Guidelines for BSL-3 Laboratory Setup
Guidelines for BSL-3 Laboratory Setup
GENERAL GUIDELINES
ESTABLISHMENT OF
BIOSAFETY LEVEL-3
LABORATORY
INDIAN COUNCIL OF MEDICAL RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH RESEARCH
MINISTRY OF HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
NEW DELHI
PREFACE
Globally, there is a strong perception that studies on microbial agents need more care and caution to
avoid health hazards to the laboratory personnel and the community. Emerging and newly emerging
diseases caused by unknown as well as known pathogens occur unpredictably worldwide. These often
appear in epidemic forms and are very difficult to diagnose and manage.
It is pertinent to have laboratories with high containment facilities (BSL-3) and protocols to deal with
such threats. The institutes with a mandate to investigate such outbreaks are required to be in a state
of preparedness. It is also mandatory that storage of these pathogens be done in appropriate biosafety
2 3
laboratories. Diseases of global public health significance are tackled by forming international networks
of laboratories having suitable infrastructure and trained manpower, and there is an increasing need
for containment facilities. The containment facilities are also required to enhance countries’ capacity on
preparedness in term of diagnostics and vaccines.
Biosafety policies and procedures are designed to safeguard personnel and the environment from
biologically hazardous materials and to comply with regulatory requirements. Containment science
emerged as an important branch of science in recent times. There were no national guidelines for
establishment, operation and maintenance, auditing and validation of containment laboratories.
Therefore, according highest priority to establishing such facilities becomes laboratory management’s
responsibility and lacunae in knowledge to execute such projects become biggest hurdles.
In most of the developing countries, the awareness about bio-containment has increased but planning,
designing, constructing and operating BSL-3 laboratories needs regular updates and clear definitions
of risk groups and their handling.
Realizing the importance of containment science these National Guidelines are developed to benefit
principal investigators, engineers, architects and management in conceptualizing the concept, layout
to final drawing, developing cost estimate to the execution of project. It has incorporated the hand-on
experiences of the contributors in establishing containment facilities in this country as well as in many
SEAR countries. This also has compiling the right information on a large number of areas that needs
tremendous attention during establishing such facilities.
ICMR Chair in Virology & Scientist F Div. of ECD Scientist ‘G’ & Head ECD
Zoonoses Indian Council of Medical Indian Council of Medical
Indian Council of Medical Research, New Delhi Research, New Delhi
Research, New Delhi
FOREWORD
Biosafety and biosecurity are essential pillars of international health safety. In today’s interconnected
world, there is an ever-present threat of emerging, re-emerging and newly emerging viruses and
other pathogens that are capable of causing outbreaks & epidemics. Such emerging pathogens can
potentially and rapidly spread due to very fast air-transit and increasing urbanization in the era of
globalization. Many of these zoonotic viruses and other infectious etiologies are highly pathogenic and
transmissible in humans with high consequences.
High containment laboratories like Biosafety level-3 and -4 levels and specialized know-how for
4 5
handling these highly pathogenic micro-organisms and viruses are very essential in the developing
world, which faces the major brunt of infectious diseases and many of the outbreaks due to emerging
and re-emerging pathogens.
In Indian settings, recent outbreaks due to emerging viruses such as Nipah virus, arboviruses such
as Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus (CCHF) have led to increased emphasis on having high
containment facilities for the preparedness to handle outbreaks due to highly infectious pathogens.
Several high containment BSL-3 facilities have been established or currently in the planning or
execution phase. It is recognized that highly specialized expertise required for establishment,
maintenance and operation of high-containment facilities at BSL-3 and BSL-4 levels laboratories.
Currently, there is no existing guideline for establishing BSL-3 facilities for biomedical research and
diagnostic laboratories from the South Asian or South-East Asian region.
The Department of Health Research and the Indian Council of Medical Research has taken an initiative
to develop “General Guidelines for Establishment of Biosafety Level-3 Laboratories”.
The first edition of guidelines on establishment of BSL-3 laboratories will be a useful reference to
institutions in India and SEAR countries. It is hoped that these guidelines will act as a standardized set
of guidelines useful at the national level and the regional level for other countries in South-East Asia as
well as for other developing countries elsewhere.
Among many essential aspects covered in this guideline are clarifications on different biosafety
levels, objectives and scope of BSL-3 laboratory facilities, specific laboratory designs, considerations
in construction, staffing as well as pertinent issues related to operation and maintenance of these
facilities.
The guideline is timely and essential in the backdrop of outbreaks of emerging and re-emerging
highly-pathogenic viruses and micro-organisms such as Nipah virus, Avian influenza virus, SARS and
CCHF virus and drug-resistant mycobacteria in India and the South-East Asian region.
These guidelines will play an important role in the current efforts by the Government of India to
enhance biosafety and biosecurity in the country in accordance with the International Health
Regulations (IHR).
6 7
We gratefully acknowledge the inputs from Lt. Gen D Raghunath, former Director General, Armed
Forces Medical Services for his valuable suggestions for the development of this guideline.
We sincerely acknowledge the experts from different areas, Dr. Ashwin Raut, NIHSAD, Indian Council
of Agricultural Research, Bhopal, Dr. Amit Singh, Indian Institute of Sciences, Bangalore, Dr. Arunava
Dasgupta, Central Drug Research Laboratory, Lucknow, Mr. Yogesh K. Shelar CDSCO, Ministry of Health,
Dr. Nitin K Jain, Department of Biotechnology, Dr. Umesh Gupta- Consultant, Indian Council of Medical
Research, for their opinion and suggestions for improvement of this document.
Contributors also sincerely thank the team of Indian Council of Medical Research; Dr. RR Gangakhedkar,
Dr. Nivedita Gupta, Dr. Rajni Kant and Department of Health Research; Ms. Anu Nagar, Dr. Ira Praharaj, Dr.
Neeraj Aggarwal, Dr. Harmanmeet Kaur, Dr. Jitender Narayan, Dr Neetu Vijay and Dr Siddharth Giri for
their valuable inputs for in the preparation of guideline.
CONTENTS
Introduction 2
Identifying prerequisites for the construction 4
Defining basic objectives and scope of work 8
Preparation of pre-design 10
Preparation of BSL-3 laboratory design 12
8 1
Construction 16
Commissioning 20
Validation of the laboratory 24
Operation and maintenance 26
Further Reading 28
Annexure-1: BSL-3 Laboratory Infrastructure And Environment 30
Annexure-2A: Classification Of Infective Microorganisms By Risk Group 31
Annexure-2B: Relationship Of Risk Groups To Biosafety Levels, Practices And Equipment 31
Annexure-3: Points to be considered during Biological Risk Assessment 32
Annexure-4a: Criteria for BSL-3 laboratory 34
Annexure-4b: Criteria for BSL-3 laboratory 34
Annexure-4c: Criteria for BSL-3 laboratory 35
Annexure-5: Self-assessment of Biosafety 36
Annexure-6: Format for Biosafety Level 3 [Basic laboratory safety survey] 37
Annexure-7: BSL-3 Construction related information 42
Annexure-8: Conceptual BSL-3 Drawings 43
Table-1: Categories of laboratory and secondary barrier requirements 44
Table 2. Onsite equipment in the laboratory 47
Table-3: Thumb-Rule Calculations for Understanding Estimated Budget of Proposed 48
Laboratory
INTRODUCTION
India, like many other progressing nations, faces a formidable challenge of
infectious diseases and especially of viral infections. Despite a few major
successes such as the elimination of wild polio virus, the country continues to
suffer substantial morbidity and mortality from both emerging and re-emerging
pathogens. The recent establishment of a 3-tiered network of Virus Research and
Diagnostic Laboratories (VRDL) across the country has greatly facilitated the timely
diagnosis of viral infections. These laboratories are equipped with facilities at the General considerations in the establishment of a Biosafety
Biosafety Level 2 (for handling pathogens causing moderate risk to humans and Level 3 (BSL-3) laboratories
2 low risk to the community), while a few of them have the capability to handle some 3
of the high-risk pathogens. Building preparedness against the emerging high-risk
An in-depth analysis of the scientific framework, objectives, pre-requisites (availability of
pathogens is a need of the hour in all parts of the country, and the establishment of
manpower, funding and space) as well as plan of proper utilization of the facility is a critical
more high containment laboratories would be a critical step to achieve this goal.
requirement prior to decisions on development of a biosafety level 3 laboratory.
A high containment Biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory would be mandatory for
all clinical, diagnostic, teaching & research facilities that perform work involving
agents that cause serious or potentially fatal disease in the workers through
Following essential steps are involved in establishing BSL-3
inhalation or lead to environmental contamination with these. All the work would laboratory (Figure-1)
be performed in bio-contained environments with appropriate engineering
controls. Work would be performed only by specifically trained personnel and
supervised by scientists competent in the handling of infectious agents.
Identifying pre-requisites for the construction
Key elements of Biosafety level-3 (BSL-3) laboratory Preparation of BSL-3 laboratory design based on risk
assessment
Following are the key elements for the establishment of BSL-3 laboratory,
a) Biorisk assessment
b) Specialized physical, engineering infrastructure and environment (Annexure-1)
Construction of BSL-3 laboratory
c) Safety equipment (Primary and secondary containment barriers) and other supplies
d) Training of human resource for special practices
Commissioning of laboratory
Importance of these key elements are described and
discussed in relevant sections below:
The following guidelines are to summarize the practical approaches for the
Validation of the laboratory
establishment, commissioning, operationalization, requirement of validation and
functionality of a BSL-3 laboratory. These guidelines mainly assist the VRDL network
for establishing BSL-3 laboratories for expanding their diagnostic and research
capabilities in handling high risk pathogens. Operation and maintenance
1. IDENTIFYING
PREREQUISITES
4
FOR THE 5
CONSTRUCTION
The first step in initiation for executing the thought of establishing BSL-3 laboratory is identifying the
pre-requisites/assessment of proposed facility for the construction is based on
Assessment of biorisk:
Based on the severity of infection caused by the pathogens to individuals and to the communities,
microbes are divided into four risk groups (Annexure-2a). Identifying the risk group of the pathogens
and other associated factors would be helpful in proper risk assessment.
Assessment of biorisk plays a key role in defining biosafety infrastructure, requirement of engineering
controls and safety equipment, hence in establishing BSL-3 laboratory.
Establishment of basic objectives Based on the above considerations a detailed conceptual proposal needs to be prepared including
Construction site budget estimation for funding, simultaneously formulation of national committee that will help in
selection and risk monitoring of developmental process.
assessment of area
Work flow chart
formation
List of Equipment
6 7
finalization
Predesign Identify hazards (agents
if known, lab procedures
and worker)
Figure: -1 Essential steps involved in establishing BSL-3 laboratory Figure: -2 Risk Assessment process flowchart
Source: Mourya DT et al., (2014)
2. DEFINING BASIC
OBJECTIVES
8
AND SCOPE OF 9
WORK
The basic objectives for establishment of containment laboratories for handling risk group-III agents
include:
Handling of clinical samples of patients infected with high risk pathogens during routine diagnostic
testing or outbreaks.
Conducting basic, applied or clinical research, or a combination of these on high risk pathogens.
Creating safe environment for detection, identification, propagation, manipulation of such organisms
in the laboratory; as well as maintaining safety of the community and the environment.
List of probable high-risk pathogens on which laboratory propose to work along with their relative
importance in terms of human morbidity and/or mortality in the region should be included in the
scope.
Further, considering the futuristic approach, scope of work intended to be performed in the BSL-3
laboratory has to be discussed thoroughly among the scientific/Biosafety officer and administrative
heads of the [Link], assessing the biorisk involved.
Defining basic
objectives and scope
of work
During preparation of pre-design of the BSL-3 laboratories there are several criteria which play
critical role in pre design preparation that should be understood (Annexure-4a, b, c). Further knowing
3. PREPARATION different types of BSL-3 described below and their important features will ensure correct pre-design
development.
Identify the workflow, prepare required flow charts for each routine diagnostic and research
procedures.
DESIGN
In this phase, complete design with action plan for constructing a BSL-3 laboratory should be
crystallized which mainly include:
A detailed drawing of development of the entire facility should then be prepared, in order to monitor the
work progress.
The drawings must depict the layout of all laboratory areas to facilitate placement of essential on-site and
stand-alone equipment (including autoclaves, biological liquid effluent decontamination plant/chemical
kill tank, air handling units, exhaust filters).
The plan should also indicate the placement of safety equipment, such as fire extinguishers etc. within the
facility. A detailed concept proposal with detailed drawings, plans as per requirements and abiding the
biosafety regulations should be developed.
Preparation of detailed construction document with final specifications
Finalizing the engineering controls
16 17
An important aspect in the construction of the BSL-3 laboratory is putting forward the conceptual
proposal with detailed drawings and plans, justifying the objectives for the construction as per the
requirements along with abiding with the national and international guidelines of biosafety.
A construction document with final specifications is to be prepared at this stage. The final proposal with
detailed drawings and equipment specifications should submitted for release of funds so that tenders can
be invited.
Tender must be prepared to select agencies/organizations experienced in similar works earlier, and with
proven track record.
The tender should include the general conditions of contract, description and scope of work, qualification
criteria, instructions to bidders and evaluation of bids, in addition to the notice inviting the tender.
Some of the construction documents setting basic criteria and requirements for this facility should be part
of the tender document.
A credible agency and contractor with successful track record in undertaking similar works should be
identified as described in laboratory designing phase.
Awarding the tender to agency, hiring a consultant agency for supervising the quality of construction as
per the requirements recommended in national and international standards.
Tender must be customized to select a professional organization, having experience of constructing this
kind of laboratory.
An agreement should be signed specifying all the requirements and guidelines to be followed, mentioning
the time limit given for the completion of the project and the penalty clause, if not completed in time.
Monitoring of precise construction
It is important to monitor precise construction by Identifying project management consultant.
Given the scarcity of regulations, codes and standards for high containment laboratories in the country,
and the complexity of the international standards, a competent agency or group of engineers should
18 supervise the quality of construction process. 19
The local engineering department may ensure supervision of construction. Installation of integral
equipment and procurement of accessory equipment required for the laboratory could proceed along with
the construction work.
The team members should possess a thorough understanding of the features of the equipment being
procured and the essential requirements for their installation, calibration and routine maintenance.
Selection of correct material as per international guidelines is the prime requirement during construction
phase.
20 21
The process of laboratory commissioning plans ideally should start in the design phase and continue
throughout the construction process.
(ii) Testing and validation of the commissioning process of equipment are performed in presence of the
facility In-charge and Biosafety Officer.
(iii) Final testing and commissioning should take place in presence of committee / project team. On
completion the laboratory is to be made functional, ready for takeover.
Commissioning procedure for the laboratory should be well designed and implemented to verify the safe
facility operation.
Testing and commissioning of some of the elements are crucial to the proper functioning of the
containment, such as airflow patterns and pressures within isolators and biosafety cabinets, temperature
profiles in autoclaves, procedures for decontamination and sterilization, verification of light lux level (must
be between 300-600 lux), operation of HVAC systems, capacity calculations of HVAC systems plant, chilled
water pumps capacity, air quantities at outlet diffusers / grilles, and air compressor, testing air curtains,
steam boiler, clean room garment storage cabinet, floor traps, drains, dunk tanks, checking of ceiling
panels, pass box, shower cabinets/air shower, water outlets, air leak in ducts as well as plenums, doors and
view panels along with functioning of all the alarm systems.
Taking over the facility includes verifying all the basic requirements as per the approved layouts, electrical
connections (raw, essential and UPS), local area network (LAN) connections, servers, water connections,
sewage connection, hardware fitting, telephones and intercoms, functioning of the BMS with all the
desired parameters, fine setting of access control and all the inventories.
Staff Pattern in a BSL-3 Laboratory and Preparation of Training
program
A multi-disciplinary team of specially trained staff, consisting of clinical/scientific, engineering,
administrative and support staff is integral to the functioning of a BSL-3 laboratory.
22 23
An experienced and qualified Biosafety Officer and a Scientist-in-Charge would be responsible for
the overall functioning of the facility. The objectives of the laboratory and the specific projects to be
undertaken in the laboratory would be important considerations in deciding the pattern of scientific and
technical team.
Staff requirement would also include an officer-in-charge for maintenance, one technician each for HVAC,
electrical systems, instrumentation and the staff for general building and service maintenance.
On-site training on relevant aspects could be considered for the project staff, at other laboratories.
This training program should be developed keeping in mind the mandate and specific requirements of the
laboratory; this training should cover the concepts of biosafety and biosecurity and safe working within
the BSL-3 laboratory.
The Biosafety Officer and Scientist-in-charge of the facility shall be responsible for the development and
implementation of the training programs and protocols.
In addition to the initial training, refresher trainings on biosafety (along with safety drills) should be
conducted every six months.
Records of orientation and refresher training for staff should be maintained along with the list of trainees
and results of assessment/competency evaluation.
Approval from local statutory authorities like the Fire Department and Municipal Corporation should
be obtained before commencing operation of the laboratory for validation. Staff training should be
reinforced and mock drills along with validation of SOPs should be conducted at this stage. Upon
completion of these processes, the validation process for the laboratory can be started.
In addition, commissioning reports of major equipment, SOPs of laboratory workflow, use of equipment
and engineering controls (including records of operation of AHU and change of filters), user log books of
all equipment, certification details, maintenance reports should also be prepared and maintained in the
laboratory.
The records for entry/exit, printouts of shower entry, records of daily checks, requisition file, and file of
calibration of equipment should be prepared and maintained.
Documents in support of validation of decontamination processes (e.g., spore strip test for validation
of autoclaves, records of area fumigation and surface swab tests), record of performance of Building
Management System, room pressure, temperature and humidity should also be prepared.
Documents related to the inventory of samples and other material (stored in laboratory refrigerators,
-20˚C and -86˚C freezers and liquid nitrogen storage) and backup plans should be developed.
Facility and Operation Manuals explaining biosafety aspects as well as maintenance of engineering
systems should also be prepared.
A Technical Manual should also be developed for the facility.
Validation of the laboratory should be conducted by internal and external expert committees in liaison
with the Facility-in-Charge and/or Biosafety Officer, construction agency and project management
consultancy.
The validation process aims to ensure biosafety and biosecurity concerns to the workers, work and the
environment as well as adherence to the work flow program.
8. OPERATION AND
MAINTENANCE
26 27
The laboratory would commence the safe operation mode upon completion of the validation process
and obtaining the certificate to use the facility.
The contingency plan for emergencies needs to be reviewed during the regular operation mode, to prevent
biosafety breaches with respect to the building management systems, UPS, DG set and autoclaves.
All organizations which undertake work involving microorganisms/genetically engineered organisms
should constitute an Institutional Biosafety Committee which should prepare an updated site emergency
plan as per recommendations given in the Review Committee on Genetic Manipulation (RCGM), and also
evaluate the biosafety concerns arising from experimentation and containment issues.
Operation and comprehensive maintenance contract for day to day (24Hr) operation of BSL-3 lab should
be undertaken in advance with the suppliers for all major equipment to ensure prompt service. A contract
should also be undertaken for maintenance of the facility with the facility contractor to ensure engineering
support.
Finally, Memoranda of Understanding should be executed with the contractor and subcontractors to
ensure uninterrupted provision of spares and services, for a minimum period of 5 years.
After successful competition of all the phases involved in establishment of BSL-3 laboratory, during
routine usage of the facility, the laboratory persons have to self- assess the biosafety parameters
(Annexure-5) in the laboratory. Further to generate systematic documented evidence, every BSL-3
laboratory should develop a format for capturing basic laboratory safety check points (Annexure-6).
In conclusion, for achieving biosafety and biosecurity during handling high risk pathogens,
multifactorial assessment of biorisk, infrastructure, safety equipment, Good Laboratory Practices,
trainings etc. is mandatory as described in these guidelines.
28 29
FURTHER READING
Mourya DT, Yadav PD, Majumdar TD, Chauhan DS, Katoch VM. Establishment of Biosafety Level-3 (BSL-3)
Laboratory: Important criteria to consider while designing, constructing, commissioning & operating the
facility in Indian setting. Indian J Med Res 2014; 140:171-83.
Mourya DT, Yadav PD, Khare A, Khan AH. Certification & validation of biosafety level-2 & biosafety level-3
laboratories in Indian settings & common issues. Indian J Med Res 2017; 146:459-67.
Oregon State University. Basic Laboratory Design for Biosafety Level 3 Laboratories. Available at https://
[Link]/cpd-standards/appendix/room-and-space-types/basic-laboratory-design-biosafety-
level-3-laboratories.
A.N. Zaki, Biosafety and biosecurity measures: management of biosafety level 3 facilities. International
Journal of Antimicrobial Agents 36S (2010) S70–S74
World Health Organization. Laboratory biosafety manual 3rd edition (2004), World Health Organization,
Geneva, 2004.
Regulations and guidelines for recombinant DNA research and bio contentment 2017. Accessible at: http://
[Link]
Annexure-1: BSL-3 Laboratory Infrastructure And Environment Annexure-2A: Classification Of Infective Microorganisms By Risk
Group
Sr.# BSL-3 laboratory infrastructure and environment Remarks
Risk Group 1 (No or A microorganism that is unlikely to cause human or animal disease
1 Controlled access
low individual and
2 Physical separation from access corridor community risk)
3 Personnel shower Optional, as/risk Risk Group 2 A pathogen that can cause human or animal disease but is unlikely to be
assessment (Moderate individual a serious hazard to laboratory workers, the community, livestock or the
4 Anteroom; two self-closing interlocked doors risk, low community environment.
5 Single pass air directional air flow risk) Laboratory exposures may cause serious infection, but effective treatment
and preventive measures are available and the risk of spread of infection is
6 Air pressure differential (ranging from -10 to -60 Pa, as per the
30 limited. 31
risk assessment)
Risk Group 3 (High A pathogen that usually causes serious human or animal disease but does
7 Exhaust system independent from remainder of the building
individual risk, low not ordinarily spread from one infected individual to [Link]
8 Supply system independent from remainder building community risk) treatment and preventive measures are available.
9 Single HEPA filtered exhaust Depending upon the size Risk Group 4 (High A pathogen that usually causes serious human or animal disease and
of the lab., multiple HEPA individual and that can be readily transmitted from one individual to another, directly
filters at exhaust points are community risk) or indirectly. Effective treatment and preventive measures are not usually
necessary. Thus, HEPA SAFE available.
CHANGE BOX could be
considered connected with
a single suitable blower
with 100% redundancy
10 Supply exhaust fans interlocked with supply fans
11 Redundant exhaust fan (N+1)
Annexure-2B: Relationship Of Risk Groups To Biosafety Levels,
12 Utilities backflow prevention
Practices And Equipment
13 Minimum 6-12 air changes per hour
14 Autoclaves available in facility Within facility preferable Risk Biosafety Laboratory Type Laboratory practices Safety equipment
15 Sealed windows Group level
16 Sealed penetrations 1 Basic Basic teaching, Good Microbiological None: open bench work
17 Seamless floors Biosafety research lab Techniques (GMT)
level 1
18 Monolithic ceiling
2 Basic Primary health, GMT plus protective Open bench plus biological
19 Chemical resistant floors, walls, ceiling, doors and frames clothing, biohazard safety cabinet (BSC) for
20 Chemical resistant piping, fixtures and casework Biosafety services; sign potential aerosols
21 BSL-3 laboratory on emergency power level 2 diagnostic,
services, research
22 Laboratory lighting and biosafety cabinets on emergency Preferred to avoid blackout
Inverter/UPS 3 Containment Special diagnostic As level 2 plus special BSC & other primary devices
Biosafety services, research clothing, controlled for all activities
23 HVAC failure alarm level 3 access, directional
24 Pressure differential monitors airflow
25 Deep sealed floor traps 4 Maximum Dangerous As Level 3 plus airlock Class III BSC, or positive
26 Hand wash sinks and emergency eye wash Containment pathogen units entry, shower exit, pressure suits in conjunction
27 Surface mounted sealed lighting Biosafety special waste disposal with Class II BSCs, double
level 4 ended Autoclave (through
28 Less than 60 db. noise level
the wall),
29 Lighting (300-600 lux)
30 BSC shall be located out of the mainstream of traffic filtered air
31 Isolation dampers in ventilation system
Annexure-3: Other factors that should be considered as appropriate include:
Points To Be Considered During Biological Risk Assessment Pathogenicity of the agent and infectious dose
The backbone of the practice of biosafety is risk assessment. Potential outcome of exposure
While there are many tools available to assist in the assessment of risk for a given procedure or experiment, Natural route of infection
the most important component is professional judgment. Other routes of infection, resulting from laboratory manipulations (parenteral, airborne, ingestion)
Risk assessments should be performed by the individuals most familiar with the specific characteristics of Stability of the agent in the environment
the organisms being considered for use, the equipment and procedures to be employed, animal models
Concentration of the agent and volume of concentrated material to be manipulated
that may be used, and the containment equipment and facilities available.
Presence of a suitable host (human or animal)
The laboratory director or principal investigator is responsible for ensuring that adequate and timely risk
32 Information available from animal studies and reports of laboratory-acquired infections or clinical reports 33
assessments are performed, and for working closely with the institution’s safety committee and biosafety
personnel to ensure that appropriate equipment and facilities are available to support the work being Laboratory activity planned (sonication, aerosolization, centrifugation, etc.)
considered. Any genetic manipulation of the organism that may extend the host range of the agent or alter the agent’s
Once performed, risk assessments should be reviewed routinely and revised when necessary, taking into sensitivity to known, effective treatment regimens
consideration the acquisition of new data having a bearing on the degree of risk and other relevant new Local availability of effective prophylaxis or therapeutic interventions.
information from the scientific literature.
On the basis of the information ascertained during the risk assessment, a biosafety level can be assigned
One of the most helpful tools available for performing a microbiological risk assessment is the listing of to the planned work, appropriate personal protective equipment selected, and standard operating
risk groups for microbiological agents. However, simple reference to the risk grouping for a particular procedures (SOPs) incorporating other safety interventions developed to ensure the safest possible
agent is insufficient in the conduct of a risk assessment. conduct of the work.
No one standard approach or correct method exists for conducting a risk assessment. Each laboratory should adopt a safety or operations manual that identifies known and potential hazards,
However, several strategies are available, such as using a risk prioritization matrix, conducting a job hazard and specifies practices and procedures to eliminate or minimize such hazards.
analysis; or listing potential scenarios of problems during a procedure, task, or activity.
Chemical Steam
Decontamination
Type
NA: Not applicable
M
NM: Not mandatory, depends on risk assessment for mandated work
Effluent
System
M: Mandatory
Type
NA
NA
**: Air Changes depends on risk assessment for mandated work
[ACPH]**
changes
NB: If mandate of the laboratory includes processing & propagation [in vitro] of unknown samples
10-12
10-12
from known or unknown high-risk group agents’ outbreak/ unusual outbreaks or regional VRDL: it is
/Hr.
Air
advised to follow BSL-3, Type-5 standards. However: If mandate of the laboratory includes processing &
46 propagation [in vitro & in vivo] of unknown samples from known or unknown high-risk group agents’ 47
100% Fresh Recirculatory
M Equipment Remarks
Biosafety Cabinet Class-II (A1/A2/B1/B2) or Class-III, based on risk assessment
Autoclave Yes
Size and configuration shall be based on the program/laboratory’s
air
NM [vertical
considered]
considered]
Autoclave
autoclave
autoclave
may be
may be
Dunk Tanks & Pass Boxes Size and location of dunk tank/s and pass boxes shall be determined
by the program and shall be integral to the containment barrier. The
depth of partition must exceed the expected maximum pressure
differential.
Chillers for HVAC Capacity will depend on the total area of the facility.
M
M
Containment wash
Eye-
M
Class II A2 +
Class II A2 +
Primary
IVC
IVC
related to DNA recombination
laboratory diagnosis and with
to DNA recombination
with animal challenge
RG-3 agents)
Utilities)
agents
Table-3: Thumb-Rule Calculations for Understanding
Estimated Budget of Proposed Laboratory Includes: Other materials, 300 f2 500 2,70,000
Item Work description Qty Unit Unit rate** Amount Chilled/Hot Water Piping,
Doors 12 Nos. 32,000 3,84,000 Walls & Ceiling Acoustic
Insulation
Treatments of Plant Rooms
Windows 5 Nos. 15,000 75,000
& A.H.U. Room, Acoustic
Walls & Ceiling Panels 2400 f2 3,000 72,00,000 Treatment Installation etc.
Civil Work Epoxy based joint less 243 m2 900 2,18,700 ++: Cost will depend on 1 Job 25,00,000 25,00,000
flooring & covings Building the area of the laboratory,
Plumbing & Sanitary 1 Job 2,20,000 Management which company? & critical
Installations System requirements of the specific
Internal electrification of 2,50,000 laboratory.
48 building Specialized ++: Depends on the 49
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