“Defending the Storehouse” by

Jason Askew. Art courtesy An-

glo Zulu War Historical Society,
www.anglozuluwar.com.

BATTLE ANALYSIS:
The Battle at Rorke’s Drift
by Captain Arch Ratliff III

Although the following analysis of the jor avenues of approach between Trans- British center column prior to their ar-
Battle of Rorke’s Drift is presented in vaal, Natal, and Zululand was meant to rival at Ulundi, to force a favorable res-
an after action review (AAR) format, keep the Zulu army from conducting a olution with the British government.”4
with obviously fictional dialogue, the counterattack into the two territories.
information that forms the basis of the The endstate desired was the destruc- O/C: “Thank you. Lieutenant Chard,
please describe the situation at Rorke’s
analysis is factual and taken from the tion of the Zulu main body in Zululand,
accompanying bibliography of texts. and to prevent enemy forces from con- Drift prior to the battle.”
ducting counterattacks into Transvaal Rorke’s Drift commander, Lieuten-
Observer controller (O/C): “Good and Natal.”2 ant Chard: “As an engineer officer, I
morning gentlemen, let’s get started was sent to Rorke’s Drift to repair dam-
with our AAR for the battle at Rorke’s O/C: “Thank you. King Cetshwayo, age caused by the heavy traffic from
Drift. We have the British army com- please describe for us your mission and the center column’s crossing. The com-
mander, the garrison commander at intent for your army.” mander of the outpost, Major Spalding
Rorke’s Drift, the Zulu army com- left for Helpmekaar on the morning of
mander, and the Zulu commander at Zulu King Cetshwayo: “My mission
for the army was to defend in depth 22 January to help along the reinforce-
Rorke’s Drift all present. Let us begin ments promised us. Due to my senior-
with a review of the British army’s mis- along the major avenue of approach
from Natal to disrupt the center col- ity, he left me in charge of the outpost
sion. Lord Chelmsford.” in his absence.5
umn’s advance to Ulundi.3
British commander, Lord Chelms- “There were several aspects of terrain
ford: “Our mission was to attack in “The decisive point of the operation that I failed to consider during my ini-
zone to destroy the Zulu army’s main was the attrition of the enemy heavily tial estimate of the situation, until they
body along the center axis of advance and quickly on Zulu soil. I realized ear-
ly on that the British would move on became significant factors in the battle.
into Zululand to prevent the enemy I will refer to the accompanying sketch
from attacking settlements in Transvaal Ulundi in an attempt to draw us out in map (Map 1) throughout my descrip-
and Natal.1 an open fight. I also fully comprehend-
ed the logistics resources available to tion of the situation.
“The decisive point of the operation the British army, especially if the home “The drift was located on the Mzin-
was destroying the Zulu main body government perceived us as a true threat yathe River and was trafficable except
within the borders of Zululand. My in- to their colonial expansion. Therefore, during periods of extreme flooding.
tent was to advance into Zululand along my intent was to conduct a limited de- The outpost was approximately one-
multiple axis of advance from Trans- fensive campaign within the borders of half mile from the crossing and con-
vaal and Natal to destroy the Zulu main Zululand aimed at atritting the British sisted of two existing buildings con-
body before we arrived at the Royal without appearing to be the aggressor. verted into a hospital and a commissary
Kraal at Ulundi. Our advance along ma- The endstate desired was to disrupt the storehouse.6

ARMOR — January-February 2003 31

 REFERENCE

Sketch Map last line

of defence
D door W window

0 10 20 30 40 50
metres
a p p r o x. s c a l e

garden
fence

h
di
tc
r o a d
hIgh s h rough stone
wall 1.52m
b u kraal
ro ck
wall of mealie bags
wc 1.21m
W

xes
W stoop D
W D

it bo
D
W well
W D D W heap of built rock
mealie

biscu
mealie bags kraal
bags 1.21m
wagons W W
door above
stoop
ditch and below
D D W DW
W
bank 61cm

bank 61cm high

oven

cook
oven house

Map 1. The Defense of Rorke’s Drift courtesy South African Military History Society, “The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, Isandlwana and
Rorke’s Drift” by G.A. Chadwick, Military History Journal, Vol. 4, No. 4, December 1978, http://rapidttp.com/milhist/vol044gc.html.

“Not many natural obstacles existed and concealment from the enemy, but “Even though the enemy seemed to
apart from the Mzinyathe River to the we lacked the resources to completely come from all sides, it became evident
north and Shiyane Hill, 500 meters to cover the deadspace it created.8 that two main avenues of approach ex-
the south. There were, however, several isted into the outpost. The first, from
man-made obstacles including a well- “Generally, observation was good, ex- the west, took advantage of the blind
built stone kraal to the east that meas- cept for a blind spot on the west wall of spot created by the design of the hospi-
ured 17x10 meters, and a rough stone the hospital, and the small intervisibil- tal and would eventually prove the open
kraal northeast of the storehouse that ity line created by the retaining wall yard in west sector to be untenable. The
measured 30x30 meters. A barricade of along the ledge. Unfortunately, time second was in the north and used the
mealie bags formed a perimeter be- did not permit the clearance of the brush to the north of the ledge. It pro-
tween the hospital, the storehouse, and brush north of the ledge, which limited vided a superb assault position for the
the well-built kraal. Additionally, bis- target acquisition in that area.9 enemy and allowed them a location to
cuit boxes stacked two-high formed a “Although the battlefield was fairly regroup after each attack.”11
wall that divided the outpost into two contained due to the small size of the
sectors, the west sector that included O/C: “Let’s continue with the Zulu
the hospital and its large open yard, and defense, there were a number of key commander at Rorke’s Drift. Prince Da-
pieces of terrain in the small area. Shi- bulamanzi, please explain your intent
the east sector that included the smaller yane Hill, a rocky hill to the south over-
yard, the storehouse, and the well-built and concept of operations for the attack
looked the outpost and provided a su- on the outpost.”
kraal.7 perb location for an enemy support by
“A line of rocks forming a 1.5-meter- fire position. Had the enemy been able Zulu commander at Rorke’s Drift,
high ledge was located 5 meters from to provide accurate and sustained fire Prince Dabulamanzi: “During the at-
the hospital running east to west across from the hill, it would have rendered tack on the encampment at Isandlwana
the entire length of the outpost, pro- our position untenable within minutes. on the morning of 22 January, I was
viding excellent cover for the enemy. The two buildings at the outpost and with approximately 4,000 warriors of
The mealie bag barricades were erected well-built kraal were key terrain due to the uThuwana, iNdlondlo, and uDloko
along the axis of the ledge to allow us the cover that they provided for the Regiments, as well as elements of the
to fire down into the deadspace that it defender. Initially, I thought that the iNdluyengwe Regiment. As the main
provided, and in fact, it had the effect loss of any one of these, especially the body pursued British scouts and over-
of creating an 8-foot barrier on the at- storehouse, would have resulted in the ran the center column’s encampment at
tacker’s side. However, the thick brush defeat of the defense. The brush to the Isandlwana, we served as the reserve
to the north of the ledge provided ex- north of the ledge provided a location force and, therefore, did not take part in
cellent concealment to within meters of to advance a large number of personnel the assault. With this in mind, I in-
the ledge and some 5 meters from the without immediate observation, a tactic tended to press the attack on the British
perimeter. At the base of the ledge, a that was successfully employed against by attacking the outpost near Rorke’s
retaining wall allowed for some cover us repeatedly during battle.10 Drift as the remainder of the main body

32 ARMOR — January-February 2003

continued to search for the larger por- through the first Zulu attack on the gar- sector of the garrison. They immediately
tion of the center column that had not rison.” raced toward us, covering the ground
been present at the encampment that more quickly than expected. Even though
morning. My estimate of the situation Lieutenant Chard: “Although we the Martini-Henry 0.450 caliber rifles
heard shots all morning coming from
was that the garrison could have no Isandlwana, it was not until a Natal Na- we used could fire out to 1,000 yards, I
more than a few hundred soldiers and held fire until 500 yards to more accu-
we had just defeated more than 1,300 at tive Horse Troop raced by the garrison rately mass our fires.”17
that we received our first intelligence
Isandlwana. It seemed a simple enough update. Having taken part in the defeat
operation.”12 O/C: “Prince Dabulamanzi, what was
at Isandlwana, they had no intention of your understanding of the situation at
O/C: “How did attacking the garrison staying at the drift and quickly rode this point?”
at Rorke’s Drift meet your higher com- away. Much of the Natal Native Con-
mander’s intent for the campaign?” tingent followed their lead and aban- Prince Dabulamanzi: “I quickly po-
doned post. It reduced our effective sitioned myself on top of Shiyane Hill
Prince Dabulamanzi: “Well, it did combat power from approximately 350 to observe the battle and more easily
not meet with the king’s intent to con- control the attack. At this stage, I knew
duct defensive operations on Zulu soil. men to around 150, the bulk of which
was made up of Lieutenant Bromhead’s that the advanced guard had immedi-
However, my warriors did not get to Company B, 2d Battalion, 24th Regi- ately launched into an attack on arrival
take part in the battle at Isandlwana, at the garrison. They sought to immedi-
and they could not return home without ment. The Natal Native Horse Troop
commander did inform us of the results ately overwhelm the force when they
‘washing their spears.’ I had hoped that of the battle and it was my understand- saw it was even smaller than expected.
a successful attack would counteract any However, by 1640 hours, the continu-
repercussions from King Cetshwayo for ing that the entire center column had
been destroyed. It was not until after ous volley of rifle fire from the store-
attacking into Natal. However, a suc- the battle that I learned only the en- house and the hospital had created such
cessful attack was not to be the case.”13 campment at Isandlwana, and not the a heavy crossfire that the assault was
O/C: “Thank you. Please continue with main body of the center column, had halted some 50 meters from the perime-
your scheme of maneuver.” been destroyed.15 ter.18
Prince Dabulamanzi: “My scheme of “After the situation update from the “I would like to point out that although
maneuver for the attack on Rorke’s Natal Native Horse Troop commander, our force was numerically superior, the
Drift was based on our standard tactics I began considering our options. After relatively small size of the enemy’s gar-
that have been employed for decades consulting with subordinates and Lieu- rison prevented us from using our size
and served us successfully earlier in the tenant Bromhead, we came up with two as an advantage. As we tried to attack
day at Isandlwana. As we advanced on basic courses of action. The first was the small, weak points of the enemy’s
the garrison, the regiments were de- for the garrison to pack up as much as defense, we quickly became backed up
ployed into the standard ‘bull’s head’ possible including the infirm, of which at the point of penetration. This meant
formation with an advanced guard in we had about 30 men, and move to that every time we massed our forces
front, the main body directly to the rear, Helpmekaar approximately 30 miles they were much deeper than they were
and two ‘horns’ or crescent-shaped for- away, to join the reserve force that had wide and this limited the number of
mations to each flank of the advanced been left there. The second was to stay warriors that we could bring to bear
guard. The advanced guard would fix and establish a perimeter defense at the against gaps in the garrison defense at
the enemy, while the flanking forma- garrison and use our massed rifle fire to any one time. Combine this bottleneck
tions would envelop the enemy to block repel enemy attacks. Neither option with the massed fires tearing through
its withdrawal. The main body was seemed very appealing at the time. our ranks, and it made for a formidable
then employed at the weakest point to However, after considering the enemy’s barrier to overcome.
destroy the enemy. The bull formation tactics, his ability to move great dis- “However, while acknowledging the
and subsequent enveloping maneuver is tances, and his desire to use envelop- physical effects that the rifle fire had on
a direct reflection of our warfighting ment to overwhelm his enemy, I knew our formations, at this point the psy-
philosophy, which favors tactical ma- that conducting any type of road march chological effects of sustained volleys
neuver to apply overwhelming force at over 30 miles of open ground would of rifle fire were negligible. In fact, the
the enemy’s weakest point. Although play to the enemy’s advantage. There- 18-inch bayonet that the British used
we travel on foot, our warriors are some fore, I chose the second course of ac- was much more intimidating. It out-
of the best conditioned in the world and tion to stay and defend the garrison.16 reached our stabbing spear by more
have no trouble running for miles and “I placed an observation post (OP) at than 2 feet, and each warrior readily un-
launching directly into multiple-hour derstood its effects.”19
close combat battles using our stabbing the top of Shiyane Hill to give me ad-
vance warning, and at around 1600
spears and shields.”14 hours, it informed us that a Zulu army O/C: “Seeing that the garrison was
able to effectively repel your initial as-
O/C: “As we commence analysis of of about 4,000 warriors was moving east sault and that your maneuver-style tac-
the battle, please keep in mind that we toward the garrison. The OP could see
are particularly interested in key events that they were starting to transition into tics had little effect on the defense,
what was your intent with the arrival of
and how the warfighting functions of their ‘bull’s head’ formation, at which
command and control, maneuver, fires, point we immediately manned the entire the main body?”
intelligence, logistics, and force protec- 100-yard perimeter. At 1630 hours, we Prince Dabulamanzi: “After the ad-
tion were tied into the actions of the saw the initial elements of the Zulu ar- vanced guard’s attack was repelled, the
battle. Lieutenant Chard, please talk us my at about 600 yards west of the west remaining warriors moved around the

ARMOR — January-February 2003 33

west of the hospital and to an assault O/C: “Lieutenant Chard, it was at Prince Dabulamanzi: “It quickly be-
position in the thick brush north of the about this time, around 1800 hours, that came apparent that by consolidating
western sector. By 1645 hours, they you withdrew your men from the west- their perimeter in the east, our seizing
had commenced a series of assaults on ern sector and consolidated and reorga- the hospital would not cause the desired
the north perimeter by the hospital. At nized your defense solely in the eastern penetration of their defense. In fact, due
1655 hours, seeing heavy fire to the sector with the small yard, the store- to the enemy’s covering fire of the
southwest and the advanced guard en- house, and the well-built kraal. What large open yard, seizing the hospital put
gaged in an assault from the bush at the was your intent by consolidating and us further from the enemy than at any
north, the main body moved to support reorganizing the defense and what ef- other point around the garrison. In addi-
the advanced guard’s assault.20 fects did it have on the battle? tion to the shear distance of open space
created by the British withdrawal, the
“It was then that I placed approximate- Lieutenant Chard: “We were defend- fire on the hospital roof served to illu-
ly 100 marksmen armed with Brown ing a 100-yard perimeter and started tak- minate the area as darkness fell.25
Bess flintlock rifles, relics of the Napo- ing a number of casualties. I was con-
leonic wars, on Shiyane Hill. However, cerned that we would not have suffi- “Seizing the hospital did gain us one
fires from the riflemen, due to the anti- cient numbers to man the entire perime- advantage; it enabled us to use the
quated rifles and the lack of marksman- ter, and therefore decided to consoli- ledge and mealie bag perimeter on the
ship training, failed to produce the de- date my defense within the eastern sec- northwest side of the garrison as a cov-
sired effects on the garrison. Converse- tor.”23 ered and concealed assault position.
ly, the British soldiers on the southern This position became critical as the
perimeter, being free from the attacks O/C: “This left the hospital undefend- weakest point of the new defense be-
along the northern barricade, were able ed. As you mentioned in your estimate came the northeastern corner of the
to fire accurately at the riflemen on the of the situation, the hospital was deter- eastern sector perimeter where the bis-
hill. The heavy billows of smoke from mined to be key terrain, and without it, cuit box wall tied into the mealie bag
the black powder gave excellent aiming you expected the garrison defense to barricade. We tried to penetrate at this
points for the British soldiers.”21 fail. How did you expect to overcome point, and succeeded in causing several
the loss of the hospital with your new enemy casualties, but again, due to the
defensive position?” small size of the gap in the enemy de-
O/C: “Fighting continued along the
northern perimeter as the main body Lieutenant Chard: “Although the fense, we could never mass enough war-
joined the fight with the assaulting Zu- hospital was key terrain, as the battle riors to break through before being
lus spreading out to the east along the progressed it became evident that if the repelled by close combat supported by
entire length of the northern perimeter. large open yard were left to the enemy, volumes of enemy fire.26
By 1800 hours, numerous uncoordinat- it would give them no greater tactical “When darkness fell at 1930 hours, we
ed assaults had occurred along the north- advantage than they already had. shifted our attack to the eastern flank of
ern perimeter and to the west at the the garrison to assault the perimeter
hospital. Prince Dabulamanzi, what was “With the same number of soldiers
covering a perimeter of approximately from an area that was not illuminated
the intent of these assaults?” by the hospital’s burning roof. How-
30 yards instead of 100, I was able to
make my defense much more compact. ever, attacking in the dark again ex-
Prince Dabulamanzi: “There was no It also became an issue of force protec- posed a fault in our command and con-
‘intent’ in the military sense of the tion as the eastern sector was almost trol system as hand and arm signals
word, other than to overwhelm the en- completely obscured from the Zulu were used extensively to coordinate the
emy through repeated assaults. These marksmen to the south on Shiyane Hill. large formations. We were now re-
assaults were in effect uncoordinated Although the Zulu marksmen may not quired to shout orders over the sound of
above the small-unit level. The officers have been able to achieve their com- rifle fire and war cries, causing more
at the subordinate levels were control- mander’s desired effects, their sus- confusion than anything else.”27
ling the assaults at this point. Without tained rifle fire still had some effects on O/C: “The Zulu assaults on the east-
the ability to maneuver freely, they had the garrison, especially into the large ern perimeter did, however, succeed in
started to rely on mass, trying to over- open yard. In fact, with our withdrawal,
whelm the perimeter. However, they pushing the British defense out of the
we were now able to cover the large well-built kraal, leaving only the store-
were doing so without coordination be- open yard by fire, turning it into a ‘no- house and the small open yard as a pe-
tween the different units. Remember, man’s land.’ Really, the only problem
we had four different regiments attack- rimeter. Lieutenant Chard and Prince
with the contraction of the defense is Dabulamanzi, please take us from this
ing a 50-meter perimeter at the north that it isolated the men in the hospital. point to the end of the battle, and ex-
wall, and I was not in a position to con- However, once the thatched hospital
trol the attack at the small-unit level. It plain why the defense did not fold with
roof was set on fire at about 1930 the fall of the well-built kraal.”
was a breakdown of the command and hours, most men in the hospital made
control structure caused by our failure the dangerous withdrawal across the Lieutenant Chard: “The assault on
to adapt to the enemy’s small, well-de- open yard to the eastern sector.”24 the well-built kraal from the east did
fended garrison. We did realize, how- cause concern because it allowed the
ever, that the hospital proved to be the O/C: “Prince Dabulamanzi, with the enemy to maneuver within feet of our
weak point in the defense and the war- consolidation and reorganization of the perimeter that was covered by the rock
riors on the west side made a concerted British defense, how did you change walls of the kraal. However, we estab-
effort to seize the hospital.”22 your overall attack on the defense?” lished a redoubt in the center of the

34 ARMOR — January-February 2003

 8Knight,
small yard that allowed a small group point. Our maneuver tactics are superb Rorke’s Drift 1879, pp. 26-30.
of soldiers to fire over the soldiers man- in the open ground, but are less effec- 9Ibid.
ning the perimeter and down into the tive against a well-armed enemy using 10Ibid., pp. 28-36; and Victor Davis Hanson,
deadspace created by the kraal. This a perimeter defense. We need to have
did not allow the enemy to effectively better trained riflemen and rifles to act Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the
Rise of Western Power, Doubleday, New York,
use the kraal to advance toward our as a support by fire as we advance to 2001, p. 289.
perimeter. More disconcerting to our destroy the enemy in close combat.
11Knight, Rorke’s Drift 1879, p. 40.
situation was the low amount of am- Until we achieve this level of coordina-
munition we had left. We started with tion of effective fire and movement, the 12Laband, pp. 231-233.
20,000 rounds and by the last assault enemy will use their superior firepower 13Hanson,
were down to 900. Any further assaults to attrit us before we can close with and pp. 291-292; Laband, p. 233.
would have surely resulted in a com- destroy them. 14Hanson, pp. 317-321.
plete hand-to-hand fight without sup- 15Morris, p. 397.
porting fires.”28 “Our command and control system also
needs improvement, as we will increas- 16Ibid., pp. 392-395.
Prince Dabulamanzi: “Even though ingly be required to conduct night op- 17Knight,
erations. Current hand and arm signals Rorke’s Drift 1879, pp. 36-40.
fighting continued until well past mid-
night, this attack’s failure to produce a do not always allow us to adequately 18Ibid., p. 41.
decisive result proved to be the culmi- coordinate the maneuver of subordinate 19Ibid., p. 40.
nating point of the operation. It was elements while allowing the command-
20Ibid., pp. 42-44.
around 2100 hours, and our warriors er to take up an observation point on
had been fighting for over 4 hours non- the high ground. The use of runners and 21Ibid., pp. 44-45.
stop and had sustained hundreds of ca- messengers, as well as the practice of 22Hanson,
organizing into standard formations for pp. 318-321.
sualties. We continued to conduct lim-
ited assaults on the perimeter for an- units smaller than a regiment, will al- 23Knight, Rorke’s Drift 1979, pp. 46-48.
other hour, but were repelled by heavy low us to exercise greater control over 24Ibid., pp. 48-50.
fires each time. Hearing the British our warriors in the attack.”
25Morris, pp. 412-413; Laband, p. 236.
cheers at the defeat of the final charge
at 2200 hours, we withdrew into the Lieutenant Chard: “Until the Zulus 26Knight, Rorke’s Drift 1879, p. 48.
darkness to regroup. We kept up heavy can employ sustained and accurate fires 27Ibid.,
to support their movement, we will p. 65.
fires at the enemy perimeter until after
midnight and then a few times after overcome their maneuver tactics by 28Laband, p. 236; Knight, Rorke’s Drift 1879, p.
midnight, but this was merely an attack forming a perimeter defense and using 69.
by fire and did not support any further massed fires to repel their assaults be- 29Laband, p. 236; Knight, Rorke’s Drift 1879,
assaults on the garrison. By 0400 hours, fore they close with our positions. As pp. 67-69; Morris, pp. 414-415.
the last shots were fired against the evidenced by the number of rounds
garrison and our regiments had with- we used to repel the attack — almost
drawn behind Shiyane Hill. A small 20,000 — logistics sustainment will be CAPT Arch Ratliff III, U.S. Marine
contingent returned around 0700 hours critical to executing this tactic.” Corps, is an assistant S3, Opera-
to observe the garrison but soon left, O/C: “Thank you gentlemen. That tions and Training, 3d Assault Am-
moving to the southeast to meet up concludes our AAR for the battle of phibian Battalion, 1st Marine Divi-
with the main body.”29 sion, Camp Pendleton, CA. He re-
Rorke’s Drift.”
O/C: “Thank you, let’s please finish ceived a B.S. from Brigham Young
up with a few conclusions from the bat- University. He has served in various
tle. What actions during the battle would Notes command and staff positions, in-
you like to see sustained in future op- cluding S4, 2d Transportation Sup-
1Donald R. Morris, The Washing of the Spears,
erations, and which require improve- port Battalion, Camp Lejeune, NC;
ment? Prince Dabulamanzi.” Simon and Schuster, Inc., New York, 1965, p.
294. commanding officer, Beach and
Prince Dabulamanzi: The fierce man- 2Ibid.,
Terminal Operations Company, 2d
pp. 294-295.
ner in which our warriors executed Transportation Support Battalion,
3Ian
their assaults is definitely the key ac- Knight, The Zulus, Osprey Publishing Ltd., Camp Lejeune; commanding offi-
London, 1989, p. 31. cer, Bridge Company, 8th Engineer
tion that should be sustained in future
4John Laband, The Rise & Fall of the Zulu Na-
operations. It was the only element that Support Battalion, Camp Lejeune;
kept us in the fight after it came to light tion, Arms and Armour Press, New York, 1997, commanding officer, Headquarters
that our maneuver tactics and massed p. 213.
and Services Company, 8th Engi-
assaults were not overcoming the en- 5Ian Knight, Rorke’s Drift 1879: Pinned Like
neer Support Battalion, Camp Le-
emy defenses. Rats in a Hole, Osprey Publishing Limited, Ox- jeune; S4, 8th Engineer Support
ford, U.K., 1996, p. 23.
“However, we will never overcome Battalion, Camp Lejeune; and pla-
6Michael Barthrop, The Zulu War, A Pictorial
the massed rifle fires from a fixed de- toon commander, D Company, 3d
History, Blandford Press, U.K., 1980, p. 77.
fensive position if we do not revise our Assault Amphibian Battalion, 29
7Ibid.,
tactics for attacking an enemy strong- pp. 74-75. Palms, CA.

ARMOR — January-February 2003 35