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The Mamluks

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1K views47 pages

The Mamluks

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Syamil Yusuff
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as PDF or read online on Scribd
  • Introduction to the Mamluks
  • Historical Overview
  • The Mamluk Army
  • Clothing and Tactics
  • Military Illustrations
MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES THE MAMLUKS 1250-1517 sy (OSPREY, MILITARY, DAVID NICOLLE PHD ANGUS McBRIDE THE MAMLUKS INTRODUCTION In Europe the Mamluks of Egypt are remembered as so-called ‘Slave Kings’ who drove the Crusaders from the Holy Land; but they were far more than that, Though its frontiers barely changed, the Mam- luk Sultanate remained a ‘great power" for two and a half centuries. Its armies were the culmination of a military tradition stretching back to the 8th century and provided a model for the early Ottoman Empire, whose own armies reached the gates of Vienna only twelve years after the Mamluks were overthrown, The Arabic word mamluk meant a sol cruited as a young slave, then trained, educated and released as a full-time professional. In earlier cen- turies mamluks, or ghulams as they were then known, formed the core of most Muslim armies (see e.g. MAA 125: The Armies of Islam 7th-11th Centuries, MAA 171: Saladin and the Saracens, and MAA 255: Armies of the Muslim Conquest). Most were of Turkish origin, recruited from the pagan peoples of Central Asia; and by the 12th century most Muslim armies seem to have been largely Turkish, whether mamluks or free-born Turcoman nomad warriors even that of the great Saladin, founder of the Ayyubid dynasty, who was himself a Kurd. The last effective Ayyubid ruler, al Salih, tried to reunify the fragmenting Ayyubid state and its armies by buying greater numbers of Turkish mamluks for his own forces based in Egypt. These became al Salih’s famous Bahriyak regiment and his smaller Jamdariyah guard. Mongol invasions across southern Russia and the Ukraine had meanwhile uprooted the Kipchak Turks of these lands, resulting in far greater numbers of slaves becoming available (see Elite 30: Autila and the Nomad Hordes). Although al Salih’s Gite Bahriyah and Jamdariyah only numbered around one thousand men, they were taught to take pride in their mamluk background and it was they who led the revolution which overthrew al Salih’s ier re- Examples of Mamluk heraldry (after Meinecke): (A) late 13th cent ; (B) early agth cent; (C) mid-rgth cent; (D) early 14th cents (E) late r4th cent; (F) mid- 15th cent.; (G) early-mid= 3th cent: (H-D) late 15th cent, non- mamluk military class. son, paving the way fora Mamluk state. (Throughout this book the term will be printed mamluk in reference to a soldier of slave origin, and Mamluk in reference to the state set up by these troops in 1250.) The Mamluk Sultanate was a military state, mamluks providing the foundation of both army and government; there was also a greater concentration of power in Cairo than under the previous Ayyubid Sultanate. Nor did mamluk ‘men of the sword’ feel any inferiority in relation to those born free, though civilian ‘men of the pen’ continued to play a vital administrative role, particularly in the Diwan al Jaysh or Army Ministry Another feature which set mamluks apart from most military élites of medieval Europe was their dedication to city life ~ not just any city, but Cairo, where they clung to their barracks even during the 3 severest plagues. Today the old quarters of that city are still dominated by elaborate domes and minarets dating from the Mamluk Sultanate, as these soldiers were also pious Muslims endowing dozens of reli- gious buildings. Yet the mamluks were often a paradox, horrifying more conventional Muslims with their elaborate displays, extravagant costume, and love of both public and private entertainment ~ the latter said to leave little to the imagination. (The Arabian Nights Tales, after all, reached their final form in Mamluk Cairo.) Few mamluks learned Arabic, and they normally married girls of Turkish slave origin or the daughters of other mamluks. During the late 13th century the mamluks viewed ‘many aspects of Mongol military organization, tactics, and weaponry as an ideal, believing that there was almost nothing for them to learn from Europe. ‘Compared with 13th-century Crusader armies, Mus- lims had shown superior discipline, particularly in unit cohesion and an ability to rally after defeat. Like the Ayyubid armies before them, Mamluk armies basically relied on a combination of traditional Islamic and newer Turkish Central Asian styles of warfare, In other respects, however, Mamluk mili- tary administration was more highly structured, and although the armies were still divided into distinct, sections these no longer had equal status. Instead there were clear differences between mamluk and freeborn troops. Tt would also be wrong to think that mamluk Siva KUFRA eer Kanem-Bornu ABESEHR AL ASHER Darfur Mamluk frontiers = ¢.1300 AD Wc 45040 Anatolia Sr ‘Ano Srazanan ‘f wine ae EB AisPP0, maroc? a Cyprus aggre fava namAnan (= (Wamluk f AIMS . SY Saenury Syria — I ahaa = eoanascus eAcHoAD ‘SURNNA “+ RASHID ACRE a AULA ALEXANDRIA ‘Nubian Kingdoms (Mamluk suzerainty) BASRA Arabia Abyssinia armies remained the same throughout Mamluk his- tory. Following the overthrow of the last Ayyubid Sultan in Egypt in 1250, freeborn Kurdish troops tended to migrate to Syria, where minor Ayyubid princes still reigned. Within only a few years the Mamluk Sultanate faced a devastating Mongol inva- sion which was halted at the decisive battle of Ayn Jalut in 1260. For the next few years Mamluk armies were a hotchpotch of mamluks, Ayyubid survivors and dissident Mongal refugees known as Wafidiyah. Anew army was then developed, and the great Sultan Baybars was largely responsible for its more formal, coherent military institutions. The Wafidiyah were now the main source of freeborn troops, some 3,000, of them arriving in Syria as fully trained adult warriors. But welcome as they were, these Wafidiyah were not allowed to remain a separate military unit, stead being dispersed amongst the mamluk regi- ments of the Sultan and his amir. Not surprisingly, military science was taken seriously in this militarized state. For centuries the Arabs and Persians had written books on military theory, but under the Mamluk Sultans practical treatises written for study by junior officers started to appear. Another characteristic of Mamluk govern- ment was its concern with spies and intelligence sources, political and military stratagems, secrecy and elaborate ruses. The Sultan used similar methods Werth as to monitor the loyalty as well as the competence of his senior amirs or officers; and the fact that the Sultan’s, ‘own mamluks were mostly stationed in Cairo’s huge Citadel, while most of the senior amirs and their troops also lived in Cairo city, made it easier for the ruler to keep an eye on everyone, Civil wars amongst the mamluk élite were common, but the ordinary people rarely suffered: such conflicts were short, normally involving only the mamluks themselves, and often ended with a ‘peace feast’ between the contend- ing parties. By the 15th century, however, it seemed that the mamluks did little real fighting, despite the faction-ridden state of the Sultanate. Those who survived the many plagues mostly died in their sixties, seventies or even eighties of heart attacks, hernias or gout. Even in the early 14th century, however, the Mamluk state showed the first signs of decay. Pride in traditions turned into an unwillingness to adopt new techniques, particularly firearms. A series of plagues cut deep into mamluk manpower, both in Egypt and in the recruiting grounds of southern Russia and the Ukraine, By the late 14th century rivalry between mamluks of Turkish and Circassian origin (recruited from the Caucasus and other parts of south-eastern Europe) led to various civil wars, The last serious external threat was that posed by Lenk (Tamerlane) in 1394-1401, after which internal imur-i (Bakri Mamluks: 1250-1390) AI Salih Isma’il 1342-1343, Al Muzaffar Ahmad 1421 bak 1250-1257 Al Kamil Sha’ban 1345-1346 Al Zahir Tatar 1421 Ali Tbn Aybak 1257-1259 Al Muzaffar Hajii 1346-1347 AlSalih Muhammad 42t-1422 Al Muzaffar Qutuz 1259-1260 ALNasir Hasan (1st reign) Al Ashraf Bars-bay 1422-1438 Baybars Bundukdari Al Salih Salih AI’Aziz Yusuf 1438 AISa‘id Baraka AI Nasir Hasan (2nd reign) AlZahir Jagmag 1438-1453 AD’Adil Salamish 1279 Al Mansur Muhammad Al Mansur "Uthman 1433 Al Mansur Qalaun 1279-1290 AL Ashraf Sha’ban Al Ashraf Inal 1453-1460 AI Ashraf Khalil 1290-1293 Al Mansur "Ali AI Mu’ayyad Ahmad 1460-1461 AI Nasir Muhammad AlSalih Haji (rst reign) 1381-1382 Al Zahir Khushqadam 46x 467 (istreign) 1293-1294 Al Zahir Barqug (1st reign; Al Zahir Yal-bay AVAdil Kitbugha 1294-1296 see Burji Mamluks below) 1382-1389 Al Zahir Timurbugha AI Mansur Lajin 1296-1298 AISalih Haji (2nd reign) 1389-1390 Al Ashraf Quit-bay AL Nasir Muhammad Al Nasir Muhammad (and reign) 1298-1308 (Burji Mamluks: 1390-1517) Al Zahir Qansuh Baybays Jashankir 1308-1309 AI Zahir Barqug (2nd reign) 1390-1398 Al Ashraf Janbalat 1500-1501 AINasir Muhammad AL Nasir Faraj(ist reign) 1308-1403 AI”Adil Tuman-bay 1501 (3rd reign) 1309-1340 AlMansur Abdal’Aziz 1405-1406 AL Ashraf Qunsur al Ghuri_ 1501-151 AI Mansur Abu Bakr Al Nasir Faraj (2nd reign) 1406-1412, Al Ashraf Tuman-bay 1516- Al Ashraf Qujug AI Nasir Ahmad Caliph Mustain (not mamlub) 1412 Al Mus'ayyad Shaykh 1gi2-1g2t rivalries gradually undermined the Sultanate. Other symptoms had already appeared, such as shorter military training, disobedience and weakened loyalty Promotion was often no longer by merit, and there was declining respect for experienced mamluks. Nevertheless, the Mamluk army which faced the invading Ottoman Turks at Raydaniyah outside Cairo in 1517 was still a powerful one, and it was, perhaps, only the mamluks’ lack of firearms that gave victory to the Turks. A itele known inlaid bronze candlestick-holder shows late Ayyubid or early Mamluk cavalrymen fighting with various weapons. Some ride laborately eaparisoned horses which also have chamfrons to protect their heads. Here a horse-archer carries no other weapon and has no visible armour, whereas the trooper with a Tong lance also has 2 sword and a lamellar jawshan Cuirass. (Private coll, Rome, author's photo) THE MAMLUK ARMY Islamic civilization had a different attitude towards slavery than that seen in western Europe: not only were slaves far better treated, but their status was quite honourable. Even the use of the word abd or ‘slave’ differed, Muslim men often including various ways of saying ‘Slave of God’ in their names, such as Abdullah, Abd al Aziz, Abd al Hamid, etc. The career opportunities open to. skilful mamluk, and the far higher standards of living in the Middle East, meant that there was often little resistance to being taken as a mamluk among the Turks of Central Asia. The khawajah or slave merchant was their first master, assessing their potential and bringing them to a tabagah or military slave market such as that in Cairo’s great Citadel. The price of individuals varied considerably, but by the 15th century it was normally around 50 to 70 dinars (by comparison a good war- horse cost 15 to 17 dinars). ‘Training was hard and warfare dangerous, but perhaps the greatest hazard was plague, the mamluk army always being hard hit by epidemic pestilence. Foreigners suffered worst: during the plague of 1459/60 one-third of all mamluks died, the proportion being even higher amongst the Sultan’s new recruits. ‘The older a mamluk grew the better were his chances of survival, for he developed the local immunities that, protected native Egyptians. Many young Kipchak ‘Turkish women, slaves and free, also arrived in the wake of mamluk recruits, bringing with them some of Central Asia’s traditions of sexual equality. At least one Mamluk Sultan’s wife gave advice not only on politics — which Muslim women had done since the time of the Prophet Muhammad — but even on details of military recruitment. In 1382 the rule of the largely Turkish Bahri (River) Mamluk Sultans was replaced by that of the basically Circassian Burji (Tower) Mamluk Sultans. The latter were essentially Europeans, mostly from the Christian regions of the Caucasus and Russia. Never particularly renowned for their military skills, they had for long been regarded as a second-best, source of manpower. Nevertheless these Circassians gradually increased in numbers, often causing trouble for the dominant Turks, until they finally took over. Thereafter successful Circassian mamluks often summoned their entire families to share their good fortune. This led to an influx of adult foreigners who, on the basis of family connections alone, were sometimes given senior rank despite their lack of military training. Africa had long been another source of slaves, but these had only occasionally played an important military role, Now, however, African eunuchs became prominent in the mamJuk training system. As a separate corps within the ‘Men of the Sword’ they moved between the Sultan’s military schools and the Sultan’s harim, both of which were in the Cairo Citadel, In the former they taught young mamluks, while in the latter they taught the Sultan’s many children. ‘The best career opportunities were open to those young slaves bought by the ruler himself. These kuttub students were sent to tabagah schools for religious, literary and military education until they were adults, when they were freed as the Sultan’s own mamluks. Discipline in the abagahs was strict, but at the end of his training each kuttub received his ‘itagah certificate, a uniform, horse, bows, arrows, quivers, armour and some swords. Available evidence sug- gests that, at least during the late 13th century, this training system led to attitudes of leadership and loyalty similar to those expected of a modern Sand- hurst or West Point graduate officer. For example, the losses suffered by professional Muslim troops during the siege of Acre in 1291 reveal a proportion of 13 officers killed for 83 men (1:6.4) ~ much higher than the actual ratio of officers to men. Even during the decline of the 15th century most mamluks still went through such military schools, though their training was now perfunctory. The survival of so many furusiyah training ‘manuals means that more is known about the training, of Mamluk forces than any other medieval army. It was based on a number of maydan training grounds, their number and state of repair reflecting the country’s military readiness. During the Bahri or carly Mamluk period there were several of these in Cairo alone, the Maydan al Salihi having been built during the reign the Ayyubid Sultanal Salih, founder of the Bahri regiment. It stood on the banks of the Nile and was mainly used for polo. The Maydan al 7 Salihi was abandoned during the reign of Sultan Baybars, who replaced it with his own Maydan al Zabiri, which had manazir or terraces for spectators. The Maydan al Qabaq was also built for Baybars, nearer the Citadel, and was the army’s main cavalry training ground; it had sibag marble columns which did not, as once thought, mark out a horse-racing circuit but were distance markers for long-range archery contests. The biggest maydans were s deed by stone walls and contained wells, water wheels, drinking fountains, palms and other trees, ‘palaces’ for the ruler and his amirs, as well as stables for horse breeding. Smaller maydans were built by senior amirs, but Sultan al Nasir had these closed down in 1333 Baybars himself trained in a maydan daily from noon until the evening prayer, accompanied by two from every ten amirs to avoid overcrowding. In fact, _furusiyah exercises were almost a spectator sport in the big cities. Furusiyak itself was not a code of military conduct and loyalty, such as the ideal of chivalry admired by the knightly class of medieval Europe, nor was it an ideal of courage. Rather, roun= The most famous illustration of mamluk warriors is on the silver- inlaid bronze Baptistére de St. Louis made around AD 1300. In one combat scene a bearded horse-archer is attacked by younger men with spear and sword. The only visible armour is a broad-brimmed helmet (or hat), possibly with a pendant aventail, ofa man who also has a short staff in his left hand. A second scene shows the same weapons being used while two figures also wear armour. Both again hav broad-brimmed helmets with possible aventails, That on the left includes something over the shoulders like a European Coif, while the horseman in the centre has mail protecting most of his face. Inaddition he wears the large lamellar jawshan normally associated with the Mongols. (Louvre Mus., inv. LP 16, Paris) furusiyah was a system of physical fitness and specific military skills. These were basically as follows: la’b al rumh or lance play; la’b al kura or polo; gabaq or archery at a high target; gighaj or archery at a ground target; samg al birjas, another form of archery and possibly use of the javelin; ramy bi'/ bundug, shooting with a pellet bow; ramy al nushshab, archery in general; darb bi’l sayf, sword fencing; fann al dabbus, use of a mace; sira’ wrestling; samq al mahmil, displays associated with the return of Muslim pilgrims from Mecca; says, hunting; and sibag al khayl, horse racing, Archery is generally regarded as the mamluks’ most important military skill; and to conserve their horses, particularly when fighting Mongols with far larger reserves of mounts, the mamluks practised shooting ‘at rest’ with a very high rate of release. To counter the greater mobility of his Mongol foe the mamluk was also expected to hit a gscm target at a range of 75 metres, and to loose three arrows in one and a half seconds (a much faster rate than attributed to the vaunted English archers at Agincourt) Mamluk furusiyah manuscripts include exei using crossbows both on horseback and on foot, this weapon being regarded as suitable for small or inexperienced cavalrymen. The sword, perhaps sur- prisingly, seems to have been a secondary weapon for horsemen, who relied more on bows and spears. Hunting served as a military exercise in all medieval countries; and in the 13th century the ‘mamluks used the same highly organized large-scale hunting techniques as the Mongols, with a huge circle of horsemen surrounding a tract of countryside before gradually closing in to slaughter the trapped animals. Unlike the European knight, the fully qualified mamluk was trained not only to put on and ter take off his own armour but to do so whilst on a moving horse ~ as well as to look after his own arms, armour and horse. After being issued with his first set of kit, the mamluk had to equip himself or get replacements from his officer. The most complete armour was generally reserved for the Sultan’s élite troops, but richer auxiliary units could also be well equipped: in 1280, for example, 4,000 Arab warriors of the Banu Murra tribe entered Mamluk service, each wearing a mail-lined kazaghand covered in red satin. Most arms, armour and harness was made in the big cities. Various chronicles describe how busy, crowded and noisy such arms bazaars could be when a major military expedition was being prepared. Arms were also imported, even from Italy, despite repeated Papal bans on such a trade, while captured enemy weaponry was reused or passed on to allies as gifs. Captured Mongol armours were, for example, sent far south to the Yemen in the late 13th century. Furusiyah manuals list much of the kit that a properly equipped mamluk should carry, but little is, known of the cost of armour. In 1299, during the emergency of a Mongol invasion, the price of the chest-piece of a lamellar jamshan jumped from ten dirhams (the cost of two sheep in autumn) to 100 dirhams. In the x4th century such jamshans were regarded as additional protection to be worn over a mail dir’ hauberk. A padded gargal could also be worn beneath the jamshan and over the dir’, Later gargals may have incorporated iron lamellae or scales, and they replaced the kazaghand, which was a padded, cloth-covered and often highly decorated mail gar- ment. True mail-and-plate armour probably did not reach the Mamluk area until the 15th century, where it may have been knownas libasal hadi al munaddad, ‘a garment of layed iron.’ Turbans had long been used as a form of head protection, but the more heavily armoured mamluks wore iron helmets mail aventails. The sliding nasal bar, so characteristic of later Muslim helmets, now appeared, and was used by horse archers; when raised such nasals were less likely to snag the archer’s bowstring. By the late Middle Ages the composite bow had evolved into an astonishingly effective weapon; being more reliable, with greater range and penetration, than all but the most powerful crossbows, it gave the ‘mamluks greater ‘firepower’ than their Crusader foes. But the mamluks also used crossbows, not only for 10 Mamluk armour and ‘helmets, plus the spear, ‘sword and bow, are shown on this early 1gch-cencury inlaid bronze bowl. The rider on the left has a full Jamellarjawshan cuirass ‘anda pointed helmet with a pendant neck-guard. The ‘swordsman in the centre has a similar helmet of ‘segmented construction, while the horse-archer is more lightly equipped. (Inv. 13597, Mus. fir Islam. Kunst, Staat. Museen Berlin) hunting but also in siege and naval warfare. These were sophisticated weapons, the jarkh being spanned by a wheel or windlass at an early date, while around 1368 the furusiyah writer Taybugha claimed to have invented a clip to hold the crossbow nut in place ~ a feature not seen in Europe until the 16th century. The late 13th-century