hearings. We cannot subscribe to the Republic's views.

Special Appearance to Question a Court's Jurisdiction

Is Not Voluntary Appearance

The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure clearly provides:

Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.--The defendant's voluntary appearance in

the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance. (Emphasis ours.)

Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of

the court over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not
deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule on
voluntary appearance--the first sentence of the above-quoted rule--means
is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without
qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack
of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.

The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do

not show that she voluntarily appeared without qualification. Petitioner
filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b)
motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer; (c) second motion for
reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture case with plunder
case; and (e) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in
Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II; and (b)
motion for partial reconsideration.

The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by

petitioner solely for special appearance with the purpose of
challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of
her three children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person and of her three children for lack of valid
service of summons through improvident substituted service of summons
in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner never
abandoned when she filed her motions for reconsideration, even with a
prayer to admit their attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated
January 22, 2005 setting forth affirmative defenses with a claim for
damages. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon
her stance and defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper substituted
services of summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the foregoing
Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner
and her sons did not voluntarily appear before the SB constitutive of or
equivalent to service of summons.

Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals[26] applies

to the instant case. Said case elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction
that a special appearance before the court--challenging its jurisdiction over
the person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other
grounds--is not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his
objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive of a
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily
appeared before the SB to cure the defective substituted services of
summons. They are, therefore, not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the SB over their persons nor are they deemed to have
waived such defense of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no
valid substituted services of summons made, the SB did not acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children. And perforce,
the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and her
three children are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Thus, the order declaring them in default must be set aside and voided
insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned. For the
forfeiture case to proceed against them, it is, thus, imperative for the SB to
serve anew summons or alias summons on the petitioner and her three
children in order to acquire jurisdiction over their persons.

WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus

are PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division has
not acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Clarita D. Garcia and her three
children. The proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196 before the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as they pertain to petitioner and
her three children, are VOID for lack of jurisdiction over their persons. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Chico-Nazario, Leonardo-De Castro*, and Peralta, JJ., concur.

Carpio, (Chairperson), J., see concurring  & dissenting opinion.

*
 Additional member as per October 7, 2009 raffle.
[1]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 170122), pp. 49-50.
[2]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 171381), pp. 48-69.
[3]
 An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to
Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and
Providing for the Proceedings Therefor.
[4]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 170122), p. 80.
[5]
 Id. at 106-122.
[6]
 Id. at 151-166, dated February 3, 2005.
[7]
 An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended,
Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
[8]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 170122), p. 49.
[9]
 Id. at 15-17.
[10]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 171381), pp. 70-82.
[11]
 Id. at 71.
[12]
 499 Phil. 589 (2005).
[13]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 170122), pp. 219-227.
[14]
 RA 1379, Sec. 2.
[15]
 Id.
[16]
 RA 1379, Sec. 6
[17]
 Sec. 3. Civil suits for restitution x x x or x x x forfeiture proceedings
provided for under [RA] 1379 x x x may be filed separately from and
proceed independently of any proceedings and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
[18]
 G.R. No. 84895, May 4, 1989, 173 SCRA 72.
[19]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 171381), p. 303. Comment on Petition.
[20]
 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 21 provides that "[n]o person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."
[21]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 171381), p. 81. SB Resolution dated January 24, 2006.
[22]
 Casimina v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 147530, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 171.
[23]
 G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006, 499 SCRA 21.
[24]
 Id. at 34; citing Far Eastern Realty Investment, Inc. v. CA, No. L-36549,
October 5, 1988, 166 SCRA 256, 262.
[25]
 Oaminal v. Castillo, 459 Phil. 542 (2003).
[26]
 G.R. No. 103200, August 31, 1994, 236 SCRA 78.
538 Phil. 684

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions dated February 7 and 12, 2003 denying petitioner Joseph
Victor G. Ejercito's Motions to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum/Ad
Testificandum, and Resolution dated March 11, 2003 denying his Motion
for Reconsideration of the first two resolutions.

The three resolutions were issued in Criminal Case No. 26558, "People of
the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al.," for plunder, defined and
penalized in R.A. 7080, "AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE
CRIME OF PLUNDER."

In above-stated case of People v. Estrada, et al., the Special Prosecution

Panel[1] filed on January 20, 2003 before the Sandiganbayan a Request for
Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum for the issuance of a subpoena
directing the President of Export and Industry Bank (EIB, formerly Urban
Bank) or his/her authorized representative to produce the following
documents during the hearings scheduled on January 22 and 27, 2003:

I. For Trust Account No. 858;

1. Account Opening Documents;

2. Trading Order No. 020385 dated January 29, 1999;
3. Confirmation Advice TA 858;
4. Original/Microfilm copies, including the dorsal side, of the following:

a. Bank of Commerce MC # 0256254 in the amount of P2,000,000.00;

b. Urban bank Corp. MC # 34181 dated November 8, 1999 in the
amount of P10,875,749.43;
c. Urban Bank MC # 34182 dated November 8, 1999 in the amount of
P42,716,554.22;
d. Urban Bank Corp. MC # 37661 dated November 23, 1999 in the
amount of P54,161,496.52;

5. Trust Agreement dated January 1999:

Trustee: Joseph Victor C. Ejercito
 Nominee: URBAN BANK-TRUST DEPARTMENT
Special Private Account No. (SPAN) 858; and
6. Ledger of the SPAN # 858.

II. For Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9

SPAN No. 858

1. Signature Cards; and

2. Statement of Account/Ledger

III. Urban Bank Manager's Check and their corresponding Urban Bank
Manager's Check Application Forms, as follows:

1. MC # 039975 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of

P70,000,000.00;
2. MC # 039976 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of
P2,000,000.00;
3. MC # 039977 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of
P2,000,000.00;
4. MC # 039978 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of
P1,000,000.00;

The Special Prosecution Panel also filed on January 20, 2003, a Request for
Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum directed to the
authorized representative of Equitable-PCI Bank to produce statements of
account pertaining to certain accounts in the name of "Jose Velarde" and to
testify thereon.

The Sandiganbayan granted both requests by Resolution of January 21,

2003 and subpoenas were accordingly issued.

The Special Prosecution Panel filed still another Request for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated January 23, 2003 for the
President of EIB or his/her authorized representative to produce the same
documents subject of the Subpoena Duces Tecum dated January 21, 2003
and to testify thereon on the hearings scheduled on January 27 and 29,
2003 and subsequent dates until completion of the testimony. The request
was likewise granted by the Sandiganbayan. A Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad
Testificandum was accordingly issued on January 24, 2003.
Petitioner, claiming to have learned from the media that the Special
Prosecution Panel had requested for the issuance of subpoenas for the
examination of bank accounts belonging to him, attended the hearing of the
case on January 27, 2003 and filed before the Sandiganbayan a letter of
even date expressing his concerns as follows, quoted verbatim:

Your Honors:

It is with much respect that I write this court relative to the concern of
subpoenaing the undersigned's bank account which I have learned through
the media.

I am sure the prosecution is aware of our banking secrecy laws everyone

supposed to observe. But, instead of prosecuting those who may have
breached such laws, it seems it is even going to use supposed evidence
which I have reason to believe could only have been illegally obtained.

The prosecution was not content with a general request. It even lists and
identifies specific documents meaning someone else in the bank illegally
released confidential information.

If this can be done to me, it can happen to anyone. Not that anything can
still shock our family. Nor that I have anything to hide. Your Honors.

But, I am not a lawyer and need time to consult one on a situation that
affects every bank depositor in the country and should interest the bank
itself, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and maybe the Ombudsman himself,
who may want to investigate, not exploit, the serious breach that can only
harm the economy, a consequence that may have been overlooked. There
appears to have been deplorable connivance.

xxxx

I hope and pray, Your Honors, that I will be given time to retain the services
of a lawyer to help me protect my rights and those of every banking
depositor. But the one I have in mind is out of the country right now.

May I, therefore, ask your Honors, that in the meantime, the issuance of the
subpoena be held in abeyance for at least ten (10) days to enable me to take
appropriate legal steps in connection with the prosecution's request for the
issuance of subpoena concerning my accounts. (Emphasis supplied)
From the present petition, it is gathered that the "accounts" referred to by
petitioner in his above-quoted letter
are Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9.[2]

In open court, the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, through

Associate Justice Edilberto Sandoval, advised petitioner that his remedy
was to file a motion to quash, for which he was given up to 12:00 noon the
following day, January 28, 2003.

Petitioner, unassisted by counsel, thus filed on January 28, 2003 a Motion

to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum praying that the
subpoenas previously issued to the President of the EIB dated January 21
and January 24, 2003 be quashed.[3]

In his Motion to Quash, petitioner claimed that his bank accounts are
covered by R.A. No. 1405 (The Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) and do not
fall under any of the exceptions stated therein. He further claimed that the
specific identification of documents in the questioned subpoenas, including
details on dates and amounts, could only have been made possible by an
earlier illegal disclosure thereof by the EIB and the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC) in its capacity as receiver of the then Urban
Bank.

The disclosure being illegal, petitioner concluded, the prosecution in the

case may not be allowed to make use of the information.

Before the Motion to Quash was resolved by the Sandiganbayan, the

prosecution filed another Request for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces
Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated January 31, 2003, again to direct the
President of the EIB to produce, on the hearings scheduled on February 3
and 5, 2003, the same documents subject of the January 21 and 24, 2003
subpoenas with the exception of the Bank of Commerce MC #0256254 in
the amount of P2,000,000 as Bank of Commerce MC #0256256 in the
amount of P200,000,000 was instead requested. Moreover, the request
covered the following additional documents:

IV. For Savings Account No. 1701-00646-1:

1. Account Opening Forms;
2. Specimen Signature Card/s; and
3. Statements of Account.
The prosecution also filed a Request for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces
Tecum/Ad Testificandum bearing the same date, January 31, 2003,
directed to Aurora C. Baldoz, Vice President-CR-II of the PDIC for her to
produce the following documents on the scheduled hearings on February 3
and 5, 2003:

1. Letter of authority dated November 23, 1999 re: SPAN [Special

Private Account Number] 858;

2. Letter of authority dated January 29, 2000 re: SPAN 858;

3. Letter of authority dated April 24, 2000 re: SPAN 858;

4. Urban Bank check no. 052092 dated April 24, 2000 for the amount of
P36, 572, 315.43;

5. Urban Bank check no. 052093 dated April 24, 2000 for the amount of
P107,191,780.85; and

6. Signature Card Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9. (Underscoring

supplied)

The subpoenas prayed for in both requests were issued by the

Sandiganbayan on January 31, 2003.

On February 7, 2003, petitioner, this time assisted by counsel, filed an

Urgent Motion to Quash Subpoenae Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum
praying that the subpoena dated January 31, 2003 directed to Aurora
Baldoz be quashed for the same reasons which he cited in the Motion to
Quash[4] he had earlier filed.

On the same day, February 7, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution

denying petitioner's Motion to Quash Subpoenae Duces Tecum/Ad
Testificandum dated January 28, 2003.

Subsequently or on February 12, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a

Resolution denying petitioner's Urgent Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces
Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated February 7, 2003.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated February 24, 2003 seeking a
reconsideration of the Resolutions of February 7 and 12, 2003 having been
denied by Resolution of March 11, 2003, petitioner filed the present
petition.

Raised as issues are:

1. Whether petitioner's Trust Account No. 858 is covered by the term

"deposit" as used in R.A. 1405;

2. Whether petitioner's Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No.
0116-17345-9 are excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405; and

3. Whether the "extremely-detailed" information contained in the

Special Prosecution Panel's requests for subpoena was obtained
through a prior illegal disclosure of petitioner's bank accounts, in
violation of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.

Respondent People posits that Trust Account No. 858[5] may be inquired

into, not merely because it falls under the exceptions to the coverage of R.A.
1405, but because it is not even contemplated therein. For, to respondent
People, the law applies only to "deposits" which strictly means the money
delivered to the bank by which a creditor-debtor relationship is created
between the depositor and the bank.

The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term "deposits,"
as used in R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-
debtor relationship between the trustor and the bank, does not lie. An
examination of the law shows that the term "deposits" used therein is to be
understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a
creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank.

The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:

SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give

encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking institutions
and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly utilize
d by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the 
country. (Underscoring supplied)
If the money deposited under an account may be used by banks for
authorized loans to third persons, then such account, regardless of whether
it creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the
bank, falls under the category of accounts which the law precisely seeks to
protect for the purpose of boosting the economic development of the
country.

Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust
Agreement between petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the trust
account covers "deposit, placement or investment of
funds" by Urban Bank for and in behalf of petitioner.[6] The money
deposited under Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not
merely to remain with the bank but to be invested by it elsewhere. To hold
that this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage
private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by banks in
other ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law.

Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term
"deposits" was intended to be understood broadly:

SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking

institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the
Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential
nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the
depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court
in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where
the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The phrase "of whatever nature" proscribes any restrictive interpretation of
"deposits." Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted provision
that, generally, the law applies not only to money which is deposited but
also to those which are invested. This further shows that the law was not
intended to apply only to "deposits" in the strict sense of the word.
Otherwise, there would have been no need to add the phrase "or invested."

Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No.
858.
The protection afforded by the law is, however, not absolute, there being
recognized exceptions thereto, as above-quoted Section 2 provides. In the
present case, two exceptions apply, to wit: (1) the examination of bank
accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation.

Petitioner contends that since plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of

duty, his accounts are not excepted from the protection of R.A.
1405. Philippine National Bank v. Gancayco[7] holds otherwise:

Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of 
duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepte
d from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one
cannot be different from the policy as to the other. This policy expresses the
notion that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon
its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant
to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.
Undoubtedly, cases for plunder involve unexplained wealth. Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7080 states so.

SECTION 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder;

Penalties. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with member
s of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, su
bordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten we
alth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described
in Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least
Seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000.00), shall be guilty of
the crime of plunder and shall be punished by life imprisonment with
perpetual absolute disqualification from holding any public office. Any
person who participated with said public officer in the commission of
plunder shall likewise be punished. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any
and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stock derived from the deposit or
investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
An examination of the "overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d)"
of R.A. No. 7080 would make the similarity between plunder and bribery
even more pronounced since bribery is essentially included among these
criminal acts. Thus Section 1(d) states:

d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or

material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2)
hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates and or business associates by any combination or
series of the following means or similar schemes.

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public

funds or raids on the public treasury;

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,

percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project
or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;

3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging

to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities or government-owned or -controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;

4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of

stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or

other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended
to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship,

connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, all the above-enumerated overt acts are similar to bribery such
that, in each case, it may be said that "no reason is seen why these two
classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits
confidential."[8]

The crime of bribery and the overt acts constitutive of plunder are crimes
committed by public officers, and in either case the noble idea that "a
public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge
does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is
open to public scrutiny" applies with equal force.

Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the exception to R.A. 1405

applicable in cases of bribery must also apply to cases of plunder.

Respecting petitioner's claim that the money in his bank accounts is not the
"subject matter of the litigation," the meaning of the phrase "subject matter
of the litigation" as used in R.A. 1405 is explained in Union Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[9] thus:

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals confuses the "cause of action"
with the "subject of the action". In Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, petitioner
points out, this Court distinguished the two concepts.

x x x "The cause of action is the legal wrong threatened or committed, while

the object of the action is to prevent or redress the wrong by obtaining
some legal relief; but the subject of the action is neither of these since it is
not the wrong or the relief
demanded, the subject of the action is the matter or thing with respect to w
hich the controversy has arisen, concerning which the wrong has been done
, and this ordinarily is the property or
the contract and its subject matter, or the thing in dispute."
The argument is well-taken. We note with approval the difference between
the 'subject of the action' from the 'cause of action.' We also find
petitioner's definition of the phrase 'subject matter of the action' is
consistent with the term 'subject matter of the litigation', as the latter is
used in the Bank Deposits Secrecy Act.

In Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Magsino, where the petitioner bank inadvertently c
aused the transfer of the amount of US$1,000,000.00 instead of only US$1,
000.00, the Court sanctioned the examination of the bank accounts where 
part of the money was subsequently caused to be deposited:

'x x x Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 1405] allows the disclosure of bank
deposits in cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the
litigation. Inasmuch as Civil Case No. 26899 is aimed at recovering the amo
unt converted by the Javiers for their own benefit, necessarily, an inquiry in
to the whereabouts of the illegally acquired amount extends to whatever is c
oncealed by being held or recorded in the name of persons other than the o
ne responsible for the illegal acquisition."
Clearly, Mellon Bank involved a case where the money deposited was the su
bject matter of the litigation since the money deposited was the very thing i
n dispute. x x x" (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The plunder case now pending with the Sandiganbayan necessarily involves
an inquiry into the whereabouts of the amount purportedly acquired
illegally by former President Joseph Estrada.

In light then of this Court's pronouncement in Union Bank, the subject

matter of the litigation cannot be limited to bank accounts under the name
of President Estrada alone, but must include those accounts to which the
money purportedly acquired illegally or a portion thereof was alleged to
have been transferred. Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No.
0116-17345-9 in the name of petitioner fall under this description and must
thus be part of the subject matter of the litigation.

In a further attempt to show that the subpoenas issued by the

Sandiganbayan are invalid and may not be enforced, petitioner contends, as
earlier stated, that the information found therein, given their "extremely
detailed" character, could only have been obtained by the Special
Prosecution Panel through an illegal disclosure by the bank officials
concerned. Petitioner thus claims that, following the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine, the subpoenas must be quashed.

Petitioner further contends that even if, as claimed by respondent People,

the "extremely-detailed" information was obtained by the Ombudsman
from the bank officials concerned during a previous investigation of the
charges against President Estrada, such inquiry into his bank accounts
would itself be illegal.

Petitioner relies on Marquez v. Desierto[10] where the Court held:

We rule that before an in camera inspection may be

allowed there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdicti
on. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to
the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent
jurisdiction. The bank personnel
and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection
, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending
case. (Underscoring supplied)
As no plunder case against then President Estrada had yet been filed before
a court of competent jurisdiction at the time the Ombudsman conducted an
investigation, petitioner concludes that the information about his bank
accounts were acquired illegally, hence, it may not be lawfully used to
facilitate a subsequent inquiry into the same bank accounts.

Petitioner's attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the instant

case fails. R.A. 1405, it bears noting, nowhere provides that an unlawful
examination of bank accounts shall render the evidence obtained therefrom
inadmissible in evidence. Section 5 of R.A. 1405 only states that "[a]ny
violation of this law will subject the offender upon conviction, to an
imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty
thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court."

The case of U.S. v. Frazin,[11] involving the Right to Financial Privacy Act of

1978 (RFPA) of the United States, is instructive.

Because the statute, when properly construed, excludes a suppression

remedy, it would not be appropriate for us to provide one in the exercise of
our supervisory powers over the administration of justice. Where Congress
has both established a right and provided exclusive remedies for its
violation, we would "encroach upon the prerogatives" of Congress were we
to authorize a remedy not provided for by
statute. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir.), cert. denie
d, 434 U.S. 825, 98 [Link]. 72, 54 [Link].2d 83 (1977).
The same principle was reiterated in U.S. v. Thompson:[12]

x x x When Congress specifically designates a remedy for one of its acts,

courts generally presume that it engaged in the necessary balancing of
interests in determining what the appropriate penalty should
be. See Michaelian, 803 F.2d at 1049 (citing
cases); Frazin, 780 F.2d at 1466. Absent a specific reference to an
exclusionary rule, it is not appropriate for the courts to read such a
provision into the act.
Even assuming arguendo, however, that the exclusionary rule applies in
principle to cases involving R.A. 1405, the Court finds no reason to apply
the same in this particular case.
Clearly, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine[13] presupposes a violation
of law. If there was no violation of R.A. 1405 in the instant case, then there
would be no "poisonous tree" to begin with, and, thus, no reason to apply
the doctrine.

How the Ombudsman conducted his inquiry into the bank accounts of
petitioner is recounted by respondent People of the Philippines, viz:

x x x [A]s early as February 8, 2001, long before the issuance of

the Marquez ruling, the Office of the Ombudsman, acting under the powers
granted to it by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, and acting on
information obtained from various sources, including impeachment (of
then Pres. Joseph Estrada) related reports, articles and investigative
journals, issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum addressed to Urban Bank.
(Attachment "1-b") It should be noted that the description of the documents
sought to be produced at that time included that of numbered accounts 727,
737, 747, 757, 777 and 858 and included such names as Jose Velarde,
Joseph E. Estrada, Laarni Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Joy Melendrez, Peachy
Osorio, Rowena Lopez, Kevin or Kelvin Garcia. The subpoena did not single
out account 858.

xxxx

Thus, on February 13, 2001, PDIC, as receiver of Urban Bank, issued a

certification as to the availability of bank documents relating to A/C 858
and T/A 858 and the non-availability of bank records as to the other
accounts named in the subpoena. (Attachments "2", "2-1" and "2-b)

Based on the certification issued by PDIC, the Office of the Ombudsman

on February 16, 2001 again issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum directed to
Ms. Corazon dela Paz, as Interim Receiver, directing the production of
documents pertinent to account A/C 858 and T/C 858. (Attachment "3")

In compliance with the said subpoena dated February 16, 2001, Ms. Dela

Paz, as interim receiver, furnished the Office of the Ombudsman certified
copies of documents under cover latter dated February 21, 2001:

1. Transaction registers dated 7-02-99, 8-16-99, 9-17-99, 10-18-99, 11-

22-99, 1-07-00, 04-03-00 and 04-24-00;
 2. Report of Unregularized TAFs & TDs for UR COIN A & B Placements
of Various Branches as of February 29, 2000 and as of December 16,
1999; and

3. Trading Orders Nos. A No. 78102 and A No. 078125.

Trading Order A No. 07125 is filed in two copies a white copy which showed
"set up" information; and a yellow copy which showed "reversal"
information. Both copies have been reproduced and are enclosed with this
letter.

We are continuing our search for other records and documents pertinent to
your request and we will forward to you on Friday, 23 February 2001, such
additional records and documents as we might find until then. (Attachment
"4")

The Office of the Ombudsman then requested for the manger's checks,
detailed in the Subpoena Duces Tecum dated March 7, 2001. (Attachment
"5")

PDIC again complied with the said Subpoena Duces Tecum dated March 7,

2001 and provided copies of the manager's checks thus requested under
cover letter dated March 16, 2001. (Attachment "6")[14] (Emphasis in the
original)
The Sandiganbayan credited the foregoing account of respondent People.
[15]
 The Court finds no reason to disturb this finding of fact by the
Sandiganbayan.

The Marquez ruling notwithstanding, the above-described examination by

the Ombudsman of petitioner's bank accounts, conducted before a case was
filed with a court of competent jurisdiction, was lawful.

For the Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing on the bank accounts of
petitioner about four months before Marquez was promulgated on June 27,
2001.

While judicial interpretations of statutes, such as that made

in Marquez with respect to R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
are deemed part of the statute as of the date it was originally passed, the
rule is not absolute.
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[16] teaches:

It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the

law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the
qualification
that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopt
ed, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should
be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the
old doctrine and acted in good faith. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
When this Court construed the Ombudsman Act of 1989, in light of the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law in Marquez, that "before an in camera
inspection may be allowed there must be a pending case before a court of
competent jurisdiction", it was, in fact, reversing an earlier doctrine found
in Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Purisima[17].

Banco Filipino involved subpoenas duces tecum issued by the Office of the

Ombudsman, then known as the Tanodbayan,[18] in the course of
its preliminary investigation of a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

While the main issue in Banco Filipino was whether R.A. 1405 precluded
the Tanodbayan's issuance of subpoena duces tecum of bank records in the
name of persons other than the one who was charged, this Court, citing
P.D. 1630,[19] Section 10, the relevant part of which states:

(d) He may issue a subpoena to compel any person to appear, give sworn
testimony, or produce documentary or other evidence the Tanodbayan
deems relevant to a matter under his inquiry,
held that "The power of the Tanodbayan to issue subpoenae ad
testificandum and subpoenae duces tecum at the time in question is not
disputed, and at any rate does not admit of doubt."[20]

As the subpoenas subject of Banco Filipino were issued during a

preliminary investigation, in effect this Court upheld the power of the
Tandobayan under P.D. 1630 to issue subpoenas duces tecum for bank
documents prior to the filing of a case before a court of competent jurisdicti
on.

Marquez, on the other hand, practically reversed this ruling in Banco

Filipino despite the fact that the subpoena power of the Ombudsman under
R.A. 6770 was essentially the same as that under P.D. 1630. Thus Section 15
of R.A. 6770 empowers the Office of the Ombudsman to

(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take
testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine
and have access to bank accounts and records;
A comparison of this provision with its counterpart in Sec. 10(d) of P.D.
1630 clearly shows that it is only more explicit in stating that the power of
the Ombudsman includes the power to examine and have access to bank
accounts and records which power was recognized with respect to the
Tanodbayan through Banco Filipino.

The Marquez ruling that there must be a pending case in order for the

Ombudsman to validly inspect bank records in camera thus reversed a
prevailing doctrine.[21] Hence, it may not be retroactively applied.

The Ombudsman's inquiry into the subject bank accounts prior to the filing
of any case before a court of competent jurisdiction was therefore valid at
the time it was conducted.

Likewise, the Marquez ruling that "the account holder must be notified to

be present during the inspection" may not be applied retroactively to the
inquiry of the Ombudsman subject of this case. This ruling is not a judicial
interpretation either of R.A. 6770 or R.A. 1405, but a "judge-made" law
which, as People v. Luvendino[22] instructs, can only be given prospective
application:

x x x The doctrine that an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel is not

to be given legal effect was initially a judge-made one and was first
announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales v. Enrile and reiterated on 20
March 1985 in People v. Galit. x x x

While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of

the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant
Luvendino for the requirements and restrictions outlined
in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers
made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of promulgation
of Morales. (Emphasis supplied)
In fine, the subpoenas issued by the Ombudsman in this case were legal,
hence, invocation of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is misplaced.

At all events, even if the challenged subpoenas are quashed, the

Ombudsman is not barred from requiring the production of the same
documents based solely on information obtained by it from
sources independent of its previous inquiry.

In particular, the Ombudsman, even before its inquiry, had already

possessed information giving him grounds to believe that (1) there are bank
accounts bearing the number "858," (2) that such accounts are in the
custody of Urban Bank, and (3) that the same are linked with the bank
accounts of former President Joseph Estrada who was then under
investigation for plunder.

Only with such prior independent information could it have been possible
for the Ombudsman to issue the February 8, 2001 subpoena duces
tecum addressed to the President and/or Chief Executive Officer
of Urban Bank, which described the documents subject thereof as follows:

(a) bank records and all documents relative thereto pertaining to all bank

accounts (Savings, Current, Time Deposit, Trust, Foreign Currency
Deposits, etc...) under the account names of Jose Velarde, Joseph E.
Estrada, Laarni Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Joy Melendrez, Peach Osorio,
Rowena Lopez, Kevin or Kelvin Garcia, 727, 737, 747, 757, 777 and 858.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The information on the existence of Bank Accounts bearing number "858"
was, according to respondent People of the Philippines, obtained from
various sources including the proceedings during the impeachment of
President Estrada, related reports, articles and investigative journals. [23] In
the absence of proof to the contrary, this explanation proffered by
respondent must be upheld. To presume that the information was obtained
in violation of R.A. 1405 would infringe the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions.

Thus, with the filing of the plunder case against former President Estrada
before the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, using the above independent
information, may now proceed to conduct the same investigation it earlier
conducted, through which it can eventually obtain the same information
previously disclosed to it by the PDIC, for it is an inescapable fact
that the bank records of petitioner are no longer protected by R.A. 1405 for
the reasons already explained above.

Since conducting such an inquiry would, however, only result in the

disclosure of the same documents to the Ombudsman, this
Court, in avoidance of what would be a time-wasteful and circuitous way of 
administering justice,[24] upholds the challenged subpoenas.

Respecting petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan violated his right to

due process as he was neither notified of the requests for the issuance of the
subpoenas nor of the grant thereof, suffice it to state that the defects were
cured when petitioner ventilated his arguments against the issuance thereof
through his earlier quoted letter addressed to the Sandiganbayan and when
he filed his motions to quash before the Sandiganbayan.

IN SUM, the Court finds that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged subpoenas for documents
pertaining to petitioner's Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No.
0116-17345-9 for the following reasons:

1. These accounts are no longer protected by the Secrecy of Bank Deposits

Law, there being two exceptions to the said law applicable in this case,
namely: (1) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Exception (1) applies since the plunder case pending against former
President Estrada is analogous to bribery or dereliction of duty, while
exception (2) applies because the money deposited in petitioner's bank
accounts is said to form part of the subject matter of the same plunder case.

2. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" principle, which states that once the
primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any
secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also
inadmissible, does not apply in this case. In the first place, R.A. 1405 does
not provide for the application of this rule. Moreover, there is no basis for
applying the same in this case since the primary source for the detailed
information regarding petitioner's bank accounts the investigation
previously conducted by the Ombudsman was lawful.

3. At all events, even if the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan were

quashed, the Ombudsman may conduct on its own the same inquiry into
the subject bank accounts that it earlier conducted last February-March
2001, there being a plunder case already pending against former President
Estrada. To quash the challenged subpoenas would, therefore, be pointless
since the Ombudsman may obtain the same documents by another route.
Upholding the subpoenas avoids an unnecessary delay in the
administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Sandiganbayan

Resolutions dated February 7 and 12, 2003 and March 11, 2003 are upheld.

The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed, consistent with this Court's ruling

in Marquez v. Desierto, to notify petitioner as to the date the subject bank
documents shall be presented in court by the persons subpoenaed.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Corona,

Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Garcia, JJ., join the dissenting
opinion.
Carpio, J., No part - prior inhibition.
Callejo, Sr., J., Pls. see my concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., I take no part - my former law office acted as counsel for a party.
Chico-Nazario, J., No part.

[1]
 Composed of the Ombudsman, the Special Prosecutor, Deputy Special
Prosecutor, Assistant Ombudsman, Special Prosecution Officer III, and
Special Prosecution Officer II, (Rollo, pp. 492-493).
[2]
 "Petitioner is the owner of Trust Account No. 858 which was originally
opened at Urban Bank but which is now maintained at Export and Industry
Bank, which is the purchaser and owner now of the former Urban Bank and
Urbancorp Investment, Inc. Petitioner is also the owner of Savings Account
No. 0116-17345-9 which was originally opened at Urban Bank but which is
now maintained at Export and Industry Bank, which is the purchaser and
owner of the former Urban Bank and Urbancorp Investment, Inc. x x x"
(Petition, pp. 3-4, rollo, pp. 10-11)
[3]
 The first paragraph of the motion identifies the subpoenas sought to be
quashed as those allegedly issued on January 24, 2003 directed to the
representative/s of the Urban Bank (now EIB) and to Ms. Aurora C. Baldoz,
Vice-President-CR-II of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation.
However, the second motion to quash later filed by petitioner with the
assistance of counsel stated that the subpoenas subject of the previous
motion to quash were those issued on January 21, 2003, addressed to the
President of the EIB and to the President of Equitable-PCI Bank, or their
representatives.

Despite the apparent conflict, it may be inferred that the first motion to
quash covered the subpoenas directed to the President of the EIB dated
January 21, 2003 and January 24, 2003, the January 24 subpoena being a
mere reiteration of the January 21 subpoena.

As there is nothing in the records before this Court which show that a
subpoena dated January 24, 2003 was ever issued to Ms. Baldoz, the Court
will consider petitioner's first Motion to Quash as concerned only with the
subpoenas directed to the President of the EIB.

The statement in the second motion to quash that the first motion covered
the January 21 subpoenas issued to the President of EIB and to the
President of Equitable-PCI Bank may only be an error arising from the fact
that a subpoena to each of these officers were granted by the
Sandiganbayan through the same Resolution dated January 21, 2003. The
petitioner could not have been referring to the subpoena directed to the
President of Equitable-PCI Bank since the subject thereof were the Jose
Velarde accounts which he has never claimed to be his, even in the present
petition.
[4]
 Rollo, p. 171
[5]
 Respondent People of the Philippines argue on the premise that Trust
Account No. 858 covers Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9.
[6]
 Rollo, p. 708.
[7]
 122 Phil. 503, 508 (1965).
[8]
 Philippine National Bank v. Gancayco, supra at note 7.
[9]
 378 Phil. 1177, 1182-1183 (1999).
[10]
 412 Phil. 387, 397 (2001).
[11]
 780 F.2d 1461 (1986).
[12]
 936 F.2d 1249 (1991).
[13]
 "According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to
have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the
"fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible." [People v. Alicando, 321 Phil.
656, 690 (1995)].
[14]
 Rollo, pp. 439- 442.
[15]
 "As clarified by the prosecution, the documents listed in the request were
obtained in February 2001, pursuant to the power conferred on the
Ombudsman under Section 15(8) of R.A. 6770, long before the Supreme
Court promulgated the Marquez v. Desierto case." (Sandiganbayan
Resolution dated February 7, 2003, rollo, p. 72)
[16]
 G.R. No. 110318, August 28, 1996, 261 SCRA 144, 168.
[17]
 G.R. No. L-56429. May 28, 1988, 161 SCRA 576.
[18]
 Section 2 of P.D. 1630 entitled "FURTHER REVISING PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1487, AS REVISED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1607,
CREATING THE OFFICE OF THE TANODBAYAN" states:
"An independent Office of the Ombudsman, to be called the Office of the Ta
nodbayan, is hereby created. The Chief of said Office of the Tanodbayan
shall be called the Tanodbayan who shall have two (2) deputies for Luzon,
one for the Visayas and one for Mindanao." (Underscoring supplied)
[19]
 Vide note 18.
[20]
 Supra at 582.
[21]
 Vide RAFAEL A. MORALES, THE PHILIPPINE GENERAL BANKING
LAW (ANNOTATED), 2nd ed. (2004), page 145:
"It used to be believed too that the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law did not ap
ply to the Ombudsman, on account of his authority, under Section 15(8) of
the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6770), to 'examine and have
access to bank accounts and
records.' However, the Supreme Court in Marquez vs. [Link] A. Desie
rto, et al., G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001, restricted the Ombudsman's po
wer x x x." (Underscoring supplied)
[22]
 G.R. No. 69971, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 36, 49-50, reiterated in Filoteo v.
Sandiganbayan, 331 Phil. 531, 573 (1996).
[23]
 Rollo, p. 439.
[24]
 Amunategue Vda. de Gentugao v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-30340.
June 30, 1976, 71 SCRA 565, 574); vide Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership v.
Velasco (G.R. No. 109645, July 25, 1994, 234 SCRA 455, 501).

566 Phil. 94

CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review[1] of the order[2] dated October 27, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, dismissing the complaint
for forfeiture[3] filed by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) against respondents Glasgow
Credit and Collection Services, Inc. (Glasgow) and Citystate Savings Bank,
Inc. (CSBI).

On July 18, 2003, the Republic filed a complaint in the RTC Manila for civil
forfeiture of assets (with urgent plea for issuance of temporary restraining
order [TRO] and/or writ of preliminary injunction) against the bank
deposits in account number CA-005-10-000121-5 maintained by Glasgow
in CSBI. The case, filed pursuant to RA 9160 (the Anti-Money Laundering
Act of 2001), as amended, was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-107319.

Acting on the Republic's urgent plea for the issuance of a TRO, the
executive judge[4] of RTC Manila issued a 72-hour TRO dated July 21, 2003.
The case was thereafter raffled to Branch 47 and the hearing on the
application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was set on
August 4, 2003.

After hearing, the trial court (through then Presiding Judge Marivic T.
Balisi-Umali) issued an order granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. The injunctive writ was issued on August 8, 2003.

Meanwhile, summons to Glasgow was returned "unserved" as it could no

longer be found at its last known address.

On October 8, 2003, the Republic filed a verified omnibus motion for (a)
issuance of alias summons and (b) leave of court to serve summons by
publication. In an order dated October 15, 2003, the trial court directed the
issuance of alias summons. However, no mention was made of the motion
for leave of court to serve summons by publication.

In an order dated January 30, 2004, the trial court archived the case
allegedly for failure of the Republic to serve the alias summons. The
Republic filed an ex parte omnibus motion to (a) reinstate the case and (b)
resolve its pending motion for leave of court to serve summons by
publication.

In an order dated May 31, 2004, the trial court ordered the reinstatement of
the case and directed the Republic to serve the alias summons on Glasgow
and CSBI within 15 days. However, it did not resolve the Republic's motion
for leave of court to serve summons by publication declaring:

Until and unless a return is made on the alias summons, any action on [the
Republic's] motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication
would be untenable if not premature.
On July 12, 2004, the Republic (through the Office of the Solicitor General
[OSG]) received a copy of the sheriff's return dated June 30, 2004 stating
that the alias summons was returned "unserved" as Glasgow was no longer
holding office at the given address since July 2002 and left no forwarding
address.

Meanwhile, the Republic's motion for leave of court to serve summons by

publication remained unresolved. Thus, on August 11, 2005, the Republic
filed a manifestation and ex parte motion to resolve its motion for leave of
court to serve summons by publication.

On August 12, 2005, the OSG received a copy of Glasgow's "Motion to

Dismiss (By Way of Special Appearance)" dated August 11, 2005. It alleged
that (1) the court had no jurisdiction over its person as summons had not
yet been served on it; (2) the complaint was premature and stated no cause
of action as there was still no conviction for estafa or other criminal
violations implicating Glasgow and (3) there was failure to prosecute on the
part of the Republic.

The Republic opposed Glasgow's motion to dismiss. It contended that its

suit was an action quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant was not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court. It
asserted that prior conviction for unlawful activity was not a precondition
to the filing of a civil forfeiture case and that its complaint alleged ultimate
facts sufficient to establish a cause of action. It denied that it failed to
prosecute the case.

On October 27, 2005, the trial court issued the assailed order. It dismissed
the case on the following grounds: (1) improper venue as it should have
been filed in the RTC of Pasig where CSBI, the depository bank of the
account sought to be forfeited, was located; (2) insufficiency of the
complaint in form and substance and (3) failure to prosecute. It lifted the
writ of preliminary injunction and directed CSBI to release to Glasgow or
its authorized representative the funds in CA-005-10-000121-5.

Raising questions of law, the Republic filed this petition.

On November 23, 2005, this Court issued a TRO restraining Glasgow and
CSBI, their agents, representatives and/or persons acting upon their orders
from implementing the assailed October 27, 2005 order. It restrained
Glasgow from removing, dissipating or disposing of the funds in account
no. CA-005-10-000121-5 and CSBI from allowing any transaction on the
said account.

The petition essentially presents the following issue: whether the complaint
for civil forfeiture was correctly dismissed on grounds of improper venue,
insufficiency in form and substance and failure to prosecute.

The Court agrees with the Republic.

The Complaint Was Filed
In The Proper Venue

In its assailed order, the trial court cited the grounds raised by Glasgow in
support of its motion to dismiss:

1. That this [c]ourt has no jurisdiction over the person of Glasgow

considering that no [s]ummons has been served upon it, and it has
not entered its appearance voluntarily;

2. That the [c]omplaint for forfeiture is premature because of the

absence of a prior finding by any tribunal that Glasgow was engaged
in unlawful activity: [i]n connection therewith[,] Glasgow argues that
the [c]omplaint states no cause of action; and

3. That there is failure to prosecute, in that, up to now, summons has yet

to be served upon Glasgow.[5]

But inasmuch as Glasgow never questioned the venue of the Republic's

complaint for civil forfeiture against it, how could the trial court have
dismissed the complaint for improper venue? In Dacoycoy v. Intermediate
Appellate Court[6] (reiterated in Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. v. Registry of
Deeds of Parañaque City),[7] this Court ruled:

The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint by [the] trial

court on the ground of improper venue is plain error.... (emphasis
supplied)
At any rate, the trial court was a proper venue.

On November 15, 2005, this Court issued A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing of
Monetary Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or
Relating to an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense under RA
9160, as amended (Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture). The
order dismissing the Republic's complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgow's
account in CSBI has not yet attained finality on account of the pendency of
this appeal. Thus, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture applies
to the Republic's complaint.[8] Moreover, Glasgow itself judicially admitted
that the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture is "applicable to the
instant case."[9]

Section 3, Title II (Civil Forfeiture in the Regional Trial Court) of the Rule
of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:

Sec. 3. Venue of cases cognizable by the regional trial court. - A petition for
civil forfeiture shall be filed in any regional trial court of the judicial
region where the monetary instrument, property or proceeds
representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or to a
money laundering offense are located; provided, however, that
where all or any portion of the monetary instrument, property or proceeds
is located outside the Philippines, the petition may be filed in the regional
trial court in Manila or of the judicial region where any portion of the
monetary instrument, property, or proceeds is located, at the option of the
petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under Section 3, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture, therefore, the venue of civil forfeiture cases is any RTC of the
judicial region where the monetary instrument, property or proceeds
representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or to a money
laundering offense are located. Pasig City, where the account sought to be
forfeited in this case is situated, is within the National Capital Judicial
Region (NCJR). Clearly, the complaint for civil forfeiture of the account
may be filed in any RTC of the NCJR. Since the RTC Manila is one of the
RTCs of the NCJR,[10] it was a proper venue of the Republic's complaint for
civil forfeiture of Glasgow's account.

The Complaint Was Sufficient

In Form And Substance

In the assailed order, the trial court evaluated the Republic's complaint to
determine its sufficiency in form and substance:

At the outset, this [c]ourt, before it proceeds, takes the opportunity to

examine the [c]omplaint and determine whether it is sufficient in form and
substance.

Before this [c]ourt is a [c]omplaint for Civil Forfeiture of Assets filed by the
[AMLC], represented by the Office of the Solicitor General[,] against
Glasgow and [CSBI] as necessary party. The [c]omplaint principally alleges
the following:

Glasgow is a corporation existing under the laws of the Philippines,

(a) with principal office address at Unit 703, 7th Floor, Citystate Center
[Building], No. 709 Shaw Boulevard[,] Pasig City;
[CSBI] is a corporation existing under the laws of the Philippines,
(b) with principal office at Citystate Center Building, No. 709 Shaw
Boulevard, Pasig City;
As events have proved, aforestated bank account is related to the
(d) unlawful activities of Estafa and violation of Securities Regulation
Code;
Glasgow has funds in the amount of P21,301,430.28 deposited with
(c)
[CSBI], under CA 005-10-000121-5;
(e) The deposit has been subject of Suspicious Transaction Reports;
After appropriate investigation, the AMLC issued Resolutions No.
094 (dated July 10, 2002), 096 (dated July 12, 2002), 101 (dated
(f)
July 23, 2002), and 108 (dated August 2, 2002), directing the
issuance of freeze orders against the bank accounts of Glasgow;
Pursuant to said AMLC Resolutions, Freeze Orders Nos. 008-010,
(g) 011 and 013 were issued on different dates, addressed to the
concerned banks;
The facts and circumstances plainly showing that defendant
Glasgow's bank account and deposit are related to the unlawful
(h) activities of Estafa and violation of Securities Regulation Code, as
well as to a money laundering offense [which] [has] been
summarized by the AMLC in its Resolution No. 094; and
Because defendant Glasgow's bank account and deposits are related
to the unlawful activities of Estafa and violation of Securities
Regulation Code, as well as [to] money laundering offense as
(i) aforestated, and being the subject of covered transaction reports
and eventual freeze orders, the same should properly be forfeited in
favor of the government in accordance with Section 12, R.A. 9160,
as amended.[11]
In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the focus is on
the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. [12]The
determination is confined to the four corners of the complaint and nowhere
else.[13]

In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the

question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the
allegations made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not
whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.

The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is

whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could
render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer of the complaint.[14] (emphasis ours)
In this connection, Section 4, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of
Civil Forfeiture provides:

Sec. 4. Contents of the petition for civil forfeiture. - The petition for civil
forfeiture shall be verified and contain the following allegations:

(a) The name and address of the respondent;

(b) A description with reasonable particularity of the monetary instrument,

property, or proceeds, and their location; and

(c) The acts or omissions prohibited by and the specific provisions of the
Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended, which are alleged to be the
grounds relied upon for the forfeiture of the monetary instrument,
property, or proceeds; and

[(d)] The reliefs prayed for.

Here, the verified complaint of the Republic contained the following
allegations:

(a) the name and address of the primary defendant therein, Glasgow; [15]
a description of the proceeds of Glasgow's unlawful activities with
(b) particularity, as well as the location thereof, account no. CA-005-10-
000121-5 in the amount of P21,301,430.28 maintained with CSBI;
(c) the acts prohibited by and the specific provisions of RA 9160, as
amended, constituting the grounds for the forfeiture of the said
proceeds. In particular, suspicious transaction reports showed that
Glasgow engaged in unlawful activities of estafa and violation of the
Securities Regulation Code (under Section 3(i)(9) and (13), RA
9160, as amended); the proceeds of the unlawful activities were
transacted and deposited with CSBI in account no. CA-005-10-
000121-5 thereby making them appear to have originated from
 legitimate sources; as such, Glasgow engaged in money laundering
(under Section 4, RA 9160, as amended); and the AMLC subjected
the account to freeze order and
the reliefs prayed for, namely, the issuance of a TRO or writ of
preliminary injunction and the forfeiture of the account in favor of
(d)
the government as well as other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises.

The form and substance of the Republic's complaint substantially

conformed with Section 4, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture.

Moreover, Section 12(a) of RA 9160, as amended, provides:

SEC. 12. Forfeiture Provisions. -

(a) Civil Forfeiture. - When there is a covered transaction report made, and

the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose ordered seizure of any
monetary instrument or property, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly,
related to said report, the Revised Rules of Court on civil forfeiture shall
apply.
In relation thereto, Rule 12.2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 9160, as amended, states:

RULE 12
Forfeiture Provisions

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 12.2. When Civil Forfeiture May be Applied. - When there is a

SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORT OR A COVERED TRANSACTION
REPORT DEEMED SUSPICIOUS AFTER INVESTIGATION BY THE
AMLC, and the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose, ordered the
seizure of any monetary instrument or property, in whole or in part,
directly or indirectly, related to said report, the Revised Rules of Court on
civil forfeiture shall apply.
RA 9160, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations lay down
two conditions when applying for civil forfeiture:

(1) when there is a suspicious transaction report or a covered transaction

 report deemed suspicious after investigation by the AMLC and
the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose, ordered the seizure of
(2) any monetary instrument or property, in whole or in part, directly or
indirectly, related to said report.

It is the preliminary seizure of the property in question which brings it

within the reach of the judicial process.[16] It is actually within the court's
possession when it is submitted to the process of the court.[17] The
injunctive writ issued on August 8, 2003 removed account no. CA-005-10-
000121-5 from the effective control of either Glasgow or CSBI or their
representatives or agents and subjected it to the process of the court.

Since account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 of Glasgow in CSBI was (1) covered

by several suspicious transaction reports and (2) placed under the control
of the trial court upon the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the
conditions provided in Section 12(a) of RA 9160, as amended, were
satisfied. Hence, the Republic, represented by the AMLC, properly
instituted the complaint for civil forfeiture.

Whether or not there is truth in the allegation that account no. CA-005-10-
000121-5 contains the proceeds of unlawful activities is an evidentiary
matter that may be proven during trial. The complaint, however, did not
even have to show or allege that Glasgow had been implicated in a
conviction for, or the commission of, the unlawful activities of estafa and
violation of the Securities Regulation Code.

A criminal conviction for an unlawful activity is not a prerequisite for the

institution of a civil forfeiture proceeding. Stated otherwise, a finding of
guilt for an unlawful activity is not an essential element of civil forfeiture.

Section 6 of RA 9160, as amended, provides:

SEC. 6. Prosecution of Money Laundering. -

(a) Any person may be charged with and convicted of both the offense of
money laundering and the unlawful activity as herein defined.

(b) Any proceeding relating to the unlawful activity shall be given

precedence over the prosecution of any offense or violation under this
Act without prejudice to the freezing and other remedies provided.
(emphasis supplied)
Rule 6.1 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9160, as
amended, states:

Rule 6.1. Prosecution of Money Laundering -

(a) Any person may be charged with and convicted of both the offense of
money laundering and the unlawful activity as defined under Rule 3(i) of
the AMLA.

(b) Any proceeding relating to the unlawful activity shall be given

precedence over the prosecution of any offense or violation under the
AMLA without prejudice to the application ex-parte by the AMLC to
the Court of Appeals for a freeze order with respect to the monetary
instrument or property involved therein and resort to other remedies
provided under the AMLA, the Rules of Court and other
pertinent laws and rules. (emphasis supplied)
Finally, Section 27 of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture
provides:

Sec. 27. No prior charge, pendency or conviction necessary. - No prior

criminal charge, pendency of or conviction for an unlawful
activity or money laundering offense is necessary for the
commencement or the resolution of a petition for civil forfeiture.
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, regardless of the absence, pendency or outcome of a criminal
prosecution for the unlawful activity or for money laundering, an action for
civil forfeiture may be separately and independently prosecuted and
resolved.

There Was No Failure

To Prosecute

The trial court faulted the Republic for its alleged failure to prosecute the
case. Nothing could be more erroneous.

Immediately after the complaint was filed, the trial court ordered its deputy
sheriff/process server to serve summons and notice of the hearing on the
application for issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The
subpoena to Glasgow was, however, returned unserved as Glasgow "could
no longer be found at its given address" and had moved out of the building
since August 1, 2002.

Meanwhile, after due hearing, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining Glasgow from removing, dissipating or disposing of
the subject bank deposits and CSBI from allowing any transaction on,
withdrawal, transfer, removal, dissipation or disposition thereof.

As the summons on Glasgow was returned "unserved," and considering that

its whereabouts could not be ascertained despite diligent inquiry, the
Republic filed a verified omnibus motion for (a) issuance of alias summons
and (b) leave of court to serve summons by publication on October 8, 2003.
While the trial court issued an alias summons in its order dated October 15,
2003, it kept quiet on the prayer for leave of court to serve summons by
publication.

Subsequently, in an order dated January 30, 2004, the trial court archived
the case for failure of the Republic to cause the service of alias summons.
The Republic filed an ex parte omnibus motion to (a) reinstate the case and
(b) resolve its pending motion for leave of court to serve summons by
publication.

In an order dated May 31, 2004, the trial court ordered the reinstatement of
the case and directed the Republic to cause the service of
the alias summons on Glasgow and CSBI within 15 days. However, it
deferred its action on the Republic's motion for leave of court to serve
summons by publication until a return was made on the alias summons.

Meanwhile, the Republic continued to exert efforts to obtain information

from other government agencies on the whereabouts or current status of
respondent Glasgow if only to save on expenses of publication of summons.
Its efforts, however, proved futile. The records on file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission provided no information. Other inquiries
yielded negative results.

On July 12, 2004, the Republic received a copy of the sheriff's return dated
June 30, 2004 stating that the alias summons had been returned
"unserved" as Glasgow was no longer holding office at the given address
since July 2002 and left no forwarding address. Still, no action was taken
by the trial court on the Republic's motion for leave of court to serve
summons by publication. Thus, on August 11, 2005, the Republic filed a
manifestation and ex parte motion to resolve its motion for leave of court to
serve summons by publication.

It was at that point that Glasgow filed a motion to dismiss by way of special
appearance which the Republic vigorously opposed. Strangely, to say the
least, the trial court issued the assailed order granting Glasgow's motion.

Given these circumstances, how could the Republic be faulted for failure to
prosecute the complaint for civil forfeiture? While there was admittedly a
delay in the proceeding, it could not be entirely or primarily ascribed to the
Republic. That Glasgow's whereabouts could not be ascertained was not
only beyond the Republic's control, it was also attributable to Glasgow
which left its principal office address without informing the Securities and
Exchange Commission or any official regulatory body (like the Bureau of
Internal Revenue or the Department of Trade and Industry) of its new
address. Moreover, as early as October 8, 2003, the Republic was already
seeking leave of court to serve summons by publication.

In Marahay v. Melicor,[18] this Court ruled:

While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real
test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the circumstances,
plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with
reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to
delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe
the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the
plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense
with rather than wield their authority to dismiss. (emphasis
supplied)
We see no pattern or scheme on the part of the Republic to delay the
disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory
requirement of the rules. The trial court should not have so eagerly wielded
its power to dismiss the Republic's complaint.

Service Of Summons
May Be By Publication

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[19] this Court declared that the rule is settled

that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem. While that case involved
forfeiture proceedings under RA 1379, the same principle applies in cases
for civil forfeiture under RA 9160, as amended, since both cases do not
terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the
properties either acquired illegally or related to unlawful activities in favor
of the State.

As an action in rem, it is a proceeding against the thing itself instead of

against the person.[20] In actions in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to conferring jurisdiction
on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
[21]
 Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant in order to
satisfy the requirements of due process.[22] For this purpose, service may be
made by publication as such mode of service is allowed in actions in
rem and quasi in rem.[23]

In this connection, Section 8, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of

Civil Forfeiture provides:

Sec. 8. Notice and manner of service. - (a) The respondent shall be given
notice of the petition in the same manner as service of summons under
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and the following rules:

1. The notice shall be served on respondent personally, or by any other

means prescribed in Rule 14 of the Rules of Court;

2. The notice shall contain: (i) the title of the case; (ii) the docket number;
(iii) the cause of action; and (iv) the relief prayed for; and

3. The notice shall likewise contain a proviso that, if no comment or

opposition is filed within the reglementary period, the court shall hear the
case ex parte and render such judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the petition and its supporting evidence.

(b) Where the respondent is designated as an unknown owner

or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be
effected upon him by publication of the notice of the petition in a
newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such
time as the court may order. In the event that the cost of publication
exceeds the value or amount of the property to be forfeited by ten percent,
publication shall not be required. (emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The October 27, 2005
order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No.
03-107319 is SET ASIDE. The August 11, 2005 motion to dismiss of
Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc. is DENIED. And the
complaint for forfeiture of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Anti-Money Laundering Council, is REINSTATED.

The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila,

Branch 47 which shall forthwith proceed with the case pursuant to the
provisions of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC. Pending final determination of the
case, the November 23, 2005 temporary restraining order issued by this
Court is hereby MAINTAINED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, and Leonardo-De

Castro, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2]
 Penned by Judge Augusto T. Gutierrez. Rollo, pp. 49-58.
[3]
 Docketed as Civil Case No. 03-107319.
[4]
 Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas.
[5]
 Order dated October 27, 2005, supra note 2, p. 49.
[6]
 G.R. No. 74854, 02 April 1991, 195 SCRA 641.
[7]
 398 Phil. 626 (2000).
[8]
 Section 59, Title IX (Common Provisions) of the Rule of Procedure in
Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 59. Transitory provision. - This Rule shall apply to all pending civil
forfeiture cases or petitions for freeze order.
[9]
 Memorandum dated January 11, 2007 for Glasgow. Rollo, pp. 329-347.
[10]
 Section 3 of BP 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended) provides:

Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. - There are hereby created

thirteen (13) Regional Trial Courts, one for each of the following judicial
regions:

xxx xxx xxx

The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities

of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and the
municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig, Pateros,
Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela[.]
(emphasis supplied)
[11]
 Order dated October 27, 2005, supra note 2, pp. 52-53.
[12]
 Malicdem v. Flores, G.R. No. 151001, 08 September 2006, 501 SCRA
248.
[13]
 Id.
[14]
 Id., citing Balo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129704, 30 September
2005, 471 SCRA 227.
[15]
 With CSBI impleaded as a co-defendant for being a necessary party.
[16]
 36 Am Jur 2d, Forfeiture, Section 30.
[17]
 Id., Section 28.
[18]
 G.R. No. 44980, 06 February 1990, 181 SCRA 811.
[19]
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 461 Phil. 598 (2003).
[20]
 Id.
[21]
 Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, 10 March 2004, 425 SCRA
98.
[22]
 Id.
[23]
 Sps. Jose v. Sps. Boyon, 460 Phil. 354 (2003).

569 Phil. 98

TINGA, J,:
The present petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 assails the
orders and resolutions issued by two different courts in two different cases.
The courts and cases in question are the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 24, which heard SP Case No. 06-114200[1] and the Court of Appeals,
Tenth Division, which heared CA-G.R. SP No. 95198. [2] Both cases arose as
part of the aftermath of the ruling of this Court in Agan v.
PIATCO[3] nullifying the concession agreement awarded to the Philippine
International Airport Terminal Corporation (PIATCO) over the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal 3 (NAIA 3)
Project.

I.

Following the promulgation of Agan, a series of investigations concerning

the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by the
Ombudsman and the Compliance and Investigation Staff (CIS) of petitioner
Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC). On 24 May 2005, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) wrote the AMLC requesting the latter's
assistance "in obtaining more evidence to completely reveal the financial
trail of corruption surrounding the [NAIA 3] Project," and also noting that
petitioner Republic of the Philippines was presently defending itself in two
international arbitration cases filed in relation to the NAIA 3 Project. [4] The
CIS conducted an intelligence database search on the financial transactions
of certain individuals involved in the award, including respondent
Pantaleon Alvarez (Alvarez) who had been the Chairman of the PBAC
Technical Committee, NAIA-IPT3 Project.[5] By this time, Alvarez had
already been charged by the Ombudsman with violation of Section 3(j) of
R.A. No. 3019.[6] The search revealed that Alvarez maintained eight (8)
bank accounts with six (6) different banks. [7]

On 27 June 2005, the AMLC issued Resolution No. 75, Series of 2005,
[8]
 whereby the Council resolved to authorize the Executive Director of the
AMLC "to sign and verify an application to inquire into and/or examine the
[deposits] or investments of Pantaleon Alvarez, Wilfredo Trinidad, Alfredo
Liongson, and Cheng Yong, and their related web of accounts wherever
these may be found, as defined under Rule 10.4 of the Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations;" and to authorize the AMLC
Secretariat "to conduct an inquiry into subject accounts once the Regional
Trial Court grants the application to inquire into and/or examine the bank
accounts" of those four individuals.[9] The resolution enumerated the
particular bank accounts of Alvarez, Wilfredo Trinidad (Trinidad), Alfredo
Liongson (Liongson) and Cheng Yong which were to be the subject of the
inquiry.[10] The rationale for the said resolution was founded on the cited
findings of the CIS that amounts were transferred from a Hong Kong bank
account owned by Jetstream Pacific Ltd. Account to bank accounts in the
Philippines maintained by Liongson and Cheng Yong. [11] The Resolution
also noted that "[b]y awarding the contract to PIATCO despite its lack of
financial capacity, Pantaleon Alvarez caused undue injury to the
government by giving PIATCO unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, in
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019."[12]

Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an

application to inquire into or examine the deposits or investments of
Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong before the RTC of Makati,
Branch 138, presided by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Sixto
Marella, Jr. The application was docketed as AMLC No. 05-005. [13] The
Makati RTC heard the testimony of the Deputy Director of the AMLC,
Richard David C. Funk II, and received the documentary evidence of the
AMLC.[14] Thereafter, on 4 July 2005, the Makati RTC rendered an Order
(Makati RTC bank inquiry order) granting the AMLC the authority to
inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of Alvarez, Trinidad,
Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being satisfied that there existed
"[p]robable cause [to] believe that the deposits in various bank accounts,
details of which appear in paragraph 1 of the Application, are related to the
offense of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act now the subject
of criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan as attested to by the
Informations, Exhibits C, D, E, F, and G."[15] Pursuant to the Makati RTC
bank inquiry order, the CIS proceeded to inquire and examine the deposits,
investments and related web accounts of the four.[16]

Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis

Villa-Ignacio, wrote a letter dated 2 November 2005, requesting the AMLC
to investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other entities
involved in the nullified contract. The letter adverted to probable cause to
believe that the bank accounts "were used in the commission of unlawful
activities that were committed" in relation to the criminal cases then
pending before the Sandiganbayan.[17] Attached to the letter was a
memorandum "on why the investigation of the [accounts] is necessary in
the prosecution of the above criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan." [18]

In response to the letter of the Special Prosecutor, the AMLC promulgated

on 9 December 2005 Resolution No. 121 Series of 2005,[19] which
authorized the executive director of the AMLC to inquire into and examine
the accounts named in the letter, including one maintained by Alvarez with
DBS Bank and two other accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with
Metrobank. The Resolution characterized the memorandum attached to the
Special Prosecutor's letter as "extensively justif[ying] the existence of
probable cause that the bank accounts of the persons and entities
mentioned in the letter are related to the unlawful activity of violation of
Sections 3(g) and 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended." [20]

Following the December 2005 AMLC Resolution, the Republic, through the
AMLC, filed an application[21] before the Manila RTC to inquire into and/or
examine thirteen (13) accounts and two (2) related web of accounts alleged
as having been used to facilitate corruption in the NAIA 3 Project. Among
said accounts were the DBS Bank account of Alvarez and the Metrobank
accounts of Cheng Yong. The case was raffled to Manila RTC, Branch 24,
presided by respondent Judge Antonio Eugenio, Jr., and docketed as SP
Case No. 06-114200.
On 12 January 2006, the Manila RTC issued an Order (Manila RTC bank
inquiry order) granting the Ex Parte Application expressing therein "[that]
the allegations in said application to be impressed with merit, and in
conformity with Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) of 2001 and Rules 11.1 and 11.2
of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations."[22] Authority was thus
granted to the AMLC to inquire into the bank accounts listed therein.

On 25 January 2006, Alvarez, through counsel, entered his

appearance[23] before the Manila RTC in SP Case No. 06-114200 and filed
an Urgent Motion to Stay Enforcement of Order of January 12, 2006.
[24]
 Alvarez alleged that he fortuitously learned of the bank inquiry order,
which was issued following an ex parte application, and he argued that
nothing in R.A. No. 9160 authorized the AMLC to seek the authority to
inquire into bank accounts ex parte.[25] The day after Alvarez filed his
motion, 26 January 2006, the Manila RTC issued an Order [26] staying the
enforcement of its bank inquiry order and giving the Republic five (5) days
to respond to Alvarez's motion.

The Republic filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration [27] of the 26

January 2006 Manila RTC Order and likewise sought to strike out Alvarez's
motion that led to the issuance of said order. For his part, Alvarez filed a
Reply and Motion to Dismiss[28] the application for bank inquiry order. On
2 May 2006, the Manila RTC issued an Omnibus Order[29] granting the
Republic's Motion for Reconsideration, denying Alvarez's motion to dismiss
and reinstating "in full force and effect" the Order dated 12 January 2006.
In the omnibus order, the Manila RTC reiterated that the material
allegations in the application for bank inquiry order filed by the Republic
stood as "the probable cause for the investigation and examination of the
bank accounts and investments of the respondents."[30]

Alvarez filed on 10 May 2006 an Urgent Motion [31] expressing his

apprehension that the AMLC would immediately enforce the omnibus
order and would thereby render the motion for reconsideration he intended
to file as moot and academic; thus he sought that the Republic be refrained
from enforcing the omnibus order in the meantime. Acting on this motion,
the Manila RTC, on 11 May 2006, issued an Order[32] requiring the OSG to
file a comment/opposition and reminding the parties that judgments and
orders become final and executory upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days
from receipt thereof, as it is the period within which a motion for
reconsideration could be filed. Alvarez filed his Motion for
Reconsideration[33] of the omnibus order on 15 May 2006, but the motion
was denied by the Manila RTC in an Order[34] dated 5 July 2006.

On 11 July 2006, Alvarez filed an Urgent Motion and

Manifestation[35] wherein he manifested having received reliable
information that the AMLC was about to implement the Manila RTC bank
inquiry order even though he was intending to appeal from it. On the
premise that only a final and executory judgment or order could be
executed or implemented, Alvarez sought that the AMLC be immediately
ordered to refrain from enforcing the Manila RTC bank inquiry order.

On 12 July 2006, the Manila RTC, acting on Alvarez's latest motion, issued
an Order[36] directing the AMLC "to refrain from enforcing the order dated
January 12, 2006 until the expiration of the period to appeal, without any
appeal having been filed." On the same day, Alvarez filed a Notice of
Appeal[37] with the Manila RTC.

On 24 July 2006, Alvarez filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Clarification.

[38]
 Therein, he alleged having learned that the AMLC had began to inquire
into the bank accounts of the other persons mentioned in the application
for bank inquiry order filed by the Republic.[39] Considering that the Manila
RTC bank inquiry order was issued ex parte, without notice to those other
persons, Alvarez prayed that the AMLC be ordered to refrain from inquiring
into any of the other bank deposits and alleged web of accounts enumerated
in AMLC's application with the RTC; and that the AMLC be directed to
refrain from using, disclosing or publishing in any proceeding or venue any
information or document obtained in violation of the 11 May 2006 RTC
Order.[40]

On 25 July 2006, or one day after Alvarez filed his motion, the Manila RTC
issued an Order[41] wherein it clarified that "the Ex Parte Order of this Court
dated January 12, 2006 can not be implemented against the deposits or
accounts of any of the persons enumerated in the AMLC Application until
the appeal of movant Alvarez is finally resolved, otherwise, the appeal
would be rendered moot and academic or even nugatory." [42] In addition,
the AMLC was ordered "not to disclose or publish any information or
document found or obtained in [v]iolation of the May 11, 2006 Order of this
Court."[43] The Manila RTC reasoned that the other persons mentioned in
AMLC's application were not served with the court's 12 January 2006
Order. This 25 July 2006 Manila RTC Order is the first of the four rulings
being assailed through this petition.

In response, the Republic filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for

Reconsideration[44] dated 27 July 2006, urging that it be allowed to
immediately enforce the bank inquiry order against Alvarez and that
Alvarez's notice of appeal be expunged from the records since appeal from
an order of inquiry is disallowed under the Anti money Laundering Act
(AMLA).

Meanwhile, respondent Lilia Cheng filed with the Court of Appeals a

Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for
TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction [45] dated 10 July 2006, directed
against the Republic of the Philippines through the AMLC, Manila RTC
Judge Eugenio, Jr. and Makati RTC Judge Marella, Jr.. She identified
herself as the wife of Cheng Yong[46] with whom she jointly owns a conjugal
bank account with Citibank that is covered by the Makati RTC bank inquiry
order, and two conjugal bank accounts with Metrobank that are covered by
the Manila RTC bank inquiry order. Lilia Cheng imputed grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Makati and Manila RTCs in granting
AMLC's ex parte applications for a bank inquiry order, arguing among
others that the ex parte applications violated her constitutional right to due
process, that the bank inquiry order under the AMLA can only be granted
in connection with violations of the AMLA and that the AMLA can not
apply to bank accounts opened and transactions entered into prior to the
effectivity of the AMLA or to bank accounts located outside the Philippines.
[47]

On 1 August 2006, the Court of Appeals, acting on Lilia Cheng's petition,

issued a Temporary Restraining Order[48] enjoining the Manila and Makati
trial courts from implementing, enforcing or executing the respective bank
inquiry orders previously issued, and the AMLC from enforcing and
implementing such orders. On even date, the Manila RTC issued an
Order[49] resolving to hold in abeyance the resolution of the urgent omnibus
motion for reconsideration then pending before it until the resolution of
Lilia Cheng's petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals Resolution directing the issuance of the temporary restraining
order is the second of the four rulings assailed in the present petition.

The third assailed ruling[50] was issued on 15 August 2006 by the Manila

RTC, acting on the Urgent Motion for Clarification[51] dated 14 August 2006
filed by Alvarez. It appears that the 1 August 2006 Manila RTC Order had
amended its previous 25 July 2006 Order by deleting the last paragraph
which stated that the AMLC "should not disclose or publish any
information or document found or obtained in violation of the May 11,
2006 Order of this Court."[52] In this new motion, Alvarez argued that the
deletion of that paragraph would allow the AMLC to implement the bank
inquiry orders and publish whatever information it might obtain thereupon
even before the final orders of the Manila RTC could become final and
executory.[53] In the 15 August 2006 Order, the Manila RTC reiterated that
the bank inquiry order it had issued could not be implemented or enforced
by the AMLC or any of its representatives until the appeal therefrom was
finally resolved and that any enforcement thereof would be unauthorized.
[54]

The present Consolidated Petition[55] for certiorari and prohibition under

Rule 65 was filed on 2 October 2006, assailing the two Orders of the Manila
RTC dated 25 July and 15 August 2006 and the Temporary Restraining
Order dated 1 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals. Through an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion[56] dated 9 October 2006, petitioner informed the
Court that on 22 September 2006, the Court of Appeals hearing Lilia
Cheng's petition had granted a writ of preliminary injunction in her favor.
[57]
 Thereafter, petitioner sought as well the nullification of the 22
September 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, thereby constituting
the fourth ruling assailed in the instant petition.[58]

The Court had initially granted a Temporary Restraining Order [59] dated 6

October 2006 and later on a Supplemental Temporary Restraining
Order[60] dated 13 October 2006 in petitioner's favor, enjoining the
implementation of the assailed rulings of the Manila RTC and the Court of
Appeals. However, on respondents' motion, the Court, through a
Resolution[61] dated 11 December 2006, suspended the implementation of
the restraining orders it had earlier issued.

Oral arguments were held on 17 January 2007. The Court consolidated the
issues for argument as follows:

1. Did the RTC-Manila, in issuing the Orders dated 25 July 2006 and 15
August 2006 which deferred the implementation of its Order dated 12
January 2006, and the Court of Appeals, in issuing its Resolution dated 1
August 2006, which ordered the status quo in relation to the 1 July 2005
Order of the RTC-Makati and the 12 January 2006 Order of the RTC-
Manila, both of which authorized the examination of bank accounts under
Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 9160 (AMLA), commit grave abuse of discretion?

(a) Is an application for an order authorizing inquiry into or examination of

bank accounts or investments under Section 11 of the AMLA ex-parte in
nature or one which requires notice and hearing?

(b) What legal procedures and standards should be observed in the conduct
of the proceedings for the issuance of said order?

(c) Is such order susceptible to legal challenges and judicial review?

2. Is it proper for this Court at this time and in this case to inquire into and
pass upon the validity of the 1 July 2005 Order of the RTC-Makati and the
12 January 2006 Order of the RTC-Manila, considering the pendency of CA
G.R. SP No. 95-198 (Lilia Cheng v. Republic) wherein the validity of both
orders was challenged?[62]
After the oral arguments, the parties were directed to file their respective
memoranda, which they did,[63] and the petition was thereafter deemed
submitted for resolution.

II.

Petitioner's general advocacy is that the bank inquiry orders issued by the
Manila and Makati RTCs are valid and immediately enforceable whereas
the assailed rulings, which effectively stayed the enforcement of the Manila
and Makati RTCs bank inquiry orders, are sullied with grave abuse of
discretion. These conclusions flow from the posture that a bank inquiry
order, issued upon a finding of probable cause, may be issued ex parte and,
once issued, is immediately executory. Petitioner further argues that the
information obtained following the bank inquiry is necessarily beneficial, if
not indispensable, to the AMLC in discharging its awesome responsibility
regarding the effective implementation of the AMLA and that any restraint
in the disclosure of such information to appropriate agencies or other
judicial fora would render meaningless the relief supplied by the bank
inquiry order.

Petitioner raises particular arguments questioning Lilia Cheng's right to

seek injunctive relief before the Court of Appeals, noting that not one of the
bank inquiry orders is directed against her. Her "cryptic assertion" that she
is the wife of Cheng Yong cannot, according to petitioner, "metamorphose
into the requisite legal standing to seek redress for an imagined injury or to
maintain an action in behalf of another." In the same breath, petitioner
argues that Alvarez cannot assert any violation of the right to financial
privacy in behalf of other persons whose bank accounts are being inquired
into, particularly those other persons named in the Makati RTC bank
inquiry order who did not take any step to oppose such orders before the
courts.

Ostensibly, the proximate question before the Court is whether a bank

inquiry order issued in accordance with Section 10 of the AMLA may be
stayed by injunction. Yet in arguing that it does, petitioner relies on what it
posits as the final and immediately executory character of the bank inquiry
orders issued by the Manila and Makati RTCs. Implicit in that position is
the notion that the inquiry orders are valid, and such notion is susceptible
to review and validation based on what appears on the face of the orders
and the applications which triggered their issuance, as well as the
provisions of the AMLA governing the issuance of such orders. Indeed, to
test the viability of petitioner's argument, the Court will have to be satisfied
that the subject inquiry orders are valid in the first place. However, even
from a cursory examination of the applications for inquiry order and the
orders themselves, it is evident that the orders are not in accordance with
law.

III.

A brief overview of the AMLA is called for.

Money laundering has been generally defined by the International Criminal

Police Organization (Interpol) `as "any act or attempted act to conceal or
disguise the identity of illegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to
have originated from legitimate sources."[64] Even before the passage of the
AMLA, the problem was addressed by the Philippine government through
the issuance of various circulars by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Yet
ultimately, legislative proscription was necessary, especially with the
inclusion of the Philippines in the Financial Action Task Force's list of non-
cooperative countries and territories in the fight against money laundering.
[65]
 The original AMLA, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9160, was passed in 2001. It
was amended by R.A. No. 9194 in 2003.
Section 4 of the AMLA states that "[m]oney laundering is a crime whereby
the proceeds of an unlawful activity as [defined in the law] are transacted,
thereby making them appear to have originated from legitimate
sources."[66] The section further provides the three modes through which
the crime of money laundering is committed. Section 7 creates the AMLC
and defines its powers, which generally relate to the enforcement of the
AMLA provisions and the initiation of legal actions authorized in the AMLA
such as civil forefeiture proceedings and complaints for the prosecution of
money laundering offenses.[67]

In addition to providing for the definition and penalties for the crime of
money laundering, the AMLA also authorizes certain provisional remedies
that would aid the AMLC in the enforcement of the AMLA. These are the
"freeze order" authorized under Section 10, and the "bank inquiry order"
authorized under Section 11.

Respondents posit that a bank inquiry order under Section 11 may be

obtained only upon the pre-existence of a money laundering offense case
already filed before the courts.[68] The conclusion is based on the phrase
"upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of this Act," the
word "cases" generally understood as referring to actual cases pending with
the courts.

We are unconvinced by this proposition, and agree instead with the then
Solicitor General who conceded that the use of the phrase "in cases of" was
unfortunate, yet submitted that it should be interpreted to mean "in the
event there are violations" of the AMLA, and not that there are already
cases pending in court concerning such violations. [69] If the contrary
position is adopted, then the bank inquiry order would be limited in
purpose as a tool in aid of litigation of live cases, and wholly inutile as a
means for the government to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence
to sustain an intended prosecution of the account holder for violation of the
AMLA. Should that be the situation, in all likelihood the AMLC would be
virtually deprived of its character as a discovery tool, and thus would
become less circumspect in filing complaints against suspect account
holders. After all, under such set-up the preferred strategy would be to
allow or even encourage the indiscriminate filing of complaints under the
AMLA with the hope or expectation that the evidence of money laundering
would somehow surface during the trial. Since the AMLC could not make
use of the bank inquiry order to determine whether there is evidentiary
basis to prosecute the suspected malefactors, not filing any case at all would
not be an alternative. Such unwholesome set-up should not come to pass.
Thus Section 11 cannot be interpreted in a way that would emasculate the
remedy it has established and encourage the unfounded initiation of
complaints for money laundering.

Still, even if the bank inquiry order may be availed of without need of a pre-
existing case under the AMLA, it does not follow that such order may be
availed of ex parte. There are several reasons why the AMLA does not
generally sanction ex parte applications and issuances of the bank inquiry
order.

IV.

It is evident that Section 11 does not specifically authorize, as a general rule,

the issuance ex parte of the bank inquiry order. We quote the provision in
full:

SEC. 11. Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits.ʉۥ Notwithstanding the

provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as amended, Republic Act No. 6426,
as amended, Republic Act No. 8791, and other laws, the AMLC may inquire
into or examine any particular deposit or investment with any banking
institution or non bank financial institution upon order of any competent
court in cases of violation of this Act, when it has been established that
there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an
unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof or a money laundering
offense under Section 4 hereof, except that no court order shall be required
in cases involving unlawful activities defined in Sections 3(i)1, (2) and (12).

To ensure compliance with this Act, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
may inquire into or examine any deposit of investment with any banking
institution or non bank financial institution when the examination is made
in the course of a periodic or special examination, in accordance with the
rules of examination of the BSP.[70] (Emphasis supplied)
Of course, Section 11 also allows the AMLC to inquire into bank accounts
without having to obtain a judicial order in cases where there is probable
cause that the deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for
ransom,[71] certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002,[72] hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive
arson and murder. Since such special circumstances do not apply in this
case, there is no need for us to pass comment on this proviso. Suffice it to
say, the proviso contemplates a situation distinct from that which presently
confronts us, and for purposes of the succeeding discussion, our reference
to Section 11 of the AMLA excludes said proviso.

In the instances where a court order is required for the issuance of the bank
inquiry order, nothing in Section 11 specifically authorizes that such court
order may be issued ex parte. It might be argued that this silence does not
preclude the ex parte issuance of the bank inquiry order since the same is
not prohibited under Section 11. Yet this argument falls when the
immediately preceding provision, Section 10, is examined.

SEC. 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property.ʉۥ The Court of

Appeals, upon application ex parte by the AMLC and after determination
that probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in
any way related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof,
may issue a freeze order which shall be effective immediately. The freeze
order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court.
[73]

Although oriented towards different purposes, the freeze order under

Section 10 and the bank inquiry order under Section 11 are similar in that
they are extraordinary provisional reliefs which the AMLC may avail of to
effectively combat and prosecute money laundering offenses. Crucially,
Section 10 uses specific language to authorize an ex parte application for
the provisional relief therein, a circumstance absent in Section 11. If indeed
the legislature had intended to authorize ex parte proceedings for the
issuance of the bank inquiry order, then it could have easily expressed such
intent in the law, as it did with the freeze order under Section 10.

Even more tellingly, the current language of Sections 10 and 11 of the

AMLA was crafted at the same time, through the passage of R.A. No. 9194.
Prior to the amendatory law, it was the AMLC, not the Court of Appeals,
which had authority to issue a freeze order, whereas a bank inquiry order
always then required, without exception, an order from a competent court.
[74]
 It was through the same enactment that ex parte proceedings were
introduced for the first time into the AMLA, in the case of the freeze order
which now can only be issued by the Court of Appeals. It certainly would
have been convenient, through the same amendatory law, to allow a
similar ex parte procedure in the case of a bank inquiry order had Congress
been so minded. Yet nothing in the provision itself, or even the available
legislative record, explicitly points to an ex parte judicial procedure in the
application for a bank inquiry order, unlike in the case of the freeze order.

That the AMLA does not contemplate ex parte proceedings in applications

for bank inquiry orders is confirmed by the present implementing rules and
regulations of the AMLA, promulgated upon the passage of R.A. No. 9194.
With respect to freeze orders under Section 10, the implementing rules do
expressly provide that the applications for freeze orders be filed ex parte,
[75]
 but no similar clearance is granted in the case of inquiry orders under
Section 11.[76] These implementing rules were promulgated by the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Insurance Commission and the Securities and
Exchange Commission,[77] and if it was the true belief of these institutions
that inquiry orders could be issued ex parte similar to freeze orders,
language to that effect would have been incorporated in the said Rules. This
is stressed not because the implementing rules could authorize ex
parte applications for inquiry orders despite the absence of statutory basis,
but rather because the framers of the law had no intention to allow such ex
parte applications.

Even the Rules of Procedure adopted by this Court in A.M. No. 05-11-04-
SC[78] to enforce the provisions of the AMLA specifically authorize ex
parte applications with respect to freeze orders under Section 10[79] but
make no similar authorization with respect to bank inquiry orders under
Section 11.

The Court could divine the sense in allowing ex parte proceedings under

Section 10 and in proscribing the same under Section 11. A freeze order
under Section 10 on the one hand is aimed at preserving monetary
instruments or property in any way deemed related to unlawful activities as
defined in Section 3(i) of the AMLA. The owner of such monetary
instruments or property would thus be inhibited from utilizing the same for
the duration of the freeze order. To make such freeze order anteceded by a
judicial proceeding with notice to the account holder would allow for or
lead to the dissipation of such funds even before the order could be issued.

On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not
necessitate any form of physical seizure of property of the account holder.
What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination of the particular
deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank financial
institutions. The monetary instruments or property deposited with such
banks or financial institutions are not seized in a physical sense, but are
examined on particular details such as the account holder's record of
deposits and transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the
records to be inspected under a bank inquiry order cannot be physically
seized or hidden by the account holder. Said records are in the possession
of the bank and therefore cannot be destroyed at the instance of the account
holder alone as that would require the extraordinary cooperation and
devotion of the bank.

Interestingly, petitioner's memorandum does not attempt to demonstrate

before the Court that the bank inquiry order under Section 11 may be
issued ex parte, although the petition itself did devote some space for that
argument. The petition argues that the bank inquiry order is "a special and
peculiar remedy, drastic in its name, and made necessary because of a
public necessity… [t]hus, by its very nature, the application for an order or
inquiry must necessarily, be ex parte." This argument is insufficient
justification in light of the clear disinclination of Congress to allow the
issuance ex parte of bank inquiry orders under Section 11, in contrast to the
legislature's clear inclination to allow the ex parte grant of freeze orders
under Section 10.

Without doubt, a requirement that the application for a bank inquiry order
be done with notice to the account holder will alert the latter that there is a
plan to inspect his bank account on the belief that the funds therein are
involved in an unlawful activity or money laundering offense. [80] Still, the
account holder so alerted will in fact be unable to do anything to conceal or
cleanse his bank account records of suspicious or anomalous transactions,
at least not without the whole-hearted cooperation of the bank, which
inherently has no vested interest to aid the account holder in such manner.

V.

The necessary implication of this finding that Section 11 of the AMLA does
not generally authorize the issuance ex parte of the bank inquiry order
would be that such orders cannot be issued unless notice is given to the
owners of the account, allowing them the opportunity to contest the
issuance of the order. Without such a consequence, the legislated
distinction between ex parte proceedings under Section 10 and those which
are not ex parte under Section 11 would be lost and rendered useless.
There certainly is fertile ground to contest the issuance of an ex parte order.
Section 11 itself requires that it be established that "there is probable cause
that the deposits or investments are related to unlawful activities," and it
obviously is the court which stands as arbiter whether there is indeed such
probable cause. The process of inquiring into the existence of probable
cause would involve the function of determination reposed on the trial
court. Determination clearly implies a function of adjudication on the part
of the trial court, and not a mechanical application of a standard pre-
determination by some other body. The word "determination" implies
deliberation and is, in normal legal contemplation, equivalent to "the
decision of a court of justice."[81]

The court receiving the application for inquiry order cannot simply take the
AMLC's word that probable cause exists that the deposits or investments
are related to an unlawful activity. It will have to exercise its own
determinative function in order to be convinced of such fact. The account
holder would be certainly capable of contesting such probable cause if given
the opportunity to be apprised of the pending application to inquire into his
account; hence a notice requirement would not be an empty spectacle. It
may be so that the process of obtaining the inquiry order may become more
cumbersome or prolonged because of the notice requirement, yet we fail to
see any unreasonable burden cast by such circumstance. After all, as earlier
stated, requiring notice to the account holder should not, in any way,
compromise the integrity of the bank records subject of the inquiry which
remain in the possession and control of the bank.

Petitioner argues that a bank inquiry order necessitates a finding of

probable cause, a characteristic similar to a search warrant which is applied
to and heard ex parte. We have examined the supposed analogy between a
search warrant and a bank inquiry order yet we remain to be unconvinced
by petitioner.

The Constitution and the Rules of Court prescribe particular requirements

attaching to search warrants that are not imposed by the AMLA with
respect to bank inquiry orders. A constitutional warrant requires that the
judge personally examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce,[82] such examination being in the form of
searching questions and answers.[83] Those are impositions which the
legislative did not specifically prescribe as to the bank inquiry order under
the AMLA, and we cannot find sufficient legal basis to apply them to
Section 11 of the AMLA. Simply put, a bank inquiry order is not a search
warrant or warrant of arrest as it contemplates a direct object but not the
seizure of persons or property.

Even as the Constitution and the Rules of Court impose a high procedural
standard for the determination of probable cause for the issuance of search
warrants which Congress chose not to prescribe for the bank inquiry order
under the AMLA, Congress nonetheless disallowed ex parte applications for
the inquiry order. We can discern that in exchange for these procedural
standards normally applied to search warrants, Congress chose instead to
legislate a right to notice and a right to be heard characteristics of judicial
proceedings which are not ex parte. Absent any demonstrable
constitutional infirmity, there is no reason for us to dispute such legislative
policy choices.

VI.

The Court's construction of Section 11 of the AMLA is undoubtedly

influenced by right to privacy considerations. If sustained, petitioner's
argument that a bank account may be inspected by the government
following an ex parte proceeding about which the depositor would know
nothing would have significant implications on the right to privacy, a right
innately cherished by all notwithstanding the legally recognized exceptions
thereto. The notion that the government could be so empowered is cause
for concern of any individual who values the right to privacy which, after
all, embodies even the right to be "let alone," the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized people.[84]

One might assume that the constitutional dimension of the right to privacy,
as applied to bank deposits, warrants our present inquiry. We decline to do
so. Admittedly, that question has proved controversial in American
jurisprudence. Notably, the United States Supreme Court in U.S. v.
Miller[85] held that there was no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the
bank records of a depositor.[86] Moreover, the text of our Constitution has
not bothered with the triviality of allocating specific rights peculiar to bank
deposits.

However, sufficient for our purposes, we can assert there is a right to

privacy governing bank accounts in the Philippines, and that such right
finds application to the case at bar. The source of such right is statutory,
expressed as it is in R.A. No. 1405 otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Act
of 1955. The right to privacy is enshrined in Section 2 of that law, to wit:

SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking

institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the
Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential
nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the
depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court
in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where
the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
(Emphasis supplied)
Because of the Bank Secrecy Act, the confidentiality of bank deposits
remains a basic state policy in the Philippines.[87] Subsequent laws,
including the AMLA, may have added exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act,
yet the secrecy of bank deposits still lies as the general rule. It falls within
the zones of privacy recognized by our laws.[88] The framers of the 1987
Constitution likewise recognized that bank accounts are not covered by
either the right to information[89] under Section 7, Article III or under the
requirement of full public disclosure[90] under Section 28, Article II.
[91]
 Unless the Bank Secrecy Act is repealed or amended, the legal order is
obliged to conserve the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank
deposits.

Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically

legislated. Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions
whereby these bank accounts may be examined by "any person,
government official, bureau or office"; namely when: (1) upon written
permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the
examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases
of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and (4) the money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of
R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been
recognized by this Court as constituting an additional exception to the rule
of absolute confidentiality,[92] and there have been other similar
recognitions as well.[93]

The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section
11, the AMLC may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent
court in cases of violation of the AMLA, it having been established that
there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to
unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money
laundering offense under Section 4 thereof. Further, in instances where
there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to
kidnapping for ransom,[94] certain violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,[95] hijacking and other violations under R.A.
No. 6235, destructive arson and murder, then there is no need for the
AMLC to obtain a court order before it could inquire into such accounts.

It cannot be successfully argued the proceedings relating to the bank

inquiry order under Section 11 of the AMLA is a "litigation" encompassed in
one of the exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act which is when "the money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation." The orientation
of the bank inquiry order is simply to serve as a provisional relief or
remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such does not entail a full-
blown trial.

Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to

the Bank Secrecy Act it does not mean that the later law has dispensed with
the general principle established in the older law that "[a]ll deposits of
whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines x x x
are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature."[96] Indeed,
by force of statute, all bank deposits are absolutely confidential, and that
nature is unaltered even by the legislated exceptions referred to above.
There is disfavor towards construing these exceptions in such a manner
that would authorize unlimited discretion on the part of the government or
of any party seeking to enforce those exceptions and inquire into bank
deposits. If there are doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential nature
of bank deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into such
accounts, then such doubts must be resolved in favor of the former. Such a
stance would persist unless Congress passes a law reversing the general
state policy of preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine
bank accounts.

The presence of this statutory right to privacy addresses at least one of the
arguments raised by petitioner, that Lilia Cheng had no personality to assail
the inquiry orders before the Court of Appeals because she was not the
subject of said orders. AMLC Resolution No. 75, which served as the basis
in the successful application for the Makati inquiry order, expressly adverts
to Citibank Account No. 88576248 "owned by Cheng Yong and/or Lilia G.
Cheng with Citibank N.A.,"[97] whereas Lilia Cheng's petition before the
Court of Appeals is accompanied by a certification from Metrobank that
Account Nos. 300852436-0 and 700149801-7, both of which are among the
subjects of the Manila inquiry order, are accounts in the name of "Yong
Cheng or Lilia Cheng."[98] Petitioner does not specifically deny that Lilia
Cheng holds rights of ownership over the three said accounts, laying focus
instead on the fact that she was not named as a subject of either the Makati
or Manila RTC inquiry orders. We are reasonably convinced that Lilia
Cheng has sufficiently demonstrated her joint ownership of the three
accounts, and such conclusion leads us to acknowledge that she has the
standing to assail via certiorari the inquiry orders authorizing the
examination of her bank accounts as the orders interfere with her statutory
right to maintain the secrecy of said accounts.

While petitioner would premise that the inquiry into Lilia Cheng's accounts
finds root in Section 11 of the AMLA, it cannot be denied that the authority
to inquire under Section 11 is only exceptional in character, contrary as it is
to the general rule preserving the secrecy of bank deposits. Even though she
may not have been the subject of the inquiry orders, her bank accounts
nevertheless were, and she thus has the standing to vindicate the right to
secrecy that attaches to said accounts and their owners. This statutory right
to privacy will not prevent the courts from authorizing the inquiry anyway
upon the fulfillment of the requirements set forth under Section 11 of the
AMLA or Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act; at the same time, the owner of
the accounts have the right to challenge whether the requirements were
indeed complied with.

VII.

There is a final point of concern which needs to be addressed. Lilia Cheng

argues that the AMLA, being a substantive penal statute, has no retroactive
effect and the bank inquiry order could not apply to deposits or investments
opened prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 9164, or on 17 October 2001.
Thus, she concludes, her subject bank accounts, opened between 1989 to
1990, could not be the subject of the bank inquiry order lest there be a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

No ex post facto law may be enacted,[99] and no law may be construed in

such fashion as to permit a criminal prosecution offensive to the ex post
facto clause. As applied to the AMLA, it is plain that no person may be
prosecuted under the penal provisions of the AMLA for acts committed
prior to the enactment of the law on 17 October 2001. As much was
understood by the lawmakers since they deliberated upon the AMLA, and
indeed there is no serious dispute on that point.

Does the proscription against ex post facto laws apply to the interpretation

of Section 11, a provision which does not provide for a penal sanction but
which merely authorizes the inspection of suspect accounts and deposits?
The answer is in the affirmative. In this jurisdiction, we have defined an ex
post facto law as one which either:

(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was
innocent when done, and punishes such an act;

(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;

(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when committed;

(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offense;

(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was
lawful; and

(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which

he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. (Emphasis supplied)[100]
Prior to the enactment of the AMLA, the fact that bank accounts or deposits
were involved in activities later on enumerated in Section 3 of the law did
not, by itself, remove such accounts from the shelter of absolute
confidentiality. Prior to the AMLA, in order that bank accounts could be
examined, there was need to secure either the written permission of the
depositor or a court order authorizing such examination, assuming that
they were involved in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials, or in a case where the money deposited or invested was itself the
subject matter of the litigation. The passage of the AMLA stripped another
layer off the rule on absolute confidentiality that provided a measure of
lawful protection to the account holder. For that reason, the application of
the bank inquiry order as a means of inquiring into records of transactions
entered into prior to the passage of the AMLA would be constitutionally
infirm, offensive as it is to the ex post facto clause.

Still, we must note that the position submitted by Lilia Cheng is much
broader than what we are willing to affirm. She argues that the proscription
against ex post facto laws goes as far as to prohibit any inquiry into deposits
or investments included in bank accounts opened prior to the effectivity of
the AMLA even if the suspect transactions were entered into when the law
had already taken effect. The Court recognizes that if this argument were to
be affirmed, it would create a horrible loophole in the AMLA that would in
turn supply the means to fearlessly engage in money laundering in the
Philippines; all that the criminal has to do is to make sure that the money
laundering activity is facilitated through a bank account opened prior to
2001. Lilia Cheng admits that "actual money launderers could utilize the ex
post facto provision of the Constitution as a shield" but that the remedy lay
with Congress to amend the law. We can hardly presume that Congress
intended to enact a self-defeating law in the first place, and the courts are
inhibited from such a construction by the cardinal rule that "a law should
be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying it." [101]

Besides, nowhere in the legislative record cited by Lilia Cheng does it

appear that there was an unequivocal intent to exempt from the bank
inquiry order all bank accounts opened prior to the passage of the AMLA.
There is a cited exchange between Representatives Ronaldo Zamora and
Jaime Lopez where the latter confirmed to the former that "deposits are
supposed to be exempted from scrutiny or monitoring if they are already in
place as of the time the law is enacted."[102] That statement does indicate
that transactions already in place when the AMLA was passed are indeed
exempt from scrutiny through a bank inquiry order, but it cannot yield any
interpretation that records of transactions undertaken after the enactment
of the AMLA are similarly exempt. Due to the absence of cited authority
from the legislative record that unqualifiedly supports respondent Lilia
Cheng's thesis, there is no cause for us to sustain her interpretation of the
AMLA, fatal as it is to the anima of that law.

IX.
We are well aware that Lilia Cheng's petition presently pending before the
Court of Appeals likewise assails the validity of the subject bank inquiry
orders and precisely seeks the annulment of said orders. Our current
declarations may indeed have the effect of preempting that0 petition. Still,
in order for this Court to rule on the petition at bar which insists on the
enforceability of the said bank inquiry orders, it is necessary for us to
consider and rule on the same question which after all is a pure question of
law.

WHEREFORE, the PETITION is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to

costs.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Carpio-

Morales, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

*
 As replacement of Justice Antonio T. Carpio who inhibited himself per
Administrative Circular No. 84-2007.
[1]
 Entitled "In the Matter of the Application for An Order Allowing An
Inquiry Into Certain Bank Accounts or Investments and Related Web of
Accounts, The Republic of the Philippines Represented by the Anti-Money
Laundering Council, Applicant."
[2]
 Entitled "Lilia Cheng v. Republic of the Philippines represented by the
Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), Hon. Antonio M. Eugenio, As
Presiding Judge of the RTC Manila, Br. 24; Hon. Sixto Marella, Jr., as
Presiding Judge of RTC, Makati City, Br. 38; and John Does."
[3]
 G.R. No. 155001.
[4]
 Rollo, p. 96.
[5]
 Id. at 97.
[6]
 Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:

(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit

in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such
license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or
dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.
[7]
 Rollo, p. 98.
[8]
 Id. at 96-100.
[9]
 Id. at 99-100.
[10]
 Id. at 98.
[11]
 Id.
[12]
 Id. at 99.
[13]
 Id. at 101.
[14]
 Id.
[15]
 Id.
[16]
 Id. at 27.
[17]
 Id. at 104.
[18]
 Id.
[19]
 Id. at 105-107.
[20]
 Id. at 106.
[21]
 See id. at 109-110.
[22]
 Id. at 109.
[23]
 Id. at 111.
[24]
 Id. at 111-117.
[25]
 Id. at 111.
[26]
 Id. at 118.
[27]
 Id. at 119-130.
[28]
 Id. at 131-141.
[29]
 Id. at 142-147.
[30]
 Id. at 146.
[31]
 Id. at 148-149.
[32]
 Id. at 150.
[33]
 Id. at 151-158.
[34]
 Id. at 167.
[35]
 Id. at 168-169.
[36]
 Id. at 171.
[37]
 Id. at 172-173.
[38]
 Id. at 174-175.
[39]
 Id. at 174.
[40]
 Id. at 175.
[41]
 Id. at 68-69.
[42]
 Id. at 69.
[43]
 Id.
[44]
 Id. at 176-186.
[45]
 Id. at 187-249.
[46]
 Id. at 189.
[47]
 Id. at 200-201.
[48]
 Id. at 73-77.
[49]
 Id. at 78.
[50]
 Order dated 15 August 2006, see id. at 71.
[51]
 Id. at 285-287.
[52]
 Id. at 285-286.
[53]
 Id. at 286.
[54]
 Id. at 71.
[55]
 Id. at 6-65.
[56]
 Id. at 299-304.
[57]
 See id. at 310.
[58]
 Id. at 302.
[59]
 Id. at 297-298.
[60]
 Id. at 312-313.
[61]
 Id. at 549-551.
[62]
 Id. at 752-753.
[63]
 See rollo, pp. 786-828; 867-910; 913-936.
[64]
 See Funds derived from criminal activities (FOPAC),
([Link]
FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/[Link], last visited 8 December
2007). See also J.M.B. TIROL, THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LAW
OF THE PHILIPPINES Annotated (2nd ed., 2007), at 3.
[65]
 TIROL, supra note 64, at 4-6. The Financial Action Task Force was
established in 1989 by the so-called Group of 7 countries to formulate and
encourage the adoption of international standards and measures to fight
money laundering and related activities. Id. at 28.
[66]
 Republic Act No. 9160 (2002), Sec. 4.
[67]
 Republic Act No. 9160 (2002), Secs. 7(3) and (4).
[68]
 See rollo, pp. 809-810, 932.
[69]
 Id. at 600-601.
[70]
 Republic Act No. 9194 (2003), Sec. 11.
[71]
 Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
[72]
 Particularly Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 thereof.
[73]
 Republic Act No. 9194 (2003), Sec. 10.
[74]
 Unlike in the present law which authorizes the issuance without need of
judicial order when there is probable cause that the deposits are involved in
such specifically enumerated crimes as kidnapping, hijacking, destructive
arson and murder, and violations of some provisions of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002. See Sec. 11, R.A. No. 9194, in connection with Section
3(i).
[75]
 "Rule 10.1. When the AMLC may apply for the freezing of any monetary
instrument or property.

(a) after an investigation conducted by the AMLC and upon determination

that probable cause exists that a monetary instrument or property is in any
way related to any unlawful activity as defined under section 3(i). The
AMLC may file an ex-parte application before the the Court of Appeals for
the issuance of a freeze order on any monetary instrument or property
subject thereof prior to the institution or in the course of, the criminal
proceedings involving the unlawful activity to which said monetary
instrument or property is any way related." Rule 10.1, Revised
Implementing Rules And Regulations R.A. No. 9160, As Amended By R.A.
No. 9194. (Emphasis supplied)
[76]
 See Rule 11.1, Revised Implementing Rules And Regulations R.A. No.
9160, As Amended By R.A. No. 9194. "Rule 11.1. Authority to Inquire into
Bank Deposits With Court Order. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1405, as amended; Republic Act No. 6426, as amended;
Republic Act No. 8791, and other laws, the AMLC may inquire into or
examine any particular deposit or investment with any banking institution
or non-bank financial institution AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES AND
AFFILIATES upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of this
Act, when it has been established that there is probable cause that the
deposits or investments involved are related to an unlawful activity as
defined in Section 3(j) hereof or a money laundering offense under Section
4 hereof; except in cases as provided under Rule 11.2."
[77]
 Republic Act No. 9160 (See Section 18, AMLA).
[78]
 Effective 15 December 2005.
[79]
 See Title VIII, Sec. 44, Rule Of Procedure In Cases Of Civil Forfeiture,
Asset Preservation, And Freezing Of Monetary Instrument, Property, Or
Proceeds Representing, Involving, Or Relating To An Unlawful Activity Or
Money Laundering Offense Under Republic Act No. 9160, As Amended.
[80]
 Republic Act No. 9160 (2002), Sec. 11.
[81]
 See J. Tinga, Concurring and Dissenting, Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No.
164007, 10 August 2006, 498 SCRA 445, 501; citing 12 Words and Phrases
(1954 ed.), p. 478-479 and 1 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed.,
1914), p. 858.
[82]
 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 2.
[83]
 2000 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 126, Sec. 5.
[84]
 Perhaps the prophecy of Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v.
U.S., 227 U.S. 438, 473 (1928), has come to pass: "[T]ime works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and purposes." Subtler and more far-
reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the
Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the
Government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to
obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet…Moreover, "in
the application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what
has, been but of what may be." The progress of science in furnishing the
Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping.
Ways may someday be developed by which the Government, without
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by
which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of
the home." Id. at 473-474.
[85]
 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
[86]
 "Even if we direct our attention to the original checks and deposit slips,
rather than to the microfilm copies actually viewed and obtained by means
of the subpoena, we perceive no legitimate "expectation of privacy" in their
contents. The checks are not confidential communications but negotiable
instruments to be used in commercial transactions. All of the documents
obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips, contain only
information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their
employees in the ordinary course of business. The lack of any legitimate
expectation of privacy concerning the information kept in bank records was
assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy Act, the expressed
purpose of which is to require records to be maintained because they "have
a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations
and proceedings." Ibid. The passage by the U.S. Congress in 1978 of the
Right to Financial Privacy Act was essentially in reaction to
the Miller ruling. Tirol, supra note 64, at 155.
[87]
 See TIROL, supra note 64, citing GABRIEL SINGSON, LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE ON SECRECY OF BANK DEPOSITS, 46 Ateneo Law
Journal 670, 682.
[88]
 See Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948 (1998).
[89]
 "The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
[90]
 "Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest."
[91]
 Chavez v. PCGG, 360 Phil. 133, 161, citing V Record of the Constitutional
Commission 25 (1986).
[92]
 See Phil. National Bank v. Gancayco, et al., 122 Phil. 503, 506-507
(1965).
[93]
 Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 6770, or the Ombudsman Act of 1989
empowers the Ombudsman to "[a]dminister oaths, issue subpoena and
subpoena duces tecum and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry,
including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and
records." See Sec. 8, Rep. Act No. 6770 (1989). In Marquez v. Hon.
Desierto, 412 Phil. 387 (2001), the Court, interpreted this provision in line
with the "absolutely confidential" nature of bank deposits under the Bank
Secrecy Act, infra, and mandated: "there must be a pending case before a
court of competent jurisdiction[;] the account must be clearly identified,
the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the
court of competent jurisdiction[;] the bank personnel and the account
holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such
inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case." Id. at
397. With respect to the Ombudsman's power of inquiry into bank
deposits, Marquez remains good law. See Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
Nos. 157294-95, 30 November 2006, 509 SCRA 190, 224 and 226.
[94]
 Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
[95]
 Particularly Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 thereof.
[96]
 Republic Act No. 1405 (1955), Sec. 2.
[97]
 Rollo, p. 98.
[98]
 A copy of such certification was attached to Cheng's Comment as Annex
"2". See id. at 421.
[99]
 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 22.
[100]
 In the Matter of the Petition for the Declaration of the Petitioner's
Rights and Duties under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132, 146 Phil. 429, 431-432
(1970). See also Tan v. Barrios, G.R. Nos. 85481-82, 18 October 1990, 703.
[101]
 Interpretate fienda est ut res valeat quam pereat.
[102]
 Rollo, p. 818, citing House Committee Deliberations on 26 September
2001.

Week 4G.R. No. 181111, August 17, 2015 - JACKSON PADIERNOS Y QUEJADA, JACKIE
ROXAS Y GERMAN AND ROLANDO MESINA Y JAVATE, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.:

G.R. No. 181111, August 17, 2015 - JACKSON PADIERNOS Y QUEJADA, JACKIE ROXAS
Y GERMAN AND ROLANDO MESINA Y JAVATE, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 180969, September 11, 2017 - NOEL NAVAJA, Petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL A.
DE CASTRO OR HIS SUCCESSOR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF JAGNA & GARCIA-HERNANDEZ, JAGNA, BOHOL,
AND ATTY. EDGAR BORJE, Respondents.:

G.R. No. 180969, September 11, 2017 - NOEL NAVAJA, Petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL A.
DE CASTRO OR HIS SUCCESSOR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF JAGNA & GARCIA-HERNANDEZ, JAGNA, BOHOL,
AND ATTY. EDGAR BORJE, Respondents.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 180969*, September 11, 2017

NOEL NAVAJA, Petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO OR HIS SUCCESSOR,

IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT OF JAGNA & GARCIA-HERNANDEZ, JAGNA, BOHOL, AND ATTY. EDGAR
BORJE, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 26, 2007
and the Resolution3 dated November 12, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR.
SP. No. 02354, which affirmed the Order4 dated September 21, 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50 (RTC) in Sp. Civil Action No. 0357, and
accordingly, sustained the denial of petitioner Noel Navaja's (petitioner) motion to
quash filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jagna & Garcia-Hernandez, Jagna,
Bohol (MCTC-Jagna).

The Facts

The instant case is an offshoot of a preliminary investigation proceeding initiated by

DKT Philippines, Inc. (DKT) before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bohol (OPP-
Bohol) in Tagbilaran City, charging its then-Regional Sales Manager for Visayas, Ana
Lou B. Navaja (Ana Navaja), of the crime of falsification of a Private Document,
docketed as I.S. Case No. 04-1238.5 In the course of the said proceeding, a certain Ms.
Marilyn Magsigay (Ms. Magsigay), a material witness for DKT, was subpoenaed to
appear in a hearing before the OPP-Bohol on March 15, 2004 in order to shed light on
the official receipt allegedly falsified by Ana Navaja. 6 On March 9, 2004, petitioner, who
is Ana Navaja's husband, allegedly went to Ms. Magsigay's workplace in Garden Cafe,
Jagna, Bohol, and told her that as per instruction from Ana Navaja's lawyer, Atty.
Orwen Bonghanoy (Atty. Bonghanoy), her attendance in the scheduled hearing is no
longer needed (March 9, 2004 incident).7 Thus, Ms. Magsigay no longer attended the
scheduled March 15, 2004 hearing where petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy presented an
affidavit purportedly executed by Ms. Magsigay and notarized by a certain Atty. Rolando
Grapa (Atty. Grapa) in Cebu City, supporting Ana Navaja's counter-affidavit (March 15,
2004 incident).8 Resultantly, I.S. Case No. 04-1238 was dismissed.9

Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Edgar Borje (Atty. Borje), DKT's counsel, found out from
Ms. Magsigay herself that: (a) she would have attended the scheduled March 15, 2004
hearing were it not for the misrepresentation of petitioner that her presence therein
was no longer required; (b) she was merely told by her superior in Garden Cafe to sign
the affidavit and that she did not personally prepare the same; and (c) she could not
have gone to Cebu to have it notarized before Atty. Grapa as she was at work on that
day.10 This prompted Atty. Borje to file the following criminal complaints before the
OPP-Bohol and the City Prosecution Office of Tagbilaran City: the first one, 11 charging
petitioner of Obstruction of Justice, specifically, for violation of Section 1 (a) of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 182912 in connection with the March 9, 2004 incident; and
the second one,13 charging petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy of Obstruction of Justice as
well, specifically, for violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law in connection with the
March 15, 2004 incident.14 After due proceedings, separate Informations were filed. The
case relating to the March 9, 2004 incident was filed before the MCTC-Jagna, 15 while
that relating to the March 15, 2004 incident was filed before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities of Tagbilaran City, Bohol (MTCC-Tagbilaran). 16

Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash Information (Motion to

Quash)17 before the MCTC-Jagna, principally arguing that the charge of violation of
Section 1 (a) of PD 1829 pending before it should have been absorbed by the charge of
violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law pending before the MTCC-Tagbilaran,
considering that: (a) the case pending before the latter court was filed first; (b) the
criminal cases filed before the MCTC-Jagna and MTCC-Tagbilaran arose from a single
preliminary investigation proceeding, involving the same set of facts and circumstances,
and flowed from a single alleged criminal intent, which is to obstruct the investigation
of I.S. Case No. 04-1238; and (c) to allow separate prosecutions of the foregoing cases
would be tantamount to a violation of his right to double jeopardy. 18

The MCTC-Jagna Ruling

In an Order19 dated November 2, 2005, the MCTC-Jagna denied petitioner's Motion to

Quash. It held that petitioner had no right to invoke the processes of the court, since at
the time he filed said motion, the MCTC-Jagna has yet to acquire jurisdiction over his
person.

On reconsideration, the MCTC-Jagna issued a Resolution 20 dated January 24, 2006

upholding the denial of the Motion to Quash. It ruled that in the criminal case before it,
petitioner is being charged with violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829, an offense
separate and distinct from violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law, which is pending
before the MTCC-Tagbilaran. As such, said offenses may be prosecuted independently
from each other.21

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated22 his case to the RTC.

The RTC Ruling

In an Order23 dated September 21, 2006, the RTC denied the petition, thereby,
affirming the MCTC-Jagna Ruling. It held that the criminal cases pending before the
MCTC-Jagna for violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829 and MTCC-Tagbilaran for violation
of Section 1 (f) of the same law are two (2) separate offenses, considering that: (a) the
case in MCTC-Jagna has only one (1) accused, i.e., petitioner, while the one pending
before the MTCC-Tagbilaran has two (2), i.e., petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy; and (b)
the places of commission are different, as the March 9, 2004 incident happened in
Jagna, Bohol, while the March 15, 2004 incident occurred in Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
Further, the RTC opined that while both offenses arose from substantially the same set
of facts, each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of
the other.24

Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the CA.25

The CA Ruling

In a Decision26 dated June 26, 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC Ruling. It held that
petitioner allegedly committed several acts which constitute violations of different
provisions of PD 1829, namely: (a) the March 9, 2004 incident where he prevented Ms.
Magsigay from attending the scheduled hearing in I.S. Case No. 04-1238 by means of
deceit and misrepresentation, which is a violation of Section 1 (a) of the law; and (b)
the March 15, 2004 incident where he, along with Atty. Bonghanoy, submitted a
purported spurious affidavit of Ms. Magsigay in the scheduled hearing in I.S. Case No.
04-1238, which is a violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law. Moreover, the CA pointed
out that the foregoing acts were committed in distinct places and locations. As such,
there is more than enough basis to try petitioner for two (2) separate crimes under two
(2) distinct Informations.27

Unperturbed, petitioner moved for reconsideration, 28 which was, however, denied in a

Resolution29 dated November 12, 2007; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that
petitioner may be separately tried for different acts constituting violations of PD 1829,
namely, violations of Sections 1 (a) and (f) of the same law allegedly committed during
the pendency of a single proceeding.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Section 1 of PD 1829 defines and penalizes the acts constituting the crime of
obstruction of justice, the pertinent portions of which read:
Sec. 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging
from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly
or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and
the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following
acts:

(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the
commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery,
misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats;
xxxx  
(f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of
its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or
official proceedings in, criminal cases;
xxxx
The elements of the crime are: (a) that the accused committed any of the acts listed
under Section 1 of PD 1829; and (b) that such commission was done for the purpose of
obstructing, impeding, frustrating, or delaying the successful investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases.30

In this case, two (2) separate Informations were filed against petitioner, namely: (a) an
Information dated September 22, 2004 charging him of violation of Section 1 (a) of PD
1829 before the MCTC-Jagna for allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and
testifying in a preliminary investigation hearing; 31 and (b) an Information dated August
27, 2004 charging him of violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law before the MTCC-
Tagbilaran for allegedly presenting a false affidavit. 32 While the Informations pertain to
acts that were done days apart and in different locations, the Court holds that petitioner
should only be charged and held liable for a single violation of PD 1829. This is because
the alleged acts, albeit separate, were motivated by a single criminal impulse - that is,
to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-
1238, which was, in fact, eventually dismissed by the OPP-Bohol. 33 The foregoing
conclusion is premised on the principle of delito continuado, which envisages a single
crime committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or
resolution.34 In Santiago v. Garchitorena,35 the Court explained the principle of delito
continuado as follows:
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of
acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and
unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of
the same penal provisions are united in one and the same intent or resolution
leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (II Derecho
Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed).

Accordingly to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several

crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the
perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal
Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).

Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal
intent or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).

xxxx

The concept of delito continuado although an outcrop of the Spanish Penal

Code, has been applied to crimes penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of
[Republic Act] No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following
up claims for war veteran's benefits x x x.

Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special
laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from
the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished
under special laws.36 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In ruling that the acts imputed to petitioner are deemed separate crimes and thus, may
be tried separately, the CA cited the case of Regis v. People (Regis),37 wherein it was
held that the malversation committed through falsification of document performed on
different dates constitute independent offenses which must be punished
separately.38 However, a closer perusal of Regis shows that its factual milieu is not on
all fours with the instant case. In Regis, the accused, then municipal treasurer of
Pinamungahan, Cebu, signed payrolls on two (2) different dates, i.e., April 30, 1931
and May 2, 1931, making it appear that certain workers worked as laborers in a
municipal project when in truth, there were no such workers and that he and his co-
accused misappropriated the payroll amounts to themselves. The Court ruled that the
accused may be held liable for two (2) separate crimes, considering that when the
accused committed the first act constituting malversation committed through
falsification of document, it did not appear that he was already predisposed to
committing the second act constituting the same crime. 39 Clearly, when the accused
in Regis falsified the payroll of April 30, 1931, and later, the payroll of May 2, 1931, he
-though committing similar acts - could not be said to have been motivated by a single
criminal impulse as he was working towards discernibly distinct criminal objectives.

In contrast, petitioner's acts of allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and
testifying in a preliminary investigation proceeding and offering in evidence a false
affidavit were clearly motivated by a single criminal impulse in order to realize only one
criminal objective, which is to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation
proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238. Thus, applying the principle of delito continuado,
petitioner should only be charged with one (1) count of violation of PD 1829 which may
be filed either in Jagna, Bohol where Ms. Magsigay was allegedly prevented from
appearing and testifying in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, or in Tagbilaran City, Bohol where
petitioner allegedly presented a false affidavit in the same case. 40 However, since he
was already charged - and in fact, convicted in a Judgment 41 dated July 3, 2007 - in the
MTCC-Tagbilaran, the case in MCTC-Jagna should be dismissed as the events that
transpired in Jagna, Bohol should only be deemed as a partial execution of petitioner's
single criminal design. The Court's pronouncement in Gamboa v. CA42 is instructive on
this matter, to wit:
Apart and isolated from this plurality of crimes (ideal or real) is what is known as
"delito continuado'" or "continuous crime." This is a single crime consisting of a series of
acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division. For
Cuello Calon, when the actor, there being unity of purpose and of right violated,
commits diverse acts, each of which, although of a delictual character,
merely constitutes a partial execution of a single particular delict, such concurrence or
delictual acts is called a "delito continuado." In order that it may exist, there should be
"plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision
infringed upon or violated and unity of criminal intent and purpose, which means that
two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same
intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim."43
Consequently, the criminal case in MCTC-Jagna must be dismissed; otherwise,
petitioner will be unduly exposed to double jeopardy, which the Court cannot
countenance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 26, 2007 and the
Resolution dated November 12, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP. No. 02354
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Criminal Case No. 2878 pending
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jagna & Garcia-Hernandez, Jagna, Bohol
is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Cario,**Acting C. J., (Chairperson), Peralta, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

*
 Part of the Supreme Court's Case Decongestion Program.

**
 Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2479 dated August 31, 2017.

1
Rollo, pp. 12-44.

2
 Id. at 49-59. Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos with Associate Justices
Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring.

3
 Id. at 62.

4
 Id. at 64-66. Penned by Executive Presiding Judge Dionisio R. Calibo, Jr.

5
 See id. at 68 and 70.

6
 See id. at 70.

7
 Id.

8
 See id. at 251 -252 and 259-260.

9
 See id. at 70 and 252.

10
 Id. at 252.

11
 See Complaint-Affidavit dated June 24, 2004; id. at 73-78.
12
 Entitled "PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS" (January 16, 1981).

13
 See Complaint Affidavit dated June 24, 2004; rollo, pp. 91-94.

14
 See id. at 50.

15
 See Information in Crim. Case No. 2878 dated September 22, 2004; id. at 68.

16
 See Information in Crim. Case No. 15942 dated August 27, 2004; id. at 246-247.

17
 Dated August 3, 2005. Id. at 104-116.

18
 See id. at 107-112.

19
 Id. at 136. Penned by Presiding Judge Manuel A. De Castro.

20
 Id. at 137-138.

21
 Id. at 138.

22
 See petition for certiorari dated February 15, 2006; id. at 117-132.

23
 Id. at 64-66.

24
 Id. at 65-66.

25
 See Memorandum [For Petitioner-Appellant] dated January 31, 2007; id. at 211 -229.

26
 Id. at 49-59.

27
 See id. at 53-57.

28
 See motion for reconsideration dated July 20, 2007; id. at 230-244.
29
 Id. at 62.

30
 See Padiernos v. People, G.R. No. 181111, August 17, 2015, 766 SCRA 614, 628-
629.

31
 See rollo, p. 68.

32
 See id. at 246-247.

33
 See id. at 70.

34
Paera v. People, 664 Phil. 630, 636-637 (2011).

35
 G.R. No. 109266, December 2, 1993, 228 SCRA 214, 224.
36
 Id. at 223-225; citation omitted.

37
 67 Phil. 43(1938).

38
 See id. at 46-48.

39
 See id. at 47.

40
 See Section 15, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

41
Rollo, pp. 248-264. Penned by Judge Emma Eronico-Supremo.

42
 160-A Phil. 962 (1975).

43
 Id. at 969.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 141710. March 3, 2004

EVELYN V. RODRIGUEZ, AND ANDRES ABONITA, JR., Petitioners, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, AND

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

The January 17, 2000 three separate Orders of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioners
motion to quash the second amended information,1 denying the motion to defer
arraignment,2 and entering a plea of not guilty for petitioners in light of their refusal to
plead to the information,3 are assailed in the present petition for certiorari.

The antecedents of the case are as follows:

On September 24, 1996, acting upon an information that rampant illegal logging activities
have been going on in different areas of Taytay, Palawan, a joint team composed of the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO), the Philippine National Police (PNP) Tiniguiban
Command, the Bantay Palawan, and the Philippine Marines confiscated freshly
cut/processed ipil lumber at Sitio Maypa, Barangay Pancol, Taytay. The cutting and sawing
of the lumber, which were alleged to have been done under the supervision of Pancol
Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego upon orders of herein petitioner Mayor Evelyn
Rodriguez and Association of Barangay Captains President Roberto Rodriguez, were without
proper permit or license.

Due to the unavailability of trucks to haul all the lumber to Puerto Princesa for safekeeping,
some were hauled inside the Rural Agriculture Center (RAC) Compound of Taytay and left
under the custody of 2nd Lt. Ernan Libao.
 On September 25, 1997, Barangay Captain Rodriguez appeared at the RAC Compound
demanding the release of the lumber by presenting a letter-request addressed to the
CENRO to salvage old cut timber, duly indorsed by Mayor Rodriguez. As the request did not
bear the approval of the CENRO, it was denied.

On October 5, 1997, Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego and the other herein
petitioner, Igang Barangay Captain Andres Abonita, Jr., went to the RAC Compound upon
orders of Mayor Rodriguez to haul the lumber to the Municipal Hall, but the officer-in-
charge refused to release the same without the advice of EIIB authorities. On even date,
acting upon the orders of Mayor Rodriguez, Barangay Captain Abonita returned to the RAC
Compound accompanied by two fully armed policemen who then and there forcibly took
possession, hauled, and transferred the lumber to the Municipal Hall of Taytay.

On November 7, 1996, Enrique A. Cuyos, Sr. of the EIIB, Region IV-A, Palawan filed
complaints for robbery4 and violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No. 1829 5 (Decree Penalizing
Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders) against petitioners
Mayor Rodriguez and Barangay Captain Abonita before the Provincial Prosecution Office of
Palawan.

By Resolution6 of February 18, 1997, the Deputized Ombudsman Investigator recommended

the filing of an information against petitioners for violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No.
1829,7 and the forwarding of the records of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman-Luzon
for review and further proceedings, petitioner Mayor Rodriguez being a public officer and
the charge against her being work-connected.

Following its review of the case, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Luzon, by a Joint
Review Action8 of October 19, 1998, resolved to, as it did file an information 9 for violation of
Section 1(b) P.D. 1829 on December 8, 1998 against petitioners before the Sandiganbayan,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 25065.

A warrant of arrest10 was accordingly issued against petitioners on December 14, 1998.

Before the 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner Mayor Rodriguez voluntarily
surrendered and posted a cash bond on January 4, 1999, 11 as did Barangay Captain Abonita
on January 29, 1999.12

On January 27, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment, 13 they having filed on
even date a Motion to Quash14. By Order15 of January 29, 1999, the Sandiganbayan reset the
arraignment to February 26, 1999.

During the scheduled arraignment on February 26, 1999, the special prosecutor moved to
defer the arraignment as recommended changes in the information were not yet acted upon
by the Ombudsman. Without objection from petitioners counsel, the arraignment was
reset16 to April 8, 1999.

In the meantime, the special prosecutor filed on April 6, 1999 an opposition 17 to petitioners
Motion to Quash.

Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan, acting upon a Motion to Admit Information 18 which was
filed by the special prosecutor, admitted the amended information by Order 19 of April 8,
1999.

Petitioners filed on April 26, 1999 a Motion to Quash 20 the amended information, to which
motion the special prosecutor filed a comment/opposition 21 on June 9, 1999, explaining
that the belated filing thereof was due to the transfer of the records of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor to its new office at the Sandiganbayan Centennial Building in Quezon
City.
 Thereafter or on June 28, 1999, the special prosecutor filed another Ex-parte Motion to
Admit Amended Information22 which was set for hearing on November 25, 1999. The
scheduled hearing on November 25, 1999 was, however, cancelled and reset 23 to December
3, 1999 upon urgent motion by petitioners counsel upon the ground that on said date, he
needed to appear before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong.

By Order24 of December 3, 1999, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion to admit amended
information, denied the motion to quash the amended information, and ordered the
arraignment of petitioners on January 17, 2000.

On January 14, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss 25 the second amended
information.

During the scheduled arraignment of petitioners on January 17, 2000, the Sandiganbayan
issued in open court the assailed separate orders denying petitioners motion to quash the
second amended information,26 denying the motion to defer arraignment,27 and entering a
plea of not guilty for both accused28 herein Petitioners, which orders petitioners allege have
been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioners argue that the pendency of the preliminary investigation of the case which
dragged for almost three years is unreasonable or unjustifiable and violates their
constitutional rights as accused to due process, 29 they citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan.30 They
add that the repeated and ex-parte amendment of the information by the Ombudsman
resulted to inordinate delay in bringing the case to trial, which is a ground for dismissal of
the information under Section 13, in relation to Section 7 of R.A. 8493 (The Speedy Trial Act
of 1998).31

Petitioners likewise argue that the simultaneous filing by the Ombudsman of two
informations against them, one before the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case No. 25065), and
the other before the Regional Trial Court in Puerto Princesa City (Criminal Case No. 14959),
involving the same subject matter constitutes forum shopping which is expressly prohibited
under the Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 28-91 directing the summary dismissal of
multiple complaints or charges, and necessarily places both of them in double danger of
conviction and punishment for the same offense.32

Petitioners additionally question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, they arguing that
they are not tasked with the enforcement and implementation of P.D. No. 705 (REVISED
FORESTRY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES) as neither of them are law enforcement officers or
prosecutors but are mere executive officials of their respective local government units with
entirely different official functions and, as such, the accusation against them is not in
relation to their office.33 Petitioners thus conclude that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, as Section 4 of R.A. 8249 limits the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to those offenses defined and penalized in Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code. 34

The petition fails.

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan35 cited by petitioners has a different factual setting from the

present case. The cases against Tatad remained dormant for almost three years, drawing
this Court to dismiss them in light of the following observations: political motivation played
a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process; there was a blatant
departure from established procedures prescribed by law for the conduct of a preliminary
investigation; and the long delay in resolving the preliminary investigation could not be
justified on the basis of the record.36
From the records of the case at bar, it is gathered that the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan
took only three months, from November 7, 1996 to February 18, 1997, to come up with its
resolution finding probable cause against petitioners. The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
took eight months to review the case and come up with the joint review action on October
19, 1998. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman acted on the case for around two
months. Considering that the records were passed upon by three offices, the period of
preliminary investigation, which did not exceed two years, cannot be deemed to have
violated petitioners constitutionally guaranteed rights to procedural due process and to a
speedy disposition of cases.

As Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan37 instructs:

The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated
only when the proceedings [are] attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;
or when the unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. In the determination of whether or not the right has been
violated, the factors that maybe considered and balanced are: the length of the delay, the
reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the
prejudice caused by the delay.

A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In
the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases,
particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 38

Parenthetically, as reflected in the following observation of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners

themselves contributed to the delay, thus:

With respect to the alleged delay of the filing of the Information and for the delay in finally
getting the case ready for arraignment, Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero has stated that, to a
certain extent, the claim is valid although the delay is caused not unreasonably but because
of the exercise of the right of the  accused to determine whether or not they could be
charged under the Information for which they have filed Motions to Quash; thus, the delay
cannot be considered unreasonable nor the grounds for setting aside the amended
Information as it now stands.39 (Underscoring supplied)

The rule is well settled that the right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delay.40

In further pressing for the dismissal of the case, petitioners cite Sections 7 41 and 1342 of
R.A. 8493, averring that the unreasonable delay in bringing them to arraignment is a
ground for the dismissal of the case, they having been arraigned only on January 17, 2000,
after several and repeated amendments of the information.

The records show, however, that it was on account of petitioners continuous filing of
motions that the arraignment was deferred.

Under Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, Implementing Rules for R.A.8493, the
pendency of petitioners motion to quash takes the case out from the time limit for
arraignment (and pre-trial) provided under Section 2 of said law.

Sec. 2. Time Limit for Arraignment and Pre-trial. - The arraignment, and the pre-trial if the
accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, shall be held within thirty (30) days from
the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The period of the
 pendency of a motion to quash, or for a bill of particulars, or other cause justifying
suspension of arraignment shall be excluded. (Underscoring supplied)

On the claim of petitioners that the Sandiganbayan should be faulted for granting the
repeated amendments of the information by the Ombudsman, suffice it to state that an
information may be amended in form or in substance without leave of court at any time
before an accused enters his plea.43

In another attempt at having the case dismissed, petitioners aver that the Ombudsman
committed forum shopping by filing the same information before the Sandiganbayan and
the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan in violation of Supreme Court Circular
No. 28-91 (Additional Requisites for Petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals to Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of Petitions and Complaints).

Assuming arguendo that indeed the same information for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D.
1829 was also filed before the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, then as the
People by the Office of the Ombudsman through the Special Prosecutor contends in its
Memorandum, since the Information in Criminal Case No. 25065 was filed with the
Sandiganbayan on December 8, 1988, while the information before the regional Trial Court
was allegedly filed on February 24, 1999, then, if there is any case to be dismissed for
forum shopping, that case should be the one before the Regional trial Court, as it was the
second action filed.44

Petitioners further assail the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan over the offense for which they
were indicted.

Lamentably, petitioners may well have been confused regarding the charge against them
for instead of showing that the offense with which they were charged - violation of Section
1(b) of P.D. 1829 (obstruction of justice) - is not in relation to their office, they argued that
they are not tasked with the enforcement and implementation of P.D. No. 705 the offense
subject of the investigation which petitioners allegedly obstructed or interfered with.

Petitioners are charged not for violation of P.D. 705 but of P.D. 1829, hence, petitioners
argument that the act complained of was not done in relation to their office to take the case
out of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan does not lie.

At all events, Republic Act 8249, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides
that as long as one (or more) of the accused is an official of the executive branch occupying
position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989,45 the Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over
offenses or felonies committed by public officials whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees in relation to their
office.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

For purposes of vesting jurisdiction with the Sandiganbayan, the crux of the issue is
whether petitioner Mayor Rodriguez, who holds a position of Grade 27 under the Local
Government Code of 199147, committed the offense charged in relation to her office.

In Montilla v. Hilario48, this Court laid down the principle that for an offense to be
committed in relation to the office, the relation between the crime and the office must be
direct and not accidental, in that in the legal sense, the offense can not exist without the
office.49

As an exception to Montilla, this Court, in People v. Montejo,50  held that although public
office is not an element of an offense charged, as long as the offense charged in the
information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated
 while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official
functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused would
not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, 51 the accused is held to have
been indicted for an offense committed in relation to his office.

Applying the exception laid down in Montejo,  this Court in Cunanan v. Arceo,52 held that
although public office is not an element of the crime of murder as it may be committed by
any person, whether a public officer or a private citizen, the circumstances under which the
therein petitioner, who was a member of the Philippine National Police, shot and killed the
victim in the course of trying to restore local public order, bring the therein petitioners case
squarely within the meaning of an offense committed in relation to the [accuseds] public
office.53

In the present case, public office is not an essential element of the offense of obstruction of
justice under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. The circumstances surrounding the commission of
the offense alleged to have been committed by petitioner Rodriguez are such, however, that
the offense may not have been committed had said petitioner not held the office of the
mayor. As found during the preliminary investigation, petitioner Rodriguez, in the course of
her duty as Mayor, who is tasked to exercise general and operational control and
supervision over the local police forces54, used her influence, authority and office to call and
command members of the municipal police of Taytay to haul and transfer the lumber which
was still subject of an investigation for violation of P.D. 705.

The joint-counter affidavits55 signed by petitioners during the preliminary investigation

quoted the letter of petitioner Mayor Rodriguez to the municipal police officers, viz:

To: SPO1 Juanito G. Gan and

PO2 Emmanuel Nangit;

PNP Members of Taytay

Municipal Police Office,

Taytay Palawan

Upon receipt of this order you are hereby directed to proceed to Sitio Igang, Poblacion
Taytay, Palawan, at the compound of the Rural Agricultural Center[, in order t]o haul the
flitches ipil lumber intended for the projects of the Municipal Government of Taytay and to
turn over to the DENR office of Taytay, Palawan.

For immediate strict compliance. 56

Reference to this above-quoted letter of petitioner Rodriguez is found in both the

Resolution57 of the Deputized Ombudsman Investigator of the Provincial Prosecution Office
of Palawan and the Joint Review Action58 of the Graft Investigation Officer-Luzon.

What determines the jurisdiction of a court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing
from the allegations in the information59. The averment in the information that petitioner
Rodriguez, as municipal mayor, took advantage of her office and caused the hauling of the
lumber to the municipal hall to obstruct the investigation of the case for violation of P.D.
705 effectively vested jurisdiction over the offense on the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the
amended information reads:

AMENDED INFORMATION
 The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby
accuses EVELYN VILLABERT RODRIGUEZ and ANDREWS BONITA JR. of Violation of Section
1(b), Presidential Decree No. 1829 committed as follows:

That on or about October 5, 1996, at Sitio Igang, Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of

Taytay, Province of Palawan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
EVELYN VILLABERT RODRIGUEZ and ANDREWS ABONITA JR., both public officers, being the
Municipal Mayor and Barangay Captain of Barangay Igang of the same municipality,
respectively, committing the offense in relation to their office and taking advantage of the
same, confederating and conspiring with each other enter the compound of the Rural
Agricultural Center (RAC) at Sitio Igang, Poblacion, Taytay, Palawan and while inside with
force, intimidation and against the will of the one officially detailed thereat, 2LT. ERNAN O.
LIBAO, did then and there willfully, feloniously, unlawfully, knowingly and forcibly haul 93
pieces or 2.577.32 board feet of assorted dimensions of ipil lumber, that were officially
confiscated by a joint team of EIIB, PENRO, BANTAY PALAWAN, PNP-TINIGUIBAN
COMMAND and PHILIPPINE MARINES, stockpiled inside the RAC for safekeeping while
waiting for available transportation to haul the same to Puerto Princesa City, and  brought
the same ipil lumber within the compound of the Municipal Hall of Taytay, with the
primordial purpose of suppressing or concealing the said ipil lumber as evidence in the
investigation of the case for violation of P.D. 705, as amended. 60  (Italics supplied)

There being no flaw or infirmity then in the amended information, respondent

Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the order of January 17, 2000, denying petitioners motion to quash.

The orders of the Sandiganbayan denying the motion to defer arraignment and entering a
plea of not guilty for petitioners in light of their refusal to plead were accordingly rendered
without any grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
  Rollo at 19-20.

2
  Id. at 21-22.

3
  Id. at 23-25.

4
  Id. at 103.

5
  Id. at 104.

6
  Id. at 56-61.

7
 P.D. 1829, 1. - The penalty of prision correcional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or
both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the
apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
xxx (b) Altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object with intent to impair its
verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in
criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases.
8
  Rollo at 105-108.

9
  Id. at 31-32.

10
  Id. at 109.

11
  Id. at 110.

12
  Id. at 114.

13
  Id. at 111.

14
  Id. at 28 to 30.

15
  Id. at 113.

16
  Id. at 116.

17
  Id. at 121.

18
  Id. at 117-120.

19
  Id. at 122.

20
  Id. at 36 to 42.

21
  Id. at 123-125.

22
  Id. at 126-127.

23
  Id. at 133.

24
  Id. at 135-136.

25
  Id. at 47-51.

26
  Id. at 19-20.

27
  Id. at 21-22.

28
  Id. at 23-25.

29
  Id. at 9-10.

30
 Tatad  v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988).

31
  Rollo at 11-12.

32
  Id. at 12-13.

33
  Id. at 13-14.

34
  Id. at 14-15.

35
  Supra note 30.
36
 Blanco  v. Sandiganbayan, 346 SCRA 108, 114 (2000).

37
 Ty-Dazo  v. Sandiganbayan, 374 SCRA 200 (2002).

38
 Order of January 17, 2000,  Id. at 201 - 202.

39
  Rollo at 19.

40
  Supra note 36..

 R.A. 8493, 7. Time Limit between Filing of Information and Arraignment, and Between Arraignment and Trial. - The
41

arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the
accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court on which the charge is pending, whenever date last occurs.
Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen days to prepare for trial. Trial shall
commence within thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed by the court. xxx

 RA 8493, 13. Remedy Where Accused is Not Brought to Trial Within the Time Limit. - If an accused is not brought to trial
42

within the time limit required by Section 7 of this Act as extended by Section 9, the information shall be dismissed on
motion of the accused. xxx

43
 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, 14.

44
  Rollo at 192.

 R.A. 8249, An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree
45

No, 1606 as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes 4 (a) (1).

46
 Id.  at 4 (b).

47
 R.A. 7160 Local Government Code of 1991 , 444 (b)(5)(d).

48
 Montilla  v. Hilario 90 Phil 49, (1951).

49
  Id. at 51.

50
 People  v. Montejo 108 Phil 613 (1960).

51
  Id. at 622.

52
 Cunanan  v. Arceo, 242 SCRA 88 (1995).

53
  Id. at 89, 97.

54
 R.A. 7160, 444 (b)(2)(v).

55
 Records of the Sandiganbayan, Vol. I, at 26.

56
  Ibid.

57
  Rollo at 56-61.

58
  Id. at 105-108.

59
 Madarang  v. Sandiganbayan, 355 SCRA 525, 532 (2001).

60
  Rollo at 130-131
G.R. No. 223477

CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari  assailing the Decision  dated August 28, 2015
1 2

and the Resolution  dated February 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No.
3

02211, which affirmed the Judgment  dated September 10, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
4

City, Branch 6 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. CBU-87386 finding petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar (Melgar)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9262,  otherwise
5

known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004."

An Information was filed before the RTC charging Melgar with violation Section 5 of RA 9262, the
accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the month of August, 2001 and subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, having the means and capacity
to give financial support, with deliberate intent, did then and there commit acts of economic abuse
against one [AAA,  ] and her minor son, [BBB] (12 years old), by depriving them of financial support,
6

which caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation, to AAA and her son.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 7

After arraignment wherein Melgar pleaded not guilty to the charge against him, he and AAA entered
into a compromise agreement  on the civil aspect of the case. After the RTC's approval of the
8

compromise agreement on June 24, 2010, the criminal aspect of the case was provisionally
dismissed with Melgar's conformity. However, one (1) year later, or on June 24, 2011, the
prosecution moved to set aside the compromise agreement and to revive the criminal action, on the
ground that Melgar sold the property, which was supposed to, among others, answer for the support-
in-arrears of his son, BBB, from 2001 to 2010 pursuant to their compromise agreement.
Consequently, the RTC revived the criminal aspect of the case and allowed the prosecution to
present its evidence. 9

The prosecution alleged that in 1995, AAA had a romantic relationship with Melgar, which resulted in
the birth of BBB, an illegitimate child. Melgar freely acknowledged the paternity of BBB as evidenced
by the latter's Certificate of Live Birth, as well as numerous photographs showing Melgar with BBB.
However, AAA's relationship with Melgar turned sour as the latter had an affair with a younger
woman. When BBB was just about one (1) year old, Melgar stopped giving support, prompting AAA
to file a case for support, which was eventually granted. This notwithstanding, Melgar still refused to
give support for her and BBB. As such, AAA was constrained to file the instant criminal case against
Melgar.10

To substantiate her claims, AAA averred that Melgar could afford to provide support of ₱5,000.00
per month because he has a lavish lifestyle with his family. He owns a Toyota Avanza and his
children are enrolled in ██████. On the other hand, her son, BBB, is a scholar at
████████████████ and she spends the amount of ₱20,000.00 a month for his needs, of
which she asked Melgar for ₱8,000.00 as support. 11

For his part, Melgar was deemed to have waived his right to adduce evidence due to his repeated
failure to appear during trial.
12

The RTC Ruling

In a Judgment  dated September 10, 2012, the RTC found Melgar guilty beyond reasonable doubt
13

of violating Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. 14

The RTC found Melgar to have committed economic abuse against AAA and their son, BBB, when
he stopped supporting them. Worse, he sold the property which was supposed to answer for his
support-in-arrears from 2001 to 2010. 15

Melgar moved for reconsideration,  which was, however, denied in an Order  dated May 9, 2013 of
16 17

the RTC. Aggrieved, Melgar appealed  to the CA.

18

The CA Ruling

In a Decision  dated August 28, 2015, the CA affirmed Melgar's conviction. It held that Melgar is
19

legally obliged to support BBB.  As such, when he deliberately and with evident bad faith deprived
20

BBB of support, he committed economic abuse under Section 5 (e) of RA 9262. In this regard, the
CA observed that the reinstatement of the criminal case was prompted by Melgar's evident refusal to
comply with the judgment based on compromise agreement, particularly, in providing support to his
son; and worse, in conveying to another person the parcel of land which was supposed to, among
others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his son from 2001 to 2010.  Lastly, the CA ruled that
21

Melgar's acts "has clearly caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to [AAA]
and her child[, BBB]." 22

Undaunted, Melgar moved for reconsideration,  which was, however, denied in a Resolution  dated
23 24

February 10, 2016; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Melgar's conviction for
violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Enacted in 2004, RA 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence
against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e., husband,
former husband, or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the
woman has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in, inter alia, economic abuse.  The said law
25

defines "economic abuse as follows:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - xx x.

xx xx

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid,
serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of
the conjugal, community or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or
properties.

xx xx

As may be gathered from the foregoing, "economic abuse" may include the deprivation of support of
a common child of the man-accused and the woman-victim, whether such common child is
legitimate or not.  This specific act is penalized by Section 5 (e) of RA 9262, pertinent portions of
26

which read:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xx xx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child.  This shall include, but
1âшphi1

not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the
woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

xx xx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her
or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

Under this provision, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of
violence against women and children.  Notably, case law instructs that the act of denying support to
27

a child is a continuing offense.28

In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA
9262 are present, as it was established that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic relationship,
resulting in BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had failed
to provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year old; and (d) his intent of not supporting
BBB was made more apparent when he sold to a third party his property which was supposed to
answer for, among others, his support-in-arrears to BBB. Thus, the Court finds no reason to deviate
from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In
fact, the trial court was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses
presented by both parties and, hence, due deference should be accorded to the same. 29

In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Melgar argues, inter alia, that he was charged
of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 as the Information alleged that the acts complained of
"caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to [AAA] and her son[, BBB]." As
such, he contends that he cannot be convicted of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262. 30

Melgar's contention is untenable.

Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence,  punishes the act of "causing mental or
31

emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of
minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children." Notably, "[p]sychological violence
is an element of violation of Section 5 (i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the
victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional
anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish
psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of
any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar acts. And to establish mental or emotional
anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to
this party."  Thus, in cases of support, it must be first shown that the accused's denial thereof -
32

which is, by itself, already a form of economic abuse - further caused mental or emotional anguish to
the woman-victim and/or to their common child.

In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA and BBB of
support, no evidence was presented to show that such deprivation caused either AAA or BBB any
mental or emotional anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot be convicted of violation of Section 5 (i) of
RA 9262. This notwithstanding - and taking into consideration the variance doctrine which allows the
conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different from but necessarily included in the
crime charged  - the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262
33

as the deprivation or denial of support, by itself and even without the additional element of
psychological violence, is already specifically penalized therein.

As to the proper penalty to be imposed on Melgar, Section 6 of RA 9262 provides that violations of
Section 5 (e) shall be punished by, inter alia, prision correccional. Notably, while such crime is
punishable by a special penal law, the penalty provided therein is taken from the technical
nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In Quimvel v. People,  the Court succinctly
34

discussed the proper treatment of prescribed penalties found in special penal laws vis-a-vis Act No.
4103,  otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, viz.:
35

Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL),
provides that if the offense is ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum and maximum
prison term of the indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond what the special law prescribed. Be
that as it may, the Court had clarified in the landmark ruling of People v. Simon [(G.R. No. 93028,
July 29, 1994, 239 SCRA 555)] that the situation is different where although the offense is defined in
a special law, the penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC. Under such
circumstance, the legal effects under the system of penalties native to the Code would also
necessarily apply to the special law.
36

Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the penalties under the RPC,
the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules applied for those crimes
punishable under the RPC. 37

Applying the foregoing to this case, the courts a quo correctly imposed on Melgar the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, Melgar is also ordered to
pay a fine in the amount of ₱300,000.00, to undergo a mandatory psychological counselling or
psychiatric treatment, and report compliance to the court.38

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated August 28, 2015 and the
Resolution dated February 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02211 finding
petitioner Celso M.F .L. Melgar GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of
Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004," are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing petitioner Celso M.F.L.
Melgar: (a) to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum; (b) to pay a fine in the amount of ₱300,000.00; and (c) to undergo a mandatory
psychological counselling or psychiatric treatment and report compliance to the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 6.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA *

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
 On official business.

1
 Rollo, pp. 12-43.

 Id. at 50-61. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos with Associate Justices
2

Renato C. Francisco and Edward B. Contreras concurring.

 Id. at 64-65. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos with Associate Justices
3

Edward B. Contreras and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi concurring.

4
 Id. at 88-93. Penned by Presiding Judge Ester M. Veloso.

 Entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN,
5

PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENAL TIES

THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on March 8, 2004.

6
 The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her
identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld
pursuant to RA 7610, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND
SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND
DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 17, 1992; RA 9262,
entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN,
PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on March 8, 2004; and Section
40 of A.M. No. 04-10-1 l-SC, otherwise known as the "Rule on Violence against Women and
Their Children" (November 15, 2004). (See footnote 4 in People v. Cadano, Jr., 729 Phil.
576, 578 [2014], citing People v. Lomaque, 710 Phil. 338, 342 [2013]. See also Amended
Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, entitled "PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES IN THE
PROMULGATION, PUBLICATION, AND POSTING ON THE WEBSITES OF DECISIONS,
FINAL RESOLUTIONS, AND FINAL ORDERS USINU FICTITIOUS NAMES/PERSONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES," dated September 5, 2017.)

7
 Rollo, pp. 50-51 and 88.
8
 Dated June 23, 2010. Id. at 85-87.

9
 See id. at 51-52.

10
 See id. at 89-90.

11
 See id. at 90-91.

12
 Id. at 52. See also id. at 92.

13
 Id. at 88-93.

14
 Id. at 93.

15
 See id. at 92-93.

16
 See motion for reconsideration dated February 4, 2013; id. at 94-98.

17
 Id. at 99-101.

18
 Not attached to the rollo.

19
 Rollo, pp. 50-61.

20
 Id. at 60.

21
 See id. at 55-60.

22
 Id. at 60.

23
 See motion for reconsideration dated October 7, 2015; id. at 66-78.

24
 Id. at 64-65.

25
 See Section 3 (a) of RA 9262. See also Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 66 (2013).

 Under the Family Code, parents are obliged to provide for their children, whether legitimate
26

or illegitimate, support which comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,

clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family. This obligation to give support is demandable from the time the person
who is entitled thereto needs it, and such obligation may be enforced through a civil action
for this purpose. (See Articles 194, 195, and 203 of the Family Code.)

27
 Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, 749 Phil. 823, 839 (2014).

28
 Id. at 840.

 See Peralta v. People, G.R. No. 221991, August 30, 2017, citing People v. Matibag, 757

29

Phil. 286, 293 (2015).

  See rollo, pp. 21-34.
30

 Under Section 3 (a) (C) of RA 9262, '" [p]sychological violence' refers to acts or omissions

31

causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited
to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to
witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the
victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or
to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common
children."

 Dinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356, 376(2015).

32

 See People v. Caoili, G .R. Nos. 196342 and 196848, August 8, 2017. See also Sections 4
33

and 5 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which read:

Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof - When there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and
the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or
of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

Section 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. - An offense charged

necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients
of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

 See G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017.

34

 Entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND PAROLE FOR

35

ALL PERSONS CONVICTED OF CERTAIN CRIMES BY THE COURTS OF THE

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; TO CREATE A BOARD OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND TO
PROVIDE FUNDS THEREFOR; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on December 5,
1933.

 See Quimvel v. People, supra note 34.

36

 See Peralta v. People, supra note 29, citing Mabunot v. People, G.R. No. 204659,

37

September 19, 2016, 803 SCRA 349, 364.

 Pertinent portions of Section 6 of RA 9262 read:

38

Section 6. Penalties. - The crime of violence against women and their children, under
Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:

xx xx

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than
One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) but not more than Three hundred thousand
pesos (₱300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric
treatment and shall report compliance to the court.