Quimen vs CA Thus, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right

G.R. No. 112331. May 29, 1996 of way through Anastacia’s property. The proposed way was
unobstructed except for an avocado tree standing in the middle.
Facts:
Anastacia denies ever promising Yolanda a right of way. She also
insists that passing through the property of Yolanda’s parents is more
Petitioner Anastacia Quimen, together with her 3 brothers and sister,
accessible to the public road than to make a detour to her property
inherited a piece of property in Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the
and cut down the avocado tree standing thereon.
property equally among themselves. The shares of Anastacia and 3
other siblings were next to the municipal road. Anastacia’s was at the
Anastacia also argues that when Yolanda purchased the second lot,
extreme left of the road while the lots on the right owned by her
the easement of right of way she provided was ipso jure extinguished
brother and sister were sold to Catalina Santos. A portion of the lots
as a result of the merger of ownership of the dominant and the
behind Anastacia’s owned by her brother Antonio were sold by her (as
servient estates in one person so that there was no longer any
her brother’s adminstratix) to respondent Yolanda.
compelling reason to provide private respondent with a right of way as
there are other surrounding lots suitable for the purpose.
Yolanda was initially hesitant to buy the property because it had no
access to the public road. But Anastacia assured Yolanda that she
Anastacia strongly maintains that the proposed right of way is not the
would give her a right of way on her adjoining property (which was in
shortest access to the public road because of the detour and that,
front) for P200 per square meter.
moreover, she is likely to suffer the most damage as she derives a net
income of P600.00 per year from the sale of the fruits of her avocado
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using
tree, and considering that an avocado has an average life span of
as her passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia’s
seventy (70) years, she expects a substantial earning from it.
property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the
pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact, she was
Issue/s:
thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property.

1. Whether or not there was a valid grant of an easement

After a few years, Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio, located
2. Whether or not the right of way proposed by Yolonda is the
directly behind the property of her parents who, out of love, provided
least onerous/least prejudicial to the parties
her a pathway between their house.

Ruling: YES to both

However, while the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not
adequate for ingress and egress because it is blocked by her parents’
1. The conditions for a valid grant of an easement of right of way
sari sari store made of strong materials.
are:
 a. the dominant estate is surrounded by other dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will
immovables without an adequate outlet to a public cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as
highway; elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur
b. the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least
indemnity; damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.
c. the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant
estate; and, In this case, the proposed right of way of Yolanda will cause
d. the right of way being claimed is at a point least the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the
prejudicial to the servient estate. suggested passage through the property of Yolanda’s father
which would mean destroying the sari-sari store made of
These elements were clearly present. The evidence clearly strong materials.
shows that the property of private respondent is hemmed in by
the estates of other persons including that of petitioner; that As between a right of way that would demolish a store of
she offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for her right of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and
way as agreed between her and petitioner; that she did not another right of way which although longer will only require an
cause the isolation of her property; that the right of way is the avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be
least prejudicial to the servient estate. These facts are preferred.
confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk of court,
more so that the trial court itself declared that “the said
properties of Antonio Quimen which were purchased by
plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated from the
public highway and there appears an imperative need for an
easement of right of way to the public highway.

2. Article 650 of the NCC explicitly states that “the easement of

right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.”

The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must

prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a
matter of judicial appreciation. When the easement may be
established on any of several tenements surrounding the
 Leogario Ronquillo vs. Jose Roco ISSUE: Whether an easement of right of way can be acquired thru
G.R. No. L-10619 February 28, 1958 prescription.

HELD:
FACTS:

NO. An easement of right of way though it may be apparent is,

The plaintiffs Leogario Ronquillo and other alleged that they have
nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be
been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or
acquired through prescription, but only by virtue of a title.
passageway which traversed the land of the defendants and their
predecessors in interest, in going to Igualdad Street and the
Under the New Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether
marketplace of Naga City, from their residential land and back, for
apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title (Articles 620
more than 20 years.
and 622)
Plaintiffs further claim that the predecessors in interest of defendants
Thus, it would therefore appear that the easement of right of way may
have long recognized and respected their private legal easement of
not be acquired through prescription.
road right of way.

Even Article 1959 of the Old Civil Code providing for prescription of
In 1953, the defendants Jose Roco and their men constructed a
ownership and other real rights in real property, excludes therefrom
chapel in the middle of the said right of way which, accordingly,
the exception established by Article 539, referring to discontinuous
impeded, obstructed and disturbed the continuous exercise of the
easements, such as, easement of right of way.
rights of the plaintiffs over said right of way.

Further, in the case of Cuayong vs. Benedicto, where the point in

The next year, defendants planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed
issue was whether or not vested rights in a right of way can be
wire and hermetically closed the road passageway and their right of
acquired through user from time immemorial, the Court held that no
way against the plaintiff’s protests and opposition. This prevented
discontinuous easement could be acquired by prescription in any
them from going to or coming from their homes to Igualdad Street and
event.
the public market of the City of Naga.

Plaintiffs thereafter filed a complaint against the defendants, alleging

that they have acquired the easement of right of way over the land of
the defendants and the latter's predecessors in interest thru
prescription.
 Remigio O Ramos, Sr. vs. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., et. al.
G.R. No. 75905; October 12, 1987 Ruling:

NO. A compulsory right of way can not be obtained unless the

Facts:
following four requisites are first shown to exist: (SPIL)
Plaintiff Remigio Ramos acquired from Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos
1. That it is Surrounded by other immovables and has no
Subdivision a house and lot situated in Parañaque City, Metro Manila.
adequate outlet to a public highway
In the subdivision survey plan, two road lots abut plaintiff's property,
2. After payment of Proper indemnity
clearly appearing as a proposed road in the Lombos subdivision plan
3. That the Isolation was not due to the Central's own acts
and Lot 4135 of the Parañaque Cadastre now known as Pambansa
4. That the right of way claimed is Least prejudicial to the
Road but more commonly referred to as Gatchalian Avenue.
servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may
Respondent Eduardo Asprec owns a lot alongside Gatchalian
be the shortest.
Avenue. Respondent Gatchalian Realty was granted the road right of
way and drainage along respondent’s lot to service the Gatchalian
On the first requisite, the Court finds that the plaintiff failed to prove
and Asprec subdivision, by the respondent Asprecs.
the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road except
through the Gatchalian Avenue.
In 1981, plaintiff Ramos filed a complaint for an easement of a right of
way against the private respondents, alleging, among others, that he
From the record, there is a road right of way provided by the Sobrina
constructed his house at 27 Gatchalian Avenue and has since resided
Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated in its subdivision plan for the
therein with his family from 1977 up to the present; that during
buyers of its lots. The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes
construction of the house, Gatchalian Realty, Inc. built a 7-8, feet high
inconvenience to the plaintiff when he uses it to reach the public
concrete wall right in front of his premises, blocking his entrance/exit
highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite.
to Gatchalian Avenue which is the nearest, most convenient and
adequate entrance/exit to the public road or highway, the Sucat Road.
The plaintiff should have, first and foremost, demanded from the
Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement and
Ramos claims that with the construction of the concrete wall, he and
maintenance of the said lot as his road right of way because it was
his family are constrained and inconvenienced to use as temporary
from said subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from the
ingress/egress other lots belonging to different owners.
Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec.
Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff Ramos is entitled to a legal or
To allow the plaintiff access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue
compulsory easement of a right of way.
in spite of a road right of way provided by the plaintiff's subdivision for
its buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows plaintiff a much
greater ease in going to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to
completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained
through the years regarding an easement of a right of way, that "mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its
basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real,
not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it."

Considering that the plaintiff has failed to prove the existence of the
first requisite as aforestated, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss
the rest of the preconditions for a legal or compulsory right of way.
 Tomas Encarnacion v. CA, et al. owners and requested that they sell to him one and one-half (1 1/2)
G.R. No. 77628; March 11, 1991 meters of their property to be added to the existing pathway so as to
allow passage for his jeepney. The request was turned down by the
two widows and further attempts at negotiation proved futile.
Facts:

Petitioner then instituted an action before the RTC of Batangas, to

Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late
seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over an
Aniceta Magsino Viuda de Sagun are the owners of two adjacent
additional width of at least two (2) meters over the respondents De
estates situated in Talisay, Batangas. Encarnacion owns the dominant
Saguns' 405 sqm parcel of land.
estate while respondent owns the servient estate which stands
between the dominant estate and the national road.
Issue: Whether or not Encarnacion is entitled to a widening of an
already existing easement of right-of-way.
When the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence,
persons going to the national highway just crossed the servient estate
Ruling:
at no particular point. However, in 1960 when private respondents
constructed a fence around the servient estate, a road path
YES. The Court finds that petitioner has sufficiently established his
measuring 25 meters long and about a meter wide was constituted to
claim for an additional easement of right of way, holding that where a
provide access to the highway. Half a meter width of the path was
private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of
taken from the servient estate and the other one-half meter portion
easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law.
was taken from another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. No
compensation was asked and none was given for the portions
Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement
constituting the pathway.
of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the
dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time."
It was also about that time that petitioner Encarnacion started his
This is taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the
plant nursery business on his land where he also had his abode. He
dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the
would use said pathway as passage to the highway for his family and
passage. And these needs may vary from time to time.
for his customers. Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer
hard work flourished and with that, it became more and more difficult
When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his
for petitioner to haul the plants and garden soil to and from the
family could easily make do with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to
nursery and the highway with the use of pushcarts.
the national highway. But the business grew and with it the need for
the use of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manual hauling
In 1984, petitioner was able to buy an owner-type jeep which he could
of plants and garden soil and use of pushcarts have become
use for transporting his plants. However, that jeep could not pass
extremely cumbersome and physically taxing. To force petitioner to
through the roadpath and so he approached the servient estate
leave his jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements and to the
risk of theft simply because it could not pass through the improvised
pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate
and can only be counter-productive for all the people concerned.
Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to
accommodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary
aspect of the plant nursery business.

Inasmuch as the additional one and one-half (1 1/2) meters in the

width of the pathway will reduce the area of servient estate, and the
petitioner has expressed willingness to exchange an equivalent
portion of his land to compensate private respondents for their loss,
perhaps, it would be well for respondents to take the offer of petitioner
seriously. But unless and until that option is considered, the law
decrees that petitioner must indemnify the owners of the servient
estate including Mamerto Magsino from whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter
was taken to constitute the original path several years ago. Since the
easement to be established in favor of petitioner is of a continuous
and permanent nature, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the
land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient
estate pursuant to Article 649 of the Civil Code.
 Dichoso, Jr. vs. Marcos good faith as they expressed their willingness to pay proper indemnity.
GR No. 180282 April 11, 2011 However, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision ruling that
a right of way had already been granted by the servient estate. Thus,
there is no need to establish an easement over the respondent’s
Facts:
property.

In 2002, petitioners Crispin Dichoso and 2 others filed a Complaint for

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to a grant of legal
Easement of Right of Way against respondent Patrocinio Marcos.
easement of right of way from their landlocked property through the
Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a lot of the Cadastral
property of private respondent which is the shortest route in going to
Survey of Laoag City; while the respondent is the owner of Lot 1.
and from their property to the public street.

As petitioners had no access to a public road to and from their

Ruling:
property, they claimed to have used a portion of Lot No. 1 in
accessing the road since 1970. The respondent, however, blocked the
NO. An easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property
passageway with piles of sand. Though petitioners have been granted
rights of the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or
another passageway by the Spouses Arce, the owners of another
encumbrance on the servient estate. It is incumbent upon the owner
adjacent lot, petitioners instituted the complaint before the RTC and
of the dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence
prayed that they be granted a right of way over an area of 54 sqm of
the presence of all the preconditions before his claim for easement of
Lot 1 by paying the defendant the amount of P54,000, and that the
right of way may be granted.
right be annotated on defendant’s title. In addition to that, the
defendant will pay the plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 as damages for
To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following requisites
attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
should be met: (SPIL)
a. the dominant estate is Surrounded by other immovables
Defendant Marcos denied that he allowed anybody to use Lot 1 as
without an adequate outlet to a public highway;
passageway. Moreover, he stated that petitioners’ claim of right of way
b. the dominant estate is willing to pay the Proper indemnity;
is only due to expediency and not necessity for there already is an
c. the Isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate;
existing easement of right of way available to petitioners granted by
and,
the Spouses Arce. Thus, there is no need to establish another
d. the right of way being claimed is at a point Least prejudicial to
easement over respondent’s property.
the servient estate.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners Dichoso and

In the case at hand, the petitioners failed to show sufficient factual
others by finding that they had adequately established the requisites
evidence to satisfy the above-enumerated requirements. Admittedly,
to justify an easement of right of way in accordance with Articles 649
they had been granted a right of way through the other adjacent lot
and 650 of the Civil Code. Also, the trial court declared petitioners in
owned by the Spouses Arce. In fact, other lot owners use the said
outlet in going to and coming from the public highway. Clearly, there is
an existing outlet to and from the public road.

However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and circuitous, and
they have to pass through other lots owned by different owners before
they could get to the highway. We find petitioners’ concept of what is
“adequate outlet” a complete disregard of the well-entrenched
doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right
of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it.
Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required
by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in
the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the
easement, the same should not be imposed.

The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge
for the grant of compulsory right of way. To be sure, the true
standard for the grant of the legal right is “adequacy.” Hence,
when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant
estate to a public highway, as in this case, even when the said outlet,
for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up
another servitude is entirely unjustified.

Therefore, the petition is denied.

 Manuel Soriano v. Oscar Sternberg YES. The Court held that Soriano’s right of action under Article 582 of
G.R. No. L-15628 November 18, 1920 the Civil Code accrued in 1905 when the windows in Sternberg’s
house were opened, and that, in accordance with Chapter III of the
Code of Civil Procedure, his action has prescribed. Article 582 of the
Facts:
Civil Code provides: "No windows or balconies or other similar
projections which directly overlook the adjoining property may be
The wall of the house of defendant Oscar Sternberg, have four
opened or built without leaving a distance of not less than 2 meters
windows and a gallery (upper story), two windows, one door and an
between the wall in which they are built and such adjoining property.
opening with wooden lattice (lower story), which is 1.36m away from
the dividing line between the lot on which said building stands and the
It should first be noted that Sternberg has never prohibited Soriano
lot of the plaintiff, Manuel Soriano.
from building on the latter’s own land, any wall that he may desire to
construct. Further, it should be noted that the offending edifice of
The building of Sternberg has stood with the identical openings
Sternberg was constructed in 1905. This was the year when the
mentioned earlier since the year 1905. Sternberg has a direct view
defendant violated the law. This was the date when the cause of
over Soriano’s lot, and that the windows and the gallery of Soriano’s
action accrued.
edifice have direct views on his lot. In the Torrens titles which both
parties have to their respective buildings, there does not appear any
Nevertheless, the windows complained of were permitted to be open
easement of view in Soriano’s title, nor any right to easement in
for thirteen years without protest. The plaintiff must, consequently, by
Sternberg’s.
reason of his own laches, be considered to have waived any right
which he may have had to compel the windows to be closed. The
Soriano later filed an action before the court, to compel the defendant
argument of plaintiff that it was only in 1917, when he bought the land
to close the windows in the wall of his house adjacent to the former’s
in question, that the statute of limitations began to run, is not
property, because the wall of Sternberg’s house is less than 2 meters
convincing, for the general rule is, that once the statute begins to run,
from the division line. Sternberg pleads prescription as his sole
it never stops, and the transfer of the cause of action does not have
defense. The lower court agreed with the plaintiff's contention and
the effect of suspending its operation.
ordered the windows of the defendant's house to be closed. Hence,
this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not a right of action to enforce Article 582 of the

Civil Code may be lost by failure to prosecute within the prescriptive
period fixed by the Code of Civil Procedure.

Ruling:
 Hidalgo Enterprises v. Guillermo Balandan, et al. resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured
G.R. No. L-3422, June 13, 1952 thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.

The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance
Facts:
in question, although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so
enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to
Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice-plant
approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied
factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were
invitation to such children.
installed two tanks full of water, 9 feet deep, for cooling purposes of its
engine.
Issue: Is a swimming pool or water tank an instrumentality or
appliance likely to attract the little children in play and considered as
While the factory compound was surrounded with a fence, the tanks
an attractive nuisance?
themselves were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers.
The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the
Ruling:
ground. Through the wide gate entrance, which is continually open,
motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity
NO. The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to
passed, and any one could easily enter the said factory, as he
bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some
pleased. There was no guard assigned on the gate.
unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its
location.
In 1948, respondent Guillermo Balandan’s son, Mario, a boy barely 8
years old, entered the factory premises through the gate while playing
Further, the Court cited the explanation of a US court which holds
with other boys of his age to take a bath in one of said tanks. While
that: Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract
thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished
children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning.
out later, already a cadaver, having died of "asphyxia secondary to
Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are
drowning."
sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private
property creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely
The lower court and the CA took the view that the petitioner’s tanks
duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, he is
are an attractive nuisance and neglected to adopt the necessary
not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance.”
precautions to avoid accidents to persons entering its premises.

As petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the

It applied the doctrine of attractive nuisance, stated as follows: One
question whether the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions
who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or
becomes immaterial. And the other issue submitted by petitioner—
appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails
that the parents of the boy were guilty of contributory negligence
to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or
precluding recovery, because they left for Manila on that unlucky day
leaving their son under the care of no responsible individual— needs
no further discussion.
 Pacita David-Chan v. CA and Phil Rabbit Bus Lines Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a legal easement of
G.R. No. 105294 February 26, 1997 right of way over that position of the property of respondent Phil.
Rabbit.
Facts:
Ruling:
Petitioner David-Chan’s property in San Fernando, Pampanga was
almost completely surrounded by various business establishments. NO. Petitioner is NOT “without adequate outlet to a public
Lying between her property and the MacArthur Highway, was highway.” It can be stressed that it was petitioner David-Chan who
private respondent’s lot. Her only access to the highway was a built a concrete fence on the southern boundary of her property to
very small opening measuring 2 ft. 4 inches wide through the separate it from the property of the Pineda family.
aforementioned property of private respondent. David-Chan
believed she was entitled to a wider compulsory easement of right Worse, during the pendency of the case, she closed the 28-inch
of way through the said property of private respondent. clearance which she could use as a means to reach the National
Highway without passing through the property of the defendant. If
David-Chan claims that the former owner of respondent’s lot sold it plaintiff wants a bigger opening, then she can always destroy a
to the latter without her knowledge so she could not exercise her portion of the concrete fence which she erected and pass through
right of pre-emption or redemption. Further, private respondent the property of the Pineda family which, as shown on the attached
Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines was allegedly about to complete the sketch, has an open space on the southern boundary of plaintiff’s
construction of its concrete fence on the said lot which would result land.
in depriving David-Chan of the only available right of way.
The second requisite— that there was payment of the proper
Thus, David-Chan filed with the trial court an amended petition, indemnity was likewise not met by the plaintiff. Plaintiff's complaint
seeking to stop private respondent from fencing its property and contained no averment that demand for the easement of right of
depriving her of access to the highway. way had been made after payment of the proper indemnity. There
was no showing that plaintiff ever made a tender payment of the
Private respondents argued that petitioner is not entitled to be proper indemnity for the right of way.
informed of the sale since the parents and relatives of petitioner
were never tenants or lessees of the former owner, but rather As to the other requisites, they are all issues of facts which this
illegal occupants as already held by the MTC in another civil case. Court has no authority to rule upon. The Supreme Court is not a
Also, petitioner had another access to the highway without passing trier of facts.
through the lot in question.
 Sps. Tedy Garcia & Pilar Garcia v. Loreta T. Santos, et. al. the said structure constructed on Lot 1 is at a distance of less than
GR. No. 228334, June 17, 2019 3 meters away from the boundary line, in alleged violation of their
easement. Furthermore, the Spouses Santos allegedly made
Facts: excavations on Lot 1 without providing sufficient lateral support to
the concrete perimeter fence of the Spouses Garcia.
Petitioners Spouses Garcia had occupied for 11 years the subject
property located in Iloilo City with a one-storey residential house Hence, the Spouses Garcia filed a complaint for easements of
erected thereon and was purchased by them from the respondents light, air and view, plus damages with TRO against the Spouses
Spouses Santos in October 1998. Santos and respondent Conchita Tan.

At the time of the purchase of the subject property from the Sps. Respondents argued that the Sps. Garcia failed to allege how they
Santos, the one-storey house was already constructed. Also, at the acquired the easement of light and view either by prescription or
time of the acquisition of the subject property, the adjoining lot, Lot title; that the mere presence of windows on the one-storey house
1, owned and registered under the name of the Sps. Santos, was of the Sps. Garcia in itself does not give rise to an easement by
an idle land without any improvements. title and that the Sps. Garcia also failed to acquire an easement by
prescription because they never alleged that they made a formal
Lot 1 remained empty until the Sps. Santos started the prohibition of the construction of a taller structure on Lot 1.
construction of a two-storey residential house therein in 2009.
Upon Inquiry from the construction workers, petitioner Tedy Garcia Issue: Whether the Sps. Garcia have acquired an easement of
was erroneously informed that respondent Conchita Tan was the light and view with respect to Lot 1 owned by the Sps. Santos.
new owner of Lot 1.
Ruling:
The building constructed on Lot 1 is taller than the Sps. Garcia's
one-storey residential house. As such, the Sps. Santos' building YES. Easement of light and view is a positive one if the window or
allegedly obstructed the Sps. Garcia's right to light, air, and view. opening is situated in a party wall, while it is a negative one if the
The Sps. Garcia bemoaned how, prior to the construction on Lot 1, window or opening is thru one's own wall, that is, thru a wall of the
they received enough bright and natural light from their windows. dominant estate.

The construction allegedly rendered the Spouses Garcia's house In the instant case, it is not disputed that the windows and other
dark such that they are unable to do their normal undertakings in openings are made in the wall of Sps. Garcia's one-storey-house.
the bedroom, living room and other areas of the house without There is no party wall alleged to be co-owned by the parties.
switching on their lights. The Spouses Garcia likewise alleged that
However, it is not true that all windows or openings situated on the and remained open. It is also not disputed that there was no
wall of the dominant estate may only be acquired through agreement made by the parties whatsoever to the effect that the
prescription. windows and openings of the Sps. Garcia's house should be
closed or removed.
Aside from prescription, easements may likewise be acquired
through title. The term "title" does not necessarily mean a Hence, in accordance with Article 624 of the Civil Code, from the
document. Instead, it refers to a juridical act or law sufficient to time the Sps. Santos transferred the subject property to the Sps.
create the encumbrance. One such legal proviso which grants title Garcia, there arose by title an easement of light and view, placing a
to an easement is found in Article 624 of the Civil Code. burden on the servient estate, i.e., Lot 1, to allow the Sps. Garcia's
residence unobstructed access to light and view, subject to certain
Article 624 finds application in situations wherein two or more limitations as will be discussed hereunder.
estates were previously owned by a singular owner and
subsequently, one estate or a portion of the estate is alienated in Therefore, considering that the Sps. Garcia have acquired by title
favor of another person, wherein, in that estate or portion of the an easement of light and view in accordance with Article 624 of the
estate, an apparent visible sign of an easement exists. There Civil Code, the Sps. Santos should necessarily demolish or
arises a title to an easement of light and view, even in the renovate portions of their residential building so that the
absence of any formal act undertaken by the owner of the three-meter distance rule as mandated under Article 673 of the
dominant estate, if there remains the active and passive Civil Code is observed.
continuance of the easement or that this apparent visible sign,
such as the existence of a door and windows, continues to
remain and subsist. This continues to remain even after the
transfer of the property to the new owner, unless such apparent
sign is removed or if there is an agreement to the contrary.

This is precisely the situation that has occurred in the instant case.
Prior to the purchase of the subject property by the Spouses
Garcia, it and Lot 1 were both owned by the Spouses Santos. On
the subject property, a one-storey house with windows and other
openings that accept light and view from Lot 1, which was idle at
that time, was built. Subsequently, in 1998, the subject property
was alienated in favor of the Sps. Garcia. It is undisputed that the
windows and other openings on the one-storey house subsisted