Media's Role in the Global Village
Media's Role in the Global Village
I believe television is going to be the test of the modern world, and that in this new opportnity
to see beyond the range of our vision, we shall discover either a new and unbearable
disturbance of the general peace or a saving radiance in the sky.
— E.B.White1
O
ver the next few years, the media will take on a substantially new form. As
the Internet, print media, and television converge, the traditional methods by
which people learn about the world they live in will change forever. Near-
universal access to the Internet may be a real possibility. Responding to new custom-
ers, the American media industry is already global in scope and owes no allegiance to
any government.
Whether globalization in the media will promote peace cannot be known. (The
telegraph brought countries closer together, but did not prevent war.) It is known,
however, that live pictures from the battlefield and raw coverage of human suffering
influence attitudes toward intervention—the so-called Cable News Network (CNN)
effect. It is also known that the American public appears more willing to accept casu-
alties than its leaders are. The U.S. Government must develop an Internet strategy to
deal with the new global media in order to minimize potential dangers and take ad-
vantage of growing opportunities.
Key Phenomena
Digitalization and Convergence
Technology will be the driving force as the media evolve from print-based and
broadcast-based methods of communication to become an integrated computer-based
and computer-transmitted multimedia hybrid available to almost everyone who has a
computer. Technological developments will change the very way mass communica-
tions are transmitted and received.
*
Samuel Feist is executive producer of public affairs programs for the Cable News Network in
Washington. He previously was senior producer, producer, and associate producer in the
CNN Washington bureau and also worked at CNN news headquarters in Atlanta.
709
710 FEIST
areas, it may simply be more cost-effective to use wireless transmission rather than
invest in the enormous infrastructure required to connect every home with hard tele-
phone lines. The impact of converging media technologies will be felt in all nations.
Even if every citizen is not online, virtually every community will be. Individual
communities, whether in the United States, in Europe, or in rural China, will be more
closely connected than ever before.
As technologies continue to converge, programs that are now available on broad-
cast, cable, and satellite television will soon be available on the Internet. In fact, most
American broadcasters already provide some low-resolution forms of their programs
on the Internet. Eventually, everyone with an Internet connection will have almost
universal access to the world’s television programs. People around the globe will be
able to watch the same newscast at the same time. National borders will be largely
irrelevant as far as reception of news images and information are concerned. Within
15 years, it is possible, if not likely, that television and the Internet may be one and
the same. Because of the nature of the Internet, it is virtually impossible for a gov-
ernment to successfully limit access to information via the Web.
stories. Today, news channels largely compete with wire services such as Reuters,
Agence France-Presse, and the Associated Press to break stories. The competition is
already fierce, and in the not too distant future, the competition will intensify. As
more Internet-based news organizations develop and newspapers place greater em-
phasis on Web sites, stories will break even more frequently throughout the day; po-
litical and military leaders will have even less time to respond. The 24-hour news
cycle has been replaced with a constant news cycle.
access. As people around the world become “connected,” they will also become in-
formed. Citizens living under even the most repressive regimes will know the details
of life in other countries. The days in which whole populations are limited to one or
two state-run channels are almost over. Soon, because of technology convergence,
dozens of channels in different languages will be available. Such availability leads to
exposure to diverse cultures, movies, news, and languages.
The new Syrian leader, Bashar Assad, has long promoted Internet services for his
people. He has called for “the Internet in every home” in Syria. Although the gov-
ernment has long controlled the flow of news and information to the Syrian people,
Assad has never proposed censoring or blocking access to the Internet. Assad’s
spokesman explained that because the Internet will soon be available by satellite, it
would be impossible for the government to block or limit access, even if the govern-
ment had such a goal.7 For the first time, Syrians will have access to unfiltered news
and information from around the world. What has been a relatively closed society
will instantly become more open and connected to the rest of the world.
Some believe that a world more interconnected through trade, culture, and com-
munication is an inherently safer one. According to that theory, a country with exten-
sive economic and cultural ties would not risk the economic harm and cultural
upheaval that would result from hostile military actions. If it is true that this intercon-
nectedness creates a safer world, then globalization of the media would contribute to
that safety. The development of the global village, however, hardly eliminates con-
flict. There were those who theorized that greater international trade and international
contact after the turn of the 20th century would reduce the likelihood of war or elimi-
nate it altogether. Clearly, they were wrong. Others see globalization and expanded
access to the media as a destabilizing force, at least temporarily. Whether it be Rus-
sia, Indonesia, or Yugoslavia—access to the global media and the Internet can con-
tribute to the undermining of a government by empowering opposition groups and by
fomenting unrest among the people.
Converging communications technologies can also provide a platform for inter-
nal dissent and for protest groups. The riots and demonstrations at the World Trade
Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle in late 1999 were largely organized over the
Internet. Before that, in 1998, protesters successfully disrupted a meeting of the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which was work-
ing toward completion of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment in Paris.8 That
conference was suspended not only because of street protests largely organized on
the Internet, but also because of a coordinated campaign by activists to overload the
negotiators with critical information, complaints, and Internet-based protests from
many directions.9 To respond to such challenges, governments and multilateral or-
ganizations must be even better prepared for protests and for a barrage of conflicting
information—all designed to scuttle the work of these bodies. Because it allows peo-
ple to organize and communicate in relative anonymity, the Internet is an excellent
organizational tool, particularly when a regime stifles public dissent and opposition.
This is a prime example of how globalization and technology can be destabilizing
factors within a nation-state.
FACING DOWN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE 715
Nevertheless, a more interconnected world can be only good for the spread of
democracy in the long run. A recent A.T. Kearney study noted that rapidly globaliz-
ing countries enjoyed significantly expanded political and civil liberties.10 A popula-
tion that is informed about the value and benefits of democracy is more difficult to
suppress. Pro-democracy leaders can use the technology of the Internet to communi-
cate and connect with one another. They can access the global news media to gain
reliable information about their country and about the outside world. Free and open
media also benefit democracy by helping to expose corruption in a government or in
an economic system. Furthermore, any nation that attempts to cut off its population
from the Internet risks economic isolation, as the global economy is becoming more
and more dependent on e-commerce. Even old-economy companies now rely on the
Internet to do business. International markets react to world events on a minute-by-
minute basis.
To survive economically, developing countries will be pressured to bridge the
digital divide or risk falling further behind. Once media convergence is complete,
anyone doing business in the global economy will also have access to global media,
including the BBC, Voice of America, The New York Times, the Cartoon Network,
and MTV. It is not possible to limit one without restricting access to the other.
As recently as the war in Kosovo, an opposition radio station in Belgrade, B–92,
continued to operate—even after the Milosevic regime shut down its transmitters. B–92
received millions of hits per day on its Web site after the transmitter was turned off.11
Serbs were not the only beneficiaries of B–92 resilience. The international media regu-
larly relied on information gathered by its reporters and used its Web site as a source
for what was happening inside Serbia.
The Kosovo war also demonstrated how the Internet will be a critical source of
information for actors on all sides of future wars. News organization Web sites such
as [Link], MSNBC, [Link], and [Link] offered exten-
sive coverage of the war. They also provided links to nongovernmental organiza-
tions’ Web sites, to B–92, and to official Yugoslav government and NATO sites.
Citizens in Kosovo and Serbia became reporters themselves by posting letters and
emails of first-person accounts of the war.12 The U.S.-based media regularly transmit-
ted those first-person accounts over broadcast and cable television networks. The
United States and NATO regularly cited these accounts as evidence of atrocities by
the Serb regime. The media’s global village was clearly in full operation.
Impact on Diplomacy
Direct diplomacy, too, is being dramatically changed by the expansion of the
global media. No longer does communication between governments rely on the filter
of professional diplomats. On November 14, 1998, for example, President Clinton
authorized an attack on Iraq because of its continued defiance of the United Nations
(UN) resolutions. After U.S. planes had been dispatched to attack Iraq, an official
told a CNN reporter in Baghdad that Iraq would comply with UN demands and that a
fax to the UN Secretary General was forthcoming. U.S. officials monitoring CNN
quickly briefed the President, and with literally minutes to go before missiles were
launched, the attack was aborted. No diplomat-to-diplomat communications took
716 FEIST
place. Iraq agreed to the U.S. terms essentially by informing CNN. ABC News an-
chor Peter Jennings says that “the idea of having calm and contemplation with di-
plomacy went out the window with globalization in the media.”13
Former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott tells of being on the telephone
with Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister during the 1993 attempted Russian coup.
During their conversation, Talbott says, both men fell silent while watching pictures
of Russian commandos storming the parliament building. Both diplomats then real-
ized that they were watching the same television image on CNN. They discussed the
significance of the event in real time.14 In this instance, the broadcast available
around the world helped create a diplomatic opportunity, binding two officials during
a political crisis. In coming years, as technology makes news gathering and satellite
transmission easier, almost every crisis will be visible live around the world.
Only a fool expects the authorities to tell him what the news is.
— Russell Baker16
Technology is changing the way that the media cover the world and the way that
people all around the world are receiving the media. If pictures are already powerful
today, then the power of pictures can only increase as more pictures become available
to more people. Whether the CNN effect has a minimal impact or a dramatic impact on
policy, one thing is certain: the more often images of human misery are broadcast, the
more likely U.S. policymakers will have to decide whether to take action.
The CNN effect is controversial, but it is useful to examine how some in and out
of government view the power of a heart-wrenching picture. Former President
George Bush tells how the decision to commit U.S. troops to Somalia came after he
and Mrs. Bush saw pictures of starving children on television; he says he telephoned
his national security team and said, “Please come over to the White House. . . . We
can’t watch this anymore. You’ve got to do something.”17 Why did Bush act?
Whether officials take action because of actual demands by the public, because of
perceived demands by the public, or because of a personal reaction to a television
image, when the United States acts in part because of poignant images, the CNN ef-
fect is operating. Andrew Natsios, the Assistant Administrator for the U.S. Agency
for International Development during the Bush administration, claims to have delib-
erately used the news media to get the attention of policymakers in Washington.18
Here, a government official used the media to reach his own bosses in the govern-
ment, attempting to generate an American response to the crisis in Somalia. Natsios
was certainly successful at attracting additional media attention to Somalia. That me-
dia attention, he says, helped encourage civilian and military leaders to take action.
President Bush’s statement mentioned earlier suggests that Natsios’s strategy may
have been entirely effective.
FACING DOWN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE 717
By providing the media with powerful pictures of human despair, groups and
governments can help encourage other governments to act. For example, when Sad-
dam Hussein’s army pushed the Kurds into the mountains of Southern Turkey in
1991, the Turkish government allowed television cameras and satellite dishes into
those areas, which were not normally open to outsiders. The images were powerful;
they showed the Kurds freezing, dying, and living in horrid conditions.19 The images
certainly contributed to the international response, which included humanitarian aid
and the military protection of Operation Provide Comfort.20 Similarly, television im-
ages recorded by a freelance cameraman documenting the siege of the Bosnian town
of Srebrenica in 1993 have been credited with pressuring the international commu-
nity to respond. Even though the United States, Britain, and France were, at the time,
opposed to safe havens for Bosnian Muslims, television pictures had such an impact
on other UN members that the Security Council authorized safe areas.21 As collection
and transmission of such images become easier and less expensive, the likelihood
that the images will trigger a response increases.
Powerful pictures can also give policymakers much needed support for an exist-
ing policy. The troubling images of the 1994 Sarajevo market bombing caused inter-
national outrage and may have given the Clinton administration an important tool in
its efforts to persuade NATO to act. Then White House Press Secretary Dee Dee
Myers says, “Here the images helped the Clinton administration move the policy
forward and it was successful.”22 After the market bombing, the administration per-
suaded NATO to declare an area around Sarajevo a safe zone, free of Serb heavy
weapons. Thus, a tragic picture was used to advance a particular policy.
A reason for the lack of consensus on the CNN effect is that powerful television
images of human tragedies have not consistently led to U.S. action. Media images
certainly helped precipitate action in the cases of the Kurds in 1991, Somalia in 1992,
Sarajevo in 1994, and Kosovo in 1999. But there are just as many examples of
equally horrifying pictures with no U.S. military response: Bosnia in 1992, Rwanda
in 1994, Burundi in 1996, Sierra Leone in 1998, Chechnya and East Timor in 1999.
The bottom line is that pictures are powerful and can help justify action, but it is far
from certain that powerful images alone will lead to U.S. action. There will always
be other factors involved. For example, there is general consensus that despite horri-
fying pictures out of Chechnya in 1999, the United States would not and could not
intervene militarily because it would not be in the U.S. interest to engage the Russian
military. The CNN effect simply suggests that powerful images will put pressure on
the United States to intervene, but will by no means guarantee U.S intervention.
Gelpi postulate that the government officials did not act because of a public outcry—
but rather they acted because of a perceived public outcry.23 Feaver and Gelpi ana-
lyzed interviews with almost 5,000 Americans, including senior military officers, and
found that the public’s tolerance for American casualties far exceeded the expecta-
tions of policymakers. They suggest that the foreign policy community generally be-
lieves that U.S. citizens demand zero casualties, while in reality, the public demands
no such thing.
Other scholars who have examined the CNN effect and the public’s tolerance for
casualties have also concluded that the public actually has a far higher tolerance than
officials think it has.24 Many in the media (and many high-level officials as well) are
convinced that the public is entirely casualty-averse. BBC reporter Nik Gowing, who
has examined this phenomenon for Harvard’s Kennedy School and for the Carnegie
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, debunks the conventional wisdom and
argues that a “political paranoia” exists with respect to the possibility of casualties.
Gowing and others note that casualty-aversion can be significantly reduced by politi-
cal preparation of the public in advance of military action and by general bipartisan
approval of the mission.25 This finding puts additional pressure on U.S. officials to
more clearly articulate a sound policy rationale for military action before casualties
appear in the newspapers or on television. An extreme aversion to casualties on the
part of policymakers not only can pressure them to withdraw but also can pressure
them to change their conduct of a war. Many believe that an aversion to casualties
hindered NATO ability to prosecute the air war in Kosovo and ultimately put thou-
sands of innocent civilians at risk. It was widely reported that bombing runs were
almost always conducted from 15,000 feet or more in order to protect NATO pilots.26
While pilots may have been protected, the accuracy of the bombing missions was
reduced, and the potential for mistakes was greatly increased. The CNN effect helps
to exaggerate the problem because officials fear that the media will report extensively
on each casualty and will broadcast image after image of any captured or downed
American pilot. At the same time, globalization has assisted the news media in rap-
idly broadcasting images of civilian casualties that were caused, in part, by the aver-
sion of political and military leaders to incurring American casualties.
critical component in the decision to take action. One way or another, the image has
an impact.
There is a constant danger that the United States will utilize its military to ad-
dress humanitarian concerns at the expense of other vital security concerns. Former
Defense Secretary William Perry and former Assistant Secretary Ashton Carter have
analyzed threats to U.S. security and have divided the threats into three categories. At
the top of their hierarchy is their A list, which includes threats to national survival,
such as the nuclear threat from the former Soviet Union. In the middle, the B list, are
threats such as those mounted by North Korea and Iraq. At the bottom, the C-list
threats are other potential conflicts that do not directly threaten U.S. vital interests,
such as those in Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti.28 Perry and Carter’s
former DOD colleague Joseph Nye argues that their C list dominates the media atten-
tion in the Information Age and, therefore, diverts attention from A-list strategic is-
sues. Nye suggests that the media’s focus on the C list may cause the United States to
overreach and be ill prepared for any major crisis that threatens vital interests.29 This,
of course, is one of the key potential dangers of the CNN effect.
the troops and, for much of the war, reported a relatively sanitized view. The Johnson
administration had a great deal of influence over the news bosses during the Vietnam
conflict.31 Today, news organizations are unlikely to support a war effort in unscruti-
nizing ways. CNN Chairman Tom Johnson told Brill’s Content, “We have to take off
our hats as Americans when we are journalists. . . . I cannot be an extension of any
government.”32 Part of this results from post-Vietnam skepticism; part, from the
development of the international marketplace for news. Networks with a clearly pro-
American bias cannot compete as easily for viewers around the world. Johnson says
that while CNN will not air reports of secret troop movements, the network would
also not air reports of secret movements “by any government if it would jeopardize
any combatants.”33 The point is that the media, even U.S.-based media, are not neces-
sarily on the side of the United States.
The Kosovo conflict raised another issue that is potentially troubling. Many jour-
nalists and military analysts were extremely skeptical about the information that they
received from the Pentagon and from NATO during the war. General Bernard Trai-
nor, a highly decorated retired Marine and a regular analyst for television networks
and The New York Times, said, “The media manipulation finally got so transparent
that I didn’t believe anything [NATO Spokesman] Jamie Shea and [Pentagon
Spokesman] Ken Bacon had to say.”34 One Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist called
the briefings “baloney-laden.”35 Journalists’ fears about press briefings during the
Kosovo war turned out to be well founded. While NATO briefers claimed during the
war, for example, that 120 Serb tanks had been destroyed, a post-war Air Force study
revealed only 14 tanks destroyed.36 Episodes such as this can quickly erode the trust
between the media and the Pentagon.
The danger for the U.S. military that occurs when the media lose faith in the offi-
cial spokespeople is that the media will strike out on their own in search of the story.
Most in the media already believe that journalists should be out digging up the facts
on their own without depending on military spokespeople. Nevertheless, as long as
the spokespeople have the trust of the journalists, the journalists are more likely to
feel pressures to toe the party line. Again, because journalists, particularly television
journalists, are newly enabled by technology to travel lightly, more of them will be
behind the lines digging for a story and broadcasting video from places heretofore
rarely seen in wartime. While such reporting probably benefits the public’s right to
know, it is likely to complicate the mission of the U.S. military. First, journalists are
in danger of becoming casualties themselves. Second, journalists doing their own
reporting will probably not be reporting the Pentagon message of the day. They will
report what they see. Had there been many journalists in Kosovo during 1999, they
would have reported that Serb positions were not damaged to the extent suggested by
NATO. The media may have learned an important lesson during the Kosovo conflict,
and it is likely that the next time, many news organizations will think twice about
reporting a war from the comfort of a briefing room.
Television pictures during the time of conflict can be useful to the U.S. military
as sources of immediate information. Certainly, CNN presence inside Iraq during the
Persian Gulf War provided U.S. commanders with confirmation of their successful
bombing operations. In later U.S. strikes on Iraq, CNN reporters were again able to
FACING DOWN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE 721
broadcast immediate information about the attacks. During the Kosovo conflict, there
was no question that Serbs had found the downed U.S. Stealth fighter when Serb
television pictures of the wreckage were broadcast on all American networks simul-
taneously only minutes after the story of a possible downed jet had leaked. For better
or for worse, the White House first learned that Russian troops had taken control of
the Pristina Airport in Kosovo by watching the Russians live on CNN and MSNBC.
There are times when the media will provide faster and better information to civilian
and military leaders than the military itself will provide. It is no accident that virtu-
ally every computer in the operations center of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
has a window open showing CNN. But this valuable immediate information should
not be confused with accurate intelligence and analysis. The media do an excellent
job of reporting what is happening now. They do not do a particularly good job of
predicting the future. The media failed to predict India and Pakistan’s nuclear tests,
and they failed to predict Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. In fact, most jour-
nalists would not consider predictions to be a proper role for news organizations. The
media’s strength is in reporting, not in analyzing events or in predicting the future.
The globalization of the media creates another strategic opportunity for the
United States—the projection of “soft power.” Soft power has been explained as the
ability to attract citizens of other countries through cultural and ideological appeal in
order to connect with and influence them.37 Joseph Nye argues that massive flows of
cheap information have expanded the number of contacts across national borders, and
the United States is in the best position to make use of such power.38 American tele-
vision networks and Web sites can be powerful instruments of democracy. The Inter-
net has the potential to penetrate a repressive or closed society far more effectively
than, for example, Radio Liberty or the Voice of America does today. During times
of conflict and times of peace, the United States will benefit if the citizens of its ad-
versaries have access to international media broadcasts, Web sites, and newspapers.
The same technological changes that make it difficult for repressive regimes to
stop the information flow into their countries will also make it difficult for the United
States to stop those regimes from broadcasting propaganda to its people. During the
Kosovo war, NATO Commander Wesley Clark ordered the bombing of Serb televi-
sion transmitters to prevent the enemy from broadcasting its propaganda to its people.
The bombing largely knocked Serb television off the air and made it more difficult
for Slobodan Milosevic to communicate with his people. In the new media world,
however, blowing up a television transmitter will not stop the information flow. Even
during the Kosovo conflict, Serb Web sites sprang up with official and quasi-official
information. In order to stop the information flow, at the current time, the United
States would have to destroy the telephone system because it is through the telephone
system that people get their Internet connections today. However, in the very near
future, satellite-based Internet connections and wireless Internet connections will be
common, so it is likely to become very difficult for any single military actor to suc-
cessfully disconnect a country’s population from the Internet. The United States will
not be able to disconnect a population from the Internet with a surgical strike. The
Internet, in fact, was designed to survive a nuclear attack. From the perspective of the
United States, the advantage of propaganda in the Internet Age is that if a repressed
722 FEIST
population can receive “official” propaganda from their government, then they will
also have access to thousands of other information sources. On the Internet, all
propaganda must compete equally with other sources for the hearts of the people.
The technology advances that will connect remote peoples to the Internet are the
same advances that will help television journalists beam more and more pictures of
humanitarian crises from the most remote locations. Pictures of human misery alone,
however, should not be enough to precipitate a U.S. response. As discussed earlier,
civilian and military leaders appear to be influenced by such images far more so than
the American public. With a global media, there will be more such pictures. It is sim-
ply not possible for the United States to respond each time as the Clinton Doctrine in
its purest form might require. The global media will continue to fill the airwaves with
images that demand action to resolve Perry and Carter’s C-list crises (minor threats
with only indirect impact on security). This is the essence of the CNN effect. The
media are not likely to heavily cover the A-list stories until a major conflict is virtu-
ally under way. Policymakers must remember that the news media do not necessarily
reflect national interests. The news media today have a global audience with global
interests. U.S. officials must be careful to make certain that the images put forth by
the global media do not cause the C-list crises to take priority over the A-list threats
simply because the former are in the news.
The other lesson to be drawn from a discussion of the CNN effect is that the pub-
lic appears far more willing to accept casualties than are the leaders. If the public has
been psychologically prepared for a conflict—if the goal, mission, and risks have
been adequately explained—then the public will likely be willing to accept casual-
ties, even if the images of the casualties appear on television. The disconnect between
the public’s perceived aversion to casualties and the public’s actual aversion to casu-
alties is worthy of additional exploration and study.
The media do an excellent job of reporting what is happening now. The media do
not do such a good job of predicting the future. One reason that the C-list crises at-
tract so many headlines is that the journalists can grasp onto something. The media
can show pictures of starving children and report on the tragedy befalling them. Jour-
nalists have a much more difficult time predicting an imminent nuclear arms race on
the Subcontinent, for example. Officials should not fall into the trap of relying on the
media to predict the future as well as it reports on the present. Some who advocate a
reduction in funds for U.S. intelligence gathering have suggested that with CNN, why
does the United States need a CIA? The media are only an effective intelligence tool
to provide information on what happened yesterday and what happened today—not
what is likely to happen tomorrow. This makes the media relatively unreliable part-
ners in intelligence gathering.
The media will, however, remain critical partners in the spread of ideas and in-
formation. As the print and broadcast media transform themselves over the next few
years, the impact will be felt by everyone, in all areas of society, in all parts of the
globe. Globalization is changing the media, and the Internet is where these changes
will manifest themselves. The Internet is a powerful weapon for those seeking to ad-
vance U.S. interests. That weapon can benefit and harm U.S. security interests. Effec-
tive U.S. leadership in the future will require an understanding of the consequences
of globalization plus a bold media and Internet strategy that will put these new tools
to their most productive use. à