Australian Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis

Vol. 36, No. 2, 2008, 99–114

A N E RICKSONIAN A PPROACH TO H YPNOSIS : T HE

P HENOMENOLOGICAL M ODEL OF H YPNOSIS; THE N ATURE
OF H YPNOTIC “S TATES ”; M ULTILEVEL C OMMUNICATION
AND I NDIRECTION; AND WHY ALL H YPNOSIS IS NOT
S ELF -H YPNOSIS

Jeffrey K. Zeig
The Milton H. Erickson Foundation, Phoenix, Arizona

From a phenomenological perspective, hypnosis can be deconstructed into five component

subsets in three categories: intrapsychic, interpersonal, and contextual. The five subsets
are: altering attention; modifying intensity; fostering dissociation; eliciting responses; and
defining the situation as hypnosis. Each subset is explained and illustrated herein. The
synergistic combination of some, or all, of the five sets elicits in the patient the experience
of hypnosis. In this position paper, the nature of “states” is explained, as is the purpose
of multilevel communication and indirection. Also addressed are the distinctions among
hypnosis, self-hypnosis and related “states” including meditation, active imagination,
autogenic training, mindfulness, and relaxation.

My training in hypnosis began in 1971 and was guided by extraordinary

experts and mentors, including Milton Erickson. Over the years I have been
exposed to many theories about the nature of hypnosis, both from those who
taught me and in the literature. Having matured as a clinician, it is time to
consolidate my clinical knowledge and present my perspective on the nature
of hypnosis with the hope that it can add to existing principles and contribute
to the future of practice. I will start from the beginning.
In my early years I remember teachers stating with conviction, “All hypnosis
is self-hypnosis.” Acupuncture had just made its entrance onto the American
stage and some mentors were staunch in their view that acupuncture was
merely hypnosis. I accepted their pronouncements as fact. After all, they were
propounded by learned men and women, and I had little notion about the
nature of hypnosis.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Jeffrey Zeig at JeffZeig@[Link].

99
100   Zeig

In those years experts grouped themselves into camps. There were state
theorists and non-state theorists, and each position was bolstered by research
findings. T. X. Barber (1969), one of the principal non-state theorists, put
“hypnosis” in quotation marks as a way of indicating its non-state nature.
Additionally, he was one of the first to point out that the very act of defining
the context as hypnosis was an essential aspect of its character.
The nature of hypnosis as a state has not been a subject of a lot of serious
debate in the recent literature, and it is not my intention to revive the debate.
Rather, by examining hypnosis from the perspective of its phenomenology,
we can advance practice and theory. We can, moreover, elucidate the nature of
hypnosis as distinct from self-hypnosis and place self-hypnosis in context with
related phenomena including meditation.
Because I am going to offer a phenomenological perspective, I will begin
by defining phenomenology.

PHENOMENOLOGY
Phenomenology, the study of lived experience, is a lens that can be used to
further a subjective understanding of lived moments. Science is a separate
lens. When it comes to human events such as hypnosis or any other “state,”
our understandings depend on the lens we use to examine them.
How shall we understand “states” and their deconstruction? We can use the
lens of phenomenology to understand “states” and their deconsfuction.

DECONSTRUCTION
Deconstruction results when one examines one’s phenomenology. The “state”
that is being experienced can be subdivided into component parts. Distinctions
are made so that the components can be examined and understood. One
deconstructs to understand the essential nature of lived experience.
Science is similar. A scientist might deconstruct a life form into cells and
their components in order to determine an essential aspect of its mechanics. In
this paper I deconstruct hypnosis into five component sets in three categories:
intrapsychic, interpersonal, and contextual. Together, they constitute the
essentials of the hypnotic “state.”

“STATES”
The term “state” in my usage is a generic reference to any human experience
characterised by coherence, intent, structure, and duration. “State” is a meta-
 An Ericksonian Approach  101

category that includes positive and negative emotions, as well as processes

such as interest, curiosity, awareness, evaluation, attention, perception, and
even patterns of movement. The term “state” is a kind of shorthand. A
“state” is a construct of convenience that allows one to summarise a series of
phenomenal events into a whole so that those events can be understood and
communicated.
It is a thesis of this paper that Barber put the wrong concept in quotation
marks. It would be more accurate to put “states” in quotation marks, not
because they do not exist, but because any individual “state” is not a singularity
and cannot be considered as such. Labelling a phenomenon as a “state” helps
people categorise, understand, and relate to others their own experience.
Thinking of a “state” as a singularity leads to fuzzy thinking because states
are complex and unstable. “States” change moment to moment and situation
to situation. “States” are not easily subject to scientific evaluation. They are
constructs of subjective and interpersonal convenience. And so is it with
hypnosis.
Hypnosis is a construct of convenience, just as is love or indifference, or
curiosity or interest. And, it is not a singularity. Bertrand Russell defined
electricity as “not so much a thing, as a way that things happen”(1925/2001).
Similarly, hypnosis is not a thing, but it is a way that things happen in a social
context.
Hypnosis would best be considered a syndrome, in the same way that
Meniere’s is a syndrome; in the same way that fibromyalgia is a syndrome.
Depression, too, is a syndrome, although most consider it a disease.
In practice, one commonly refers to syndromes as singularities, for example,
“I have Meniere’s,” “I have depression.” Such labelling has decided advantages,
one of which is convenience. However, labelling may also obscure subsequent
action. If one states categorically that one suffers depression, the options
for change seem limited to medical interventions. Labels can constrict or
open options. Labelling an experience as hypnosis makes it seem as if it is a
singularity, which it is not.
Hypnosis is a way that a complex, but definable, phenomenology is affected
in relationships over time. It is a way that social exchange and responsiveness
happen. Because it shifts over time, it should not be thought of as a singularity.
Hypnosis is similar to love and depression, each of which is a complex of
definable phenomenologies affected in relationships that alter over time.
To better explain what I mean, I will use hypnosis as a model, and explain
what I do when I conduct an hypnotic induction. It should be noted that I
102   Zeig

use numerous structures and methods to elicit trance effects, but in order to
stay on topic I am streamlining this part of the discussion.

THE INDUCTION OF HYPNOSIS

When I start to elicit trance, I imagine a diamond-shaped figure surrounding
my patient. The diamond represents facets of the responses I am inviting
from the patient. It also is my model of hypnosis from a phenomenological
perspective.
For the sake of explanation, I will present the model as if it were a baseball
diamond. Of course, in baseball one runs the bases sequentially, which is
not the case in my inductions, but I will explain it in this way to clarify the
fundamental points.
Figure 1 illustrates the diamond. Later, I will present hypothetical examples
of induction language used to facilitate each of the five response sets in order
to further the understanding of each aspect of the model. There are five
response sets that make up the phenomenological model of hypnosis: altering
attention; modifying intensity; fostering dissociation; eliciting responses; and
defining the situation as hypnosis. Using the baseball metaphor, the first four
serve as bases, and the fifth is the playing field.

Figure 1: The Phenomenology

DEFINEofTHE
Hypnosis
SITUATION AS HYPNOSIS

INTENSITY
3. More vivid
4. Less vivid

ATTENTION
DISSOCIATION
1. Internal
5. “Things just happen”
2. Focused
6. “Apart from” and “A part of”
7. Destabilisation (intermittent)

RESPONSE
8. Minimal cues/implication
9. Search for personal meaning
 An Ericksonian Approach  103

The following is a hypothetical illustration of induction patter, starting with

guiding attention and proceeding around the [Link] phenomenological
rationale of induction language will be explained as we go.

Guiding Attention
One could consider first base, guiding attention.
Let’s take as an induction technique, which might be considered a semi-
traditional (Weitzenhoffer, 1989) imagery induction of walking on a beach.
During the description certain elements can be highlighted for the subject
to intentionally elicit changes in attention. We will pick up the hypothetical
induction shortly after eye closure.
You can imagine walking down a beautiful beach.
Perhaps you can sit comfortably on the sand and take a moment with your eyes
closed to reflect on the sights you have just seen so that you can see the blue/green
colour of the sea, the birds flying overhead, the sails of the ships fluttering in the wind,
and realise which of them interests you more so that you can further experience the fine
details …
Maybe you are remembering inside the sound of the calls of the birds that you just
heard; the sounds of children playing; the rolling sounds of the surf; and the fine details
that now you can realise …
You could be taking time to just go inside … and feel the way your body can realise
the warmth in the air, and how fine it can feel to realise it.
And, you can really enjoy the way in which you can especially intently enjoy one of
those experiences and let it occupy a central place right now in a fine way …
Consider the intent of this patter: It is meant to elicit a change in attention,
primarily in which the subject will do two things—focus and attend internally.
Consider also the method. It is similar to what a dramatist would do. The
dramatist subtly shapes responses; he does not tell the reader what to think or
feel. The dramatist puts “props” on the reader’s “stage” and invites the reader
to play with those props to realise an emotional tone. This is what I do as a
hypnotist: I put “toys” on the patient’s emotional stage and invite the patient
to play with them with the intent that, by doing so, the patient will label his
experience as trance. Another relevant metaphor is that the hypnosis creates
“scaffolding” that quickly falls away, but stays in place long enough for the
patient to establish a foundational experience. One common component of
the lived experience of trance is a change in attention.
104   Zeig

What is the reason for orienting patients to change their attention? It has
to do with the way in which some individuals experience hypnosis. For some
people, merely attending internally is enough for them to say, “I’m in a trance.”
Others may report trance when they visually focus intently on something
internal or external. Still others report trance when they focus intently on an
internal sensation or image.
Orienting the subject to focus internally allows the willing patient to access
that aspect of phenomenology. Note that the patient is not being directed to
alter attention per se, but being invited. Inviting rather than directing is central
to an Ericksonian perspective. The rationale behind this approach will be
explained in the section on dissociation.
One important aspect of trance is to offer the patient an opportunity to
change attentional processes. Focusing attention internally is only one method.
There are situations in which it is the wrong strategy, but it would diverge
too far from the mission of this paper to explain that in detail. Suffice it to
say that there are situations in which, for example, it is more therapeutically
valuable to elicit a diffuse external attention in order for the patient to label
his experience, “I am in a trance.”
Some individuals require other phenomenological experiences to say, “I am
in a trance,” including changing the intensity of their experience.

ELICITING CHANGES IN INTENSITY

Let’s consider second base, eliciting changes in intensity. To illustrate, we can
continue our hypothetical induction ...
and as you find a fine central place for your focus, there are other experiences that can
become so pleasantly apparent …
For example, you might want to experience yourself now as if you are lying in the
sand on the beach so that you can really feel the pleasant, comfortable warmth of the
sand; so that you can really feel how nice it is to let your body just rest back into the
pressure of the support behind you; so that you can really let yourself settle comfortably
into the support … of the sand … behind you now and feel the comfort of the support
in the back of your head, the back of your spine, the back of your legs … and how the
moments seem to linger … because as you do that you do not have to be aware of the
noises around you; you can notice how the sounds of the waves have vanished; how the
sensations of support quickly fade into the background … so you can vividly experience
the comfort that is really yours …
 An Ericksonian Approach  105

The intent of this patter is to elicit changes in intensity by which the

intensity of experience becomes more or less vivid. Sensations can become
more or less vivid; images can become more or less vivid; the passage of time
can become more or less vivid, and so forth.
As far as the method is concerned, again note that the patient is not being
directed to alter intensity per se; the patient is being invited.
The purpose of eliciting changes in intensity is that some people report
trance when they experience changes in intensity. One person might say, “I
know I am in a hypnotic trance because I am deeply relaxed.” Another might
say, “I know I am in trance because images are more vivid.” For still another,
it is memories that become more vivid.
Some report trance when experiences become less vivid. They know that
they are in trance when the passage of time is less vivid, when sensations fade,
when they do not experience their body, etc.
Some only report trance when they experience changes both in attention
and intensity. Others only require changes in one aspect of those two sets.
Then there are individuals who require different phenomenological
experiences to say, “I am in a trance,” including the experience of dissociation.

DISSOCIATION
We are calling third base, dissociation. To illustrate, we can again continue our
hypothetical induction ...
And there are so many interesting ways to experience [Link] body can experience
the comfort of resting in the sand, while your mind can suddenly remember vivid
experiences of comfort from so long ago … and for a moment it can suddenly seem as
if those memories come alive, because as you can remember certain experiences, you can
experience certain memories …
And you have a conscious mind and an unconscious mind. And your conscious mind
can be attending to the tone of my voice while your unconscious mind can be attending
to the tone of comforting voices from long ago, because it is so nice to experience things
both consciously and unconsciously …
And your body can explore present comfort while your mind can understand or your
mind can explore comfort while your body presently can understand ...
And all along you can feel yourself go … glow … grow … go more comfortably
inside …
The intent of this unusual patter is to foster dissociation. Dissociation is
defined as one or a combination of three events: one, the sense that something
106   Zeig

“just happens”; two, being both “part of, and apart from”; and three, a sense of
destabilisation. Each will be explained in turn.
Dissociation is experienced when something “just happens.” Patients report
trance when there are sudden changes in behaviour, as occurs for example
with an arm levitation in which the arm seems to move independently.
The dissociative phenomena of “just happening” can be mental rather than
physical. The patient can suddenly realise that images just happen, memories
just happen, that the passage of time is different, and so on.
Dissociation is experienced when a person feels herself to be “part of
and apart from” immediate experience. A hypnotised person can experience
herself as in trance explaining, “I was here, but I was there … ” Hypnotised
patients commonly say that they know they were in trance because they had
a dual sense of feeling as if they are in another time or place, but also present.
The more that the person dissociates, the less the person attends to the present
and the more the archaic involvement.
Dissociation is experienced to a lesser extent when there is a sense of
destabilisation. Destabilisation often is a precursor to dissociation. Erickson
maintained that confusion is a part of all hypnosis, whether or not the clinician
realises it. In his later years, Erickson “seasoned” his inductions with minor
confusion methods as a way of destabilising the conscious set and eliciting
the hypnotic set. The use of mini-confusion methods also dramatically raised
tension, which was lowered by the subsequent concrete suggestion. For example,
when offering an induction in which he revivified forgotten memories by
describing learning the letters of the alphabet, Erickson might have said, “Did
you dot the ‘t’ and cross the ‘i’?” The purpose of the method was to promote
momentary destabilisation, which could subjectively be experienced as a
discontinuity in the flow of experience and minor dissociation.

DISSOCIATION AND INDIRECT TECHNIQUES

The technique of fostering dissociation requires explanation. In the earlier
example, I use three notable techniques: dissociation statements, double
dissociation statements, and misspeaking. These methods have been described
by other investigators, including Erickson, Rossi, and Rossi (1976) and
Lankton and Lankton (1969). I will not elaborate on those techniques here,
but it is important to note that eliciting dissociation requires a different
technique than altering attention or modifying intensity.
 An Ericksonian Approach  107

One can use direct suggestions to alter attention or modify intensity. For
example, in a traditional hypnotic induction, a hypnotist can pronounce to a
patient, “Close your eyes. Go inside. Focus on relaxing your body. Take deep
breaths until your relaxation becomes more profound.”
But one cannot use direct methods to elicit dissociation, because the nature
of dissociation is essentially different from altering attention or modifying
intensity, both of which can be done volitionally. Dissociation is one of many
human experiences that must be experienced avolitionally.
There are some human “states” in which dissociation is a basic component.
Spontaneity is one of them. So is laughter. One cannot direct oneself to laugh
unless one is a trained actor. Laughter has to “just happen.”
To create a sense of avolition, a clinician must use methods that set
a background for the patient to “spontaneously” access the dissociative
experience. The clinician orients the patient toward a dissocative experience
by using methods including dissociation statements, double dissociation
statements, and destabilising methods such as misspeaking. These methods are
commonly classified as indirect. Orienting-toward (indirect) methods must
be applied when a clinician wants to elicit dissociative phenomena or any
phenomenon that has avolition as an essential part of its phenomenological
complex. There are many orienting – toward methods that I use in eliciting
trance. Some have been characterised in the literature; others have not. Suffice
it to say that orienting-toward methods are integral to eliciting avolitional
experience.
In a chapter that I wrote on hypnotic amnesia (Zeig, 1985), I explained
the special need for using indirect suggestions for creating amnesia and
any hypnotic phenomena based on deleting experience, including negative
hallucinations. One sets the background for amnesia to “just happen” by using
indirect methods because that method will promote amnesia more readily.
There are few subjects who can experience amnesia on command through
direct suggestion.
Some hypnotic phenomena require more dissociative skill than others,
including amnesia, negative hallucinations and anaesthesia, but all hypnotic
phenomena, when deconstructed, are based to some extent in dissociation. To
promote hypnotic phenomena, indirect methods have an important role if the
goal of the clinician is to simultaneously set the stage for dissociation.
When offering an induction, a clinician cannot say, “Make relaxation just
happen. Make yourself feel as if you are here and not here at the same time. Be
108   Zeig

slightly disoriented and destabilised.” To say such things would be tantamount

to saying, “Be spontaneous.” Rather, the clinician sets a background (creates a
mementary scaffolding) for dissociation to be experienced.
Dissociation is not just a phenomenological component of hypnosis.
Dissociation is a basic component of psychological symptoms, which by their
very nature have to “just happen.” A patient could complain that her phobia
just happens; her habit problem just happens; her hallucinations just happen.
The severity of the problem is often determined by the intensity of the
dissociation. The more dissociation, the more troublesome the problem, and
the more recalcitrant it is to treatment.
There is a hypnotic parallel to the phenomena of intensity of dissociation.
The more dissociation the patient exhibits, the more hypnotic phenomena the
patient can achieve, because all hypnotic phenomena are based in dissociation.
Those who achieve more hypnotic phenomena are deemed better hypnotic
subjects, and experience themselves as such.
Curiously, dissociation is a platform from which many human experiences,
both adaptive and maladaptive, are generated. Dissociation in hypnosis is
good; dissociation in a symptom is bad. Many human experiences are based in
dissociation. The automaticity of dissociation is a biological trait. One cannot
be conscious of all activity. Automaticity increases efficiency, and is salutary in
the vast majority of cases. In the case of symptoms, however, automaticity is
part of the problem.
The automaticity generated in hypnosis as dissociative phenomena can
be subtly therapeutic. Hypnotic dissociation is benign and can lead to more
pleasant “states.” If a hypnotised person can have pleasant dissociation in
trance, that experience may be built on therapeutically as a steppingstone to
countering the negative dissociation inherent in symptoms.
Hence, it is incumbent on practitioners of hypnosis to foster dissociation
throughout the induction and therapy. Encouraging more dissociative
experience often will lead patients to classify their experience as a hypnotic
“state.” Perhaps the clinician will be able to find a way to use the elicited
constructive, hypnotic dissociation to counter the symptomatic dissociation.
Because there are many useful aspects of dissociation for both induction and
therapy, hypnotists will do well to have methods for eliciting dissociative
experience. Further, dissociative experience can be elicited while promoting
other aspects of hypnosis, including using it in tandem with the operations of
altering attention, modifying intensity, eliciting responses, and even defining
the situation as hypnosis.
 An Ericksonian Approach  109

Return to the sections of hypothetical induction examples for both

altering attention and modifying intensity. Note that the respective goal sets
are suggested more indirectly than directly. Indirect methods orient toward
the goal set, and in doing so simultaneously subtly encourage dissociative
behaviour. Indirect methods are inherently destabilising because the patient
needs to interpret the intent of the message, which carries varying degrees of
ambiguity and contains more that one level of message.
Examined structurally, when using indirection, the hypnotist is speaking
on multiple levels, perhaps simultaneously addressing multiple changes in
phenomenology. Alterations in attention, modifications in intensity, and
dissociation can happen at the same time. The social effect of multilevel
communications on the recipient of the induction is that it can destabilise the
habitual conscious set, paving the way for emergence of the hypnotic set. The
patient, who is often behaviourally passive, activates to interpret the message
from the hypnotist.
Hence, we can understand Erickson’s use of multilevel communication as a
method that, among other things, elicits the hypnotic set of dissociation within
the patient. In this case multilevel communication fosters destabilisation.
Destabilisation is a simple form of dissociation and opens the door for more
complex dissociative behaviour. A phenomenological perspective also sheds
light on the use of so-called indirect methods.
There have been many interesting investigations of indirect suggestions, but
science cannot adequately investigate the complexities of lived experience,
which we refer to as phenomenology. Scientific inquiries do not take into
account the underlying strategic, phenomenological purpose for which
indirect suggestions are constructed in the warp and woof of induction. Indirect
communications orient toward goal phenomenology and simultaneously elicit
destabilising, dissociative responses. Using the method of “orienting toward,”
while targeting alterations in intensity and modifications in intensity, allows
those two phenomena to “just happen” in a dissociative/automatic manner,
instead of merely being responses to a direct command. Responses to a direct
command, for example, suggestions to attend internally, could be deemed
“hypnotic,” but if they just happen automatically, they are certainly more
hypnotic.
Indirect suggestions are integral to hypnosis because they are vehicles for
changing mood and perspective. Indirect suggestions are not singularities to be
investigated. Rather, indirect suggestions are the way that things happen when
inducing trance. In using indirect suggestions, the hypnotic communication
110   Zeig

takes on characteristics of poetry in that it is geared, like poetry, to eliciting

phenomenological changes in mood and perspective.
Consider theatre arts. The purpose of theatre, film, literature and poetry is to
change mood and perspective. For example, Shakespeare offers us Sonnet 30:
When to the sessions of sweet silent thought
I summon up remembrance of things past,
I sigh the lack of many a thing I sought,
And with old woes new wail my dear time’s waste;
Then can I drown an eye, unused to flow,
For precious friends hid in death’s dateless night,
And weep afresh love’s long-since-cancell’d woe,
And moan the expense of many a vanish’d sight;
Then can I grieve at grievances foregone,
And heavily from woe to woe tell o’er
The sad account of fore-bemoanèd moan,
Which I new pay as if not paid before.
But if the while I think on thee, dear friend,
All losses are restored and sorrows end.
Consider the themes in the [Link] are couched in a rhythmic language
of unusual syntax, which creates a destabilising effect. The language is indirect.
The purpose of Shakespeare’s method is to orient the reader to change his
mood and perspective. Destabilising and indirect methods are required to elicit
phenomenological effects. If Shakespeare merely presented the theme directly,
the poem would have little impact; in fact, the poetry would fall away.
In the same way, if a hypnotic message is presented directly, there is no
hypnosis. The syntax and grammar, and, as we will see, the response and the
context, determine the set that is elicited.
Erickson’s inductions were multilevel and indirect because he was orienting
his patients to achieve a change in set, a change in mood and perspective.
He was setting up conditions for a patient to experience alterations in
phenomenology combining subsets of altering attention, modifying intensity,
fostering dissociation, changing response patterns, and defining the context as
hypnosis. It is my hypothesis that Erickson’s model comes more from literature
than science. He was very well read. He understood what dramatists do to alter
mood and perspective, and he built on their models.
 An Ericksonian Approach  111

Although dissociation has a central place in hypnotic phenomenology, a

percentage of people require another phenomenological experience to say, “I
am in a trance,” namely, a change in responsiveness. Note that the previous
three categories were intrapsychic. The next category is interpersonal. When
we add the interpersonal set, we will be able to differentiate hypnosis from
self-hypnosis and related “states.”

RESPONSIVENESS
Continuing the baseball metaphor, one can consider home plate as a change in
responsiveness. This is home base in an essential way. When the patient develops
the two responsiveness characteristics that I will outline, the induction period
ends and the utilisation of therapeutic trance can begin.
We continue our hypothetical induction...
And as you go comfortably inside, you don’t have to concentrate on the way in which
you suddenly … take a deeeep breath … so you can notice that the moment that
you … exhale fully … is a moment of most profound physiological rest. And I don’t
know if you can realise all the ways that you … head forward … into trance, but you
can now enjoy realising the movements that best create trance comfort …
And the sense of return can be interesting. There can be the return to sitting on the
sand … reflecting … remembering the comfort … and how easy it is … and how you
can memorise it by an action no more complex that your ability to … take a deep
breath … and remember that you can bring back this comfort quickly and easily in
such a way that it can be at home with you … at work … inside you … and realised
in relationship … to the capacity of your unconscious mind to guide you …
Yes, these iterations may seem strange, but I hope that they seem strange in
the way that poetry is strange. It is the experienced meaning of the message,
not the content of the message, that elicits the response. The implications and
covert injunctions are scaffolding that carry the target inside them.
The intent of this induction patter is to elicit two types of response, a
response to minimal cues, which are the implications of the communication,
and an intense search for personal meaning.
A patient could respond to the couched messages (minimal cues) of taking a
deep breath, exhaling fully, or moving her head forward. On surface reflection
it might seem strange to promote such responses, but consider the target of
social psychology. That field investigates how individuals respond to covert
aspects of social communication, how individuals respond to attributions,
112   Zeig

demand characteristics, authority, and priming. In many ways Erickson was the
consummate social psychologist, investigating how people respond without
fully realising the cues that prompted the response.
There is a three-step pattern to induction: Say “A,” mean “B,” to get
response “C.” The hypnotist might talk about walking on the beach (“A”), but
mean (“B”) “I am talking about trance” in order to get a response to minimal
cues (“C”). Once the person responds to minimal cues, the induction is over
and therapy begins.
We can simplify a model of therapy. In the ensuing therapy, the therapist
says, “X,” means, “Y,” in order to get response, “Z.” For example, the therapist
might offer a therapeutic metaphor that could parallel the patient’s problem
and contain ideas that effect real-life solutions.
Why does the hypnotist believe that the patient will respond to the
therapeutic metaphor? The answer is because the patient responded to minimal
cues in the induction. The induction, among other things, paves the way for
the patient to respond to implication. The induction opens the responsiveness
to the injunctive layer of communication. In his practice, Erickson commonly
did not tell therapeutic stories until he saw that there was an earlier response
to the induction, which sometimes was a formal induction and sometimes was
a “naturalistic,” informal induction.
The second aspect of responsiveness is to promote a search for personal
meaning. In the induction, the words and images may be vague and ambiguous.
The purpose is to stimulate responses from the patient that are personally
meaningful. The hypnotist uses generalities; the patient supplies the specifics.
The induction is like a Rorschach or an abstract painting; the projections of
the patient create meaning.
Promoting responsiveness is an interpersonal tactic. It makes the hypnotic
experience into a two-party event a dialogue. Hypnosis happens in an
interpersonal field, which distinguishes it from related states.
In some ways, the concept of self-hypnosis is a misnomer because it is not
the same entity as hypnosis as I have defined it. Self-hypnosis is more similar to
active imagination, meditation, relaxation, mindfulness, and biofeedback states,
none of which rely on interpersonal responsiveness—a characteristic that I am
requiring as a central definition of hypnosis.
Self-hypnosis and related states have overlapping phenomenologies; they
depend to varying degrees on alterations in attention, modifications in
intensity and dissociative/destabilising activities. For example, meditation can
be effected by focusing on a mantra. Active imagination can lead to images
 An Ericksonian Approach  113

“just happening.” Relaxation training adds new intensity to immediate

experience. But none of these related states is conducted in an interpersonal
field in which implication is central. The context of each “state” changes the
experience in essential ways. How one defines the situation changes the way
that it is experienced.

DEFINING THE SITUATION AS HYPNOSIS

Continuing the baseball metaphor, one can consider defining the situation as
hypnosis as the playing field, the context in which the action happens. It is
important to define the situation as hypnosis because the contextual definition
of any situation determines how it will be understood. For example, take the
phrase, “Here is a table.” If that statement is made by a carpenter, it will be
understood differently than when it is made by a chef.
Contexts can be defined directly or indirectly. In most situations the
contextual markers that add meaning are implicit. But contextual markers can
be made explicit, which is commonly the case in traditional hypnosis.
One can directly define the situation as hypnosis by calling it as such. The
traditional hypnotist can initiate the experience by telling the patient that it is
time to begin hypnosis.
Erickson sometimes initiated trance directly. At other times, he initiated
trance indirectly by covertly orienting the patient to the idea that the time
for trance was present. Erickson might suggest that trance was about to begin
by shifting his voice to a softer tone; changing the direction of his speech, for
example, by talking to the floor rather than directly to the person; and/or by
changing the cadence of his voice to a “hypnotic” metre.
Why define the situation indirectly? Because it provides another opportunity
to promote destabilisation and dissociation through multilevel communication.
In addition, such methods further activate the patient to respond to minimal
cues and search for personal meaning.

WHEN DOES HYPNOSIS HAPPEN?

The effect of experiencing the phenomenological components of trance
is synergistic. The component sets comprise a system, and the systemic
complexity of hypnosis cannot be fully understood by examining each element
in isolation. Similarly, in biology, a cell cannot be understood by examining its
component parts, and life cannot be understood by examining the function of
groups of cells. Still, there are things to learn when one examines individual
114   Zeig

elements. Thus, speaking in general terms, when a person defines the situation
as hypnosis overtly or covertly, alters attention, modifies intensity, experiences
dissociation, and responds to implication, that person will say, “I am in a
trance.” Yet it is true that some individuals who experience only a set of
the components will report trance. Each of the phenomenological sets that
contributes to the whole of hypnosis, moreover, changes over the course of
time, and changes as the emphasis of the clinician changes. Hence, hypnosis
as a singularity does not exist. Hypnosis is not a thing; it is a way in which
things happen.

CONCLUSIONS
A phenomenological perspective on hypnosis has been offered that is derived
from clinical experience. Using the lens of phenomenological deconstruction,
hypnosis can be viewed as consisting of contextual, intrapsychic, and
interpersonal components. An individual reports hypnosis as happening when
there is the experience of one or a combination of five sets: altering attention;
modifying intensity; fostering dissociation; eliciting responses; and defining the
situation as hypnosis. Implication and multilevel communication are integral
to eliciting five sets. Implication and multilevel communication are integral
to hypnosis; they are the way that hypnosis happens. The five sets constitute
the essentials of hypnosis, which can be considered a “state,” just as curiosity
or love or anger can be considered “states.” Hypnosis can be differentiated
from self-hypnosis, meditation, mindfulness and related states because hypnosis
is based on the interpersonal aspect of responding to implication, and that
component is absent or greatly minimised in those other states.

REFERENCES
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Erickson, M. H., Rossi, E. L., & Rossi, S. I. (1976). Hypnotic realities: The induction of clinical
hypnosis and forms of indirect suggestion. New York: Irvington.
Lankton, S., & Lankton, C. (1969). The answer within: A clinical framework of Ericksonian
hypnotherapy. New York: Brunner-Routledge.
Russell, B. (1925/2001). The ABC of relativity. New York: Routledge.
Weitzenhoffer, A. M. (1989). The practice of hypnotism: Vol. 1. Traditional and semi-traditional
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Zeig, J. K. (1985). The clinical use of amnesia: Ericksonian methods. In J. Zeig (Ed.),
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