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Participatory Budgeting in Germany – A Review of

Empirical Findings

Sebastian H. Schneider & Stefan Busse

To cite this article: Sebastian H. Schneider & Stefan Busse (2019) Participatory Budgeting in
Germany – A Review of Empirical Findings, International Journal of Public Administration, 42:3,
259-273, DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2018.1426601

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
2019, VOL. 42, NO. 3, 259–273
[Link]

Participatory Budgeting in Germany – A Review of Empirical Findings

Sebastian H. Schneider a
and Stefan Busseb
a
Department III – Civil Society-Level Development Cooperation, Development Education, German Institute for Development Evaluation
(DEval), Bonn, Germany; bFaculty of Philosophy I, Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, Halle (Saale), Germany

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Participatory budgeting (PB) is one of the most popular democratic innovations worldwide. PB is Civic engagement;
connected with high stakes regarding mobilizing political inactive citizens, efficient and effective democratic innovation;
budgetary policy as well as positive effects on citizens (e.g., civic education, democratic attitudes). evaluation; Germany;
However, in many Western countries empirical evidence for such benefits is scarce. This also holds participation; participatory
budgeting
for Germany. Since the conduction of PB demands financial and personnel resources, a thorough
evaluation is necessary. This article systematically summarizes the current state of research to
make the literature on PB in Germany accessible to international scholars as well as political and
administrative practitioners. It focusses on the context (which municipalities conduct PB and why),
process (role of local administration and council, participation, deliberation), and outcome/impact
dimension (outcomes and impact on policies and citizens). To conclude, further research venues
are briefly outlined, followed by an outlook on PBs future and practical implications.

Introduction mechanisms (Holtkamp, 2008). Its goals are mani-

fold: more efficient and effective local budgetary pol-
In Western democracies, social, economic, and political
icy; reintegrating minorities and dissatisfied citizens
change has altered the relationship between government
into local political and administrative processes; as
and citizens tremendously in the last 25 years. Political
well as fostering civic education, democratic atti-
and administrative authorities face governance problems
tudes, and identification with the municipality
(e.g., budget deficits) and an increasingly critical citi-
(Busse & Schneider, 2015; pp. 8–9; Geißel, Kolleck,
zenry aiming for more influence on political planning
& Neunecker, 2015; pp. 154–156; Günther, 2007; pp.
and decision-making processes (Norris, 2011; Vetter,
31–33).
Klimovský, Denters, & Kersting, 2016; pp. 273–274).
However, despite its popularity in the last years
Hence, they try to re-establish and increase trust in
and while literature on PB’s origins, design features,
parliamentary and administrative institutions (e.g.,
and potentials is abundant, empirical evidence about
Åström, Jonsson, & Karlsson, 2017) as well as acceptance
its functioning and effects is still scarce. Most of the
of policy outputs by reforming electoral rules, widening
literature consists of single case (evaluation) studies,
direct democracy and especially by implementing new
comparative case studies or even students’ theses.
forms of civic participation (e.g., Papadopoulos &
Whereas several quantitative large-N studies examine
Warin, 2007; Smith, 2009).
effects on a set of social indicators for PB in Brazil
Among the latter, participatory budgeting (hence-
(e.g., Boulding & Wampler, 2010; Gonçalves, 2014;
forth PB) is one of the most popular democratic
Touchton & Wampler, 2014), with one exception
innovations worldwide (Sintomer, Herzberg, Röcke,
(Neunecker, 2016) no such studies are existent for
& Allegretti, 2012; Wampler, 2007). From the origi-
Germany. What is more, most contributions are in
nal case in Porto Alegre PB diffused to all continents
German language. Currently, no systematic and
and arrived in Germany at the end of the 1990s
exhaustive up-to-date review on the functioning and
(Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012; Ruesch & Wagner,
effects of German PBs is available for an interna-
2014). PB opens the budget process for citizens’ pro-
tional audience. 1
posals in combination with discussion and voting

CONTACT Sebastian H. Schneider [Link]@[Link] German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval), Fritz-Schäffer-Str. 26, 53113
Bonn, Germany.
1
Since there are only few evaluation studies with a diverse set of research questions and designs, this review is not able to follow the
strict protocol the Campbell Collaboration suggests for systematic reviews and subsequent statistical meta analyses (see www.
[Link]).
© 2018 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
260 S. H. SCHNEIDER AND S. BUSSE

This article aims at closing this lacuna by answering Historical developments, process design, and
the following questions. Which municipalities imple- political context
ment this innovation, respectively why? What is known
Participatory budgeting in Germany
about the participants of PB and the general participa-
tion rates? What knowledge about the participation While PB has its roots in Porto Alegre, Brazil, at the
processes is available, particularly about the submitted end of the 1980s (see, e.g., Wampler, 2007), it took a
budget proposals and the discussion among citizens as decade to arrive in Germany (Ruesch & Wagner,
well as with public officials? Were the goals fulfilled and 2014). The first PB process was implemented in
which impacts does PB have on budget plans, citizens, Mönchweiler, a small municipality with less than
and the local political system? Finally, how does the 5,000 inhabitants, in 1998 (Sintomer, Herzberg, &
public evaluate the processes? To answer these ques- Röcke, 2010, p. 118). In the following years, further
tions, existing literature is surveyed utilizing Busse and smaller towns experimented with PB. Under the gui-
Schneider’s (Busse & Schneider, 2015) evaluation dance of the federal government of North Rhine-
scheme. The article aims at contributing to the growing Westphalia and the Bertelsmann Foundation, the
literature on democratic innovations as well as inform- project “Bürgerhaushalt in Nordrhein-Westfalen”
ing practitioners searching for information on the was a major step (Franzke & Kleger, 2010, pp.
potentials and risks of PB. 56–58; Ruesch & Wagner, 2014). But only with the
The review is structured as follows: The next section first PB in the borough of Lichtenberg in Germany’s
offers a brief overview on historical developments, typi- capital Berlin in the year 2005, the innovation rose to
cal process design and promotors of PB in Germany to wider prominence. From the pioneering municipali-
introduce the reader to the context of this democratic ties and Berlin-Lichtenberg, the idea of participation
innovation.2 The third section then presents the evalua- in local budgeting processes spread over the country
tion scheme. The existing literature is surveyed in the leading to a heyday around 2010 with 96 counted
fourth section. The last section summarizes the findings, municipalities (see Figure 1).3In the last years, the
briefly outlines further research venues, and provides an trend has stagnated, but nevertheless many larger
outlook on PBs future as well as recommendations for cities, as for example Bonn, Cologne, and Stuttgart
practitioners. conduct PB while others discuss its implementation.

Municipalities with PB (1998-2015)

120

96
100 91
87
Number of Municipalities

80 71
65

60
45
38
40 34

20 12 14
11
6 6 7
4 4
1 1
0

Figure 1. Number of municipalities with PB in Germany (1998–2015). Source: Ruesch and Wagner (2014, pp. 288); supplemented
with data from Ermert et al. (2015, pp. 6), and Ruesch and Ermert (2014, pp. 3).

2
Günther (2007), Franzke and Kleger (2010), Herzberg (2009), and Sintomer et al. (2010, pp. 112–137) provide more detailed
accounts.
3
It should be noted that some municipalities conduct PB every year while others use a two-year cycle. Some municipalities even take
longer breaks before starting the next cycle.
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 261

In 2015, 71 municipalities conducted PB while 45 become an issue (Holtkamp, 2008, pp. 226–227). The
offered processes which did not fulfill usual defini- use of this innovation needs to be justified with regard
tional standards (see Sintomer et al., 2012, pp. 2–3). to the use of public money for process facilitation,
Additionally, 125 municipalities discussed its intro- moderation, advertisement, overhead costs, etc. In
duction (Ermert, Pützer, & Ruesch, 2015). Figure 1 cases where a seemingly low turnout of participants
illustrates the spread over time.4 meets a high and costly effort of mobilization, public
debates are evoked (Busse & Schneider, 2015, p. 4).
However, they are often based on subjective, presum-
Process design ably biased impressions.
The standard process design for PB in Germany follows Therefore, a few cities initiated a more systematic
the triad of information, consultation, and accounting evaluation process by engaging consultants or scientific
(Holtkamp, 2008, pp. 223–224). First, the municipal experts, the latter especially from the field of political
administration informs about the financial situation science. Although civil servants and facilitators overseeing
and the budget plan (e.g., via websites, leaflets, or press the PB process could conduct an evaluation themselves, it
conferences). Subsequently, citizens are consulted via is expected that external scientific expertise adds credibil-
public meetings, online discussion forums, or postal ity to the process and circumvents organizational blind-
surveys. In the last years, conducting PB via the internet ness (see Rossi, Lipsey, & Freeman, 2004, p. 58).
has become the dominating mode (Ermert et al., 2015, p. Table 1 gives an overview over the eight existing
15). In most municipalities local authorities collect citi- German evaluation studies. To the present, only in
zens’ proposals while others combine this approach with the case of Oldenburg three consecutive evaluations
the presentation of administrative or council proposals were carried out. While the evaluation of the process
(Ermert et al., 2015, p. 14). Usually, this phase allows for in Jena retrospectively analyzed six PB cycles, nearly all
discussion and voting. Afterwards, the municipal admin- other studies focused on one cycle.
istration edits and summarizes the proposals. Finally, the The literature on evaluations differentiates between for-
local council makes a decision. However, the linkage to mative evaluations seeking program improvement and
the established budgeting routines as well as the parti- summative evaluations investigating if goals were fulfilled
cular tools used varies tremendously between municipa- (Rossi et al., 2004, pp. 36–42). In general, the tabulated
lities (Franzke & Kleger, 2010; Günther, 2007). studies are summative since they assess the whole process
Compared to the Porto Alegre-model, which is con- retrospectively. Nevertheless, each of these studies provides
sidered as a co-governance mechanism (Geissel, 2012, p. general as well as fine-grained recommendations for the
165) in which citizens, council, and administration conduction and design of the respective PB process. For
jointly decide on the municipal budget (Cabannes, example, Taubert, Krohn, and Knobloch (2011) discuss
2004), PB in Germany has only a consultative function adaptions in internal administrative processes in detail.
(Geißel et al., 2015, pp. 151–152). Citizens may present Vorwerk, Gonçalves, and Hedwig (2016), in contrast, out-
their ideas, but the local council—due to the legal frame- line approaches to mobilize more citizens to take part in PB
work—still has the final say. In sum, despite claims of (e.g., longer duration of the participation phase; distribu-
democratic reform, it has the character of a public man- tion of a fixed amount of money).
agement tool (Sintomer et al., 2010, pp. 137–138). To evaluate the processes, the authors of these stu-
Political conflicts and matters of distributive justice are dies refer to the processes’ goals as well as to more
out of the scope of the German model. As Baiocchi and general scientific criteria. Basically, these goals and
Ganuza (2014) argue, the original focus on empowering criteria can be condensed to increasing input and out-
citizens in the Porto Alegre case has often been removed put legitimacy of local governance (Papadopoulos &
on PB’s way from Brazil to Europe. In this regard, PB in Warin, 2007, p. 446). The input dimension taps pro-
Germany is an illustrative example. blems of decreasing and socially biased electoral turn-
out as well as dissatisfaction with democratic processes,
while the output dimension focusses on “better” poli-
Evaluation of participatory budgeting cies (Geissel, 2013). The aspects are complemented with
fostering civic education, building social capital, enhan-
With PB becoming popular in Germany, the need to
cing identification with the municipality, etc.
evaluate its processes, outcomes, and impact also has
4
Compared to the total number of municipalities in Germany (currently about 11,000) this count is low. Furthermore, the platform
[Link] has not published their annual status report since 2015. Hence, the latest data on the distribution of PB
is unfortunately dated from 2015.
 262

Table 1. Evaluation studies on German PB processes.

Mansfeld- Berlin-Marzahn-
Berlin-Lichtenberg Jena (2007– Südharz (2012/ Hellersdorf
S. H. SCHNEIDER AND S. BUSSE

Municipality (2005) Cologne (2010) Cologne (2014) Oldenburg (2010–2012) 2012) Frankfurt/Main (2011/2012) 2013) (2015)
Author(s) (year) Klages and Daramus (2007) Taubert et al. Vorwerk et al. (2016) Schneider (Schneider, Kersting et al. Geißel et al. (2013) Franzke and Public One
(2011) 2011, Schneider, 2012, (2013) Roeder (2014) GmbH (2015)
Schneider, 2013)
Current 275,000 1,047,000 1,047,000 161,000 110,000 718,000 142,000 259,000
population (borough) (administrative (borough)
district)
PB design Complex design (citizen’s Online PB, focus Online PB, focus on proposals Complex design Postal PB with Complex design (citizen’s forums, Online PB with Complex
forums, online platform, on education/ for the city districts (citizen’s forum, online online voting online platform, survey) offline features design
survey) environmental platform, survey) (citizen’s
protection forums, online
platform)
Study design Online, postal, telephone, Online surveys of Online survey of registered Postal and online Interviews, Postal and online survey, Interviews Interviews
paper-and-pencil survey of citizens and users, administration, survey, interviews, online survey, interviews, participant councilors/ councilors/
citizens and councilors; administration; councilors, and local advisory participant observation, analysis of observation, content analysis of administration administration;
participant observation; expert interviews councilors; media analysis; analysis of documents reports and documents and online forum; (incl. survey of
analysis of secondary data councilors/ analysis of secondary data and secondary data secondary analysis of secondary data standardized participants
administration/ data questionnaires)
consulting firm;
analysis of
secondary data
Evaluation criteria Guiding questions Processes’ own Guiding question: How can a Processes’ own goals; Processes’ Improving dialogue with citizens; Criteria Processes’ own
(mobilization, quality of goals; guiding higher number of participants criteria from democratic own goals; decision guidance; Increasing discussed in the goals; guiding
proposals, satisfaction with questions be achieved? theory criteria from transparency; fostering literature questions
the process) democratic identification with the city; mentioned but
theory acceptance for budget decisions not explicitly
used
Note: Because the studies in Cologne were conducted by different authors and with several years in between, we discuss both studies in separate columns.
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 263

Table 2. Evaluation dimensions, criteria, and factors.

Dimension Criteria Factors
Context – How far did political actors support participation and
participatory budgeting?
Does the municipality have financial leeway?
Process Organization Was there a reasonable ratio between cost and effort? (efficiency) Where the provided resources (finances and staff
appropriations) sufficient for organizing the process?
Participants Number of active Participants (broadness of participation) Did the mobilization and the communication fit to
and Access Did the socio-demographic characteristics of the participants correspond to the target groups?
the socio-demographic structure of the municipality (inclusiveness) User-friendliness and barrier-freeness of the process
Procedure How intense and reasonable were the discussions? (quality of deliberation) Where public and participants informed about the
and Output To which extent did the process produce or reveal knowledge? (solution- goals and rules of the process?
relevant knowledge) Where the objects of participation of relevance for
the participants and decision makers?
Outcomes and impact Were the procedures own goals fulfilled? (effectivity) –
To which extent did the participants evaluate the process and its output
positively? (satisfaction)
Did the process change participants’ attitudes and behavior?
(empowerment)
Source: Busse and Schneider (2015, pp. 9), based on Abelson and Gauvin (2006), and Kubicek et al. (2011).

Subsequently, all authors use a wide array of qualitative procedural output, either as influencing factors or nor-
and quantitative social research methods to capture mative criteria to evaluate the innovation’s success but
these categories (Busse & Schneider, 2015, pp. 9–10). also its efficiency related to the outcomes. Finally, the
However, efforts for fieldwork and methodological outcome dimension refers to the fulfillment of the
sophistication vary vastly between studies. process’ own goals but also to criteria derived from
To summarize the existing evidence for PB in democratic theory.
Germany, however, a more detailed evaluation scheme
introduced by Busse and Schneider (2015) based on
previous work of Abelson and Gauvin (2006) as well Empirical findings
as Kubicek, Lippa, and Kopp (2011) is utilized. This
scheme also incorporates aspects of legitimacy derived The context dimension
from democratic theory, but combines them with Before looking at evaluation studies, a few words on
more practical aspects of PB, as for example user the institutional context are necessary because the
satisfaction. political system affects the respective municipality
At this point a short clarification is necessary. and its PB-process.6 In this regard, one should keep
Classic democratic values like inclusiveness, empow- in mind that in Germany the local council only deci-
erment, and effectivity are dependent variables, des on a small proportion of the budget, whereas the
which must be differentiated from a number of inde- large share is preset by compulsory municipal tasks
pendent variables influencing their fulfillment.5 To from the federal level (see, e.g., Gabriel & Eisenmann,
evaluate PB, it is furthermore useful to break down 2005, pp. 121–124). As a part of the European multi-
the process into three main dimensions: context, pro- level governance system, municipalities also have to
cess, and outcome. While process and outcome/impact act in accordance with European law as “policy-
are dimensions most evaluation studies focus on at takers” (see Schultze, 2003). Nevertheless, literature
least implicitly, including the context allows for a does not mention a direct influence of the European
more comprehensive view (Abelson & Gauvin, 2006, integration process on the development7 and func-
p. 16). tioning of PB in Germany, albeit it can be argued
The context is an especially important set of factors that it motivates political parties, civil society, and
(socio-political, institutional, issue-related, etc.) influ- NGOs to call for citizen participation as a means to
encing the success of PB. The process dimension counter feelings of losing political influence (Dahl,
includes aspects of organization, participation, and 1994; Sintomer et al., 2010).
5
Since most surveyed studies do not explicitly distinguish criteria and influencing factors, this article primarily focusses on the
fulfillment of criteria (see Table 2). Furthermore, long-term impacts of the processes are not within the scope of the surveyed
studies.
6
Gabriel and Eisenmann (2005) and Heinelt and Egner (2011) offer a detailed description of local governance in Germany. In
particular, they elaborate on the differences between the 16 federal states (e.g., electoral systems, role of council, administration,
and mayor, etc.).
7
For instance, there are no EU directives on letting citizens participate in local budgeting.
264 S. H. SCHNEIDER AND S. BUSSE

Also, the European financial crisis from 2010 by proponents of nearly all parties (Franzke &
onwards might have had an ambivalent influence. Kleger, 2010, p. 61), which corresponds to impres-
Chronic financial problems have often been a problem sions from international comparisons (Baiocchi &
for German municipalities. During the “Eurocrisis” Ganuza, 2014, p. 31).
they increased in many municipalities in a way that Since the beginning of PB in Germany many pro-
affected the disposability of resources for establishing jects were terminated after a short period of time.
public participation processes and simultaneously also Typically, the efficiency of the process is doubted,
the necessity to legitimate cuts in public spending (see, oftentimes due to the low number of participants,
e.g., Diemert, 2013, p. 88). The latter led to a certain inducing political and administrative officials to ter-
type of PB, the so-called “Sparhaushalt”, which aims at minate it. An important point, hence, is administra-
savings and revenues for the municipality (Holtkamp & tion’s and council’s attitude toward the process.
Bathge, 2012). Against this background, public austerity Taubert et al. (2011, pp. 93–107) show for Cologne
rhetoric could have had a demotivating effect on citi- that the city administration regards PB as useful, but
zens. Why participate when there is nothing to distri- also as challenging for administrative processes.
bute? However, Schneider’s (2017) analysis does not Councilors displayed an approximately similar posi-
provide empirical evidence for such an effect. In his tion (Taubert et al., 2011, pp. 114–121). Nearly iden-
study, municipal debts do not correlate with participa- tical results were reported for the administrative
tion rates and individual decisions to participate.8 district Mansfeld-Südharz (Franzke & Roeder, 2014,
Regarding the implementation of PB, unfortu- pp. 41/51) and Berlin-Lichtenberg, where additionally
nately, no systematic comparative studies are avail- the mayor extraordinarily supported the process
able yet that straighten out which factors lead to the (Klages & Daramus, 2007, p. 168). In Frankfurt,
implementation (and termination). Hence, findings councilors were highly skeptical while administrative
of case reports must be summarized. Holtkamp staff put forward a more positive view (Geißel,
(Holtkamp, 2012, p. 268) points out that an interac- Kolleck, & Neunecker, 2013, pp. 76–80). The same
tion between contextual conditions and actor’s goals is true for Jena (Kersting, Busse, & Schneider, 2013,
provides a reasonable explanation: fiscal situation and pp. 40–44). For Oldenburg, Schneider (2013, pp. 1/
legitimation crises enforce the search for remedies. A 56) observed growing skepticism among councilors
solution might be new forms of citizen participation over the three years, who showed themselves a lack
which are often advocated by NGOs while consulting of active support for the process, which eventually
firms offer the practical tools (e.g., software, modera- led to its termination. In contrast, the city adminis-
tion). Political actors (councilors, mayors) who aim tration remained neutral and not too enthusiastic. In
at maximizing their share of votes and present them- sum, this leads to the conclusion that PB is often
selves as “in touch with the people” highly appreciate valued by the administration while councilors par-
such offerings and subsequently put PB on the tially oppose it, at least latently, despite a positive
agenda. Among the first promotors of PB in rhetoric. Supposedly, this might be due to the
Germany at the end of the 1990s were the impression that civic participation in budget policy
Bertelsmann Foundation, foundations close to parties leads to a potential loss of power. 9
and trade unions as well as public management Finally, the financial context is not discussed in
reform think tanks (Günther, 2007, p. 57). The every study in great detail, but nearly all larger cities
major breakthrough in Berlin-Lichtenberg, for among the surveyed cases have to cope with fiscal stress
instance, was enforced by a mayor of the Left Party (see the first paragraph of this section). Presumably,
and supported by the Federal Agency for Civic this inhibits citizens’ participation since the prospect
Education (Günther, 2007, pp. 71–72). In this regard, for fulfillment of costly proposals is unfavorable. Also,
the impression is often that PB is a project of the political constellations are in many cases not reported.
political left (e.g., Left Party, Green Party). Contrary Hence, in Table 3 this information was added from
to that, others argue that this innovation is advocated external sources.

8
For Schneider’s (2017) study data on how citizens perceive the financial situation of their municipality was not available. However,
citizens presumably base their decision to participate in PB predominantly on information cues they receive from the media, their
social network or local politicians (see, e.g., Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991). Detailed facts about the local budget plan, in
contrast, might only play a minor role.
9
Additionally, a younger survey among councillors and mayors in four federal states showed that they rank citizen participation last among
other goals (Holtkamp & Friedhoff, 2014). Furthermore, they are highly skeptical regarding citizens’ willingness and skills to take part in PB.
Table 3. Summary of empirical findings.
Mansfeld-
Berlin-Lichtenberg Frankfurt/Main Südharz Berlin-Marzahn-
Dimension Category (2005) Cologne (2010) Cologne (2014) Oldenburg (2010–2012) Jena (2007–2012) (2011/2012) (2012/2013) Hellersdorf (2015)
Context Left majority in council; Left majority in Left majority in 2010/2011: Left majority; Social Left majority in Christian Left majority in council;
left mayor; peculiarities council; Social council; Social fragmented council; democratic major; council; Christian Democratic Social Democratic
of budgets in Berlin democratic mayor; democratic mayor; 2012: left majority.; budgetary deficit Democrat mayor; majority; mayor; peculiarities of
boroughs budgetary deficit budget deficit independent mayor; budgetary deficit Christian budgets in Berlin
2010/2011: budgetary Democratic boroughs
stress district chief
executive;
balanced
budget
Process Organization Councilors were High costs/effort for Officials were 80.000 €/year; critique Administration was Costs: 1.2 Mio. €; Public Councilors had a
satisfied; no overly administration was dissatisfied with regarding effort satisfied, councilors Public officials officials positive attitude
support for survey criticized; councilors the decreasing among councilors were skeptical, but were dissatisfied evaluated the toward the PB;
items focusing on waste and administration number of which increased over evaluated some with participation process as Administrative staff
of money and time regarded PB as participants over the years; aspects positively rates. Councilors satisfactory/ reported no necessary
useful the years administration was evaluated the good; extra efforts for
ambivalent process negatively, Despite of conducting PB
administration costs and
positively effort, in sum
efficient
Participants 4,058 participants; 10,860 participants; 3,875 participants; 1,904/1,745/1,517 372 to 4,149 postal, 2,281 participants No data on 914 participants online;
and Access citizen forums well socially biased; a no information on participants; 14 to 4,772 online; online, 94 in a participation
about 100 different on-
frequented; socially minority dominated the composition decreasing citizen’s forums not citizen forum; available but
site events but no
biased participants online activities of participants participation over the well frequented; participants were interviewees numbers of
which was balanced by (proposals, years; citizen forums online: partly political active and identified aparticipants reported;
different participation commenting), not well frequented; gender (male) and highly educated participation
Online: under-
modes particular interests participants socially age bias (younger); bias representation of
became apparent biased and political postal: elder people younger citizens, over-
active representation of
women
Procedure and Positive evaluation of Administration does Citizens do not Few innovative Online no extensive Proposals were Process Proposals were
Output proposals but negative not consider the report changes in proposals; In the first discussion rated as good; identifies evaluated positively
rating of their proposals as their opinions; two years, only observable; (since good quality of citizens’ (toward common
feasibility; intense innovative; Implicitly many proposals informal discussions Jena uses a survey- deliberation preferences; good; compatible to
discussion during councilors evaluate received no votes; (no online discussion based PB design to (utilization of congruence of the regular budget
citizen’s forums was proposals as no information on forum provided); in evaluate policy arguments, focus some proposalsprocess; hint at urgent
observed; Indications imprecise; Only few the quality of the third year no fields, almost no on common good) with problems) but not
for a good quality of proposals were proposals intense online citizens’ proposals preferences of innovative; no intense
online discussions intensely discussed discussion observable are obtained) administration discussions were
and council No detected
information on
the quality of
deliberation
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

(Continued )
265
 266

Table 3. (Continued).
Mansfeld-
S. H. SCHNEIDER AND S. BUSSE

Berlin-Lichtenberg Frankfurt/Main Südharz Berlin-Marzahn-

Dimension Category (2005) Cologne (2010) Cologne (2014) Oldenburg (2010–2012) Jena (2007–2012) (2011/2012) (2012/2013) Hellersdorf (2015)
Effects, outcomes, and Effectivity Positive evaluation of Mostly positive Study focusses on Goals were partly Goals widely Goals were partly Inconclusive Goals widely fulfilled
impacts the process; no regarding its goals; mobilization of fulfilled; Impact on fulfilled with some fulfilled (policy results; authors but no information on
information on policy (policy impacts are citizens; policy budget plan was low limitations; Impact impacts are not regarded the budget impact
impacts; all proposals not within the scope impacts are not to non-existent on budget plan was within the scope of current model reported
were discussed in of the study) within the scope of not detectable the study) as a good
council the study except in 2009 starting point
for further
improvements
Satisfaction Participants evaluated Participants were Basic functions Participants evaluated Participants rated Participants were No data on Participants evaluated
citizens’ forums and satisfied with the were seen the online module the PB process mostly satisfied citizens the process
online module online module positively but positive; in general, positively but had but skeptical available ambiguously; online
positively deficits in clarity, participants were the impression that regarding the module was evaluated
transparency, skeptical regarding officials do not take impact positively
accountability; PB PB’s impact on budget the PB results
was considered seriously
useful but lacking
impact criticized
Empowerment Gains in knowledge, Participants reported Participants Impact on citizens’ Impact on citizen’s Participants Increasing Participants reported
responsibility for the gains in knowledge reported gains in attitudes not attitudes not reported gains in contact with positive impacts on
borough, and knowledge measurable measured knowledge; citizens but no political interest
motivation for civic Increase of other effects
engagement reported identification with were reported
the city likely
Note: If not included in the study, context information (e.g., party of the mayor, council majority) was obtained from the municipality websites. Furthermore, the boroughs of Berlin virtually do not have debts because as
administrative units they receive their annual budget according to their needs from the city administration. However, the federal city state Berlin is heavily indebted.
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 267

The process dimension: Participation and Oldenburg, he shows that participation is related to
deliberation dissatisfaction with local fiscal policy, an internalized
participation norm, trust in local political institutions,
First of all, PB requires financial and human resources,
civic association membership and age (reverse
a factor that is directly related to the financial leeway of
U-shaped). Second, using a comparative aggregate
the municipality. However, the costs of PB vary tre-
data set for PB in Germany (2006–2013) he finds that
mendously between municipalities. For instance,
the average participation is about 1,700 persons (med-
Solingen spent 50,000€ in 2010 (Holtkamp &
ian: 400) or 1.3% (median: 0.6%) of the municipality’s
Friedhoff, 2014, pp. 6), Oldenburg from 2010 to 2012
total population (N = 185). Highest participation was
80,000€ each year, Freiburg 2009/2010 about 680,000€
observed in Stuttgart 2013 with about 27,000 partici-
(Eich, 2011, p. 53), and Frankfurt nearly 1.2 Mio. €
pants. Compared to average participation in local elec-
(Holtkamp & Bathge, 2012, p. 55).10 Nevertheless, in
tions and referendums, this finding is disillusioning.
many cases it is not possible to determine which items
However, these rates are higher in comparison to the
are included and if some are missing (e.g., personnel).
usual usage of access to records and rights to objection
In times of fiscal stress, these costs regularly evoke
provided by municipal codes. Regression models show
criticism and demands for terminating PB.
that participation rates are positively related to the
A fundamental difference between municipalities is
percentage of welfare recipients, the effective number
the role of external consultants. While some local
of parties in the local council and the usage of the
administrations develop online platforms on their
internet for citizen consultation. The latter is in line
own, others outsource this task. In some cases, these
with findings from Weber et al. (2015, p. 42). What is
consultants also manage the online platforms. For
more, large differences between processes in Eastern
instance, they moderate discussions, filter hate-speech,
and Western Germany can be found. Participation is
summarize duplicated proposals and respond to
substantially higher in the Eastern part of the country.
requests regarding the platform’s functionality. A sur-
Unclear in this respect is the effect of mobilization
vey among administrative department heads in 31
strategies (see Vorwerk et al., 2016, p. 22 for a detailed
municipalities shows that this approach is indeed fruit-
discussion of potential factors). Of course, municipali-
ful since the processes with external service providers
ties hold press conferences, provide press releases, send
are rated as more efficient regarding personnel
post cards to a random sample of households, and put
resources and costs (Weber et al., 2015). What is
announcements on their websites, but personal contact-
more, these municipalities seem to attract more citizens
ing, usage of multiplicators, a systematic social media
since the participation rates are significantly higher.
campaign, or the targeted contacting of political inac-
This leads to another issue: A general problem of PB
tive groups was often not measurable.
in Germany (and elsewhere) is socially biased partici-
Another crucial aspect regarding the process dimen-
pation. Most participants are from 35 to 65 years old
sion is the quality of discussion among citizens as well
and well educated, as most of the studies reported in
as between citizens and public officials and local coun-
Table 2 show. These findings match with the classical
cilors. The surveyed studies first show that intense
social status model (Verba & Nie, 1972) and provoke
discussions in the sense of Habermas’ deliberation are
criticism arguing that PB is primarily useful for already
in most cases not observable in online forums. For
politically active middle-class citizens (Geißel et al.,
instance, Schneider (Schneider, 2013, pp. 33–34)
2015, p. 160). Additionally, the evaluation in
reports for Oldenburg 2012 that the 144 submitted
Oldenburg reports an overrepresentation of leftist and
budget proposals on average received only 2.4 com-
post-materialist participants (Schneider, 2012; pp.
ments, including those from local administration and
14–16, 2013; pp. 19–20), which matches with findings
councilors. Only six proposals were commented ten
on political participation in general (e.g., Van der Meer,
times or more. In the previous years, in contrast, for
Van Deth, & Scheepers, 2009). Hence, PB does not
face-to-face citizen’s forums sometimes intense debates
fulfill the hopes of reintegrating politically and socially
could be found whereas in other cases just a handful of
marginalized people into local political processes. In
participants showed up (Schneider, 2011, p. 35). Pieper
addition, it might provide an additional channel for
and Pieper (2015) report for the case of Frankfurt that
particular political preferences. Schneider’s (2017)
from 1,328 proposals about 30% were at least rudimen-
study provides deeper insights. First, using a rational
tary discussed online. Furthermore, they conducted a
choice framework and survey data from PB in
content analysis for the longest forum thread in

10
100,000€ = ~ 105,000 US $.
268 S. H. SCHNEIDER AND S. BUSSE

Frankfurt’s online platform. They conclude that one However, these results were based on subjective
third of the comments fulfill Habermasian standards impressions within a case study framework.
of deliberation while only a minuscule amount was A major breakthrough regarding the analysis of PB’s
coded as “shit storm”. Predominantly, participants policy impacts in Germany is therefore Neunecker’s
mixed deliberative standards with subjective, passio- (2016) comparative study. The dominant result is that
nate, sometimes ironic comments and repeating already PB has no or only diffuse effects on the local budget
known arguments. Moreover, none of the studies pro- plan. This is due to the already mentioned vague or not
vides evidence for citizens changing their preferences. innovative budget proposals but also local councilors’
Regarding online discussion forums, exploratory limited capabilities to deal with the complexities of poli-
research indicates that structural features (moderation, tical decision-making. This leads to executive leadership
registration, etc.) might account for the quality of delib- and compliance with administrative draft proposals.
eration (Kolleck, 2013). Not surprisingly, not only par- Additionally, participation rate, social composition of
ticipation in general is socially biased but also on online participants as well as the budgetary situation, at least
platforms. For Cologne, Taubert et al. (2011, pp. 40–44) in parts, correlate with the realization of citizens’ wishes.
show that the highly educated submitted proposals, Moreover, hopes for reducing budget deficits by means
wrote comments, rated the proposals and, therefore, of citizen participation are generally not met although
dominated the online discussions. However, encom- some success could be reported for Solingen and Essen
passing comparative and methodological rigorous ana- (Holtkamp, 2012; p. 266; Holtkamp & Bathge, 2012).
lyses are missing for online and offline PB in the However, these municipalities focused their process
German case (e.g., the utilization of the discourse qual- purely on savings and revenues.
ity index by Steenbergen, Bächtiger, Spörndli, & Besides fiscal impacts, the literature on the first pro-
Steiner, 2003). In sum, the evidence for a desired cesses in Germany reports increases in transparency about
good quality of deliberation is at best mixed. the local budget plans (Herzberg, 2009; pp. 119–120;
Finally, the opinion of political and administrative Sintomer et al., 2010; p. 125). Nevertheless, some studies
officials on the quality of budget proposals is impor- based on survey data show that citizens in larger cities do
tant. Neunecker’s (2016) comparative study reveals that not necessarily share this impression (Geißel et al., 2013;
councilors often regard citizen’s input as imprecise and pp. 8–9; Kersting et al., 2013; p. 44; Schneider, 2013; p. 29).
not innovative (e.g., “more expenditures for educa- Furthermore, none of the reviewed studies offers evi-
tion”). What is more, councilors share the impression dence regarding broader impacts of PB on political
that most proposals would have made their way to the knowledge, attitudes, and behavior. This can be attribu-
political arena even without PB. ted to the particular research designs which in general
do not employ surveys before the first PB process in a
municipality, even less panel surveys (Busse &
Schneider, 2015, p. 10). At least for direct participants,
The outcome dimension: Policy effects and impacts
some positive findings regarding political knowledge are
Participants, in general, report to be satisfied with the reported in the surveyed evaluation studies. However,
process. However, they express doubts regarding their with respect to usually low numbers of participants and
actual influence on the budget (see, e.g., Vorwerk et al., the low-threshold participation, which does not require
2016, p. 53) as well as the transparency of the process. exhaustive information procurement, it is safe to say that
This objection is further corroborated by the finding spill-over effects on the general population are illusory.
that it is often indeed unclear what happens with bud- In sum, substantial positive effects on perceived
get proposals. In the cases of Frankfurt and Oldenburg input and output legitimacy cannot be expected, at
similar results are reported for the general population. least in the current modus operandi of German PB.
This corresponds to authors stating that PB in However, at least effects on citizens’ satisfaction might
Germany does not lead to citizen empowerment (e.g., be plausible when proposals lead to the improvement of
Herzberg, 2009, pp. 121–123). deficiencies in infrastructure.
Early contributions were highly skeptical about note-
worthy impacts of PB on aspects of social equality or
Further aspects
ecological and financial sustainability (e.g., Herzberg,
2009, pp. 121–122). Hence, only minor impacts were Of course, there are other aspects to discuss regarding
reported, mostly the result of local councils’ cherry PB. Masser, Pistoia, and Nitzsche (2013) and Nitzsche,
picking favorable citizens’ proposals. Since PB is only Pistoia, and Elsäßer (2012), for example, provide com-
a consulting tool, this finding was foreseeable. prehensive insights into the technical details of online
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 269

PB in five German cities. They inspect the functionality educated, socially integrated, and from 35 to 65 years
of online platforms, registration procedures, and secur- old (“usual suspects”). This rejects the assumption that
ity issues. In this regard, vulnerability to systematic this innovation is a probate mean to activate margin-
manipulation and excessive citizen mobilization are alized or political inactive social groups. True delibera-
frequently mentioned topics (e.g., Eisel, 2011; pp. tion in a Habermasian sense often cannot be seen.
217–220; Holtkamp, 2012; p. 269; Holtkamp & What is more, decision-makers often evaluate budget
Bathge, 2012; pp. 58–59). In some cases, such attempts proposals as imprecise or only loosely connected to the
could indeed be observed, either to support a proposal budget planning process and as not innovative. Taken
or to expose deficits of online platforms. Since voting together, these points offer considerable leverage for
results can gain political momentum, these findings critics and their claims to terminate PB, especially in
should not be underestimated. combination with the costs incurred.
Finally, in his forthcoming PhD thesis Busse (2014) Outcomes and impact: The impact of submitted pro-
sheds light on another aspect that is not covered in the posals is generally diffuse or non-existent, even if the
literature to date: the democratic potentials arising local council made a positive decision. Reasons for the
from involving civil society in process engineering way councilors deal with budget proposals besides their
and management. He shows that that such involvement quality are located in the complexity of political pro-
creates new spaces for political participation, albeit they cesses and the resulting tendency to follow administra-
differ in democratic quality. tive draft resolutions. Additionally, the usually low
number of participants leads to skeptical view on the
legitimization of proposals. Budget deficits may be con-
Conclusions sidered as another obstacle to successful policy impact.
PB is presumably the most popular democratic innova- Next to genuine policy impacts, fostering political
tion in Germany these days. A growing number of knowledge and civic education is among PB’s goals.
municipalities has experimented with this tool in the However, methodological sophisticated studies are
last years. Despite this popularity, empirical evidence is lacking. Available participant surveys do not provide
not only scarce but also predominantly available in grey rigorous evidence for such assumptions. At least mod-
literature and German language. In this article, the key est impacts on political knowledge seem possible.
findings from existing evaluation and academic studies In sum, the overall résumé for the assumed benefits
were summarized using the scheme of Busse and of PB, in particular increasing input and output legiti-
Schneider (2015), making the state of knowledge acces- macy, is not overtly positive. The goals of mobilizing
sible to an international audience. The findings regard- marginalized groups as well as improvements in budget
ing context, process, and outcome and impact can be effectivity and efficiency clearly should be rejected.
summarized as follows: Beneficial effects on citizens also seem to be too far-
Context: PB is conducted in smaller towns as well as fetched since only a minority participates, oftentimes
large cities. Most major cities use it or at least experi- only voting for a certain proposal without commenting,
mented with PB in the past. By no means, it is an discussing, or even obtaining information on the finan-
innovation of the political left since mayors and coun- cial situation of their municipality. Thus, spill-over
cilors from nearly all parties advocate PB. In some effects on the general population in a municipality are
cases, municipalities introduce PB to evaluate austerity illusory. What is more, frustration due to ignored or
measures, but most municipalities offer an open pro- rejected proposals is also a very likely scenario. At best,
cess allowing proposals for expenditures. Studies indi- PB in Germany currently is a reporting system for
cate that municipal administration has a better opinion deficits in local infrastructure which has nothing in
on PB than local councilors. Conceivably, this is caused common with the aspirations toward reforming democ-
by a fear of loss of power, especially since the executive racy and empowering people put forward in participa-
(mayor, municipal administration) dominates policy tory democratic theory.
making on the local level (Kuhlmann, 2009). Nevertheless, there are at least two major gaps in the
However, the actual efforts to mobilize citizens are existing literature. First, they concern basic scientific
often unclear. research in the first place because it helps to understand
Process: Probably the most important aspect in the elementary mechanisms and paves the way for subse-
process dimension is the number of participants and quent evaluations. Future research should put more
their social composition. On average, about 1,700 per- emphasis on the role of municipal administration and
sons respectively 1.3% of the municipality’s total popu- councilors. An impression is that despite enormous lip
lation take part. In general, participants are highly services the actual efforts to make the process attractive
270 S. H. SCHNEIDER AND S. BUSSE

are limited. An important explanatory factor for such Kersting & Schneider, 2016). Especially in times of
efforts might be minority vs. majority status in the local chronic budget stress and the feeling of losing authority
council. Moreover, a look at established local media to higher levels of the political system this endorsement
might be fruitful since in many cases they accompany could easily be nothing more than lip services.
the processes critically (Geißel et al., 2015, p. 159). Practitioners considering the introduction of PB
Second, research should more systematically investi- despite the pessimistic assessment in this article should,
gate impacts of PB on participants, in particular with first, be aware that currently this innovation hardly
longitudinal and (quasi-)experimental research designs. provides a solution for governance problems and
For example, research on deliberative polls shows democratic malaises. Instead, it is merely a system to
indeed positive effects on knowledge and attitudes collect budget ideas which could inform the traditional
(Fishkin, 2009). Hence, similar findings might be pos- budget process, at least in the way PB is conducted in
sible for PB. In this regard, a look at design issues could Germany. Second, practitioners are advised to take the
be useful to find out how processes should be designed process seriously to create trust among citizens, which
to enable feasible participation and deliberation. This could be facilitated, for instance, by means of rigorous
might provide a solution to the often observed on-off budget, process, and outcome transparency as well as
participation. creating a broad consensus among all political parties
This leads to the question of German PB’s future. In in the local council. The self-committing rule-set men-
general, the trend toward letting citizens participate in tioned above is in this regard a good framework
budget planning already stagnates, although it is still because it addresses the critique citizens voice in sur-
discussed in many municipalities (see Figure 1). On the veys (Vetter et al., 2013). Third, one has to keep in
one hand, PB might sustain as the aforementioned mind that PB has to be well-designed and embedded in
online reporting system to the municipal administra- the local budget cycle. Furthermore, effective mobiliza-
tion, which citizens can use to hint at roadway damage tion efforts always require sufficient financial and per-
or littered parks. Such a transformation would in fact sonnel resources. Offering online participation is a
mean to abandon all aspirations regarding curing the must,11 even though the best designed PB is by no
“malaises” of current representative democracy (see, means a fast-selling item. To make the processes more
e.g., Newton, 2012). On the other hand, some authors democratic, borrowing recruiting and participation
argue for a substantial reform of PB. In particular, they mechanisms from Fishkin’s deliberative polls (see
suggest combining the consultation process with a sub- Fishkin, 2009) might be a valuable option. Random or
sequent binding referendum (Geißel et al., 2015; p. 165; quota selections of citizens could overcome well-known
Neunecker, 2016; pp. 285–287). However, this would participation biases whereas the controlled participa-
mean legislative amendment since referendums on tion and deliberation process has the potential to
budget policy are currently prohibited (Müller, 2009). ensure profound knowledge about the budget as well
What is more, it would lead to enormous additional as a reflected preference formation among participants.
burdens on the municipal budget since the costs for a In turn, this might foster better participation results
referendum add to the costs for PB. Hence, support for (i.e., budget proposals).
such reforms on local and federal state level seems
unrealistic. A third and middle way is to introduce a
Declaration of interest
self-committing rule-set for PB while keeping the estab-
lished process design (see, e.g., Vetter, Klages, & Ulmer, There are no potential conflicts of interest. The article is not
2013). Such a rule-set—consisting, for instance, of clear related to Sebastian H. Schneider's work at the German
Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval).
decision rules, transparent schedule, and rules for
accounting and result reporting—would provide at
least reliability of expectations and potentially reassure Funding
a fair treatment of citizens’ input. However, in the
This article received no external funding.
opinion of the authors the first scenario will prevail
since calculus of power among local councilors,
mayors, and bureaucrats should not be underestimated, ORCID
even though they endorse participatory democracy in
Sebastian H. Schneider [Link]
surveys (e.g., Egner, 2007; p. 172; Heinelt, 2013; p. 111; 3676

11
This includes, for instance, user-friendly, appealing, and secure online platforms offering opportunities to submit, discuss, and rate
budget proposals (for details on online PB in Germany see Masser et al., 2013).
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 271

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